THE EXTENT OF Divine Providence: OR, A Treatise tending to show that the just and holy God, may have a hand in the unjust actions of sinful men: and that in such a way as shall be without any impeachment of his Justness and Holiness, or diminution of his Power and Providence. By Thomas Whitfield Minister of the Gospel. The Lord is just in all his ways, and holy in all his works, Psal. 145.17. How unsearchable are his judgements, and his ways past finding out, Rom. 11.33. LONDON, Printed, for John Wright at the Kings-Head in the Old-Bailey, 1651. To the Right Honourable Edward Lord Montague of Boughton, a fruitful increase of piety, prosperity, and all true happiness both here and hereafter. My Noble Lord, IT would not a little conduce to the happiness of our lives, if our thoughts (which are the immediate and to oft abortive issue of our minds) were rightly employed and improved: then are they well employed, when they are conversant about the most excellent object: when they are taken up with the contemplation of the wisdom, power, providence, justice, holiness, and other excellent attributes of him who is excellency itself; in the fruition of whom is our highest felicity: this made the sweet Singer of Israel to say, How precious are thy thoughts to me, O God, how great is the sum of them? Psa. 139. As if he had said, the thoughts of thy wisdom, and wonderful workings of thy providence (things which before he had mentioned) are of great price and worth, being things of incomprehensible excellency: yea, they are as rare as precious, the minds of most men being so seldom taken up with them. I am bold to present to your Lordship this small Treatise, that it might give you occasion to entertain such thoughts as these, as also that it might be a testimony of my thankful acknowledgement of all that honourable respect I have received from you. Thus humbly imploring the Father of mercies, that he would farther enrich you with the true treasure, & enable you inwardly with the graces of his spirit proportionably to those outward endowments wherewith he hath been pleased to dignify you; I resign you to his mercy & rest Your Honours in all due observance and Christian service. Tho. Whitfield. The Preface. IT hath been a question much controverted in all ages, how the good and holy God can have a hand in the great evils that are done in the world: Quomodo id non fieret praeter Dei voluntare quod fit contravoluntatem (as Austin speaks) this is done mire & inessabili modo (as he saith:) this one of the mysteries and depths of divinity worthy our searching into. Scripture expressions for the most part hold this forth by way of action; As when it is said that God hardened Pharaohs heart, that he sent Joseph into Egypt, that he took away Jobs Cattle which were taken away by the Chaldaeans and Subaeans, and the like. Papests and Arminians confine this only to a way of permission without action, and calumniate our Orthodox divines, as if they made God the Author of sin, because they bring it within the compass of his will and decree, and make him to have a kind of action in it. Thus Bellarmine chargeth Zunighlius, Calvin, Peter Martyr, ●eza. The like imputation also Arminius seeks to fasten on Mr. Perkins. I know well that it is far beyond my ability to untie this knot as may give satisfaction to all; but if I may contribute any beam of light towards the clearer discovery of God's manner of proceeding in the production of sin: If I may help to vindicate the innocency and Orthodoxy of our worthy Writers from the unjust aspersion of their adversaries: especially, if I may in any sort vindicare the All wise, and All working providence and power of God, from that over much straightening and dimination which hath been put upon them for the maintaining of his justice: If (I say) I may by this discourse be helpful any of these ways, I shall attain the end which I aim at. Whereunto I shall only promise these things briefly. 1. That this discourse is not so much intended for those of the learned fort (who are better able to inform these lines) as for such ingenuous Christians, who when they meet with those Scriptures wherein by the sound of the words, God seems to be made the proper cause of sin, they stumble at them, and not being able to satisfy themselves desire help this way. 2. I shall desire the indifferent Reader, that if in this discourse he shall meet with that which may seem to go higher than many of our Divines have done, in making God to have an active hand in the actions of sinful men: he would forbear either to reject or censure, till he hath weighed the strength of the arguments brought to prove the thing propounded. 3. If I shall let fall any thing in this Treatise, which shall not be agreeable to clear evidence of Scripture, and this be made appear to be so; I shall not refuse to unsay any thing which I have said, and readily to imbrate my truth though not agreeing with my former apprehensions. The good Spirit of truth make us all lovers of truth, and lead us into all those ways of truth which may bring us at length to the enjoying of him who is the another of truth. Amen. Exodus, 9.12. And the Lord hardened Pharaohs heart, etc. IT is a principal privilege belonging to the Covenant of Grace, and a special promise which God hath made unto his people, that he would take away their stony heart from them, and give unto them hearts of flesh, Ezek. 36.26. that is, that he would take away the hardness of their hearts: How God should take away the hardness of heart in some, and yet harden the hearts of others, is not easy to apprehend. The scope of this Treatise is to show how the just and holy God, may have a hand in the sinful actions of men; and that not only by way of permission, but also by some kind of operation and working; and yet this be done without any diminution of his justice, or violation of his holiness, but still he remain to be most just in all his ways, and holy in all his works. CHAP. I. Showing what hardness of heart is. HArdness of heart may be said to be an evil quality of the soul, which makes it in a man insensible of the evil which he doth, or the evil which he shall suffer; when either he hath no feeling of it, or feels it not in that measure which he should do; then is his heart affected with hardness. It is man's duty to be sensible of the sin which he commits, and of the suffering which will most certainly follow after. God hath placed in his soul that faculty of Conscience for this very end and purpose, to give him warning and make him take notice of both these that he might be affected accordingly: Now when after the committing of sin, there are no affections of grief, sorrow, and trouble of spirit stirring in him, when there is no fear to commit sin, nor care to prevent the evil that sin will bring, then is the heart heardned. This hardness of heart is either natural, or adventitiall and acquired; the first of these we all bring with us into the world, being either altogether insensible of our spiritual misery, by reason of sin and suffering, or not so sensible as we should be. Hence the heart of man is said to be a heart of stone. Acquired hardness is that whereby the natural is increased and augmented; this may in some degree be not only be in the worst but in the best of men, which is brought to pass either by custom in sinning, or by secret judgement, or by both; of this there are divers degrees, as 1. When a man takes liberty, voluntarily and frequently to do such things as he knows to be sinful. 2. When he doth these against the frequent persuasions, admonitions, and calls of the word to the contrary. 3. Against such corrections, punishments and judgements which God shall inflict upon himself, or he shall see inflicted upon others for the same, or for the like sins. 4. When he shall do this against the stir and strive, the checks or rebukes of his own Conscience. 5. When notwithstanding all these, he shall take up strong resolutions and confirmed purposes to do as he hath done, namely to maintain his own will against Gods will. Thus may wicked men harden their own hearts; and thus it's often said of Pharaoh, that he hardened his heart, and would not let the people go, when he once saw that the judgement was passed. 6. When he shall come to be past all sense and feeling of his sin, thus the Apostle speaks of some, that being past feeling, gave themselves to commit all uncleanness with greediness, Eph. 4.10. 2. There may be an acquired hardness by the secret judgement of God. Thus it's said here that the Lord hardened Pharaches heart: and of Sihon, that the Lord hardened his spirit and made it obstinate, that he might give him into the bands of the Israelites, Deut. 2.30. How this is done, more shall be spoken in the due place. CHAP. II. Showing that God is not, nor cannot be the author or proper cause of this, or any other sin. BY another and proper cause I understand causa pierce, such a cause as is in itself, and in its own nature tends to produce, such or such an effect, as the Sun is the proper cause of light and heat, the water of moissure and the like: That God cannot thus be the cause of sin, may appear upon these following grounds. 1. God is the Author of all good, Argu. and therefore he cannot be Author of evil, for out of the same fountain cannot proceed sweet water and bitter, Jam. 3.11. As the Sun cannot be the proper cause of light and darkness, no more can the Lord be of good and evil. 2. Sin is a defect, now God is all act, yea he is actus purissimus & perfectissimus, the most pure and perfect act; therefore he cannot be the Author that which is a defect: for however sin cleaves to men's actions, as the accident to be subject, yet itself is a mere defect in a privation of what should be. 3. Sin is contrary to those excellent qualities and properties which immediately flow from the nature of God is light, sin is darkness, 1 Joh 1.5.6. God is purity and holiness, Sin is pollution and filthiness, Jam. 1.21. God is righteous, yea righteousness itself, all sin is unrighteousness, 1 Joh 5.17. God is perfection in the highest degree, all sin is imperfection: now one contrary cannot be the proper cause of another. 4. God is said to be such a God as loveth not wickedness, neither can evil dwell with him; yea he hates all the workers of iniquity, Psal. 5.4.5. he hates them because of their sin: now he cannot hate that which himself is the Author and proper cause of. 5. He th●carons in his word that he will punish all sin and iniquity, that he will not hold the wicked innocent, Exod. 34.7. but he will visit the iniquities of the Fathers upon the Children, even unto the third and fourth Generation; that the wicked shall not go unpunished, Prov. 11.21. they shall not escape, 1 Thes. 5.3. Now it cannot stand with his justice to punish that which himself is the Author and proper cause of. 6. Sin makes a reparation between God and the soul, Esay 59.2. It is an aversion of the soul from God: Now God cannot be the Author of that which is an aversion from him, for than he should deny himself, but he cannot lie or deny himself, 1 Tim. 2.13. 7. If God could be the Author of sin he himself might be said to be a sinner; if he were the Author of unrighteousness, he himself might be said to be unrighteous; to which the Apostle gives an absit, as a thing blasphemous to speak or think. Is God unrighteous which punisheth (saith he) God forbid: How then shall he judge the world? Rom. 3.5, 6. 8. The Apostle saith, that he who committeth sin, is of the Devil, 1 John. 3.8. and that Christ came into the world to dissolve the works of the Devil. Now Christ came not into the world to dissolve the works of God, therefore sin is none of his work. 9 If God should be the Author of sin, than the difference betwixt good and evil would betaken away, both arising from the same cause in the same manner. 10. If God should be the Author of sin, than he should seem to dissemble and deal deceitfully with men; because he so often calls off, from this as a thing which he loathes and abhors, and mean while is the parent and producer of it. By all these grounds it appears that God cannot be the Author and proper cause of sin, though he hath some kind of hand in it. CHAP. III. Showing how God hath a hand in the sinful actions of men. THe just and holy God may be said to have a hand in the unjust actions of sinful men divers ways, as 1. By way of permission, when he suffers them to follow the sinful inclinations and dispositions of their own wicked natures, and so produce actions accordingly, without restraining or hindering them. Thus it is said, he suffered the Gentiles to walk in their own ways, Act. 14.16. A man may be said to have a hand in that which he willingly and wittily suffers to be done when he hath power to hinder it: This is granted on all hands, for if God should not suffer sin to be, it could not be committed. God is able to restrain and hinder the committing of sin if he pleaseth, if any thing should be done whether he would or not, then were he not omnipotent. 2. By suffering Satan to tempt and provoke men to sin, and by his temptations to prevail: thus it is said that he did deliver all that Job had into the hands of Satan, and then Satan stirs up the Caldaeans and Sabaeans, to take away his Oxen and his Camels, and to kill his Servants Job 1.12, 15, 17. And he suffered Satan to enter in the heart of Judas, and to stir him up to betray his Master. 3. By withdrawing his grace from men, and not affording a continual supply of his help for their support and sustentation, that they may be preserved from falling. Thus it is said, he took away his spirit from Saul, 2 Sam. 7.15. And that when the Ambassadors of the King of Babel came to Hezekiah, the Lord left him to try him, that he might know all that was in his heart, 2 Chron. 22 31. The depraved nature of man is like to a ruinous house that his ready to fall, if it be not continnally under-propped and upheld by some supporters; now God is not bound to yield this support to sinful men, but he may withdraw his helping hand from them as he pleaseth, which when he doth, then are they ready to fall. 4. God often times punisheth one sin with another; thus he punisheth the abuse of the means of grace with hardness of heart, and the abuse of light with greater blindness. Thus it is said of the Jews, that God gave them the spirit of slumber, eyes that they should not see, and ears they should not hear, Rom. 11.8. And of the Gentiles, that because they abused the light of nature; and when they knew the true God by the works of Creation, yet they did not glorify him as God, but withheld the truth in unrighteousnesr; therefore he gave them up to vile affections to do such things which were not seemly, Rom 1.21, 26. And in the times of the Antichristian Apostasy, because men received not the love of the truth, therefore God did send them strong delusions to believe lies, Bellar. de Amis. great. & Sta. Pect. lib. 2. c. 14. 2 Thes. 2.10, 11. And thus much Bellarmine himself grants, for speaking of Absalon's incest, he saith, Deus decitur malum illud fecisse, non quia culpa Absoloxis sed qua paena Davidis erat. God is said to have done it not as it was Absalon's fault, but as it was David's punishment. 5. God may be said to have a hand in the sinful actions of the Creature, because he so ordereth them by his providence, that he suffereth sin to be committed in one kind rather than in another: thus he suffered joseph's brethren rather to sell their brother into Egypt, then to kill him: Thus Christ gave leave to the Devils, rather to enter into the Swine, then into men; Besides he so ordereth and over ruleth the actions of the sinful Creature, as he makes them serve to good uses and purposes; yea some times to ends altogether differing, yea contrary to what themselves intended. Thus he made the actions of joseph's brethrens in selling him into Egypt for a slave, to be a means of his greater advancement: And haman's enmity against Mordecay, and the Jews in getting a decree of the King for their destruction, to be a means of their greater safety and preferment; And the envy of the Jews against Christ, in procuring him to be put to a shameful and cursed death, to be a means and occasion not only of man's salvation, but also of Christ's greater exaltation. 6 God hath a hand in the sin which man commits, so far as he doth sustain and support him in all his natural motions and actions; God being the Author of nature, doth support man in all, the actions of nature, and that not only in good, but in evil actions. Sin being a defect or privation, and so a kind of none entity, cleaves away to something that hath being, to some habit, to some action or motion, as the subject wherein it is seated. Now all natural actions and motions are in themselves goods hence the rule holds true, that malum est in bono tanquam in subjecto, evil is in good, as in the subject of it. All natures works are Gods works, In him we live, and move, and have our being, Act. 17.25. This is true not only in regard of our External, but also of our internal motions and actions; not only of the body, but of the mind: As we cannot move our hand or foot, or not our thoughts, wills and affections without him. In every sinful action, there are two things conjoined and included: The action itself, and the defect or deformity; the inordinacy, and obliquity of it: One of these is as it were the matter, the other the form of it, which Divines call the materiale and formale Pacti. The former of these is from God, the other from the corrupt will of the Creature. It is a true rule that Deus agit inpeccato non tanquam causa moralis sed tanquam causa naturalis, God acts in sin, not as a moral, but as a natural cause; so fair only as there is nature's work in any action. All new actions are new entities and beings, and all beings are from God, who is the first and most perfect being, and from whom all other beings proceed. All natural motions and actions are creatures, and all creatures are the work of a Creator. Pet. Mart. loc. common. loc. 14 sect. 19 Qui equid est, quatenus est, non tantum a creaturis sed per deum produeitur saith Peter Martyr. Every thing that is, so far as it is, hath his production, not only from the Creature, but from God. And so far as these actions are beings, Augustin de Fera relig. cap. 34. and from God they are good. Ipsum quantulum cunque esse bonum est, quia summun esse est summun bonum, saith Augustin. The very being of any thing though never so small is good, because the chiefest being is the chiefest good. If it be objected that in sins of Omission there is no action, Object. therefore in these God hath no hand. It may be answered though there be no outward action yet there is an action of the mind and will: Ans. for when a man doth omit any duty, he omits it sciens & velens, upon deliberation he doth willingly choose rather to let it alone, then perform it. Homo corruptus vult non amare proximum, Pet. Mart. loc. commun loc. 14. sect. 20. vult nonire adsaerum caelum, ac perinde videmus actum voluntatis; ille actus, quà astus nata●ae, a Deo est, (saith Peter Martyr.) A corrupt minded man will not love his neighbour, he will not go to the holy Assemblies; this act of his will, so far as it is an act of nature, is of God. Thus we have seen how God hath a hand in sin divers ways; The two first, are acts of his Sovereignty, whereby he acts as a fire Agem, as being bound to none. The two second, are acts of his justice, whereby he inflicts punishment upon such as deserve it. The two last, are acts of his power and providence, whereby he doth not only sustain the Creatures in their several actions and motions, but guides these with the several adjuncts and accidents belonging to them, to such ends as seem best to his wisdom; and in none of these doth he appear in any sort culpable. CHAP. IU. Showing that God hath a hand in the evil actions of men, more than by way of bare permission. THat permission is excised by God, in the sinful actions of men, is by none denied (for if he did not suffer them, they could not be). but whether this permission be accompanied with action whether he hath any kind of efficiency or working in the evil that 〈◊〉 done by men, is the great question; the affirmative part whereof may thus be proved. 1. Argu. The Scripture expressions whereby God is said to have a hand in sin, are almost always such as denote action, and not a bare permission only. It doth not say that God suffered Pharaoh to harden his own heart, but that God hardened Pharao●s heart, Exod. 9.12. It is not said that he suffered the Canaanites to hearden their hearts against Joshua; but that it was of the Lord that they should harden their hearts to come against Israel, that they might destroy them, and they might have no favour, Josh. 11.20. It is not said that he suffered Absalon to commit wickedness with his Father's Concubines, but he tells David, What thou hast done in secret I will do in the sight of the Sun, 2 Sam. 12.12. It is not said that he suffered the Egyptians to hate his people, but that he turned their hearts to hate them, Psal. 105.25. that he suffered the false Prophet to be deceived, but I the Lord have deceived him, Ezek. 14 9 that he suffered the Gentiles to follow their vile affections, but he gave them up to vile affections, Rom 2.26. that he suffered those who received not the love of the truth, to be led away with delusions, but he should send them strong delusions, to believe a Lie, 2 Thes. 2.11. When our Saviour directs us to pray against temptation, he doth not bid us pray that God would not suffer us to be led into temptation, but that he would not lead us into temptation. By these and many other places, where Gods working in sin is held forth to us by way of action, it plainly appears, that in the sinful actions of men God doth exercise more than a bare permission: else why should the Scripture so constantly use such expressions as denote action? The Scripture doth never so frequently and constantly speak improperly in any subject, where it might as easily have spoken properly. 2. When God is said to harden Pharaohs heart, Argu. and Pharaoh is said to harden his own heart, if one of these may be taken by way of permission only, why not the other also, and so Pharaoh should have no action in the hardening of his own heart; for though God doth act and work in another manner than Pharaoh himself doth (as shall more largely be shown afterwards) yet the same expression being applied to both, it plainly argues that action belongs to both in this hardening, though the manner of their acting be far different. 3. It is granted by all, that God doth permit sin to be, Argu. otherwise it could not be: Now if he doth permit, than he doth volens permittere, he doth willingly permit it; for if he should not willingly permit it, th●n it should come to pass against his will: August in enchirid. cap. 95. but it cannot stand with his omnipotency that any thing should come to pass whether he will or no: It is the true rule of Austin, Nihil fit, nisi quod omnipotens fieri velit, vel ipse faciendo vel permittendo ut fiat; There is nothing done but the omnipotent God will have it to be done, either by doing it himself, or by permitting it to be done by others. If he willingly permits it, than he wils it, (for an act of his will passeth upon it) if he wills it, look how far he wils it he works it; For he is in Heaven and doth whatsoever he will, Psal. 115.3. so far as he wils any thing shall be or come to pass, so far he acts in bringing it to pass; for his will is an active and operative-will. The acts of his will are actus ad intra, acts within himself; and all immanent acts are of the same nature with himself, who is totus actus, all act: how then can it be conceived that such acts as these should be without action? All these immanent acts, namely the acts of his will, counsel, and purpose touching things which shall be as they are in him from all eternity, so in time he puts them forth in some outward action and working. Hence it is said, That he works all things according to the counsel of his will, Bellar. de amiss. great. & statu pcti. lib. 2. c. 14. Ephes. 5.11. Bella mine saith, Deus est ●ausa indurationis, non positiuè sed nogatiuè seilicet permissive, God is the cause of hardening not positively, but negatively; namely, by way of permission, so that he makes permission to be such a thing wherein God denies and withholds all action, and thus he saith God hardens; But to harden is an act, and how can an act be without action, so that this is nothing else but to bring in a clear contradiction for the blinding of the truth, yea, he saith further, Deus praesidet ipsis malis voluntatibus, eas regit, gubernat, terquet, flectit, in iis invisibiliter operando; God doth as it were sit Precedent over the evil wills of men, and doth rule, govern, wrist and bend them by working invisibly in them. Is not here a manifest contradiction to his negative permission? for are not all these actions, and can there be action without action? Far more agreeable to truth is the assertion of Dr. Twisse speaking of this subject, Non tantum voluisse Deum ab aeterno dicimus, Dr. Twisse vindict. l. 2 p. 27. sed conformiter ita operatum esse in tempore, & totum negotium ita administrasse ut river a pec●aret Adamus; We affirm, that God did not only will from all eternity, but did answerably so work in time, and so order the business, that Adam should certainly fall. 4. Argum. The Scripture saith that Herod, Pontius Pilate, and the people of Israel were gathered together against Christ, to do whatsoever the hand and counsel of God had determined before to be done, Acts 4.27, 28. what these did to Christ in his suffering was sinful in a h●●h degree, yet it was done by the determinate counsel of God: and as it is in this, so it is in all other actions of the like nature; whatever is done in time is determined, and decreed before all time. Now the decrees of God are ●ne●geticall decrees, whatever he hath decreed shall be, he some way or other procures the being of it; so that though he be not the Author of it if it be evil, yet he hath some kind of efficiency and working in it: for if he should leave it to others, and have no hand at all in the effecting of it, than the thing might never be, and so God might be disappointed of the thing which he decreed. It is a true rule being rightly understood, Qua decrevit fecit. If God should decree to permit sin, and that this permission should be without action, without doing any thing in it, than he should decree to do nothing which cannot stand with the nature of a decree. 5. So far as sin makes for the glory of God, Argum. so far he hath a hand in effecting it (for he both decrees and works all things which make for his glory, so far as they make for his glory: but sin by accident makes much for the glory of God; The Jews crucifying and killing of Christ made way for the glorious work of our redemption. The Apostle saith that man's unrighteousness commends the righteousness of God, and that the truth of God abounds through our lie, unto his glory, Rom. 3.5.7. so far as sin is for God, so far it is from God. Of him, through him, and by him are all things, to him be honour and glory, Rom. 11. last. 6. The Substratum or subject of sin, namely, Argum. the natural motion or action whereto sin cleaves, is such a thing without which sin could not be (for an accident could not be without a subject) men could not use their tongues to deceit if they could not speak at all, neither could their feet be swift to shed blood if they could not go at all. But of this natural motion and action God is the author and proper cause (as hath been showed) if God wils to yield his concurrence to the substance of any act, it is plain that he wils that act should be done, now without this act the sin that cleaves to the act could not be; therefore he must needs likewise some way both will and-work in the sin of the act: especially, because in many evil actions, not only the action itself simply considered, but the pravity and deformity of it, makes way, and is an occasion whereby God gets himself glory. 7. Argu. If God's permission of sin, should be a bare permission without action, than he should be a mere spectator of men in their sinful actions, himself not doing any thing. And this would much diminish and strengthen the work of his providence in ruling and governing the world, by excluding and shutting him out from having any working hand in the greatest part of those actions that are done in the world; for the number of wicked men in the world being fare greater than the number of good men, the number of evil actions, must needs fare exceed the number of good actions: yea thus the actions of greatest consequence, as the mutation or overthrow of Kingdoms, States, Commonwealths, (which for the most part are done in a sinful way) should be exempted, and excluded from the working of his providence. Arminius saith, Quae deus neque fiers vult, neque non vult, ea permi●tit: Those things which God neither wills, nor wils not to be done, those he permits. But is not this to make God an idle spectator of the greatest part of actions that are done in the world? If a man stands and sees a thing to be done, which he neither would have to be done, nor would not have to be done; wherein he will neither help nor hinder; doth he not here stand as in idle spectator, as one not at all caring whether the thing be done or not? and yet such a kind of carriage do they attribute to God in regard of the greatest part of things done, who make his permission to be without action: yea, herein they do after a sort contradict themselves. For Arminius makes permission to be, Armin. in Perk. 134. efficacis impedimenti suspensio, the withholding of an efficacious impediment, of such a thing as would certainly hinder the doing of a thing. Bellarmine saith, Permittere est, gratiam efficacem qua peccatum vitetur negare. To permit, is to deny such effectual grace, as whereby sin may be avoided. But can this withholding of an impediment, and this denial of effectual grace be without any action, at least without the action of Gods will? and doth he not work answerably to his will? 8. It is granted by the adversary, Argu. that God doth punish one sin with an other; Now is it not a ridiculous thing, to say that the judge permits only punishment to be inflicted upon a Malefactor? doth he not appoint it? and if it be not just, he ought not to permit it: There can be neither appointing, nor executing of judgement and punishment without action. By all these aguments it plainly appears, that God doth exercise more than a bare permission in the sin which man commits. This may further be confirmed by the testimony of the most Orthodox Writers: Excellent Calvin saith thus, Instit. lib. 1. cap. 18. Sect. 2. Deus indurat corda hominum non tantum permittendo sed etiam agendo. God hardeneth the hearts of men, not only by permitting, but by acting. Deus dicitu● indu●are reprobos corum corda vertere inclinare impellere. Id quale sit, Lib. 2. cap. 4. Sect. 3. nequaquam explicatur si confugitur ad praescientiam & permissionem. God is said to harden reprobates, to turn their hearts to incline and move them. How this is done, is not sufficiently explicated, if we fly to prescience and permission only. Peter Martyr saith, Loej. Com. loc. 13. Sect. 16. Est permissio quidem sed aliquid amplius efficacibus illis locutionibus ostenditur. There is indeed a permission, but something more is held forth in these strong expressions (namely such as before were mentioned.) Si minus propriè loqui velineus', Deus poterit aliquo modo dici, Locjs. come. loc. 13. Sect. 7. aut initium, aut causa peccati, non propria quidem, sed ea quae removens prohibens appellatur. If we will speak improperly, God may be said some way to be either the beginning, or the cause of sin: no proper cause indeed, but that which is called the removing of what hinders. Piscator saith, An vero negari potefl, Ad Amic. coll. vorstij. Sect. 17. illum procurare negotium cujus consilio & decreto negotium geritur? Can he be denied to procure a business to be done, by whose counsel and determination the thing is done? Mr. Bayne saith, Bayne on the Lord's Prayer. p 129. God's sufferance is not to be understood without his action, he is a voluntary agent in the things he suffereth; we must not think his permission to be a pure permission, without action. Yea, not only our modern Divines, but that famous ancient Angustin himself gives a large suffrage to this truth. August, in Enchirid. ad laurent. cap. 100 Deus permittit (saith he) aut voleus aut invitus, non certè invitus, quia id esset cum tristitia, & potentia se maj●rem haberet: si volens permittit, p●●missio est genus quoddam voluntatis. God permits a thing either willingly, or against his will; if against his will, this would be with pain and grief to him, and then he should have some other greater in power then himself; if he permits willingly, than his permission is some kind of will. Sencti affliguntur secundum Dei voluntatem, Ibid. 1 Pet. 3.17. at illi non possunt pati nisi alter agate. Qui unit passionem vult actionem, actio proficiscitur ab agente. The Saints are afflicted according to the will of God, 1 Pet. 3.17. They cannot suffer unless another acts; he that wils the passion, wils the action also, and action proceeds from an agent. Here by the way we may take notice how ill Bellarmine agrees with S. Austin in this point, for the writing of this subject, and answering to that place, Act. 2.23. where it is said that Christ was delivered to be crucified by the determinate council of God. Bellar. de Amis. great. & statu. Pcti. lib. 2. cap. 13. He saith, Saepe accidit ut actio sit mala passio bona, Deus voluit passionem & patientiam sanctorum, non autem actionem eorum a quibus affliguntur. But this crosseth Austin, who saith that in the Saints suffering, who suffer according to the will of God, Qui vult passionem vult actionem, and it is contrary to right reason; for action and passion a●e one and the samemotion, one cannot be without the other, therefore he that wils the one, must needs will the other also. Further, Austin speaking of that place, Rom. 1.26. where God is said to give men up to their vile affections: hath these words. Quid est quod dicit, Contra. jul. Pelag. l. 5. c. 3. cum desiderijs suis traditi dicuntur: relicti per divinam patientiam intelligendi sunt, non per potentiam in peccata compulsi? Quasi non simul posuit haec duo idem apostolus patientiam nempe & potentiam, Rom. 9 What is it which he saith, when men are said to be delivered up to their to their own affections and desires? are they to be understood as left only by the divine patience, and not put forward to sin by the divine power, as though the same Apostle did not join both these together, namely patience and power, Rom. 9.22. Thus we see that this learned Father goes as high, or rather higher in his expressions, touching the manner of Gods working in sin, than those of our Divines have done, who are so much quarrelled against, by Bellarmine and Arminius. I know well that most of our Orthodox writers do seldom use that expression, that God did decree sin, or is the cause of it, but only that he did decree to permit sin: but their meaning must needs be, that he did decree that sin should be effected and brought about in such a way and manner, and by such means, as himself would not be the Author or proper cause of it, but only a cause by accident: For if they should mean that he would have no efficiency or working in it, than they should make him to exercise a bare permission in it, and so to be an idle spectator of all the sinful actions done in the world; which is an opinion that they altogether renounce and reject, as hath been already showed. Doctor Twisse hath a passage where he affirms, that though God intends the evil action which man doth, yet he intends not the evil of the action: But that is meaning his, he doth not so intent it, as to be the Author of it, though he hath a working hand in it, appears by many other places in his writings; as when he saith, Vindic. great. lib. 2. pag. 156 Cum peccatum Adae eveniebat non nisi Deo volente eveniehat. When it sell out that Adam did sin, this fell out by the will of God. Excaecare est preouldubio, Effectum dare ut quis excaecaretur. To blind, is so to work & bring it about that a man should be blinded. Ibid. p. 87. An quae Satanas in sanctnm Job patravit Deo tantum permittente facta sunt? Anon Job profitetur Deum abstulisse quae dederat? Were those things which Satan did ill against Job, done only by God's permission? doth not Job profess that God had taken away what he gave? Decretum permissiwm nihilominus est efficax ad fines a Deo sibi praestitutos quam effectivum. Ih. p. 157. The permissive decree is no less efficacious for the ends fore appointed of God, than his working decree. These are the words of that learned man, by which it appears, that his meaning in the former words, is not as if he denied that God did decree the evil actions of men at all (for here he grants a decree, and that an efficacious decree) but only that he doth not so decree the evil of an action, as to be the author or proper cause of it; for if he should not at all intent the evil of men's actions, than the evil of those actions should fall out besides his intention; and than it should be either besides his knowledge, and so he should not be omniscient, or against his will, and so he should not be omnipotent. CHAP. V. Showing more particularly the manner how the righteous God hath a hand in the unrighteous actions of sinful men. THat God is not the Author or proper cause of sin, and yet hath some kind of efficiency and working in it, hath been already showed: it follows now to show more particularly, the manner how he worketh in producing of it. The manner of Gods working in sinful actions is secret and hidden, not easily to be apprehended, Contra Justinum Pelag. lib. 5 cap 3. much less to be explicated; which made Austin speak thus of it, Quanta est poena tradi passionibus ignominiae, sive de●erendo, sive alio quoque vel explicabili vel inexplicabili modo, etc. how great a punishment is to be given up to unseemly passions, whether this be done by way of desertion, or by any other explicable or inexplicable way; yet there is one way, which is not altogether above our apprehension, but therein we may in some sort discern God's manner of working in sinful actions, and that is by administering occasions, by presenting such objects, and offering to men such things are in themselves lawful and good, but they make an ill use of them, taking occasion by them to be stirred to evil in some kind or other. Licet Deo ita se gerere in rerum omnium administratione ut materiam & occasionem objiciat unde homines naturaliter excitentur pro varia affectuum qualitate vel ad bonum vel ad malum saith Dr. Twisse God may so carry himself in the administration of things, Vindic. lib. 2. p. 133. as he may offer matter and occasion, whereby men may be excited either to good or evil, according to the divers quality and tempers of their affections; yea, Bellar. de amiss. gratiae & sta. pcti. l. 2. c. 14. Bellarmine himself confesseth; Deum immutare cor prin●ipum immittendo aliquam bonam cogitationem aut saltem indifferentem, ex qua tamen impediuntur a proposito suo & ita decipiuntur; That God doth change the mind of Princes, by putting some thought that is good, or at least indifferent, whereby they are hindered from their purpose, and so are deceived. Thus God may administer occasions of sinning either inwardly or outwardly; Inwardly by stirring up and suggesting such thoughts to their minds as are in themselves lawful and good, or at least not evil, and yet they take occasion by them to be led to evil. It was no ill thought for Nineveh's brethren to think that their Father loved him better than he did them, yet this was the occasion of their envy and hatred against him, Gen. 37.4. It was no ill thought for Pharaoh to think that if the Israelites should continue to multiply and increase as they began, they might in time grow too strong for him, and so departed out of his country whether he would or no; yet hence he takes occasion to oppress them with heavy burdens, and to give command for murdering their male children, Exod. 2.10.13, 14. Shimei whose heart was full of rancour and bitterness against David, because the Kingdom was translated from his tribe to the Tribe of Judah when he faw that David was in distress, being driven from Jerusalem by the conspiracy of his son Aos●●on, and thinking it may be) that this came upon David as a just judgement of God for his unjust dealing with Vriah the Hittite, hence takes occasion to vent his spleen by cursing of David, the the hope of impunity likewise helping him forward. Jeroboam thought if the people should go up yearly to worship at Jerusalem this might be a means to make them return again to the house of David, this was no evil thought, yet hence he takes occasion to set up the Calves at Dan and Bethel, whereby he made Israel to sin 1 Kin. 12.26, 28. If the Jews thought that to morrow they should die, that is, that destruction would shortly come (the Prophet having denounced it) this was no ill thought, yet hence they take occasion instead of fasting to fall to feasting; Let us eat and drink for to morrow we shall die, say they, Isal. 22.13. The Jews thought if they should let Christ alone all men would follow after him, this thought was not evil, but hence they take occasion of taking counsel to kill him, Vind. lib. 2. p. 83. Joh. 11.48. Deus non modo occasiones ministrat sed ad eonsilia ex occasionibu●nata formand● concurrit, saith Dr. Twisse, i. e. God may administer occasions outwardly, and that both by his works and by his word; By his works divers ways, as 1. By his works of mercy; Because sentence against an evil work is not executed speedily (saith Solomon) therefore the hearts of the sons of men is fully set in them to do evil, Eccles. 8.11. These things hast thou don● (saith God) and I was silent, and thou thoughtest that I was such an one as thyself, Psal. 50.21. When God holds his peace at wicked men, when he doth not speak to them in his wrath, and vex them in his sore displeasure, than they are ready to think that he likes of them well enough, and of their ways and and courses, so that we see God's patience and long suffering is an accidental cause of man's security, of his prefumption and boldness in evil ways. Magna peccandi illecebra impunitatis spes (saith the Orators) hope of impunity is a great allurement to iniquity. And as his patience is an occasion of presumption, so is bounty of forgetfulness, yea, of rebellion against God. When thou hast eaten and filled thyself beware thou forget not the Lord thy God, Deu. 8.10, 11. (saith Moses to the people) Give me not riches lest I be full and deny thee, Pro. 30.9. When Jeshurun waxed fat than he kicked, than he waxed wanton and rebellious, Deut. 13.15. and it follows, Psal. 18. Thou hast forgotten God that form thee? 2. By works of justice Thus men men of times take occasion by the judgements and punishments which God inflicts upon them for sin, to break out further into sin. The Lord led his people through the wilderness, and caused them sometimes to meet with want of water, other whiles want of bread, sometimes to be assailed by enemies, to humble and to prove them, that he might do them good in their latter end, Deut. 8.2. But the bad ones amongst them, hence took occasion to murmur and rebel against him: When the Lord pours the vials of his wrath upon the followers of the Beast, and the adherents of Ante-Christ, hence they take occasion to blaspheme God of Heaven for their pains and sor●s, and repent not of their works, Rev. 16.10. when the King of Moab was brought to great straits, by the Armies of Judah and Israel, (to whom the Lord had promised success in their expedition against him) 2 Kings 2.17. he takes his eldest son and sacrifices him upon the wall, ver. 27. 3. By his works of providence. It was the work of a favourable providence which caused the Israelites so exceedingly to multiply in Egypt, yet hence Pharaoh takes occasion to oppress them and to murder their male-childrens. It was a work of providence that brought David in his slight from Saul, to Abimelech the Priest for relief at such a time when Doeg the Edomite was with him, 1 Sam. 22.7. now hence he takes occasion by his false slanders to stir up. Saul to kill all the Lords Priests at Nob, and to make him the instrument, 1 Sam. 23.18. It was a work of providence that brought David to the sight of a woman washing herself in her garden, when he was walking upon the roof of his house in an evening; this was an occasion to him of entertaining thoughts of uncleanness, and of putting them forth into action, 2 Sam. 11.2, 4. there was no fault at all in offering the occasion, but all the evil arose from David, for Joseph had as strong an occasion offered to allure him to the like sin, yet was not at all hurt by it, Gen. 39.9. It was a work of providence that brought the wise men that came from the East, to Jerusalem to inquire after the King of the Jews who was then borne, it was the special command of God to direct their going home another way, and not to return again to Jerusalem; yet Herod hence takes occasion to murder all the male children in Bethlem, and the bordering coasts, that were two years old and under, Mat. 2.16. 2. As God by his works administers occasion to men to break forth into sin, so he doth the like by his word; Thus he sent his word and command to Pharach, charging him to let the people of Israel go, but hence Pharach took an occasion to grow stubborn and rebellious, and more to harden his heart in a resolution not to let them go, Exod. 5.2. I know not the Lord (saith he) neither will I let them go; yea, the ofner Moses came to him with command from God for doing it, the more he still hardened his heart against it; look as a strong stream the more it is stopped the higher it riseth (though no new water be added to it) so it is in this case; Thus the Jews the more they were warned by the Prophet of their Idolatry, and that they should not go down into Egypt, Jer 42.17. the more obstinate and wilful they waxed both these ways, Chap. 44.16. so when Christ's hearers heard that which they thought touched themselves, it is said, they were filled with with wrath, and thrusting him out of the City they led him to the edge of an hill, with purpose to have thrown him down headlong, Luk. 18.27. When Stephen preached so excellently to the Jews, they burst with anger, and gnashed upon him with their teeth, running violently upon him: Act 7.54.57. So that Christ's and Stephen's preaching was an accidental cause of the wrath of these wicked men, as the stopping of a stream is the cause of the rising of it. Hence the Apostle speaking of the Law, saith, where there is no law thene is no transgression, Rom. 4.15. & that sin took occasion by the command, and wrought in him all manner of concupiscence; for without the Law sin is dead, but when the Law came sin revived, Rom. 7, 8, 9 that sin took occasion by the command and deceived him, verse. 11. so that the Law quickened sin, put life into it, and se● it on work, it lying as it were dead before, and not stirring so strongly as it did after the coming of the Law; by all which it appears that the Law is an accidental cause of sin. Now so far as the Law works it, God works it, the Law being his agent and instrument. But here it may be asked, Quest. how can it be that the Law which in itself is holy, just and good, should any way be the cause of evil? This ariseth from the contrariety that is betwixt the good and holy law of God, Answ. and man's corrupt and wicked heart. there is nothing more pure and holy than the Law of God, (it being the perfect rule of righteousness, and an exact idea of all purity and holiness) there is nothing more corrupt and and impure than the wicked heart of man, it being the fountain of all pollution and filthiness, Mat. 15.19. Jer. 17.9.) Now it is a true rule in Logic, Contraria juxta se posita magis ●l●cescunt, when contraries are placed near together, the contrarieties of their natures doth more appear and put forth itself; keep fire and water at a distance, and the contrarieties of their natures doth not much show itself, but bring them together, cast water upon the fire, or put coals of fire into the water, than they fight one with the other, and the stronger overcomes the weaker: so the more near and close the most pure and holy word of God be brought and applied to the corrupt and rebellious will of man, the more is the innate corruption and rebellion of it irritated and stirred up, and the more strongly doth it put forth itself. The more strongly the command was pressed upon Pharaoh touching letting the Israelites go, the more strongly did his rebellious will rise up against it. This we may see true in the ordinary carriage of wicked men: Let a proud swearer, or filthy speaker be rebuked for their ill language, and they will the more break forth into abusive speech. Thus we see how the Law and Word of God that in its own nature tends to restrain and repress sin, may accidentally provoke and put men forward to greater eagerness and violence in sinning; yea, not only the Law but the Gospel may by accident be an occasion of greater evil. Thus our Saviour tells the Pharisees, that if they had been blind they had had no fin, but because they said they did see therefore their sin remained, Joh. 9 last. if they had had no means of knowledge, their sin had not been so great, but now the light shined upon them, thereby their sin was increased, because they s●ut their eyes against it. Hence likewise the Apostle saith; that the Gospel was to somethe savour of death, 2 Cor. 2.16. In it own nature it did tend to life, but by accident it came to be an occasion of death to such as rejected it. Thus we see how God may be accidentally a cause of sin, namely, by administering occasion, and that both inwardly and outwardly, both by his works and by his word; and Bellarmine himself is forced in a manner to acknowledge thus much; for he saith, Bellar. de amiss. great. & statu. pcti. l 2. c. 14. Patientia Dei aliquo modo indurat, Caeterum non dicitur excecare vel indur are nisi per accidens sedipsis homines abutentes rebus bonis seips●s obdurate. The patience of God doth after a sort harden men: but yet he is not said to blind or to harden but only by accident, for when they do abuse good things they harden themselves. Here Bellarmine grants that God may be said to blind and harden men by accident, when they abusing his Patience and long suffering take occasion from thence to harden themselves in sin. CHAP. VI Showing, that such causes as work by accident, may have a true efficiency, and yet not be altogether blameless, in blame-worthy actions. THat accidental causes may have a true efficiency, and yet not be faulty when the effect is faulty, may appear both by Reason and Scripture. 1. The rule of reason tells us, that whatsoever hath a vis, any power or virtue to bring forth an effect, is so far a cause of that effect; For causa est cujus vires est. Now there be many things which have an efficiency in bringing forth such or such an effect, which yet cannot justly be blamed, though the effect be evil. When a man stands so near the fire that he scorcheth his legs, the fire hath a true efficiency in this scorching; yet not the fire, but the man only is to be blamed: for though it be the natural property of the fire to burn, yet the end why the fire was made, was to warm, not to burn those that stand before it; and that it scorcheth the man's legs, it is his own fault, because he did not stand further off when he might have done it: and the fire was only an accidental cause of scorching. When a man wears a sword for his defence, and he in a Melancholic or mad humour, shall run the Sword into his own body; here not the Sword, but the man is to be blamed, because the end of wearing a Sword is the safety, not the hurt of the owner: and though it hath a true efficiency in hurting wounding him, yet the fault only is his own, because he willingly turned the Sword against himself. When a Physician according to the true rules of Art, shall administer wholesome Physic to his Patient for such or such a disease, and this meeting with some hidden distemper or corrupt humour in the body, shall cause greater pain or (it may be) death; yet here neither the Physic nor Physician are to be blamed, because the work of both these in their own nature tended to health, and was fit to procure it. When Jason had his imposthume cured by the thrusting of a Sword into his body, by the hand of his enemy, this was no thank to his enemy, who intended not his health, but his death: so on the contrary it is no blame to the Physician that intends health, and useth fit means to procure it, though death follows by accident. When the same Sun beams lights upon a Garden and a Dunghill, and raise a sweet smell from the one, and an ill savour from the other; neither the Sun nor the beams thereof are to be blamed, because the efficacy of them did extend to both a like, but the different effect did arise from the difference of the matter whereon they did light. The like instances also may be brought from Scripture, when a man is hewing wood with an Axe, and the head of the Axe slippeth from the helve, and slays the slander by; here neither the Axe nor the man are to be blamed, though they have an efficiency in the death of the other, because they are only causes by accident; the scope of neither being to hurt the slander by, Deut. 19.5. When King Uzziah went into the Temple of the Lord to burn Incense, Azariah with fourscore other Priests, went in after him and withstood him, telling him that it did not belong to him to burn incense to the Lord; than it is said Vzziah was wrath, 2 Chron. 26.16, 17, 18, 19 Here the Priests were causes of the wrath of the King, but no faulty causes, because they did but their duty, and their intention was only to hinder him from doing that which was unlawful for him to do, but not to provoke him to anger and wrath. When the Pharisees were filled with wrath against Christ, and the Jews breast with anger against Stephen, because they justly reproved them, they were accidental causes of their wrath and anger, but no faulty causes. The Apostle saith, that the Law causeth wrath, Rom. 4.15. It causeth wrath by means of Transgression, (for transgression only properly causeth wrath) as the Law is the cause of wrath, so likewise is the cause of transgression, namely an accidental cause, yet no faulty cause, for the proper end of the Law was neither to procure wrath, nor to procure transgression, but rather to be a means to preserve man from both these, by directing him so to walk as he might please God; so when he saith that the motions of sin were by the Law, (that is, were stirred up by the Law) Rom. 7.5. and that sin took occasion by the Commandment, and wrought in him all manner of concupiscence, verse 11. here sin is said to be stirred up by the Law, and to take occasion by the Commandment of working concupiscence, and therefore the Law hath some kind of efficiency in producing of sin it is an accidental cause but no faulty cause. As the Law is in itself holy, and just, and good, Rom. 7.12. so it is good that it should be brought to man's understanding by the knowledge of it, and to his will and affections by the right application of it: but the more this is done (he being left to himself) the more doth it irritate and stir up corruption in him, and his will (by reason of the contrariety that is in it to the holy Law of God) waxeth so much more stubborn and rebellious as the Law is more closely applied to it. When the Apostle saith, that believers are not under the Law, Rom. 6.14. and that they are delivered from the Law, that being dead (namely that corruption) wherein we are held, Rom. 7.6. this must needs be understood of the accidental work of the Law, whereby (by means of our corruption) it stirs up sin in us; for it cannot be understood of the Law as it is a rule of obedience (because then the Law should be wholly abolished, to which the Apostle gives an absit, do we then make the Law of none effect through faith, God forbidden, Rom. 3.31.) neither can it be understood in this place of the condemning power of the Law: for though it be true that believers are freed from the curse and condemnation of the Law, yet this is an effect of justification, and hath reference to that, whereas the subject of the Apostles discourse in these two Chapters, where he speaks of freedom from the Law (namely the sixth and seventh) is altogether about sanctification, and he brings many arguments to prove the necessary connexion of these two together, and this amongst the rest, because they were not under the Law they were delivered from it; they must not suffer sin to reign in their mortal, because they were not under the Law but under grace, cap. 6.14. they were delivered from the Law (lust and concupiscence being killed in them, chap. 7.6. How were they not under the Law? how were they delivered from it? So far as they were truly sanctified they were no longer under the accidental work of the Law, whereby it had power to irritate and stir up the rebellion and corruption of their natures, and so to cause sin more to abound in them, being implanted into Christ and made partakers of the virtue of his death and resurrection, their old man was crucified, and their body of sin destroyed, so as they should no longer serve sin, as they did before, chap. 6.6. while they were in the flesh the motions of sin which were by the Law (which were stirred up by having the Law brought nearer to them) did work in their members to bring forth fruit unto death; but they were delivered from the Law (from that accidental work of the Law) that being dead wherein they were held, (their sinful lusts being in part mortified) that they should serve God in newness of spirit, and not in the oldness of the letter, chap. 7.5.6. by both which places it appears that the Law hath power to stir up sin and corruption in those that are in the a state of corruption that remain as yet altogether unsanctified, and so it is an accidental cause of sin, yet no faulty cause, that remaining still holy, and just and good. In this sense likewise Christ saith of himself, that be came not to send peace but the Sword, that he came to set a man at variance against his Father, and the daughter against the Mother, Mat. 10.34, 35. that he came to set fire on the earth, Luk. 12.49. How is this to be taken, that Christ came not to send peace but the sword? is he not the Author and purchasor of peace? Is he not called the Prince of Peace? Isai. 9.6. Is it not said of him that he is our peace? Ephes. 2.14. how then doth he say, that he came not to send peace? these words must needs therefore be taken with similation: he came not to send peace; that is, not peace only but the sword also: but especially, his coming was the cause of peace in another manner than it was of the sword. How did it cause the sword? this coming was not the proper cause of the Sword, but the sword (that is, wars and troubles) broke forth in the world occasionally upon his coming: for after that Christ came and the Gospel was peeached in the word; some there were that rejected it, others embraced and entertained it, believed and obeyed it, and accordingly made profession of Christ and his truth; now those who did thu● came to be hated and maligned, yea to be persecuted, and ill entreated by the other: yea by this means it came to pass that those who were joined together by the nearest bond of outward relation came to be divided, & be carried on with the greatest enmity and ill affection one against another, so that the brother did deliver the brother to death, and parents their children, and children did rise up against their pa●ents and cause them to be put to death, Mat. 10.21. By which it is plain, that Christ and his Gospel had a hand in both these, both in sending peace, and sending the sword, because the same expression is used in both; if there were a bare permission in sending the sword there was permission only in sending peace: if there was efficiency and working in the one, there was so also in the other (although after another manner.) In like manner, when Christ saith, that he came to set fire on the earth (to send persecution, and that his desire was this fire might be kindled, Luk. 12.49. It is plain he hath a working hand herein, for what he intends and earnestly desires, that he likewise some way or other effectually procures. If it be asked how the same cause can bring forth contrary effects, Object. how the same Christ and the same Gospel can bring both peace and trouble? The answer is, Answ. that though Christ had a sufficiency and work in both, yet in a far differing manner; for he is the author and proper cause of peace, this he both purchased and prayed for, of this he is causa per se, of the other he is causa per accidens, an accidental cause only; the end of his coming and of causing his Gospel to be preached to be preached, being not to bring trouble and persecution, but this ariseth from the perverse refractory wills of wicked men, who therefore hate the light because their deeds are evil. As the same heat of the Sun softens the wax, and hardens the clay, and the same light of the Sun helps a good sight to see better, but hurts sore eyes, so it is in this case. Thus also it is said that Christ is set or appointed for the rising and fall of many, Lu. 2.34. Not only for the rising of some, but the fall of others; that he is the corner stone elect and precious he is made in head of the corner to believers, but a stumbling stone and rock of offence to those that are disobedient, 1 Pet. 2.7, 8. He hath an efficiency in both these, for the text saith he is made to both, but of the one he is the author and proper cause, and therefore altogether faultless and blameless, their own wilful unbelief being the proper cause of their stumbling. CHAP. VII. Showing that God may work in the same blame-worthy actions with Satan and sinful men, and yet himself be altogether blameless. THat the holy God doth work in the same action with the sinful creature hath been already showed: Not only Satan moved David to number the people but God also, 2 Sam. 24.1. jacob's sons sold their brother into Egypt, so it is said, that God sent him thither, Psal. 10.17. when Jobs cattle were taken away by ill instruments, Job saith, the Lord took them away. Job 1.21. Now it follows to show yet further how the Lord may be blameless when he works with the creature in the same blame-worthy actions. This hath been in part made plain, by that which hath been showed already, namely, that in all sinful actions he is only causa per accidens, an accidental cause, no proper cause, which works out of inward principles, and according to its own nature; and this yet will more clearly appear, if we consider the differences that are betwixt him and the sinful creature in their working: though they work together in the same action, yet they differ in the ground in the manner, and in the end of their working. 1. They differ in the ground; the ground of all God's actions is his own most holy will, his own purpose and good pleasure. He worketh all things after the counsel of his own will, Ephes. 1.11. Whatsoever pleased the Lord, that didd he in heaven and in earth, Isal. 135.6. But evil instruments are guided by their own wicked wills, and not by God's will in their evil actions, (for they do that which is contrary to his revealed will; and his secret will they know not) if they do the same things God wils yet not because he wils them, but upon other corrupt grounds, when a wicked man sins he seeks to fulfil the will of the flesh, but not at all to fulfil the will of God, Eph. 2.2. he doth that which seems good in his own eyes, and not which seems good in God's eyes. 2. They differ in manner of working; for in sinful actions God works with evil not as a moral causebut as a natural cause only; God no where doth counsel or command, or persuade men to do evil, but altogether the contrary: But herein wicked men follow only the dictate of their depraved judgement, the sway of their corrupt will, the motion of their inordinate affections: or are carried on by the counsels and persuasions, or examples of others that are like unto themselves. It belongs to God (as the author of nature) to uphold the creature in all its natural motions and actions. And he moves the creatures with a motion agreeable to their several natures; as irrational creatures, so also Angels and men: when he moves good men they work according to their natures, when he moves bad men, they work also according to their natures, and this without any iniquity or injustice at all in God: for he is the author and proper cause of the motion: of the obliquity of it he is only an accidental cause (saith Dr. Twisse. Vindict. l. 2 p 86. ) True it is that in good actions he useth a further motion and concourse than he doth in other actions, for there he works not only as the author of nature, but of grace, not only by a general influence of nature, but by an influence of special grace; but in all actions he works as the supporter of nature, whereas wicked men work as the abusers of nature. Bellarmine grants, that Gods has an influx into all the actions that proceed from men, and yet that he is not the author of sin, because he hath only a general, no particular influx into the action wherein sin is committed, such an influx as is indifferent either to good or evil. But by this reason as he is not the Author of evil, so he should not be the Author of good, and if God be the Author of nature, he must needs have a particular influx into all natural actions, but into good actions he hath a double influx, namely, not only a natural, but a gracious influx. 3. As they differ in the ground and manner, so also in the end of their actings. The end of all God's actions is himself, and his own glory, He hath made all things for his own sake, even the wicked for the day of evil, Prov. 16 4 for this purpose he stirred up Pharaoh that he might show his power in him, and might declare his name through all the earth, Rom. 9.17. and for this end doth he suffer with long patience the vessels of wrath prepared for destruction, namely to make his power known, verse 22 Now the now the end which wicked men aim at in their actions is not God and his glory, but some unworthy and base respects of their own; wicked men usually make themselves, and the satisfying of their lusts the end of their actions: they prefer their own glory before Gods, Is not this great Babel which I have built by the might of my power, and for the honour of my Majesty, (saith that proud King, Dan. 4.27. How far evil instruments when they work in the same action together with God, do differ from him in the ground and end of their working will yet further appear if we shall look into some particular instances. When Satan assailed Job with his temptation, he did it out of hatred against him, & to drive him to distrust and impatience, & so overthrow & ruin him. But God did this out of love, that thereby he might exercise his faith and patience, and make way for his greater advancement. When Satan moved David to number the people, he did this out of malice against David and the people, and that hereby he might stir up the anger of God against them: But God did it to humble David, and to make it an occasion of inflicting just punishment upon the people for their many miscarriages. When joseph's brethren sold him into Egypt, they did it out of envy and hatred, and that they might rid themselves of him; but God did it out of love to Jacob and his family, that it might be an occasion of joseph's preferment in Egypt, and so of preferring of Jacob and his household in the time of extreme Famine: when th● Jew's high Priests and Elders, delevered up Christ to the Soldiers to be Crucified, they it out of envy and ill will, and that they might rid the world of him: but God did it out of love and good will to his Elect, that they might be saved and delivered out of their lost condition, so that the ends of evil instruments in those actions wherein they work together with God, being altogether differing, yea sometimes contrary to God's ends, they may be justly blame-worthy, when he is altogether blameless. But wicked men are blame-worthy though they propound good ends to themselves in the bad actions they do, Object. how then can God be blameless, when he concurs with them in the same actions, though his end be good? 1 Because he differs from them not only in the end but also in the ground and manner of his working. 2 There is not the same reason betwixt God and man, Answ. betwixt the Creator and the creature. Man is bound not only to aim at a right end, but also to be guided by a right rule, he is bound to regulate all his actions by the holy Law of God: but though man be bound to yield obedience to the Law, God is not bound to do it; for he made the law not for himself, but for the creature, not to put himself but man under the subjection of it: he having no other Law but his own most righteous and holy will, Who shall say to him, What dost thou? Job 9.12. He giveth not an account to any of his matters, cap. 33.13. If he be not to give an account to any than is he not subject to any Law, for whoever is subject to the Law must give an account to some or other, else the Law would be of no use. So that this is sufficient to make all God's actions good, because the end is always good (namely, himself and his own glory) If a man were free from all obligation of a Law, and only bound to aim at the glory of God, or the good of his neighbour in the things which he doth then if he propounded these these ends to himself in all his deal with God and men, he should be free from blame, but besides this he is obliged to live by a Law, to this law he owes subjection, which God doth not. But God is a Law to himself. If this be so understood, as that whatever is the ground and guide of his actions, it is within himself, than it is true: (for he borroweth nothing from without himself, which he makes the motive and ground of any of his actions, but all proceed from his own good will and pleasure.) But if this be so taken as that whatever God's law binds man to do, his nature binds him also to do the like; than it holds not, for the Law binds a man to do many things to which God is not bound: it binds man not only not to commit sin, but also to hinder it (if he hath power to hinder it;) but God is not bound to this, yea, man is bound to employ all the skill and power that he hath to hinder the committing of sin; if it were so with God then there should never be any sin committed in the world, for by his omnipotent power he is able to hinder it:) besides, if there were no sin at all, he should lose a great part of his glory, for as he is able to bring light out of darkness, good out of evil, so he daily doth it. The Apostle saith our unrighteousness commends the righteousness of God, and some sins by accident make much for the glory of God (as before hath been showed.) Besides, the Law binds man to do all the good he can, to convert all his children and kindred, his friends and neighbours, if we were able to do it; God is able to do this, but he doth it not, neither is bound to do it. God supporteth sinful men in their sinful actions, and supplieth them with natural strength for the acting of them, as in the actions of uncleanness, of drunkenness and the like: but man (if he were able) were bound not to do this; so that we see, God may do many things which his Law binds men not to do, & the other side may not do many things which by his Law men are obliged to do, and therefore he is not subject to it as men are, he is Dominus legis, non subditus. True it is, that God is so a Law to himself that he can do nothing which is contrary to his one nature, as he cannot lie, he cannot deny himself; but there are some things forbidden in the Law, which are not contrary to the nature of God; Thus we see how God may work in the same actions with the sinful creature, and yet himself be altogether blameless; for look as when God gets himself glory by the actions of wicked men (as by the Jews crucifying of Christ) it is no thank to them because they never intended it; so on the other side, when they abuse his power and providence (supporting the strength of nature even in sinful actions) it is no blame to him, because he being the good of nature must sustain nature in all her actions and motions; and because that as the evil which wicked men do is only an accidental cause of his glory, so the good which he affords them, and the help which he administers in upholding their natural strength, is only an accidental cause of the evil which they commit. CHAP. VIII. Showing how those Scriptures are to be understood which by the sound of words seem to make God the author and proper cause of sin. THose Scriptures wherein the same sinful actions are attributed both to God and men, and set forth by the same expressions (as when God said, that what David had done he would do, 2 Sam. 12.12.) seem to sound so as if both were alike causes of these actions; therefore it will be needful to speak something that may be helpful to weaker apprehensions for the right understanding of these Scriptures, and for clearing of God's holiness and justice, I shall instance only in some of the principal of them, and what shall be held forth for the clearing of these may likewise be helpful for giving satisfaction to other places wherein the like expressions are used. In that place, Object. Exodus 9.12 which was propounded for the subject of this discourse) it is said that God hardened Pharaohs heart, afterward it is said that Pharaoh hardened his own heart, verse 34. Now it may be asked, since the same action is attributed to both, how both were not causes alike in producing of it. The Lord did this in another way than Pharaoh did it, Answ. he did it only by administering occasion; he sent Moses with a peremptory command to Pharaoh to let his people go; this did irritate the natural pride and rebellion of Pharaohs heart, and stir up in him a stronger and more stubborn resolution not to let them go. As the command was holy, just and good, so it was good that it should be applied to Pharaoh, by propounding it, and urging it upon him; but the more this was done, the worse he grew: for the command being holy, and his heart altogether unholy; these two being contrary, the nearer they were brought together, the more they did strive and fight one against another, this being the nature of contraries (as before was showed.) But here was no fault at all in the command, for the proper end of the command was to inform Pharaoh of his duty, and to stir him up to the performance of it: But Pharaoh takes a contrary course, for whereas the end of the command was to make him willing to let the people go, he takes occasion from it to grow more refractory; either because it put him in mind of the damage he should receive by their departure, (they being so serviceable in making brick for his buildings) or that it might appear that he thought not any (no not the great God) greater than himself; and therefore he scorned to stoop and submit himself to any of his commands. By all which it appears, that the command was only an occasion or accidental cause of Pharaohs hardening, but no faulty cause at all. Now as the command did it, God did that being his agent, and he working by it. Neither God, nor his command, put any evil into Pharaohs heart, but by propounding good to him, and not imparting grace to perform it, he takes occasion to become more evil. Deus obdurat non impartiendo nialitiam sed non impatiendo gratiam, (saith S. Austin) God hardeneth not by infusing any evil, Augustine Epist. 105. ad Sixtum. but by not bestowing grace. To this purpose, Doctor Twiss saith well; In his answer to Mr, Cotten. that when a man is moved to courses contrary to his corrupt humours, whether by the word of God, or his works, these motions being only by way of persuasion; and he doth not by grace remove or correct those corrupt humours: in this case to move and to deny grace, is to harden. It is a good thing to move to good actions by outward persuasions, neither is God bound to confer grace inwardly, upon all those whom he doth thus persuade outwardly. 2 It is said that God did, Object. that which Absalon did when he defiled his Father's Concubines. 1. Answ. As god did it, it was an Act of justice in punishing David's sin with Vriahs' wife, by suffering Absalon to commit the like sin with his wives. 2. God administered occasion of this action, by causing David to leave his Concubines to keep his house: There was no evil in this, bu● hence Ahitophel takes occasion to give that wicked counsel, and Absalon takes occasion to follow it in defiling his Father's Concubines. 3. Object. David saith, that God bad Shimei go and curse him, 2 Sam. 16.10. This is not to be taken properly, Answ. as if Shimei had received a command from God to do this, but only it showeth the efficacy of the divine administration of things, even in such things whereof God is only a cause by accident. 2 God did administer occasion to Shimei, for his heart being full of rancour against David; he seeing now David to be brought into distress, thought this a fit time to vent his malice, because now he might do it with hope of impunity (as before was showed. 3. He did it as an Act of justice, David had caused the name of God to be blasphemed by the sins which he had committed, and the Lord suffers this wretch to curse and blaspheme him. 4. Object. It is said that God turned the heart of the Egyptians to hate his people, Psal. 105.25. He is said to do this not that he infused any hatred into their hearts, Answ. but in that he administered occasion, for he caused his people to grow and increase exceedingly both in number and in wealth: Now this gave occasion to the Egyptians to envy and to hate them: here the goodness of God to his people stirred up evil affections in them; but this was long of their own wickedness, no fault in God's goodness. 5. Object. It is said, that if the false Prophet be deceived, the Lord hath deceived him, Ezek. 14.9. The deceiving of the false, Answ. is here attributed to God in these respects. 1. In that he withdrew his grace from him, and left him to the deceitfulness of his own heart, which was of itself ready enough to ●un out into ways of error. 2 He did this to punish the people because they rejected the doctrine of the true Prophets, and would not believe nor obey that truth which they held forth to them; both these were acts of justice. 3. By administering occasions for the judgements threatened by the true Prophets were not presently executed, hence the false Prophets took occasion to persuade that they should never be. But further, sometimes the true prophets did foretell a peaceable and flourishing estate of Judah and Jerusalem; as that Jerusalem should be called the throne of the Lord, and that all nations should be gathered unto it, Jer. 3.17. That Jerusalem should be a praise in the earth, Esay 62.6. That their Land should no more devour the inhabitants, Ezek. 36 14. These and many other like promises which were not to be fulfilled till the latter days; the false Prophets understood and applied to the present times, and so thereby deceived both themselves and the people: but that they made a false interpretation or application of the doctrine of the true Prophes, the fault was only in themselves, and not in the Doctrine which the other had truly taught. 6. It is said that God gave up the Gentiles to vile affections, Ro. Object. 1.26. and that he sent strong delusions to those that lived under the Antichristian Apostasy, 2 Thes. 2.2.11. These Gentiles had vile affections of their own, Answ. and the other wanted the love of the truth, and that God left them to their vile affections, and to the deceitfulness of their own hearts, or to the delusions of false Teachers; this was an act of Justice to punish the one for going against the light of nature, and, and the other for not receiving the truth in love, when it was held forth to them. 7. When the evil spirit offered himself to seduce Ahab, Object. the Kord bids him go and do it, 1 King. 22.22. Here is more than a permission, here is a command; therefore here the Lord seems to be Author of Ahabs being deceived by the evil spirit; what a man commands to be done, that he is Author and proper cause of. 1. Ans. It is plain by this Scripture, that the evil spirit was defirous to seduce Ahab (for he offers himself as an instrument to effect it) but that he had no power to do it without leave from God: Now when the Lord bids him go and do so, this hath but the force of a permission, as if he had said thou mayst go and do the thing thou desirous to do, namely to persuade Ahab to go up to Ramoth-Gilead to battle, that he may fall there. 2. It may be answered, that all this which is here spoken by the prophet Michaiah, of the Lords sitting upon a Throne, and all the host of heaven appearing before him, and the question and answer here made, that all this, (I say) is delivered in a parabolical way, and therefore cannot in every breach be taken properly. Deus inducitur per prosopopeiam (saith Peter Martyr) God is brought in the person of a man, Locjs. common. loc. 14. and speaking after the manner of men. Now in parables, the scope of the parable is chief to be looked at, and what truth it holds forth; neither is every parabolical application to be urged as a thing really done: as in the parable of the Rich Man, he is brought in as speaking to Abraham, and Abraham answering him again, which we cannot think was really done; so in this place, every circumstance cannot be urged as a thing really acted, touching the Lords sitting on a Throne, and all the host of heaven shanding before him, and the question propounded and answered; but this is brought in by way of resemblance to Kings and Princes, who when they have business of weight in hand, are wont to consult with their Nobles, and those about them. All parables are similitudes, and of them the rule is true, that in every similitude there is aliquid dissimile, there is something that is unlide, and therefore they ought not to be stretched beyond their bounds, and so urged as if they agreed in every thing to that which they are brought to illustrate. These are the principal Scriptuers wherein such expressions are used, as seem to make God the Author of sin; for other like unto these, they may receive the like answer, namely that when God is said to do the same things which sinful men do, he doth it, either as the Author of nature and supporter of it in natural actions, or as the righteous judge by withdrawing of his grace, and punishing one sin with another, or by administering occasions; In all which he is altogether blameless. CHAP. IX. Containing an answer to some objections which arise from that which hath been before delivered touching the manner how God hath a hand in sin. IT hath been showed before, that God doth not only permit sin, but that he doth willingly permit it, therefore his will is conversant about it; and his will is more than a velleietas, a mere wishing, what he permits, that he wils with an active will: against this it may be objected. 1. That will may be said to be evil whose act is evil, Object. that act is evil which hath an evil object (for all acts receive their information, and so their denomination from their object) when the act of a man's will is carried after things unlawful then is this act evil and so is the will whence it proceeds. To this it may be answered, Answ. that sin is not so wholly and absolutely evil, but it may have some respect of good, it may have some good joined with it, 1. For in sinful acts nature's work is good (as hath been showed) It is a true rule, that actus peccati in genere entis bonus est, in genere moris malus. The act of sin as it is an entity, it is good, in regard of the moral affection or quantity of it, so it is an evil. Secondly, though in itself it be evil, yet it may be made a means an occasion of good, God is able to bring good out of it. Hence Augustine saith excellently, August. in Enchirid. cap. 96. Quamvis quae mala sunt in quantum mala sint, non sin bona, tamen ut non solum bona, sed etiam sint & mala bonum est. Although evil things so far as they are evil are not good, yet it is good that not only good, but evil should be. Sin is in itself against the glory of God, therefore he cannot will it as it is in itself, and in its own nature, and as wicked men will it. But as the skilful Physician can so order and temper some poisons that though they be in themselves destructive to nature, yet he can make them medicinal and helpful; so the wise and mighty God is able to make that which is in itself against his glory, to be serviceable to his glory, he can work out his own glory from the work of men's actions, he can make them useful to the best ends; and so far he may both will them and work them, namely, as he can, and will bring good out of them. Non sineret bonos fieri malis, Enchirid. cap. 100 nesi omni●otens etiam de malo facere p●ss●t bene (saith Augustine) the good God would not suffer evil to be, unless he being omnipotent could bring good out of evil. To the same purpose he saith also in another place, Scivit Deus magis ad omnip●tentissimam ejus bonitatem pertinere, De correpes great. cap. 10. etiam de malis benefacere, qu●m mala non sinene. God did know that it more befirs his omnipotent goodness to bring good out of evil, than not to s●ne any evil at all to be; yea, Bellarmine himself acknowledgeth that God did Ex lapsu hominis ingens bonum elice●e, did draw forth a wonderful great good out of the fall of man. So that we see that sin (though evil in itself, may have some respect of good in it, and some way make for the glory of God now in this respect only, God wils it, and this he may do and his will still be a just, holy, and righteous will. If man's s●n be the object of God's decree, Object. 2 then man's sins necessarily (for what God hath decreed must necessarily come to pass) and if the decree of God be the cause of this necessity, than likewise it is the cause of that sin which follows upon it, and so God shall be the Author and proper cause of sin. That God's decrees do not take away the liberty of man's will may appear many ways. Answ. 1. Christ's death was decreed, for he was delivered by the determinate counsel of God, Acts. 23. yet he died freely, for he saith of himself, that he laid down his life when no man had power to take it from him, John. 10.17, 18. he laid it down willingly and freely; beside if he had not done thus, if Christ's death had not been voluntary, it had not been an act of perfect obedience, and so could not have been meritorious. The steadfastness and firm standing of the good Angels in their integrity is a free act, for they are not enforced to it, 2 Thes. 2.2.13. yet this was decreed for they are elect Angels. The Saints are chosen to faith and sanctification, yet they believe and repent freely, not being led to it by any natural or violent necessity. All our natural motions and actions proceed freely from us: yet to deny these to be within the compass of God's decree, were to deny a great part of his providence, In him we live and move, Act. 11.28. Pro. 16.9. And what he doth in time he hath determined to do before all time. 2. God's decree is, actus ad intra, one of those immanent acts which are always within himself: and of the●e acts the rule holds true, that they do nihil ponere in objecto, they put nothing into the object about which they are conversant; Gods decree alone (being an instrument within himselve) works nothing upon the creature, till it comes to execution, till some some way or other he doth put forth his purpose by some outward act: unless therefore it can be s●ewed how God in the execution of his decree, by some outward act upon man doth necessitate man's will, his decree alone will never infer any necessity upon it, and we find the contrary by experience, namely, that we are carried forward to the committing of sin freely as we are to eat out meat, or drink our drink, or perform any other action most agreeable to our natures, being led to it neither by any violent or natural necessity. 3. God's decree is so far from infringing the liberty of the second causes that it establisheth and strengthens them in their liberty: for he doth not only discernere rem ipsam sed modum rei, not only determine and decree the thing itself, but also the manner of it: he determines that somethings shall come to pass necessarily, other things freely and contingently. That necessary things shall come to pass by necessary causes, contingent things by contingent causes. All entilies and beings as from God, with all the adjuncts and properties that belong to them, and he worketh in all things according to the nature of the things: and therefore in natural agents he causeth things to come to pass necessarily, in free agents contingently: so that though Gods will determine man's will, yet it determines to work contingently and freely, voluntas necessario movetur ad agendum eu u●posttione motionis divinae, Vindic. lib. 2. pag. 31. page 27. ita e●iam necessari● movetur ad age●dum libere, quia movet Deus voluntatem hominis conveniunter suae natucae (saith Dr Twisse) as the will is necessarily moved to act, upon supposition of the divine motion, so it is necella●ily moved to act freely, because God moves man's will, in a way agreeable to its own nature. Posito decreto necesse erat ut primus 〈◊〉 pecca●et, sed necesse erat ut peccaret liberè. Upon suppo●●ition of Gods decree it was necessary that the first man should ●inne, but it was also necessary that he should sinne freely. 4. Causes by accident, never work necessarily, but contingently: the Sun sends forth light necessarily, but darks weak eyes contingently. The Law is only an accidental cause of sin (as before was showed) and look how the law works it God works it, and as he works it so he hath decreed to work it, therefore his decree infers no necessity. Besides a cause by accident never works, till causa peruse such as is properly, and in its own nature a cause, sets it on work. The Sword which a mad man wears will never move to hurt him, till he himself gins to move it. The wall will never hurt the glass or pot, till the drunken man or some other dasheth it against the wall: no more will the Law of God ever hurt a man till he dasheth himself against it. Causes by accident are always reducible to other causes; so the last resolution of sin must be in the freewill of man as into the true and proper cause of it. Object. But here it may be further objected, that if that which God hath decreed doth not necessarily come to pass, than his decree may be frustrated. Answ. This Objection makes as much against God's foreknowledge, as against his decree, for as he cannot be disappointed in his decree, so he cannot be deceived in his foreknowledge; but it is granted on all sides that God did foresee and foreknow Adam's fall (as all other sins) before it was committed; and therefore his foresight doth not hinder the free working of man's will, no more doth his decree. 2. It follows not that his decree may be frustrate and disappointed, though some things come to pass contingently, because although it be necessary that what God hath decreed should come to pass, yet not that it should come to necessarily: that it should be effected, Necessario modo & necessarijs medijs in a necessary manner, and by necessary means. God having decreed that not a bone of Christ should be broken, it was necessary that this should come to pass, and that Christ's legs should be preserved from breaking, when the others were broken that were crucified with him: but yet this came not to pass necessarily, for both Christ's bones were in their own nature fragilia, talia quae frangi possint, such as might be broken, as also the Soldiers did freely abstain from breaking of them, without any compulsion at all. But it is not possible that the same effect should come to pass, both necessarily and contingently. Yes, it is possible; as this effect hath reference to divers causes, as the not breaking of Christ's bones had reference to God's decree and appointment, it was necessary (as hath been showed) because that could not be disappointed; but as it had reference to the second cause, namely the free will of the Soldiers, as it was not necessary but contingent. So on the other side, the Suns giving light in the air, and the fire burning of combustible matter, are necessary effects as they have reference to the second causes, but contingent as they have reference to the first cause; for God doth freely, not necessarily concur with the Sun in his shining, and the fire in his burning. Hence arise these distinctions so frequent with Divines, of nenessitas absoluta & hypothetica, necessitas causae & consequentiae, an absolute and condition all necessity; a necessity of the cause, and of the consequence. The absolute necessity, or necessity of the cause is, when things are so fast and firmly tied together by the order of the second causes, as according to the course of nature, the effect cannot come to pass otherwise then it doth: As if a man be a man, he must needs bea reasonable creature; if fire be fire, it must needs have the property of burning; if a stone be a stone, the motion of it must needs tend downward. The conditional or consequential necessity, is when there is no such fast linking together of the second causes, but that when they work one way, there is a disposition in them to work another way, though one thing doth certainly follow another, yet by no necessary causation, but by a free and contingent manner of working. Upon supposal of God's Ordination and appointment, the rising of the Sun follows the rising of the morning Star, and (in the Countries where we live) the coming of the warm summer, follows the coming in of the Swallows amongst us, and this by a consequential necessity, for it is never otherwise, but not by any absolute or causal necessity. God having decreed and appointed concerning Esau and Jacob, that the elder should serve the younger, it was necessary that Jacob should get the birth-hood and blessing from his brother Esau; but this was effected by as contingent means as might be: for it was no whit necessary that Esau should come in hungry from hunting, that Jacob should have Pottage in a readiness, that Esau should be desirous of them, and be willing to part with his birthright for them; all these things were done freely on both parts: there was no necessity that Jsaac should mistake Jacob for Esau, and his savoury meat for Esau's Veinson; but all this was done most freely (though guided by a secret providence.) God having determined that the Israelites should spoil the Egyptians of their Jewels, of Silver and Jewels of Gold at their departure out of Egypt, Exod 12.35. compared with Chap. 3.22. and 11.2. this must necessarily come to pass; yet it was done in a most free manner without any enforcement or necessity; for it is said they asked of the Egyptians Jewels, of Silver, and Jewels of Gold, and the Lord gave them favour in their eyes, that they granted their request, Chap. 12.34, 35. So God having decreed the fall of Adam, it was necessary that this should come to pass, but it was also necessary it should come to pass freely: and accordingly he did freely and willingly yield to the enticing persuasion of the Serpent, without any compulsion at all: For as the power of God, whereby he his able able to change the nature of things, doth not hinder the necessary working of necessary causes; so likewise the will of God, (whereby he hath determined the event one way) doth not hinder the free and contingent working of contingent causes. Besides every necessary truth, is an eternal truth; this being a most true rule, that axioma necessacium est quod semper verum est ne falsum esse potest, a necessary proposition is that which is always true, and can never be false, that man is a reasonable creature, was a necessary truth before man was born: That a Cain should kill his brother, was no necessary truth before the thing was done; no more was it a necessary truth that Adam should eat the forbidden fruit, before he had eaten it; and although it was a truth afterwards, yet no necessary truth: for no circumstance of time can change the nature of things, as to make a contingent truth to become necessary, or a necessary truth to become contingent. True it is that when a thing is done, it cannot be undone, (for a thing cannot be, and not be both at once) but it was not necessary that it should be done, if it be a thing of contingent nature. What I now speak or write, is necessary should be thus spoken or written when it is once done: but before it was done it was not necessary that I should speak or write in this manner, or speak or writ at all, these being acts of freedom and liberty: so it is in all actions of the like nature, in all contingent actions. Thus we see that God's determination and decree doth no whit infringe or obstruct the liberty of man's will, and therefore not withstanding such decree, man is no whit less blame-worthy, nor God at all faulty in the evil which man doth. A third objection which may be raised from what hath been delivered is, Object. that God hath been said to be an accidental cause of sin, if so, than the sinful actions of men fall out besides his scope and intent: for that is said to be an effect by accident, qu indo aliquid p●ater efficientis secpum accidit, when some event happens besides the intent of the efficient: Now how can God will or decree sin, if it sals out besides his scope and intents? To this doubt answer may be made by distinguishing betwixt intentio operis & operantis, Answ. the intention of work and the workman: Sin is besides the scope of the work which God doth, but not besides his own intent who is the agent and workman. When he decrees sin shall be, he intends it shall be by such ways and means, by which acts and works (so far as he works in it) as in themselves and their own nature tend only to good, and are mere accidental causes of the evil which man does. The Law, and word of God, his mercies, judgements and all his dealing with men, in their own nature tend to this end, namely, to make men better, not worse; and if they be made worse by them, it is propter scopum, besides the scope and intent whereto these things in their own nature tend. The Gospel in itself tends to life, when therefore it is the savour of death, it is besides the proper scope intent and of the Gospel: but though it besides the intent of the Gospel to be the savour of death, it is not besides God's intent, for he both knows and intends in what effect the Gospel shall have: otherwise he should be defective in his wisdom and providence: besides what power the Gospel hath to produce an effect either way, it receives from him. Hence it is aid to be the power of God unto salvation, Rom. 1.16. the powerful instrument which God useth to bring men salvation, which power he puts into it: and so likewise when he works the other way it is power also. The Lord bids the Prophet Go make the hearts of this people fat, and make their ●ares heavy, and shut their eyes, &c, Isa. 6.10. and how should he do this? namely, by preaching the word unto them; by which it appears, that sometimes the word doth harden men's hearts, close their ears and shut their eyes; and that God intends it should do so, and sends it for this very purpose; yet the word in own nature tends to soften their hearts, to open their cares, and eyes, to make them see and hear better; so that the word here is only an accidental cause (it being beside the scope and intent of the word to harden:) yet this is not besides God's intent, who in all his actions, and in the use of such instruments as are employed in them propounds to himself a most sure and certain end. By all which appears as the secret and just judgement of God, so his infinite wisdom and skill, who can work out his own ends by such means, as in their own nature do tend a contrary way. CHAP. X. Showing some useful conclusions which do necessarily follow from what hath been spoken of this Subject. IF God so ordereth things, Conclu. 1 that in all the sins which are committed by men though he hath a secret working hand, yet he works in a most just and holy manner, and doth nothing but what is right and good: Hence it follows, that in all the sin which is committed, in all the evil which is done, either by ourselves or others we lay all the blame on ourselves or them, not imputing the least miscarriage on God, not so much as in our thoughts, He is just in all his ways, and holy in all his works; what ever he doth is well done, be the instruments never so bad by whom it is done. In all the evil that befalls us, we have no just reason at all to repine and murmur, to be impatient or discontent; for all his deal with us, whether by his word or his works, his mercies or his judgements, do in themselves tend to good: when therefore any evil comes we must take heed we do not charge God foolishly, job 1.22. but remember that we have procured these things to ourselves, (as the Prophet tells the people, Jer. 2.17.) Sin is the seed of sorrow: all the evil of suffering ariseth from the evil of finning, and this ariseth only from ourselves: yea, though sometimes we suffer many evils altogether unjustly as they proceed from men, yet as they come from God (who guides all the actions of men) they are done most holily, wisely and justly. Thus Daniel acknowledgeth in regard of himself and his people, O Lord, righteousness belongs to thee, open shame to us, Dan. 9.6. Thou art just in all that is come upon us (saith Nehemiah) for thou hast done right, but we have done wickedly, cap. 9 last. Let God be true and every man a liar (saith the Apostle, Rom. 3.4.) So let God be just and holy, and every man sinful, wicked, and wretched abundantly worthy of all the evil which comes upon him. Hence it follows, Conclu. 2 that we ought with all reverence to admire and to adore the infinite wisdom justice and power of God, that is able to work in the most blame worthy actions of sinful men, and yet himself remain altogether blameless: that is able to bring about the best ends by the worst means: that in many great works which have been done in the world, hath wrought out such ends, as have been altogether different, yea, sometimes contrary to the scope and intent of those who have been the principal actors and agents in them. Little did joseph's brethren think that when they sold their brother for a slave, this should be the means of making him the greatest man in all the Land of Egypt next to Pharaoh. Little did Haman think that when out of his hate and indignation against Mordecai, he gate a decree of destroying all the Jews in the King's Dominion in one day, that this should be a means and occasion of making them have a hand against their adversaries and of procuring liberty to destroy them? yea, of bringing himself to the Gallows, Hest. 8.11.7.10. Little did the Jews think that their envy and hatred against Christ should be an occasion of redemption of mankind, that when they spit upon him, buffeted him, beat him with rods, crowned him with thorns, caused him to suffer the shameful and accursed death of the Cross, that this should be a means of his greater advancement and exaltation: yet the Scripture saith, that because he made himself of no reputation, and humbled himself to the death of the Cross, therefore God highly exalted him, and gave him a name above every man, Phil. 2.8. what reason therefore have we in way of admiration to cry out with the Apostle, Oh the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and ounsell of God, unsearchable are his judgements and his ways past finding out, Rom. 11.33. Thirdly, Conclu. 3 hence it follows, that we ought to acknowledge with all thankfulness that infinite goodness of God, which doth not suffer us to go on in a course of sinning, especially in such a sort as would ruin our souls, and drive us to destruction: for if he should it would be in vain for us to complain against him; he would easily acquit himself and justify his own proceed: he would be justified in his words, and overcome when he is judged (as the Apostle speaks, Ro. 3.4.) he would easily convince us, that in all the evil which we have done, or shall suffer, the just blame lies upon our own heads, and our destruction is of ourselves: he would cause our mouths to be stopped, and make us (as all the world) to be found culpahle before him, Rom. 3.10, If he should enter into judgement with us, we should not be able to answer one of a thousand: what a mercy is it that he doth not suffer us to fall into sin so frequently, and in so fowl a manner as we are ready to do, especially that he doth not charge our sins upon us. What reason have we to say with the Psalmist, Praise thou the Lord, O my soul, and all that is within me praise his holy name, who forgiveth all thine iniquities, and healeth all thine infirmities, who doth not deal with us after our sins, nor reward us after our iniquities; but as high as the heaven is above the earth, such is his mercy towards us; as far as the East is from the West, so far he doth remove our sins from us, Psalm. 103.1, 3.10, 11, 12. to him alone be all glory now and ever. FINIS