CONSIDERATIONS ON Mr. Harrington's COMMONWEALTH OF OCEANA: Restrained to the first part of the Preliminaries.  
LONDON, Printed for Samuel Gellibrand at the Golden ball in Paul's Churchyard 1657.   

A Letter sent to Dr. W. W. of W. C. By whom the Author was desired to give his judgement concerning the Commonwealth of OCEANA.  
SIR,  
I Am to give you thanks for the occasion you have given me of reading the Commonwealth of Oceana; which Book I find to be so much the Discourse of good companies, that not to have seen it would expose a man to some shame: But to deal freely with you, I have cause to complain of your severity in imposing a necessity upon me to give you my thoughts about it; for in a matter of so obscure and intricate speculation as the principles of Government, it will be difficult not to lose the way, especially for one very little acquainted in the Resorts of Learning and Experience. Yet to show you Sir, that my own convenience is not allowed to be an Exception against any of your commands, with this you shall receive some Papers, and in them an account of such things wherein either Mr. harrington's want of demonstration, or my own want of capacity have not suffered me to receive satisfaction.  
Those men Sir, who have the good fortune to have part in your friendship, a●e not more in love with any of your virtues, then with the generous freedom you maintain in an Age overrun with passion and soureness: It is not enough with you, for the ruining a man, to be told that he is of such a party or persuasion, but Truth and Merit are never strangers to your good opinion, in what Country soever they have been brought up: This is the Prerogative of your judgement, which being able to pass sentence upon every particular, is not put to take things in gross upon the credit of any faction or company of men. The knowledge of this fair temper gives me assurance that though I had in charge from you to put down what I could object to Mr. Harrington's Oceana, the liberty will not be unaceptable that I take in telling you, There are in it many things deserving praise, a sprightly expression, and a sort of Oratory well becoming a Gentleman, good remarks out of ancient and modern Histories, and a judgement not ill founded on past & present policy, were it not for a certain violence in seeking to draw all things into servitude to his Hypothesis.  
Having thus let you know that I do not mean to fall out with the whole Book, it is fit that next I inform you what part of it I resolve to attack; And in that my choice shall be directed by the imitation of good Greyhounds who if let slip at the whole Herd, will, run at none but the Leading Deer: The first part of the Preliminaries is that I fasten on, which is the Groundwork of the whole Discourse, and consisting in the debate of universal and rational notions of government, asserted by examples of the Greek and Roman History will very properly become the subject of a Disquisition. As for the following model of a Commonwealth, Mr. Harrington hath by transcribing her Orders very wisely put himself under the Protection of the most serene Republic of Venice, against whom I have no inclination to make War, at this time especially when doing so would look like an Association with the Turk, the common enemy of Christendom.  
In making out this Design I have not been able to find out any more proper Method then to follow Mr. Harrington foot by foot, setting down the Passages in him to which every thing refers, though I am sensible how disadvantageous this is by cutting off all Ellegancy and freeness of Expression, which is no more to be expected from one who ties himself to such a Method, than an high Dance from a Man in Fetters: Besides, whereas to read it over throughly for the understanding of it, is more than a Book can often obtain of the Reader; This Piece will lie a great deal more at his mercy, seeing that to make sense of it, it will be requisite to read so much of Mr. Harrington as it pretends to answer.  
But I beseech you Sir, are not We the writers of Politics somewhat a ridiculous sort of People? Is it not a fine piece of folly for private men sitting in their Cabinets to rack their brains about models of government? Certainly our Labours make a very pleasant Recreation for those great Personages who sitting at the Helm of Affairs have by their large Experience not only acquired the perfect art of Ruling, but have attained also to the Comprehension of the Nature and Foundation of Government: To them I believe We shall appear just as Wise as the Philosopher who read a Lecture of the Duty of a good Commander before the greatest Captain of his Age.  
To be exempted from this Censure will be a very great kindness which is in your Power to do me by imprisoning these Papers in some close place from whence they can make no Escape; They are I confess so absolutely made yours that there remains with me no Power over them, but only to beg of you that your favour to them may not prove want of justice to me.  
I am not ignorant Sir with what artifice and importunity Mr. Harrington hath courted opposition from others. And you have told me, that he hath professed himself not capable of any greater kindness or obligation, then to have objections made against what he had published. Upon which account I should think it not unjust or unreasonable to expect, that these Animadversions should not be any offence or provocation to him; And yet I am not without some reason to suspect the contrary: since I have seen by his rigour to Dr. Ferne, that Mr. Harrington is of a nature that does not willingly admit of Opposition. In earnest sir, to speak frankly, his usage of the Doctor appears to me very harsh, and I can make no better of it then if he should press a Gentleman so far as to whisper a modest Challenge into his Ear, and then with the help of his Footboy make a street-Debate of that which ought to be decided in the way of Honour. Yet I shall be very little liable to this Danger, both because it is likely he will think me below his Revenge, and because not knowing me he will be at a loss how to aim his blows in the Dark.  
If then these Papers happen at any time to be so disposed of by you that they come to give Mr. Harrington the trouble of looking on them, I desire he may only know they were wrote by a Person who though he agrees not with his judgement hath a great respect for his good parts, And that he is one who neither is nor ever hopes to be within the reach of his Agrarian: If you please he may be assured also that I am none of the University, which he complains hath been about his Ears, not having the least interestin a Gown. But perhaps this last declaration was needless, since it may be hoped that Mr. Harrington does not yet think so meanly of the University as to believe so slight a Piece could proceed from any Member of it.  
However I may mistake in my Apprehensions of Government, I give it you upon my word Sir, I know very well what belongs to Obedience, as you shall receive Testimony whensoever you please to honour with any more of your commands  
The humblest of Your faithful Servants.   

Considerations on the Commonwealth of OCEANA.  
Page 1.  
JAnotti divideth the whole series of Government into two Periods, The one ending with the liberty of Rome, was the Course of Ancient Prudence, followed by the Greeks and Romans; The other being the Course of modern Prudence, was introduced by the Huns, Goths and Vandals, etc.  
Jannoti's Division of Government, (of which the Author of Oceana is so well persuaded that he builds up his Definitions of Government, and the frame of his whole Discourse upon it) may safely be admitted if he means only that the Greeks and Romans were before the Goths and Vandals, or that Solon and Brutus were dead long before Theodoricus or Genseric were born; But if his intention be (as Mr. Harrington seems to understand him) that before Caesar in the time of Ancient Prudence the Greeks and Romans observed a way of Government free from those imputations of passion and violence with which the government of succeeding ages (and that generally proves to be Monarchical) is chargeable, it will be necessary to propose some Considerations.  
1. It seems to be a defect of Experience to think that the Greek and Roman actions are only considerable in Antiquity; It is very frequent with such as have been conversant with Greek and Roman Authors to be led by them into a belief that the rest of the World were a rude inconsiderable people, etc. which is a term they very much delight in, altogether barbarous. This humour was even among them a mean & servile addiction to narrow Principles, and a piece of very Pedantical pride; but in us who have not the same temptation of interest, it would be downright folly. In this question the Examples of the Babylonians, Persians, and Egyptians, (not to insist upon the new discoveries of the Chinese History) cannot without gross partiality be neglected; and their government will not only be found to have been Monarchical, but also in a more absolute and arbitrary form (if I mistake not very much) then is to be met with at present in any kingdom of Europe.  
2. But then, they who have not yet passed their Novitiat in History are not ignorant that originally all Government among the Greeks was Regal; At the War of Troy we find them commanded by their Kings & Princes, & Thucydides 
Lib. 1  says expressly that it was not till after the taking of Troy, which filled Greece with arrogance and riches, that hereditary Monarchies degenerated into tyrannies. And then it was that the Grecians out of an extreme a version to that which was the cause of their present sufferings, slipped into Popular Government; not that upon calm and mature Debates they found it best, but that they might put themselves at the greatest distance (which spirit usually accompanies all Reformations) from that with which they were grown into dislike. Yet Macedon an important part of Greece, and that which lifted the Grecian name to the highest pitch of glory, never suffered this change, but continued under a successive Royalty.  
3. The foundation of the Roman state was in Kingship; and if it be considered how accidental, tumultuary, and violent the change was, there will be very little from thence to be inferred to the credit of the succeeding government.  
After these Considerations I must profess I am not convinced of any utility in this Division of ancient and modern prudence, or that a Court of Claims would allow of the pretensions to ancient prudence, which are laid by that kind of government which Oceana endeavours to assert.  
Pag▪ 2. Relation being had unto these two times, Government (to define it according to ancient Prudence) is an Act instituting and preserving a Civil society of men upon the foundation of common Right or Interest; or it is the Empire of Laws and not of men.  
And Government (according unto Modern Prudence) is an Act whereby some man or few men subject a City or a Nation, and rule it according to his or their private Interest, which may be said to be the Empire of men and not of Laws.  
If then this Division of government have lost its credit, the Definitions of the several Members of it need not be considered further than that they come not at all up to the first and remotest Notions of government, in the foundation and origination of it, about which is all the difficulty; and being here neglected, there is little reason to hope the subsequent Discourse can have in it the Light of probable satisfaction, much less the force of infallible Demonstration.  
Ibid. The former kind is that which Machiavelli hath gone about to retrieve, and Leviathan goes about to destroy, etc.  
I do not think myself bound to undertake all Challenges that are sent to Mr. Hobbs: but the easiness of the Defence in this Particular that Men Govern and not Laws, tempts me to be his second. To say that Laws do or can Govern, is to amuse ourselves with a form of speech, as when we say Time or Age or Death does such a thing; To which indeed the Fancy of Poets or Superstition of Women may adapt a Person, and give a Power of Action; but Wise men know they are only expressions of such Accidents and Qualifications as belong to things and Persons. He that requires Obedience from another, cannot rationally do so unless he declare what those things are, both to be done and not to be done, in which this obedience is to be paid; This Declaration of the Will of the sovereign Power is called Law, which if it outlives the person whose Will it was, it is only because the persons who succeed in power are presumed to have the same Will, unless they manifest the contrary, and that is the abrogation of a Law: So that still the Government is not in the Law, but in the person whose Will gives a being to that law. This declared Will of those who have power is of the Essence of law; the punishment expressed, I conceive is not so; For it is enough for me to obey the Will of a person, that I know hath power to hurt me, though I do not know particularly what the hurt is he will do me; and therefore as some laws are, so all might have been with leaving the punishment at the discretion of the Magistrate.  
In the similitude, the great Gun is not well traversed to this point. If the Proportion of things be accurately considered, it will appear that the laden Canon answers not to the laws but to the power of the person whose Will creates those laws, without which power he might be as as safely disobeyed, as that Gunner may be contemned who hath neither powder nor Bullet in his Piece.  
The whole force of the next Objection against Mr. Hobbs amounts but to this; That because Hervey in his Circulation hath followed the principles of nature; therefore Aristotle and Cicero have done so in their Discourses of Government.  
Page 3. Government according to the Ancients is of three kinds; the government of one man, or of the better sort, or of the whole People: which by their more learned Names are called Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy. Legislators having found these three Governments at best to be naught, have invented another consisting of a mixture of them all which only is good.  
The partition of Government, with reference to the persons in whose hands it is, into Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, without Question is very natural; for necessarily either One or All, or some number between both must have the power; nor do I see how we can have a Conception of any other Government, unless at the same time we can conceive the power may be resident in more than All, or less than One. It is not to be denied but that in History the names of Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy are to be found applied to such governments, the parts of which severally taken may serve to compound a new individual Government differing from all of them: But this Mixture and Difference is no more than this (which not being enough attended to, hath been the cause of great Mistakes) that some points of the Government are administered by one or few persons, or by the body of the people; as perhaps one single person governs the Militia, some select few dispatch affairs of State, the whole people meet for Election of Officers; And yet the Sovereignty or supreme power belongs but to one of these three; and the Actions in which it is truly seated are no ways communicable to the other two.  
Page 3. The Principles of Government are twofold; the goods of the Mind, and the goods of Fortune. The goods of the mind are natural or acquired virtues, as Wisdom, Courage, etc. The goods of Fortune are Riches. To the goods of Mind, answers Authority; to the goods of Fortune, Power or Empire.  
In considering the Principles of Government, Mr. Harrington gives us cause to complain of a great Disappointment; We hoped to receive from his hand that satisfaction about them, which several great Wits have in vain studied to derive to us; but we find him instead of the first principles thrusting upon us such things as are at best but fair endowments of persons fit to be entrusted with a Government already settled or resolved on. The Wisdom, Courage, or Riches of another man can never give him a Title to my obedience, nor take from me that liberty with which I was born: There must be something before all these in the Nature of Government, without which it will be as unjust to define Sovereignty and subjection, as it would be to oblige Mr. Harrington to give his  or money to the next man he meets wiser or richer than himself.  
Page 4. Empire is of two kinds; Domestic and National; or Foreign and Provincial. Domestic Empire is founded on Dominion.  
Dominion is Propriety Real or Personal, that is to say, in Lands, or in money and goods.  
Lands are held by the Proprietors in some Proportion; and such as is the Proportion or Balance of Dominion or Property in Land, such is the nature of the Empire.  
Pag. 5. Unto Propriety producing Empire it is required that it should have some certain root or foothold, which except in Land, it cannot have, being otherwise as it were upon the Wing.  
Nevertheless in such Cities as subsist most by Trade and have little or no land, as Hollandand Genoa, the Balance of treasure may be equal to that of Land.  
There is a great Contention between Leviathan and Oceana (whose names might seem to promise a better Agreement) whether power or propriety be the Foundation of Dominion; but they seem to me to mean the same things; For what is propriety but Riches? and Riches are (Pag. 3.) confessed to be power: The Difference than is only in Words; and propriety the Balance; the Agrarian, etc. make up only a new Lexicon to express those things we knew before.  
But the Assertion will appear too positive that propriety producing Empire consists only in land, except in such places as Holland and Genoa which have little or no land: Experience instructs us that it is not a large possession in lands, but an Estate in ready money which is proper for carrying on a great and sudden Enterprise. And we know of what importance Banks or Monti are, even in other places besides Amsterdam and Genoa. I will propose a Case, which was once so near being a true one, that I presume it cannot be rejected as improbable. England is defined to have been under the Gothick Balance, that is, having the propriety in the hands of a Nobility and Clergy, and consequently to have been a mixed Monarchy, where the King was not absolute: To a King of England, Hen. 7. was the first proposition of discovering America made by Columbus, which if it had been embraced, the Silver of Potosi had sailed up the Thames instead of the Guadalquivir, and by this the King's Revenue would annually have been increased above a Million, the rest coming into the hands of private Merchants and Adventurers, and not of the principal Nobility. In this case I ask whether this Accession of Revenue would not have preponderated on the King's part, and changed the Balance, though the Lands at home had still been possessed by the Nobility in the same Proportion as before. It is not to be doubted but that a Revenue sufficient to maintain a Force able to bear down all Opposition, does equally conduce to Empire, whither it arises from the Rents of lands, the Profits of ready moneys, the Duties payable upon Manufactures and Traffic, or any other kind of Income.  
That Empire is well divided into National and Provincial, shall be admitted without Opposition, if I may be satisfied in this demand, whether there may not be a mixture of these two, by which the Balance of Government shall receive Alteration: which in effect differs little from this, That the several parts of a Nationall Empire may so poise one another as to produce a new Balance. For example, The Crowns of Castille and Arragon were of a differing Balance, the power of the King being more absolute in the former, and the interest of the Communality greater in the latter; The union of these two Crowns did not render the Government of Arragon purely foreign or provincial; And yet the Balance in Arragon hath been so far changed by it, that the power of the King hath devoured the Interest of the people. This is no nice and unprofitable speculation; for it is the case of almost all the present Sovereignty's in Europe, hardly any one of which is all of one piece, but is composed of distinct Provinces differing in Genius, Laws, Customs and Balance, which have come to be united at distant times, and by as various Titles.  
Pag. 10. Saith Solomon, there is an evil which I have seen under the Sun which proceedeth from the Ruler; and Eccles. 10. 15. Sad complaints, that the Principle of Power, and of Authority do not twine in the wreath of Empire. Wherefore, etc.  
I know not how it comes about, but Mr. Harrington hath taken up a very great unkindness for the Clergy, which (though it be most discovered towards the end of the book, and in another little Discourse of a later Date) here gins to manifest itself: For he invades one part of their Office without ask their leave; He falls a preaching, and taking that of Solomon for his Text, I have seen servants upon horses, etc. he proceeds to make us a very goodly Sermon.  
Pag. 10. & 11. The soul of man is Mistress of two potent Rivals, the one Reason, the other Passion, etc.  
From thence he slips into some Metaphysical considerations of the soul of Man, and its operations, which being translated to Government must evince the Truth of this Assertion, That a Commonwealth is an Empire of Laws and not of men. If I could be persuaded he were so far in earnest as to expect any Man should be convinced by the Metaphorical use of two or three Words, some further considerations might be proposed; In the mean while it is enough to desire, that seeing the whole force of the Argument rests upon the similitude of Government with the soul of Man, we may be instructed what the soul is, and what the whole Philosophy belonging to it: And then and not before, will it be time to consider how far the similitude between that and Government will hold true.  
Page 12. There is a Reason which is the Interest of Mankind, or of the whole. Now if we see even in those Natural Agents, etc. Hooker B. 1.  
The Argumentation about the Reason or Interest of Mankind is little less infirm: For the Question being, Whether there be any such primary Interest of Mankind differing from that of every particular Man, He takes it for granted there is such a common right or Interest, more excellent than that of the parts, without proffering any other proof than the Testimonies of Hooker and Grotius; Whose Opinions cannot oblige us beyond the Reasons on which they are founded. Mr. Hooker's Expressions are altogether figurative, and it is easier to prove from them that Things wanting sense make Discourses and act by Election, then that there is such a thing as a common Interest of Mankind. For Grotius his words, They carry a great Restriction with them, and the way of producing Action in Beasts is so different from the Emanation of humane Reason, that the Inference from one to the other must needs be very weak.  
Page 12 and 13. But it may be said the Difficulty remains yet; for be the Interest of Popular government right Reason, a man doth not look upon Reason as it is right or wrong in itself, etc.  
And therefore it was a very judicious part to foresee that the Difficulty would still remain, and no less ingeniously done to confess That a man doth not look upon reason as it is right in itself, but as it makes for him or against him; That is, that the common Interest stoops to every man's peculiar one. But we are promised a solution so facile, that it is obvious to such as have the Green sickness. Let two Girls, says he, have a Cake given between them, that each may have what is due: Divide says the one that I may choose, or I will divide and you shall choose; And this is the whole mystery of a Commonwealth. An Oven it seems is the best Emblem of the World, and a Bakehouse the only School of Policy. Let us obey Mr. Harrington when he send us in Pistrinam, and consider a while this mystery. The Cake was given that each might have what was due; so the Laws of this society proceeded not from any Natural Right, or from the consent of the Girls, but were limited by the Person who gave the Cake with this intent that it might be equally divided between them. Again, these Girls live under the Discipline of the Rod, that is, under a Government already established, and she that had been wronged in the Division might upon appeal to the School Mistress or the Person who gave them the Cake, have obtained an equal share. But now suppose the two girls had met by chance, and found the Cake in their way, and suppose them out of the influence of all such persons whose power might constrain them to an equal Division, must we still believe they would have strained courtesy, and not rather think the stronger of the two Girls would have eaten up the whole Cake if she found her stomach serve her for it? This is no great mystery, but will be found to be the true Case of a Common wealth: For either Government is founded upon Paternity and the Natural Advantage the first Father had over all the rest of Mankind who were his sons, and then there will be no such thing as dividing and choosing, but being content with what portion he allows; Or else Government flows from the increase of strength and power in some Man or Men to whose Will the rest submit, that by their submission they may avoid such mischief as otherwise would be brought upon them; And then here also there is no room for dividing and choosing, but acquiescing in the Will of him whose power cannot be resisted. There may perhaps be degrees of this power as it more or less exceeds the strength and force of those who are to obey, the proportion of which degrees being duly observed will I conceive teach us the true Nature of those things which are commonly reputed to be Conditions imposed upon the supreme power. If the power of the Government exceed in any great proportion the power of those that are under his Government, so that he stands not in need of any thing he can have from them, The Government becomes absolute and unlimited; But if he exceeds them in a less proportion and be in continual want of something that they may allow him, he must buy it by some concessions or other as cheap as he can; But this amounts not to a mixture of the Government; for without an excess in Power there can be no Government. Thus a General of an Army sitting down before two Towns, the one very weak, the other of good strength, will have the first at discretion, to the second he allows good and honourable Conditions, out of a desire to save his time or Men, or to preserve the place from being defaced, and the Ammunition imbezeled: Or to take Mr. Harrington's own example, The stronger Girl gives the other a piece of Cake to fetch her some water to drink after it. Since Mr. Harrington hath brought these Actors upon the Stage, he will not I hope take it ill if one of the Girls give him an Answer; and tell him in her proper style, That his Cake is dough.  
Pag. 13. A Commonwealth is but a Civil society of men: Let us take twenty men, and forthwith make a Commonwealth; six of these will be wiser than the other fourteen, and by the eminency of their Parts acquire an influence, that is, Authoritas Patrum. Wherefore this can be no other than a Natural Aristocracy diffused by God throughout the whole body of Mankind.  
In the next example of the twenty men, the Paralogism lies in this. Let us take twenty men, says he, and forthwith make a Commonwealth; He first supposes them a Commonwealth, and then considers how they would dispose of the Government; But it is to be denied that they could ever have been a Commonwealth, unless in one of the cases last expressed, in which the Government would not have been free for them to dispose of. The sense of want among Men that are in equality of power, may beget a desire of Exchange; as let me have your Horse and you shall have my Cow, which is the Fountain of private Contracts; but it is not to be with reason imagined that this should be enough to make a Man part with a natural Freedom, and put himself into the hands of a Power from which he can afterward have no shield though it should be used to his own Destruction.  
But Mr. Harrington hath not in this lost his way without company; for I have observed very frequently that while men profess to consider of the Principles of Government, they fall upon Notions which are the mere Effects of Government, not unlike the complaint of Grotius, that they who treat of Jus Gentium do commonly mistake some part of the Roman Jus  for it.  
To consider this instance of the twenty men a little further. What security can Mr. Harrington give us, that the six in their consultations shall not aim rather at their own advantage then that of the fourteen, and so make use of the eminence of their parts to circumvent the rest? Or on the other fide how shall we be satisfied that the fourteen will not soon begin to think themselves wise enough to consult too, and making use of their excess in power pull the fix off their Cushions, where they must needs appear to sit at better Ease than the fourteen were in while they stood at the Door waiting for the Result of their Debates.  
I am willing to gratify Mr. Harrington with his Partition of them into six and fourteen; but if I had been in an humour of contradiction, it had been as free for me to have said that some one of the twenty would have excelled all the rest in Judgement, Experience, Courage and height of Genius, and then told him that had been a Natural Monarchy established by God himself over Mankind.  
Pag. 14. The Decrees of the Senate are never Laws, nor so called, but Senatusconsulta.  
In exchange of this fair dealing, I expect Mr. Harrington should inform me what it is he means when he says the Decrees of the Senate are never Laws, nor so called, but Senatus consulta; The word Senatus consultum is a Latin name, and belongs not properly to the Decrees of any Senate but that of the Romans; so I must at present necessarily understand him, That the Roman Senatus consulta never were Laws. It is true they were not called Leges, no more were the Plebiscita, the Edicta Praetorum, and other parts of the Roman Jus ; but they had the power of Laws, and equally with them required the obedience of the whole Roman people. Coepit Senatus se interponere, & quicquid constituisset, observabatur; Idque 
D. de origine juris. P. necessarium deinde quia.  jus appellabatur Senatus consultum. Thus the Senatus consultum Macedonianum, with many more came to have a place allowed them by Justinian in the compilement of the Roman Laws. Nor can it be pretended that the Senatus consulta were (like the orders of one single house of Parliament) binding only to their own members; for though it were so at first with the Plebiscita, to avoid the discord which was by it occasioned, It was soon agreed that the distinct Decrees of the Senate and People should be extended to the Nature of Laws, and oblige the whole body 
Cujac. come. ad. s.  of the Commonwealth, as is proved by Cujacius.  
To lay down what hath been said upon a smaller Scale: It hath been shown, That Ancient Prudence differs not from Modern, and serves not at all to enforce Oceana's project of Government; That Commonwealths are no more than Monarchys the Empire of Laws and not of Men; That there is no such thing as a mixed Government, but that the supreme Power and the Actions in which it truly and properly resides must belong to one or all or some Number between both; That Oceana falls short in considering the principles of government, and takes for Principles things that are a great deal on this side of them; That to say propriety is the foundation of Empire is all one to say that power is; That this propriety may as well consist in ready Money, or any other foreign Revenue as in Possession of Lands; That there is a Balance producible by distinct Government united into one person, which Mr. Harrington did not consider; That the common Right or Interest of Mankind, differing from that of every particular Man, is not firmly made out to us; That the notion of dividing and choosing cannot subsist; And that the Instances alleged for it are mistaken; That the consent of the people is an improbable and weak Hypothesis of the Original of Government, which is better deduced either from Paternity or Force; And finally that there can be no Government without excess of power.  
After this I hope it will appear no ill grounded confidence in me to say, that there is very little, if any thing, of consequence in the first and General part of the Preliminaries left unanswered: And the principal Stones being thus taken from the Foundation, a little Wind will be enough to reverse the superstructure.  
Page 15. Now whether I have rightly transcribed these Principles of a Commonwealth out of Nature, I shall appeal unto God, and to the World. Unto God in the Fabric of a Commonwealth of Israel: And unto the World in the Universal series of Ancient Prudence.  
I am now come to Mr. Harrington's Appeal to past Ages for justifying these Principles of a Commonwealth; which Appeal is made to God in the Fabric of the Commonwealth of Israel, and unto the World in the Universal series of Ancient Prudence. Of the Commonwealth of Israel, anon; For the World I must remind Mr. Harrington of my just complaint put in against him for partiality in omitting the Examples of the Assyrians, Persians, and Egyptians, and all other old Monarchical Governments, which certainly are included in the Universal series of Ancient Prudence. But perhaps I am too blame to think Mr. Harrington should have less Discretion than a common Attorney, who will be sure to examine only those Witnesses that seem to make for the cause in which he is entertained.  
One particular in this appears more than strange to me; It is, that having said the Heathens have all written their Commonwealths, as if they had no other Copy but that of Israel in the holy Scriptures, (Page 18) in the Enumeration he brings in Switz and Holland. Which is it? Are these two within the series of Ancient Prudence, or must they be reckoned among the Heathen Commonwealths?  
I applied myself so late to the reading and considering of Oceana, that before I could reach so far as to examine what is asserted concerning the Commonwealth of Israel, I was made a spectator of the Paper-combat between the Author and Dr. Ferne, the publication of which proclaims the Author's conceit of the Victory. He indeed deserves the reputation of making rude Charges, and in these Disputes the last Reply gains the Opinion of the same Advantage, as in Battles it does to stay last upon the Field. If the Doctor's Leisure and Inclination serves him, we may see the Fight renewed; However there is so much reason to expect that some of the Clergy (against all of whom the Author hath declared War) will undertake the Quarrel, that I think it cannot justly be counted any subterfuge in me to wave this part of the Dispute, and leave it in the hands of those men whose Interest and Obligation gives them a propriety in it.  
Not to examine then whether it be a true or false Picture which Mr. Harrington hath drawn of the Republic of Israel, I will only consider how far we are now bound to work after that Original, and whether there may not be Proportion, Force and Beauty in the Face of Government, though it differs from the Air of that of Israel: And this the rather, because the Commonwealth of Israel seems proposed with more Authority than belongs to a bare Example, and the Christian World accused of blindness or negligence (Page 18) for not transcribing from it.  
It must not be denied but that whatsoever shall appear to have been an establishment of God in the Jewish Republic, is to be allowed consonant to the Laws of 
Grotius de jure bell. & pac. lib. 1.  Nature, Justice and Wisdom; seeing a Legislator supremely Good, Just and Wise, cannot be supposed to have made Laws which do not bear the impression and character of that hand from which they proceed. Yet if we should admit of Mr. Harrington's Position that the people of Israel had the power of confirming all their Laws, so that without their consent they had not (Page 16 and 17) been Laws, We must abate much of the precedent Proposition; for it is a great deal less to be the Adviser or Persuader of a thing then to be the Author and Commander of it. He instances in this power of the people in that Act where they make God King, Exodus 19 So that in his Opinion the Laws given in that and the next Chapters (for they are but a continuation of the same Action) take their validity from the consent of the people, who had a liberty of dissenting by which they might have exempted from those Laws. These Laws are the Ten Commandments, and if the people of Israel need not have been subjected to them without their own consents, there is no reason but we should enjoy the same privilege. In this Mr. Harrington proves an huge benefactor to Mankind; for he hath with no greater expense than the withholding their consents asserted them into the mighty Liberty of being free from the whole Moral Law. But I ask pardon for this Digression, and come to another consideration of the influence of the Jewish constitutions upon our practice.  
It is now lawful in making of Laws and modelling a Commonwealth to tread in the steps of Moses unless in such things as either by their own Nature terminated with the Revelation of the Gospel, or have been altered by some general or special constitutions of Christ.  
Beyond these considerations I am not ware of any prerogative of Authority belonging to the Israelitish more than any other Republic: For a Law can oblige only those to whom it is given, which were the children of Israel only; And as no other Nation was at that time (according to the opinion of the soberer of the Jews themselves) bond to observe the Jewish Laws or form of Government; so it would be much more unreasonable at this distance of time and place, to impose upon us any Obligation of following either their Government or their Laws. In considering of Laws and frames of Government it is not enough to look at the Dignity of the Legislator, but regard must be had also to circumstances of times, places, and persons, with which the Lawgiver is often so fettered that he cannot take those Resolutions which in themselves are best. Now there were many conditions and qualifications of the people of Israel vastly differing from the present Age, some of which I shall have occasion to touch when I speak of the Agrarian.  
Here I will not conceal the pleasure I have taken in observing that though Mr. Harrington professes a great Enmity to Mr. Hobbs his politics, underhand notwithstanding he holds a correspondence with him, and does silently swallow down such Notions as Mr. Hobbs hath chewed for him: Of this sort is the Fancy of the compact between God and the children of Israel, by virtue of which he received the Civil Power, and was enabled to enact Laws for them; His conceits taken from the Notation of the Words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are also of the same breed.  
Pag. 20. Let me invite Leviathan who of all other Governments giveth the advantage unto Monarchy for Perfection, to a better disquisition of it by these three Assertions.  
The invitation sent to Mr. Hobbs is not I presume so personally intended to him, but that it may indifferently concern any Man who concurs with him in giving the Advantage for perfection unto Monarchy of all other Governments: In that Proposition I acknowledge myself a Zealot, and have Temerity enough to expose my body to the receiving those Blows which were aimed at another's Head.  
Ibid. The first, (which requireth no proof) That the Perfection of Government lieth upon such a Libration in the frame of it, that no man nor men, in or under it, can have the Interest; or having the interest can have the Power to disturb it with Sedition.  
Though Mr. Harrington thinks the first Assertion requires no proof, it may admit of some Explanation. To give such a Government as no Man nor Men in or under it, can have the Interest to disturb with Sedition, is altogether impossible; For that were to suppose there should not be in an whole country one Ambitious Boor man who might hope for Advantage, nor one Vicious Rich man who might expect security from the perturbation of the Government: The whole matter than must be reduced to the want of power to do it. And that will appear to be in no other Libration but this, That the Power of which the Governor is possessed does so vastly exceed the power remaining with those who are to obey, that in case of a contest it must be desperately unreasonable for them to hope to maintain their Cause and Party. The true Method then of attaining to perfection in Government, is to make the Governor absolute; for if there be any who can Dispute upon probable Terms the power with him, the State can never be free from Tumult and Sedition.  
Ibid. The second, That Monarchy reaching the Perfection of the kind, reacheth not unto the Perfection of Government, but must have some dangerous flaw in it. For proof of this  
Monarchy is either by Arms or by a Nobility: A Monarchy by Arms, as that of the Turk, hath this incurable Flaw, That the Janissaries have frequent Interest and perpetual Power to raise sedition, and tear the Prince himself in Pieces. In a Monarchy by a Nobility, (as of late in Oceana) the flaw is this, that the Nobility had frequent Interest and Perpetual power by their Retainers and Tenants to raise sedition, and to levy a lasting War. Wherefore neither of these is a perfect Government.  
But this is not attainable in a Monarchy, says Mr. Harrington's second Assertion; For a King being but a single Person, that kind of Government hath this Flaw in it, that the Instruments of Ruling whether they be an Army or a Nobility, have both interest and power to disturb the government; for the proof of which the Examples of Turkey and Oceana are proposed.  
In a Monarchy by Arms it is indeed very apparent that the Mutinies of the Soldatesca are always dangerous, and often Fatal; But than they happen solely among the Militia of the Court; for the Troops dispersed through the Provinces (upon whom the security of the Government depends) can seldom, perhaps never, be shown to have caused such Disorders; And yet such a Militia at Court seems necessary for the preservation of the Prince's person, and the Reputation of the Government: But it will not be hard to find a Temperament, by which all may be secured, which I think will lie in this, That the Guards of the King's person be not increased beyond necessity of security, that they be not suffered to stagnate at Court, but be by a perpetual circulation drawn out upon service, and chief that they consist not of one entire Body united under the same Head, but be divided into distinct Parties and Commands: As we may see in France, where though (in proportion to the extent of their Dominions) the King's Guards be more numerous than those of the Roman or Turkish Emperors; yet being divided into the distinct Bodies of French, Scotch and Switz Guards, under their several Colonels and Captains, they have never been the Authors of any the least Sedition. And in Turkey of late years they begin to learn the Art of poising the Janissaries by the Spahis, and so have frequently evaded the danger of their Mutinies.  
In like manner in Monarchy by a Nobility, there never arises any Danger to the Crown, but when either a great part of the Sovereign power is put into the hands of the Nobility as in Germany and Poland, or when some Person or Family is suffered to overtop the rest in Riches, Commands, and Dependence, as Princes of the blood and Lorraine not long since in France, and of old the Montforts and the Nevils in England. The first is a vicious constitution of the Government, and a Monarchy only in name; the second easily admits of this cure, That these Great Ones be reduced to a less volumn, and levelled into an equality with the rest of their Order.  
But I see no Necessity of admitting the Division of Monarchies which Mr. Harrington hath made, when the most Natural and Excellent form of Monarchical Government arises from the Mixture of them both. The Prince who governs merely by an Army, not only is exposed to the danger of their Mutinies, but is also forced to run this hazard, That upon any potent Invasion, the loss of a Battle or two draws inevitably along with it the loss of his Crown: On the other side he that rests wholly upon a Nobilty, leaves himself in a manner at their Discretion, and is with no great difficulty Dispossessed of the Throne. Let me then have leave to assert that the perfection of Monarchy is free from those flaws which are charged upon it, and that it consists in Governing by a Nobility weighty enough to keep the people under; yet not tall enough, in any particular person, to measure with the Prince; And by a moderate Army kept up under the Notion of Guards and Garrisons, which may be sufficient to strangle all Seditions in the Cradle.  
In this place it will be no great impertinence to desire to know of Mr. Harrington his Opinion of the Way of Governing by Counsels, which I confess I have always thought admirable; I do not mean such as are coordinate with the Prince, (which have been seen in the World) but such as those of Spain, purely of Advice and Dispatch, with power only to inform and persuade, not limit the Princes Will: For almost all the weaknesses which have been thought incident to Monarchy, are by this course prevented, and if there be any steadiness and maturity in the Senate of a Commonwealth, this takes it all in. If the Delays of the Spanish Counsels be objected, the answer is obvious, that they proceed more from the grave retired temper of the Spanish Nation, then from the Nature of these Counsels; And this objection is much more forcible against all Popular Governments.  
Page 20. and 21. The third, that Popular Government reaching the Perfection of the kind, reacheth the Perfection of Government, and hath no flaw in it, for which kind of Constitution I have something more to say then Leviathan hath said, or ever will be able to say for Monarchy; As  
1. That it is the Government was never conquered by any Monarch, from the beginning of the World unto this day; for if the Commonwealths of Greece came under the yoke of the Kings of Macedon, they were first broken by themselves.  
The third Assertion remains, which shall receive a Discussion through all the five Branches of it.  
1. The first of which seems intended for a trial of our Noses, whether they will serve us to discover the Fallacy of an Inference from the prosperous success of Arms, to the Perfection of Government: As if on the one side great and well policed Empires had not been subverted by people so eloigned from the perfection of government, that we scarce know of any thing to tie them together but the desire of Booty; And on the other side we had not the Examples of the little Republics of Ragusa and San Marino, which are commended for their upright and equal frame of Government, and yet have hardly extended their Dominions beyond the size of an handsome Manor. It is not the perfection of the Government, but the populosity of a Nation, the natural Valour of the Inhabitants, the Abundance of Horses, Arms, and other things necessary for the equipping of an Army, assisted with a good Military Discipline, that Quality a people for Conquest; And where these concur, Victory is entailed upon them, whether it be of one Monarch over another, or of a Commonwealth over a people of the same form of Government. Nay, I will add of a Monarch over a Commonwealth, though Mr. Harrington hath pawned his Credit that this was never known from the beginning of the World unto this day. He foresaw the instance that might be made of the Kings of Macedon ●nd Commonwealths of Greece, ●●●d therefore would have us believe that had not happened if they had not been first broken by themselves; At this rate of arguing Mr. Harrington shall have much ado to produce any one Feat of Arms of a Commonwealth, which will not be easily stripped of its Glory by attributing the success to some Miscarriage or Disorder of the Enemy. And it is worth observing, that to evade the F●rce of this Instance, He admits of something in the Commonwealths of Greece that will evince them to have been of a turbulent mutinous Temper, & ignorant of their true Interest. But to help a bad Memory, let me ask Mr. Harrington what he thinks of the little Grecian Republics planted round the coasts of Asia Minor, and of the servitude into which they were brought first by the Lydian, 
Pausan. messen.  and then by the Persian Monarches, the asserting whose Liberties was the most plausible pretence the other Greeks had for the Persian War? What account likewise is to be given of the Sicilian Commonwealths, which (before that the Island came under the Power of the Carthaginians and Romans) were reduced under the yoke of one Monarch? And, not to wander in the obscure Paths of Antiquity, let me beg his judgement of the Commonwealth of Genua, which fell under the Dominion of the Dukes of Milan, and afterward (upon pretence of their Title) of the Kings of France. If it be told me that this Commonwealth subsists to this day, I shall only need to reply that Andrew Doria did rather erect a new then restore an old Republic, (as will appear by the alterations he made in the Laws and Form of the old Government) and that it is altogether as rational to fortify the claim of the present States of Holland from the freedom enjoyed by the Ancient Batavians, as to pretend that the present Commonwealths of Genua is the same with what it was before it paid obedience to the Dukes of Milan. I will afflict Mr. Harrington but with one particular more, and that is of the Florentine Republic, which having chased away all of the Family of Medici, and restored itself to a plenary Liberty, was by the Arms of Charles 
Guicciard. lib. 20.  the 5 th'. under the Command first of the Prince of Orange, and then of Don Ferrando Gonzaga, forced to submit to that Monarchical Government which it now acknowledges.  
Page 21. 2. That it is the Government that hath frequently led mighty Monarches in Triumph.  
2. In the second Mr. Harrington runs upon the Foil, it being only the conversion of the First.  
Ibid 3. That it is the Government which if i● h●ve been seditions, it hath not been ●rom any imperfection in the kind, but in the particular Constitution, which where ever the like hath happened, m●st have been unequal.  
3. The third Branch is, methinks, a very pleasant One, and not unlike the Procedure of the judiciary Astrologers; Who grounding their Art upon wild and Arbitray, but as they pretend, infallible Notions, are fain to appeal to the success of some few lucky Predictions; And when these are confronted with the foul and ridiculous Mistakes of the greatest Masters of their Art, They presently shelter themselves under this answer, That the Error is not in the rules of Art but in the Man, who therefore is convinced to have mistaken in his calculation, because his Predictions have not been justified by the Event. So if we complain of the seditions which have infested almost all Commonwealths that ever were, Mr. Harrington tells us, It hath not been from any imperfection in the kind, but in the particular Constitution; which where ever the like hath happened must have been unequal. For my part I despair of cutting off the Retreat, and think him to be dealt with only by those who know how to drive the Irish from a Bog.  
Ibid. 4. That it is the Government which if it have been any thing near equal was never seditious; or let him show me what sedition hath happened in Lacedaemon or Venice.  
4. We shall have somewhat firmer footing in the Next, in which the Commonwealths of Lacedaemon and Venice are brought upon the Carpet for such as by the equality of their Government have been redeemed from all Seditions. Of Lacedaemon first.  
If Lacedaemon hath enjoyed a more than ordinary exemption from Domestic Troubles, it is upon the same Accou●t that he that works his Horse hard and gives him no Provender is secure of being run away with: The design of Lycurgus in framing their Laws seems only to have looked at making them good Soldiers, and accordingly they were seldom free from War, and when they were, the hardness of their Diet, 
Plutarch. in Licurg.  the strictness of their Conversation, the Toil of their Sports and Exercises made Peace itself little less rigorous than War uses to be, The greatest landed man in the whole Country had not enough to maintain a Teme, and for personal Estate, all but Iron money being prohibited, what would now go into one of our little Pockets, with them would have loaded a Wagon; Riches, Luxury and Excess, being thus banished, it is no wonder they continued quiet, seeing there was nothing left for which they should contend; the condition of the meanest Spartan being in every point (bating merely the Reputation of Power) as desirable as that of their Kings. And yet even thus they did not scape.  
For first, They were infested with frequent and dangerous sollevations of their Helots' or slaves; These Mr. Harrington hath no reason to call external Commotions, (Page 167.) being the Helots' were not strangers but inhabitants and spread over the Face of the whole Country; Nay more, They were Fundamental and Essential to the Commonwealth; For the Spartans' were by their Laws and Institution to neglect all Occupations, even Agriculture itself, and attend solely to the service of the Public, which could not possibly have been done unless they had had the Helots' to perform those Offices.  
And then have they often been in distractions about the succession to the Crown, some of which it will be proper to relate. A quarrel breaking out between the two Kings Cleomenes and Demaratus, the latter was accused of Bastardy, and as it was then the custom of Greece in difficult cases, a reference is made to the Oracle 
Pausan. Lacon.  at Delphos, which having been bribed by Cleomenes, pronounces against Demaratus, who thereupon is deposed and seeks Protection from the King of Persia to the prejudice not only of the Laconian, but of the whole Grecian Interest. Of the same nature was the contention about the succession, when by the power of Lysander and his faction Agesilaus was promoted to the Crown, with the 
Plutar. Agesil.  Exclusion of Leotychides the true heir. But much more Fatal was the contest between Cleonymus and his Nephew Arens the son of Acrotatus, who being Jure Representationis (as the Modern Lawyers speak) preferred before him, Cleonimus made shift to get some forces together with which he gave beginning to a civil War in which the City Z●rax was destroyed, and which was far worse 
Pausan. Lacon. Plutarch. Pyrr.  he drew King Pyrrhus into the Country, who made himself Master of the Campagna, besieged the capital City, and reduced the Commonwealth to the last Gasp. The Reign of Agis and Cleomenes were so full of Turbulence and Sedition, that it is sufficient to name them.  
Nor have they been privileged from another sort of Attempts, which being secretly managed by some few Conspirators discover not themselves till the danger be almost inevitable; This will appear by the Treason contrived in the beginning of Agesilaus reign, at 
Xenoph. Gr. Hist. lib. 3.  which time the Republic was in its greatest health and vigour at home and highest Reputation abroad; The Author of this conspiracy waa one Cinadon a bold gallant young fellow who excited by ambition was resolved to make himself Master of the State, and had engaged in the Design divers Persons of courage and execution, provided them with Arms, and had prepared all things ready to fall upon the King, the Ephori and the Senate in the Marketplace, which being done He made no doubt by a plausible Declaration to draw over to his Party the slaves, the mean People and the Borderers. Things were at this Pass when one of the conspirators revealed all to the Ephori, by whose extraordinary Wisdom and conduct the Heads of the Party were surprised, and the Design broke in pieces. The practice of Lysander for altering the Government shall not be insisted on; for though the Contrivance was admirable, yet the Discovery having been prevented by his Death, it will not be amiss to let it sleep with him.  
The City of Venice is possessed, by Mr. Harrington's own confession, of several Advantages by the benefit of her situation, which she were not to expect from the manner of her Government; Among these there is just cause to reckon her Immunity from Seditions, which notwithstanding hath not been so entire that we need be put upon any difficulty in the retriving of Instances to prove she hath been subject to Tumults and Faction.  
Not to insist upon the continual Disorders to which she was exposed before the settlement of the Commonwealth upon the Election of her Dukes, Let Giannotti be the computer and from the first to Seba●tian Ciani the 39 th'. Duke, We shall have an account of three 
Donato Giannotti.  Dukes meeting with violent Deaths by intestine broils, and of Nine who after having suffered Excaecation died in Exile. In the time of Duke Piero Gradenigo (under whom the Commonwealth received its last Reiglement about 360 years ago) We meet first with Marrino Boccon who not finding the new constitutions to his Gust endeavoured to oppose them by open Force: But the memory of this Attempt is lost in that more great and dangerous One (which happened also in the Reign of the same Duke though not till the year 1311) of Bajamonte Tiepoli, by which the Commonwealth was reduced to that Exigence, that the only hope of her preservation consisted in the well defending the stairs of the 
Gasp. Contarim.  Palace of St. Mark. After that in the year 1355. the Health of the Commonwealth became her Disease, I mean the power of the Dukes by which she had gained so much Order, Grace, and Firmness, was made an Instrument to the mabition of Duke Marin Falier for dissolving the Frame of the Government; But at this Time the Power of the Dieci was salutary to the Republic in the Deposition and Execution of Falier.  
Of late days indeed the Commonwealth of Venice hath enjoyed tranquillity enough at home, (for though partialities and factions be kept up between the Old and New families of Noblem●n, yet having never made any scandalous Eruptions, they do but little harm) for which She is a Debtor to the nice and dangerous Estate of her Affairs abroad; On the one side She is next Neighbour to the Devouring Ottomon Empire, and on the other her Frontier reaches to the Territories of the King of Spain, a Prince of as good Appetite though of a slower digestion; Nay the Rope himself for all his Age and Holiness hath often endeavoured to commit a Rape upon her: In this condition it is no more wonder that the Apprehension of a Public Enemy begets Union and Concord within herself, than it is to find Agreement among the Mariners of that Ship which is ready to be boarded by Pirates.  
Pag. 22. 5. That it is the Government, which attaining unto perfect equality, hath such a libration in the frame of it, that no man living can show which way any man or men in or under it, can contract such Interest or Power as should be able to disturb the Commonwealth with Sedition; Wherefore an equal Commonwealth is that only which is without flaw, and containeth in it the full Perfection of Government.  
5. After all this in answer to the fifth Branch, I will only tell Mr. Harrington that the Libration He speaks of in Government, is of the same Nature with a perpetual Motion in Mechanics; for as the one is not attainable as long as there is in Matter a resistance to Motion, or a Propensity in it by which it is determined to some other Motion; So will the other be impossible as long as Men have private Interests and Passions by which they are biased from the public Ends of Government: And as all Motion will grow faint and expire unless renewed by the hand of a continual Mover; so there is no Frame of Laws or Constitution of Government which will not decay and come to Ruin unless repaired by the Prudence and Dexterity of those who Govern. Now that this may not be expected from a Monarch as well as from a Senate or any Assembly of Men, I have not yet met with any conviction, but rather find it reasonable to think that where Debates are clearest, the Results of them most secret, and the Execution sudden, (which are the Advantages of a Monarchy) there the Disorders of a State will soon be discovered, and the necessary Remedies best applied.  
Ibid. In an equal Commonwealth there can be no more strife, than there can be overbalance in equal weights; Wherefore the Commonwealth of Venice being that which of all others is the most equal in the Constition, is that wherein there never happened strife between the Senate and the People.  
Wherefore it is not this pretended equality of a Commonwealth that causes her stability and security, but rather the contrary; For, a● Mr. Harrington hath well observed, (Page 5.) where there are two Parties in a Republic with equal power, (as in that of Rome the Nobility had one half and the People the other half) Confusion and Misery are there entailed: And to avoid this there can be no way but to make the Commonwealth very unequal, that is to make the scale of Power gravitate on the part of those persons who are possessed of the Government. This will be found to be the practice of Venice, which though alleged as the example of a most equal One, is as much as any in the World, an unequal Commonwealth; The power there is wholly in the hands of the Noble Families, who make up the number of about 3000 heads, though formerly they have amounted to 4500, and the people are not concerned in it more than that they are admitted to the Offices of Chancellors and Secretary ship, which are places of no power though of some Trust: Nor is it material perhaps not true) which Mr. Harrington (Page 9) hath delivered, that the Senate of Venice at the first Institution took in the whole people; for the Question belongs not to the first Original Institution which was rude and not well digested, but to the present Frame of that Republic a● it was perfected under the Government of Piero Gradenigo. To conclude this point, Contarini himself a Noble Venetian and very likely to discern the true temper of their Government, when he inquires into the reasons of the fidelity of the Venetian people to the Senate, never thinks upon this equality in the constitution of the Commonwealth, but proposes the plenty of Bread, the Provision made for the poor by so many Hospitals, the lucrative employment of Artificers in the Arsenal, things purely Accidental and , as the most probable causes which can be assigned of so happy an Effect.  
Ibid. An equal Commonwealth is such an one as is equal both in her Balance or foundation, and in the superstructures, that is to say, in her Agrarian Law, and in her Rotation.  
An equal Agrarian is a perpetual Law establishing and preserving the balance of Dominion, by such a Distribution, that no one man or number of men within the compass of the Few or Aristocracy, can come to overpower the whole people by their Possession in Lands.  
To him that makes propriety, and that in Lands, the Foundation of Empire, the establishing an Agrarian is of absolute Necessity, that by it the power may be fixed in those hands to whom it was at first committed: But if an Estate in ready money, or any other Revenue conduces as much to Empire as the Possession of Lands, (which was shown in its Place) the true importance of an Agrarian will come to no more but this, that the government be provided of a Revenue sufficient to make good that advantage of Power which it enjoys over all persons and parties living under that Government. The examples of an Agrarian are so infrequent that Mr. Harrington is constrained to wave all but two Commonwealths, and can find in the whole extent of History only Israel and Lacedaemon to fasten upon. What the Nature of these Agrarians was, and how they differ from that which Mr. Harrington goes about to establish, w●l be the business of my present Disquisition.  
When in obedience to God's command Abraham had abandoned his native soil, and the inheritance of his Fathers, and like an Adventurer in prosecution of his Fortune had wandered as far as the Land of Canaan, He received a promise of God in reward of this submission that his posterity should enjoy as a possession the Land in which he now l●ved as a stranger; The hopes of seeing this promise performed had always so much influence upon the Israelites, that when in Egyp● they fell into an Affliction of the greatest Pressure and Duration that ever Nation suffered, They not only bore up against it by their care in maintaining their National Interest, but with extraordinary Diligence attended to the preserving their Genealogies through their Tribes and Families: The time of impletion of the Promise being come, There was no Man that was able to make out his descent from Abraham by Jacob, but had an unquestionable Title to the Possession of the Land, and consequently it was necessary to divide the Land viritim among the people of Israel. Yet it will not be easy to determine whether they all inherited by equal Portions, or whether in the Division respect was had to the Princes of Tribes and Heads of Families. The Public Division upon the return of the Survey (Jos. cap. 18.) it is evident went no further than to assign by lot the Seat of every Tribe, or at most of the Families in that Tribe; For the shares of particular Men it appears not how they were laid out (unless in the cases of Joshuae and Ca●eb which were peculiars') except the place in Numbers, cap. 26. 54. belongs to them, To many thou shalt give the more inheritance, and to few thou shalt give the less inheritance; to every one shall his inheritance be given according to those that were numbered of him. But it is more probable that this is meant of families then of persons, if we consider that the Dignity of the Princes and Heads of Families could not have been preserved without some Advantage in Estate; And besides if none could have been Rich, none could have been Poor, and yet we find Poor abounding in the Commonwealth of Israel even to that extremity as to addict themselves into servitude. Let the Nature of this Division of Lands be what it will, ●are was taken for the preservation of the people in and upon it; and therefore there could be no alienation of Land but with a Defeasance or power of redemption, and once within 50 years, in the Jubilee, all Sales were rescinded and lands reverted to the possession of the former owners. The most considerable though withal most obvious observation concerning the Jewish Agrarian remains, which is that having extirpated the inhabitants of the Land, they might Tailler en plein drape, and so avoid the almost insuperable Difficulties which will cleave to a project that must be introduced by alteration of possession.  
This was the condition of the Jewish Agrarian, which will, if I mistake not, prove very little conformable to the Notion Mr. Harrington hath of it; He thinks not upon the promise of God to Abraham, but considers the Division of the Lands as a politic constitution upon which the Government was founded, though in the whole History of the Bible there be not the least Footstep of such a Design: But in the name of Wonder how can this Agrarian be the foundation of that Government which had subsisted more than 45 year without it? The Constitution of the Jewish Government by Mr. harrington's compute (Pa. 16) bears date before the sending the dozen spies to discover the Land, but from that Action to the Division of the Land was 45 years, Jos. 14. 10. Again, If this Agrarian was meant as Fundamental to the Government, the provision was weak and not proper for the attaining the End proposed, there being nothing in the nature of the Agrarian to hinder but that the whole Country might for the space of near 50 years, that is the time between two Jubiles, have come into the hands of one Man, which had been enough to destroy the Balance and turn the Agrarian itself, as well as all other points of the Government, out of Doors.  
As to the Agrarian of Lacedaemon, it may be comprehended by what hath been already said of that Commonwealth, that the Design of Lycurgus in it was not so much to attain an equality in the Frame of the Government, as to drive into Exile Riches, and the Effects of them Luxury and Debauchery: This will further appear by his endeavour to introduce this Law not only into Real but Personal Estate, though afterward he laid it down upon experience that it proved of too hard Digestion, and instead of it substituted the Law forbidding all but Iron-money by which in a way more secret and artificial he obtained the fame End: The same is manifest also by the Proportion of Lands which he assigned to every particular Man, which might have been far greater without endangering the Equality of the Commonwealth, The success also is clearly of the same side; for no sooner had Lysander by filling the City with Gold and Silver broke the Vow, as I may call it, of Voluntary poverty, but the Commonwealth fell in Virtue and Reputation though she continued a long time after firm in her Agrarian. It is to me as strange as any thing in History that Lycurgus should find credit enough to settle a Government which carried along with it so much want and hardship for particular Men, that the total Absence of Government could scarce have put them into a worse Condition; The Laws that he made prohibiting the use of those things, to enjoy which with security, is that only which to other Men makes the yoke of Laws, supportable: But it may well be thought, this would have been impossible to Lycurgus, had he not wisely obtained response from D●lphos, magnifying his person and the Government he went about to introduce after which all Resistance would have been downright Impiety and Disobedience to the Gods. And whosoever shall have the Fortune to be the Founder of such a Government must encounter a very superstitious people▪ apt to be wrought up into a Belief that their Legislator holds a more than ordinary Correspondence with Heaven.  
But all this will seem to concern Mr. Harrington very little, who (though to bring his Agrarian into Credit he had before made a great flourish with that of Lacedaemon) does let us know (Page 106.) that there is much Dissimilitude between the Agrarians of Lacedaemon and Oceana; Indeed he is thus far in the right, that the Voice of the first was, Every man shall be thus Poor; but that of the latter is, No man shall be more than thus Rich. I will then leave the Ashes of Lycurgus at peace, and examine a little the Moddel of the Agrarian which Mr. Harrington hath propounded to the World.  
1. The first Discovery I make of it, is that it is Unjust. If it be truly asserted that Government is founded on Propriety (Page 4.) then Propriety subsists in Nature before Government, and Government is to be fitted to Propriety, not Propriety to Government. How great a sin than would it be against the first and purest Notions of justice to bring in a Government not only differing from but directly destructive of the settled propriety of Oceana, in which there are confessed (Page 101.) to be 300 persons whose Estates exceed the Standard of 2000 l. per annum. Let me not be choked with the Example of Lacedaemon till Mr. Harrington hath shown Us the power of his persuasion with the Nobility of Oceana, as Lycurgus with them of Lacedaemon, to throw up their Lands to be parceled by his Agrarian, (Pag. 113.) And when that is done, I shall cease to complain of the injustice of it. Not need any one of these 300 be put to own a shame for preferring his own Interest before that of a whole Nation; for though when Government is once fixed, it may be fit to submit Private to Public utility, when the Question is of choosing a Government, every particular Man is left to his own Native Right, which cannot be prescribed against by the Interest of all the rest of Mankind. But in this Case the Interest of three hundred is not balanced with that of a whole Nation, but that of some few extravagant spirits, who by making Dams in the Current of other men's Estates, hope to derive some Water to their own parched Fortunes.  
2. In the second Place the Nature of this Agrarian is such that it can never be Fixed, but as 2000 l. is held now to be a due Standard of Estates, so hereafter they may be brought down to 1000 l. or a far less Sum; For the whole Body of the People being entrusted with giving a Vote and keeping a Sword, may easily either by the way of Counsel or Arms agree to make this Change, in which they need not value the Opposition of such as enjoy 2000 l. whose greatest number can never exceed Five thousand persons, (Page 100) a Company too inconsiderable to withstand Two hundred thousand Men. (Page 200.) It will not be enough to reply that the Law by which the Agrarian shall be settled will hinder this, For it is not to be imagined that those Five thousand can have a more Legal Title to their 2000 l. then the Three hundred now have to the Surplus above 2000 l. Wherefore this Agrarian must needs be unfixt and flitting, and cannot terminate in any thing but Levelling, or at least Reducing the Rate of Estates to that pass, that the keeping it from going any lower shall be the Concern of a greater Number of Men than they make up who have an Interest in the further debasing of it.  
3. But thirdly. As the Jews who have no Land are  great Traders; so the possession of Lands being limited by this Agrarian, Men who are either Covetous or Ambitious, will employ themselves and Estates in Foreign Traffic, which being in a manner wholly engrossed by the Capital City of Oceana; that City already too great will immediately grow into an Excess of Power and Riches very dangerous to the Commonwealth. The Republic of Venice would long since have been sensible of this inconvenience, but that her Extent being no greater than the Isles on which the City stands; (for Mr. Harrington hath truly observed that to all her other Dominions her Government is provincial) the increase of that one place is the equal Augmentation of the whole Commonwealth. But the case stands not so with our Neighbours of Holland, where every Province consisting of the Union of several Towns, and the Republic of the Union of those Provinces, the Town of Amsterdam hath within a few years been so aggrandized by Commerce, that it is become of almost equal importance with all the other Provinces, and hath been able of late to exercise a Tyranny in the Disposal of some public Affairs much to the prejudice both of the Liberty and Interest of the Residue of the Union. An equal if not greater incommodity to Oceana would be created by the Agrarian, which making Emporium a City of Princes, would render the Country a Commonwealth of Cottagers, able to dispute precedence with the Beggar's Bush.  
4. Another Consideration suggests itself from the great Difficulty in making this Agrarian equal and steady; Not only in reference to the various Tenors and Rents of Land in Oceana, (which with all other Objections produced by Mr. Harrington himself (Page 88) I on purpose omit) but with respect to the Flux and Inconstant value of Money by which this Agrarian is computed; We have the experience of all Ancient Surveys of Lands and Rates of Commodities how vastly they recede from the present Estimation of Money, which having no natural Value rises and falls by a thousand Accidents; And who knows but that 2000 l. per annum, may Two hundred years hence differ as much in Value from this present Age, as 2000 l. per annum does now from what it did Two hundred years ago? So the Agrarian which is represented as the firm  Basis of the Commonwealth, must like a floating Bridge undergo all the Vicissitudes which Money is subject to in its Ebbs and Flows.  
But if there were as many Demonstrations to Evince an Agrarian as there are Arguments to impugn it, I should notwithstanding despair of the issue, because it must make War against an Universal and immemorial custom; The power of Custom is without doubt more prevalent than that of Reason, and there is nothing of such Difficulty as to persuade Men, at once and crudely, that they and their Forefathers have lived in an Error.  
Page 22. As the Agrarian answereth unto the Foundation, so doth Rotation unto the superstructures.  
Equal Rotation is equal vicissitude in Government, or succession unto Magistracy conferred for Convenient Terms, enjoying equal vacations as take in the whole body by Parts, succeeding others through the free Election or suffrage of the People.  
The contrary whereunto is Prolongation of Magistracy, which trashing the wheel of Rotation, destroys the life or Natural motion of a Commonwealth.  
That Ancient Republics have through a malicious jealousy made it unlawful even for persons of the clearest Merit to continue long in Command, but have by a perpetual vicissitude substituted new Men in the Government, is manifest enough; but with what success will best appear by Veturius, Varro, Mancinus, and the residue of weak and passionate Commanders which have by this means come to be employed by the Romans: And no less by the rabble of Generals often made use of by the Athenians, while Men of Valour and Conduct have lain by the Walls. It is an Argument of much imperfection in a Government not to dare to employ the whole Virtue of her Citizens. And those Orders must needs be against Nature which excluding persons of the best Qualifications, give Admission to others who have nothing to commend them but their Art in Canvasing for the suffrages of the people. Yet this Law hath been as often broke as a Commonwealth hath been brought into any Exigency; for the hazard of trusting Affairs in weak hands then appearing, no scruple hath been made to trample upon this Order for giving the power to some able Man at that time rendered uncapable by the Vacation this Law requires. The continuation of the Consulship to Marius is sufficient to be alleged for proof of this, though if occasion were it might be backed by plenty of Examples. The Dilemma into which a Commonwealth is in this case brought is very dangerous; For either she must receive a Mortal wound from without, or she must give herself one by gaining the Habit of infringing such Orders as are necessary for her Preservation. I know not what Advantage Mr. Harrington may foresee from the Orders of this Rotation, (Page 213.) for my part I can discover no other Effect of it but this, That in a Commonwealth like that of Oceana taking in the many (For in Venice Mr. Harrington Page 24. confesses it to be otherwise) where every Man will press forward toward Magistracy, This Law by taking off at the end of one year some Officers, and All at the end of three, will keep the Republic in a perpetual Minority, no Man having time allowed him to gain that experience which may serve to lead the Commonwealth to the understanding her True Interest either at home or abroad.  
Were the Agrarian he aims at once established, the Nobility would be so throughly plumed, that they would be just as strong of wing as Wildfowl are in moulting time. And therefore where Mr. Harrington goes about (Page 25.) to persuade the people they need not fear the Nobility, I am of Opinion he might have spared his Pains as I shall mine in any further Consideration of the first part of his Preliminaries, seeing what remains of any Consequence will properly belong to those Men to whom I have recommended the Disquisition of the Jewish Commonwealth.  
FINIS.