TRUTH and PEACE HONESTLY PLEADED, AND RIGHTLY SOUGHT FOR: OR, A Loyal Subjects Advice. VSEFVLLTo 

CONFIRM HONEST  
CONVINCE IGNORANT  
CALM PASSIONATE  
Condemn Malicious   Men. BY A True Lover OF GOD And King CHARLES.  
Printed 1642.   

A PLEA FOR TRUTH, AND MOTIVES FOR QVIET.  
To the Reader,  
MIght these Motives, though undressed, unset of, as running out in haste (like those Sabine Women, (too like in weakness) in Rome's infancy, with disshevelled hair, throwing themselves as interposers between their Parents and husbands, now on point of a bloody Encounter concerning them) contribute a little to turn some of those Arms upon passion, and mistakes, now ready extended, for blows into embraces: and those embraces again into blows, from both reunited on the heads of the infernal Authors, of these disunions, and the moneys and munition sent to embroile us in civil wars, not without good interest or grateful acknowledgement of our own, on the senders heads, and so might England and his Excellency grow both young again, in a second journey for the Palatinate; these our stirs proving but as trainings for such a service. But to draw nearer; to breviate the case well by reducing it all (if possible) to one point issuable, had been the next way to judge well of it, whereas much dilating, whilst it would explain, confounds weak judgements (and such are most) as too many acquaint divisions, questions, and affectation of Method intended to clear, darken: But since this Pamphet, coming out in haste, as its imperfection shows, wants this advantage, as others. The judicious Reader (if any such will read it) may in the perusing cast the chief points, which are not many, into a narrower posture, fit to judge upon, whether the inferences held, or rather, since it may deserve no such pains, he or any may abstract or take notice, if any particular point chance to present itself, that may any way serve the truth, or them that love it.  

THe principal point in which the others seem to be contained, as the effect in the cause, the future oak in the acome, may be this. If a King having his Prerogative bounded by Laws, Liberties, Privileges, etc. misled, and seduced by those about him, striving to make him absolute, whom they hope absolutely to make use of, (or rather to speak in a more reverend phrase) if such men as the principal agents, perverting his good intentions, and abusing the royal name and authority, as their instrument, or possibly the Prince himself misled by his own passions or mistakes, or assuming arbitrary government, endeavour, and act, and by a continued tenor or drift of his Counsels, designs, actions, (notwithstanding fitting Remonstrances made to the contrary) persist in the pursuit of things dangerous and pernicious to the people's religion, liberty, property, privileges, laws, or suffer others to do such things, contrary to the original intent, end, and trust of the first institutors of such a Monarchy, & not according to the contracts and conditions at his Coronation, being for the good and happiness of the people, and consequently for the preservation of the said particulars: and if the King afterwards desert, oppose, frustrate the public Counsel of the Kingdom, the Parliament going about (after it hath in vain sought remedy at his hands) to suppress the further growth of and to remedy such public mischiefs and dangers, grown through long want of due calling that good & great Counsel; and moreover, if the Prince after all may and doth convert the power of the people itself, to back still and carry on these designs and compass these ends, and the people be remediless: then, besides the unreasonableness of the premises inconsistent in themselves, and other gross absurdities that thereon follow, the condition of a free Nation is worse than that of a most miserable slave.  
For first, being before in a free and happy estate every way, it must bring itself into servitude, and each man make one another mutually, and those he holds dearest and his Country itself slaves, and must expose his own life, that he may take the lives of whosoever refuseth slavery (if much rather all be not already or before slaves, if bound to do, and suffer such things, at the pleasure or discretion of the Prince, or rather of those about him.)  
Secondly, besides thus each man being one another's mutually, and all their countries' executioners, each must be bound to expose all he hath, and his life as much as in him lieth, to procure or advance the means of damnation of those he holds dearest, nay of innumerable others, and of himself (Religion being part of the case.) Thus whereas it seems sufficient to the constitution of a slave, not to have power to dispose of himself, or of what he hath in a passive way only: In this case men must be positively active against themselves.  
Thirdly and lastly, a whole Nation cannot fly, or run away from a condition so miserable, and by any other means unavoidable, as a particular slave may.  
More might be said in this point, but what needed thus much, were not their Judgements with whom we deal as turbulent as the waters they have troubled; which sort a possibility of delusion, that yet may partly hoodwink them, must distinguish from the other part among them, whom malice hath made utterly reason, and religion proof; and therefore their senses, whose souls seem nothing else, are to be dealt with in another method.  
But to the point; the premises and consequence being utterly absurd, inconsistent, contradictory, against reason and nature, Princes being instituted for the people's happiness, and so rather publici servi, as regnum splendida servitus: and since there is provision against the danger of the minority of a Prince, who can be only positively ill, it being à fortiori reasonable, that it should not be wanting against the peril from such a Prince, as we propound, who by means of a greater maturity and authority, may concur more actively, and consequently more perniciously to the greatest evil, the people in our case, if or when the King makes such attempts in reason cannot be without means of remedy. It were perhaps so were a King instituted in an immediate miraculous extraordinary manner by God himself, than a lower power could not disannul the act of the higher; or perhaps there were colour, if the people itself had absolutely given or entrusted itself to the power or Provision of the Prince at the first institution, or framing of the Monarchy. But with us the laws, customs, privileges, power, and use of Parliaments etc. argue, or rather are limitations, restrictions, conditions, or reservations made upon the original trust, commission, or delegation from the people, or after upon occasion, which it keeps in its own power, or reserves to itself, as the supreme resort for extraordinary emergents. Not let any think that the King having taken his oath for the keeping himself within his bounds, or for the observing the laws, liberties, privileges, or the like, that he is hereupon only left to God and his conscience, and the people without humane remedy, if he exorbitate; for they ought not to presume, but to prove strongly (if they could) this, which were for the disadvantage of the people so mainly, for whose good all was intended at the first institution of the Monarchy; and the people's happiness ought to be rather favoured and preferred in the interpretation of a doubtful matter (were this such) as assuredly according with the first institutors' intention; and I think it is not so apparent (if it be apparent at all) that the King is so left to God only, as it is that the safety and happiness of the people is Lex suprema, and the end of all, which is out of doubt; and therefore by this tye of an oath, and all other fitting ties, power, and means also intended to be procured, and secured; and all oft little enough (though such power is unless upon necessity not only not to be exercised, but also to be kept as secret, as may be, that the Prince's authority in as much as it may make for the good of the people, may be kept up.) And perhaps the oath the people hath taken to the King, especially as the people is represented in Parliament, may (respecting at this time this reason only) infer as well on the people's side, that it is left to God only thereupon, and so supreme in point of judgement and power: but allowing, or rather understanding truly such power to be in the people, and from it in the Parliament (as hereafter may further appear we are to do) is not this way the people's liberty, rights, happiness, safer and better assured, together with the King's just power or prerogative, since the Parliament is not capable (could it be willing) to usurp upon either (as after may be showed) then imagining such supreme power to be invested in the King, either the people's right or the King's just power itself can be; seeing no man will deny but Kings are subjects capable of arbitrary or tyrannical power, oft times willing and giving the attempt, and sometimes actually prevailing. So, if the framers of this Monarchy had intended such paramount power should be still in the King, and that in such extraordinary emergents as now appear in England, they had been more solicitous of, and provided better far for one means of divers ordained to an end, then for the very end itself, the people's happiness, which they had left still depending dangerously on one man's conscience, or will, as it should at any time happen to change, when so sure and safe a provision offered itself elsewhere, (as before is partly touched) and had preferred the means before the end: and so do all the desperate malignants, and the disorderers of our times & State, which is retrograde to reason: others may better ensorce this point touching the intent of the first institution, and add express authorities perhaps out of the Laws to this end, or the practice of Parliaments in such times (if such have ever before been) or otherwise proceed by analogy and good consequences of reason.  
If it be said, that by such a provision of remedy for the people in danger, as abovesaid, a dangerous precedent of disobeying, and weakening the King's authority is introduced, which may work even danger of dissolution of the Monarchy. Admitting but not granting, that upon such a precedent, once made, upon an extraordinary cause, and that by an orderly way (and which once done may well prevent all suture need of making any more such precedents) admit such a danger even to the Monarchy followed thereupon (which yet will not be made good in our present case, as after will appear) then here now is the point. Among divers forms of government, whereby a people may be governed, that it may be happy, which is the end and aim of every such form, this Nation chose one particular one, which it judged fittest to compass that end (as indeed Monarchy duly tempered is the best, but distempered by tyranny the worst, the advantage of union, or unitive power, which it hath above other forms strengthening to evil, when it degenerates, as it did to good, whilst it stood incorrupt) but if this objection were of weight it would follow, that it were more rational, that the people's felicity, which is the supreme end, to which all good forms of government are ordained and tend, should rather suffer, than a particular form or fashion of government, of which there are choice, and any of which are but one means, or way to compass that end if it continue incorrupt, but if corrupted to destroy the end: and so one means to the end, nay in our case a means if not rectified wholly to frustrate the end, should be preferred before the end itself, which it ought only to serve, nor can it be said the remedy were worse than the disease; for what remedy can be so ill, as that disease; a free, a glorious, a noble Nation to fall to servitude spiritual and temporal from a long enjoyed Liberty in both kinds, and ourselves the instruments? though to go on in such a case, the remedy might not prove so ill, or difficult, if men would pay obedience duly there where reason tells them they own it; And should there be no such remedy for the people, or for conservation of the frame of the government the constitution of this Monarchy, which the King declareth he admireth so much, were most deficient in the most principal point of all namely, the defending and preserving itself, the very foundation and groundwork, as the end of all, otherwise provisions orders, Laws, without which what were they but folly and fantasy? Nay were not the folly of the first institution rather to be as much admitted (as raising an instrument utterly unfit for the purpose it was meant for) had it left the main end of all, that is, the people's safety, liberty, happiness in such a case as ours, without all possible, nay without any provision express or employed by common intendment, or analogy of reason, or rule of Law, though the true, the natural, the best, or the only provision, or remedy to keep Prince and people in their due temper, were so at hand, so facile, so offering itself, and if not before usual, yet used possibly at the very time of such an institution, and for that very purpole, namely, a Parliament or other meeting of the like nature, without provision, I say, against the greatest public mischief of all, that ultimum malum Reipublicae (as divine Plato terms it) arbitrary power, or tyranny, and that a mischief, so likely to happen; more, so oft attempted, nay actually happening. But he that implores force (not now to speak of what is pretended herein by words) and that though but to resist the orders of that power, whose part alone it is to remedy the people in our case, doth in fact deny that this Monarchy hath made such provision, or hath that power so necessary to help and descend itself, or that the people in this case is remediable, for by such having recourse to force or war, though but defensive, he challengeth and assumeth all the power from the people to himself, making himself supreme Judge of all upon the last resort, of which somewhat more shortly. But the King cannot be so in our present case, in which he is a party in as much as the evil proceeds from ill counsel prevailing with him; For to bring the hypothesis to a Thesis, and not to stand always on supposition taking it as a supposition) that a king seduced may, de facto, make such attempts as are above put, it is more evident of itself then that we need look on the fall of Liberty in France; if not from the King, nor Counsel, about him consequently, then whence is the remedy for our loss? from the Judges? what ever their will may be they want power, and notwithstanding they still were present the mischief grew on: It must be then from the two Houses of Parliament only (unless you would have the whole Nation assemble personally, as in the Vale of Jehosaphat, if you suppose it possible, and if possible fit for any thing but confusion, except perhaps force) the king having (to speak with what reverence we can) in this case excluded himself, and the Clergy justly being excluded, from such temporal distractions, that it may attend the better and advance the celestial, and ecclesiastic, more than enough to take up the ablest men wholly, and not a little hindered and discredited by their so great greediness after worldly matters: let them do their duty, let them teach truly, live exemplarily, like professors of mortification, this will render the people so devoted to religion, to them, that they may securely trust the Parliament with all that touches them, and safely make it their proxy, themselves being absent; and whilst thus spiritual matters are the better served and attended, these, and the temporal both receive the greater blessing: but such diffidence and suspicion in the Clergy (if it should not be present in Parliament) argues ill deserving, since the justice and wisdom of the Parliament, as principles of this government ought not to be questioned: but how much more is the Clergy to receive at the hands of the Parliament, that fuora, i. preti, i.e. Priests void the room, used by that Council in Venice, of which Bodin in the third book De republicâ, the 3. Chapter, then, when they shall be found in life and doctrine unsound, ill affected to the public good, accessary to the evil to be remedied, nay ardent to bring in, or maintain either Papistry, and idolatry, or at least a most scandalous symbolising with it in temporal pride, riches and greatness, and even Antichristian domination through the breaches and ruins of their Country, rather than even a Parliament shall question it. The Parliament then, and under this notion of the two Houses in these times understood, being our only remedy, or rather Physician, it follows it may and is to be Judge of the danger or disease, and that of power which is to remedy if it be so, is to try whether it be so; for without judgement or knowledge of the disease how can there be remedy? or how shall the Physician know, what, when and how to apply? If it be the only competent Judge of this our dangerous disease, and of the means to meet with, or expel it (the knowledge of the remedy depending essentially upon the knowledge of the Malady, and receiving thence its Judications) it hath consequently power to execute, or act, or cause to be executed or acted, what it hath, or shall judge or ordain necessary for the cure, else such power to judge were vain, and it would still return that the people were remediless. But WISDOM or Judgement and POWERS as they are divine co-incidents, and all one really and naturally where they are supreme, and essential as in the Divine nature, it being but our weakness of understanding to conceive them disjoined so (for principles of one faculty questioned are to be enforced from an higher faculty) even in this supreme power on earth (which as fare as frail mortality can bear imitates, and represents that above) they ought not to be by us apprehended separate, but mutually presupposing or inferting one the other. Let as add to make up this terrestrial trinity; Goodness, which last may be understood in our present case, a doing no unjust, or dishonourable thing, but wholly intending the public good, according to the people's trust. And it were an arch heresid in the policy of this Monarchy to disjoin in out belief or opinion, the third from the two former. And the Law saying, no dishonourable thing is to be conceived of the Parliament, it seems all one as to have said in other terms, that it is the supreme Judge of the last resort (and that even without the king, if he hath excluded himself as above, which is more than if he were far personally absent, or otherwise casually disenabled, and as much as if no king at all were for the time) where all appeals are to rest, and determine, all men to acquiesse, binding all from questioning what is there done; and infers the supreme power there to reside, as being the whole kingdom (in which it is radically and fundamentally by representation: such power to be exerted and used, when it judges necessary, and that (if the nature of the occasion so requires) with the suspension of the power of the supreme, ordinary Delegate, or Magistrate, during that parenthesis of state; for the kingdom having entrusted the Parliament with all it holds precious, the effect of the Commission upon the matter being, that it provide ne quid respublica detrimenti capiat, it hath consequently trusted it with its power, which is the supreme, that it may be enabled to perform and execute the trust, when it judgeth, this cannot be made good, without using that power. But to return; the Law saith also, That the King can do, or doth no wrong but it denieth not, but ill Counsel about him may: or perhaps the Law intends the king as he is in his great Counsel, where he is as Shall in Leone, or any Planet (as they say) in his proper house; of fare greater virtue and power, than otherwise. But however, Reason tells us, that a Prince or a few of his Cabinet counsel, may far more easily err in judgement, or possibly in point of will, than the multitude of a Parliament (so many whereof are selected out of the whole Kingdom by the people) in point of Judgement, much more of will, or well willing to the public (whereof themselves are so great a part): and this much the rather, in that it is to be feared, that oftentimes, those privadoes of the Prince, finding out cunningly the Princes will, inclination, or humour, before they advise, and, further to ingratiate themselves, seconding it, much that there is agitated, becomes to be upon the matter the judgement or will but of the Prince alone.  
Well, I hope we are now come safe to this pass, that the Parliament may and aught in our case to defend the people or kingdoms rights, use the people's power which is the supreme, (as others have proved to clear passionate men, rather than to satisfy any judicious man, who will not require proofs in a point plain enough of itself) ever resident in the people, and so in the Parliament, though dormient, till it be by the Parliament thought fit to be wakened, which should it not now be done, such a seeming-secure, and supine sleep might have proved a mortal lethargy. But here these Sophisters think to enter upon us, and to take the benefit of their own wrong, for seeing they have brought the Kingdom to this pass, that unless the Parliament take the power of the kingdom into the kingdoms or its own hands, it cannot defend itself, or the kingdom's rights, or rather rescue them; they would cunningly prepare those, whom they intent to make slaves, by first making them such fools, as to believe, that the Parliament intends a change of the Monarchical form of government, and to oppress King and people by I know not what new kind of arbitrary tyrannical government. I believe the King and Parliament will soon be attoned, if any can show the Parliament by what other way it can discharge its trust and duty in this constitution of the times, without the power it hath assumed. But what if it shall appear (I should make scruple to use the word shall, as if it did not appear already without these weak offers, had we not to do with such as seem to have found our some new kind of reason, or having antiquated the old, which differenced man from irrational creatures, to have substituted passion, or idle fantasy in the room of it; the best method indeed for them afterward on as good or the same proportion of reason, to advance the power of the King into the place of the power of the whole people or Kingdom; it is their own manner of speech and practice as sound and good as their own Method, to make such distinction and difference betwixt King and kingdom) what if it shall appear, time bringing every day truth to light, and perhaps even to these men some allucida inter valla, that there is not the least probability, that the Parliament can have such a thought of usurpation, as these men would impose or seem to suppose; much less was it ever heard that any free Parliament, actually made any the least attempt to that effect, so far is it, that ever it effected it: Whereas on the other side, ill Counsel about Princes have attempted oft, and de facto, sometimes performed the turning of a well poised or tempered Monarchy, into an arbitrary tyrannical power and public oppression; by which change, such ill instruments appear the only gainers; and the malignant spleen swells in a miserable consumed body, the head not exempt, and yet the very swelling a dangerous disease even to the spleen itself at last. Unless such monstrous times did privilege, it were high presumption to think it were not all-sufficient to stop such mouths to say it is a Parliament, and it were dishonourable for it to do as they calumniate, and therefore not to be imagined. This maxim on ground being no more to be denied, or questioned in this Monarchy, then that the earth is round in natural Philosophy, as near as moral Philosophy may attive at natural in point of certitude: though should we grant them that a Parliament may err, nay do wrong to Prince, people, or particulars, yet that would not follow upon this which they would maliciously infer, and aim at for none but itself or another Parliament were to correct, or rectify what a Parliament should have done amiss, and not the King or any other persons any way whatsoever, much less by force or war; for he that is allowed to judge or correct, is allowed thereby at least an equal (if equality for such an intent can be conceived sufficient possibly): but such equality of power in two distinct Magistrates (for so we must distinguish King and Parliament here) of different natures, and touching one and the same point or matter in controversy, cannot be in one and the same state, than such a corrector must be allowed superior and the corrected subordinate, but such the King cannot be in our case, as above is partly showed, and shall be further afterwards. How then can lorce or war on his side for this cause be rational, and just? nay though it should be but defensive, much less if offensive, or inferred? Since even bate resisting the ordinances of the Parliament, is or presupposes an assuming of the supreme power to judge and condemn, such resistance being the execution of the sentence.  
But we shall not carry it away so easily that the Parliament will not be unjust to any, holding such power, strong temptations of profit corrupt: too oft, where one, or a few are ordinary Judges; as a little water standing sooner is putrified, but multitude of these Judges are like the Sea incorruptible: But moneys received, profits and emoluments accrueing, (it were a shame not without a certain mixture of presumption to insist on such base imputations here, had not frontless and monstrous malice been so incredibly audacious, as actually to raise them) may make a dividend sufficient to draw to some unjust act each man or the mayor part of such a multitude, very likely; and to draw the more matter of profit, we see how by frequent orders they invite private causes; and do they give any public account of the moneys they receive from the people, more than the Malignants could have done for Ship money? But we err; they give public account: but it is to get credit only with the people, that they may be in their sinister practices and machinations the less suspected, and better served: But stay; how can they have ill ends at all on foot or in agitation, since of all their particular actions and proceed, of most moment, from time to time, they by their Declarations, or the like, give no less then of the moneys an account to the world except they be evident of themselves? Should they do that they cannot give reason for, but such malicious vigilance, as we deal with, when it might in particulars charge them, and article against them upon truths, would never be driven to the base and miserable shifts of these generals, and the like most ridiculous impudent transparent calumnies for want of matter to work on; and did not the people see clearly, they have reason, and that their ends are merely the public good, it would desert them; losing patience upon the sense of the present evils, which (like the sickness, which, even the best physic, before it can induce a final settled state of health, works in a patiented, chief if disorders, during the cure, also foment the peccant humours) through the malignant traverses of our Calumniators, both people and Parliament are of necessity to pass through: and were it not so, though the King cannot dissolve the Parliament, yet the people possibly might recall their elections in each County, since the Parliament doth but populo volenti imperare; which if then it doth not do, what ever some few inconsiderable and inconsiderate particulars may have attempted here and there, it appears the major part at least approves what passeth, and that sufficeth: but let us take heed we traduce not these traducers; they have a more honourable conceit of the Parliament: it is not base profit only, but places of honour, such as are mentioned in their Propositions to the King, or the like they look at, and travail for: but there may be hope, that these that direct, correct the Parliament in all things, will here tell them, that they are out of their way, and that their nearest way had been to have complied with the King, which seeing these would seem to imagine the Parliament so unjust and dishonourable they need not doubt, they would follow: and by this course bringing in an arbitrary government; in which case (as before is said) the ill Counsellors, especially being authors or instruments of the change, carry away the advantage or the gain, and spoils of the people, those their places would be fare more imperious, absolute arbitrary on the oppressed people (we may instance in the Star-chamber) or more beneficial, as less obnoxious to strict syndications, than they can be the other way, they now hold; in every regard so accountable; the King in all presumption like to be eagerly vigilant over them; and these Malignants themselves, grown yet more malicious and venomous, if possible, by seeing the tables so turned, and what they have been thus enormously wicked to compass, possessed by those they hate, that may be the instruments to punish them for such their wickedness; besides the Parliaments ever hanging over their heads; and so highly interested in the demeanours of those they have made choice of; and perhaps the next Parliament may consist of other Members than this present doth, and so, as strangers to those so chosen, less subject to favour them, if this were any thing to satisfy the insatiate malice of those who under colour of seeming suspicious of the integrity of this Parliament, would through the sides of it, strike at the heart and authority of all future Parliaments: so upon the matter, by this course the Parliament now holds in such their propositions, the people and kingdom are like to be the only gainers, as these public mischiefs grew from ill Counselors and Officers. But have not some of the principal Worthies of this Parliament quitted or endangered places of greater moment (besides the general loss common I fear to the most or all of them through the neglect of their private affairs, whilst they are thus wholly taken up with the public) as their countries' confessors if not Martyrs, than they can any way expect by the course they hold? are not examples of such, as suffering themselves to be taken off from such services (on which they purposely seemed the more sharp, that they might be so taken off) have grown almost as much in greatness, thereby, as they lost in goodness, are not such instances as vulgar as the spirits that furnish us with them? More might be said and much better herein by better Judgements, but a weak one may suffice so strong a cause: there being good reason to be short and slight in an argument or point that could afford no just reason to have begun at all, did not such monsters of men urge it; Less can it be conceived that hope, intention, or fruition of uncontroulled dissolute licentiousness or pleasures, by means of the capacity they now stand in, or as they are a Parliament can be a motive to them to continue the power, or place they have, longer than the public necessity or good requires, or convert it to any other use than it for which they were and are by the people entrusted with such power, supposing they were no better than our Calumniators, that where there were a motive or cui bono it would prevail with them to do evil, had intention of such licentiousness been one of the principles that moved them, what meant they without any necessity not only to give public significations, that they meant to induce a strict reformation of manners, but even amid so great and dangerous distractions to begin to set it on foot, not without some further danger from those that hate it: As for any pleasures they may hereby pretend, they seem to be no other than their indeficient and admirable pains, dangers and indignities (let me add and base ingratitudes, a blessed condition to fain tears and dangers that they may continue in it) their noble constancy judging pro Deo & patria dulce periculum, for all which whereas it appears they have no earthly reward propounded to them (the like may be said of all those that adhere to the Parliament) but the conscience of having done nobly in serving God and their Country and defending it, did the Kingdom give what it could afford it were short of them, and it must be an higher kingdom that can indeed equal them and such a change of the kingdom, and no such as our Malignants would have us fear, they appear to aim at and affect; and could they would they aim at a tyranny for themselves, what need they have laid such a block in their own ways, as a voluntary oath generally taken for the conservation of the King's just authority, and so many Declarations and public protests to that purpose, which they desist not from upon all occasions yet to do, when as, had not their resolutions been thus fixed, divers free late declaring themselves to that effect, specially since matters of difference have arrived at this height, and the Parliament so strong, and so many other circumstances fitting, might have been forborn. But to leap over all these bars in imagination (for in Reason we never can) suppose the Parliament may effect a change of the Monarchy, what form of government could they bring in instead of it (for they will not say Anarchy, nor I deny a mixed government, for such is our Monarchy reduced to his right temper) Democracy? Then through perjury, great injustice, and danger, they pursue their own ruin: For Democracy where the people or multitude governs is enemy to the Nobility and Gentry, whereof chief or solely the Parliament consists, bringing all to a parity, and making all men alike in power, or rather taking away eminent persons quite, as envious or jealous of them; whereas such have privileges over the vulgar in a just Monarchy: What then doth the Parliament affect Aristocracy? (where the Nobility, or chief govern) but the multitude or people whom the Parliament hath been charged to court, in which multitude resides or consists the main strength, and who choose the Commons House, and must execute chief what the Parliament orders, without which their orders are nothing, after Democracy or Monarchy before Aristocracy: And doth not the Parliament (as above is said) from time to time give particular accounts of their actions to the world? doth there appear any previous preparing the way or disposing the people for such a change? which were necessary, were it intended? at least after so long a time, they would have begun to carry their design outward, and the people having found it, would more and more have fallen off: but we see the contrary, and the people every day more and more satisfied and assured of the integrity of their intents. But were the two Houses a subject possibly capable of Aristocracy, would the Lords of the upper House concur to it, which would reduce each of them to a parity in power with each Member of the House of Commons, as Democracy would equal them both with the multitude, for unless the Lords would lose by granting this, should the Commons get any thing (if this yet be any thing) by this imaginary if possible change?) yet how could they continue, or hold it without the consent of the multitude or people? And should the people unanimously concur to the erecting of this or any other form of government, who should oppose it? But how foolish were it for a people to fear that which can never be unless itself will? and the Parliament hath found it a long time strangely infatuated, insensible, unwilling to stir (till time and experience had given too good attestation to the Parliaments next to divine foresight) even when it hath made appear to them their own rights, liberties, and implored defence: and could the Parliament presume to find them to concur actively to an unjust and unreasonable thing, the erecting a new tyranny, not without great danger over themselves, contrary to the oaths and perpetual Protestations of the Parliament.  
And the Scots in the like occasion we see did not bring in any of these new governments: nay, were the Parliament possibly capable of such tyranny, yet it being in the hands of such a multitude, and that against the good will of the people, (for so we must here suppose) they were easily divided, and so the tyranny dissolved, especially there never wanting a minor part contrary to the rest, and contrariety being the cause of dissolution: but so were not a tyranny in the hands of one, and in him established by the good will of a potent faction of malignants: unity which chief makes a Monarchy, duly tempered the best form of government (as above was said) making the arbitrary or tyranny of one upon the same reason, as the worst of all, so most hardly dissolvible.  
We may add to all, that this Parliament having pressed for, and obtained triennial Parliaments, whereby their actions, and demeanours in this present Parliament, are subjected to frequent and certain examen, should or could they give cause, and that perhaps by Parliaments consisting of other members than these (not to speak of other accidents that may procure such a change) should the people not be satisfied with what these do in this present Parliament: it plainly argues, that out of the clearness of their intentions, actions, and consciences, they are content, nay desire to leave their actions to the censure of any: their persons, as concerning future elections, to the opinion of the people upon their demerits; if the King please not to come among them, and look to their do, as they desire: If then upon these reasons and much more that might be offered, the Parliament cannot have any such end of establishing in themselves any arbitrary tyranny, or of their own private emolument, with the hurt of their Countries; What can their aim be all this while but the public good, the just defence and asserting of their countries' rights and honour, by the just regulating and reducing the Monarchy to the due temper? which is all the change of the government they seem to affect (the same holds in all those that adhere to the Parliament, and in it desert not themselves) from which it had especially through want of due Parliaments exorbitated so dangerously, that had not this like another Moses been sent by our gracious God to redeem or rescue us rather than to defend us, and that with an outstretched arm, forcing the malignants to it, who as they ever shunned it by all means, now deadly hate it, as fearing it, and in that fear confessing tacitly, that same politic omnipotence of it, which is now asserted, a worse than Egyptian servitude in humane probability had overwhelmed us, and consequently the true principle or end that moves the malignants, cannot be a true fear of any arbitrary power to be established in the Parliament, though they so pretend, to divert us by foolishly fearing an imaginary impossible danger, from looking to and timely opposing the true real danger imminent and evident, nay to draw us to concur to the bringing of it in with our own hands, which is an arbitrary government at discretion, which the malignants themselves would establish, and that by a civil war, to the ruin of all that is precious with honest men, or men of honour: They have had such power in manner already in their hands; and that which the King is induced by them to challenge at this present, amounts to no less in effect as shall appear, the Parliament yet in vigour; what then may we expect if they should prevail by force, which now their fallacies and deluding reasons are plainly discovered they fly unto: What but that the Court and Parasites of it, should wallow and revel in all licentiousness, luxury, excess, with pride, avarice, and tyranny proportionable, whilst the rest languish under oppression, slavery, poverty, disgrace, perpetual indignities or fears, accounted as their beasts to labour for them, and so mediocrity a State, which the wisest of men prayed for, no where to be found, but a deluge of vices from contrary causes, till general ruin involve altogether; virtue and the glory of the Nation before extinct. For we must not think that these which love their Country so well (for which to doubt to die were dishonour) that they will not be quiet and sit still to save it (for this much only may suffice from the multitude of them, the heads and leaders excepted) nay can be content to ruin the glory, liberty, safety of it, even with the hazard of their estates, lives, honours, souls, so they may in some proportion share the spoils of their Country, and grow fat with the blood and tears of the oppressed people: We must not think they can do thus, but to the end to have greater means and power to beget more monstrous in all villainy if it were possible. These can fight against their Country to make themselves slaves to a few above them, that the rest of their oppressed Country may be slaves to them, slaves of slaves: but I doubt not, but these monsters, unless reason transform them, shall meet with their Herculesses, honest men and men of honour, ready to die for their Country, if need require, judging such a death infinitely to be preferred before the lives of the chiefest of these, should they obtain what they seek.  
But let us end this pathetical flying out, though it be hard for the inferior faculties sometimes not to stir, when the understanding somewhat enlightened hath inflamed the will.  
On the other side, so divine a gift as this Parliament thankfully recognized and made use of duly, and the just power and dignity of the Parliament, and therein all our happiness wisely and manfully now once asserted, moderation and mediocrity induced, the Monarchy duly tempered, may be in human probability perpetual, and all the surfeit become Physic. And this violent Fever of the State having amazed and drawn to an head all the malignant humours before dispersed all over the body, and lying dangerously hidden, and set on fire, consumed and expelled them (like the filth of an house swept into an heap and burnt) the whole body may be much clearer sounder and better disposed, then had not such a distemper ever been.  
I hope it appears already were there no more than these presented weak reasons to an ordinary rational man (if far better from others be too mean for his Majesty) what way he is to take that all may be well; and seeing but one side can be trusted with the power of the Kingdom, which of them is most unlikely to tyrannize, or reduce all to arbitrary government, or which will most probably use it to the public good only, or whether in such extraordinary times it do not most safely repose where it is originally, naturally inherent, viz. in the people's own hands, and so in the Parliaments: Nay were the case hitherto dubious, yet since liberty first made appointed limited prerogative; for they confine together, as the people (in whom is the radical, primary supreme power, and who made Kings, not King's people) thought best, when it first made choice of, or instituted this one form of government among divers others, which we call Monarchy, and whereof there are sundry degrees in sundry States, some more some less trusted, or limited, as the first founders pleased, (else why are they not all equal since free and voluntary agents work or do only so much, or so far as they please; and the various subordinate degrees or kinds of the creatures prove the divine Majesty to be agens liberrimum, else the creatures would be all equal: an involuntary or natural agent (as Philosophy terms it) ever working as much as it can, or to the utmost extent or sphere of its power and activity, and so an equality in the effects) since I say, liberty or the people first created (as I may say) Prerogative, and that so tempered, modified, or graduated, as it thought most conducible to its own happiness (for the supreme power ever worketh for itself rather then for the subordinate or inferior, as being the end; the efficient and final causes being here co-incidents) it is just, that this, namely, liberty, judge and give law to that; and that this, if an unnatural jar fall out, gain and prosper rather than the other; and since the people reserved ever in its own hands, and saved to itself upon the trust to the Monarchy, what privileges, right of Parliament, or liberties, etc. (parcel 〈◊〉 the original power naturally in the people, and which may draw bacl to the fountain the derivative power, as the blood and spirits to the heart, when there is cause) it thought best, surely it must do this with purpose to see them conserved as safely as may be, and upon occasion to make use of them and enjoy them, which could not be surely done without a power reserved to judge of the state of them, and when they were to be used, and the like, (for if the Prince be trusted touching the keeping himself within his limits, he may even as well be trusted absolutely without limits:) nor such power to judge of them is to any purpose, as abovesaid, without power to execute what is judged hereupon fit. So the Parliament judgeth in this case as the first author, and superintendent of the intent, and is not as a party to be judged.  
Further, were the matter yet dubious, yet seeing the Protestant Religion, the power being in the Parliaments hand, is far more out of the reach of danger then the other way, even without calling his Majesty's good meaning into question therein, as I hope anon will appear, it ought to put it out of all question, how we are to range ourselves in these times. The Parliament having (our case so standing) such power as is deduced, whatsoever would seem to oppose that power and stand in their way, as they defend and assert the public good so invaded, must be voidable: and usual ordinary known laws or customs made or in use supposing, or whilst the Prince kept duly within his bounds (which the King speaks so much of, saying, that he will ever govern by them, and hold all to them) but ever intending the public good, are no way to bond or tie up the transcendent power of the Parliament, when it shall encounter new and never before heard of exorbitances or invasions of the public good, which the times that made those known Laws never heard of, so never provided against. But by proportion of reason this Parliament may and aught as well provide by new Ordinances or orders for such new evils as they encounter, as the former did for what they then met with: for they had their original also (ex malis moribus bonae leges) and had those times had such causes offered, as these have, they would have provided remedies of a nature like those this Parliament hath done, the power and general intentions of all times, or the universal ground being still the same, that is, to defend and vindicate, or procure the public good: and to tie them to the known or old Laws in this case, where the letter might kill, were irrational; for so the first breaker of the Laws might take the privilege of the Laws, and advantage of his own wrong, and under the colours of the Laws fight against and overthrow them, or the rule, reason, or intention that caused them at first.  
If it be said, nothing was done by the King of public consequence, but by advice of the Judges, it may be answered, that the Parliament is the only competent Counsel & Judge in cases nearly concerning the public, and people in general, which the King is entrusted upon such occasions to call, that the whole people may not but upon extraordinary causes be troubled to elect for Parliaments, and attend that service: But in such a case as ours by virtue of the legislative power residing in the Parliament it may make new Ordinances, at least for the time, as it sees occasion and judges to be in order to that supreme and immutable Law, or Law of Laws, and end of them all; Salus populi suprema lex, and that power even of making new Laws is ever upon the matter in both Houses of Parliament, and that even when the King keeps himself within his due bounds, and is assistant in Parliament (how much more then, as before is showed, if he shall by exorbitating dangerously bring himself within the compass of our case?) and that the King's consent to what the Parliament propounds to him, to be enacted for Law, ought not to be denied, may appear by comparing this following part of the Oath, which the Kings of England at their Coronation take, or aught to take, cited in the Remonstrance of the 26th of May, in haec verba: Concedis justas leges, & confuetudines esse tenendas, & permittis per te eas esse protegendas, & ad honorem Dei corroborandas quas vulgus elegerit secundum vires tuas? Respondebit (Rex) Permitto, & concedo. Comparing this part of the Oath with the clause of the preamble of a Statute there also cited, intimating that the King is bound by his oath to remedy by Law such inconveniences, as the Kingdom may suffer in the future, as well as to keep and protect Laws already in being; for then either those Latin words here cited, or some part of them, and that the latter, namely, Quas vulgus elegerit, are to be understood of Laws futurely to be made, or else it cannot be showed by what part of the Oath, as the said preamble affirms, the King is bound by Law to remedy the mischiefs that happen from time to time to his Realm. Nor will the Laws of Grammar, or use of speech, or custom of phrase tolerate, that, Elegerit, without the conjunction, Si, or the like preceding, or regulating it (though we pass not by unconsidered the rude speaking of those times) can ever be taken for Elegit, the preter-perfect tense: but as it stands in the forecited place, must of necessity participate a future nature, and signify precisely, shall have chosen; that is, that the King assumeth to confirm such Laws, as the people shall have chosen; it being to be conceived, that the people, or Parliament first amongst themselves, must have debated of, chosen and agreed upon them, before they present them to the King to be confirmed. Besides, if those cited words, Et permittis per te esse protegendas, & ad honorem Dei corroborandas quas populus elegerit, should not refer to future elections, but to past only, they were superfluous and vain: the words precedent, Concedis justas leges & consu●tudines esse tenendas (which presuppose necessarily, and cannot be understood without a precedent election and consent of the people to them) expressing sufficiently Laws and customs elected, already confirmed and in use. And the King's answer to these cited words, being bimembris, or twofold, Concedo & permitto (all the other answers of the King to the other Questions in the Oath, cited in the said Remonstrance, because the questions are merely simple and single, contained in one word only, as to one question only; Servabo to another only; faciam being also single, and in one word) argues the question to be double, as is said. And that the King is not bound only in general thus to remedy the particular ways or means left to his choice; see the said Remonstrance, folio 8. which ought to have itself sufficed without such poor glean, as these, or the like: If then by these and other better reasons which others have presented, the Parliament hath such a legislative power, even where the King dischargeth his office, as upon the matter to make such Laws as it judgeth best for the public good; where through the prevalence of ill men about him, it is not done, but the contrary, and so the danger is from him, shall not power be in them to make new Ordinances, or provisional Laws, for the timely remedying such public mischiefs, at least for the time, and to suspend some of those in being, if they judge fit? How much more than to judge of, declare, or interpret those that seem dubious, ranging and making all to be subservient to the supreme Law Salus populi, the rule and reason of all Laws, as was ever intended at the making of all particular Laws. Hath not even the Lord Chancellor a little touch of such a power upon the Common Law? What then may we think a Parliament hath, and that when the very public is in danger? And if the whole people unanimously consenting, upon a Princes not performing what he is bound unto, may possibly change the very form of that limited government, which it first instituted, how much more may it conserve or defend that temper or kind of government, which it hath erected by regulating the enormities of the Prince, by maintaining and holding what they have reserved out of that which was all theirs at the first, or their own rights? How many degrees than are they off from being bound to become themselves the instruments to overthrow them? how strongly are they bound to the contrary? And indeed were not the Parliament the supreme Judge in all the said questions, or of like nature, (if we may call it a Parliament at all, not having this power) it could not possibly save the people, when ill men prevailing upon the King would oppress it; for while they carry on by degrees, and mature by little and little such their mystical and pernicious designs (which must be met with betimes in such tender and jealous matters, before they advance and grow strong, when caution comes too late, and opposition out of season doth but exasperate and increase the evil) they will cause the King by fit instruments for the purpose, to pronounce, judge, or interpret each such degree or gaining a new and further point, still lawful, and not subject to question, however dangerous to the people in itself, and of worse consequence, till the mystery at last unmask, and all be desperate.  
It may be superadded, that should the Parliament be more jealous of the Prince then there were reason, (which yet as I hope hath appeared is not to be imagined of the wisdom and Justice of the Parliament) yet it were the fare less evil, that the Prince, being but for the people, should somewhat suffer by such the Parliaments jealousy (which were but peccare in meliorem, & securiorem partem) then that by the Parliaments too much security and believing in the Prince, the people or whole kingdom should be endangered, or oppressed for whose good they both are ordained, as means for the end: Besides that the authority and politic infallibility of the Parliament must be by all that love their Country, not blemished but held sacred and inviolate, as supreme. The King indeed saith he will defend and maintain, the Laws, Liberties, properties of Subjects, just privileges of Parliament, but even in saying this he seems to violate them, if he thereby assume the supreme Judgement of them to himself, which, as already partly hath appeared, and further hereafter may do, cannot be; Admit this Trojan horse into your walls, allow this, all of them may easily resolve into nothing. Consider well, what Judgement hath been made of the Laws, the liberty, the property of the Subject, before this Parliament, whilst a future Parliament was doubted and feared, and therefore kept off as long as these Malignants could, (but their fear and hate shows what we ought ardently to desire, and love) whilst so many Monopolies, Loane, Conduct, Coat, Ship-money, and the like grievances were brought upon us (our persons not going Scotfree) as consisting well, and compatible with our laws, liberties, properties, and adjudged lawful, which yet what did they, or ere long going on at least would they have wanted of making them all merely at discretion, pleasure, and will, the mere names of such things remaining, and used indeed, as Trophies of their Conquest, and monuments of our quondam felicity, and at leisure to be lamented folly and eternal shame. The danger of our Religion is not forgotten, because not ranked in mention with the rest, it shall have a better place by itself, as a Queen sitting alone.  
The Judgement made of privileges of Parliament during this Parliament seem to have come little short of the Judgements made of our liberties, properties, etc. and if it be duly weighed. First, that they will have the King to be judge of them, than what Judgement hath been lately made, both in fact and in words, or Declarations of them, a man meanly penetrant will find them resolved by the positions of these Malignants into next to nothing: and all this while the Parliament was and is in vigour, vindicates, and asserts them, and likely to call these men to account, what will they make of them, should they through the authority, and reputation of this Parliament, which is the essence of it, pierce at once the heart of all future: for a Parliament not free were no Parliament, and if the King be allowed judge of privileges of Parliament, where any new case happens which may touch the very essence of it (if it be any thing else then the privileges) will it not come to this, that the Judges he appoints, or rather such instruments, as the Malignants about him please to set over us, shall upon the matter judge the Parliament, which is to Judge their Judges, making it and the Laws what they please, and to restrain the power and freedom of it, as of the Laws, as they think fit; whereupon would follow even the same inconveniences, which were before mentioned, supposing the King the supreme Judge of the Laws, namely, that the Parliament should be disenabled to defend the people, or indeed itself if encroached on, or oppressed upon the same reasons in that place expressed. But it seems more rational, that since the Parliament is to be Judge of the Laws (as is above shown) nay even may make them, at least in some cases; it may judge as well of its own privileges: neither appears it in the King's power to make them, what he pleases, save only thus: if he doth not exorbitate, nor innovate any thing against them, neither can the Parliament desire any alteration of them in any point, betwixt it and the King, concerning them. But in case of extraordinary emergents of never-before-heard of attempts on his part, whither by any verbal declaration, or by fact, whereby the privileges, authority or very being (for it may trouble a good School-man to distinguish clearly betwixt these three) itself of the Parliament is endangered, it is reason, that the privileges now become any thing that the Parliament judges fit for the conservation of itself. For the main end and intent of the first, ancient, ordinary, and usual privileges of Parliament, being to enabie, and qualify it for the due attending, defending or advancing the public good (for which purpose they were judged sufficient by the first Institutors, not suspecting such new invasions, or attempts on them, or on Parliaments as since have happened in more corrupted times, but thinking them rather secure, as pait of the Laws, or customs which Kings are bound to keep inviolate) why should not the same end and intent, which ever remains in equal force, immortal, and immovable, work and move, as well to the instituting even of new ones, if new causes happen, and without such new ones the Parliament shall remain disenabled to procure the public good, for which it was ordained? and if the Parliament may in extraordinary rhymes as now make new Ordinances for the conservation of the people, it may make (if need require) new Ordinances or Privileges (which are but the private Laws of or concerning the Parliament) for its own conservation, without which they cannot descend or conserve the people; and in vain had it power to make new Ordinances upon new occasions for the public good, if it have no inherent power to make new privileges or ordinances upon new emergent dangers to save itself, Posse naturally and necessarily presupposing Esse, as grounded on it; Qui dat finem, dat necessaria ad finem: the privileges being to defend and maintain the Parliament as the Laws the people, and as Salus populi is lex suprema, as before, so it may as well be said, Salus Parliamenti supremum privilegium. If it may work new, it may much more interpret, declare, and judge of the old on occasion; and are no more to be held to the old, usual, known, privileges, when new extraordinary attempts, or affronts happen, then to the old known Laws only in the case above spoken of, and upon the same ground and analogy of reason. And here we are fallen unawares on the old Lord Treasurer Burleigh, who we need not say was a great Statesman, who was wont to say, He knew not what a Parliament might not do: not much unlike the Archbishop Bancrost (a great Statesman) who would tremble (as is said) at the mention of a Parliament, as knowing, or rather not knowing the power of it; and had not they both taken the word Parliament in our acception, they had told us no news. It is one effect of ill Counsel about a Prince (in the consequence sometimes better then in their intention) to minister occasions to the people by invasion of their rights, to look narrowly into the nature of the Prince's prerogative when by the power of truth, it  looseth of the former reputation (which liberty gains): a more dubious light setting it of better, and ignorance begetting here devotion, and admiration, of what is unknown; & hence it is perhaps, that in these times as more polite and penetrant, than many former ages, Prerogative is said generally to lose in Christendom, the better thus fortified against the so great, and growing danger from the Common enemy the Turk, and other great Mahometan Princes (the great bulwark of Christendom, Germany, now so torn the more requiring it) by so main a disparity in matter of liberty (the Mahometans using their Subjects, as their beasts, or slaves) as well as of Religion. But to our way from this Digression. We may from this place take a prospect another way into the plot of these Malignants; being by a crew of our own Nation but unnaturalized, partly not penetrating their deluding pretences by reason, as naturally simple, partly having their understandings debauched by a will instantly solicited, or overruled by enormous affections, and passions: which second kind may constitute a middle degree between malice and simple ignorance (might this simple tractate gain one of the first sort, the pains taken were a pleasure, but should it hope to win one of the second degree, this presumption might make bare pardon too much for it.) There is a third sort in whom their understandings and consciences though having perfect light and clearly discerning the truth, and right, yet are like slaves forced, and dragged by a Diabolical will (affections in this degree not mentioned, as arguing gross carnality, or corporealnesse: but these are spirituales nequitiae) by such a society, whilst they speciously pretend to defend privileges of Parliament, Laws of the Land, liberty, property of the Subject, etc. but whereof the King must be supreme Judge (for in this point lieth all the mystery, and Cabala) through this mortal wound of the authority and essence of the Parliament, the true, and only Judge, and consequently defender of them all (as above is showed) to strike the heart of them all, leaving us only tenues umbrae, or manes, or apparitions of them, to pursue, distract and torment us, as accessaries to the murder, or rather principals (since no accessary in Treason) if we passively concur, much more if we help to act it, thus the matter being disposed they may introduce the form (the perfection of the work) and the state at their discretion, and the way of the Lord Pope prepared, and his crooked paths made strait, they may easily bring him in, as after we may endeavour to show.  
But if the plot seem not deep enough laid, as supposing and hoping at home so many monsters, and vipers (though the fewer needed, the sound party of England and Scotland already distracted by the Irish Rebellion to that end if not at first raised, yet sundry ways fomented by them) then perhaps to piece it from abroad; and by cutting the banks of the kingdom to let in a deluge of foreign forces, and so yet further subdistract the remnant; if we conceive the Fleet of Spaniards, seen not long since at the Downs, carried any mystery, or came not unsent for, or moved not to no end, or Hull so earnestly made at, Newcastle, Portsmouth, etc. signify any thing; which though intended to distract England, and ruin it, may rather (opening our eyes, and disabusing us) by God's overruling unite it as in a common cause against an universal and evident danger, not to speak now of other matters judicating the same. And they intending in England a government at discretion, and all made in all probability, or after the French fashion; if the middle sort of people of England, and Yeomanry, of whom chief consist the trained bands, and wont to be a main strength of our victorious Armies, can by no subtleties be drawn to their party, then by policy, or even plain force to disarm them, suspecting as they have good cause that these, if once they be unhoodwinkt, will especially oppose the change as whereby they from being in the happiest condition of any of their rank perhaps in Europe, nay in the world (who here live like men, and are wont to fight, or die like men in honour or defence of their Country) might well be reduced to the terms of the Peasants of France, of villainage, and slavery: a fit recompense for their danger and pains should they fight and labour to bring it in. As for the scum of the people they judge it either senseless, or careless of the public, and desiring a change, or easily drawn, where there is hope of greater spoil, and pillage. We may place so much the more below this scum many of the greater sort, that stand for these Malignants against the truth and right (every day more and more plainly convincing them) and against their Country by how much they own to it more than the Rascality doth, yet appear to be crawn with hope of spoil, and pillage in their degree and proportion as much or more than the Rascality itself.  
But though it be so with the State, is our Religion in danger that way also? why else are the Papists so active, so busy? is it only that they may beslaves? but in a politic way only use may be made of them, and of their power, without any intent to symbolise with them in their religion, as sometimes hath been done in other countries'. Be it so (though it be not good to be prodigal and facile in our grants which our religion may pay for) yet taking it this way, so great a service so seasonable at such a pinch (when all good Subjects, and judicious honest men fail them) received from the Papist, must draw on in way of grateful acknowledgement, some favour at least some advantage, which cannot be but at as much danger, and disadvantage of the religion (not to insist how hardly they will lay down their Arms once taken up, and victorious, or the King be able to make good his faith, or word). And are not they the fittest and surest means to conserve a State, that have been thought and found such for the acquiring? But be this as it may it is clear, that can the Papist bring the matter to an absolute, and arbitrary government, and render the prerogative immense and even divine, they gain a main point on our religion, for then between them and the heaven of their desires, there were interposed but the turning of one will, and that one already prepared, disposed and inclined to them by such meritorious supererogatory service, and further propitiated by the so strong intercessions (how strong (to speak like those we have to do with) when used by her that may in some things even command) our sovereign Lady Mary. (I had rather seem to some a little too much tied to sense only, and to the present times we yet live in, when I presumed to use that phrase: turn, or change of one will; then with others, by the abstraction of apotent imagination, found worthy to have been rapt into the glory of those times, in stead of change of will: to have used a phrase or sense seeming to such more orthodox, terming it rather an external manifestation and declaration only to us here below of that which was ever from the beginning predestinated internally since in Gods no real change nor shadow of change) but the other way a whole Parliament at least must be first turned, and that in diametral opposition with the Papist, and should foreign Force come in by Portsmouth, Plymouth, or Falmouth (what if we add Ireland?) to induce Tyranny, Religion runs equal hazard with the State. And it may be, the King's forces running lately with so strong bias so eagerly at Banbury, Warwick, Coventry, etc. esteemed most opposite indeed to the Papist, though perhaps not otherwise direct to the first, or main mark for the present, of these Malignants, may judicate and argue, without any sophistry, a present complication of the disease, and the duplicity of the design, and danger: or if not a present essence of a double disease, yet a dangerous malady now in being already, but breaking out into a symptom more to be taken heed of then the very disease, and depending on it: But they object, our Religion is on the other hand more endangered by Brownism, Anabaptism, etc. suppose this true, and that these should get strength, nay prevail with the Parliament (which it is charged to promote upon as likely, as strong, and even the same grounds, as it is to affect the change of the Monarchy, yet as we said of we know not what new form of government, supposing ridiculously the Parliament did introduce it, it were easily dissolvible; so obscure Brownism or Anabaptism were much more easily mastered, and redressed, then most politic, potent, all over bearing Papistry, likely to be backed with foreign force, which I think none will say is to be feared from those other scarce known, weak, poor Sects, whose obscurity, and paucity, hides rather and exempts from animadversion, and would the Parliament attempt this (though we might justly refuse to dispute with those that deny principles in this kingdom's policy, calling still in question the wisdom, Justice and honour of Parliaments) could it ever effect it without the people's concurring? Papistry so increased at home, so countenanced might (if it doth not already with their good friends help in Ireland, and elsewhere hope to force entrance). How foolish then is it for the people to fear that, which can never take effect, unless itself will have it so? (I fall unawares upon the same answer here used before touching the supposed change of the State, because the false grounds they would seem to go on here, and there seeming the same) and if the whole kingdom or people will have it so there is no opposing. But hath not the Parliament taken a voluntary Oath (besides so many public Protestations, and other obligations to us, the Scots, and the States of the Low Countries) for the maintenance of the Protestant Religion, which they are too wise, and just needlessly to have done, and so should they do otherwise to incur most justly universal falling of, or rather falling on them, had they had any intent ever to have done, as these would seem to fear, to direct us here also from looking at the true fear and danger, nay to draw us with our own hands to pull it on us; we may superadd, that the voluntary oaths of such a multitude as the Parliament on whom no suspicion at all can fasten, of inclining to that religion, which takes upon it to dispense with oaths and equivocations, and thereby with the Law of God, Nature and Nations (which intended to advance it, will by God's justice advance the ruin of it) are better security, than our Malignants have or can give us on the other side, the Antithesis in each part inquired into duly as the subject well deserves.  
But these men would here also take benefit of their own wrong, according to their usual method (it may appear what correspondence, or good intelligence the main dangers of our Religion and State still hold mutually, or how they resemble). Necessity of the State, nay of the very preservation of itself (whereof these Objectors are manifestly the authors) may justly and too evidently doth compel the Parliament to the letling of Religion, (though the end of policy and however first in esteem and intention, yet not so in the time of execution always) after the ordering of politic affairs; and in such desperate times as these, not to do this, were but a sacrifice without salt, a foolish superstition (like that of the Jews, who would rather sit still, and so suffer themselves to be cut in pieces by the capital enemies of their State and Religion, (contrary to David who in necessity spared not the very Shewbread) who maliciously invaded them purposely at such a time) than arm or fight upon such necessity on their Sabbath; Which they complain the Parliament will not now do; which should it now, one ruin might involve both Church and State both at once: yet hath it not altogether, even such times notwithstanding, left itself without some testimony of their good intentions herein, as particular Acts or Orders of theirs do show to the world; but the attempts, and facts of the Malignants, evident to all men apologise too well for the Parliament in this point without any words from any man, if we weigh the desperate estate of public affairs well in these times, caused by the malice of these Monsters; which times forcing us for a while to content ourselves with an implicit, or general faith, as touching the ordering, reforming, or settling of other particulars concerning Religion, which cannot for the said necessary reasons and the like, be yet effected; yet we have, besides many other inducements obvious enough to confirm such implicit faith, this also, that of such ordering and settling these matters, as is to be wished, there is fare greater hope, and presumption (caeteris paribus) from those Divines, that preach and cry down the temporal greatness, pride, riches, avarice, etc. of the Clergy, and so all their own hopes and pretensions that way, and consequently from the Parliament, which we see countenanceth such men, then from the contrary side: that professing likewise in a special manner and degree, mortification, contempt and renouncing of the world, and of the glory, greatness, and pomp of it, humility and the like (as minding heavenly matters, and things above) as principles of the Doctrine and Religion they press upon us, yet are not ashamed to appear to the world invested (through various mysteries of iniquity) with so great a share of whatsoever the most worldly men (whose highest contemplations ascend not to the Moon) compose their Trinity of, as may enable these men thus crucified, and dead to the world by their own earthly power, greatness, authority (not to insist on that kind which they have in our times, attempted to render, in some points, or cases at least, independent of the crown, and absolute; and which earthly greatness, rather than the Parliament shall question, or regulate, they will question and condemn the Parliament, and advance a Civil War, or foreign invasion, to the evident danger of a general ruin, and abomination of desolation of their Country, nay Church itself, which these hypocrites would seem to stand for) as may enable them, I say, by their own temporal potency (which in the hand of such men becomes more dreadful, than any spiritual power they exercise) sufficiently to keep in awful silence, if not to bring into a kind of Inquisition, such as most heretically shall not captivate and subdue their understanding and reason under so strong a faith, as to believe, that these chief ones (who ought to be most eminent of all in practising the said principles of renouncing the world, humility, mortification, etc. which they recommend, command, and enjoin, as Leaders and Captains for all that should follow them on so difficult services) can yet practise and pursue, I say, so ardently, so desperately the clean contrary, so as if they would have others quit the world, only that themselves might seize it; and yet thus by their deeds drawing into suspicion, doubt, misptision with multitudes of men, nay, even confuting their Doctrine, not be a main cause of the miseries and calamities of the world, whilst deluges of sin and wickedness, and pernicious consequences break in at this so great an overture of the faith, thus discountenanced, and discredited, and even called in question; will not many incline rather to believe, that this practice, this doctrine, so destructive one to the other, is sowing their fields with mingled seed, wearing a garment mingled with woollen and linen, so forbidden in the Mosaike Law? That such a ridiculous unsuitablenes between such profession & doctrine, such practice and deeds, is rather a mockery of the world. Will they not like one Cicero speaks of, wonder cur aruspex videns risum teneret? Though the Mahometan sect be gross, and carnal, and the Mahometans themselves exceeding devout in their kinds, and superstitious, having their Churchmen in great reverence, divers of them rich and profuse otherwise in works they conceive any way pious and charitable, and though otherwise the Nation very covetous, yet I think it will not be easy to show that their chief Church men in general, in any temporal greatness or riches, do not much rather resemble the mendicant Orders among the Papists (did they hold themselves to their Rules) than the Papistical or our Prelates and chief Clergymen, who yet profess themselves Leaders in so spiritual, so heavenly, and sublime, so world-renouncing a way, faith and doctrine. It is true the Turkish Muphty or chief Priest, is by the grand Turk, partly to please the people, in show and shadow greatly honoured; not perhaps without a competency in revenue, but I take it hereabouts their devotion of any note this way ends. As for any temporal greatness and riches the Mosaical Clergy might have, we are taught, these were rather gross and sensible Types, than any thing else, of the spiritual eminency, graces, endowments, and power, that aught to shine in the sublime and heavenly Antitype; whence their true authority with the people and reverence, and even veneration to their doctrine, places and persons must flow, conserved, increased by ever constant and invincible rejections of the least not necessary temporal matter, if pressed on them, as an high dishonour, or affront offered to discredit them, a bribe to corrupt them in the execution of their Embassage, a bait to entrap them and frustrate the service they are sent about, a temptation of pernicious consequence, nay, of what the State may adjudge and assign the Clergy as necessary (if it might be) a voluntary and absolute declining of part even of that (for I doubt not but the State would appoint such a proportion, as might to duly mortified and spiritual men, afford matter for the honour of such a refusal) would undoubtedly add such authority and reverend regard to them, and their doctrine, that men seeing they seek them not theirs, nor will admit more of the world, than what is merely necessary for them, for the discharge of their places; you shall discover a new world: Men by such courses which will bring on doctrine proportionable, will be so moved that cutting off each in his proportion greatly, even their own superfluous vanities, much more their sins: what our spiritual men may so have refused, with infinite more by others thus cut off, may be distributed among the poor, (besides the benefit of such examples and doctrine, extending even to these:) and so universal charity, reducing all to a blessed kind, if not of parity, yet of proportion, leaving the least in a tolerable mediocrity, a golden age or primitive times may rise again in the world.  
But the way to this heaven is first to go by the gates of hell, as through the Parliament the Kingdom is made at by the true malignants, so through or under colour of a pretended malignant party, that seduceth or ruleth the Parliament, the Parliament or authority and dignity thereof is attaqued, but sure this is propounded as an article of saith, and to weak reason past comprehension how it can well be: but how ever they are misbelievers and heretics that pertinaciously reject an article of faith, and with force to be proceeded against; yet force being found oft none of the best ways to extinguish heresy, but rather the canker spreaded and exasperated by rude handling, many have not and will not be deterred from advancing such as these, plain or stronger oppositions, if any of this malignant party propound any thing (as in all great assemblies some must break the matter and begin) and the house consent to the proposition; it is now the act of the whole house: if any propound or speak things that seem to others offensive, or to deserve animadversion, and yet the house, or major part punish it not, they by such connivance (for these men may be allowed to question still principles, that the Parliament would do dishonourably, and yet come short of their malicious intents) make it also this way their own; and so not these censors, or any else but the Parliament, as above appeared, is to judge of the Parliament; but such censors themselves are to be condemned by the Parliament, for thus presuming or assuming to themselves the supreme power to judge; besides particular charges and articles against such were to be offered to the House, the accusers and witnesses to be produced and forthcoming, that if they make not good their charges, the parties unjustly molested and accused, might have condign reparations upon them; and the House itself satisfaction, the public service thus causelessly interrupted, and the integrity of the House called in question, and the like, appertaining to cases of this nature. Such charges have been promised long since should suddenly appear against the accused Members of the Parliament, and by them as Justice earnestly required, but appear not all this while, not so much as to the people abroad, (though this were not the right way) which they so strive to incense against the Parliament, but rather war in stead of them; and seeing so many of the very Members of the Houses of Parliament are their enemies, falling off from them unjustly (if none such still remain among them) were things appearing unjustifiable there said or done (if it might stand with the liberty and power of Parliament not to have liberty of speech) it might easily be made appear in particular to the world, and so complaint be made to the Parliament thereof, if it were to any end to complain there of that, which hath already passed without punishment. But seeing the Parliament hath power (the case standing as before hath been showed) to do in all things as they see cause; by good consequence their speeches necessarily preparing, discussing, agitating, concluding what is so to be done, cannot be subject to any limiting, questioning, or account abroad, nor in reason therefore are to be divulged in that sense; this being incompatible with such power. But then these haters of our Lawmakers and Laws, say; Many of both Houses are away, and so the acts less valid; but be the number remaining little, yet the acts of the Major part of that number are still good. For neither the King that calied them away, or countenanceth them that desert their stations, may allege this; nor the Members that voluntarily (not upon trust in those that remain, or leave obtained) abandon their places there and duties, are to take the benefit, either of their own wrong, whether negligence in such Members, or worse perhaps, nor of their own unworthiness, as Cowardice, to oppose what they liked not: which fear (admitting such could be) argues still that they that feared were the lesser number; though what needed they fear to speak freely, a dissenting lesser number being ordinary, and sometimes a very few, perhaps scarce enough to make a number, dissenting openly from the rest of the whole House without any inconvenience? It being allowed for any to speak their minds whilst a matter is in agitation before it be settled. If they say, they go away that they may not seem to allow what would pass though they were present: then the Major part concurres to what is done by their own confession, else why stay they not to oppose it? If they say, so many are gone without leave of the Houses, as put together would make the Major part, supposing this were true, either such a Major part went away at once in a body, and then it was their fault not to stay; for than they being the Major part had prevailed; or they went by little and little, and then still it was a Major part of the remainder that concurred to what was done, else it had not passed: and so the acts still good: If they fly to say that they who thus deserted the House out of fear, did it not as fearing the Parliament, but the people; granting these men this, which is not their due, that such had cause to fear the people, and that such base fear, when as they pretend, they were to stand for the King, Country, Laws Liberties, Religion, and did not render them utterly unworthy their places: it may be answered briefly; they that remained and carried matters, might fear the King as much or more: but their cause was noble and good; but these or the like Cavils will no more hoodwink the people: their only course were to produce some public act of Parliament, that might certify the world, that the King and both houses have long since unanimously concurred to dissolve this Parliament; else Sophistry will not carry it against the manifest truth.  
By the premises or rather by divers excellent Tractates published by others to the same, or the like effect, I hope it is even as clear that the Parliament is and aught to be the supreme Judge in public matters now in question in England, as what it is, it hath judged and ordered touching these things, by so many public orders, declarations, and the like; and consequently that reason wills that they be sacred in our esteem, and punctually obeyed and executed, and so no need of war: and whosoever goeth against reason and truth, goeth against God himself, who is Prima, summa, pura ratie, and it will concern him nearly to look to it, whether he be stronger than God: goeth against himself if he be a man, and shall first find a civil war in himself, before he can cause it in his Country upon such grounds, and for his Majesty he cannot as he is a King, but judge that, that man thinks dishonourably of him, who goeth about to persuade him, that, that can be for his good that is not for the good of his Kingdom, and so sever what is so excellently joined; or that the great Counsel of the Kingdom is not the only, at least the very best, and the only sure and securing way without all doubt, for that Prince to follow that intends the public good: and which will ever assuredly concur with him to that end: nor in opposing an arbitrary power, which ill men about him for their own private and wicked ends, would induce: Doth the Parliament any thing but disenable a Prince, or rather those about him from doing ill, or more properly from usurping such power; which to what end is it in a good Prince, which he will or can never reduce to act or use: but the false or pretended Mother of the child, who would have it divided, (whom the wisdom of the King may discern) will whisper, there is no thanks or glory to do good, unless he might have done evil, and so did good freely; since free will only merits (I believe they hold merits) it seems these malignants fetched not this Doctrine from heaven; for there we may find that confirmation in grace in the Angels and blessed spirits of just men, whereby complete free will, or the remains of it (which free will argues but imperfection and mutability; power to sin being but impotency; and the King of Kings, God himself, who is perfection itself, being above and without all power or possibility of doing any evil, yet, (rather therefore I should say) omnipotent in or for good that confirmation in grace, I say, by which free will is transfigured and sublimed into a state divine; and Posse non peccare, into non posse peccare, is a transcendent blessing, if not the very essence of celestial beatitude; where these suggest, such a condition is to be declined, though with ruin of all: But howsoever the Divines of our times may not allow the explication or application of this point, we may hope his Majesty out of his Princely care of the good of his people, though both himself and it may believe well of his good intents to that purpose, will be far from judging such a puntiglio of arbitrary power (for however it may fill and tickle the fantasy, yet deeply and duly penetrated into by judgement, it appears to resolve even into no more (if a puntiglio be any thing) or lest it might possibly be thought, he would, or might have done evil, had he not been restrained from it (when he cannot violate such just restrictions, without first doing the greatest evil of all to the public) from judging, I say, such a puntiglio a just and sufficient cause to destroy the people by a civil war; when were this power indeed justly belonging to him, yet true love to his people might judge it no other way useful, then to have the glory and thanks of relinquishing it voluntarily, lest otherwise the people's good and safety for a puntiglios sake, or satisfying a fantasy, or an humour of one man, should depend on the turn or change of one man's will, whensoever it may happen, and more than this, great and noble minded men, though no Christians, have more than once done, when having in their hands absolute power over their Country (not unjustly gotten) they have freely and of their own accord given it up absolutely, judging it so best for their countries' good, leaving it even in full liberty, and so living themselves in, or rather under it, but much higher in true glory and honour then ever. But though such power is not here in his Majesty, he is yet not without means in his hands, and a fair opportunity to lay a tye not altogether unlike on his people, and to exhibit freely great and public munificence all at once, by a fair and voluntary relinquishing all contestation about it, whilst yet a malignant faction, preferring their passions before reason, and conscience, before his honour and safety, instigate and assist him as much as they can, or rather would make him their instrument to compass it by an unnatural pernicious civil war, on whom the blame may justly be laid, as they alone would have gone away with the benefit.  
By these and the like passages had been, and even yet (so it be betimes taken) may be the way to the true arbitrary power indeed; the people's hearts (where God gins with man, as at the right end; this is the divine Method) which draw all the rest sweetly, which the pretended false bastard arbitrary power, could never by unjust violence effect: and thus by fairly quitting the pursuit of the false, the true may be gained: a magnanimous Prince, that confides in his own virtue, will put himself boldly and securely on the free wills of his Subjects. It is in manner a divine Character; Scire, & velle liberis hominibus imperare; to know how to temper and govern free men, Gentlemen, Princes; and in such a condition God made man, to serve his glory best: and is it not a more glorious thing when a Prince shall by his great, proportionate, and heroic virtues, render them at his devotion, and make them his voluntary slaves, being otherwise free and noble, then if he found them made slaves by the practice and vices of others, or so made them such himself. Thus a free people is a strong motive and occasion to a Prince to render them wholly his by extraordinary virtue; the fall of this emulous Carthage would shake Rome, though in opposition with it and therefore the noblest of the Romans best and most wifely loving Rome, for Rome's good advised Carthage should stand. But reason evinceth, that persisting as he doth, he remains sequestered from all just power and authority, as touching the matters in question between him and his Parliament, on the justice and wisdom whereof he may safely put himself, secure, that they will not, not can divest him of any thing, that justly belongs to him: only reason and right require, that it be left to the Parliament to be the Judge thereof, without which power, the people and Kingdom cannot be safe, as stands deduced. Monarchy thus tempered by liberty and prerogative, as it is remote from intrinsicke causes of dissolution, so from external. If a Prince governing at discretion invade it, the party in the goodly arbitrary government excluded by the distemper of such a State from the benefits of liberty (the party, I say, for be a Prince never so absolute, yet his Mamaluks, his Militia, by whose conspiracy or tyranny he awes and enslaves the rest, not only equal for the most part in point of liberty, the Subjects of a free State, but exceeding them far in all licentiousness and tyrannising, and enslaving upon the matter the Prince himself, as well as others, justly lay on his own shoulders by God's judgement, that which he makes or useth these as instruments to lay unjustly on the necks of his other Subjects, whom he ought to have protected: Instances are requent of the Praetorian Cohorts or Legions tyranny on the Roman Emperors, of the Janissaries on the great Turk, of the Mamaluks on the Egyptian Sultan's) and reason shows this danger is most to be feared, where a Prince hath assumed the people's liberty by public oppression) I say, if the absolute Monarch invade the justly tempered, the oppressed party is not to be trusted, but to be kept under by part of those he will trust, (he can trust none safely) as certain enemies at home; so the power which he must trust, doubly lessened: the party used goeth faintly on the free Nation, for at best by bringing their free neighbours (whence was the chief hope of assistance for the recovering their own liberty) into servitude, they should but confirm and render remediless their own slavery, increasing the strength of the oppressor, and likewise on the same reason resist less, if invaded: Only if the Prince will make account, or can be content, or cannot avoid to be himself an equal, a companion with his Mamaluks (Facinus, quos in quinat, aequat) or rather to be tyrannised by them, and his honour, authority, name, person, to be made their instrument against his people, he may translate the said faintness from them on himself; though when all is done, they are unsafely trusted who have before broken the great tye, that to their Country; else he must fly to foreign help. But on the other side, the free Subjects duly interessed in the State, loving it, living like men, defend, invade the other, nobly, courageously, as in heart, and men of honour, and as oft for the good of the conquered; with greater power, as universally to be trusted. Not to insist on riches, the nerves of War, infimtly increased by industry, so encouraged by industry, lost by servitude, but what needs more, or indeed so much, if any thing in a matter so apparent? We now have been rapt sufficiently into the goodly imaginary heaven, and the glory of it, but with an hell of inextricable miseries to the Prince and people, which these Gods of the infinite prerogative pretended, are raising for themselves, through a government at will, but by such means and in such manner, as shows they believe, or hope for no other heaven hereafter.  
These things being thus, it must follow, that those that oppose the Parliament, and in it the kingdom, in whom is the supreme power, as reason hath evinced since contestation happening as now between King and people, the people must carry it, oppose their Country, reason, right, and the truth, moved by defect of judgement, or worse principles; converting themselves and their power received from their Country to enable them to serve and defend it, to the ruin of it, and of all that is precious to men of honour, and consequently that they are guilty of their own blood, and of all the blood and miseries which this unnatural monstrous war may cause (a means suitable indeed to the end they force themselves to compass:) nor can unpartial posterity judge of them otherwise, then as Parricidae patriae, and damnatae momoriae, if all this be not of force with them to descend deeply into themselves, and to weigh whether they be in state fit for death every moment, at least they may deign this last motive the honour of a deep and sad thought, or two, whether thus obstinately persisting, they contract not before God another way a guilt to contribute or be accessary to the endangering or perdition of their own, and innumerable souls in another kind, and more directly, and highly, there being aliquid sacri in hoc morbo, and Religion sharing the hazard, as abovesaid: but if the premises have not power to infer thus much with them, yet I hope at least they are not so irrational, so extravagant, as that these men can truly believe, that they are only to be confuted, and those that maintain such tenants to be instructed by a civil war: but if folly and defect of that reason that should govern men, or a violent forcing, tyrannising, and enslaving their reason and conscience by enormous and monstrous passions, and sins, the two original causes of slavery, be by no art to be severed from these men, but they must and will by still persisting apply these two said general causes of servitude, particularly and expressly, or in a specrall manner now to draw it upon them, it is not unlikely most of them, and their posterity and friends may find, and prove the effect as inseparable from the causes thus redoubled and enforced, as the causes from themselves, should they be so unhappy as to carry what they by such means so pursue: and however some decoy indulgence may be used towards them, to draw others, till all be in the power of the principal malignants (the like we may say of their cunning enforcing themselves not yet to declare all the depth of their malicious intentions towards those they disarm, or any way get within their power, using them as stalking horses, till by seeming for the present to leave these in a tolerable condition, they may make others stand out less resolutely or warily, and so drawing still to them, make all sure at last, and at their discretion (though even whilst matters are yet dubious, the infernal are of malice, hate, cruelty, jealousy, and the like, which is in their hearts, sometimes cannot but flash out in divers enormous words, or acts) such present indulgence, I say, notwithstanding of the malignant party, let not these men think that it having all once at its dispose, and made sure, will judge it may securely repose on such of the Nation, as have violated wittingly & willingly the greatest tye on earth, by being traitors to their Country, or on those that loving their Country, have been violently or fraudulently disarmed, or on them that not intending the disservice of their Country, but seduced by specious pretences, have voluntarily assisted the malignant party, when time and plain experience shall have disabused these two sorts, and afford means of redeeming their Country and themselves, will not the malignants rather have recourse to foreign protection, or forces (an usual refuge of an arbitrary, or tyrannical government, especially succeeding and having usurped liberty of the Subject, as abovesaid) under colour of being guards, garrisons, auxiliary forces, joined in league, or the like; as France useth the Swissers, (the French Nation forsooth not populous or warlike enough.) It is true, the Spaniard, though not governing at discretion as the French useth the Swissers also, but not upon jealousy and diffidence of their own people (for aught I find) as France doth, but for want of men or some other reason of State, and may not many strangers already here also be employed; then may these Zelots of the Malignants share largely in contributing to the wages of their foreign Masters, and be put to maintain their own servitude (as they stood to bring it in) with all their power. But God be praised these men unless they speedily come in and make their peace, are on the point rather of falling under the sword of Justice in the hand of the Parliament: and it is not to be doubted, but God himself whom they have by sundry passages too notorious (if we may so speak) made a party against themselves; these Atheists belike thinking he is grown old, and impotent, and cannot drown these Egyptians in a red sea of their own blood, if they with diabolical obstinacy go on as Lucian that old Atheist said of the Pagan gods in his time, because they begot no more sons and daughters, will resist, and defend himself, and his (were humane means wanting) against these public oppressors of the people in intention and endeavour, which they ought to expose their lives to defend, and protect.  
And for those that stand already for that Palladium of their Religion and Country, the Parliament, as they are herein duly sensible of themselves and honour, so out of the same feeling, they cannot but so lively ardently and speedily concur with all their power (if need require) when all their fortunes, and all that is dear to such men lie at stake (and which now nobly and bravely asserted and vindicated, may for ever be secured, and the roots of dangers plucked up) that the Scots assistance be not the second time needed (though in all presumption ready) it being the common cause) to our exceeding charge, nay dishonour, as if others were more apprehensive of our honour then ourselves, and we needed others to protect or defend our Liberty, or take and manage our quarrels. And now howsoever we may not share in the putting a period to the disorders of the State, yet let us think of doing it to this disordered discourse, wherein though there may not appear manifestly one continued beatch track of coherent passages, to bring you readily to the truth: yet I hope you have encountered a few points here, and there, not induect, nor impertinent thereto; like Posts of direction for Travellers, at each miles end, in some of our English deserts, to give you aim that you may hold the right way: or rather like race posts quickly to be run over, lest it might seem to pretend itself worthy to hold you long. And you may the rather pass by the imperfections in regard whilst it was endeavoured to have ordered and completed it, and to make all yet clearer, the Antiparliamentary party hath so in the interim, unmasked itself in sight of the world, and given such attestation in plain matter of fact (a stronger testimony than out of the mouth of the adversary) to the prospective and next to prophetic prudence and Judgement of the Parliament, so long since having penetrated and shined on the secret corners of their designs, and deeds of darkness, and exposed them to view that there is little need of any further light, and the defect is rather now in those who shut their eyes, that they may not see it We see already our Laws manifestly conculcated by force and violence, our liberties, properties, lives exposed to the fury and malice of these desperate Malignants (for which violence they cannot plead their present necessity, if being grounded and depending on their oppugning the Parliament unjust in itself as hath been showed) the danger of our Religion and consequently of the Religion abroad, from those, that having none, would bring in such, as may best suit with their pernicious purposes, and from the rest of old in direct opposition with it, on all which they are carried with such desperate ardour and violent fury, as their u must and last attempt, that having first in a due method indeed used all machinations to vilify and disannul the authority and very essence of the Parliament, the only rampart of England's happiness, and traverse to their designs, though God and good men have herein repulsed them, yet they cannot temper themselves, from breaking out into such effects as all the world sees, nor brook any delay from seizing what part they can meet with of the designed prey, till they may with less danger of reprisal do it; but it is high time now to leave words and writing: therefore let us endeavour to conclude this Tractate, almost as indigested and troubled as the times (like that offer of that poor Country man, that when the great King Artaxerxes passed by, having nothing else to present him, before whom none must appear empty handed, ran to a little troubled water, and thence offered the King what his hand only could contain; but the troubled present coming from a clear and good intention, and native hearty ingenuity, met with a serene, magnanimous, and regal acceptance) but let us conclude with a point of Judgement not altogether so weak as hitherto may have appeared; for I would end at least well and leave you with a good relish (though I appear to begin this point also but ill) which is, that having above received it as a sacred truth and ground, that no reason shall ever shake, that the wisdom, and Justice of a Parliament freely, duly, and lawfully elected is no way to be called in question or doubt, but to be assuredly believed and confided in, securely reposed upon and held sacred and inviolable by all that hearty love England's happiness: I will take heed at last to be found not fast and true to my grounds, and ends, by presuming (as some particular private men have done in their well otherwise understood discourses) to offer up any advice (were I otherwise able) or counsel to the wisdom, or exhortation or persuasion to the Justice of it; and thus my best is but a negative, a privative, or a nothing: but only yet upon the whole, inferring or enforcing justly by the power of truth; That it is the part of all honest men, men of honour that love their Country to obey the Parliament (taken in that notion our case presents) punctually, to serve it faithfully, and zealously; to love it with that kind of love, which is morte fortior, to vindicate, assert, maintain, propugne, clear the authority and safety of it, as a true collection of all that is or can be most dear, precious, and sacred to, and with such men, to join unanimously in the clearing England once again of Wolves, these man-wolves, if reducible by no reason, and not to lose their share of contributing to such a work; above all ardently to solicit and press the divine Majesty to inspire, protect, bless, this Congregation of Princes, this multitudinem Consiliariorum in quibus est salus, and in it our Country and all. I conclude this discourse, wherein I have spoken my heart, which nothing, but a lively and dear apprehension of the imminent and extreme danger of my Country, forced from so unfit a man; raising so violent but natural and just a passion, as broke the strings of a tongue ever before tied (and perhaps ever fit to have been so you may say), like that son of Croesus who before, or born dumb, yet seeing his Father in the very point of being slain, so natural a passion supplying the place and power of nature, or rather stronger than it, forcing and clearing all impediments turning dumbness itself into a strong vociferation; he cried out aloud: Oh man kill not Croesus, and so notifying him saved him. I need not fear you think so well of me, as that you would not remember that a similitude doth not hold throughout, and to the last, should I not put you in mind solemnly it doth not.   
FINIS.