TRUTH TRIED: OR, Animadversions On a Treatise published by the Right Honourable ROBERT Lord BROOK, ENTITLED, The Nature of Truth, Its Union and Unity with the Soul. Which (saith he) is One in its Essence, Faculties, Acts; One with Truth.  
By I. W.  
LONDON, Printed by Richard Bishop, for SAMUEL GELLIBRAND at the Sign of the Brazen Serpent in Paul's Churchyard, 1643.   

To the Right Honourable ROBERT Lord BROOK.  
My Noble Lord,  
YOur Lordship being pleased to do the World that honour, to impart to it somewhat of Yours (and therefore Honourable,) it was My Happiness, amongst the rest, to be an Object of that Favour; And yet my Unhappiness so far, as not in all things to fall in with your Lordship: Like a Mariner at Sea, descrying within ken a fair Vessel under Sa●le, promising a rich Lading, makes up to her; and understanding whence she is, and whether she is bound, desires to view her Fraught; but coming so near as to go aboard, falls foul of her (as they speak) and is entangled, and perhaps may both have work enough to get clear. The ●●ire Vessel I had in view, was your Lordship's Treatise, now under Sail, (when made public;) which however directed▪ to a Private Port or Sinus (a Friend's Bosom) yet passes the Ocean to arrive at it: your Lordship's Name enforms me Whence it is, and withal promises a Rich Fraught; which the Bill of Lading tells me What it is, The Nature of Truth; and blame me not if I were ambitious to see it, that I might adore it: If, by mischance, I be entangled, I hope your Lordship's hand will help me to get clear. Our first fathers, which had never seen Fire before, while every one was catching at that which shone so Bright, no marvel if he that first meddled with it, Burnt his Fingers: The Beauty of Truth is likewise Bright and Glorious; so Glorious, that some have found her Dazzle their Eyes, (he might have said, Others have Burnt their Fingers, And I, perhaps, am one of them.) Truth is a Glorious Object, a fit Object only for a Noble Hand: Yet Suitor sometimes, though he presume not to Better Apelles' Picture, may yet find fault with the Shoe; and that without blame, while he go not ultra crepidam.  
Your Lordship, sometimes, in this Divine Treatise, for fear of Dazzling our Eyes, hath left us in a Want of Light. Naked Truth, which your Lordship had the happiness to Behold, is proposed to us Clothed, and Guilded (rather then Painted) in a most curious Dress indeed, yet such as hides the Body; the Beauty whereof being so well worth beholding, we had rather have seen her (as your Lordship did) without her gown, without her crown, the better to have discerned her true Proportion. Rhetorical Embellishments being the same sometimes in a Philosophical Discourse, that varnish on a fair Picture, which helps to set it off, but withal hides it, and presents it more Glossy but less Distinct. For what the Orator useth to Illustrate, that the Philosopher finds to Obscure.  
And thus much perhaps, if no more, may be gained by the ensuing discourse, that your Lordship taking occasion from thence, may afford more Light to that which divers desire better to understand, and Vnmask so Fair a Face. (At least those who have once seen her Naked, may take the pains to Undress her.) And perhaps having taken a second view, through this a more thick Perspective of not so high raised a Fancy, may give us a more Distinct Delineation of what its own Dazzling Brightness presented at first more confused.  
I hope I shall need no large Apology to obtain Acceptance, at least a Pardon from so Noble a Lord, (to whom, I am told, nothing can be more grateful, and who promiseth the fairest answer,) if I Accept the Challenge: which it's like your Lordship would Perform, (if at least Encounters of another nature would give way to those of the Penne.) If I be demanded therefore of what I do, Why at all? I reply, Because, in your Lordship's name, invited: If why so late? I have nothing to reply but this, Qui serò dat, diu noluit. What was at first, in a few days, written to a private Friend, having lain so long in your Lordship's hands, is a sufficient testimony that I made no haste to publish it.  
I have but one request to make, and kiss your Lordship's hand, that you would vouchsafe, if I have done well, to Accept, if otherwise, to Pardon  
Your Lordship's 
 most humble 
 Servant, 
 JOHN WALLIS.   

To the Worshipful, and my Worthy Friend, Henry Darley Esquire.  
Worthy Sir,  
THe Sad news of so Unhappy a Loss as his Lordship's Death, forceth me to give an account of what might else seem a Solecism. The book was newly finished in the press, before his Lordship's death, and expected only to be first presented to his Noble Hands, before it was presented to the World; to whom it was then a going, when that unhappy news stopped it, and some copies were gone abroad. I have suppressed it since, to add that which you see adjoined; in testimony of mine own sadness for so great a Loss. Which yet cannot be so fully expressed by a private pen, as by the common Tears of all those to whom Religion is dear. A sad loss it was, had it been in the Best times, to lose so many excellent Accomplishments in one Noble Breast; but Now most Unhappy, when there is so much work and so few hands; in which, I am confident, None was guided by a more single Eye, with less Obliquity to collateral aims. Unhappy then was that accident, that deprived us of one so well worthy to live;  
Unhappy hand! by one sad stroke who shot  
Religion, Learning, Piety, what not?  
Sir, The Treatise penned long since at your request, had once passed in another Character through Yours to his Lordship's Hand, not then intended to be made public, nor directed to any other than your own eye; what entertainment it then found (such Candour and Nobleness dwelled in that Breast) You know as well as I: And now, being oft solicited, as well by you as others, It was a second time Advancing, ambitious again to be made happy by the same Hand; (and indeed I had been extremely injurious to His Candour, if I should have seemed to decline His Eye and present it to another, who taking liberty sometime to descent from Others, did with the same freedom allow others to descent from Him, willing to accept of any Assistance in the search of Truth;) but being there prevented, it is fain to Retreat, and fall back to the same hand where it first lodged, as being, next after his Lordship, due to you; from  
Your humble Servant 
 J. W. March. 11. 1642   

THE CONTENTS of the ensuing Chapters.  

The Preface.  
DIvers acceptations of Truth. pag. 1.  
Logical and Moral Truth, their nature, and difference. ibid.  
Whether breach of Promise be formally a Ly. 3.  
Metaphysical Truth. 4.  
Veritas Essendi & Cognoscendi, or Cognoscibility. ibid.  
None of these are Truth or Light as here taken. 5.  
The Object not Identically the same with the Faculty. ibid.  
By Truth or Light is meant the Light of Reason. 7. 9 27. 63.   

Chap. 1.  
A double Notion of Truth. 8.  
His first Position, that Truth in the first Notion is the Understanding in its Essence, the Argument because both, a Ray of Divinity cousidered 9   

Chap. 2.  
A second Argument from the three Requisites to every Being, a Fountain imparting, a Channel receiving, and Wa●ers imparted, considered; and Where we may find these in the Understanding, if a Faculty 12.  
Whence Ignorance, and Error in the Understanding. 13.  
Reason and the Understanding, ratio & facultas ratiocinand●, all one. 1●.  
The efficient of Accidents. 14.  
What is the Recipient of Truth. 15.  
How Reason in the ●nderstanding, ●an make the Soul Rational, and give it an Essential Difference from the Irrational. ib.  
Whether the Qualities be Formae ●ementorum. 17.  
The Efficient or Fountain whence Reason comes to the Soul; Internal, external, from the Soul itself, from the Parent, from God. 18.  
Whether the Recipient of Truth must be Truth. 21.  
Whether Light pass from the Understanding to the Soul; from the Understanding to the Will; and how the Soul acts by its Faculties. 22.   

Chap 3.  
How these are found if the Understanding be Truth. 24.  
How every thing is its own Recipient. ibid.  
To receive a Being, and to receive a Form Do Esse, & do Habere; differ. ibid.   

Chap. 4.  
Whether the Vnderstanding-Faculty may not be the Recipient of Truth. 26.   

Chap. 5.  
A second Assertion (or the first improved) that both Truth, and the Understanding, be the same also with the Soul, considered. 27.   

Chap. 6.  
A Corollary, that All things are this One Truth, considered. 28.  
Whether a consequent of the former Assertions. ibid.  
Whether true in itself, viz. whether all things One. 32. 5.  
Whether Physically, Integrally, Specifically; one Thing, one Whole, of one Kind. 32.  
How all from one Fountain. 34.  
Simplicity in God hinders not Variety in the Creatures. 28. 34  
Unity in God equivalent to an infinite Variety. ibid.  
Whether the Divine Attributes be distinct ratione ratiocinate. 35.  
Whether all Being's be Homogeneal; of the same specifical nature, only gradually distinct. 36.  
How all received in the same manner. 37.  
Whether Number be Real. ibid.   

Chap. 7.  
A farther Corollary, that Unity is the Essence of all things, considered. 38.  
Whether Unity be the Essence of God. ibid.  
Whether Infiniteness or Unity in God be first. 39  
Whether Unity be the Essence of Created Being's. ibid.  
How the Commandments are comprised in Love: and Moral Virtue's concatenate in Prudence. ibid.  
Whether Quantity may be divided in semper divisibilia. 40.  
Unity as opposed to Multitude, is purely Negative. 43.  
Yet, not Imaginary. 44.  
Negatio realis & negatio rationis. ibid.  
Ens Rationis & Negatio rationis. 45.   

Chap. 8.  
The nature of Habits. A third Assertion, that Habits also are the same with the Souls Essence, considered. 46.  
Faculties and Habits how they differ, and how distinct from the Soul. ibid.  
Habits Infused and Acquisite. 47.  
Plato's Reminiscentia, and Aristotle's Rasa Tabula, compared. 49.  
Whether former acts do help subsequent acts or only Seem to do. ibid.  
Whether Reason and Faith differ only in degrees. 51.  
The Liberty of the Will, wherein it consists. 53. 55.  
Why some of more Knowledge have less Faith. 54.  
Whether the Will always follow the Understanding, and how. 55.  
Libertas Contrarietatis & Contradictionis. 56  
It is no perfection to the Will, to be able to disobey Reason. ib.  
How all sinful acts may be called Omissive. 58.  
The Understandings dictates are Declarative, not Imperative. 59  
Speculative & experimental Knowledge. 60  
This latter the Will cannot reject. ibid.  
Whether God be all Mercy to the Devils. 6●.  
How Mercy and justice are One in God. ibid.   

Chap. 9  
How Knowledge and Affection differ. 62.  
Whether Knowledge extinguish Affection. ibid.  
Why some of less knowledge have larger affections. ibid.  
How far we may admit, Reason, the Understanding, the Soul, its Habits, and Actions to be the same. 63.   

Chap. 10.  
A fourth Assertion, that the Operations are the Souls Essence, considered. 64.  
How the Soul is Actus 64. Several acceptions of Actus. 65.  
An materia individuetur a formâ. 66.  
Whether the Act or the Power be first, in order, dignity, and nature. 67.  
How Omnis virtus consist it in actione. ibid.  
The difference between actus primus & secundus, ibid.   

Chap. 11.  
An Objection against his last Assertion, Whether the actions being divers, there be not so many souls, considered, and Whether Time and P●ace be only imaginary. 69.  
Distinction of Operations proceeds not from Time and place. ibid.  
Whether all the Souls Actions be One. 70  
How all things are present to ●od. 71  
How permanency in God may consist with succession in the creature. 72  
Whether Good and Evil may be in the same act. 72  
Whether contradictions may be conscistent. ibid.  
Whether Copernicus' opinion be confused by sense. 73   

Chap. 12.  
Another Objection against the same Assertion, concerning Falsehood in the Souls Operations; Whether it cease to be, when it ceaseth to act Truth, considered. 75  
Whether it cease to be, when it ceaseth to act. ibid.  
Whether succession of moments be only imaginary. ibid.  
Whether all acts be the same. 76  
Whether it cease to be when it acts Falsehood. 78  
Whether the reality of the Object be requisite to make the act real. ibid.  
Distinction of Metaphysical Goodness and Truth, from Moral and Logical Goodness and Truth. 79  
Whether Evil be merely privative. ibid.  
Whether any individual action be indifferent. 82  
Whether Falsehood be merely privative. 83  
How Ens & Verum convertuntur. ibid.  
The difference between Ensrationis and Error intellectus. 84  
Whether Pain be merely privative. 86  
Whether better to be miserable, than not to Be. ibid.  
Whether God be the author of Falsehood, or Evil. 88  
Relations, how produced. ibid.   

Chap. 13.  
Corollaries or general Consequents from his whole Assertion, (That all things are One Truth:) Whether useful in practicals. 89   

Chap. 14.  
Whether Knowledge and Sciences receive benefit from this Assertion. 91  
Curiosity in searching, blamed. 92   

Chap. 15.  
Whether confusion in the knowledge of Causes be redressed by this Unity. 92.   

Chap. 16.  
Whether divisions in other parts of Learning be redressed by it. 93.  
Wherein the nature of Faith consists. 94  
And Bellarmine's Dilemma avoided. 95  
Whether Faith save only declarative. ibid.  
Whether we be saved, even in the Execution of the Decree, without Faith. ibid.  
Scientia simplicis intelligentiae and scientia Visionis. 96.  
Whether God Will do what ever he Can do. ibid.   

Chap. 17.  
Of curiosity in the search of causes, with a close of all. 97   

The Postscript.  
A Breviate of the whole Discourse. 100    

ERRATA.  
PAg. ●9. l. 6 read ●i●t. l. 11. r. first. pag 48. l. 36. r. produced. p. 90. l. 37. r. and ●ood. p. 117. l. 38. r. contrariè, sin●ulares verò contradictoriè. p. 11●. l. 19 r revera singulares.   

TRUTH TRIED: OR, Animadversions on a Treatise, entitled, The Nature of Truth.  

SIR,  
I Have, according to your desire, perused that Treatise concerning The Nature of Truth. (The which how far it serves to the expounding the 24. Chapter of Math. I examine not.) One thing that may make it seem somewhat dark, is, that his Lordship speaking of a matter somewhat unusual, is forced to use such Metaphors, for want of native words, which may somewhat obscure it: And his Lordship was the less careful to avoid it, because they being with himself of frequent use, and sufficiently understood by him to whom he wrote, there was the less fear of being not understood, or misunderstood: And so the less need to prevent it, by seeking for such words as might better suit with an ordinary Reader.  
Before I proceed to state the Question, Whether Truth and the Soul be One; It is very requisite to search, in what sense his Lordship understands Truth; that through the ambiguous sense, and divers acceptations of the word, we be not confounded in the progress.  
Truth in Logic, is when the Proposition agrees with the Thing; and Falsehood, when they disagree.  
Truth in Ethics, is when our Words and Actions agree with our Mind; and is opposed to a Lie, to Hypocrisy.  
And Truth in these acceptations is nothing else but an Agreement or conformity of a Type with its Prototype, Archetypi & Ectypi; of a Transcript with its Original▪ of an Idea, or thing representing, with that represented; Signi & Signati.  
Thus in Logic, Vox est signum rei, or Imago r●i. If therefore we have that expressed in Words, to which in the order of Things there is nothing agreeing; it is a False Copy, or rather no Copy, being drawn according to no Pattern. If that be, which is affirmed to be; it is True, because they are a Copy or Representation of the Things so being.  
As it is in words, so it is also in Apprehensions, in conceptibus; If our mind conceive a thing to be, which is not, or to be otherwise then it is, this is a False Apprehension, because the Idea in our understanding is not a true representation of the Thing.  
In Ethics, our words are to be compared with another Copy; because (thuss they are not the representation of the Things (immediately) but the representation of our Thoughts, or Intentions: Therefore, if our Words do truly express or represent what we Think; It is morally True, that is, it is not a Lie, because they agree with this Copy; but yet they may be Logically False, as not being a true expression of the Thing. If the Idea in our apprehension agree with the Things, so that we conceive a ●ight of them; and our Word▪ be a true representation of this Idea; they do truly also represent the Things: There is both v●ritas Logica, and veritas Moralis If we conceive a right of things, and our words express otherwise then we think; this Proposition is both ways false; for it neither agrees with the thing, nor with our judgement: But our Judgement is Logically true▪ because the Idea in our mind is a true expression of the thing. If we conceive amiss, and yet affirm as the thing is (if we affirm snow to be white, which we conceive to be black,) our Proposition is Logically true, but Morally false; and our conceptus is also Logically false. If lastly, we conceive amiss, and speak otherwise then we conceive, and yet divers from what we ought both to think and speak (as if we conceive snow to be bl●●k, and affirm it to be red:) our Idea or Conceptus is Logically false, our Proposition Logically false, and Morally false.  
Thus i● one▪ intending upon a Signet to grave the Kings▪ Image, mindeth of the true proportion, and with this Signet maketh impression in Wax▪ the wax cont●●nes a true representation of the Seal▪ but not the true Image of the King; whereas, if the Signet had been truly graven, and then impression made in the wax; the wax had truly represented both the one and the other. Thus is it in Moral and Logical Truth.  
Accordingly, one making a Promise with intention to perform it, yet afterward breaks it; this Promise is Morally true, because it is a true representation of his Intentions; but it is not Logically true, as not being a representation of his future Actions. And in his subsequent Actions there is also a kind of Moral falsehood; because they are not conformable to his promise, by which they should be regulated. Or you may say, his Promise was (Morally) a True expression of his Intention; but his Intention was (Logically) False, as not agreeing with the Thing, because he intended that which was not Futurum Whereas, if he had promised, with a purpose to break it, his Promise had been Morally False, but his Intention Logically True▪ If, intending to break it, he yet perform it, his Intention is Logically false, and his Promise Morally false, though Logically true. And thus Breach of Promise will come under the nature of Injury, or Injustice; but not under the nature of a Lie, except it were made to deceive; because it is the true expression of the Intention, which is the immediate rule of Veracity or Moral truth.  
Thus Hypocrisy, or Dissimulation, is a branch of Moral Falsehood; because Actio and Jests, are Index animi, as well as Words.  
And this I conceive to be the Nature of, and Difference between Logical and Moral Truth.  
There is yet another Truth, and you may call it a Physical Truth, ● Formal or Essential Truth: Thus that which hath the Essentials of a Man, is verè Homo; so an Infant is a true Man. Thus we say, a true Church, true Faith, true Grace, true Gold, (not counterfeit:) thus a Syllogism in a right form, is a true Syllogism, though the Propositions be false. And the like.  
(But mistake me not; by Moral Truth, or Natural Truth, etc. I understand not, Truths about Natural things, or Moral things, (though the words be ofttimes so taken:) For I am not now distributing Truth into its several Species, or several Parts; but am showing the Ambiguity of the Word, and so distinguishing it into its several Acceptations. Thus Moral or ethical Truth, is that Acceptation of Truth that is usual in Ethics: Logical Truth, is that Acceptation of ●●uth, which is used in Logic, etc.)  
But ●●●pp●●●, we ●●● y●t ●●rre from that Acceptation of Truth, in which ●●● Lo●●▪ speaketh: I will therefore come somewhat ne●rer. ●●●●● the Logical and Morall●…ptat●●n ●…ptat●●n ●● Truth, we have a Metaphysical acc●ptat●… ●●s and V●rum are ●ermini conv●r●ib●les. And Truth is taken in ●●●● such acceptation, when it is divided into veri●●s Essendi and Cognosc●ndi.  
Veritas Essend●, or the truth of Being, is that per quam res veriest: And thus Ens & Verum conver●untur. quicksands ●uid est, ver● est▪ For except it have a Real and True Being (and not a Supposed Being) it is not ●ind●●d) a Being, but is Supposed ●o be.  
Veritas ●ognosce●di is that per quam res ver● Cognoscitur. And thus also Ens & Verum conver●u●t●r: For whatsoev●r is, may b●e ●n●wn to be. This Veritas i● nothing ●lse but Cognoscibilitas: Therefore Veritas, as it is Affectio Entis, is defined by some to be Convenie●●ia r●i, seu Co●formit●s rei, ●um I●tell●ct●; (●ive humano ●ive di●●●●.) Thus Truth in the Things and Knowledge in the Understanding have ●elation to each other as Objectum a●● P●tentia. As Colour in the Object to Sight in the Eye.  
Colour, as it is inherent in a Body, makes it to be Coloured (cor●us coloratum:) The same Colour, as it stands in relation to the Eye, makes it to be Visible (corpus visibil●.) Thus Essence, or Being, as it is in the ●hing, constitutes it in the nature of a Thing, or a Being: And the sa●e ●●●●nce in the thing, as it hath relation to the Understanding, makes it ●ognos●ibile. ●n the first sense it is Veritas Essendi▪ in the second it is Veritas Cognos●end●. (Where t●e construction will be somewhat hard, exc●●t you give Philosophers leave to use the G●●●●d in a Possive signification, which amongst pure grammarians is more ra●●ly ●●und.) For by the s●me E●se●c● by which it is Ens, by the same it is Cognoscibile; That Being by which it is, by the same it ●●y be ●●own to be: As by the same Colour, by which the object is Color●tum, it is also Visibile.  
And this ● conceive to be the right acceptation of Metaphysical Truth, or Truth as it is taken in Metaphysics for an Affection of Being: not being a Thing Really di●●inc● for that thing, that truly is, and may be truly known to be; But (as they call it) Modus Entis.  
And now we be come somewhat n●e●er that acceptation of Truth wherein his Lo●●▪ takes it; though (if I mistake him not) that sense wherein he useth it, is somewhat distinct from all these: For whether you consider the Truth of ●eing, or the Truth of Knowledge▪ they are in themselves really the Same, and the same ●l●● really with that Ens, t●●● Being, which tru●y Is, and is truly K●o●n ●● be: which thing 〈…〉 a being, and as truly Cognoscible, when there is no Understanding present to take notice of it, as when it is actually Unders●●●d. ●●●e a● an Object is ●●uly Col●u●ed, and truly Visible, even then when ●●●re is no ●ye present to behold it. And therefore this truth cannot be One with the Understanding▪ because it may be then and there where the Understanding is not.  
Again, Truth being (as I said) One with the Thing known, if it ●● also One with the Understanding, or the Soul; the Understanding or Soul knowing shall be One with the Thing understood: A S●one and the Soul shall be one Individual Being: For how can Truth be the same with the Stone, and the same with the Soul, except the Soul and the Stone be the same.  
Object. But you will say thi● is that he contends for, not only, that Truth understood is one with the Soul; but that both the Thing understood, and the Sou● understanding, are this Truth.  
Answ. 1. To proceed therefore. If the Stone understood, and the Soul understanding, be the Same; then when began this Unity, ●●●● Identy? Were they the Same before the Stone was actually understood? Or did they then contract this Unity, when first the Soul did actually Know it?  
Why they should be the same, Before the act of Knowing; there 〈…〉 no more reason, then why one ●●●ne should be the same with ●…ne; ●●y one man should be the same with another man: And so Peter or Paul might be ●s truly said to b●●ray Christ, as Ju●●●, if Peter and Judas be one and the same.  
And if they should ●●●n ●●ntr●●● a● Unity, (and not before when the Understanding ●o●h ●●●s● Actually understand it; we must ta●e ●●●● saying, Intell●ct●s i●●ellig●●do ●m●●a ●it ●mn●a▪ in a more gr●●●e 〈…〉 it w●● m●●●●. A●●, ●●●y judgement, it i● utterly impossible, for that which hath ●●●● been Al●ud●● ●● be made Idem; ●s also for that which is O●●, to ●e made A●●ud a s●ips●. I say, ●● i● impossible for two things to be made one●nd ●nd the s●me, by a Re●ll Identity.  
'Tis true, Two things may be so united as to be made One Aggrega●um; as the Body and the soul make one M●n, the Divi●●●y and Humanity of Christ make ●n● Person: But that two things can become the same; that the Soul is the Body, and the Body the Soul; that the Humanity of Christ is his Divinity, and his Divinity his Humanity; I conceive not only false, but impossible. The Hand and the Foot (with the rest of the members) make one Body; but neither the Hand is the Foot, nor is the Foot the Hand, but really distinct.  
Answ. 2. But further, as it is hard to show, when this near kindred either of Affinity, or Consanguinity; this Union either of Identity, or of Identification, had its first Original: So, if there be any such Union, (either connate or contracted) between the Soul and a Stone: Then will not only One but All Souls (at least, all souls actually understanding and apprehending it) be the same with this Stone. And these Souls, being one and the same with this one individual stone, they will be one and the same with each other.  
Thus we shall have but one Soul informing all Bodies; not by a Pythagorical Metempsychosis▪ by translating of souls from one body to another, but as A●●mus Averroisticus, one soul extended through the whole Universe, informing so many men as there be bodies, whereof every man is partaker tanquam communis aur●: Nay nearer, for of the Air each takes a part; but as for this Soul, each Is, each Hath this Soul entire.  
Neither doth it infer only an Identity of Souls, but an Identity of Objects also: For all▪ Objects being apprehended by one Soul, they become all One with it: And being all one with the same numerical Soul, they must be also One with each other.  
So that all Souls will thus be One, all Objects will be but One, and this One Object one and the same with that One Soul; and all the World but Vnum Ens, whose every parcel is alteri ●dem; the same with each other.  
Object. You'll say, All this is no more than he contends for; to make Truth▪ One with the Soul; and that all things that are, are nothing but this One Truth.  
Answ. If this be his opinion, To prove an Identity of all creatures, because their Being, from whence proceeds their Cognoscibility, is all One with the Soul, or Understanding: His Lord▪ must give me leave to descent from him, if for no other reason, yet because ●e dissents from himself: For if his Argument be good, That all things are One with the Soul, because Truth or Cognoscibility, (which differs not really from their Essence) being the Object of the Souls Operation, must also be One with the Soul; It will follow also, that God is likewise One and the Same with the Soul, because He also is Cognoscibilis, and may be known by the Soul: And also, that all things else are one with God, because they are all known by Him. And so he falls upon the first of those Errors, which he mentions in the ●nd of his Prooemium, immediately before the first Chapter; which is, by mounting too high in the exalting of Truth, to confound the Creator with the Creature▪ by making her God. Neither doth it only make Truth to be one with God; but even all things else, being one with Truth, to be One with God.  
Again, if so, how is it that in the end of his 3. Chapter, concerning the Body and the Soul he tells us, not that they are the Same, or that the Body is the Soul, but as husband and wife each bringeth his part towards the making up of the Compositum. At lest M●. Sadler is mistaken as well as I, (who is presumed at least to understand his Lor●▪ mind, sufficiently,) who ●ells us in his Epistle, that Corporal Union ●● materials is sometimes [Miscalled] Identity, which is at best but a ●●ld touch in a point or two.  
But I suppose there may be another acception of Truth, which may better suit with (at least the first part of) his Lordship's discourse. You may call it Veritas Cognoscendi, as well as the former, bu● in a different sense. There Knowledge was taken in a Passiveness ●●●se, and Truth was that which makes the thing Cognoscib●le, or fit to be understood: Here you must take it in an Active sense; and so Veritas Cognoscendi, or the Truth of Knowledge, will be that which makes the understanding Cognoscitivum, or fit to conceive and apprehend that Cognosc●●li●y which is in the Object. And thu● Truth will be that principle, whereby the Soul is able to ●…hend or conceive that which may be known.  
Veritas Cognoscendi in the former sense, and that in this sense, are both Principia cognoscendi, Principles of knowledge, but in a several way. (You may distinguish them, if you please, thus; Truth of knowing, and Truth of being known, and veritas cognosce●di may be 〈…〉 both) They differ as Colour in the Object, from the power of seeing in the Eye: The former makes the Object Visible, and fit to be perceived; the other makes the Eye Visive, and fit to discern it. If the first were wanting, Vision would be hindered, because there is nothing Visible: (Hence it is that the Air, and Spiritual substanc●● are not seen even by the sharpest sight.) If the latter be wanting▪ ●●● sight is hindered from a desect in the Organ: (Thus▪ the most perspicuous Colour's are not discerned by a blind Eye; whereas the ●ame Colours are in themselves sufficiently Visible, and actually Discerned by others▪) Thus Veritas cognoscendi, in the former sense, makes the Object to be Cognoscible; Truth, in the latter sense, gives the Understanding, or Soul, ability to know it.  
Now if you call the Power of se●ing, which is in the Eye, by the name of ●●●ate light (●o distinguish i● from Light either in the Object, or in the Medium:) You may also call Reason, which is this principle of knowing in the Soul, or Understanding, by the name of innate Truth, or Light.  
And this signification of Truth I conceive to be most suitable to his Lor●▪ meaning. (But Verum, or Truth, in this sense, is not convertible with Ens: For though all Being's have in them Truth, whereby they may be Known, yet all have not this Truth, or Power to Know-worth)  
And thus if you understand it, it will not seem so strange a Paradox, ●o 〈…〉 th●● Reason (which he calls Truth) is all one with the Understanding; and that the Understanding is not distinct from the Soul. For this will be granted by all those, which affirm that Potenti● non real●ter distinguuntur ab Animâ; that the Powers or Faculties of the Soul, are not really distinct from the Soul itself: And these a●e 〈…〉 I mistake not) the greater part of ●ound Philosophers. And ●●us his Lor●▪ opinion is but the same with theirs in other words. (Yet may we ●●●ll speak distinctly of these several Faculties; as w● do of the Wisdom of God, the Power of God, the Will of God, etc. which are as entirely one with God, as these Faculties can be with the Soul.) And thus much for explaining the state of the 〈…〉. ● proceed next to examine the Grounds of this his Lor●▪ opinion.   

CHAP. ●. Whether the Understanding, and Truth understood, be One.  
IN his first Chapter he tells us, That Truth (that is Reason) is enthron▪ d in the Understanding; and there appears under a double Notion Th●●●●● the Fountain or Groundwork (which is Reason itself,) We call it (saith he) the form or substance. And then those workings which breathe from thence (the Streams issuing from it) viz. the Operations and exercise of Reason, the effects of a reasonable soul. (We call them usually, actus primus, and actus secundus.)  
The first of these he begins with, proving it to be the Understanding in its Essence: (The second he proceeds to in the tenth Chapter.) His Argument is this, What is the Understanding other than a Ray of the Divine Nature, warming and enlivening the Creature, conforming it to the likeness of the Creator? And is not Truth the same?  
If you take Truth in any other acceptation beside that last mentioned, I see not how the Argument will hold: For if you take it either for the Truth of Being, or the Truth of Knowing (in the common acceptation;) for that Essence, whereby every Creature both is and may be known to be: It may be granted, that the understanding is one of those Rays of the Divine Nature, somewhat of that Excellency implanted in Man, of that Image of God whereby Man is conformed to the likeness of the Creator: It will be granted also, That the Essence or Truth of every Creature, whereby it Is or is Known to be, is a Ray proceeding from the same Centre, (though to another point of the Circumference,) a Stream issuing forth from the same Fountain of Being; and carries some weak Resemblance, some Sparkling of that Primitive Light, or Truth, that Original Essence which is in God; (For thus every Creature hath something of God in it, Refert quaelibet herba Deum.) Yet will it not follow from hence, That this communicated Ray of Being is the same with the Understanding. For the Argument will prove erroneous, as being Affirmative in the second Figure, in which no Affirmative Proposition can be concluded: And the Consequence will be the same with this, [What is the Body of Man but a material substance? And is not a Stone the same?] Which you would hardly admit as a sufficient argument to prove our Body to be a Stone.  
If you take Truth for Reason, the Argument will admit of a reduction into an exact Form, thus, [That Ray of the Divine Nature, which doth (solely, or principally) express God's Image in Man, is the Understanding; but Truth or Reason is this divine Ray; Therefore Truth (that is Reason) is the Understanding.]  
And this Argument will hold good, if we grant the Soul to be the immediate worker in rational Operations, without an intervenient Faculty: But (otherwise) those that are of the contrary Opinion would deny (or distinguish) the Major, and say, That this divine Ray, this Image of God, consists not wholly in the Understanding by itself, but in the Soul or Understanding, accompanied with its several Faculties and operations.  
And indeed it cannot be denied, but that the Operations of the Soul do contain part of this Divine Image, ●s well as the Soul in its Essence; and yet They are the Souls (immediate) Progeny, and are not immediately produced by God.  
Now what others admit concerning the Operations, They will a●●●rm concerning the Faculties; That they are but parcels of this Ray or Divine Image, That they are but lesser Rivulets derived from the greater stream▪ or branches annexed to it.  
Now from hence, [That the Soul in its Essence, together with the several Faculties and Operations wherewith it is endowed, doth make up the chiefest part of God's Image in Man] to prove, [That every part of this Image are the same with each other▪] and so [the Faculties to be the same with the Soul;] is that which they will not allow.  
And to presume, or take for granted, That this Image of God consists but in One single Ray; i● but petere principium, it being no less hard to prove, then that the Faculties and the Soul are One; That Truth (or Reason) is One and the S●●e with the Understanding, or Reasonable Soul.  
They would say rather, That the Soul is One of those Bra●●he●, which (issuing from the same Root of Being in God, from whence all other Created Being's do arise) divides itself into several Twigs. And we have no way to convince them of falsehood in this particular, till we have first proved the Soul and its Faculties to be one Simple o● Single Essence.  
The prosecution or explication of his Lor●▪. Argument doth no way oppose this acceptation of Truth which I have given, but confirms it; which (if I rightly understand it) may be thus explained; That Truth (Reason) is Light, none will deny▪ (by Light understand, that internal Principle whereby the Soul can See o● Know, which is so called by a Metaphor drawn from the Innate light, (we call it potentia visiva) whereby the Eye is enabled to See:) That Light (this power or principle of Knowing or Reasoning) i● a reasonable creature i● the Fountain of Life, i● manifest: (by Life understand the Life of the Soul, if I may so speak, That which specificates the rational Soul, and makes i● 〈…〉) For ●●●●●●● of a reasonable Soul, (that which makes it to be Reasonable) is Light, (that principle whereby it know● and understands:) And therefore when the Soul informeth, or giveth life to Animal rationale, (making it Rational) it enableth the Creature to work according to that Light, (according to this principle of Knowing: that is, It enableth the Reasonable Creature to Know or Understand, etc.) Thus whilst Life (that which makes a reasonable creature to be Reasonable) and Light (this power of Knowing) is Truth (or Reason; And Truth (or Reason) is Conformity to God (or God's Image in us:) And the Understanding also, as we yet discourse of it, is this Light (this principle of Reasoning) to the Soul; The Understanding and Truth (or Reason) can be but One.  
The whole Argument i● briefly thus; [the Image of God in us, is our Understanding; and this Image or divine Radius, consists in Reason (which he calls Truth;) therefore Truth or Reason is our Understanding.] His minor (that this Ray or Beam of Divinity in us, is Truth or Reason) is thus proved; [Because Reason in us is ● derivative Beam, a sparkling, of that primitive Light (or Wisdom) which is in God:] And so That which enlightens us, and enables us to Know, or Understand, according to our measure (that which furnisheth Us with Knowledge) is a representation of God's Sapience or Wisdom whereby He is said to Know. Now, [that Truth or Reason (which is all one) is this derivative Beam of Light, whereby we are able to Know;] and [That this ability to Know or Understand, is that which makes u● to be Reasonable,] is manifest. Wherefore he concludes, That, whilst ●ur Life (or Rationality) consists in Light, (that is, in an Ability to know and understand) and this Ability consists in Truth (or Reason) which is a conformity to God (as being a Stream issuing from his Ocean of Wisdom;) And whilst (as Reason is this ability of knowing, so) the Understanding also is this Light (this Ability or power of Knowing;) The Understanding and Truth (that is, Reason) must be all One.  
Those, who deny his Conclusion, would answer, That both Reason and the Understanding, do enable the Soul to Know, or Understand, but in a several way, as distinct principles (and therefore are not the same:) The one Instrumentally or Ministerially; The other, by using this as its Minister. Thus Fire, by its Heat, burns; a Stone, by its Heaviness, descends; Glass, by its Levity or smoothness, re●●ecteth; and the like.  
If you say, the Weight of the Stone, or Smoothness of the Glass, are not Things distinct from the Stone and Glass, but rather Modifications of these Things; I contend not: For neither do I hold the Understanding, or any other of the Souls Faculties, to be a Thing distinct from the Soul; but, at the most, only an accidental Modification of it, not Really distinct from it: Yea rather, That it is the Soul itself, quatenus intelligens, (as the Power of God, is God himself quatenus potens) admitting no other but a distinction of Reason.   

CHAP. II. A second Argument (from the three Requisites to every Being) examined.  
IN the second Chapter, he proposeth first the Opinion of those that style the Understanding a Faculty, whereby the Soul receiveth or entertaineth Truth, and Acteth accordingly.  
But here his Lordship (if I mistake not) varieth from his former acceptation of Truth; Comparing it not to the Innate Light, or power of Seeing, in the Eye; but to the Advenient Light, which streams to it through the Air, bringing with it the Idea, or visible Species, of the Object seen. For, soon after, he calls it, those sweet beams of Light which beat upon us continually; which cannot be meant of any innate Light, but of an advenient Light.  
And thus I see no inconvenience at all, to say, That the Soul, or Understanding, by its Innate Light, of Reason, (which whether you say to be distinct from the Soul, or not, it is not much material) doth daily receive or entertain new Truths, or new Representations of that Truth of Being which is really existent in Things; either by a reiterate actual understanding of those things which it had formerly understood, or by a new apprehension of somewhat whereof before it was ignorant. Like as the Eye by its innate Power of Seeing, discerns new Species (conveyed to it by advenient Light) either from Objects formerly seen, or now first represented.  
Next he lays down three Requisites to the constitution of every Being. A Fountain communicating; a Channel entertaining; and Waters imparted. (Conferent, Collatum, Recipiens.) And he asks Where we shall find these three, if the Understanding be a Faculty.  
I answer. If you speak of Advenient light (last mentioned) which is a Representative Truth, or an Idea of that R●all Truth which is in the Things Known; I say, the Real Truth (or Veritas Ess●ndi) sends forth this Representative Truth, or Idea, which is conveyed by a Deferent Light (either of Discourse, or Information, or the like) till it come to the Understanding, where it is received and entertained by the Innate Light (or Truth) of Reason. Like as the Inherent light of Colour in the Object sends forth a Representative light of visible Species, which is conveyed by a Deferent light in the Air, till it come to the Eye, where it is entertained by the Innate light, which is the faculty of Seeing.  
And, as the Remoteness, or Obscurity of the Object; the Darkness of the Medium; or the Weakness of the Faculty, may hinder Sight, so that we see not at all, or not perfectly: In like manner the Distance of the Object, as in things quite out of our reach; or the Obscurity of them, which send forth no Species, or manifestation of their essence towards us; our imperfect Discourse, or insufficient Information, which is as a dark Medium; and lastly, the weakness of our Apprehension; do cause Ignorance in the Understanding, which is answerable to notseeing in the Eye.  
Again, as in Ignorance so in Error. A reflection of a false Light upon the Object, casting a false seeming colour, which may be mistaken for the true colour of it; an indisposed Medium, as when we see through Red glass, etc. and a distempered Organ, by reason of some vicious humours accidental in the Eye, etc. may cause a mistake and Error in Sight: So here, when there is a False Light upon the Object, as when we conceive that to be the effect of one thing, which indeed proceeds from some other cause, fallacia non causae pro causâ, or the like; a false Discourse or Inference, or a false Relation, which is as a stained Medium; or a distempered Understanding, by reason of Passion, of l●sa Phantasia, or the like; may cause an Erroneous Judgement, apprehending things to be otherwise then indeed they are.  
And thus I have showed not only those three requisites which his Lordship requires, but some others besides them; supposing in the mean time the Understanding to be a Faculty; and taking Truth for those sweet Beams of Light, which beat upon us; Advenient Light.  
If you take Truth for Reason; and withal suppose Reason to be distinct from the Understanding, and ●t also from the Soul. You may say, The Understanding is the Recipient; Reason the thing Received in it; and that Then and from Those, when and from whence it received its Essence, to which Reason is a connate and appendent Faculty; That is, either from God, by immediate Creation, which many think; or from the Parents, by Propagation, which others▪ ●old.  
But I suppose there be few or none, that hold, Reason to be distinct from the Understanding, and That also from the Soul. For when they speak of Reason, as a faculty of the Understanding; by Understanding they mean, the Soul itself, quatenus intelligens, being considered a● the Subject of Reason: And when they speak of the Understandingly ●● a faculty, whereby the Soul is able to conceive and judge of Truth; Then they take the Understanding to be the same with Reason.  
I should rather say, That Reason, and the Understanding (as it denotes a Faculty) are two words Synonimons, denoting the same Faculty or Power of Knowing and Judging. Which Faculty I would not grant to be another Thing from the Soule-Knowing, or the Soule-Understanding but a Modus▪ Asdruball neither do I allow to Any Naturall-Power, or Faculty, (which they make the second Species of Quality) any other Being then the Being of a Modus, and not the being of ● Thing.  
And thus we may safely say, the Soul receives the Faculty of Reason or Understanding; Thence, from whence it receives its Being: (as a Stone receives its Heaviness from that which Produceth it:) That which gave it to Bee gave it to be Thus.  
Sometimes indeed Accidents are not received from that which produceth the Substance, but from some other Efficient; as the Smoothness of Marble proceeds not from the Producer, but from the Polisher: And yet I hold not, the Smoothness to be One Thing, and the Marble to be another Thing▪ but the Marble to be a Thing, and the Smoothness to be Modus. And thus it must be granted in Acquisite Habits; where the Giver and Receiver are the Same, and the Thing Received Modally, but not really, distinct from either.  
But for Faculties, or Naturall-Powers; If you look for an external Efficient or Giver, it will be the same that produceth the Substance; But if you be contented with an Efficient per Emanationem, Thus they are said to flow or arise from the Form, or Substance. And then the Giver and Receiver is the Same; (for the Form which i● the Subject Receiving, is also per emanation●m Effectiva, from whence it ariseth as an Essential Consequent:) and if you say the Faculty Received is not so much as Modally distinguished from it but only ratione 〈…〉; I contend not. But so much▪ distinction at least, I suppose, we must allow it.  
Having thus answered his Lordship's Cue re, I proceed to answer his Objections. If the Understanding (saith he) be the Recipient, than the Light (of Reason) which differenceth us from the Vegetative and Sensitive creatures, lieth in the Understanding, and not in the Soul: And so the Soul is either not enlightened at all, but only a Theca to the Intellect; or else there be two Enlightened (rational) Being's in ●●● Reasonable creature.  
For answer, First, I suppose (as I said before) that there are few, if any, that will affirm, the Soul, the Understanding, and Reason, to be Three things: But they will either say, Reason Is the Understanding, and not in the Understanding: or else, Reason is in the Understanding, which Understanding is the Soul, considered only under this Notion▪ quatenus Intelligens, as it is the Subject of Reason. And thus the difficulty appears not; For the Light which differenceth us from Unreasonable creatures, whether you call it Reason, or call it the Understanding▪ is seated in the Soul, and so denominates it Intelligent or Understanding.  
But secondly, we want not a Recipient for Truth though the Soul be not it, It may be the Understanding.  
Yet thirdly, though the Soul be not the Immediate Subject, it may yet be the ultimate, which is more than a Theca.  
Object. But you will reply, However it be so, that we make this Light to be inherent in the Soul; yet it is not sufficient to make an Essential difference between the Reasonable and Unreasonable Soul. For though Reason be in the Soul, except it also Be the Soul, it makes the difference but Accidental; For thus the Reasonable and Unreasonable Soul will not differ in their Essence, but only in their Adjuncts.  
Answ. To this I answer▪ First, this is a new difficulty not arising out of his Lordship's argument: For though this Light (of Reason) be an Accident, yet this hinders not but that there may be his three Requisites: For an Accident may be truly received, in the Subject, from the Producer.  
And yet (secondly) This, though a Faculty of the Soul, and not the Soul itself, makes notwithstanding a Noble difference between a Rational and Irrational Soul; so that the Soul loseth not its dignity▪ neither becomes a bare Theca to the Understanding or Reason: And is sufficiently dignified to have such a Divine faculty in it, and of it, by which it produceth it operations, which the Irrational Soul hath no●. We account those S●ones precious, that have in them some rare Virtues: And why not the Soul, endued with so Divine a Faculty?  
Especially (which is the third thing I reply) since it is so in the Soul, that is also of the Soul. The Honey which Samson found in the dead Lion's carkas●, proceeded not from it, but was only accidentally or casually in it. A Knife touched with a Loadstone will take up a Needle, or the like; but this attractive Virtue is not from Itself, but from the Loadstone: And you may call the Knife, if you please, a Theca or Receptacle of this Virtue▪ and say, it hath no other than a Relative Excellency, as it is the Receptacle of an Excellent Virtue; (though indeed to be the Subject of Inhesion, is more than a Theca, or a bare Receptacle.) But in the Loadstone it is otherwise, For there the Attractive Virtue is not only in it, but of it, or from itself: It is so received in it, that it ●●owes from it, it is sui partus. Thus in the Soul, though Reason be a Faculty of the Soul, yet is it such a Faculty as floweth from it; and so the Soul not only its Receptacle, but also its Original. Thus is Light In the Sun, and From the Sun, it is not received aliunde. And it is a Real Excellency in the Sun, and not only Relative, to be the Author and Original of that which enlightens the whole World. And it is a Real Excellency in the Soul (and more than the Excellency of a Theca) to have from itself, from its own Essence, such a Faculty whereby it is able to Know and Understand.  
But you will say still, However Reason may thus dignify and distinguish it from Irrational Being's; Yet this is but an Accidental Dignity, an Accidental Distinction, no● Essential; as consisting in that which is in the Soul, but distinct from it. Therefore  
Fourthly, Reason in the Soul, is not only an Accidental, but an Essential Perfection, an Essential Consequent flowing immediately from the Essence of the Soul, as an inseparable endowment: And so may make an Essential difference; (it is Essential to the Soul that Reason should arise from it.) And thus that which is distinct from a thing, may yet be Essential to it, viz. Essentiale Consequens, though not Essentiale Constituens.  
But fifthly, (which I conceive to be of the greatest force) though Reason, or the Understanding (as a Faculty) be only Essentiale Consequens▪ and so, in its Formality, makes only an external difference (aposteriori;) Yet it points out unto us an Essentiale Constituens, an Essential Ingredient (as I may so call it) from whence this Consequent doth arise. Which is somewhat in the Essence of the Soul: Whereof we can take no other notice then from its Operations▪ (And this Answer holds good, though you suppose Reason to be distinct from the Understanding, and Both from the Soul: For so, that Essence (from whence the Understanding flows, together with its Immediate and Remote Issue, viz. Reason and its Operations) will make this Essential Difference between the Rational and Irrational Soul.)  
Thus they say, prim● Qualitates are not Formae Elementorum, but That from whence these first Qualities do Essentially flow. And though the Qualities make but an Accidental difference between them, yet the Substantial Forms from whence the Qualities do arise make an Essential difference. (So here: The Rational Soul is such a Substance as is able to give rise to such Faculties, which the Irrational Soul is not.)  
If you ask What this Substantial Form is? You know the ordinary answer; Dic formam lapidi● & eris mihi magnus Apollo. (It is a hard thing, by his own confession, to find out the Form of any Being, much more to discover the Being of a Form, pag. 32.) Tell me the Being of Any thing, and I will tell you the Being of This. If I ask What the Soul is? (which to be we are sure:) You will say perhaps, a Spiritual Substance: And that is all you can say, for the Essence of it. But if I ask, what it is To be Spiritual? what, To be a Substance? I suppose you cannot tell me otherwise, then by Negations, or Effects. And (thus) they will do in the Elemental Forms; They are not these Qualities, but something from whence they arise. (And so for the substance of the Soul, It is not these Faculties but the Original of them.)  
If you will say, There is no such Something, as this substantial Form of the Elements; because we cannot tell you what this Something is.  
(To omit, that by the same reason you might banish all Being, because none can tell you, what Being is: For if you say (and that is all you can say) that Being is a Ray communicated from the Original Entity in God: This tells us at the most, but whence it is, not what it is.)  
I say, If you deny, that there be any other Forms of the Elements (beside their Qualities) whereby they differ one from another; Then need we look no further: For then these Faculties, though but Accidents, may be sufficient to make an Essential difference in the Rational Soul from the Irrational.  
But further, If you can persuade them, that the Essence or Form of the Elements, and their Accidents or Prime Qualities, are the same: I doubt not, but then they will as easily grant, the Soul and its Faculties to be the same also.  
And thus I have answered according to their opinion that hold the Soul and its Faculties distinct: And have showed, that we are not so far to seek for a Recipient of Reason, or Truth, as his Lordship might imagine. And indeed there is nothing more difficult in this particular, then in all Accidents whatsoever; their Subject is their Recipient, and so is the Subject of Truth, or Reason, It's Recipient.  
But there is another kind of Recipiency (which I shall touch in the next Chapter) which (if I mistake not) will cut the sinews of this Argument, and leave it of no force.  
But in the mean time (having found a Recipient) we must seek for a Fountain, from whence this Light of Reason, or Truth, is derived. For that is his Lordship's next demand; Who is it that communicateth this Light?  
For the answering of this, I shall first propound another Qu●re of the same nature, and then apply mine answer jointly to both. I ask therefore first, whether Fire (supposing it to be an Element) be not the true Recipient of Heat? and the Loadstone the true Recipient of the Attractive virtue that is in it? and the Sun, the true Recipient of Light? If so, than I demand, From whence they are received? What is the Fountain from which they are communicated?  
If you speak of an Internal Fountain, from whence they flow by an Essential Emanation; The Recipient and the Fountain will be the same. And so, if you say the Body of the Sun, of the Fire, of the Loadstone, be the immediate Recipients of their Light, Heat, and Virtue; Then must I say, That these several Bodies are the several Fountains from whence (respectively) those Qualities do proceed. If you s●y, That these Qualities are Received (subje●tantur) immediately, in the Form or Essence of these bodies, and not in the entire Substance; I must say also, They do arise from these Forms, and flow from them by an Essential Emanation. And the Definitive Resolution of this Quare depends upon the determination of that Question in Philosophy, whether Accidents be subjected immediately in the Form, or in the Comp●situm: and (consequently) whether they flow from the Form immediately, or jointly from Matter and Form together. Which questions it is not material for me to determine; for take which side you please, I shall soon find both the Fountain and a Recipient.  
If you look for an external, Physical Fountain, or Efficient; we must say, That the same Fountain from whence they have their Essence, from the same do they receive with their Essence their Inseparable Accidents, or Essential Consequents, by a Comproduction. Thus the Sun received its inherent Light by Creation, together with its Essence, from God: For in the Creation of the Substance, the Accidents are also Concreated. So Fire produced by a natural Agent, receives its Heat comproduced, or congenerated, and conferred upon it together with its Essence from the same Efficient.  
Now in any of these ways, it will not be hard to find a Fountain of Truth, an Original from whence the Light of Reason or Truth may be conferred; Though we hold the Understanding and the Soul to be distinct.  
If you ask an Internal Fountain; It will be answered, That Reason▪ or the Faculty of Understanding, flows from the Essence of the Soul, as an Essential Consequent; and is received and inherent in the Soul▪ (For I think not fitting to say, that it is inherent in the whole Reasonable Creature (jointly) consisting of Body and Soul; because it remains in the Soul separate, without the Body.) Or (if you look at them as Three things) than Reason must be said to flow from the Understanding, and It from the Soul; and to be received, by Inherence, in the Understanding, as That also is received in the Soul.  
If you inquire for an external Efficient; So the Faculties are either Concreated with the Soul by God; or else comproduced by the Parents by Propagation. And so we want not a Fountain, from whence Reason may be communicated.  
I proceed to his Lordship's prosecution of this Quaere. This Light (of Truth or Reason) must be conveyed (saith he) to the Understanding, from the Soul, from some other Creature, or from God himself; but neither of these▪ ways; therefore not all.  
I see not why Any or All of these Fountains may not be admitted to be the Source of Reason, in a several way.  
First, why may not the Soul be the Fountain of Reason or the underding Faculty; as well as the Essence of Fire is the Fountain of its Heat, and the Essence of the Magnet the Fountain of its Virtue? not by Physical Production, but by Essential Emanation? Indeed, I like not to say, The Soul communicates Reason to the Understanding, (as to a Third thing;) For I have said before, the Recipient and the Fountain in this way of conveyance, viz. per emanation●m, are the Same: like as in Immanent acts, the Agent and the Patient are the same. But I say, That Reason or the understanding Faculty, which the Soul as Recipient entertains In itself; it hath also From itself, as being the Fountain. (But if you take the Understanding as a third thing from both; then the Soul must not be said to be the Immediate Fountain, but the Understanding must be said to be the (Immediate) both Source and Channel.)  
And thus his Lordship's reason troubleth me not, viz. If the Soul communicate Light, then Hath it Light already, and so this Faculty, the Understanding, is in vain. I say, the Soul hath This Light, which both flows from the Soul as an Essential Consequent, and is Inherent in the Soul as an Inseparable Accident.  
Next, why may not the Soul, or Understanding (whether you will) receive this Light of Reason from another Creature? I mean, from the Parent, by Procreation; producing both its Essence, and Adjuncts, as well Essential as Accidental, together▪ not by Essential Emanation, as before, but by Physical Production?  
To the Reason annexed, viz. That if a Creature produce a Faculty in the Soul or Understanding that Creature must produce it by an intervenient Faculty, and That faculty must be produced by another Faculty, and s● in infinitum; I answer, The faculty of Reason (together with the Soul) was produced by the Parent (according to this supposition,) and that by an Intervenient Faculty, viz. the Generative Faculty in the Parent● And yet shall we not proceed in infinitum, For This generative faculty was produced by Another, and That again by Another, ascending still upwards till we come to the Generative Faculty of Adam, which was immediately produced of God, without an intervenient Faculty▪ either by Concreation with the Soul; or by Infusion, when he pronounced that blessing Increase and multiply.  
Lastly, why may not this and other Faculties be produced in the Soul and with the Soul, by immediate creation, from God? I mean, if Souls be daily created, as most suppose; Or, if not, yet at least the Faculties in Adam's Soul might be by God Created or Concreated with it, notwithstanding that they be distinct.  
But you ask, Why then did not God immediately and intrinsically communicate this to the Soul itself, rather than as a Faculty, or by a Faculty? If he did not, it was because he Would not; and we cannot give account of this will. God might have created immediately all Mankind, as he did the Angels; yet we see he pleased rather, that they should be produced by Generation, one from another: But who can give us any other account of this his pleasure, save only his Will? So neither, why Reason should be an Accidental Faculty, rather than M●d●● Substan●i●li●; that is, why he should produce it mediante animâ, rather than by himself immediately, together with it: he might do either.  
But, in general, By what means soever (saith he) Truth (or Reason) be conv●yed; if the Understanding do at all, receive Truth, than it is Truth▪ For God doth not communicate Light, but to Light.  
If he mean, God gives Lucem non nisi Lucido; or Lumen non nisi Luminoso; I grant it, saking the words i● sensu composito, but not insensu diviso. (And so God gives not Animam nisi Animato, nor Rationem nisi Rationali) That is, God gives not Light but to that which is Light (●. Lucide or Illuminate,) viz. when that Light is bestowed: But in s●nsu diviso, That this was (before) Lucid, it is not to be admitted. Light communicated to the Air, makes it Illuminate, but finds it not so. God inspires not a Soul, but into a Living-creature: And so breathing into Adam the breath of Life, he made him a Living-creature; but found him (his body) Inanimate, a ●ump of Earth. So here; God gives not the Light of Reason, but to that which is Light, or Enlightened, viz. Then Enlightened when this Light of Reason is bestowed.  
But if by this, God gives not Light but to Light, he means, Lucem non dat nisi Luci, or Lumen non nisi Lumini; I cannot admit it, either in sensu composito, or in diviso. When the Sun imparts Light (Lumen) to the Air; the Air is Illuminate or Enlightened: But, that the Air is Lumen, I must never grant, till we cease to hold, Lumen non est Corpus. So if God communicate to the Soul or Understanding the Light of Reason; the Soul or Understanding becomes thereby Illuminate or Enlightened with Reason: But, that the Soul or Understanding, is this Light, this Reason; follows no more than if you would say, That Water is Heat when it grows Hot; The Air is Light (Lumen,) when it is Enlightened; A Body becomes a Colour when it is Coloured; Any Substance whatsoever is metamorphised into an Accident, when (as a Subject) it Receives that Accident; or That the Body of Adam, form out of the Dust, was made a Soul, when it received a Soul inspired.  
That which is annexed as a proof; Because Quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis, (together with the illustrations following;) proves no more but this, Whatsoever is conferred▪ is no further forth conferred, then as the Subject is capable of, and actually doth receive it. And this we grant, That the Soul or Understanding, upon which the Light of Reason is conferred; is a fit Subject to receive or entertain Reason, and is actually endued with Reason. And so I admit that which he citys of Dr. Twisse, Neither a quality permanent, nor an act immanent unless they be made INHERENT IN the Soul, (observe the phrase) and the latter also produced by it, can be said to be given to the Soul. He saith, It is Inherent in the Soul, not that it is the Soul.  
Lastly, How passeth (saith he) this Light from the Understanding to the Soul? there being as vast a distance between It and the Soul, as between It and the will, (supposing them distinct Faculties) whence grow those inextricable disputes, How the Will is made to Understand, what the Understanding judgeth fit to be Willed.  
But here his Lordship varies somewhat the state of the Question in altering the acceptation of the word Truth, from truth understanding, to truth understood, and instead of innate truth of Reason, speaks of the advenient truth, which is a Conceptus or Idea framed to represent the truth of Being in the Object. For we cannot conceive Reason, which is now looked upon as a permanent Faculty, to be transient from one subject to another.  
But Truth Understood, how it may be conveyed from the Understanding to the Soul; I shall Then perhaps better tell when he shows me, How the Visible Species are conveyed from the Organ to the Soul, or Faculty, seeing. That the Organ receives species, he will not deny; for else the Soul might as well see, when the Eye is out: That the Soul also (by the Organ) doth apprehend these Species, must likewise be yielded; else why should not the Eye of a dead man see? That the Soul and the Organ are distinct, must needs be granted; for we see them really separated by death, whereas nothing can be separated from itself: And when I am informed, How the Soul and the Organ, being distinct, are conjoined in Seeing; I shall better be able to resolve, How the Soul and the Faculty, though distinct, may jointly Understand.  
Till then, it might suffice, in general to say, That, As by the Organ the Soul S●●th, so by Reason or the Understanding-faculty, the Soul Knows and Understandeth: (only allowing such disproportion as must be allowed between a Material and Immaterial instrument.) And it seems to be no more vast distance between a Faculty and the Soul, then is between an Organ and the Soul. So that if by Visible Species in the Organ, the Soul may see; why not by Intellectual Species in the Understanding (though a Faculty) may the Soul Understand?  
But, because I love not to answer a difficulty only by opposing another; you may resolve it thus. We are not to conceive, there is any such vast Gulf between the Soul and the Understanding (though a Faculty) as that Truth should need a Ferry-boat to wa●t it over: For as the Eye doth not first see, and then Inform the Soul or Visive Faculty, what it hath seen; but the Organ and the Faculty jointly concur to the Act of Seeing: So neither doth the Understanding first Receive and Entertain Truth, and afterward inform the Soul, what it hath Understood: But the Soul with and by this Faculty of Reason or Understanding, doth Know and Understand; Both concurring to the same Act. (Thus a Stone, by its Heaviness, descends; Fire, by its Heat, warms; by its Light▪ shines; Glass, by its Smoothness, reflects light; a Knife, by a communicated Faculty from the Magnet, draws iron: And yet (in some of these at least) you must of necessity grant a distinction ex parte rei.)  
There is indeed sometimes a Reflex act of the Soul, whereby it Knows▪ what is Understood: But we must not think, that it is an act of the Souls Essence, surveying or taking account of the Understanding Faculty, what it hath done; But the Soul, by this understanding Faculty, reflects upon a former Act, which Itself by the same Faculty had formerly performed.  
The Gulf is likewise fordable between the Understanding and the Will, though they be distinct faculties. Not as if the Will by an act of Knowledge should Understand what the Intellect doth dictate: But the Soul, which by its faculty of Understanding Knows, doth by its Willing faculty Command, and by its Loco-motive Execute. So that neither the Will Knows what the Understanding Judgeth, nor the Inferior Faculties what the Will Commands; But the Soul by several Faculties executes several Functions. Thus when the Soul by the Eye discovers a danger imminent, by the Hand it endeavours to divert it: And yet there is no Messenger dispatched between, to inform the Hand, what the Eye hath seen; notwithstanding that the Hand and the Eye are Really distinct, yea Locally distant.  
As for mine own Opinion, I could easily grant, The distinction of the Faculties, from the Soul, and among themselves, to be neither Real, nor a part rei. And concerning the first, I am sufficiently confident: But for the second, whether the Distinction be Modall (i à parte Rei) or merely Rational (rationis rati●cina●●,) I do yet desire a convincing Demonstration to determine.   

CHAP. III. The same Argument further prosecuted and examined, in this and the ensuing Chapters.  
IN the next Chapter he shows, That if we make the Understanding and Truth to be One, (which I suppose will be easily granted; there being but few or none which make the Soul, the Understanding, and Reason (that is, Truth) to be Three distinct things:) then will it be easy to find these three Requisites: For thus Light or Truth is Dispensed; By the Father of Light; and hath for its Recipient, the whole Reasonable creature, consisting of Body and Soul. All which I admit, (as likewise will those that be his greatest adversaries:) only with this Proviso, That he make the entire Reasonable creature to be subjectum Denominationis, and not subjectum Inhaesionis, to Reason or Truth.  
Next, he spends some time to clear this, How the whole Reasonable Creature can be said to be the Recipient; which labour, in my judgement, might have been spared: For I cannot see any reason to fear, but that it will as easily be granted, that the Reasonable Creature may be the Subject of Reason; as that the Air illuminate is the subject of Light: without any fear of Identity in the Thing Received with the Recipient.  
But it seems his Lordship speaks of another kind of Recipiency beside the Recipiency of a Subject: Such a kind of Recipiency as where the Recipiens and Receptum be the same. No Being (saith he) but it is the thing Receiving and Received: For consider any Individual Being you please, Vegetative or Rational, or what you will; Who is it that entertaineth this Being, but the Being itself which is entertained? Who is it that receiveth from the Womb of Eternity that reasonable creature, but the creature received?  
You may distinguish them thus, The Recipiency of a Being, and the Recipiency of a Form: And so, the Fountain or Efficient, that Esse, and that Habere. In the first kind of Giving and Receiving, the Recipient and the thing Received must of necessity be the same; Thus the Efficient or Producer of Light, that Lucido ESSE Lucidum, that Luci Esse Lucem, not that Lucido esse Lucem. But in the second it is otherwise, not that Lucido HABERE Lucidum, nor Luci HABERE Lucem, but Lucido Habere Lucem. Thus the Efficient or Fountain of Reason, that Rational● Esse Rationalem, Habere Rationem.  
(But how his Marginal note stands good, viz. That in all things the Agent and the Patient must be One, because The thing Receiving and Received are One, I cannot conceive; For thus he makes God and the Reasonable creature to be One: For, if I mistake no●, the Fountain or Efficient is the Agent, and the Recipient the Patient.)  
And indeed he must of necessity admit this distinction of Recipiency: For otherwise his Fundamental Axiom would have failed. For if we allow no Recipiency, but the Recipiency of a Subject, whereby it receives or entertains a▪ Form▪ It will not be Universally true, That to the constitution of every Being, there must be the three Requisites formerly mentioned. For Substantiae non sunt in subject; Complete Substances are not communicated or imparted To a Subject Receiving (a●d so would want a Recipient,) but are only made to Be, and to be the Subject Receiving other things.  
But ● desire his Lordship to consider, Whether, admitting such a Reception, wherein every thing is its own Recipient; he do not lay open so wide a gap, that his adversaries may make an Escape; and Himself break that Net wherein his Adversary should have been taken? Whether, in answering an Objection, he do not overthrow his principal Argument? For how easy is it to say, That Truth, though it be neither Soul, Intellect, nor Reason; Yet it is a Faculty (or what you will) Proceeding from God, and its own Recipient. And so, though they imagine an hundred Faculties in the Soul, one dependent upon another; yet they shall never be put to a strait to find either a Fountain or a Recipient: For God, of necessity, must be the Fountain of all Being whatsoever (either mediatè or immediatè;) And that Being whatsoever it is, shall be its own Recipient. Therefore the Soul (in this sense) hath not the Body for its Recipient; neither did God communicate or bestow a living Soul upon Adam's earthly Body, when he breathed into it the breath of Life: But he gave To the Soul, to Be a Soul. Neither is the Soul a Recipient to the Understanding, Nor It to Reason, no● any of these to Truth, (if they be distinct things:) But each of these their own Recipient. Neither (lastly) is the entire Reasonable Creature a Recipient of Truth or Reason (as he would have it) But Truth is its own Recipient. And then must he hold his hand from Concluding as he doth in the Close of this Chapter, That the totum existens consisting of Matter and Form: the Reasonable creature, is the Recipient of this Truth: Except he will say, Veritas est Animal rationale, & Animal rationale est Veritas▪  
But how, the Ignorance of this Point should give the ground to that Question, whether the Soul or the Body be Contentum; (which he admonisheth us of) I cannot see. For though it be granted, that Every thing be its own Contentum; yet this difficulty remaineth as firm as before. For, Is not Water its own Contentum: Is not the Vessel also its own Contentum? Yet he will not deny, but that (in another sense) the Water is contained in the Vessel; nor can he say, That the Vessel is contained in the Water: So though the Soul and Body be either of them their own Contentum and Recipient (quia datur Animae▪ ut sit Ani●a; datur Corpori, ut sit Corpus:) Yet that the one may not be Locu●▪ and the other Locatum; one the Subject, and the other an Adjunct (which is the meaning of that Question) will not from hence appear.   

CHAP. IU. Whether the Understanding, faculty may not be the Recipient of Truth.  
IN the 4. Chapter he proceeds, further to show, That the Understanding cannot ●● this Recipient. And if he speak of such a Recipiency as where the Recipient and the Receptum be the same; his Adversaries, that say, Truth and the Understanding to be distinct, will contend for this as well as He: For neither will They say, datur Intellectu● se esse Rationem, nor datur Rationi ut sit Intellectus. But if he speak of the Recipiency of a Subject, I see not from what hath yet been said, why the Understanding (if distinct) may not be the Subject of Reason; why they may not say, Datur Intellectui Habere Rationem: Since it is granted in Logic, That one Accident may be the immediate Subject, though not the ultimate Subject of another. And so, if any will have the Soul the Intellect, and Truth or Reason, to be tria distincta: They must say, The Intellect is the immediate Subject of Reason, and the Soul the ultimate. And then call the Understanding either a Quality, a Faculty, or Virtus quâ, it is no great matter; (we will not contend with his Lordship for the name.) For Virtus quâ i● but a Faculty, and a Faculty, (or po●●●tia naturalis) is the second species of Quality.   

CHAP. V. Whether the Soul and Truth in the Soul, be one.  
THe like Answer must be given to that in the 5. Chapter, Whether the Soul (without an intervenient Faculty) may not be the Recipient of Truth? For we cannot say, Datur Animae ut sit Veritas; except we agree to make the Soul and Reason one: But we may say Datur Animae ut sit Subjectum veritatis, or Subjectum Rationis, though we ●old them distinct. As may appear at large by what I have said upon the second Chapter.  
That which is further added in this Chapter, whether as a Suasive to enforce this, or as a New Argument▪ viz. That our Soul resembles God, who is Vnus & simplex actus, and therefore itself must be simple in its Operations▪ and we must not expect first an Essence, and then a Faculty whereby it worketh, etc. may as well be urged, to prove, That our Soul and Body are the same, because Man was made after God's Image, who is ●nus & simplex, not consisting of Parts. Or (if you instance particularly in the Soul) It may as well follow, That we know not one thing (successively) After another, nor (discursively) By another; but by One entire Act like God, because the Soul bears the Image of God, and Vnitas (which I grant not) is formalis ratio Dei.  
That which is lastly added, concerning a Resemblance of the Trinity, in Truth thus understood: Is no way peculiar to this acceptation of Truth; But holds as well in every degree of Being whatsoever. All Entity or Being, As it lieth involved in the Original▪ Fountain of Being, which is God's Essence, may represent patrem intelligentem; As it descends from above, filium intellectum; As it is received in the Creature, and maketh it to Be, spiritum dilectum.  
And thus I have surveyed his Lordship's reasons to prove, the Soul and Truth to be One. Understanding by Truth, or Light, the Light of Reason; which is the Original or actus ●rimus, from whence Rational Operations do proceed; And therefore must needs be the first of those Nations of Truth laid down in his first Chapter.  
And, that it cannot be any other acceptation of Truth, that is here meant, is very apparent; If we look upon the other acceptations of Truth; which we shall find to be no way consonant either with his Method or his Arguments. For if you consider of Truth understood, or the Idea of Truth entertained in the Mind by actual Apprehension; This will have no Being, either in the Understanding, or elsewhere, till such time as the Understanding itself frames this Conceptus: But (as ye●) we have nothing to do with the Operations of the intellect▪ (For he proceeds not to consider the Operations or Effects of the Reasonable Soul, till he come to the 10. Chapter▪) But with something antecedent them, which is the Fountain from whence these Operations do proceed; which can be no other but Reason. Yea, himself affirms it in this 5. Chapter, pag. 23.) And likewise that acceptation of Truth, for the Truth either of Being, or of Cognoscibility, in the Object hath no conjunction with the Understanding, till it be actually understood: And, even Then, we cannot make it to be One with the Understanding, except we make those things to be One, which have neither coexistence of Place, nor coexistence of Time; For those things may be understood, which were many thousand Years past, and many thousand Miles distant.   

CHAP. VI Whether all things be this one Truth.  
IN the next place he proceeds to a Consequent or Corollary, arising out of his former Thesis, viz. That All things, are this One Truth.  
I confess, I was at a stand a great while, and could not imagine any show of Consequence between these propositions: If Truth or Reason, be the same with the Soul or Understanding; then is it also the same with All things else. Why so. This Argument (saith he) will press all things that are.  
This Argument? which Argument? Doth he mean that argument which was last propounded, towards the end of the fifth chapter, [That because God is one simple act; therefore, not only the Soul and its Faculties must be One, but even All Creatures must be One, because there is in All somewhat of God's Image, whose Essence is Unity?] If this be his Argument, I shall content myself with a bare denial of the Consequence, till I see some show of proof. For, That Unity is God's Essence, is (in my judgement) grossly false▪ Or, were it true, yet, That because God is One, therefore the Creatures must also All be One; hath no strength: For this Unity in God is equivalent to an infinite Multiplicity. And, That One simple Efficient, may not produce distinct Effects, seems to me a Paradox.  
Or is it his second Argument, propounded in the second chapter, and prosecuted in those that follow; [That, to the constitution of every Creature there must be a Being communicated, a Fountain from whence, and a Recipient to which; the which Recipient must be the same with the Being received?] From hence perhaps he might prove, That every thing is the same with its own Being: But That very thing should be the same with each other, or the same with reason, or the understanding; follows not.  
Is it then his first Argument, propounded towards the end of the first chapter? Which perhaps his Lordship looks at as the principal Argument; and at all that follows, only as a Prosecution of that; (Though his Marginal notes, and the Titles of Chapters (which I question whether or no they be of his Lordships doing) point out to us distinct Arguments, in the beginning of the second, and in the end of the fifth chapter.)  
The Argument was this, The Understanding is nothing but a Ray of the Divine Nature, etc. And is not Truth the same? which I understood, as you may see, thus, [The Understanding is God's Image in Man, And this Image consists in Truth, or the Light of Reason; therefore Truth, or Reason, is the Understanding.] And thus the Syllogism will be true in the first figure, if you transpose the Premises and convert the Conclusion. Or thus, [The Image of God in Man is the Understanding; And this Image is Truth▪ therefore (some) Truth is the Understanding:] And thus it will be true in the third figure. And beside these two forms, ● see not how that Argument can be reduced to a true Syllogism. Now choose you which form you please; yet how ●● should follow from hence, [That All things else are this One Truth,] I do not yet perceive.  
It may be his Lordship would have his Argument thus ordered (in the second figure) [The Understanding is a Ray of Divinity; And Truth also is a Ray of Divinity: therefore Truth is the Understanding, or Truth and the Understanding are One.] And if this be the form of his argument; I will easily grant, that it presseth all things that are, as much as this. For, is not this Syllogism in the same form, [The blessed Angels are Spiritual Substances; And the damned Spirits are Spiritual substances; Therefore the damned Spirits are blessed Angels, and the blessed Angels damned Spirits?] Then which Consequent, scarce any thing could be less probable. And thus indeed he may prove all things that are to be One Truth, one Understanding, yea one Stone, or what you will: For take any two Being's whatsoever, and they will both be sound to be Rays of Divinity, because both proceed from the ●ame Original and Fountain of Being in the Divine Essence; and therefore (according to this Argument) they will be both One.  
But his Argument thus ordered, will prove but a plain Fallacy, offending against the Laws of the second figure, wherein no affirmative proposition can be concluded.  
The most that he can prove from hence will be this, That there is some common Predicate, which may be affirmed of Both; and so That there is some General Nature in which they both agree. And this I am confident there is none will ever deny that grants but this proposition, Quicquid est, est E●s, That All Being's, whatsoever agree in the general nature of a Being. For than they may all be the Subjects of the common Praediate Ens.  
But this is far enough from proving, All things to be One and the Same. For to assume [That whatsoever things agree in a Universal Nature, are also the same numerical and Individual Existence;] is such a proposition as Logic will not admit of.  
Yea, though his Argument should proceed thus, [The Specifical Essence of the Understanding, consists in this, that it is a Ray of the Divine Nature; And the Specifical Essence, as well of Truth, as of all Being's whatsoever, is the Same, viz. That it is a Ray of the Divine Nature; And therefore all things whatsoever agree in the same specifical Essence;) And (consequently) all things whatsoever, having the same specifical Essence with each other, must also be One and the Same with each other.] I say, though his Argument proceeded thus, yet would it little avail to prove All things to be One and the same. For, besides, that the Specifical Essence of the Understanding (and so of other things) consisteth not in being a Ray of Divinity; Besides this, I say, although they had all the same Specifical Essence; Yet doth it not follow that they must be all One and the Same. For are there not many individuals under the same Species, whereof One is not the Other? Doth not the Soul of Peter and the Soul of Judas agree in all the ●ame Specifical and Essential Predicates, whilst notwithstanding it may be truly said, that the Soul of Peter is not the Soul of Judas, and again, that the Soul of Judas is not the soul of Peter? What Essential difference is there beeween water in the Baltic Sea, and that in the Mediterranean, ●ince they are both but integral Parts of the same Homogeneal Ocean? Yet how true it is withal, That the Baltic Sea▪ is not the Mediterranean Sea; and That the Water which is now in the Baltic, is distinct from that which at the same time is in the Mediterranean Sea? Two drops of Water taken out of the same spoonful, be they in their Essentials never so Consonant, in their Accidents never so Like; Yet we may truly say This is not the Other, nor the Other This. How then can it follow, That Truth is One with the Understanding, and That All things are this One Truth, Because all Being is but a Ray of Divinity.  
It follows indeed, That if all Things have the same Specifical Essence, then are they all, Things of the same nature; (but that they are all the Same Thing, it follows not.)  
Thus much therefore I suppose will be granted him by all, That All things are of the Same (at least generical) nature, because all things have a Being; And, When he hath proved their Specifical essence to be the same, It will be granted also, That they are all, Things of the same Specifical nature; and (if you will) That All Being falls under the same Predicament▪ (Though yet a Predicamental distinction be not always a Real distinction; no, not a par●e rei.)  
But is this all he seeks to prove? I supposed he had laboured to show That the Light of Truth or Reason was not only of the same nature with the Understanding, but That it was the Understanding. Otherwise he proves less than his greatest Adversaries would have granted him. For those that contend for the greatest Distinction between the Soul and its Faculties, do not yet maintain a more Real or Physical distinction between them, than is between One Soul and another, which yet agree in the same Essential Predicates. And if you allow them the same distance between the Soul and the Understanding, which is between the Soul and a Stone, yea between two Souls, They will tell you it is more than they desire: For they will grant that the Soul with all its Faculties, and the Body with all its Members, do constitute the same Suppositum; which is a more Physical, a more Real Union, then is between two Souls, though agreeing in every Essential Predicate.  
But (if I mistake not) that which he was about to prove, was, not that the Understanding is of the same Nature with Truth, but that it is Truth. His supposition in the first words of the ●. Chap▪ is, If the Intellect, the Soul, Light, and Truth are all but One, etc. Not, A like, or of the same nature. And p. 22. If you make the Understanding▪ the Soul, Light, Truth One, then are you delivered out of these straits, etc. And pag. 10. If the Understanding be enriched with Truth, then is it, itself that Truth, that Light; Thus he frequently calls them One and the same▪ Now To be, ●● self that Truth▪ and To be of the same nature with Truth, is far different. And if he prove no other but a Logical Union, That Truth and the Understanding are of the same (generical or Specifical) nature; we may y●t safely deny a Physical or Real Union or Identity; and say, Truth is not the Understanding, nor is the Understanding Truth, (though of the same nature with Truth) as well as say, This drop of water is not the Other drop, though This and the Other be of the same nature. Neither can the same Argument (taken in the same sense, without Equivocation and Ambiguity) possibly prove a Physical and Real Identity between the Soul and its Faculties; and also a Logical or Specifical Identity between It and all things else. It is impossible by the same argument to prove, The Soul and its Faculties to be One Thing, and, The Soul with All things else to be Things of the same Nature: These to be T●lta, and Those to be Id●m.  
But to omit the consequence and dependence of This, upon that which went before: I will examine it as an entire proposition by itself, Whether All things are One?  
And if so, Then must it be either thus understood, That All things are One and the Same by a Physical Identity; This is the Other, and the Other is This; Bucephalus is Alexander, and Alexander is Bucephalus: and (by the same reason) the Bread in the Lord's Supper is the Body of Christ, and the Body of Christ is this Bread, by Consubstantion. In which sense it seems so impossible, that (in my judgement) it needs no Refutation.  
Or thus, That all things are One and the Same by an integral Identity; that is, They be all Parts of the same Whole: all Members of the same Integrum, the same Aggregatum. And in this sense it is True indeed, but there is nothing New in it, nothing Strange: For who ever denied, that All things, as parts, as members, do constitute the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, One Universe? That the whole Aggregatum, the whole Heap or Multitude of Creatures do make One World?  
Or (lastly) thus, That All things whatsoever are One, by a Logical Identity, as being all of the same Nature. And if he speak of a generical Nature, this will be as easily granted as the former: For none deny, that all things agree in the generical Universal nature of a Being: And whether Ens be Genus Vnivocum, or Gen●● Anagolum, yet it is predicated or affirmed of All Being's; Only that which He calls Truth, Others call Being, both meaning no other than the Formalis ratio Entis, propter quam dicitur Esse.  
Put if he speak of a Specifical Nature, wherein he would have all things to agree; making the Universe to be One Homogeneal Body, (which ●e seems to mean here; though he meant, I suppose, a Physical Unity, when he said, The Soul and Truth w●re One:) Then are we to inquire, whether those things which agree in a Universal generical Nature, may not admit of a Specifical difference? And for This, it will not be sufficient to prove That every Being is a Ray of Divinity issuing from the Centre of Being in God, or That the Essence and Form of every particular thing is a Roy of Divinity: Except it be proved▪ That every Being is This Ray, that it is such a Ray.  
If therefore all those Rays that have issued forth of that Centre of infinite Being, If the Streams derived from this Fountain be exactly of the same nature, without any Specifical difference; Then is it because God could not send forth Distinct and Different Rays, or because he would not. If we make God an Agent so Uniform, as that we will admit no possible Variety, not so much as in the Object, or Manner of his Actions; what difference is there between the most Determinate Natural Agent, and God the most absolutely Free Agent? if in his operations we admit not of this choice, to work Thus rather than Th●●? But if he could work in several manners, by communicating Rays of divers natures, but would not; how then hath he manifested 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the exceeding great Var●●●y of his Wisdom and Power? For there cannot be so much as an Accidental Variety in the Creatures, except there be somewhat Real produced in the One which is not in the other; which cannot be, if all Being, all Entity whatsoever be exactly of the same Specifical nature.  
I grant therefore, an integral Unity; whereby all things are parts of the same Aggregatum, the same World: I grant likewise a generical Unity▪ whereby all things agree in the general nature of a Being: But if he cont●nd further for an identical or an Homogeneal Unity (whereby each is other, or of the same Particular nature, without any other than a Gradual difference;) I must deny both. And Mr. Sadler (his Lordship's Champion) denies it with me: For so he, Corporal Union in materials which ●● [mis●●ll] 〈…〉 Identity, i● at best but a ●old touch in ● point or ●●o, ● most disdainful embrace (at 〈…〉 dista●●●) of those Being's which hav● much 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but lit●l● 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. If the Unity of all things be identical, how is i● [miscalled] Identity▪ If Homogeneal, how is there much 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and ●●t little 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪  
His Lordship's Reasons to persuade this Identity▪ come next to be examined▪ Why (saith he) may it not be so▪ since ● All Being is derived from the same Vn●f●r● Fo●●tai●; since ² All i● the same in nature (〈…〉) a Beam of that excellent Light; And▪ All entertained in the same manner by every Individual Existence, viz. By a Similitude and Union of nature▪  
If his Lordship speak of a Physical Identity, It is easy to say, This Soul is not the Other Soul▪ This drop of water is not the Other drop▪ though both produced by the same Uniform Agent, and in the same manner: This Beam of Light is not the other Beam, though both shining forth from the ●ame Sun: Because One (uniform) Agent may produce Two Effects.  
If he speak of a Likeness in Nature, It will be said, That the same Agent may produce not only Two effects, but Unlike effects. e. g. The same Sun produceth Heat and Light. Here these several Being's are ¹ derived from the same Fountain the Sun, which hath either Virtually or Formally both▪ Heat and Light; They are ² both Beam● issuing in the same manner from their Fountain; and ³ Their Essence is in the same manner received, viz. by being what they are, and Informing a Subject recipient: Yet can I not think that Light, and Heat are either the Same Thing, or of the same (specifical) Nature: (However some fond dream that Light and Heat are the same:) For then whatsoever is H●t, must also be Light (Lucide▪) which holds not in scalding Lead: and whatsoever is Light, must also▪ even in the same degree▪ be H●t, which holds not in Snow, which is Lucide; nor in Ice, which being transparent ●i● also Illuminate.  
Object. If you object a Disparity in the Example, because Light and Heat, though they both proceed from the Sun, yet the one from the Sun's Heat, the other from the Sun's Light, and that therefore their Fountain is not the same; whereas in God's Essence being absolutely Simple in itself, and uniform in its operations, we may not imagine several Fountains from whence several Streams may proceed.  
Answ. I answer, That God's Essence, however Simple, is yet equivalent to an infinite Variety: And though we cannot in God suppose to be Light distinct from Heat, and Heat from Light; yet Gods simple Essence hath virtually both Heat and Light, and all things possible. His Essence therefore being equivalent both to Heat and Light▪ why may it not produce Heat in one thing, and Light in another thing, and so several Being's in several Creatures?  
(Except you will suppose, that God's Essence, being Equivalent to, and Productiv● of, all Essences possible▪ must of necessity exercise all this Equivalency in the production of every Being, and actuate all his Efficacy in every Product, and so agere ad extr●m●m virium, which in a Voluntary agent is not Necessary; in an Infinite agent is Impossible.)  
All the Radii or Semidiameters of a Circle proceed from the same C●●t●r, but they tend not all to the s●me point of the Circumference: But the same indivisible Centre, which lies equally opposite to every point of the Circumference, As it i● supposed to lie opposite to one point, it sends ●orth One Radius to it, As it lies opposite to another point, it sends forth Another Radius to that other point, Though the Centre remain indivisibly the same. Thus Gods simple Essence quatenus productiv● Angeli, or, as it virtually contains the Essence of an Angel, may produce that Essence: And the same simple divine Essence, as it contains virtually the Essence of a Stone, may produce a Stone.  
And if you say, as Dr. Ames concerning the Divine Attributes, That these two considerations Esse productivum Angeli, and esse productivum Lapidis, be distinct ratione ratioc●●atâ, perhaps there will be no great error; although his Lordship admit not of Dr. Ames his opinion; p. 23. For 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Esse productivum Angeli, or posse producere Angelum is not the same with posse producere Lapidem. For although it be the same simple Essence of God whereby he is able to do both, yet this hindereth not but that this simple Essence may be by us apprehended per i●ad●quat●s conceptus, which is no other but distincti● rationis ratiocinate. The same Centre considered as it is the beginning of One Radius, is distinct ratione ratiocinatâ from itself considered as the beginning of Another Radius. And so the divine Essence, quatenus productiva Angeli, may perhaps be distinct, ratione ratiocinatâ, from itself quatenus productiva lapidis, without any violation to its Simplicity. They are only inadaequati conceptus ejusdem simplicis essentiae; and a Metaphysical Abstraction may be sufficiently consistent with a Physical Simplicity of Essence.  
Thus therefore may it appear, how the Unity or Simplicity of the Fountain, hinders not but that the Streams may admit of Specifical and Essential distinctions.  
But he saith secondly, All Being is also of the same nature, viz. a Beam of that excellent Light. Therefore what? Is therefore all Being the Same? How? Physically the same, (as if that Soul which is of the Same Nature with another▪ must needs be that other Soul;) or Metaphysically, Logically, the same; that is, of the same Nature? If he mean, the first; I see not how it follows. If the second; His Antecedent and Consequent is the ●ame; and so he Assumes what was to be proved.  
But for the proposition itself, All Being, saith he, is of the same nature, s●il. a Beam of that excellent▪ Light. And this I grant; All Being is of the same (generical) nature; All Being is a Stream communicated from the Fountain of Being, All Being is a Beam, etc. But (Specifically▪) All is not Such a Beam.  
If his Lordship yet contend, That this Being is also Specifically the Same, only with a Gradual Distinction.  
I desire, first, to know Whence the great Variety in the Creature doth proceed, if all Being be absolutely Homogeneal? Add Water to Water, and it remains Water still; In a greater Quantity indeed, but yet without any alteration at all in its Essence, it is still but Water. Add Heat to Heat, it remains Heat still; In a more intense degree indeed, but yet it changeth not its nature: Increase its Intention as long as you will, yet you shall never make this Colour to become Color. A Deaf man though he See never so acutely, it will not help his Hearing.  
Repl. If he urge, That the ●ame Light proceeding through divers Mediums is stained with divers Colours; and why may not therefore this Beam of Essence, though Homogeneal, being received by divers Creatures, appear in a divers Form?  
Answ. I answer, the Variety of those appearing Colours proceeds from the Variety of the Medium: But here can be no Variety in the Recipient at all: For if there be no Recipient but the Being Received, then will the Medium be every way as Uniform as this Light or Essence received, and so cannot cause this Variety. It must be therefore Various in itself, or else it cannot be Variegated in the Recipient.  
Secondly, If all Being's be but Gradually distinct: I demand Whether the Essence of a Man, or the Essence of a Magnet be the more Intense degree? If the Magnets Essence be the higher degree of Light, Why hath not the Magnet the use of Reason? If Man's Essence be the higher degree, Why hath not Man the Lodestones Magnetic faculty? For if there be only a bare Gradual distinction in their Essence: then the Inferior Essence is actually included in the Superior, with an addition of somewhat more: And if included, whence comes it to pass that it cannot operate?  
Again If the Body and the Soul be absolutely of the same nature ●which they must be, if Being admit only of a gradual distinction▪) Then the Essence of the Soul (being the superior degree) includes in it the Essence of the Body, and somewhat more▪ Therefore is it able to operate according to that Essence, and to do of itself, whatsoever the Body can do. If so, then how comes it to pass, that the Soul needs the service of the Body? Why may not the Soul separate, perform all Corporeal Operation●, since it hath in it Corporeal Essence, and somewhat more. (Yea, why may not the Soul see, when the Eye is put out?) For the adding of Another degree hinders not the Operation of the Former degree, but rather perfects it. Yea what need is there of the Body▪ at all? Non bellè quaeda● faci●● d●o, sufficit unus Huic op●ri; as his Lordship saith, out of Marshal.  
To his third consideration, I must answer accordingly as to the second; All Being is received in the same manner by every Individual Existence: That is, Every Creature receives its Being, by being What it is: A Stone and a Plant receive their several Being's, by being (severally) what they are. But come to particulars, and the case is altered: A Stone receives its Being, by being a Stone; and a Plant receives its Being, by being a Plant.  
That which followeth in the ensuing part of this Chapter (besides what I have already touched by the way) I pass over as being Explicatory, rather than Probatory. Only thus much; The doctrine of the Platonists, reducing all Being to Number, must either be taken in a Metaphorical, Analogical sense, or not taken at all. And being so, it availeth little to prove either a Physical or Specifical Identity of Being.  
Whence they had this doctrine, I inquire not, as not belonging to the present matter in hand.  
Neither will I stand to debate the controversy, concerning the Nature of Number▪ whether it be a Real, or Rational Being; Which ● conceive to have as much Reality as a Relation hath, and no more; that is, hath Fundamentum i● re, but in its Formality, it is only ●●li●… the birth of Reason. And when I am convinced, that Paternity, or ●iliation, are Essential to Humanity; that Fatherhood, or Sonship do constitute Manhood▪ or Humane nature; I shall also grant, that 〈…〉 est Prin●ipi●● Essend●▪ rather then Consequent Essentians. But, not to projudge the discourse of the next chapter, (wherein Unity is made to be the Essence of All things, yea of God himself) I proceed rather to consider the large 〈…〉 of Unity there expressed.   

CHAP. VII. Whether Unity be All in all things, or, the Essence of all things.  
ANd there we have it first proposed to consideration, Whether Unity be not in nature so glorious, and of that dignity, that it is able to inform a Being, Yea, to be the Essential Form of all things? It is prosecuted in the several kinds of Being's. Uncreated, and Created, whether Spiritual, Moral, Physical, or Mathematical. In all these, saith he, you shall find Unity as it were the Form of their Being.  
And first, Whether Unity be not All in God? (The Humility and Reverence, which his Lordship useth in proposing of it, may be a fit pattern for all to imitate, in all approaches to a Deity; Not only in duties of Worship, but even in Scholastic Discourses. And so neither to be peremptory in affirming, nor rash in censuring: Since the vast disproportion between an infinite Object, and a finite Faculty, subjects our Understanding both to Ignorance and Error; Suntque oculit tenebrae per tantum lumen.) There is (saith he) but One God; And more there could not be, since there cannot be Two Infinites, two Eternity's; Neither could this One be otherwise, for than were he not Infinite. Unity then being so inseparable, as without which God could not be what he is, May it not be said to be Coessential to him? And if of his Essence, then is it in him All; for God's Essence is All in God.  
The Objection which his Lordship moves, viz. That there is the same reason for all other divine Attributes, they being all Essential to God, as well as Unity: Will bring the Question to this Issue, Whether of these Attributes may be supposed in nature to be First? (For that every of them should be the formalis ratio of a simple Essence is Impossible:) And so, whether Infinity, etc. do arise from Unity, or Unity from thence?  
I should rather say, That neither of these, or any other divine Attribute, may be said to be formalis ratio, or the Essential form of the Deity; but somewhat else, in itself Simple, and yet comprehending all these: Which because we cannot apprehend at One Discovery, we are fain to take several Views of it per inadaequatos conceptus.  
But if we must needs seek for a Seniority in God's Attributes; I suppose, I might derive as clear a Pedigree of them from his Infiniteness, from his Perfection, from his Absoluteness or Independency; as can be showed either from his Unity, or from his Verity.  
But not to be too extravagant, it shall be sufficient for the present to sh●w, whether his Infiniteness flow from his Unity, or his Unity from his Infiniteness? whether he must needs be Infinite, because he is One; or One because he is Infinite?  
If we say, God must needs be One, because he is Infinite; his Lordship will not only assent, but furnish us with a Reason, Because (saith he) there cannot be Two Infinites.  
But if otherwise we say, That God must of necessity be Infinite, because he is One; It is not so easily proved, since there is but One Sun, and yet that One Sun not Infinite. How then can we say, That God is Essentially Infinite, or That Infiniteness is Essential to him: If the Formalis ratio, the Essential Form of Divinity, may consist without Infiniteness? Sed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
To his instances in Created Spiritual Being's. That all the Commandments are comprised in Love, shows That there is somewhat General, that is common to them all; or rather Love (as likewise Obedience, and the like) is a Collective word, and an Integrum, whereof all those are Parts: But that Unity is either the General form of All the Commandments, or the Particular of Any, it shows not. The like may be said of the Saints which agree in the Common nature of Saint ship, and do jointly make up the Body mystical, whereof Christ is Head. Yea of all Creatures, They all agree in the common nature of a Being, and They all make up one Universe; yet is not Unity either the General of all, or Particular form of any Creature.  
The Moral Virtues are said to be conjoined or concatenate, because they all proceed from one Fountain, viz. The absolute Subordination of the Will and Affections to the Understanding: which Subordination they call Prudence, (and is of the same extent in Morality, that Obedience is in Divinity) whereof all the moral Virtues are but integral parts. (But I had rather apply Prudence to the Understanding only; as that whereby it is able to judge in all Practical things, what is fit to be done; And the universal Conformity of the Will to this universal Rule of Reason, I should call Justitia Vniversali●, Universal Justice.)  
And thus I understand that Axiom, That moral Virtues are concatenate in Prudence: Because where there is this universal Subjection of the Will to Reason, there will be an observance of it in all particulars. But if the rules of some Virtues are observed, and not the rules of others; there this observance is not a Virtuous action, as not proceeding from the subordination of the Will to Reason, (which would have as well prevailed in others also) but from some other Principle.  
Now this shows perhaps, That the Moral Virtues are United in One general Essence: But how appears it, That this Essence is Unity?  
Physical Being's, as Water-drops (and other Connaturalls, either of the Same, or Concordant Species; as the Loadstone and Iron) desire to preserve their Union and Neighbourhood one with another: But let us consider the ground; Do they desire to preserve their Essence that they may be One, that is, United or Joined together; or do they desire Union and Conjunction, that they may preserve their Essence? This latter I suppose; And therefore a drop of water doth not desire to Be, to the end that it may be Conjoined with the rest, but desires to be Conjoined for its Preservation, lest it should cease to be. But how doth this prove its Essence to be Unity?  
In sum, All those instances in Nature (which doubtless are very many) whereby it may appear that all things naturally do desire Unity (or Conjunction rather) either for Conservation, or for Consummation of their natural Perfection; That by Unity their Vigour is increased, quia vi● unita fortior, and the like; will show no more but this, That Unity is a Perfection of Being, not a Principle of Being; or That Things of the like nature conjoined together are able mutually to help each other in their Conservation or Operation. But what is there in all this to persuade us, that Unity is their Essence?  
As for the Mathematical Unity of Harmony, Proportion etc. It being only Relative (for they denote but the Relation of one thing to another) can confer nothing to the constitution of an Absolute Essence, as of Sounds, etc.  
But how this should any way confer to the deciding of that question, whether Quantity be divisibilis in semper divisibilia: seems to me a greater mystery, than this Mystery that is to be cleared. For as long as Mathematical Demonstrations shall be thought worthy of credit, it shall Never be granted, that Continuum constat ex indivisibilibus. And however some Naturalists, that know little what belongs to the nature of Quantity, make much ado to the contrary, and thereby bewray their gross Ignorance in these things; Yet I am confident, that not any One Mathematician (deliberately, and in a Mathematical way) either ever did, or ever will assent to them. And I cannot without Indignation (or Pity rather) read sometimes how fond and vainly some (otherwise) able Scholars think to shift off Mathematical Arguments in this and the like cases; which will not be so easily baffled by an empty Verbal Distinction, as some of their Idle Fallacies may. And if I make it not evident (to those that are acquainted with Mathematical terms) that a Continuum consists not of Indivisible Points, by as certain and infallible Mathematical Demonstrations, as That 2. and 2. make 4. I will hereafter turn Sceptic, and affirm confidently That we are sure of nothing.  
If a Line consist of Indivisible points, each Point is supposed to be Minimum possibile, by those that do maintain it; (or else how are they Indivisible.) Then must all Points be Equal; (for if they be Unequal, they cannot all be minima.) Then no Two Lines can possibly be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or Incommensurable; (for if all Lines do consist of Points whereof each is equal to other, then are all lines whatsoever measurable by this common measure of a Point; qu● aliquoties applicata, & hanc & illam commensurabit. Contrary to what hath been often demonstrated Mathematically, That some Lines are absolutely Incommensurable with some other, admitting of no common measure, (as for Example, the Diameter and the Latus of a Quadrate, (whose Proportion therefore cannot be expressed by Rational Numbers. Now that two Contradictory Propositions should be true by Mathematical Demonstration, is utterly impossible.  
Thousands of the like Demonstrations might be brought to prove it; As, that from hence, All Angles may be demonstrated to be Equal; The same Line, to be Shorter, to be Longer than itself, to be equal to two or more conjoined, and yet to be shorter than either; Yea, all Lines to be equal, All Circles of the same bigness, The Equinoctial Circle to be no bigger than a Cipher, All Motions to be of the same swiftness, All Bodies of the same weight, and of the same bigness: And yet in the mean time All these to be unequal, in Length, Weight, Swiftness, etc. And infinite the like absurdities; as might be showed, if this were the Question I had in hand. Take an instance or two.  
Let two Circles be described upon the same Centre, of what greatness you please; Let a Thread be fastened at the common Centre, and so extended that it cut the Circumference of both Circles; Thus extended, the one end being fastened at the Centre, let the other end be moved round: Now while this Thread passeth over one Point in the Greater Circle, I demand how much it passeth over in the Lesser? Less than a Point it cannot be, because ex hypothesi, a Point is Minimum possibile; For every Point therefore that it passeth over in the Greater Circle, it passeth over a Point answerable in the Lesser Circle; There be therefore as many points in the Lesser as are in the Greater Circle; and these Points being all Equal, because every one is Minimum possibile, the Lesser Circle must needs be equal to the Greater Circle, because it consists of as many Points; and by the same reason, All Circles Equal.  
Now the Thread thus moving, move it never so Slowly, it passeth over a Point in a Moment; and move it never so Swiftly, it passeth but a Point in a Moment: And therefore all Motions are alike Swift, as passing over equal distances in equal time.  
Again, Let two Lines concurring in the same Point make an Angle, (of what greatness you please;) their Two next Points, joining upon this common Point of concurrence, will terminate a Basis of Two Points, (not more, for then the Subtendent would be equal to both the Crura.) The two Third points will terminate a Line somewhat longer than the other, and therefore at least of Three points; and so on, for every point added to the Crura, (be the angle greater or less) you must add one point to the length of the Basis, subtendent to that angle (and more than One it cannot be, for then the increase of the Basis will be equal to the increase of both the Crura:) Whence it will come to pass That all Angles (at an equal distance from the point of concurrence) will have their Subtendents equal (the Basis or Subtendent being thus measured by the length of the Crura, or lines containing the angle●) Wherefore themselves also must be equal.  
Now also it is sufficiently apparent to a Mathematician, that upon all lives whatsoever, you may erect (as from a Basis) lines of the same length containing an Angle; and therefore (both the Angle and the Basis being measured only by the length of the Crura) not only all Angles may be equal, but also all Lines, (as being Subtendents to equal angles at the same distance.) I need not add more demonstrations to show the Impossibility of that Opinion which makes every Continuum to consist ex indivisibilibus.  
It is certain then, that Continuum non Constat ex Indivisibilibus: But, how this doctrine of Unity serves either to confirm the truth, or to clear the doubts; I see not.  
But to return. His Lordship hath been copious to show some Union, ●ome Relation, of One thing to, or with Another, in the several kinds of Being. From whence he is ready to infer, That the Essence of all things is One, that it is Unity. But be it granted, That there be divers particular Species under the same generical nature; (as when all particular acts of duty are comprised in One general name of Love, or Obedience:) Be it so, That many Effects may proceed from the same Cause; (as all virtuous acts from the subordination of the Will to Reason:) That there be many Combinations of Being's or Persons, Natural, Voluntary▪ Economical, Political, Logical, etc. whence may arise One Aggregatum, One Predicament, one City, or Kingdom, one World: Be there Supernatural or Spiritual Societies, One Church, Paroch●all, national, Ecumenical, Visible, Invisible, one mystical Body: Be there also in Lines, Bodies, Sounds, etc. (besides their Absolute Affections, Length, Bigness, loudness, etc.) some mutual Relations of Proportion, Harmony, Discord, etc. Be there in Physical Bodies, a desire of Union or Conjunction in One to another; Yet will not this prove, That all things have One Nature, One Essence; much less, That this Essence is Unity. If Iron desire Union, (or conjunction rather) with the Loadstone, doth this prove their Specifical Essence to be One? Or (if it do) doth it pro●e▪ that this One Essence is Unity? And so of the rest.  
All that can arise from hence, is, That God hath so ordered the several Natures of particular Creatures, as that his Wisdom doth not only appear in their Absolute and Simple natures; but hath also put Relative or Respective natures in them, whereby his Wisdom may appear in their mutual Oppositions, Conjunctions, Similitude, Dissimilitude, Sympathy, Antipathy, Help, and Hindrance of one thing to another; whereby not only Every thing (Severally) in its Absolute nature doth set forth God's glory, but also All things (jointly) do 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and work together in their respective Relations, as well for the good of those that love God, as for their mutual advancing of God's glory. All which may be, though neither Unity, nor any One specifical Being, be the formalis ratio, the essential form of all things; but each species have a several kind of Being.  
For my own judgement; I am as confident, that Unity is Nothing; as his Lordship is, That it is All things. 'Tis a mere rational, nominal Notion, that hath no more Reality in it, than Darkness, then non esse. Yea, to be One, is a pure Negative Proposition; and what Reality you can allow to a Negation, so much you may allow to Unity.  
It is true, Vnus, as it is opposed to Nullus, is Affirmative, and is the same with Aliquis, or Nonnullus: But if it signify the same with Vnicus, and be opposed to Multitude, (according as we now take it,) it is a mere Negation, and no more.  
Which to make clear, observe but this Syllogism, [Whatsoever is in England, is in Europe; But in England there is Rex Vnicus, One only King; Therefore in Europe there is Rex Vnicus; but One King.] Where you shall find no fault in the Syllogism, save that the Minor is Negative in the first figure. Whence it is apparent, That Unity, as it is opposed to Multitude, is a mere Negative term.  
There is One Sun; but is this Unity Essential to it? Whether another Sun be, or be not; it nothing concerns the Essence of this Sun, but only grounds an external Relation, which is yet but Relatif rationis.  
Was not the Essence of Adam the Same, and he Equally a Man, before the production of Eve, while he was Vnicus; and after both the Production of Eve, and the Generation of sons and daughters, when he ceased to be Vnicus, there being more beside him? Was there any Detraction, or Addition of Essence, or any Reality, that concerned Adam's person, at such time as his children were born? or would there have been afterwards, if all except Adam had been swept away?  
Nay when two Drops of Water are separated, or conjoined, is there any Essential or Real Mutation in either?  
Surely, if Unity may come, and go, without any Real Alteration; then is Unity so far from being Essential to all things, that it is not so much as Real.  
Object▪ You will say; But God is indeed One, Vnus et Vnicus; and not only supposed to be One: Therefore his Unity must needs be Real, and not Imaginary.  
Answ. I grant it; But what then? must therefore Unity be Positive or Real? The Air, in the night time, is indeed Dark, and not only ●●●posed to be Dark; Will you therefore infer that Darkness hath a Real, a Positive Being, and is not a privation of Light? When the Moon is eclipsed, it doth Really and Indeed want the Illumination of the Sunbeams, and is not only supposed to want them; but you will not, I suppose, say that this Want of Light, hath a Real Essence. So here▪ God is indeed One, and not only imagined so to be, yet hath not Vnity●ny ●ny Entity or Positive Being in it.  
There is Negatio Realis, and Negatio Rationis; a Real absence and a Supposed absence. Of the one you may truly frame a Negative Proposition▪ of the other you cannot; there may be indeed in the Understanding concerning thi●, Negatio actus, (which is all one with Abstraction) but not actus negationis, actus negativus. When the Air, in the Night time, is Dark; there is a Real Absence of Light: when, in the Day time, I conceive of the Air according to its Essence, or according to some other Qualities, not at all regarding its being Light; this is Negatio Rationis, or negatio Abstractionis, there is only a supposed Absence of Light, but indeed a (real) Presence.  
Yea, ipsum Non-esse, is a Real Praedication though it be not a real Praedicate (Like as Mendacium esse Falsum, is a Truth:) Therefore when I say, Centaurus non est; I do not Forge this Proposition, or suppose a nonentity in a Centaur where indeed there is none, but I affirm that nonentity to be, which is; for a Centaur, Is nonens, and not only Supposed to be Nonens. And of Negations, or Privations, That is only Negatio Rationis, when by Abstraction Things are supposed to be separate, which are indeed conjoined: Other Negations though they have not realiter Esse, yet they have realiter Non-esse; their nonentity is not Imaginary. (I speak of Negatio Physica, not Negatio Logica; for a Logical Negation, that is, a Negative Enunciation, is as Real as an Affirmation.) A supposed Being is Ens rationis, and a supposed Absence is Negatio rationis.  
Negations and Privations are Non-Entia, and not Entia Rationis; for they have not in themselves so much as Esse Cognitum, which is requisite to Ens Rationis; And when as sometimes a Negation is said to be Ens Rationis▪ it is not to be understood of its internal Entity, for so Darkness in itself doth not include esse cognitum, but when the Understanding considers of a Negation, and so makes it Objectum Cognitionis, then of a Nonens it becomes Ens Rationis. But then (I say) it is ●●trationis, not Negatio rationis.  
Yet all this hinders not but that Unity, and all other Negations, may have a kind of Reality, as it is opposed to a Fiction. And therefore the Air ●● really Dark, God is really Vnicus, and not only supposed so to be: And yet Darkness and Unity are not in themselves Real, but Negative term▪  
I purposely pass over several particulars, (as well in this Chapter, as in others) which his Lordship lights upon by the way; to avoid tediousness: and look principally at those things, to which his Lordship's aim doth especially tend.   

CHAP. VIII. The Nature of Habits Whether they be one with Truth or the Souls Essence.  
IN the eighth Chapter, he speaks somewhat concerning the nature of Habits. And this is to be adjoined to the end of the 5. Chapter: the 6. and 7. Chapters, (wherein he infers a Corollary, concerning the Essence of All things▪ That it is One, That it is Unity;) being inserted as a Parenthesis. He had in the fifth Chapter affirmed That the Soul is nothing but Truth; Yet (saith he) while I affirm, that the Soul is nothing but this Truth, I do not refuse the doctrine of Habits, either Infused or Acquisite.  
But before I proceed, It is not amiss to give notice of a different acceptation of Truth here, from that before. He spoke before of the Truth or Light of Reason, which he contended, to be One with the Soul, and not a distinct Faculty. This Light was an Innate or Connate Light, which hath its Original and its Period with the Soul: For when the Soul begins, the Light of Reason begins, and this Light of Reason is no sooner extinct, then when the Soul shall cease to be. But the Light of Habitual Knowledge, (whether Infused or Acquisite,) is not an Innate Light, but an Advenient Light; subsequent to the Souls first Existence, and really separable from it. Yet may it be Antecedent to another degree of Advenient Light, viz. Actual Knowledge, which may proceed from Habitual.  
This Advenient Light of Habitual knowledge differs from Innate Light of Reason; as a Habit in the first species of Quality, from Naturalis potentia, or a Faculty, in the second species. And so, howsoever it may be true, That a Faculty or Natural Power, may be so far the Same with the Soul, as that it differ only ratione ratiocinatâ; Yet in a Habit, we must of necessity grant a distinction ex parte rei. For where there may be a Real Separation (and not only Mental) there must needs be granted a Distinction in re. Now that in all Habits there may be a real Separation, is apparent: For (though, it may be, some Habits acquired or infused cannot be lost when they are once had, as Grace, etc. yet) before the acquisition or infusion of such Habits, the Soul was actually without them. Indeed it is true, That these Habits cannot subsist without the Soul; and therefore they may not be imagined to be Really distinct, as res & res; yet because the Soul may exist without these; therefore they must have a Modall distinction in re, as res & modus. Thus the Roundness of a piece of Coin, though, when it is, it is the same Thing with the Silver, not being a Thing added, but only a Modification, a moulding or fashioning of the Former thing; yet must it be Distinct from the essence of the Silver, though not a Thing distinct: Otherwise when this Silver looseth its Roundness, it should lose its Essence and become somewhat else; whereas the Silver in this form, is not really distinct from itself in another form, but the same Metal, the same Silver.  
There being then this difference between a Habit and a Faculty: Though Reason should be One with the soul without so much as a Modall distinction; yet follows it not, that a Habit hath the same Real Identity, but that it may be distinguished ex parte rei.  
Habits he distinguisheth into Infused and Acquisite. When the soul (saith he) by virtue of its Being is clear in such a Truth; it is said to be an Infused habit: when by frequent action, such a Truth is connatural to the Soul, it may be styled an Habit Acquisite, though etc.  
Whether or no this be the genuine distinction between an Acquisite and Infused Habit, it is not material strictly to examine. If the soul by its Essence be clear in such a Truth; that is, be ready to act according to such a Truth: I should call this a Faculty or Natural power, rather than an Habit. Thus Gravity in a Stone, whereby it is naturally prone to descend, I should not call an Habit, but a Faculty. (Though Heaviness, in another relation, be neither a Faculty nor an Habit, but qualitas Patibilis. And so perhaps may Knowledge, as it is an accidental Form informing the soul, be referred to the same species of Quality, though it can hardly be called by that Name: For a Habit quatenus sic, is so called, not with any relation to the Subject, but in relation to Acts, which slow from it, or are produced by it.)  
This Proneness or Aptness for operation which is in any thing immediately from its Essence, is a natural Power or Faculty; And a Habit, is a further Readiness, and pliableness, or Facility of working according to this Faculty: A Habit therefore always presupposeth a Faculty, as being but a Facilitation of it. And when as by Reason a man hath an Ability to understand: by Habitual Knowledge, he hath a Readiness to understand.  
Now this Readiness or Facility, if it proceed from Often Acting; so that from the iterating of former Acts it becomes more prone either to continue or repeat those Acts; It is an Acquisite Habit: (Somewhat of this may be seen in Natural things; A Wheel being once in motion, it will by a smaller force be Continued, then at first Begun; yea for a while persist without help.) If this Facility proceed from some Accidental Form produced in it by an external Agent, it is an Infused Habit: The difference between an Infused and an Acquisite being no other but only in respect of the Efficient. Thus the Knowledge of divers Tongues and the Ability to speak them, which was in some of the Apostles by immediate Infusion, was an Infused Habit; whereas in others (as in Paul) it was Acquisite; differing from the other, not in Form, but in the Efficient.  
A Habit therefore, whether Infused or Acquisite, being but a Facilitation of the Faculty, cannot be a Thing distinct from that Faculty, but only a Modus of it, which hath not in itself a Positive Absolute Being of its own; but is a Modification of another Being: And its Physical Being, Existentia Rei, must be the same with the Being of that, which is thus Modificated; For it is not ipsum Existens, but Modus Existendi: And this Manner of Existing hath not an Existence of its own, distinct from the Existence of that which doth exist in this manner: Yet its Formal and Metaphysical Being is distinct. Yea and its Physical Existence, such as it is capable of, that is, Existentia Modi; for not being Res, but Modus rei, we must not expect that it should have any Existence of its own besides the Existence of a Modus: and this Existentia Modi is the actual Modificating of the Thing Existing after this Manner. The which Existence though it be not Existentia Rei, yet it is a Real Existence, (existentia in re) and not Mental: For the thing existent is not only supposed to exist in this manner, but indeed doth so, thus ordered, thus modificated: and therefore that Modus doth actually, & really modificate, and is not only supposed so to do.  
But if you will not admit (with Scotus) of any Modus entis, as a Medium between Ens & Nonens, Res et Nihil, a Thing and Nothing; you must then say, it is Res: for Nothing I am sure it cannot be: For doubtless there is some difference more than Imaginary between Knowledge and Ignorance, between a Square stone and a Round stone, between Silver Stamped and the same Smooth and Plain. This difference I should call Modall, accounting the Roundness etc. not Res but Modus Rei; affirming, that when Wax etc. is put out of one form or fashion into another, thereiss no new Thing propounded; but that which before was, is now otherwise ordered.  
And thus it is most true which his Lordship speaks, That Habitual Knowledge, is nothing but Light more or less glorious; It is Reason cleared; It's only Facultas facilitata, or facultatis Facilitas: And to this Facility or Readiness to operate, I cannot allow a Physical existence of its own; as neither to any Habit whatsoever, as being but Modi and not Entia; It's not a Being, but a Manner of Being; not Ens but aliquid Entis. And I should easily be persuaded to grant the same concerning all Accidents whatsoever, which have long since been called Entis Entia: And however an Accident hath been accounted to be Res, and so to have Existentiam Rei; yet not Subsistentiam Rei: Though it have an Existence of its own, yet its Subsistence is no other but Subsistentia Subjecti.  
Yet I cannot with his Lordship subscribe to the Platonists, to make Knowledge nothing but a Remembrance. (As if there were naturally in our Understanding, the Pictures or Pourtraictures of all Truths, but so obscured and covered as it were with dust, that these glorious Colours do not appear, till such time as they be rubbed and washed over anew.) I approve rather of Aristotle's Rasa Tabula, (than Plato's Reminiscentia) making the Understanding, of itself, to have no such Idea or Picture at all, but capable of all. Or thus (I know not how it can be better expressed;) The Understanding is not as a Table, wherein the King's Picture is portrayed in lively colours, but (hanging in the dark) it appears not, that there are any such Lineaments, till it be Enlightened with the Sun, and then it presents us with a Fair Description: But rather as a Glass which is able to Receive and Reflect whatsoever Colours fall upon it, though (before) it had none of them.  
For I demand, What Principle is there implanted in nature to inform me, Whether there ever were such a City as Troy? Whether it were so destroyed? Whether this or that were Plato's or Aristotle's Opinion? What Principle to inform, that it reigned yesterday & is fair to day? Certainly, matters of Fact have not such Ideas implanted in Nature; for than might they by Discourse be known to have been or not to have been, without the help either of Sense or Information. And if Historical Knowledge may be acquired without any fore-implanted Ideas of those Truths so known; why also may not Discursive Truth be also Known without a Reminiscentia, or a Review of Forgotten o● Obscure Principles?  
Next he tells us, That we may Seem by frequent actings to help the Soul, and so to create Acquisite Habits; whereas indeed it is not so, but all Actings are only new Discoveries.  
But how this can stand with his former doctrine of Reminiscentia, I do not see: For this takes away not only Plato's Reminiscentia, but all Remembrance whatsoever. If all Actings be new Discoveries, How and When can we be said to Remember?  
But is it so? do Former Actings no way help our Subsequent Acts? I● so, how can a Learned Scholar be said to Know more than an Ignorant Peasant? For the one is as capable of a new discovery as the other, i● his former acts make no preparation or fitness for future acts. How comes it to pass, that Learned men shall apprehend those Truths at the first relation, which another cannot without much ado be brought to conceive? Nay why should an Artist be more skilful in his Trade then another? Why may not an Infant new born plead his cause as well as the best experienced Lawyer? Certainly, if former acts do not indeed produce an Habitual Knowledge (but only seem to do) in the one which is not in the other, the one may as well act as the other, for there is the same Reasonable Soul in a Child, which is in him afterwards.  
The difference surely must proceed from hence, That the Former Actings have produced a Facility and Readiness for Future Acts: that so, what was before more Difficult, becomes now Facile.  
Nay more, That which before was utterly Impossible, becomes now both Feazi●le and Easie. All the most refined Wits in the world joining their acutest Discoveries, their strongest judgements together, are not able without the help of Historical Relation, ever to know such a thing as the Destruction of Troy: Yet when this, or the like, hath been either Seen by ourselves, or Related to us, it is then easy to tell afterwards, what we have seen, what we have heard, without a second view or a new relation. Now if the former Actings, do no● way prepare for a future Act; why might not the First discovery have been made by our own light of Reason, without an external supply, from our Senses, or from Information, as well as the Second?  
Philosophers (saith he) affirm this boldly of the Unreasonable Creature, ●teributing it to an Instinct or new Influence▪ Why then may we not conclude the same of Man?  
That Philosopher's attribute much to Instinct in Unreasonable Creatures, I grant: But that by an Instinct, they meant a new Influence, I was not aware. Certainly Memory hath been accounted one of the Sensus ●nt●rni, and so belonging to the Sensitive Soul, and therefore not to be denied to Brutes: And doubtless daily experiments put it out of question, That Brute Creatures make use of Memory, and by former acts, are fitted for following acts; not doing all from a new Instinct.  
I am called in the next place, to search out the difference between Reason and Faith. They differ (saith he) only in Degrees, not in Nature: For if Soul, Understanding, Habits be all the same, then neither do Reason and Faith differ.  
I grant that there is the same ground, why we should make Reason and Faith the Same; that there is to make the Faculty and the Habit the Same. Reason is a Faculty, Faith a Habit: Now a Faculty and a Habit, I have before said not to be res & res, but res & modus. Their Physical Difference therefore (I mean, if you consider Faith and Reason in the same man) is but Modall.  
But it doth not follow from hence, That they differ not in Nature. For though an Habit have not Entitatem Rei, distinct from the Faculty; yet it hath Entitatem Modi; so that the Habit is not a Faculty, neither is the Faculty an Habit.  
To inquire of a Physical Identity, and of a Metaphysical or Formal Identity, are quaeres far distinct. The Faith of Peter is Really and Physically distinct from the Faith of Paul; and yet their Metaphysical Formal nature is exactly the Same. Again, all the Modall Being's in the same subject, though their Essence and Nature be never so distinct (v. g. Duration, Augmentation, Situation &c, in the same man) be Really the same; (for neither of them, being Modi, have any Entitatem Rei, beside the Entity of their common Subject, and so cannot make a Real distinction, because there is not res & res:) Yet each Modus hath a distinct Formal nature of its own: The nature of a Figure, is not the nature of a Habit, though both in the same Subject.  
But yet, though it do not follow from that Real Identity between Res & Modus, that the Nature of Reason and the Nature of Faith be the same: Yet if he change but the terms, and say (in stead of Reason) that Knowledge and Faith are the same in nature, I will not contend: So that he mean Faith as it is an Act or Habit of the Understanding, and not of the Will. For so, Faith is an Assent to a Truth reveiled: & the same individual Assent to the same Truth, may be both Cognitio Scientiae, and Cognitio Fidei▪ I will instance in the Creation of the world: By Faith we know that the worlds were made, and Assent to it: And by natural Demonstrations it may be proved, that the world was made; and these also are sufficient to persuade assent. Now we from both grounds (jointly) assent to this Proposition, That the world was made. The which Assent in respect of the one Ground (propter evidentiam rei) is an assent of Science or Natural Knowledge; in regard of the other Ground (Propter authoritatem dicentis) is an assent of Faith, or Supernatural and revealed Knowledge. The assent of Science, and of Faith, differ not in their Form, but in their Efficient.  
But if he speak of Saving Faith (quatenus Salvifica) as it doth Save: so it is an act of the Will, and not of the Understanding; and therefore differs from Knowledge.  
But, to conclude this: If we speak of a Physical difference or distinction, Then all the Modi that belong to the same Thing, can admit of no more than a Modall distinction: because having no other Entitatem Rei, but that of the common Subject, their Entitas Rei must be Common; there cannot be Res & Res: the difference must be either tanquam Res & Modus, or tanquam Modus & Modus: And here is no consideration of the Nature of these Modi. In distinct Things; The Modi are Really distinct and not Modally though these Modi be exactly of the same nature; as the Roundness of several Circles; For they not having Entitatem Rei besides the Entity of their Subjects; their Subjects being really distinct, they must be really distinct also.  
(Thus in the present case, The Faith of Peter is really distinct from the Faith of Paul: But Faith in Peter from Reason in Peter is only Modally distinct, tanquam Res & Modus; (viz. If you make Reason to be Res, or a Faculty Really distinct from the soul:) and the Habit of Faith in Peter will be distinct from all other Habits in Peter (v. g. from the Habit of Knowledge) tanquam Modus & Modus.)  
But if we speak, not of a Physical, but of a Metaphysical Difference; Here it little avails to inquire of their Physical Difference, or Identity. For those things that are really distinct, as two Souls, may yet agree in the same Specifical Nature: and those which are not really distinct (as several Modi of the same Thing) may have their Formal Specifical differences.  
Again, though it be granted that Natural Knowledge (attained by by the use of Reason, without a supernatural Revelation) be of the same Nature with Faith; Yet doth it not presently follow, That their difference is Gradual, and the one but a greater Degree of the same Light: For Skill in Music and Skill in Metals or Minerals, are both Natural Habits; yet the Skill of a Musician, and the Skill of a Chemist are not the Same (though of the same nature;) neither yet is their difference Gradual; For the one is not the way to attain the other and the other a Perfection of that former. And moreover a man may be skilful in either of them without a knowledge of the other, whereas a Greater Degree of Knowledge in the same Kind cannot be without the Lesser.  
That which follows, concerning Falling from Grace, and the Freedom of the Will, (as also what proceeds, How far we do acti agere, that is, How far, and In what manner, the First cause doth concur with the Second in its Operations) require a larger discourse for the deciding of them, then to be touched at in transitu, and by the way. I shall therefore say only this (and so pass them over;) Liberty and Servitude are opposite; and both are Relative terms. He that is Free from the Dominion of one Master, may be a Servant, a Slave, to another. Thus the Will, though it be Free from any Natural Necessity, either from within, or without; so that it be neither determined by an inward Principle, as mere Natural Agents are; neither can have either Compulsion, or Necessity, imposed upon it by the command of another Creature: Yet is it not Free from the Command and Power of God, by whose Absolute Decree it is determined. We must not so far affect to be Liberi, that we become Sacrilegi; we must not vindicate our Liberty by committing Sacrilege, exempting ourselves from being under the Power of a Deity.  
If I were now to examine the nature of Freedom, wherein it consists: I might perhaps place it in a Spontaneity, that it acts without reluctancy, Sponte agit: Were it not that even Natural Agents (as a Stone falling) have such a free action, without Constraint, without Reluctancy.  
Or it might be placed perhaps in a Reflection upon its own Act; whereby it doth not only Agere, yea and Sponte (or volens) agere, without a Nolition, a Renitentia; But also Vult agere: Whereas a Natural agent, though perhaps Sponte or Volens agit, yet you cannot say Vult agere, because there is not a Reflection whereby it Willeth its Action. That which hinders me from placing it in this, is, Because I allow not any reflex act of Willing in God, besides that direct act of Working, who is yet a most Free Agent. For (beside other reasons, that if need were, might be produced) it stands not with God's Simplicity, to admit distinct acts in God, whereof one should be the Object of another. Now what strength there is in this, to hinder the placing of Freedom in this Reflex act, I propose to be considered, rather than Affirm.  
But I rather place the nature of the Wills Liberty, in a Freedom from Servitude, that it is not under the command of any Creature, or a Natural Determination of its own. And therefore though it be free from such servitude as a Natural agent, or such as may be Forced, is subject to; yet it is not free from God's Command; Nor (perhaps) from the dictate of Reason neither, Or, if it be, yet is not this its Freedom, but its Weakness.  
And this is not far distant from the received opinion, which makes it consist in Indifferentiâ. For the Will can agere vel non agere notwithstanding anything to the contrary from the Creature; but it cannot agere vel non agere notwithstanding the Decree of God; and therefore is not Free from that Determination. And whereas other things are from God determined mediante causa secundâ, the Will is Immediately determined a causa primâ.  
And therefore what he citys out of Rutterfort, That granting all things to be under an absolute Decree, it is fond to ask, Whether the Free Creature remain indifferent to do or not to do; I willingly assent unto. But you must consider withal, that This Freedom neither the Angels have, nor had Adam in his Innocence.  
And therefore, when Divines tell us, that by the Fall we have lost our Liberty, or Freedom of Will, in Spiritual things, which yet we retain in Moral and Civil Actions; I desire that they would more punctually set down, What the Liberty is, which we retain in Natural things, but want in Spiritual; What Liberty that is, which the Angels have, and Man once had, but hath now lost: And not speak of such a Liberty as neither Man or Angel ever had, nor is it possible for any Creature to have; Nay not for God himself, For God having once decreed, cannot with his Truth revoke it, nor is indifferent to execute it or not; But, as They say of Jupiter, which make Him to be the Author of their Stoical unavoidable Fate (understanding it cum grano salis) He once Commanded, and ever after Obeyed.  
There follows in the next place, an Objection, How it comes to pass, if Faith and Knowledge be One, that some who have more Knowledge have less Faith.  
I need not recite his Lordship's Answer, I will only propose my own. If there be meant a Physical Identity, whereby two Modi of the same Thing do subsist by the subsistence of their common Subject, it is not hard to determine: For two Modifications of the same Thing may yet be independent of each other: And therefore it is not requisite they should be both in the same measure, or degree.  
2. If by Knowledge be meant an assent to Natural truths, and by Faith, an assent to Supernatural truths; neither is here any difficulty: For the Knowledge of one thing is not inconsistent with the Ignorance of another thing.  
3. ●f Knowledge and Faith be considered in relation to the same Object, Spiritual truths, or Saving truth, and Faith be taken for an Intellectual assent to them: Then is it not true, that there is in any (if you speak adid●m▪ more Knowledge and less Faith; what any Knows to be Thus, he cannot Believe to be Otherwise. For the Understanding is not a Free faculty, that it can either Accept or Reject a revealed Truth.  
4. If by Faith be meant, not an Assent in the Understanding to the Truth Known, but a Consent in the Will, an embracing of it (which is the justifying act of Faith:) Neither is this difficulty much greater than the former▪ For the too too frequent sins, even in God's children, against light, makes it over manifest, That the Action of the Will doth not always follow the Knowledge of the Understanding.  
And yet if this too clear experience be not able to prove it, but that you still lay all the blame upon the Understanding, as not being clear enough in its Apprehensions, or not sufficiently Peremptory in its Dictates; and so excuse the Will of all Remissness: I demand then, what disability there is in the Will of Man since the fall more than in the confirmed Angels and Saints in Heaven? I cannot think but that the Image of God, by the Fall, is defaced in the Will as well as in the Understanding; and yet if the Will do never disobey the Light of Reason, which is its sole (immediate) Guide, I see not wherein this disability doth appear.  
I grant that the Will doth always Follow the Understanding, that is, it never goes before it, or without it; it goes never but where the Understanding hath led the way, in discovering some Good, (more or less,) something Desirable. For the Will is Caeca potentia▪ and Knows of nothing desirable, but what the Understanding discovers. And Knowing nothing, can Desire nothing; Ignoti nulla Cupido.  
But yet I grant not that Proposition in this sense, The will Always follows the Understanding; that is, It never stays behind. For to Omit what the Understanding commands, requires not a discovery of some other Good, but only an Impotency, a Backwardness, or Remissness to do its Duty. To go without direction, requires a Positive Cause, because it is a Positive Act; But Not to go when it is directed, may proceed from a Negative Cause (Negatio Causae,) because it is a Negative Act, or a Not-doing. A lame man doth not run, when he knows, that he ought to run; yet here is no need of a Positive Cause to stay him, but his Impotency (a Negative cause) sufficeth.  
And thus far do I admit that distinction of Libertas Contrarietatis, and Libertas Contradictionis, though in that way in which it is ordinarily made use of, I do wholly reject it. There is not in the Will an Indifferency to choose Good or to choose Evil; neither yet to Choose good, or Reject good (velle & nolle;) both which they call Libertas Contrietatis. For the Understanding doth not show any Amiableness or lovelines in Evil; nor any Odiousness in Good (quatenus sic;) and therefore the Will cannot Desire Evil, nor Reject Good (Nolle, or Velle non.) For Bonitas is Objectum formale Appetitûs; and Malum is the formal Object of Nolition. Now the Soul cannot velle quatenus bonum, that in which no Good is apprehended; nor nolle quatenus malum (that is, velle ut non sit) that wherein it apprehends no Evil. But for the other kind of Indifferency, (which they call Libertas Contradictionis,) to Will good, or Not Will it; too Nill Evil, or Not to Nill it; This I acknowledge to be in the Will. For that by reason of its Imbecility, it is not so ready to execute its Functions as it ought to be.  
But yet I do not conceive the Liberty of the Will to consist in this; Or, that this is any Perfection to the Will, To be able to Suspend its Act, notwithstanding the Understandings direction to the contrary. (For this the Angels Confirmed cannot do, nor the Saints Glorified; for if their Will could act contrary to their Understanding, then could they Sin; And yet these Agents are no less Free, than Man is: Yea God, who is the most absolutely-Free Agent, yet cannot Will or Decree that which is contrary to his Sapience, (intellectus divinus;) his Will never thwarts his Wisdom.) But I conceive it to be an Imperfection or Weakness in man's Will; which, Before the Fall, was not so Stable, but that it might Fall; and is Now become so Weak, that it is Unable to Stand.  
The common Opinion is, That, If the Will cannot disobey the judgement of the Understanding, then is it not a Free faculty but all its actions are determined by the Understanding, while It dictates, that this or that is to be done or omitted; and so Freedom should be placed in the Understanding and not in the Will. I may add, (to help their cause forward) that there may seem to be no Freedom at all: For the Will is determined by the dictate of the Understanding, and therefore in it is no freedom, no Election; and the Understanding (by general consent) is not Free, to judge this or that as it pleaseth, but must assent or descent according to its Light: so that Here will be no Freedom neither. For this reason they say, That the Will is not necessitated to follow the dictate of Reason; but when the Understanding hath declared what it can, it is yet in the power of the Will to Choose.  
But then, lest they should fall upon another rock, viz. That, if the Will may reject the Understandings advice; then may it desire that which the Understanding affirms to be Evil; contrary to that Principle, That Good is the only Object of Desire: To avoid that danger, they have found out this distinction of Libertas Contrarietatis and libertas Contradictionis, which they apply thus; The Will hath power indeed to disobey that which the Understanding propoundeth: But yet not so, as if, of two Objects, whereof the Understanding Allows of one, and Disallows of the other, it were free notwithstanding to embrace Either; But when an Object is commended by the Understanding, though the Will cannot Elect its Contrary, yet it may not-elect this, it may choose whether or no it will Embrace it. And thus they think the whole matter is salved.  
This Answer may seem plausible, and hath passed for current: But yet (with their leaves) the Wound, though perhaps skinned over, is not so easily Healed. For if they may not admit the Liberty of Contrariety: they may not (in my judgement) admit the Other. For when the Understanding commends an Object to the Will, as that which Ought to be Desired, here are two opposite terms, to Embrace, or not Imbrate; (agere, suspendere:) The Understanding saith, Agendum est, it Ought to be Embraced; The Will chooseth rather not to Embrace it, but to Suspend its Act. The Understanding adviseth One extreme; the Will chooseth the Other extreme. The Understanding saith, It is Good to Act, and (consequently) it is Ill to Omit, to suspend; the Will notwithstanding chooseth to Suspend (which the Understanding affirms to be Evil,) rather then to Act, which the Understanding commends as Good. Thus that libertas Contradictionis, appears upon trial to include also a liberty of Contrariety: and if it may Not-choose the term commended, than it may choose the term Forbidden, yea it must choose it, where the terms are Contradictory without a Medium.  
All that can be said to help it, will be this; Willing and Suspending are indeed Opposite Terms; and therefore when the Understanding adviseth to Will, if the Will do [Velle] suspendere, it chooseth the term Opposite, and (consequently) that which is proposed as Evil; But (they may say perhaps) the Will doth only Suspendere, and not Velle suspendere; and so this Suspending is not an Object of Choice, but only the Absence or Negation of an Act; and therefore though it do ire in contrarias parts, yet it doth not contrariam partem Eligere, it doth not Choose, or Elect, the Opposite term, because there is no positive Act of Election or Willing exercised about it.  
And this answer I confess may seem to weaken the Objection immediately foregoing; for thus the Will is not made to Choose an Opposite term; But then let them consider, how this Answer will stand with their Opinion: They tell us first that the Freedom of the Will is manifested in Suspending when the Understanding commands to Act; and yet when it doth Suspend, they say this Suspension is not an object of Choice or Election; and (consequently) there is no Liberty exercised.  
If they think thus to evade, in saying, That this Liberty is exercised, not in Suspending when it might Act, because There is no Election, & therefore no Freedom exercised; But in Acting, when as it might have Suspended. I answer, That neither will this serve the turn. For as Suspension is not Objectum Volitionis, an Object of Choice; so neither is Acting an Object of choice. And as we say not Volo Suspendere, or Volo Non-velle, so neither do we say volo Velle: For by the same reason that any may say Volo Velle, he may say also volo non Velle. So that Willing can no more be said to be an object of Choice, then Suspending.  
Their Libertas Contradictionis therefore must either be also ibertas Contrarietatis, and so by themselves rejected: or else it will be no exercise, no manifestation, of Liberty, and therefore useless for their purpose.  
I admit (as I said before) the distinction in this sense; That the Will, though it cannot Elect a Contrary object, ye● it may Not-Elect This. And thus there is no Action (of Choice or Desire) in the Will, but tending to some Good that the Understanding proposeth; For what is not Known cannot be Desired: But yet there may be a negligent Omission or Suspension, when it ought to Act Which I do not account ●o be the Liberty, or Perfection of the Will, (for Angels etc. have it not,) but an Imperfection and Weakness. Neither do I say, that the Will doth Voluntarily Suspend, or Velle suspendere, without direction, (for that were a Positive Act;) but (either by Negligence, or Weakness,) doth Not-Will. For which there is no● requisite a Positive cause, but a Negative, or the Want of a Cause.  
You will say, If this be so, then will there be only a sinful Omission●● ●● the Will, and not a sinful Commission: For Sin of Commission (doing or Willing that which ought not) is Positive, and therefore cannot proceed from the Will, when the Understanding dictates to the contrary. Whereas the Will doth as often fail in Choosing a wrong object, which the Understanding acknowledgeth to be Evil; as in Not Choosing a Good Object.  
I answer, it is true, the Will doth often choose what it ought not: And yet I affirm, that the Wills Error is only Negative and not Positive; It is Omissive only, in not-obeying some directions of the Understanding. I shall make it clear by an Instance. Pleasure and Virtue may be Competitors, and Rivals (as it were) both courting the Will; (As in an Act Pleasant, but Sinful.) The Understanding proposeth Pleasure as quid bonum, 'tis Good, 'tis Desirable; It proposeth Virtue as quid melius, 'Tis Better, 'tis more desirable. Now the Will perhaps follows the first direction; it embraceth Pleasure as being Good, and so Desirable; (for Bonum Jucundum is Desirable as well as Bonum Honestum:) But the second Precept, or Direction rather, whereby Virtue is proposed as Better, and therefore should countermand the form●●, this it hears not, it follows not.  
If you say, the Understanding doth indeed discover some Good (though a less Good) in the Object; yet this is not to be accounted the Understandings Practical Direction (dictamen:) But, that the Understanding having examined the Good and the Evil that is in every Act, and comparing them together; upon this Comparison, as it observes the Good or Evil to be more, so it prescribes, to Do, or Not to Do, H●● age, or Hoc non age: And if the Will do Act, when the Understanding Forbids, it must be said to perform a Positive Act without direction.  
I answer▪ I admit not the Understandings dictate to be Imperative, but only Declarative: It only informs, This is Good, This is Evil; but Commands not, Do this, or Omit it. But the Will upon proposal of Good, Embraceth it; upon proposal of Evil, it Rejects it: Yet not so, but that, by Negligence, it may Not-embrace Good, and notreject Evil. And thus the proposal of Pleasure, as Good; is as truly declarative as the other; and this the Will follows: But a further declaration, whereby it declares, that although Pleasure be Good, yet it is Evil to embrace this Good, because there is a greater Evil annexed; This direction, by omission, it embraceth not. And this I conceive to be the true nature of the Acts of the Will and Understanding.  
If you would have the Will and the Understanding to be the Same, (and therefore think these distinctions superfluous,) understand by the Intellect, Anima Intelligens; by the Will, Anima Volens, or Anima quatenus Volens, and then you are pleased.  
And thus you see, How there may be more Knowledge (even of Spiritual and Saving Truths) and yet l●sse Faith: Because there may be ●n Asse●t, a Believing, in the Understanding, (which is Knowledge, or Historical Faith;) without a Fiducial Trust, a Reliance, and resting upon it; which is the Justifying Faith, or the Justifying Act of Faith. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 yea, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, without 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
5. But if you speak of a Knowledge peculiar to God's children, whereof others partake not; Such a Knowledge of God whereby no man knows him but he that hath him; That Knowledge which is Life everlasting: This Knowledge, and Faith, always go together; the more there is of One, the more also of the Other. A Speculative Knowledge, whereby we assent to the Truth reveiled, is found even in the Devils, and that in as large and ample measure (I suppose) as in the Saints on Earth: For I cannot be persuaded, but the Devils (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) being Knowing Spirits, do Know and Assent to the Truth of every Proposition that a Child of God knows. But there is an Experimental Knowledge distinct from the former, Knowledge of another nature, whereby we Know, what we know, in another Manner: We do not only Know that it is so, but we Taste and See it to be so.  
A Blind man Knows perhaps that the Sun shines, but he doth not S●● it: I Know that at Midnight the Sun shines to our Antipodes, but I do not See it shine to them: I Know that at such a time there is such an I 'clipse visible to such a part of the World, yet do I not See the Eclipse. The Confectioner that provides a Banquet Knows that this or that dish is Sweet, but they only Taste the Sweetness that eat of it. A wicked man may Know that God is good, (as a blind man knows that the Sun shines, by the report of others; or as an Astronomer knows of an Eclipse before it come, by Calculation, or rational Discourse and Illation;) ●ut he S●es it no●, he Tastes it not. Now we read of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, H●b. 5. 14. some that have their Senses exercised to discern of good and evil; there is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Phil. 1. 9 a kind of spiritual Sense, whereby we do 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, super●a S●pere, Relish those things that are above.  
And where there is this spiritual Taste, this Experimental Knowledge; there must needs be Faith also▪ For Truths thus clearly, and Sensibly (as it wer●) revealed to the Soul, it seems no● to be in the power of the Will to reject: No more than it is in the power of the Ear not to be pleased with harmonious Music; or in the power of the palate, not to be delighted with the Sweetness of a Taste.  
And thus I suppose it may appear, How far, and From what Ground there may be Knowledge without Faith.  
That God is all mercy and sweetness to the Devils, is no Article of my faith, Those miserable creatures, saith he, cannot consent to it. No more can I: And yet I deny not, that Mercy and Justice are One thing in God. God's Simple Essence is the same with both; yet are not They so properly the same with each other. The Torment of the Devils proceeds from that Divine Essence which is Love; (as likewise the Mercies of God's Children proceed from that Divine Essence which is Justice: for the Justice of God is equally himself as is his Love:) Yet may we not say, the Torments of those are an effect of Love, no more than that the Mercies of these are the effects of Anger; yet Both are the effects of that Simple Essence, which is Both. It is a far different thing therefore, to say, A Loving God doth notwithstanding Punish; and to say, A Loving God doth therefore Punish: Punishment and Revenge are sufficiently consistent with Love; but not the immediate effects of Love. Thus we say, Musicus Aedificat; yet not his skill in Music, but his skill in Architecture, is exercised in Building.  
The Love of God (as likewise his Anger, Justice, Power, etc.) is (I confess) the Divine Essence; we allow no Accidents in God at all: quicquid est in Deo, est Deus. But I ask, Whether he think this Attribute Love (and so of the rest) to be an Adequate expression of that whole Essence? If so, then is it all one to say, God Loves his Children, and, God is Angry with his children, or God Hates them: If not, then is it only inadaequatus conceptus, and there remains somewhat to be expressed by other Attributes, which is not expressed in this. The Attributes of God therefore (as likewise it is in other inadaequati conceptus) may be all affirmed of the same Simple Essence; but not (Mutually) of each other: And the Effects of each may be said to be the Effects of the same Essence; but not (Promiscuously) of every Attribute: (unless we take them Materialiter, not Formaliter:) And consequently, the ruin (of the damned) is not (as he affirms) an effect of infinite sweetness (though of that (Essence) which i●, Infinite Sweetness;) nor is God, (in this) merciful to them.  
Again, What we Know, we are, (saith he:) I assume; Sed deum scimus, Ergo Dii sumus.   

CHAP. IX. How Knowledge and Affection differ.  
FRom what hath been spoken in the former Chapter, without adding any more, may appear what is to be said concerning his Ninth Chapter: How it comes to pass that some of mean Knowledge have Large Affections. For a Speculative Knowledge doth not always Breed Affection, (because the Will doth not always follow the Understanding,) though neither doth it Extinguish it.  
It is true, there is an Affection, which is rather a Blazing (then a Warming, Enlivening) Love, (as the Fool's Mirth like the crackling of Thorns;) Which ariseth either from a False Apprehension, or else from the Novelty, rather than the sweetness, of the Object, (as the Smell of Flowers at the first approach doth most Affect the Sense, though they be as Sweet afterwards;) And This perhaps may vanish, at the presence of a more Clear or more Continued Light. But the true Warmth of Zeal is not extinguished by the Light of Knowledge, (though Speculative,) but feeds upon it as Fewell: And the greater Growth there is in (especially Experimental) Knowledge, the greater is the Strength of Affection from it: And, thus, they that Know most (experimentally) do always Love most: Knowledge and Affection go together.  
Yet are we not forced from hence to grant, that Knowledge and Affection are the Same: Betwixt which I must needs allow the same difference (be it more or less, that is, Real, or Modall) which is between the Understanding and the Will: Knowledge is not Affection, and Affection is not Knowledge.  
And that Objection which his Lordship from hence makes to himself, That (since men of Largest Affections, do not always Know most of God, but some of Weaker Affections may Know More;) it might appear from hence, That all Being is not One, differing only in Degrees; but that there are even different Natures, amongst which one may Excel, while the other is Depressed: This Objection, I say, i● of that force, that I see not how all which his Lordship brings, can take it away.  
The large Encomiums, which he brings for Affectionate Knowledge, preferring it before Speculative, (which he prosecutes very Piously, very Judiciously, very Affectionately;) though it prove, That Affectionate Knowledge is the more Excellent; Yet doth it not show That Speculative Knowledge is Nothing; or That the Measure of Affection always follows the Measure of Speculative Knowledge: One of which he ought to have proved, if he conclude that Knowledge and Affection are the Same. A man may truly Know, that Sugar is Sweet, though he neither Taste its Sweetness, nor be Delighted or Pleased with that Taste. And a Christian is sometimes to live by Faith and not by Sense; That is, he is to Trust, and Rest upon the Speculative Knowledge of God's Goodness, and his own Interest in it; even then when for the present he wants the Sense of it. He may Know and Believe that the Lord is Good, though he do not Taste and See it. I will wait upon God (saith Isay) which hath Hid his Face from the House Israel. He that walketh in darkness, and Sees no Light, must yet Trust in the Name of the Lord, etc.  
And thus much for the first Notion of Truth, or Reason, as it is the groundwork of Rational Operations. In which, thus far I may go along with his Lordship, That Reason is but the Soul Intelligent; That Intellectual Habits are but Reason advanced; As likewise That its Operations are but Reason actuated. The first, distinguished from the Soul at least ratio●e ratiocinatâ: the two last, Modaliter. If he mean no more, I wish his expressions had been clearer: For then the Notions are not new, but the Words. If he do aliquid grandius moliri; I either Understand him not; o● cannot Assent to him.  
But you will tell me perhaps, that I am mistaken all this while; His Lordship by Truth intends not Reason, as I take it; For the very Title of his first Chapter, calls it Truth Understood, and this cannot be Reason, for Reason is not that which is understood, but that whereby we understand.  
It is true, it do●h so: But (shall I speak it once for all?) the Titles of his ●hapters, and his Marginal Notes, do so often clash with the Text, that I cannot believe they were done by the same Pen. I● i● like his Lordship, writing it but as a Letter to a private Friend, by whom i● i● since published, did not at first distinguish it into chapters, and give it that Analysis that now appears; and since its first writing, as the Epistle tells us not having so much as perused it, it is not like he hath added them since; But the Publisher (as in the like cases is frequent in Treatis●s of all sorts) not to trouble his Lordship with so small a matter, did it himself. Who ever did it, it is like (as else where, so here) he either did not Apprehend, or not Attend punctually▪ his Lordship's meaning. For it is clear enough, if we attend it, that that which he there contends to b● the s●me with the Understanding, cannot be Truth understood; but the Rise or Groundwork from whence all actions and sayings, the Effects of a Reasonable Soul, breathe forth. It had been more agreeable to his Lordship's mind, to have said, Intellectus and Principium Intelligendi are the same; and not, that the Understanding▪ and Truth-understood, are one▪ And so his Lordship's method will be Exact, making the Soul or Understanding▪ One with its Faculties, chap. 1. with its Habits, chap. 8. with its Operations, chap. 10. Whereas, how the Object of all these, should come first, and be that from whence all these breathe forth, appears not.   

CHAP. X. Whether the Operations of the Soul be the Souls Essence.  
HAving done (in the former chapters) with the first Notion of Truth, as it is the Fountain or Source of Knowing, as well Natural as Habitual. In this tenth Chapter, he comes to the second Consideration, or Notion of Truth; denoting the Streams proceeding from this Fountain: The Actions, and Effects of a Reasonable Soul. Endeavouring to prove, The particular and various Workings of the Soul, in Conclusions, simple Apprehensions, Negations, and Affirmations etc. to be all One and the Same, both with each other, and with the Soul. The Fountain and the Stream (saith he) make but One River: I add, The Root and the Branches make but one Tree. Yet the Root is not a Branch, neither are the Branches the Root.  
To prove this, he compares the Nature of the Soul or Understanding (For, saith he, we have proved them both one) with their Irradiations and Actings. His Argument tends to this effect: The Souls Essence, saith he, is no other thing than Activity (Actus) and therefore must be either Potentia agendi, or ipsa Actio; Actus Primus, or Actus secundus. And if it be Actus, either Primus or Secundus,▪ which he conceives to differ only in Time) it must be still in work, and Is no longer than it Acts: Which Act can be no other but a Work of Reason; else how can it constitute a Rational Soul? And if so, then how doth it differ f●om Thought or Ratiocination? The Operations therefore of the Soul (Conclusions, Sayings, Actions) are the Being, the Form of the Soul.  
Are they so? But, I suppose, the Soul at some times produceth no (Rational) Act at all, (as in sleep: Doth it then cease to be a Rational Soul, when it ceaseth to produce Rational Operations? (For when its Essence ceaseth, Itself ceaseth to Bee. Doth a Stone cease to be Heavy, when it ceaseth to Fall downwards? I think not.  
But I will consider the Argument distinctly. He hath proved (he saith) that the Soul and the Understanding are both One. This, though I would not stick to grant, Yet (as I have formerly said) I see not any Argument, in his foregoing discourse, to prove That the Soul and Understanding are all One; but what will be of equal force to prove, The Soul and the Body to be all One. And if he will allow between the Soul, the Understanding, and its Operations, a distinction as Real, a● Essential, as there is between the Body and the Soul; I am confident there is no rational Man that will desire more.  
The Nature or Being of the Soul (saith he) is nothing but Activity. That the Soul is Actus, is confessed, I grant, by all: But whether Activity may be taken in the same sense, I question. This Actus (saith he) whether Primus or Secundus (which differ but in Time, and so differ not at all, because Time is nothing) c●● be no other but a Work of Reason: And so the Souls Operation will be its Form and Essence. That Actus primus and actus secundus, (Gravity and Descension) differ only in Time, I grant not: For this is not a Distribution of Actus into its Species; but a Distinction of an Ambiguous term. Actus in the first sense signifies Actuality (not Action) and it is opposed sometimes to Potentia ad Esse, sometimes to Potentia ad Formam; sive sit forma Substantialis, sive Accidentalis, (but never to Potentia ad Operari;) And thus Actus is no other but that Essence, per quam res aut actu-Est, aut est actu-Tale. Actus in the second sense signifies, not Actuality, but Action, or Operain; and is opposed to Potentia ad Operari.  
I say therefore, the Essenc● or Nature of the Soul or Understanding is Actus; It is Actus Primus; It is that whereby the Soul & actu Est, & est Hoc, or est Tale (viz. in genere substantiae,) Such a Being, Such a substance. Its Faculties (if distinct) are also Actus, (yet not Actions:) Which you may say to be Actus secundi (as some do) because they are a secondary actuality, whereby the Soul becomes, not a Being, or Such a Being; but a Being So qualified, So adorned: Or rather I should say they be Actus Primi, because (though Accidental, yet) they are not Operations (which I conceive to be the truest meaning of Actus secundus, though I confess some attribute it to all Accidents,) but Forms; Operative indeed, but not Operations.  
If you ask What is the Form of this Activity (or Actuality rather) of this Actus primus which is the Souls Essence, If it be not Rational Workings? (Which is all one as if you should ask What is the Essence of an Essence? and again, What is the Essence of That Essence? in infinitum. I answer, The Form of this Actus is Itself, Its Essence. What can be the Form of Rationality, but ipsa Rationalitas? Humanitas you may say is Forma Hominis; but will you ask again, What is that which is forma Humanitatis? If you do we must answer still, that it is Humanitas, and stay there. Except you would have us invent one Abstract upon the neck of another, and say Humanitatitudo. And thus I think somebody hath been trying practices; For if you ask what is the Form of Honorificum, or Honorificabile, they can tell you It is Honorificabilitas, or Honorificabilitudo; and ask again what shall be Forma Honorificabilitudinis, they will tell you, It is Honorificabilitudinitas.) I say, we must not inquire for the Form of a Form, or the Essence of an Essence: For every thing hath its Essence (positive) and its Hae●ciety, not from any other thing, but from Itself; Though it may have an external, a Relative, or Accidental denomination from some Adjunct.  
(And therefore to say, Materiae individuatur a Formâ, as though the Matter of a dead Corpse, were not the same matter that was in the living Man, is a doctrine which I could never digest. For so all Generation, will become Creation; For if it be the Form which makes this Matter to be This, then cannot one Form succeed another in the same Matter: because if the Form precedent gave it its Individuation, and made it to be this, and not other matter; when this Form is abolished, the Matter which is joined with the succedent Form will not be This, but Other matter: If This Form make it to be This Matter, than Another Form will make it to be Other Matter. And if so, then is both Matter and Form produced de novo; which must needs be Creation, because it is not made of any thing preaexistent, nothing remaining of what before was.)  
He proceeds thus, If the Form of this Activity (Actus) be not th●se Reasonable Workings; then must it be either of a base allay, or of a higher stamp.  
For answer, I will but demand in general, which his Lordship judgeth to be most Excellent, the End, or the Mean●? That which is willed, not for its own sake, but for somewhat else, seems to be of less worth than That for whose sake it is desired: And yet the Mean●, being the Ends Efficient, how can it be Inferior? I say therefore that A●●us primus is the Efficient of Actus secundus; and This the (partial) End of the other: And leave it to his Lordship's consideration, Whether he will esteem thee more Noble.  
He tells us soon after, That if we distinguish between the Act and the Power, the Act must ever be first in Order, Dignity, and Nature.  
But (under his Lordship's favour) I conceive that the Act is first neither in Order, in Dignity, nor in Nature. The Cause is before the Effect, in Excellency, because Causa (aequivoca) est Nobilior Effecto; for nothing can produce an Effect more noble than itself. ² In Nature, Causa est prior Effecto; For that is defined to be Naturâ prius, A qu● non redit essendi consecutio; Now I demand, Whether of these two may be without the Other? The Act, or the Power? And ³ in Order: For he speaks I suppose either of the Order of Production, or the Order of Intention; If he speak of the first; The Order of Production, is Ordo naturae Generantis, and so that which is first in Nature, must be also first in Order: If he speak of the Order of Intention; then the End (if it be the Sole end) may seem to be preferred before the means; But this is a Moral Excellency, and a Moral Order; not a Natural or Physical Excellency, such as we are now speaking of. But I demand withal, Whether Action be the sole End of the Soul? that is, Whether the Soul in its Essence might not be produced either for its Own Excellency or for the Excellency of some Other end beside the Excellency of its Operation or Actus Secundus? And if so, then can it not be concluded That even its Moral Excellency, in genere Finis, is inferior to the Excellency of its Operation.  
But his Lordship admits not at all of this distinction between actus primus and actus secundus; so as that actus primus should be the Being or Substance, and actus secundus the Product. But why? They forget, saith he, that Omnis Virtus consistit in Actione.  
Nay we Forget it not, but we Deny it. For if you speak of Moral Virtue, est virtus tacuisse, etc. but▪ To hold one's peace, is no Action: If he speak of Physical Virtue or Excellency, of natural Perfection; then do I deny, that all Natural Excellency consists in Action; for the Essence itself is Bonum Physicum: But if he speak of Physical Efficiency, than I grant, that Virtus Efficientis, or Efficientis Efficientia, consistit in Actione; The Efficacy, or Efficiency of a Thing consists in its Operation: But what then? May not an Essence Be without Action, because it cannot Act without Action? Must its Essence be Action, because its Efficacy is Action? In ordinary Philosophy, operatio Sequitur esse, Operation Proceeds from the Essence, and not Constitutes it.  
But, saith he; What is this their Actus primus? What is the Form of it? (I have said, It's Own Essence; It is Itself its Own Form, and the Form or Essence of the Soul: We must not inquire for the Essence of an Essence, nor for the Essence of a thing out of Itself:) What is with them, the Form of a Reasonable Soul? Is it not Reason? (Yes it is) And this Reason i● not Potentia Ratiocinandi, But Ratio: (he meaneth, I suppose Ratiocinatio, rather than Ratio; for Ratio and Potentia ratiocinandi are all one:) For if you distinguish between the Act and the Power the Act must ever be first, in Order, Dignity, and Nature: (But this I grant not.) So then, what is the Form of this primus Actus? is it not some Act? (Yes, but not an Action or Operation.) If it be, then must it exist, else you allow it but a bare notional Being; And if it exist, mu●t it not be that which you call actus secundus? I answer, It is Actus, (aliquid actu) but not an Action; It Exists also, and yet is not Actus Secundus, but the Form from whence actus secundus flows.  
He proceeds; If it be not an Act (or action) then is it nothing else but a Power or Faculty depending upon somewhat else (viz upon the Soul;) and if this be the nature of the First, what shall the second Being (which is its Effect, and so Lower) be but a Notion. (Yet he said even now, that the Act is before the Power in Order, Dignity, and Nature▪ and yet the Act is the Powered Effect: How then ●oth he now affirm, that the Effect is somewhat Lower than the First Being?) I answer, It is not an Action; neither yet is it a Distinct (dependent) Faculty, (if we make the Soul and the Faculty to be the same;) but the Souls Essence. But yet though we should admit Reason to be a distinct Faculty, (as s●me do) and so, not to be the Souls actus primus, but actus afficiens: Yet doth, it not follow that the Operation must be only a Notion. Heaviness is not the Stones Essence, but an Accidental Form, a Power or Faculty of Gravitation; yet is not its Descension only Imaginary but Real. Heat in water is not its Essence, but a separable Accident; yet its Calefaction, it Heating or Scalding, is not merely notional, but Real. So might it be here: there may be (notwithstanding this Argument) a Faculty or Accidental Form in the Soul, which may be an Actus Primus in respect of its Operations, (though, no● actus primoprimu● which is the Souls ●ssence,) from whence those Operations, or Actus Secundi may proceed, which ye● might be Real, and not Imaginary.  
●● he had (as he speaks) set that distinction of Substance and Accident▪ (which he seems to challenge as an aged Imposture) upon the Rack; I would willingly▪ have examined its forced confession.  
●● the mean time, I see not from what ground ●e can strongly conclude, That this Activity (as he speaks,) this Actus primus, consists in Action; or That It and actus secundus are the s●me; and both One with Truth.  
You will ask me, What distinction therefore will I allow between actus primus and secundus; between the Agent and its Action? I answer, The One is Res, the Other is Modus; and so the distinction is Modall: Neither more nor less distinction will I admit of. And so doing, I descent not from the Opinion of others: For (as I remember) Suarez (not to instance in others) makes Action to be a Modus; And though he make a Transient Action to be Modus Patientis, (in which I assent not to him;) yet an Immanent Act (such as are Rational Operations) is with Him, Modus Agentis.   

CHAP. XI. Whether Time and Place be only Imaginary.  
IN the next Chapter, we are called to consider of the nature of Time and Place: which his Lordship occasionally falls upon, by reason of an Objection, That lays so strong a siege to his Opinion, that I doubt hi● Lordship's Answer will hardly raise it. It ariseth from hence;  
There a●e in the Soul various Operations and Workings, distinct in Time, and distinct in Place: which Distinction, though it may have an external denomination in respect of Time and Place; yet ariseth not from thence, but is Internal or Intrinsecall to the Operations themselves; This Operation is not the Other, and the Other is not This. And thi● distinction would remain though the distinct Operations were performed in the same Time, in the same Place: Cas●r and Pompey were not the same man, though Contemporary. The Water which to day runs down a River, is not the same water with that which yesterday ran in the same Place, the same Channel. Two Angels, though coexistent at th● s●me Time in the same Place▪ the same part of the Air, are not yet the same Angel. Thus Nutrition, and Volition, or Intellection, though at the same Time, performed by the same Soul resident i● the same Body, are yet distinct Acts. And on the contrary, a man remains the same man to Day, that he was Yesterday; at This place, that he was ●t Another place; though both Time and Place be altered.  
Now there being in the Soul various Actings, distinct both in Time and Place (though they receive not their distinction from either are there not then so many several Souls▪ (viz. if the Operations be the Souls Essence?) This is the Objection.  
His Lordship supposing all the Difference between these Acts to arise from Time and Place, thinks that if he prove Time and Place to be Nothing, than these Acts will not be Distinct, but the same,; and so may constitute the same Soul.  
But, whether Place and Time be any thing or nothing, whether they alter any thing or nothing in this point; Yet sure we are that This Man is not the Other Man. This Soul not Another Soul, This Action is not the Other Action: And so the difficulty remains as hard; there will be various Operations still.  
He brings several Similes to illustrate it. Complexion Lineaments, Harmony, though they be in themselves Divers, yet they make up One pleasing Being, which we call Beauty. A Flame arising from divers Thorns is but One Flame. A Stream supplied from several Springs, is but One Stream. I may add, Many Members make up One Body; Many Creatures One World. (Yet still One Member is not the Other; The water received from One Spring, is not the same water which came from the Other Spring, though both run in the same Channel.)  
But will he say, So is it in our case? That (in the same manner) several Acts do constitute One Soul? Are these Actions its integral Parts, as the Members are of the Body; and several Waters of One Stream? etc. Are they a Piece of the Whole and make up the totum Compositum? Then is the Soul Divisible; Then doth it lose some part of itself, and becomes maimed at the cessation of every Action.  
But he makes not the Soul perhaps to be constituted of these Actions, as so many integral Parts; But, saith he, The Soul is One Act, distinguished to our Notton by several apparitions.  
If so, than his Similes drawn from integral Parts constituting the whole Compositum, will not hold.  
But (secondly) I deny that all these Operations are but one Action in various Shapes. They are all Actions of the same Soul, but they are not all the same Action. The Soul, If you will may be called, One Soul under Various Shapes; But these Various Shapes cannot be said to be One Shape. Like as Wax fashioned successively in several Moulds, is the same Wax in several Figures; but that these are all the Same Figure, we cannot say. Actions performed by the same Soul, are all Modi of the Same Thing, of the same Soul; but they are not all the same Modus. This is not the Other.  
And this we may hold, whatever become of Time and Place for this Distinction ariseth not from Them. A man is the same Man to day, that he was Yesterday, though the Time be not the same. He is the same Man at York, that he was at London, though the Place be not the same. Time and Place do neither make the Same to be Two, nor Two to be the Same; One to be Two, nor Two to be One: Yet what hinders but that Things and Actions may have an intrinsical Difference one from another.  
These various Being's, therefore, not being Differenced by these Circumstances of Time and Place, (though Different in both,) It is less material for me to inquire What they are? or Whether they be some thing or nothing? Only I desire to know, wherein the strength of that Argument consists, which is by us so often urged against Papists and Lutherans, concerning their Transubstantiation, and Consubstantiation; viz. How Christ's body can be at the Same Time in Several Places? For, that i● might be successively in all these Places at several Times, we deny not: Now, if at Several Times it may be in divers Places; why may it not be so, at the Same Time, if Time and Place be Nothing? Again, Several Places at the same Time may contain several Bodies (v. g Bread, and Christ's Body;) now why may not the Same place con●●ine them, if Place be nothing? Why not Together, as well as Successively, if Time be nothing?  
All actions, saith he are Nothing if Time be Anything; Because the Time allotted for every Action, be it never so short, may be divided into several parts, many subdivisions of Time. True. But is there not t●e same Reason of Actions that is of Time? are not they divisible into as many parts, whereof every parcel answers to a portion of that Time? There is the same reason in every Continuum, be it Magnitude, Distance Time, Place, Duration, Motion, Action, or whatever: They are all equally divisible in semper divisibilia. If it be Actio Instantanea, it is dispatched in an Instant, not in Time: If it be Actus Continuus, it is capable of as many divisions as is that Time in which it is performed.  
This not being well weighed saith he, hath raised that Question, [How God should see All things?] If in their Existences▪ then they are coeternal with him: If only in their Causes, then are they not Present. Which difficulty, he supposeth, is dissolved, by making Time to be Nothing, and All things to be exi●●ent, in their Being's, with God from all Eternity. (Which of how dangerous a consequence it may prove his Lordship is not aware.)  
That God before the world's Creation, did co-exist to this Instant; I do confidently affirm; Y●t, that all things present, d●d exist before they were produced, I cannot assent; which I doubt not but to reconcile, (if I were now discussing that question ex professo, and not glancing at it in transitu) allowing notwithstanding to Time and Place, their due reality; not making Temporal and Local difference to be only Imaginary.  
As likewise, How Permanency in God may consist with Succession in the Creature; and How Acts (of Creation, Preservation, Redemption, Decree, the Execution of that Decree) may be Eternal, as they proceed from God, though in the Creature recipiantur in Tempore▪ In Place we make no scruple of it, to affirm that anima est tota in toto & t●ta in qualibet parte, that the Whole Soul may be present to one Point, or part of the Body, without ceasing to be Wholly present to another part; (Or, if possibly in the Soul, and Created Spiritual substances, it may be questioned; yet doubtless, in God himself, it must needs be granted, that he is Vbique Totus:) Now, if it be not repugnant to be coexistent to one Point of Place, without ceasing to coexist to another point though Distant; Why not to one Point of Time, without ceasing to be present to another, though Successive?  
The next Objection, Concerning the nature of Evil, is of less force against his Tenet. For, That Good and Evil may coexist in One entire Act; That there may be some Degrees of Goodness in an Action, and yet not that Perfection of Goodness, that aught to be; may as well be granted, as That the Twilight hath not [So much] Light, and [So much] positive darkness, but that it hath not so [Much] Light as the Midday. But yet in the mean time it may be doubted, whether the Nature of Evil be merely Privative. It is true indeed, The nature of (Moral) Evil is a Nonconformity (or Difformity rather) to God's Law: But why may not this nonconformity arise ex praesentiâ non debiti, as well as ex absentiâ debiti, or ex defectu debiti inesse? May not a Line disagree from its measure, by being too Long, as well as by being too Short? The not distinguishing between bonum Metaphysicum, and bonum Morale, may perhaps have caused some error in this assertion. But I stand not now to decide it: You shall find more of it in the next chapter.  
But that which is assumed as a ground of this Assertion, is far more improbable than the Assertion itself. viz. That Contradictions may be simul, semel, & eodem respectu, in the same Subject.  
What necessity his Lordship had to embrace this opinion of Anaxagoras, Democritus &c. (as he saith,) against Aristotle; I do not discern. Neither can I see, wherein this coexistence of Contradictions doth appear. For the Presence of an Inferior Degree, and the Negation of a Farther Degree, are no Contradictions, because they are not ad idem. And such a Coexistence Aristotle and his followers will not deny; Else how can they speak of Qualitates Remissae? Nay more, They will grant an Inferior Degree, to consist, not only with the Negation of a Farther Degree, but even with the Presence of its Contrary; For they deny not but that there may be Contrary qualities in the same Subject in Remissis gradibus, (as Heat and Cold in warm water, though not in gradibus Intensis.  
But if Anaxagoras, or any other, will contend, That perfect Contradictions may ●t and together, That the Presence of an inferior degree, may stand with the Absence or Negation of the Same degree; It will be in vain to dispute against it. For when I have proved it to be False, they will grant it is so, and affirm withal, That notwithstanding its Falsehood, yet may it also be True, because Contradictions are not Inconsistent. (Another adversary perhaps would deal more sharply with his Lordship upon this point: I pass it.)  
He proceeds to show by divers similitudes, How the same thing may take divers shapes in our Apprehension; And consequently, that the several Apparitions of Truth do not forthwith evince the Variety of Truth. All which we deny not, For otherwise we cannot acknowledge that there is any distinctio Rationis; Rational distinctions being no other but inadaequati conceptus ejusdem rei. That there is therefore a Rational Distinction, we deny not; But that there is Only a Rational Distinction, and not also a Real distinction; this is that we deny. Some things we acknowledge to be only Ratione distincta, but Other things we contend to have a Real distinction. Which must be overthrown before he can conclude, that all the actions of reason which seem several, are but on●, a fixed entire Unity.  
He toucheth lastly, upon Copernicus his Opinion, Which, he saith, hath been confuted these many years by the three leading Senses. (And yet his margin saith, that sense is confuted by Him.) For we [See] the circumvolutions of the Heavens: we [Feel] ourselves upon a stable Foundation; We [Hear] not from the Volutations of the Earth such a black Cant as her heavy rollings would rumble forth.  
But (not to dispute the truth of Copernicus his Opinion) I think I may affirm that Neither of these Testimonies of Sense do any way contradict his Assertion. For, first, I deny that we [See] the Revolution of the Heavens. We discern indeed, (and that Truly,) that the Stars at several times have several Positions in respect of our Horizon; (and this is all:) But whether this diversity of Position arise from the Motion of the One, or the Other, or Both, our Sight determins not; Affirming only That there is such a divers Positure. ² Our sense of [Feeling] assures us of thus much, That the Earth is such a Foundation as upon which we rest; and, that we remain in the same Positure in respect of the Earth and the Air circumstant; Which may be as well if all jointly Move together, as if all jointly stand still. A man in a Ship under Hatches upon a smooth water, supposeth himself to sit fast upon his Seat, (and he doth so;) and he seeth all things about him to remain at the same Distance, in the same Positure, discerning no alteration: Yet this hinders not but that He and They may be jointly moved Together, without being thrown from off his seat, upon which he may sit as firm as if he were on shore. And ³ for the sense of [Hearing,] I see no reason, why it should be more blamed for not hearing the sound of the Earth's Volutation; then for not hearing the Pythagorean Harmony. If the vast Celestial Spheres, whose almost every Star doth far exceed the Terrestrial Globe, be whirled about with such a silent motion, as that the quickest Ear cannot discern it; Why may not the Earth, a farrelesser body, pass as quietly, without such a dismal Cant, such an hideous Noise, as his Lordship doth suppose? For Noise doth not arise merely from Motion; but from the Crossing or Thwarting of several motions, from the Clashing and Collision of one Body against another, by reason that the One (standing) interrupts the Other in its Motion, or Both moving according to several motions do mutually hinder each others progress: Whereas, if all moved the same Way, with the same Speed, (as is supposed in the Motion of the Earth, and the things adjoining) there would be no such Clashing, or Interruption of one another, and (consequently) no Noise.  
The Senses Testimony therefore doth not contradict the Opinion of Copernicus, The Eye tells us, that the Stars and We are at several times in several Positures, but, whether it proceed from Their motion or from Ours, it affirmeth not. Our Feeling informs us, that we are not tossed from Place to Place, that is, from one part of the Earth's Superficies to another, but remain upon the same part of its Surface: But whether we jointly move together, or jointly rest immovable, it determins not. The Ear can tell us, That it hears no Noise, (for how can it since there is none?) But it doth not say, There is no Motion. These Witnesses therefore can testify nothing in this cause; Except we should suborn them, and put that into their Mouths, which is not within their Knowledge, Or falsify the Records, by supposing them to say That, which they say not.   

CHAP. XII. Concerning Falsehood in the Souls operations. Whether it cease to Be, when it c●aseth to Act Truth.  
IN the twelfth Chapter, he comes to another Objection If Actings of Truth, be Truth, (that is, if Rational Operations be the Soul, the Souls Essence) than when the Soul Acteth not Truth, it ceaseth to Be: and so when it entertaineth or pronounceth a False Position, the Soul is no more itself.  
This Objection I conceive to have two branches; For the Soul may cease to act Truth, either by Not acting at all, or by acting Falsely. For whether it act Not, or act Falsely, it ceaseth to act Truth; and therefore (if acting of Truth be its Essence) it ceaseth to Bee.  
His first Answer may be equally applied to both; That, granting the Soul when it acts upon Falsehood, to be as when it acteth not, and so is not; Yet shall we advance nothing, till we prove the Succession of Moment's to be Real and not Imaginary. Where he presupposeth, that when it Acteth not, than it Is not; and, though the same be granted in a False acting, yet neither That, nor This, will prove of any force, since Succession of Moment's is only Imaginary.  
The ground of this Reply, I conceive to be this; If there be not any Real Succession, If there be no prius and posterius Indeed, but be only supposed so to be by our Imagination; Then any One Act of the Soul, is able to give it a coexistence to all Eternity: (according to what he affirmed in the former Chapter.) For of this One Act, being Real, it cannot be affirmed, That it Was but Is not, or it Is but hath notbeen; but if it at all Be, it must Be always; Because, if Succession be only Imaginary, then to Be and to Have been is all one; then there was not a time when it Was not, neither will there be a time when it Shall Not be.  
But if the Issue of the Question depend upon this, Whether Succession be Real, or Imaginary; I doubt not but this might be soon decided.  
Therefore First, I ask, Whether there be not the same reason for Succession in Time, that is for Extension in Place? Whether there may be Pars extra Partem, Punctum extra Punctum, though not Momentum extra Momentum; or there be the same reason of Both, and Both be Imaginary? If there be in Both the same reason, (which I suppose he he will affirm;) Then must every Being have a Coexistence to all Places, as well as a Coexistence to all Times; It must have an ubiquity as well as a Perpetuity. Then is it in vain to dispute Whether Christ's Body be Really present in the Sacrament, Whether Peter were ever at Rome, etc. If every Body, every Thing▪ be every where. For if difference of Place be nothing, then that which hath a real existence in any place, hath a real existence in all places; because This place and all other places have only an Imaginary Difference, and are indeed all one.  
Secondly, If one action give the Soul a Coexistence to all eternity, than what doth the Second and Subsequent Acts produce? do they give it a new Being, a new Eternity?  
Answ. You will say (I suppose) that there is not a Second Act, an Other Act, but all Acts are One Act: And this One act, which appears to our imagination to be First and Second, etc. gives the Soul One Essence, One Eternity.  
Repl. If so, than what is the difference between an Act of Sinning, and a Course of Sinning? What is the difference between the Once committing of a sinful Act, and the Oft Reiterating of it? Between David's One Act of Adultery, and the lascivious persons Constant Practice? Why are we exhorted to Cease from evil; if every Act be Eternal, and whatsoever succeeds can be but the Same? He that stole, let him steal no more: To what end serves this counsel, if there be no other Act feazible, but what Is already, and That to remain for ever?  
Answ. 2. If you would say, That the same Act is again Reiterated▪ Rep. I ask, if the Iteration be somewhat more than the first Commission? If not, then to commit it Once, and to Iterate it often, is all One: If it be somewhat more, then is it either a Real addition, or Imaginary: If Imaginary, then are we where we were before; If it be Real, then why may there not be a real act distinct from the former, as well as a real Commission (of the Same act) distinct from the former? Thus you see if Time be Nothing, If Succession be only Imaginary; then is it all one to commit Many sins, and to commit One Sinne.  
Thirdly, if Succession and Difference of Moment's be only Imaginary, if all Duration be Eternal, all Simultaneous; Then what is the difference between the long life of the Aged, and the few days of him that dy●th in his Youth? For the Real Existence of One as well as the Other is equally Eternal; Since the Length and the Shortness of Time is but Imaginary, all Duration being indeed Simultaneous. Thus the youngest Child (if he do but Think so) hath lived as long as the most Aged.  
Again, 4. If Succession and Difference of Time be only imaginary; Then why do I not N●w know, that which I shall know To morrow? What hinders but that every man should be praescius futuri? I shall Know it to Morrow, because I shall See it; but why should I not Now both Know it and See it as well as to Morrow, since it is Now as really present as it will be Then? Why do we dispute concerning matters of Fact; as whether Peter were at Rome, and the like? Can we not see whether he be there or not? For if he were there, than he Is there: since Then and Now are all one: And if he Be there, why do not I see him there? For I am as really there as he is: For if I be any where, then am I There, since There and Here are all one; Time and Place making only an Imaginary (and not Real) difference.  
Ans. If you say, Things that seem to be Future, are even Now as really Present as they shall be Hereafter, but they appear not to be present, and therefore are not now Known and Seen, (like Colours in the dark;) But when they shall receive a new Luster, they shall both Appear to be, and be Seen to be.  
Rep. I reply, If they shall appear, than they Do appear; because Then and Now are all one. Again, If there be Apparet and Apparuit, why not Est and Erit? If there be a prius and posterius in Appearing why not in Being? Or ³ I ask, whether Appearing and not-Appearing be a Real or only Imaginary difference? If a Real difference, then will there be somewhat Real Then, which is not Now; and consequently all Reality will not be Simultaneous, there will be somewhat Real afterwards which before was not: If Appearing, be only Imaginary; what shall I have to help my knowledge Then, which I have not Now?  
Ans. 2. If you say, Things Future are both now Present, & we Know them so to be, but do not Seem to know them, or Seem, not to Know them:  
Repl. Then I reply as before, If we Shall Seem to know them, we Do Seem to know them; because Then and Now are all one.  
So that if Succession of Time be only Imaginary; Then do we already know, whatsoever we shall know, (whereas Christ himself Increased in wisdom, Luk. 2.) And the Foreknowledge of things to come, would not be such a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as might distinguish between the True and False Gods.  
And thus (if I mistake not) I have sufficiently showed (though much more might have been added) that there is a Real Succession, a Real Priority of Duration, and not only Imaginary. And therefore (notwithstanding his first answer) the Soul must really cease to Be, when it ceaseth to Work, or to work Truth; if these Workings of truth be the Souls Essence: And the soul must be (during that Cessation, or Error) as truly Non Ens, as before its first Production; for the precedent and subsequent workings cannot (Then) give it an Existence, as not (Then) being.  
His second answer, to the Objection propounded in the beginning of this Chapter, toucheth not at all the first Branch of it, wherein it is objected, That if particular Actings of Truth, be Truth, or the Souls Essence, How is it that the Understanding should not cease to Be, when it ceaseth to Work; (for this in his first Answer he seemed to grant:) But it is applied to the second Branch of it, viz. That If particular Actings of Truth be Truth, or the Souls Essence, than the Soul entertaining a False position should be no more itself. To which he answers, By denying that the Soul doth at all act upon Falsehood: and that upon this ground, Because Falsehood is not a Real Being upon which the Soul can work. For its nature being Privative, and no Real Being, how can the Soul or Truth work upon Nothing?  
I might answer here, That it is not requisite to the Souls Act, that its Object should have a Real being: (As appears by the Souls apprehending Ens rationis; which Apprehension is a positive Act, and yet hath no Real Object.) For the Object of Intellection, is not Real, but Cognoscibile. And therefore, That Falsehood wanteth a real being, is not enough to show, that the Understanding cannot work upon it.  
And this (in effect) he granteth soon after. For, it being Objected, that the Soul while it pronounceth a False position, doth Really act, (verè agere; He replies, That there are in this Action two things, a Thinking, and a So-thinking. To think is a positive Action, a good Action, But the formalis ratio of So-thinking lieth in Thinking an Error, which is Nothing; and so a Not-thinking. When (mistaking) a man catcheth at a shadow; In catching he doth truly Act; But to Catch a Shadow, is to catch nothing; Now to catch nothing, and not to catch; to act nothing, and not to act, is all one. So to Think is Real, but to Think Amiss is Nothing, and all one with Not-thinking.  
He grants therefore, that the Soul pronouncing or Understanding a False position, or thinking Amiss, doth really Think, really Act: Now I ask, while it doth really Think, What doth it think? What doth it Act? (or Upon what rather?) Certainly it must either be Falsehood▪ or Nothing: (For what else it should be, neither doth his Lordship show, nor can I imagine) If it Act upon Falshood▪ the false position; then may Falshood be the Object of a Real act; If it act upon Nothing, than what hinders, but that Falsehood▪ although it be Nothing, may yet be the Object of this Act?  
Object. But he will say, If the Soul do act upon Falsehood, then must it become Falsehood, that is, a Vanity, a lie, a Nothing: For I conceive (●aith he) the Agent itself, together with the Subject acted upon (the Object) to be One in the Act.  
Ans●. But this supposition must I deny; For if so, Then when the Soul acteth upon God (by Knowing, Loving, &c) then doth it become God: And if so, why doth his Lordship (at the end of his Preamble) blame those for mounting too high, who, confounding the Creator with the Creature, make her to be God?  
But for the better clearing of this whole discourse, concerning Falsehood and Error in the Souls working; I shall desire you to take notice of a Distinction, which all Know, and yet but few Think of, when they have occasion to use it. The non attendency whereof, hath produced much Obscurity, much Error, and inextricable perplexities concerning this and the like Subjects. It is, to distinguish between Verum Metaphysicum▪ and Verum Logicum; between Bonum Metaphysicum, and Bonum Morale: To distinguish, I say, Metaphysical Truth and Goodness, from Moral and Logical Goodness and Truth: To distinguish the Truth of Being from the Truth of a Proposition; the Goodness of Being, from the Goodness of an Action.  
Now this being premised, let us examine the truth of some Tenants which are almost generally received by all.  
1 The nature of Evil, say they, is Privative, not Positive; Evil is Nothing. And why? Because Ens & Bonum convertuntur, and therefore Malum must needs be Nonens; now Nonens is Nothing.  
Be it so; Evil is Nothing. But what Evil do they mean? Evil in Metaphysics▪ or Evil in Ethics? Goodness, in Metaphysics, is no other th●n Entity, (for none ever acknowledged a greater distinction between Ens & Bonum then a distinction of Reason,) and therefore Malum (in Metaphysics) must be Non Ens. But will they say that Moral Evil is so too? If they do, then must they say also, that bonum Morale is convertible with Ens; (otherwise their Argument will not hold:) that All Being is Honesty, or Moral Goodness; and all Moral Goodness is Being or Entity. I ask therefore, whether moral Goodness, or Honesty, ●e the Essence, the Entity of a Stone? If not, then is not every Being, Bonum Morale▪ I ask again, Whether Silence be not Morally Good, at such a time as when a man ought to hold his peace? Yet to ● Silent, or not to speak, hath no Metaphysical goodness, no goodness of Being, for it is a mee● Negation. There may be therefore Moral goodness, where there is no Metaphysical goodness, no positive Being; and there may be Metaphysical goodness, goodness of Being, without Moral goodness or Goodness of Honesty. Now if Malum Metaphysicum, a Negation, a Nonens, may be Bonum Morale, what shall be the Malum Morale opposite to this Bonum? shall that be also a Non-En●● If it be, then how can it be contrary to the other? Since that Nothing cannot be opposite to Nothing, but Something to Something, or Something to Nothing.  
I say therefore, that Metaphysical Evil, is merely Privative, as being opposite to the Goodness of Being; and it is no other but Nonentity▪ But Moral Evil is every way as Positive as is Moral Good.  
For what is the nature of Moral Good, or Evil? is it not, a Conformity, or a Difformity to a Moral Precept? Then the Goodness or Evil of it is not in the Being of the Action, but in the so Being; It lies not in the Positive or Absolute Entity of the Action, but in the Relative nature. Moral Goodness therefore, and Moral Evil, have not an Absolute Essence, but a Relative; An Agreeing, or Disagreeing; a Likeness, or Unlikeness, to its Rule. Now if Likeness be a Real Relation; why may not Unlikeness be also a relation Real? If Simile be Real, why not Dissimile? If the One be Positive, why not the Other?  
Object. They will say perhaps, That the nature of Moral Evil, is not a Difformity but a nonconformity, to its Rule; not to be (positively) Unlike, but only Not to be Like.  
Answ. If so, than not to be is a Sin; for not to Be, includes not to be Like, or not to be Obedient. If the blessed Angels had never been Created, they had been eo ipso Sinful: For if they had never Been, they must of necessity Not be Obedient; (though not Disobedient;) For how can they be Obedient, if not at all Being?  
A Stone must then be Sinful, when it doth not-understand the Nature of God, as a man doth and aught to do; For though it be not Disobedient to the precept of Knowledge, (because this precept was not made to a Stone but to Man,) Yet you cannot say that it is Obedient, and therefore must of necessity be not-Ob●dient, or notbe Obedient; wherefore if a bare not-obedience, or a not conformity to the command be a Sin, then doth a Stone Sinne. Scire Deum is morally Good, and therefore (if moral Evil be only an Absence of Good) since there is not in a Stone this Scire Deum, how can it be but that a Stone must sin?  
God commanded Moses to go down into Egypt, etc. and Aaron to offer Sacrifice: Do I Sin therefore when I do not-obey this command made to them? How is it possible that I can obey the command for Moses his Journey, or Aaron's sacrificing; for My going is not Moses his going, nor is my sacrificing, Aaron's Sacrificing; Yet do I not sin in not-obeying.  
When Moses made the Brazen Serpent, he did not (in that) obey the precept of going into Egypt, (for to go into Egypt, and to make the Serpent, is not the same,) Yet was it not Sinful to make the Brazen Serpent, though it werenot an Obedience to that Command, for neither was it a Disobedience; for that Precept, did neither enjoin nor forbid it.  
Thus every Action, though never so Good, will be a Sin; For there is in the most perfect Act, a not-Obeying of many precepts, (yea of all precepts, except that which enjoins this Action,) though there be not perhaps a Disobedience of any.  
The nature of Sin therefore, or Moral Evil, is not barely a Not-Obeying▪ but a Disobeying; It is not a Not-Conformity, but a Difformity, a Crossing or Thwarting of some Command. Therefore the Stone sins not, because there is no Disobedience in its notknowing, because it was not Commanded; Moses his making the brazen Serpent, was not a Breach of his former Injunction, although not an Obeying of it; for in his Commission to go into Egypt, his making the brazen Serpent was neither Forbidden nor Commanded. The Act of one Moral Virtue, is not an offence against the rest; for it is no Breach of their Rules, though it be not an Observance of them: It is Praeter, but not Contra.  
Ans. 2. But if I should say on the contrary, That the nature of Moral Good, were not a Conformity, or positive Likeness; but only a not-Difformity, a not-Disagreeing, or not crossing its Rule; Might not this be said with as good probability as the other? You would think it strange perhaps, that Evil should be Positive, and Good Negative: But (if I mistake not) there is more truth in this, then is in the other. For a bare not-agreeing doth not make an action Sinful, but a not-disagreeing d●th make it Lawful, and so Morally Good; For where there is no Law, there is no Sinne. If I walk for my refreshing in one part of the Garden to day, and in another to morrow; or in that other to day, & in this to morrow; I sin not in either: Not because I have a Command to walk in this first, or in the other part first: But because neither is Forbidden, therefore is neither Unlawful. I ask therefore, whether the lawfulness of this Action, in walking first in this part of the garden and not in the other part, do depend upon its Conformity to some Rule, or its not-disagreeing from any? Now, what is the lawfulness of an Action, but its Moral Goodness?  
Ans. 3 Yet Thirdly, I affirm not the nature of moral Good or Evil to be Negative, but both equally Positive; If by Good, you understand, That which Ought to be, not, That which May be. And therefore I make three sorts of Moral Being's; Bonum, Malum, Indifferens▪ Good, which must be done; Indifferent, which may be done; Evil, which may-not be done. The first, Commanded; the last, Forbidden; the other, of a middle nature, neither Commanded, nor Forbidden; which being Indifferent, is often called Good, but never Evil. The first consists, in a Conformity to its Rule; the last, in a Difformity; the other in a bare not-disagreeing. The first and last are of a Positive nature; the other of a Negative. (And yet sometimes this positiveness, whether in Good or Evil, is rather Positivum Logicum (the Praedicat of a Positive or Affirmative Proposition,) then Positivum Real. For an Omission, Negatio acts, may be Good or Evil: which having in itself no real Being, cannot be the Subject of a real Relation.)  
Yet doth not this contradict their Opinion who affirm, That non datur actio Indifferens in individuo. For by Good and Evil, they mean Licitum & Illicitum, Lawful and Unlawful; including under the name of Good, or Lawful, not only that which Ought to be done, but whatsoever May be done; as when (in civil matters) we say, it is Lawful for me to give such a portion of my Estate to such a Man, not because the Law of the Kingdom Injoins me so to do; but because it doth not Inhibit me. And thus Licitum will be a Negative term, and Illicitum a Positive, (though by the Grammatical Notation it might seem contrary;) for Illicitum affirms, that there is a Law to the Contrary; Licitum denies only that there is such a Law to Forbid it, but whether there be any to Command it, it affirms not.  
And thus much concerning the nature of Evil. (Wherein if I may seem prolix, it being but a Digression in this place: Yet because I was called to it in the former chapter, where his Lordship gave me occasion to handle it; I thought it more fit to refer the discussing of it to this place, where I meet with more questions of the like nature.)  
2. Now, as it is in Good and Evil, so also in Truth and Falsehood. Falshood, saith he, is a Vanity, a Lie, a Nothing And why so? Because Ens & Verum convertuntur, and therefore Falsum must be nonens.  
To this I say, as to the former; Truth of Being, or Metaphysical Truth, is Positive, and of the same extent or latitude with Entity, or Being. And this Truth I have formerly said to be Cognoscibility, making Verum in this Metaphysical acceptation to be all one with Intelligibile.  
I affirm also, that Ens & Verum (or Intelligibile) convertuntur. And (consequently) according to the manner of Being, must be the manner of Intellection. That which hath a real Being (as Ens Real) may be Known to Be; that which hath an apparent, or supposed Being, may be Supposed to Be.  
I affirm likewise, that Falsehood in this sense cannot be understood, or that the Soul cannot act upon (Metaphysical) Falsehood: For how can that be Known, which is not Cognoscible; or Understood, which is not Intelligible?  
But, When I affirm, that Verum and Ens are Convertible; I restrain it not to Real Entity; For there may be Esse Cognitum, where there is not Esse Real: But I proportion its Cognoscibility to its Being; and therefore if it have not a Real Being, but only Imaginary; it may be Supposed, but cannot be Known, to be.  
Neither yet do I So proportion the reality of Intellection, to the reality of the Object, as if when there is no Real Object, there could be no Real Act: For it is Cognoscibile that is convertible with Ens, and hath its reality proportionable to the reality of Being; not Cognos●itivum. The Understanding, whether it Know to be, or Suppose to be, doth yet Really Act; And his Lordship also granteth, that when the Understanding doth act Amiss, it doth yet Really Act; The Opining, or Thinking, (saith he) is a good Act. But where the Object is not Real, there the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Cognosc●, cannot be Real; for how can a real Relation be founded in a Nonentity? Yet the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Cognoscere is Real; for the Reality of ●t, depends not upon the reality of the Object, but upon the reality of the Act. That therefore which is so understood, is the Supposed Object of a Real Act.  
But now Logical Truth, the Truth of a Proposition, which is opposed to Falsehood, ●o Error, hath nothing to do with the Reality either of the Object or of the Act; For a True Proposition may be framed concerning an Imaginary Object (as when we affirm a Chimaera to be Ens Rationis, or only Imaginary▪) And an Act Metaphysically True (a Real act) may be Logically False.  
Logical Truth and Falsehood (like as Moral Good and Evil) have not an Absolute Being, but Relative. They consist not in the Being or Not-Being of the Act; (For when the Understanding doth act Falsely it doth verè Agere, though not agere Verè; it is verè Actus, though not Verus Actus:) but in the Agreeing, or Disagreeing with the Object. For when the Intellect doth Understand, it frames an Idea, a picture, or representation of the Thing understood▪ which Picture, or Idea, is a Real Picture, (it hath the Truth of Being) whether it have the Truth of Representation or not; that is, whether it be Like or Unlike, whether it Agree or Disagree, with the copy or object which it represents. A Picture in a Painter's Shop is truly a Picture, it hath real Colours and Lineaments; But perhaps it is a False Picture, it represents not that Visage by which it was drawn. When the Understanding conceives an Ens rationis, the Idea or Conceptus is not this Imaginary Being, (for this Conception is as Real as the Conception of a Real Ens,) But the supposed Object of this Conception; there being indeed no such thing as this Conceptus doth represent. When a Painter describes in a Table some Antic Shapes or strange Chimaeras; his Description, his Draught, is not a Fiction, but as Real as the true Pourtraicture of a living Man: But that which by this description is represented, that is the Fiction, there being no such Antic Forms, no such Chimaeras, as he expresseth. When the Understanding draws a Real Picture, a real Idea or Conceptus, without a Copy, without a Pattern; it is Ens rationis: When, endeavouring to imitate a Copy, to represent the nature of things, the Truth of Being; it yet misseth of it, not making its Picture agreeable to its Pattern; this is a False Apprehension. And this is the difference between Ens rationis, and Error Intellectûs: Both in the mean time being real Acts.  
The Logical Truth and Falsehood of a Conception or Proposition, are but Relations of Likeness or Unlikeness, Conformity or Difformity, in the Act to its Object; and are both founded in the Reality of the Action, or its Truth of Being: And are both equally Real, equally Positive▪ For Falsehood is not a mere not-Conformity, or not-expressing of things existent; But a Difformity, a Crossing or Thwarting of them. For else, when a man ceaseth to Think or Speak of this or that Truth, he there by Errs, and Lies: For when he Thinks not at all, he cannot think Conformably; when he Speaks not at all, he cannot speak Conformally, either to the Existence of Things, or to his own Opinion of them. Yea every Proposition, every Thought will have so many Falsehoods in it, as there be other Truths which it doth not express: For if the not-expressing of a Truth, be Falsehood: then to affirm that the Sun shines, is a Falsehood, because it doth not express the Fires hea●, or the Charcoals burning: And thus that proposition which expresseth not every Truth, is a False Proposition; yea contains Infinite Falsehoods, opposite to the Infinite number of True Propositions possible.  
Object. If you say (to avoid this) that it is not the not-expressing of One Truth, the not-conformity to One Existence, that makes a Proposition False; but the not-expressing of Any Truth: whereas the Conformity to, and the Expressing of any Truth, makes the Proposition or Conception True:  
Ans. I answer first, that this is contrary to the general Proposition, which affirms, that Perfectio oritur ex Integris, Imperfectio verò ex Particulari defectu: Which is applied to several kinds of Imperfection; That Action is Good, whose every Circumstance is rightly ordered; That Proposition True▪ whose every Branch doth agree with the Thing, etc. Whereas One Bad circumstance, One false branch makes the Action bad, the Proposition False. The contrary to which must have been affirmed, if the expressing of One Truth, make the Proposition True; and the concurrent not-expressing, or not-Conformity to All Truths be requisite to make it False.  
2. Again, If there be requisite a not-expressing of Any Truth to make it False; then must this (and the like propositions) be True, if I affirm Virgil & Homer to be Greek Poets, If I affirm a Stone to be a Reasonable Creature: For it expresseth One Truth, viz▪ that it is a Creature although it be not Reasonable, (as likewise the One was a Greek Poet, though not the other:) and the not-expressing of a further Truth, doth not hinder its expressing of This. Then must that Action be Good whose One Circumstance is Good; If the Intention be right, though the Formality of the Action be never so unlawful, yet will not the Act be Blamable.  
Logical Falsehood therefore is as positive, as Logical Truth; the one consisting in a positive Conformity, the other in a positive Difformity to the Things. Yea, of the two, the nature of Truth is rather Negative, then the nature of Falsehood; For a not-conformity makes not a Proposition False; but the not-difformity makes it True. For that is a True proposition that is not Opposite to Any Truth▪ though it do not Express All Truths.  
Neither can there be a Medium between Truth and Falsehood, as there is between Good and Evil; For though there may be an Indifferent Action, which is neither Good (positively) nor Evil; yet is there not an Indifferent Proposition which is neither True nor False. Truth and Falsehood in Propositions, are opposed as Lawfulness and Unlawfulness in Actions, (whereof Lawfulness, as I have said, is Negative;) rather then as Good and Evil, Laudabile & Vituperabile.  
Yet if we desire a Medium, I can show you one; But than it must not be Actus, but Negatio Actûs. And that is, in Abstraction; when the Understanding conceives of one Thing, without considering of another▪ for than it doth neither Affirm, nor Deny, and so that Conception is (thus far) neither True nor False; as likewise the Proposition expressing this Thought. When I conceive of the Air, not regarding whether it be Light or Dark; of a Man not considering whether he be Learned or Ignorant: This Abstracting, or considering the Air without considering Light in it; considering Aristotle to have been a Man, not considering withal that he was Learned; is neither True nor False: According to that, Abstrahentis non est Mendacium: whereas if I affirm the Air (in the day time) to be without Light, or Aristotle without Learning; the proposition is False.  
Falshood and Truth therefore being Relations, equally Real, equally Positive▪ the Understanding may be said as well to Act Falshood, as to act Truth, while it produceth that Absolute Act, in which these Relations are founded. Otherwise▪ what will be the difference between Ignorance and Error, between Silence and a Lie?  
3. There is yet another Question, to which by his Lor●. I am invited; The same (saith he) may be said of Pain; which he conceiveth cannot act upon the Soul, nor the Soul upon it; because it is but a bare Privation. And therefore subscribes to the Opinion of Dr. TWISSE, (whom if Anagrams may be credited, you may style WISEST;) that it is better to be in perpetual Pain, than not to be at all; Because if Pain be a bare Privation, then is Any Being more desirable, then for fear of a Privation (a Nothing) to become no Being. His ground you may easily perceive; Because if Misery be but a Privation of Happiness; then is it better to have the Goodness of Being, without the Goodness of Happiness, then to want both the one and the other.  
But I cannot with his Lordship (saving always the deserved respect due to that Reverend Divine) subscribe to the Opinion of Dr. Twisse in this particular. For (beside that thus Paena Damni, and paena Sensus will be all One) I conceive Pain to be as real as Pleasure. Motion hath been accounted by all (if I mistake not) to be Positive, and Rest (quies) to be only Privative, Negatio Motûs. Now in my Opinion, Ease, and Pain or Torment, are opposite in the same manner that Rest and Motion. And so I conceive Pain or Torment (whether you speak of dolour Corporis, or dolour Animi; the Grief of mind, or bodily Pain) to be Real; the Negation whereof is called Ease; and its Contrary, Pleasure or Delight.  
Neither doth it at all trouble me, that Ens & Bonum convertuntur; that all real Entity, hath a real Goodness, or the goodness of Being: For nothing hinders but that Bonum Metaphysicum, may be Malum Physicum▪ that which is Real may notwithstanding be Inconvenient; that which is, in se Bonum, may notbe Bonum huic, whether you speak of bonum Jucundum or bonum Vtile.  
Goodness of Being (Metaphysical goodness) is but a common Subject capable either of (Physical) Good or Evil; (like as the same Real Action may be Morally Good or Evil.) And according as the Physical Good, or Evil (annexed to Being Metaphysically Good) doth exceed, so is that Being Desirable, or not Desirable. Otherwise, How could it be better for that man (which betrayed our Saviour) that he had never been born?  
I urge not the judgement of Sense in this particular; because his Lordship appeals from Sense to Reason: I shall therefore examine what Reason can allege, why credit should not be given to the judgement of Sense. For, shaving a Judgement confessed in the Court of Sense; I must suppose▪ it to be in force, till such time as I see it revoked by Reason: And when Reason hath reversed it, I will grant the former Sentence to be Void.  
Object. You will say Being, though Miserable, hath some Goodness: whereas Not-Being hath none: and therefore Being, though with Misery, is more desirable.  
Ans. I reply, Misery hath much Evil, not-Being hath none: Therefore Misery is more to be Shunned then not to Be.  
But if this satisfy not; I desire to know whether there be not the same strength of Reason in This Argument, that is in Theirs. viz: A Sinful Act hath in it the Goodness of Being; and its sinfulness i● only a Privation of further Goodness, the goodness of Conformity to Gods Law. Therefore, it is better to Sin then not to Act; to commit a Sin than not to commit it: For if I Sin, I produce ●ome Good; because it is a real Action, and so hath the Goodness of Being; But in not-acting, not-committing, I produce no Goodness at all. Therefore it is better to Sin, than not to Sin: because Acting, though Sinful, hath Some good, but Not-acting hath None.  
Now if this Argument do not hold good to prove it Better to Sin (be the Sin as great as can be possible) than not to Act, not to Sin: Then must I needs think that their Argument, being exactly in the same form, is of as little force, to prove Misery (though never so great) to be better than not-Being.  
But let us hear his Lordship plead at Reason's Bar, for the revoking that Sentence which hath passed in the Court of Sense. Reason telleth us (saith he) that Pain must be Something, or Nothing: If Nothing, than it is but a Privation; ●f Something, then must it be Good or Evil; If Good, it cannot hurt us; If Evil, it is either a Nominal Evil, or Real▪ If Named an Evil and is not, it will not be disputed; but if it be a Real Evil, then is it Nothing▪ for Evil is only a Privation of Good.  
I answer to this discourse; That Pain is Something, It is Evil, It is a Real Evil, (Malum Physicum.) And this Real Evil is also Posi●ve, and not a bare Privation of Good: For I conceive not a Stone to be in Pain, though it have not Pleasure, (bonum Jucundum;) nor to be Grieved, though it do not Rejoice.  
There is one great rub that yet remains against what I have said, concerning these three last mentioned Questions; which I have referred to the End, that so once mentioning might suffice, without particular repetition in the discussing of each Question. And it is this.  
If Falsehood and Evil, whether Moral or Physical, have a Being, (if it be Real) then must we with the Manichees make two Sources of Being; or else God must be the Author of it, which none will affirm.  
For answer to this, I intent not ex professo to handle at large that question, Whether, and In what Sense, God may be called the Author of Sin, of Evil, of Falsehood. For, if I durst to encounter that difficulty, which hath troubled able Divines; yet would it be too tedious to insert here, especially when I have already transgressed with over much prolixity. Only thus.  
All Relations, you know, have their Original, not from any peculiar Act whereby they are produced, distinct from that Act by which is produced that in which they are grounded; But arise and flow from that Absolute Being, upon which they depend, per nudam Resulta●tiam, by a Resultation from it, without a new intermediate Act. The Father doth not by One act beget his Son, and by Another act (He, or his Son) produce Filiation: But the terminirelationis being once produced, the Relation doth unavoidably follow: Two white things being produced, it is impossible (etiam per divinam potentiam) but that they must (in this) be Like.  
Now Falsehood and Truth, Good and Evil, being (as I have said) Relations; and consequently having no other Production, but their Resultance from their Foundation; I leave it to others to judge, How far God doth concur with the operation of the Creature in producing that Act, which is Good or Evil, True or False; and How far the Efficient of this Act may be affirmed the Cause of that Relation which doth result from it.   

CHAP. XIII. The Consequents of this Assertion, that All things are one Truth. Whether useful in practicals.  
I Have now done with his Lordship's Thesis laid down in the full extent in the several branches of it. The Chapters ensuing are but a declaration of the Consequents, the Vsefullnesse of this Position. Which, saith he, if we consider, viz. That all things are but one Emanation from divine power; It would make our lives more cheerful, more Christian, both in the Practical and theoretical part.  
That all things are but one Emanation, if he speak of unum per aggregationem, I grant; and so I suppose will all else. God alone hath his Being of Himself, and gives Being to all his Creatures: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And whatsoever Being they have, it is only a communication of that Being which he hath in himself. But that the Parts of this One Aggregatum are not Really distinct from each other; hath not yet been so clearly proved as to convince me.  
His Arguments, if they prove any thing, will prove, That God cannot produce Creatures really distinct. For if it be enough to prove, All things that now are to be really the same, Because the Fountain of them all is God; the thing Communicated, their own Essence; and the Recipient, Themselves; (because the Essence produced, receiveth of God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Esse:) Then is it impossible for God to produce any thing that shall not be the same with these: For whatsoever can be possibly produced, If God be the Author of it, Then must He be the Fountain, and Itself the Recipient, receiving from God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Esse.  
This being premised, I ask, Whether this One Emanation which his Lordship seeks to establish, be Really distinct from God or no? If not, then must not his Lordship blame those that confound the Creator with th● Creature, making It to be God. But if this one Emanation be distinct Really, If this Fountain have sent forth One Stream really distinct from itself, What hinders but that it may send forth More Streams? Hath God (like Isaac) but One Blessing? Or Can he produce more but Will not? If he Can; then is it Possible that Two Emanations, Two Creatures, may be really distinct, though receiving their Essence from the same Fountain. And if Any Creatures may be possibly distinct from other, Why not These Creatures that now are? there being no more to be alleged for their Unity, then for the Unity of all Possible. God's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, his Power also, and the Emanation of it, is So Uniform, as that it is equivalent to an Infinite Variety.  
He proceeds to this purpose. In the Practic part of our Lives (saith he) If we knew that all things were One, with what Chieerfulness, what Courage, should we undertake any Action, any Difficulty; Knowing The distinction of Misery and Happiness, to have no Being but in the Brain; That Misery is Nothing, and cannot hurt us, That every thing is Good, and Good to me, Because I and It are Being's and so Good, And these two Goods falling under no other difference but of Degrees, Good and Good must needs agree, that which is Good is Good to Me: Yea how void of Envy at another's good, and of thoughts of Revenging Injuries; Since I have a Propriety, a Possession of that which is Another's, he and I being One; Injuries are Nothing and cannot hurt; Good things, though another's, do serve me.  
That all things are one; That the difference between Happiness and Misery is only in the Brain; That Misery, That Injuries, are Nothing and▪ cannot hurt; That whatsoever is Good must be Good to Me; and (which is the ground of it) That Good and Good, Ens & Ens, admit of no difference but of Degrees: I have already denied. I will only add, That by this discourse you prove the Devils as happy as the blessed Angels: And if it be a Good Consequent of this Position. That it will make us no● be afraid of Misery and Danger: I am sure it is as Bad a Consequent, That it will make us not afraid of Sinning. The Devils are Being's, and therefore Good; Every thing that is, is Good, and Good to them, For both They and It being Good, and admitting of no difference but of Degrees, Good and Good cannot but agree, and so, be Good to them: The Happiness of the blessed Angels doth serve Them, since (as his Lordship speaks) it is not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, They have a Propriety in it: Their own Misery and Torment is nothing, and cannot hurt them; And (which is the only difference which you can imagine) if they Think otherwise (I use still his Lordship's expression) this must be a Lie, and cannot hurt. And if this be Hell; who will be afraid to Sin?  
My judgement cannot assent to make the Torments of the damned, only Imaginary; To make Hell a Fancy. Yea to affirm, That it is Good to sin, Because the Act of sinning is a Real Good; and its Evil, only Imaginary, a Lie, and cannot hurt.   

CHAP. XIV. Whether Knowledge and Sciences receive benefit from this Assertion.  
HE proceeds to show the Usefulnesse of Unity in Theory; and complains, that Learning is broken into so many Sciences: wishing that it were all like the Chain fastened to Jupiter's Throne, All of a piece. And indeed I wish as heartily as his Lordship, (whether All things be One Emanation, or Many) that Comenius his design, (of which his Lordship speaks) of reducing all into one, might proceed: Of reducing, I say, all Knowledge into a Body, all Sciences into one System; (for This is it Comenius designs; he never fancied his Lordship's Unity.) And great pity it is, that so worthy a design is not prosecuted at a public charge, that such a shining Light should be extinct for want of Oil; if there may be hopes of effecting it.  
He shows what a Multitude of Inquiries we must needs make for the perfecting of Knowledge, whilst we acknowledge a distinction in Things; which labour might be much contracted, If we could be content to see all things to be but One, bearing only different Shapes. But though this were allowed; Yet must we then, either look at all things with a Confused Eye; or else shall be as much troubled in taking notice of Different Shapes, as we are now in observing Different Things.  
He reckons up many doubts, as not yet determined, concerning the Existence of Being's; What things there are, and What they are; Qu●nam sunt, & Qualia (vel Quid) sunt. But I see not how his doctrine, of Unity in all things, will resolve any of these. For granting all things to be One, Yet how shall I know, whether there be an Unicorn, a Phoenix a Mermaid, or Ebur F●●●il●? Whether the Philosopher's Stone, or a Perpetual Motion, be possibile? Whether Dictamnum be a Sovereign Balm? Whether Tobacco be hot or cold? What are the degrees of Heat or Cold in this or that Simple? If then this Opinion serve no way to inform us concerning these Questions wherein we doubt; How can he commend this opinion, as Useful, from the manifestion of our Ignorance in these particulars? If he would exhort us, not to inquire; this he may do though they may be Many; If he would have us search, whether or no there be these several Shapes, How doth their common Unity help forward the Enquiry? You see (saith he) in what a Maz● you are Meandred, if you admit of any Division. I wish we could see how to help it, by allowing his Unity.  
Yet notwithstanding their multitude) he accounts the knowledge of Existences, and the Being of things, to be Necessary; although those things are all of one Nature, variegated only in our apprehension. (But for aught I see, it is as little labour for us to find, that there are so many Things, as for his Lordship to find out so many Shapes.) But to inquire the Causes of these Being's, is (in his Lordship's opinion) to become Majestatis rei▪ for prying into th●se Arcana Imperii.  
In my judgement, there may be as great a Vanity and Emptiness in the curious enquiry after the Being of Things, as in the too nice search of their Causes. Vain Philosophy may be as well in the Historical as in the Discursive part. A modest inquiry both into the Being's, and into the Causes of Things, is both Lawful and Commendable; a nice Curiosity is blamable in Either: It will prove but Vanity, if not Vexation; Weaving a Spider's Web, if not Hatching a Cockatrice's Egg. T●las quasdam doctrinae pariunt, t●nuitate fili operisque Admirabiles, sed quoad usum Frivolas & Inanes. Bacon. L●ke a Razor of too keen an edge; As Seneca speaks of Chrysippus, Magnum ●●hercle virum, sed cujus acumen nimis Tenue retunditur, & in se saepe replicatur▪ etiam cum agere aliquid videtur, Pungit, non Perforat.   

CHAP. XV. Whether confusion in the knowledge of Causes be redressed by this Unity.  
OF Causes▪ he tells us) there are Two lie open to our view, The Universal Efficient of all things, God; and the Materia prima, 〈…〉 common Essence; Other Causes (saith he) are better known by Name then in the Natures of them; (as Efficient, Final, Material, Formal, etc.)  
We are ignorant, I grant, in the particular causes of divers things; and therefore when we have no other but those two Generals, we must rest there. But if the other appear and Show themselves; we need not shut our Eyes for fear of Seeing them. It is not like to cost us so dear as Ovid's, or Action's sight, or as those that saw Medusa's Head.  
Till Numeri Platonici (saith he) cease to be a Proverb, in vain shall any undertake to teach him How and Whence it is, that the various Rowlings of the Tongue should send forth so many articulate Voices, and so many several Languages.  
We say already, That the different Articulation of Sounds, ariseth from the divers Figuration of the Organs. If his Numeri Platonici can give us a better account, I would be glad to hear it.  
Till then, he will give no credence to any who promiseth an account of the Estuation of the Sea; Whether from the Moon, etc.  
That Numeri Platonici will furnish us with a better reason; I will then believe, when I see it. In the mean time I see nothing to hinder us from an Enquiry after a Physical cause. And I doubt his Lordship will have a hard task to give a reason in Numbers, why the Sea ebbs and ●lows.   

CHA●. XVI. Whether divisions in other parts of Learning be remedied by it.  
NExt he shows us many doubts in Moral Philosophy, as well as those precedent in Natural Philosophy. But I do not see that his Lordship's Position will help to clear any one of them whatsoever.  
Whether the Understanding and the Will be Really the same, or distinct, is nether Material nor Determinable, in Moral Philosophy: It belongs only to Natural Philosophy, viz. to that part of Physics that treats de Animâ.  
How the Will may sometimes omit the prosecution of the Understandings direction; I have already showed, without making the Will an Understanding.  
He glanceth at Aristotle's maintaining the Eternity of the World against Hermes, Orpheus, Anaxagoras, etc. For my own part, I would be thankful to him, that would solidly demonstrate the World's Creation from principles in Nature, and make it appear from Natural Light, that the World could not have been from Eternity. For though I deny not, but that there may be in Nature, Demonstrative Arguments; yet I confess, I have not as yet seen those (and yet I have examined many) that have given me so full satisfaction as I desire concernng an absolute Impossibility; but that I have seen (at least seemed to see) some just exception.  
But if his Lordship's Opinion be True, I shall have more cause to doubt than I have formerly had. For if all things did exist in their Being's with God, ab omni aeterno; and their Temporal Existence be only Imaginary, to our apprehension: (as his Lordship affirms in his 11. Chapter, pag. 99) I cannot imagine any hindrance at all, Why that which did really exist from all Eternity, might not be without a beginning; Why that which Was ab aeterno, might not (though it did not) ab aeterno Appear to be, and be Apprehended. I will not therefore blame Aristotle for maintaining the World's Eternity as a disputable Problem, till I see some Light which might have convinced him, whilst he enjoyed not the benefit of Revealed Light; at least, till this opinion of his Lordship be rejected.  
In the next place, I grant to his Lordship that there are doubts also in Metaphysics, in Logic, in Mathematics. But I perceive not how this opinion dissolves them.  
There be doubts also in Divinity, (though I do not see how this doth clear them▪) Whether Faith, or Repentance be precedent: Whether Faith be a particular application of Christ to myself: or only a bare spiritual belief, that Christ is the Son of God.  
I as●ent not, to place (the Saving Act of) Faith, either with Mr. Cotton, (as his Lordship citys him) in the laying hold of, or assenting to that Promise, That, He that believeth that Christ is the Son of God, shall be saved; Nor yet in a Particular application of Christ to myself in Assurance, or a believing that Christ is mine: (For though these also be acts of Saving Faith, yet they are not the Saving Act of Faith.) But I choose rather to place it in an act of the Will, rather than in either of these forenamed acts of the Understanding. It is an Accepting of Christ offered, rather than an Assenting to a Proposition affirmed. To as many as [Received] him, etc. that is, to them that Believe in his name, Joh. 1. God makes an offer of Christ to all, (else should not Reprobates be condemned for not accepting of him; as neither the Devils are, because he was not offered to them) Whosoever Will, let him come, and Take of the water of Life freely Rev. 22. 17. Whereupon the Believing Soul replies, I will, and so Takes him. When a Gift is Offered to me; That which makes it to be Mine, is my Acceptation, my Taking it; Not the Knowing that it is Offered; nor the Knowing that it is Mine; For the one of these precedeth, the other followeth, the appropriating it to myself.  
If you call this Taking of Christ, (or consenting that Christ shall be my Saviour▪ a Depending, a Resting, or Relying upon Christ for Salvation; (if you speak of an Act of the Will:) It is all One. For, Taking of Christ to be my Saviour, and Committing myself to Christ to be Saved, is the same: Both of them being but a Consenting to this Covenant▪ I will be your God, and you shall be my people; I will be thy Father, and Thou shalt be my Son.  
And if you make this the Saving act of Faith; then will Repentance (so far as it is distinct from Faith) be a Consequent of it. Confidence also or Assurance that Christ is mine ariseth from it: For Christ must first be Ours, before we can Know him so to be.  
Then also that, Whether Faith be a believing that I am Saved; (he means, in statu salutis.) or a depending upon God for Salvation, (to be put into such a Condition of Salvation,) will be easily resolved, and Beauties' Dilemma soon answered. viz. If Belief be to Believe that I am saved, (that Christ is mine,) then was▪ I saved without Faith: If it be, to believe that God will give me Grace to be saved, then do I believe before▪ I have Grace, before I have Faith. I say, It is easily answered, by making the Saving act of Faith, an Acceptance or Taking of Christ: For although the Gift be mine, before I Know; or am Assured, that it is mine; Yet is not the Gift mine, before my Accepting of it, but by my Acceptance it becomes Mine.  
If (with Mr. Cotton) we should make Faith to save us, only Declaratiuè (which we must by no means admit;) Then, Why is it said, that we are saved by Faith, and not by Works? Why do we allow, that Faith doth concurrere effica●iter ad salutem, but deny the same to Works? Seeing that Good Works do save us Declaratiuè, as well as Faith.  
That we are saved not only in the eternal Decree without faith, but even in the Execution, is strange Divinity. For if without Faith, then without Christ; for Christ is no further Ours, then apprehended by Faith. As for the Eternal Decree (of Election, he means,) it is true, we are not▪ through Faith, Elected to Salvation; but we are Elected, to Salvation through Faith. Faith is not the Cause of the Decree, but Faith is decreed to be the Cause of Salvation.  
To that Question, whether there be a prescript Form of Church-Government, I shall say nothing; For it being a Question maintained both ways, I will not oppose either of them, unless I had leisure, to confirm what I say, to prosecute what I affirm. Only to his Argument I may lay an exception. Church-government, (which he presumeth to be enjoined in the second Commandment,) is not of the nature of Moral Precepts, because not of Perpetual Continuance: (For such a prescript Form, as by which the Church since Christ should be governed, had not its beginning till since Christ: And therefore not commanded in the second Commandment any otherwise then by Consequence; (as particular temporary duties are.) However, it is like, Church Government is not more expressly commanded in the second Commandment, then Civil Government in the fifth; and yet none ever inferred from thence, a prescript Form of Civil Government. If he ask therefore, Do they leave us any latitude in any other Commandments? I say, Yes: and I instance in That. He must search for a Prescription, in the Evangelists, and Apostles writings, if he would find it, not in the second Commandment.  
(Only, by the way, I wish his Lordship would do us the favour, from his doctrine of Unity, (which he makes the Salve to cure all Controversies,) to demonstrate to us, Whether there be a Prescript Form, and What it is. And I should then judge his Opinion well worth embracing, though for nothing else. Wherein yet I shall wish him to beware, that he say not of this as of the division of Quantity, pag. 42. that all must at last be reduced to an Unity; Nor, as pag. 98. that it is divisibilis in infinitum. Lest we establish Episcopacy▪ (which himself likes not;) or become Independent; which others like as ill.)  
The distinction between Scientia simplicis Intelligentiae, and Scientia Visionis, if it be taken only for distinctio rationis (and I suppose none ever took it otherwise) may well enough be admitted. By the One, God knows the Nature of All things Possible: By the Other he Sees, that These things Are. The Object of the One, is All things Possible, all things Intelligible: the Object of the Other is only, Things Existent, either past, present, or to come  
But (saith his Lordship) If God's Power, and Will be all one; If God be p●r●● Actus and not Potentia; Then all things that ever Shall be, Were ab aeterno under ● Decree; and so what God Could do, he Did do, and Can do no more. (He had said before, pag. 99 That all things did exist [in their Being's] ab omni aeterno; And are they now but under ● Decree?) But for answer.  
I grant, that God cannot do, what he hath not decreed; for than were his Decree either Void, or Imperfect: And, supposing such a Decree, the Power of God is limited by his Will. But a Conditional, and hypothetical Impossibility, doth not infer an Absolute Impossibility And therefore we affirm, that Deus Potest ea quae non Vult. He Can do More than he Will, (in sensu diviso, not in sensu Composito.) God is able (saith Christ) of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham; Yet he doth not. Knowest thou not that I can pray to my Father, and he will send ●e more than twelve Legions of Angels? But neither did Christ pray, nor the Father send them. The God which we serve is [Able] to deliver us (said the three men in Daniel;) yet they were not certain that he Would do it.  
And if Media Scientia, (whereby God is supposed to know an hypothetical Proposition; as That the men of Keilah would deliver up David, if he stayed there) had no other hindrance but this; It might well enough be admitted.   

CHAP. 17. Concerning Curiosity in the search of Causes. With a Close of all.  
ANd now he returns again to his former complaint, of too much curiosity in the search of Causes. There is (he grants) a secondary intermediate Being, which we may call a Cause; Which doth precede and produce another: The Observation of which, saith he, is very ●itting, so that we search, and puzzle not ourselves with the grounds and reasons of this precedency. As, to observe, That Fire, applied to combustible matter, will burn it: Without enquiring How the Fire doth work upon the Wood, etc.  
He would have us therefore observe What is the Cause of this Effect, and What is the Effect of this Cause; without any curious search How this Cause comes to produce such an Effect. There is no General Rule, can be prescribed in this case; Sometimes it is needless to inquire so much as, By what Cause this or that was produced: Sometimes again it is useful to Know, not only What did produce it, but also How it did produce it. Thus far I allow, Curiosity in searching Trifles, also How it did produce it. Thus far I allow, Curiosity in searching Trifles, hinders the finding of more solid and profitable Truths; fo● (as he speaks) Intus existens prohibet alienum.  
What his Lordship hath, concerning the Holiness of Time and Place, I assent to; That they are not capable of any other Sanctification, than a holiness of Separation, a Relative Holiness: And the contrary Opinion is disclaimed, by him on whom his Lordship fastens it.  
That the Heart also should be always in such a holy frame, as that it be fit for a Sabbaths employment, fit for a Sacrament; I hold for an an undoubted Truth. Yet are we not always to be employed in such services of God's Worship; For even Adam in Paradise had a Particular calling, besides his General calling; and the exercise thereof, being done in obedience to God's command, was no doubt pleasing and acceptable ●o God. Nor can I assent that All things are Ordinances, though in All things we should acknowledge God.  
The rest of the Chapter is but a Recapitulation of his Position, and its Consequents; which needs no further consideration, besides what I have already given you in the Examination of those several Particulars. I need not make answer to the Conclusion, having already delivered my judgement concerning the Premises. But leave it to another to pass Censure.  
And thus, (Sir) I have finished that Task, which at your request I have undertaken: Which, beyond my expectation, is grown into a far larger body than I intended. You expect not Accurateness, in that which is drawn up in so short a time: Nor the Judgement of Authors in these Points; for that was not the task imposed, to give you account of Others opinions, but of mine own. I have therefore spared the labour of turning over any other books, save his Lordships own; nor have made any farther use of any, then as my present memory did supply▪ I may seem too prolix perhaps in some Digressions, prosecuting somewhat largely occasional questions, lighted on by the way: But if I have discovered any Truth, though with some breach of Method; If (with Samson) I can impart to my friends some Honey, though I step a little out of the way to fetch it; If, (as he found that Honey in the conquered Lion, which yet was not of it, but only accidentally there, so) I in the examining the main question, have withal cleared some doubts, which though not directly contained in it, were yet occasioned by it; I hope a small error in Method will be passed over.  
Sir, I am sorry it so falls out, that the first occasion, wherein I should have to do with so Noble a Lord, should be by way of Encounter. But being partly enjoined by your request, which is to me a Command, (whom therefore it concerns, to excuse my presumption to his Lordship;) and having also so fair an Invitation in Mr. Saddler's Epistle prefixed to his Lordship's Treatise; as being that, than which nothing could be more grateful to this Noble Lord; I have adventured to commit this, with myself, to be at your service.  
J. W.   

A Postscript.  
SIR,  
I Sent you (a while since) certain Animadversions upon my Lord Brook's Treatise concerning the Nature of Truth. Which (briefly) tend to this purpose.  
By Truth, or Light, his Lordship understands, that Light whereby the Soul and Understanding is able to See or Understand: Which can be no other than the Light of Reason. Which he considereth first in Itself, then in its Operations: that is Truth in the Fountain, this in the Streams; (that the Spring, this the Offspring.)  

Propositio 1. Arg. 1. Chap. 1.  
Which Truth or Light (of Reason) he contends to be the same with the Understanding, Because the Understanding in Man is that Ray of the Divine Nature, enlivening the Creature, or making it Rational, whereby it is conformed to the Creator, who is the Primitive Light, or Fountain of Knowledge. Now that which doth thus inform Animal Rationale, enlivening it, or making it Rational, is Reason; And therefore Reason (which he calls Truth) is the same with the Understanding.  
But this (if I mistake not) none will deny; for Reason and the Understanding-faculty are all one, Ratio and facuitas Ratiocinandi is the same. 'Tis true, they say sometimes, that Reason is in the Understanding, or that the Understanding is endued with Reason: But then by Understanding, they do not mean, the Understanding-Faculty, but the Soul itself quatenus intelligens. And so this proposition, Intellectus est Subjectum Rationis, is the same with this Anima intelligens est Subjectum Intellectûs. Anima, Intellectus, and Ratio, are not Three.   

Arg. 2. Chap. 2, 3 4.  
His second Argument to prove it is drawn from hence, That there is required to the constitution of every Being, an Essence received▪ a Fountain imparting, and a Channel receiving. The which Channel or Recipient must be the same with the Essence received; because every thing is the Recipient of its own Essence; nothing can receive the Essence of a Stone, but by being a Stone, for to be Stone, and to have the Essence of a Stone, is all one. Therefore the Understanding being the Recipient of Truth, must needs be Truth, that is, Reason.   

Propositio 2. Chap. 5.  
Which Truth, or Reason, Whether it be in the Understanding, or be the Understanding; yet it cannot make the Soul to be Rational, unless it be also in the Soul: For how can Reason make the Soul Reasonable, if it be not in ●t, but in somewhat else. And if it be in the Soul, then must i● be the Soul: Because to be in the Soul, and to be the Soul i● all one; every thing being its own Recipient. Thus Truth, or Light (of Reason) will be the same with the Understanding; And both That and This the same with the Soul.  
But I hope his Lordship will not deny, but that there is another kind of Receiving▪ beside that Receiving that he speaks of. (They tell us in Logic of ●cto modi habendi; and there are as many manners of Receiving, as there are of Having.) To receive the Essence of a Man, and to be a Man, is all one; To have the Essence of Money, and to be Money, is all one; But yet, I hope, a Man may receive Money, without being coined, and made Money. To receive the Essence of Water, and to be made Water; to receive the Essence of a Vessel, and to be a Vessel, is all one; yet a Vessel may contain Water, without being made Water. Thus a Substance may receive an Accident, a Subject may receive a Form, without being made that Accident, that Form. Thus datur Animae esse Animam datur Rationi esse Rationem, (each being its own Recipient:) But withal datur Animae Habere Rationem, though the Soul be not Reason, nor Reason (in this sense) its own Recipient.  
If there be any strength in this Argument, it lies in this, That if Reason (or Truth) be only in the Soul as an Accident, and not the Souls Essence, than it cannot make an Essential Difference between the Rational and Irrational Soul.  
And to this we must answer, (if we maintain Reason, and the rest of the Faculties, to be distinct from ●he Soul) That it is not the Faculties, it is not Reason, that makes the Essential Difference; but the Substance or Essence of the Soul from whence these Faculties proceed as Essential Consequents. Like as it is not Heat, and Cold, and the rest of the primae Qualitates, which make the Essential difference between one Element and another; but that Essence or Form, from whence these Qualities do proceed.   

Corollarium. 1. Chap. 6.  
From hence he proceeds to a further Corollary, That not only the Soul, but All things else, are also the same with Truth. But why so? Because every thing is its own Recipient? If it be; it doth not follow that every thing is the Recipient of Truth. If every thing be the Recipient of its own Essence, must therefore this Essence needs be Truth? If his Lordship had well considered, that Truth, as he hath formerly spoken of it, is but the same with that which others call Reason; he would scarce have made this Consequence, unless he could think to persuade us, that all things whatsoever are Reasonable Creatures▪ There is therefore too great an hiatus, to make this proposition, a Corollary of the former.  
But indeed his Lordship is by this time fallen off from his former acceptation of Truth. For having (as he supposeth) proved Reason to be the Souls Essence, the Souls Entity; he begins to take that word (which formerly signified Reason,) to signify Entity, or Being: So that Truth now, must be the same with Entitas. And the Emphasis of this last assertion lies in this, not that the Essence of all things is Truth, or Entity, (for that were no great news,) but that the Essence of all things is this One Truth: meaning, that all Entity is Homogeneal and of the same nature.  
He was proving before, that Truth or Reason was the same thing with the Soul: He hence infers, not that all things are the same thing; (for I cannot understand him to speak so harshly, as that one drop of water were the same drop with another drop of water, though Homogeneal; that the Soul of Peter is the Soul of Judas, though of the same Species;) but that they are alike things, or things of the same nature.  
The Consequence, (that all things must be of the same Species, because the Soul and its Faculties are the same Thing) will not hold. The thing itself, hath only this ground (so far as I can discover,) Because all Being proceeding from God, who is in his actions Uniform, must therefore be Alike: For the same Agent, acting in the same Manner, cannot but produce like Effects. But this Uniformity in God ' is Equivalent to an infinite Variety; and God can by one act in itself simple, produce effects variously distinct▪ And if his Lordship grant, that this Uniformity hinders not but that God may produce various Shapes, I see not why he may not produce various Species.   

Corollarium. 2. Chap. 7.  
But from hence he draws a further consequent. He is not contented to say, that the nature of all things is One, but that it is Unity. And here is as great an hiatus as the former. The Essence of all Souls is One and the same; but that this One Essence is Unity, I have not formerly heard, nor do yet believe. And I am so far from thinking that Unity is the Essence of All things, that I esteem itself to be Nothing. Unity, is but a Negative term, a Negation. Vnus indeed, as it is opposite to Nullus, is positive, and is the same with Nonnullus, or Aliquis: But Vnus, or Vnicus as it is opposed to Multitude, (and so we now take it) is Negative. Else, where is the fault in this Syllogism? Quod est in Angliâ, est in Europâ; Sed Rex Vnicus est in Angliâ; Ergo Rex Vnicus (veltantùm Vnus) est in Europâ.   

Propositio. 3. Chap. 8. 9▪  
He returns next, to his former discourse; And what he had said of the Light of Reason, he saith also of the Light of Knowledge, both Habitual and Actual. He allows not that Habits, either Infused or Acquisite, are any thing new brought into the Soul, but only former principles enlightened: And therefore rejecting Aristotle's rasatabula, he embraceth Plato's Reminiscentia, Which may be thus expressed; He supposeth the Soul to be as a Table, wherein be many rare lineaments, and lively colours described, but hanging in the dark they appear not till such time as they be illustrated by some advenient Light; which Light doth not bring with it any new colours, or more lineaments, but only illustrateth those that were formerly there but appeared not: Whereas Aristotle rightly supposeth it as a Table prepared, void of any, yet capable of all; Or rather as a Glass, which having of itself none of those Colours, is yet fit to receive and reflect all those Rays or visible Species, which from the adjacent Objects fall upon it.  
And indeed, as for Historical Knowledge, I suppose, his Lordship himself, if he well consider of it, will not affirm that to have any Ideas originally in the Soul: It being utterly impossible by discourse to find out a bypast History, without Historical Relation. And if there may be new Ideas of Historical truths imprinted in the Soul which were not there before, why not also of Discu●sive Knowledge.  
But his Lordship stays not here, dissenting from us in the Nature of Habits, whether they be new Ideas, or the illustration of former Ideas▪ but in effect, he takes away all Habits wholly. Telling us, that we Seem only by frequent acts to help the Soul, and create new Habits, but that indeed all actings are but new discoveries.  
Now this is not to establish Plato's Reminiscentia; but to take away all Memory whatsoever. How can we be said to remember? how is one said to be learned, another ignorant? what is the benefit of study, and of experience? if former acts do not at all help future acts, but only seem so to do▪ How comes it to pass, that we are able out of our own memories to furnish ourselves with Historical truths formerly heard or read, without a second relation, which at the first we could not do? if our former acts do not at all help latter acts, but all things be new discoveries.   

Proposition. 4. Chap. 10.  
And what hath been said of Natural and Habitual light of Reason and Habitual Knowledge, he now affirms of Actual Knowledge. The several Operations of the Soul, in apprehensions, affirmations, negations, etc. the several Actings of Truth, are also the Souls Essence. And why? but because the Soul is Actus primus, and therefore its Essence must be Action; This Action likewise must Exist; which what else can it be but Rational workings? and so the same with Actus Secundus.  
But his Lordship is much mistaken to think that actus primus is Latin for Action. Actus is of as large an extent as Potentia: Now there is potentia ad Esse, and potentia ad Formam, as well as potentia ad Operari. When Ens in potentiâ becomes Ens Actu, when that which was possible, is actually produced; it's own Essence o● Being is that Actus, which makes it Ens Actu, which was before Ens in Potentiâ: and this we call actus Entitativus, and it is better translated Actuality, than either Action, or Activity. Again the Matter is capable of this or that Form, which we call potentia ad Formam (substantialem;) whereby it is potentiâ tale (in genere substanti●;) as materia putris is in potentiâ ad formam vermis: Now when this Form whereof it is capable is actually introduced, that which was before potentià tale, becomes now actu tale (in genere substantiae;) and this Form is called actus Substantialis▪ (but not Actio Substantialis,) or actus primus; and (thus) the Soul is Actus. Again, a Substance of this or that Species, constituted by this or that form, is capable of this or that Accident, and is therefore potentiâ talis, accidentaliter; or in potentiâ ad hanc formam ac●identalem; as Water is potentiâ calida, when Heat is produced, it becomes Actu calida, and the Heat is this Actus whereby it is actu talis; and it is actus primus accidentalis, (though perhaps some would call it actus secundus: Yet none call it Actio) This actus acciden alis, or forma accidentalis, if it be Operative, stands in a double relation; to its Subject, and so it is actus informans; and to its Operation, and so it is actus operativus (but not Operatio) and belongs either to the first, or the second species of Quality, it is either a Habit or a Faculty; this, if you please, you may call Activity, though not Action▪ Now a Subject endued with this actus operativus is in potentiâ ad operandum: When this power is reduced into act, it is actu operans; and this actus whereby it doth actu operari, is properly Actus secundus, Actio, or Operatio, and belongs to the Predicament of Action. But such an Actus the Soul is not, and therefore its Operations cannot be its Essence.   

Objectio. 1. Chap. 11.  
But now lest by making the Souls Operations to be the Souls Essence, he should make so many Souls as there be Acts; (which is indeed a good Consequence;) he is put upon another invention, to make all these operations to be but One; the second action is but the same with the former: (So that with him, one sinful Act is all one with a continued Course of sinning.) And therefore tells us, that actions performed in distinct Times and Places are not therefore distinct actions, because Time and Place are Nothing, but merely imaginary.  
But this plaster is not large enough to cover the sore; For, it is true indeed, different actions may receive an external denomination from difference in Time and Place, but they receive not their difference from hence, but from themselves: Time and Place can neither make different things to be the same, nor the same to be different. A man is the same to day that he was yesterday, the same at London that he was at York▪ yet both Time and Place be different: Again, two Angels being at the same time coexistent in the same place are not therefore the same Angel. So that whether time and place be any thing or nothing, yet this Man is not the other Man, this Action is not the other Action.  
But if difference of Time and Place be only imaginary; then why do we deny to the Papists, that Christ's Body is corporeally present in the Sacrament? since if it be any where, it must be every where, all places being indeed the same, admitting only of an imaginary difference. Why do we cry down the Lutheran Consubstantiation, as absurd? for if several bodies may be in several places, then may they be in the same place, if difference of Place be only imaginary: If the same body may be at several times in several places, why not at the same time? since difference of Time is only imaginary.   

Object. 2. Chap. 12.  
There is another Objection as strong as this former: If Acting Truth be the Souls Essence, than what becomes of the Soul when it doth either not Act, or act Falsely?  
To the first he applies his former remedy; Any one act is able to give the Soul a Being at all times; for succession of moments being only imaginary, that which at all is, must be always, and whatsoever hath at all a Being, is indeed coexistent to all Eternity; succession, beginning, and ending being only imaginary: (So that a Child that is new born, had lived as long as the most aged, if he could but think so.  
And as for the other, he denies that the Soul can at all act Falshood, because Falsehood is only Privative, it is Nothing▪ now to act nothing and not to act is all one.  
Which he affirms likewise of Evil, and of Pain; And tells us, with Dr. Twisse, that it is better to be Miserable, than not to be: Which is grounded upon this, that Evil is only a privation of Good, and therefore to have the goodness Being without the goodness of Happiness, is better than to want both the one and the other.  
But withal I wish them to consider, whether the same Argument do not prove, that it was better for David to commit adultery, than not to commit it; For the substance of the act, in its Physical Essence, was positive, and therefore Good; the fault was only the want of a further good, to wit, the goodness of conformity to Gods will; now to produce the goodness of an Act, without the goodness of Conformity, is better than to produce neither the one nor the other.   

Corollaria. Chap. 13. etc.  
This is his Lordship's Opinion. Which he commends to us as useful to make our Christian life more cheerful both in the theoretical and Practic part. For if we knew, that All things are one, what need we fear either difficulty or danger? knowing, That Misery is nothing and cannot hurt us, and hath no Being but only in the the Brain; That whatsoever is, is Good, and good to Me, Because both I and It are Being's, and so Good; And these two Goods falling under no other difference but of degrees, Good and Good must needs agree, that which is Good is Good to Me. Yea, how void of Envy at another's good, and thoughts of Revenging injuries? since that I have a Propriety, a Possession, in that which is another's, he and I being One: Injuries are nothing and cannot hurt; Good things, though another's, do serve me.  
But to this Good Consequent of his Lordship's Tenet, I can oppose another every way as Bad: For as it would make us not afraid of Misery, so withal, not afraid to Sinne. It proposeth such an Impunity to Sinning, as that it makes the Devils as happy as the blessed Angels. For thus we might argue; The Devils are Being's, and therefore Good, because Ens & Bonum convertuntur: Every thing that is, is Good, and Good to ●hem; for both They and It being good, and Good admitting of no other difference but of degrees, Good and Good must needs agree, and so be good to them: The happiness of the Angels doth serve Them, since (as his Lordship speaks) it is not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, They have a propriety in it; all things being One. Their own Misery and Torment is nothing▪ and cannot hurt: And (which is the only difference can be imagined) if they Think otherwise, (I use still his Lordship's expression) this must be a Lie, and cannot hurt. And if this be Hell, who will be afraid to Sin?  
My judgement cannot assent, to make the Torments of the damned only Imaginary, to make Hell a Fancy; yea, to affirm, that it is good to Sin, because the act of sin is really Good, and the Evil of it is only Imaginary, a Vanity, a Nothing, and cannot hurt.  
As for the theoretical part; it is confessed, that there be many doubts in Natural Philosophy, concerning the Being, the Nature, the Causes of things; There be doubts also in Moral Philosophy, in Metaphysics, in Mathematics, in Divinity: But in telling us this, his Lordship advanceth nothing for the commendation of his new invention; except he could show us how this Tenet will resolve them.  
And thus Sir, I have given you a short account of the chief things in his Lordship's Treatise, and my Reply, so far as concerns the state of the main Question controverted: Wherein you may take a brief Survey of what is there more largely prosecuted. Which may give some Light for the better discovering the principal intent of his Lordship's Tenet; and may be a guide in your perusing the larger Discourse that you lose not yourself in the prolixity of the prosecution, and the variety of digressions. When I first undertook the Task, I intended no more in all, than some such brief notes as these, to satisfy your desire: But being once entered I have not always the command of my own pen; variety of matter carrying me beyond my intended bounds. The faults if you will be pleased to pardon, and to accept the rest, I shall commit the whole to be as I am, that is  
Yours to command, 
 J. W. April. 10. 1641.    
FINIS.   

DUm haec qu● praecedunt sub praelo erant, subiit animum cogitatlo ea quae sequuntur prioribus subjungendi; (Theses nimirum aliquot aliquando in Academiâ habitas:) partim quòd subjecto sint non adeò dispari; partim quòd, ut ut puerilia, ejusmodi tamen sint quae ●on ab omnibus attendantur. Non tanti (fateor) sunt, ut in jucem prodeant; nec (forsan) tan●illi tamen, ut nemini placeant. Sicui displi●●a●t, excuset ut puerilia; sicui placeant, fruatur.  

Propositio Singularis in dispositione syllogisticâ semper habet vim Vniversalis.  
NIhil in●e●icius est iis in e●iis (si Scaligero credamus) quae mordi●us sentiunt, majores nostros nihil ignorâsse; quae▪ que pettinaciter tuentur errores, quos two qui commisere, si viveren▪ emendarent. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Unde mihi nunquam absurdum visum est, a communi sententiâ cum ratione dissentire.  
Propositio Singularis, apud Logicos, vel pro Particulari, vel pro no●● quadam specie semper habita est: cum mihi tamen ad Universalium classem pertinere luce meridiana clarius semper vi ●m est.  
Cujus in examine pro lemmate habeatur; Formalem rationem propositionis constare in compositione praedicati cum subjecto? Quod statuit Smiglecius, disp. 12. qu. 7. (quae compositio sive nexus p●aecipuè in copulâ attenditur.) Ex va●io igitur modo compositionis horum extremorum, alius atque alius prepositionis modus oritur. Ubi itaque compositio seu nexus praedicati cum subjecto Verè fit, & ut se res habet, propositio Vera est; ubi nexus seu applicatio Falsè fit, e● Falsa est propositio, sint partes ●. e. termini simplices, sive verae, sive falsae: Unde haec propositio [Hircocervus est quoddam con●latum ex hirco & cervo] vera est, licètuterque terminus falsus, falsitate scilicet simplicium terminorum, h. e. Non-ens, sive Ens rationis; ens enim & verum convertuntur: Illa verò [lapis est homo] falsa est, licèt termini veri veritate simplicis app●ehensionis, quia falsò applicantur. Item, quum Necessarius est nexus terminorum, propositio Necessaria est; sint licèt termini entia contingentia: & sic in reliquis affectionibus propositionis.  
●ùm autem compositio sive ne●us terminorum, in quâ constat formalis ratio propositionis in Vinculo atte●datur, hinc sequitur, affectiones propositionis judicandas esse, non ratione terminorum, sed poti●s respectu vinculi. Unde axioma affirmatum a Ramo definitur, cujus vinculum affirmatur; Negatum, cujus vinculum negatur; sive termini sint affirmat● sive negati, parum interest. Haec propositio igitu● [omne non rationale est non homo] est propositio affirmativa, licèt extremum utrumque sit negans▪ Hoec verò [lapis non est homo] est propositio negans, ex terminis utrisque affirmativis. Idem dicendum est de propositione Simplici, & Compositâ; ad vinculum scilicet attendendum esse. Unde Gutberlethus hanc propositionem [animal est vel homo vel brutum] inte● axioma simplex esse statuit, non disjunctivum, cum uno verbi vinculo contineatur; licèt posterior terminus sit disjunctus; Hanc verò propositionem [omne animal vel est homovel est brutum] credo illum inter inter axiomata composita numeraturum.  
Hinc colligo▪ Ut alias propositionis affectiones, ita etiam Universalitatem & Particularitatem sumendas esse, non a terminis, sed a terminorum compositione & nexu. Affectiones enim formam sequuntur, non materiam. Malè ●gitur a plerisque Logicis distribuitur axioma, seu propositio, in Universalem, cujus subjectum est Universale; Particularem, cujus subjectum est particulare; & Singularem, cujus subjectum est singulare: cum distributio petenda esset a modo compositionis, quod est Formale in propositione, non a quantitate terminorum, h. e. a parte materiali. Propositio ergo Universalis, est in quâ applicatio praedicati ad subjectum est universalis; Particularis, in quâ applicatio est particularis: nec alias species agnosco.  
Quid a● tem velim per praedicationem vel applicationem universalem & particularem, mel●ùs ex graecâ Aristotelis appellatione, quam ex latinâ Interpretum, elucescet. Quod enim nobis est Universale & Particulare, illud Aristoteli est, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, de toto, & parte, sive secundum partem, h. ●. de subjecto vel toto, vel secundum partem; non autem 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, de omnibus & quibusdam. Quare non minùs rectè interpretaretur Totalis & Partialis praedicatio, quam Universalis & Particularis; nisi quòd mos aliter obtinuerit.  
Universalis ergo praedicatio est quando praedicatum dicitur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, de toto subjecto, (●otum intelligo praedicationis, sive totam ejus latitudinem & ambitum praedicandi,) quando scilicet praedicatum totaliter attribuitur subjecto, non partialiter cum restrictione ad aliquam subjecti partem, seu ad peculiare quiddam intra subjecti ambitum comprehensum, tunc nimirum quando de quocunque dicitur subjectum, de eodem dicatur etiam & praedicatum. Igitur haec propositio [omnis homo est animal] est universalis, quia nihil continetur sub ambitu Hominis, seu de nullo dicitur Homo, quin et de eodem dicatur Animal: Haec autem [aliquis homo est doctus] particularis, quia non de totâ hominis specie dicitur, sed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, secundum partem aliquam, h. ●. de aliquo individuo sub eâ specie. Non autem ideo universalis est prior propositio quia nota Omnis praefigitur, & posterior particularis quia ei praeponitur Aliquis, (uti nonnulli, ex tyronibus praecipuè, arbitrantur:) Non enim propositio ideo universalis est, quia notam habet universalitatis, sed quia universalis est, ideo nota praeponitur, ut agnoscit Dounamus. Nota igitur universalitatis designat aliquando universalem propositionem, non autem facit. Idem dic de notâ particularitatis.  
jam verò, ut ad praesentem controversiam accedamus; In propositione Singulari necesse est ut praedicatio sit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, de toto, cum subjectum singulare 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, sit & individuum in partes; (subjectivas intelligo, loquimur enim de toto p●aedicationis, non integrali;) Impossibile enim est ut aliquid 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 secundum partem dicatur, de illo quod 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 est & partes nullas habet. Neces●e igitur est, ut quicquid de individuo dicitur, sive subjecto singulari, dicatur de toto; & per consequens propositio singularis semper erit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Atque hoc ipsum est quod vult Aristoteles; & qui aliter Aristotelem exponunt, detorquent non interpretantur. Audiamus igitur Aristotelis mentem de propositione universali, sive, quod idem est, de dicto 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, de omni & de nullo: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Quid dissertiùs dici posset pro causâ nostrâ? Tunc demum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (non 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) de omni sive de toto dicitur aliquid, quando nihil subjecti accipere licet, de quo alterum h▪ e. praedicatum non dicetur. Assumo; In propositione singulari affirmante, nihil subjecti sumere licet, de quo praedicatum non dicatur. Concludo igitur; Propositio singularis affirmans, est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. (Eodemque modo propositio▪ singularis negans erit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.) v. g. Si dixeris [Socrates est doctus] quaero, quidnam illud est intra ambitum Socratis. c● quo non dicatur Doctus? Si nihil, igitur erit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 per Aristotelis definitionem▪ At verò cum Socrates de uno solo homine dicatur, & de illo etiam dicatur doctus, nihil aliud Socratis superest, de quo negetur, ut patet.  
Idem licet concludere ex ipsius Rami definitione; cum definiat Axioma Speciale (quod postea subdividit in particulare, & proprium) esse, quando consequens non omni antecedenti attribuitur. Sed quam benè convenit haec definitio axiomati Proprio, quod tamen illi est altera species axiomatis Specialis? Si in axiomate proprio consequens non omni antecedenti attribuatur, ostendat quaeso, ●ui non: si autem hoc ostendi non possit (ut quidem non potest) quâ ratione dicat non omni attribui non video, cum non omnis & quidam non idem valere, ex regulis Aequipollentiae certissimum est. Vel igitur ostendat Ramus axioma proprium affirmans Alicui non attribui, velego illi negabo, non Omni attribui, & per consequens definitionem axiomatis specialis non convenire axiomati proprio; Mala igitur definitio illa sit necesse est, quando definitio generis non convenit utrique specie. Imò ve●ò, si rem expendamus, inveniemus alteram speciem, s●. axioma Particulare, quod contradi●ti●guitur axiomati proprio, ejusdem prorsus esse latitudinis cum genere, sive axiomate speciali. Nam axioma speciale est, quando consequens non omni antecedenti attribuitur; Particulare, quando consequens particulariter antecedenti attribuitur. Tantum igitur distant axioma speciale & particulare, (h. e. genus & species) quantum non omni & particulariter: quod quantillum sit, ex Gutbe●letho discas, qui explica●urus quid velit Ramus per particulariter, expressis verbis confundit; particulariter, inquit, h. e. non omni. Patet igitur, quam leviter agant Ramis●ae, dum genus a specie illis vocabulis distinguant inter quae ne ipsi quidem ullam agnos●unt differentiam.  
Sed ad Aristote●em revertor: Qui duos tantùm agnoscit modos praedicandi, de toto, & de parte, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, universalem & particularem. Nec quidem potuit plures admittere: Quicquid enim de alte●o dicitur necessarium est ut vel de illo toto vel de ipsius parte aliquâ dicatur; Quicquid etiam ab altero removetur, vel a toto vel a parte tantùm remov●a●ur necesse est. Nec enim possibile est medium invenire, quod de altero dicatur, nec tamen de toto, neque secundum pa●tem. Pro certo igitur & indubitato principio pona●ur, Omnem propositionem (categoricam intelligo) quaecunque demum ipsa sit, vel universalem esse, vel particularem; h. e. vel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, vel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Atque hinc patet, perperam fecisse Ramum, ipsisúque sequaces, dum praeter syllogismum generalem & specialem, proprium adjunxe●in●. Quum enim propositiones proprias seu singulares non potuerunt particularium regulis co●ree●e, commenti sunt novam quandam syllogismi speciem alis antea inc●gnitam, quam Proprium appellant: & axiomata p●op●ia, quae illi inter specialia numerabant, a reliquis specialibus discrepare videntes, ab omni syllogismo●um specie antea notâ abhorre●e arbitrati sunt; nescientes interim, saltem non advertentes, iisdem quibus general●a regulis contineri.  
Patet etiam, quid judicandum sic de quadrupli●i propositionis divisione, in Universalem▪ Particularem, Indefinitam, & Singularem; nimirum, species sine necessitate multiplicari; cum singularis semper reducenda sit ad universalem, indefinita verò nunc ad hanc, nunc ad particularem. Atque hoc secundum mentem Aristotelis; qui quadrifariam illam divisionem nusquam (ni fallor) tradidit. Nominat, fateor, indefinitam propositionem, praeter praedictas duas species, universalem & particularem, non autem acsi quid esset ab utrisque distinctum, sed quòd ex ipsis propositionis verbis vix satis constet, ad utram duarum reducenda sit (cum signum indicem non habeat appositum,) & pro subjectâ materiâ nunc ad hanc nunc ad illam referenda sit, semper tamen ad alterutram. De singulari verò propositione ne verbum habet; nec opus est, cum semper reducenda sit ad universalem; perperam verò a Logicis plerisque intruditur quasi nova species, omnino contra rationem, mentemque Aristotelis.  
Atque hactenus probata est thesis nostra a priori, & quidem demonstratiuè; Subnectam & argumenta a posteriori nonnulla. ut lucidiús appareat veritas. Sed praemonendum est, eorum aliqua universaliter concludere de omni propositione singulari: alia verò particulariter, ita tamen ut quod illic concluditur de unâ, potuit de qualibet; atque haec inductione factâ idem valerent ac si▪ concluderent universaliter: alia denique ducta esse ab ejusmodi proprietatibus quae solis universalibus conveniunt non autem omnibus, unde n●c omnibus singularibus; quae licè t vi suâ probent tantùm aliquas singulares universalium vim habere, cum tamen hoc concesso pauci sint qui reliquum negarent cum nulla sufficiens ratio assignari possit cur quaedam sint universales non autem aliae, valebunt & haec argumenta non multò minùs quam si essent universalia.  
Primò igitur. Major in primâ & secundâ figurâ semper est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (ut a pluribus antehac demonstratum est,) at aliquando est singularis; ergo aliqua saltem singularis est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Vel sic; Quaecunque propositio potest esse maior in primâ vel secundâ figurâ, ea est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Sed quaelibet propositio singularis potest esse major & in primâ & in secundâ figura. Ergo. etc. Insto in primâ, in Barbara.  
Bar- Augustus fuit Imperator. ba- Octavius fuit Augustus. Ergo ra. Octavius fuit Imperator.  
In secundâ, in Camestres.  
Cam▪ Virgilius fuit Romanus. es. Homerus non fuit Romanus. tris. Homerus ergo non fuit Virgilius.  
Et idem fieri posset in quibuslibet modis utriusque figurae: imò in quocunque modo cujuscunque figurae assumtâ quacunque propositione singulari in locum universalis; ut experienti videre erit cuilibet.  
Secundò, Ex puris particularibus nihil concluditur, at ex puris singularibus aliquid concluditur: Ergo Singularis non est particularis; &, per consequens, est universalis, cum antea probatum sit nullam posse fieri praedicatione● quin erit vel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Major in confesso est. Minor exemplis suprà adductis probata est.  
Non solùm autem ex singularibus puris concluditur aliquid, sed ex mixtis singulari cum particulari, non minùs quám ex universall & particulari: sed (ut illic) semper concluditur particulariter, cum particularis propositio sit debilior pars. v. g.  
Da- Virgilius fuit doctus. r●- Aliquis poeta fuit Virgilius. i. Ergo, Aliquis poeta fuit doctus.  
Item,  
Fes- Virgilius non fuit Graecus. ti- Aliquis poeta fuit Graecus. Ergo no- Aliquis poeta non fuit Virgilius.  
Ubi notandum obiter, hos syllogismos & hujusmodi alios▪ constantes ex singulari & particulari in praemissis, ad nullos Rami modos reduci posse, cum tamen consequentia & satis firma sit & perspicua; nostrâ tamen hypothesi positâ facilè ad Aristotelis modos reducuntur. (In tertiâ figurâ non insto; cum enim intertiâ figurâ idem sit subjectum in utrâque praemissarum, fieri non potest ut altera ●●t propositio singularis, altera particularis, quoniam de subjecto singulari non potest praedicari particulariter.)  
Tertiò, Tres ponuntur gradus necessitatis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Confessum est etiam apud omnes, super●orem gradum necessitatis semper etiam includere inferiorem▪ unde propositio 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 est etiam propositio 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, propositio verò 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 est & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. At propositio singularis saepe est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ergo & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. v. g [Socrates est animal, Plato est substantia, Bucephalus est equus;] sunt propositiones essentiales in primo modo dicendi per se: sunt ergo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Quartò, Omne genus praedicatur universaliter de suis speciebus, (ut & essentialiter;) at Individuum (saltem secundum Ramum) est species; ergo de individuo praedicatur genus universaliter. Au●▪ si non sit species, tamen u● se habet genus ad speciem ita species ad individuum; at genus praedicatur universaliter & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 de suâ specie; ergo & species de individuo▪ Potestergo individuum universalis propositionis esse subjectum.  
Quintò, probatur e● regulis conversionum. [Socrates non est equus] est propositio negans, eaque vel universalis, ut nos dicimus, vel particularis, ut alii: non autem particularis; Ergo etc. Probatur minor▪ Quia propositio particularis negans convertitur tantum●odo per contrapositionem; at haec propositio convertitur, primò conversione simplici, [nullus equus est Socratis,] secundò per accidens [aliquis equus non est Socrates.] Utroque hoc modo convertitur universalis negans, (eaque sola,) neutro verò particularis negans: est ergo haec propositio non particularis sed universalis. Patet etiam ulteriùs ex hac ipsâ conversione; convertitur enim singularis negans in universalem, at in conversione nunquam augetur quantitas, saepe minuitur. Iterum, [Socrates non est Plato] convertitur [Plato non est Socrates,] at particularis negans non convertitur nisi per contrapositionem.  
Sextò, Ex regulis reductionum. Propono enim hunc syllogismum;  
Ces- Qui interfecit Hectoremnon supervixit bello Trojano. a- Omnes Graeci reduces supervixere bello Trojano. Ergo re. Nullus Graecorum reducum interfecit Hectorem.  
Dico hunc syllogismum esse in C●sar● ex majori universali, duplici ratione: Primò, si major esset particularis, conclusio esset particularis, (quia semper sequitur debiliorem partem;) at non est; Ergo. Secundò, per modum reductionis, r●●ucitur enim ad Celarentt per simplicem conversionem majoris; sic  
Ce- Nullus qui supervixit bello Trojano fuit interfector Hectoris. la- Omnes Graeci reduces supervixere bello Trojan●▪ Ergo rent. Nullus Graecorum reducum fuit interfector Hectoris.  
Hic syllogismus si esset ex majori particulari, non esset in ullo modo; nec usquam apud Ramum invenietur hujusmodi syllogismus, (cum tamen & verissimus sit & utilissim●s,) Imò nec (positâ illorum hypothesi, scil. quòd sit particularis) reduci posset ad alium modum. Alium accipe,  
Ces- Author Epistolae ad Hebraeos non fuit auditor Christi, Heb. 2. 3. a- Omnes duodecim selecti fuerunt auditores Christi. Ergo re. Nullus ex duodecim selectis fuit Author epistolae ad Hebraeos.  
Impossibile autem est in ullo ex Rami modis per hoc medium probare hanc conclusionem.  

Septimò, Hunc syllogismum propono,  
Omnes magnanimi sunt fortes.  
Thersites non est fortis. Ergo  
Thersites non est magnanimus.   
Hic syllogismus vel est in Camestres ex minore & conclusione universalibus, vel in Baroco ex iisdem particularibus. Sed non esse in Baroco, sic probatur. Syllogismus in Baroco non potest reduci nisi reductione per impossibile; at hic syllogismus reduci●ur ad Ceiarent reductione ostensiuâ, eo modo quo Camestres, scil. transpositis praemissis▪ & minore conclusion●que simpliciter conversis, hoc modo,  
Ce- Nullus fortis est Thersites. la- Omnes magnanimi sunt fortes. Ergo rent. Nullus magnanimus est Thersites.  
Erat igitur in Camestres ex minore & conclusione universalibus, non in Baroco ex iis particularibus. Infinitus essem si singulis insisterem quae hac in redici possent: Unico argumento concludo.  
Octauò igitur & ultimò, Propositio singularis nec fortiorem nec debiliorem vim habet quam universalis; ergo eandem & aequalem. Non fortiorem, quia ex praemissis universali & singulari aliquando concluditur singulariter, quod non esset si universalis esset debilior, quia conclusio semper sequitur debiliorem partem. Ut in hoc & similibus innumeris.  
Cam- Omnes magnanimi sunt fortes. es- Thersites non est fortis. Ergo tres. The●sites non est magnanimus.  
Nec debiliorem habet, quia ex singulari & universali, aliquando concluditur universaliter, (quod non esset si singularis esset pars debilior:) ut in hoc syllogismo, & aliis,  
Ces- Interfector Hectoris non supervixit bello Trojano. a- Omnes Graeci reduces supervixere bello Trojano. Ergo re. Nullus Graecorum reducum fuit interfector Hectoris.  
cum igitur nec fortiorem, nec debiliorem vim habeat Singularis quam Universalis, sequitur necessariò Propositionem singularem eadem vim in disposition● syllogisti●â semper habere quam habit universalis▪ Quod erat demonstrandum.   

Corollaria, & Objectiones.  
HInc sequitur primò, Propositionem singularem affirmantem & negantem opponi immediatè, hoc est, contradictoriè. Nam sublatâ universalitate affirmantis ponitur negans 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, quoniam praedicatio partialis non potest esse de eo quod est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Sequitur secundò, Propositionem universalem affirmantem converti conversione simplici, & particularem affirmantem convertibilem in propositionem▪ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪ quoties praedicatum convertendae est individuum. Posito enim praedica●o in loco subjecti, quicquid de individuo subjecto dicitur, dicitur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Sequitur tertiò, Conclusionem in tert●â figu●â esse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (contrà quam docent Logici,) quoties minor terminus syllogismi, h. e. praedicatum minoris, est individuum. Quia praedicatum minoris in tertiâ figurâ est subjectum conclusionis, quod cum sit individuum, de eo quicquid dicitur, dicitur universaliter.  
Objiciet forsan aliquis; An igitur [Socrates est doctus] perinde est ac [omnis homo est doctus?] Non est. At, inquie●, quidni? cum utratraque propositio sit universalis. Rectè. Sed replico; An [omnis homo est rationalis] idem valet ac [omne animal est rationale?] Negabit credo. At, inquam, quare? annon utraque est universalis? Est certè. Conjicio quid responsurus est; utraque propositio est quidem universalis, non tamen aequipollent, quia in alterâ rationalitas universaliter attribuitur homini, & rectè, in alterâ verò universaliter attribuitur animali, sed malè. Pariter ego, non (inquam) perinde est Socratem doctum dicere & omnem hominem; subjectis enim differunt, quamvis utraque propositio sit universalis. Doctus universaliter praedicatur de Socrate non de homine.  
Urget, Dici universaliter, est dici de multis. Fateor, in praedicatione simplicium terminorum, non in praedicatione propositionis. Aliud est dici de multis, in tractatu de Praedicabilibus, aliud dictum de omni, in tractatu de Propositione. At nunc agitur non de quantitate simplicium terminorum, sed de quantitate propositionis, & terminorum nexu. Universale, seu vox communis, potest est subjectum propositionis particularis; & Individuum pariter, seu vox singularis, subjectum propositionis universalis.  
Fatendum tamen est, Propositionem singularem leviculam aliquam discrepantiam habere ab aliis universalibus (ut in corollariis videre est) non tamen talem quae illas ex universalium numero eximat. Tria sunt, nec scio plura, (& ple●ique forsan ne haec attenderent,) quae discrepant●ae speciem exhibent: ubique tamen provenit a materiâ propositioni substratâ, potius quam a formali propositionis dispositione; nusquam tollitur illud in quo formale propositionis universalis consistit, quod hoc est, ut nihil inveniatur intra subjecti ambitum de quo no● dicatur praedicatum. Exp●ndam singula.  
Primum hoc est▪ Universalis propositio affirmans & negans opponuntur contrariè: earum utraque potest esse falsa, harum non ita. Siquis hinc argueret, propositionem singularem, vim universalis non habere,  
Respondeo primò, Eodem argumento probari posse non esse particularem; quia neque propositio particularis affirmata & negata opponuntur contradictoriè, sed subcontrariè, & earum utraque potest esse vera, harum non ita. Sicui Ramus videatur satis cavisse, dum syllogismum proprium diversam speciem constituit tam a generali quam speciali: Regero, 1. ad hominem. Malè pro Ramo arguitur ex iis quae ipse pro nugis habet, & ex Logicâ suâ exulare fecit: ille enim de Oppositione, Aequipollentiâ, & Conversione propositionum nihil habet, ut nec de Reductione syllogismorum: 2. Novum praedicandi modum facere non potest, cum impossibile sit aliquid de alio dici, quod tamen nec de toto necsecundum partem dicatur. Ut supra fusiùs explicavimus.  
Respondeo secundò. Non singularibus tantùm hoc accidit, sed & aliis universalibus quibusdam. Nam 1. in materiâ necessariâ & impossibili, ex negatione & affirmatione universali, altera semper vera est altera falsa. Unde regula illa, quòd contrariarum in materiâ contingenti utraque potest esse falsa. 2. Idem accidit in propositionibus factis per Omne collectivum; quas tamen universales esse, nemo quem scio negavit. (Possent tamen, fateor, eâdem ratione quâ negant singulares; sunt enim reverâ universales, cum praedicatum non nisi uni antecedenti attribuatur.) Hujusmodi namque propositiones [Omnes apostoli sunt duodecim, &, Omnes apostoli non sunt duodecim] item [Omnes planetae sunt septem, &, Omnes planetae non sunt septem,] non minùs sunt contradictoriae, quam [Virgilius est poeta, &, Virgilius non est poeta.] Si igitur illas pro universalibus agnosc●nt, cu● non & singulares.  
Respondeo tertiò. Ratio hujus contradictionis inter propositionem singularem affirmantem & negantem, pendet ex necessitate materiae, potius quam ex ipsa propositionis naturâ & formâ. Quoties enim subjectum universalis propositionis est divisionis capax (ut in distributivis, & de materiâ contingenti,) & praedicatum sigillatim applicatur subjecti partibus, affirmans & negans universaliter, non opponuntur immediatè & contradictoriè, quia licèt aliquid de Toto non rectè affirmetur, de parte forsan affirmari poterit, ergo nec de toto negabitur: Ubi verò materiae necessitas particularem praedicationem omnino prohibet, & necessariò requirit ut quod de illo subjecto dicitur dicatur de eo toto, ut in materiâ necessariâ & impossibili, & in universali collectiuâ, ut & in prositione singulari,▪ ibi praedicatum vel de toto dicitur, vel de toto negetur, cum de parte dici de parte verò negari non posset propter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & indivisibilitatem subjecti.  
Respondeo quartò. Consequitur hoc ex nostrâ thesi, non oppugna●. Si enim quicquid de individuo dicitur dicatur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, impossibile est ut secus esset quin affirmatio & negatio sint opposita immediata, particularis enim intermedia eo ipso excluditur.  
Nec aliunde patet ratio hujus oppositionis immediatae, quam ex hoc fundamento. Vel enim semper 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 praedicatur (prout nos afferimus) vel semper 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, vel aliquando de toto aliquando secundum partem. Si semperde parte▪ licèt de unâ parte dicatur, quid impedit quin de aliâ negetur, ita ut & affirmatio & negatio sint simul verae? cum affirmatio particularis quoad unam partem non impediat negationem partialem quoad aliam partem. Si aliquando 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 aliquando 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (prout Ramistarum doctrina videtur innuere, qui quoties una praemissarum propria est eam pro particulari habent, non autem si utraque sit propria;) Si sic, inquam, (quamvis gratis dictum sit, nec ulla appareat ratio cur haec & nonilla sit universalis, imò cur eadem promiscuè nunc sit universalis nunc particularis,) oppositio nec sic esset immediata: licèt enim affirmatio 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 falsa sit, posset tamen quoad aliquam partem (si aliquando partialiter praedicetur) vera esse, unde nec negatio 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vera; possent ergo & negatio & affirmatio simul esse falsae, & non contradictoriè oppositae. Necesse est igitur ut, si opponantur immediatè, ideo sit quia singularis propositio semper est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, unde vel de toto dicetur vel de to●o negabitur. Confirmat igitur thesin nostram, non oppugnat, quod videbatur primâ fronte debilitare. Et hoc telo repercusso eâdem operâ repercutientur & reliqua.  
Secundum sequitur. Propositio particularis affirmans converti aliquando potest in singularem. Unde singularis videri posset non majorem habere quantitatem quam habet particularis, quia in conversione non augenda est quantitas. v. g. [Aliquis homo est Socrates] ergo [Socrates est homo.]  
Respondeo. Vi conversionis, sequitur [Hominem] dici de [Socrate:] necessitate materiae, dicitur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, quoniam de 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nihil praedicatur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪ Hinc sequitur, necessitate consequentis, Convertens 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Conversae 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Idem fieri necesse est, quoties propositio singularis affirmans convertenda est in singularem. v. g. [Virgilius est Maro] ergo [Maro est Virgilius.] Quae conversio non est ex particulari in particularem (ut plurimi autumant,) nec ex universali in particularem, sed ex universali in universalem. Ubi, necessitate consequentiae sequitur, Virgil●um de Maron● dici, necessitate verò consequentis, sequitur dici catholi●è.  
Respondeo. 2. Eadem esset difficultas, si pro particulari haberetur: Nam singularis negans convertitur in universalem negantem; v, g. [Socrates non est brutum] ergo [nullum brutum est Socrates;] quare, si prior esset particularis, in conversione augenda esset quantitas.  
Singularis igitur negans convertitur simpliciter (ad modum Universalium) nunc in singularem, nunc in universalem. v. g. [Socrates non est Plato] ergo [Plato non est Socrates:] Item [Socrates non est brutum] ergo [nullum brutum est Socrates:] sicut è contrà [nullum brutum est Socrates] ergo [Socrates non est brutum.] Sin essent hae propositiones negant●s particulares, non essent convertendae nisi per contrapositionem.  
Respondeo. 3. Non in singulares tantùm, sed & in alias universales aliquando convertitur particularis. v. g. [aliquot homines sunt omnes Apostoli] ergo [omnes Apostoli sunt homines] vel [omnes Apostoli sunt aliquot homines.]  
Hactenus vidimus, quomodo singulares differant a reliquis universalibus in affectionibus propositionis, Oppositione, scilicet, & Conversione; & istius differentiae rationem reddi non posse, ni ex nostrâ these▪ propugnat igitur thesin nostram, non adversatur. Utut autem maximè nobis adversaretur, Ramistas tamen nequaquam adjuvat, (quos habeo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 opponentes; reliqui tacitè adversantur dum in paradigmatis modorum propositiones singulares ponunt pro particularibus;) Ramistae namque Oppositionem, Conversionem, etc. Nihil curant: Si igitur in reliquis, de quibus ipsi agunt, cum universalibus conveni●ent satis est cur ipsi saltem nostram thesin admittant.  
Tertium sic est. Proposi●io universalis non concluditur in tertiâ figurâ, (h. e. secundum Ramum, in syllogismo simplici contracto;) at propositio singularis hic concluditur.  
Sed neque hoc Ramistis opitulatur magis quam priora, Illi enim rem negant, nec admi●tunt conclusionem Propriam in syllogismo contracto: Qui definitur a Ramo, Quando argumentum pro exemplo ita subjicitur particulari quaestioni, ut utramque partem antecedens, & assumptione affirmatum intelligatur; (si ergo quaestio semper sit particularis, cer●è nunquam Propria secundum illos:) Explicat hoc Dounamus; Quaestio, inquit, debet esse particularis, non generalis, aut propria; Item, rationem reddens cur syllogismus proprius esse dicitur ex ut●âque prop● â non autem ex omnibus propriis, hanc assignat, Quia in contracto syllogismo conclusio semper particularis est, etiam quum utraque pars antecedentis est propria. Hoc igitur a Ramistis non urgendum muni dici praedicatum, nondum constat an ea praedicatio universalis sit an particularis, quoniam utriusque capax est.  
Dari vero conclusiones singulares in tertiâ figurâ certissimum est (lic●t vix quisquam hoc adverte●it.)  
Basilius- Dam- Maro est poeta. ras- rap. Maro est Virgilius. Ergo ta. ti. Virgilius est poeta.  
Item,  
Ce- Fe- Maro non fuit Ovid. las- lap- Maro fuit Virgilius. Ergo ten. ton. Virgilius non fuit Ovid.  
Etiam quum neutra praemissarum sit singularis. v. g.  
Ce- Fe- Nullum brutum est Socrates. lip- ris- Aliquod brutum est Bucephalus. en. on. Bucephalus ergo non est Socrates▪  
Item,  
Ba- Dam- Omne brutum est animal. tip- tis. Aliquod brutum est Bucephalus. Ergo a. i. Bucephalus est animal.  
(Ubi, si major esset particularis, nihil conclude●et, esset enim ex puris particularibus.) Hoc toties fiet quoties praedicatum minoris est Individuum. Consequentiae horum syllogismorum ex se satis patent: Quod si non, possent (si opus esset) ad primam figuram reducendo demonstrari. Sed neque hoc officit nostrae assertioni; Nam  
Respondeo, (ut prius.) Vi consequentiae sequitur de [Bucephalo] praedicari [Animal] affirmativè [Socratem] negativè, etc. necessitate consequentis praedicantur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, quoniam subjectum est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
2 Sed & in aliis quibusdam universalibus eadem est difficultas. v. g. deseptem planetis,  

Hi septem sunt stellae erraticae. Sed  
Hi septem sunt omnes planetae. Ergo  
Omnes planetae sunt stellae erraticae.   
Triplex igitur haec differentia in propositione singulari ab aliis universalibus, neutiquam enervat assertionem nostram, nec debilitat quicquam, (nisi propositionem singularem ideo diceremus universalem non omnino esse, quia semper est,) sed supponit & confirmat. In singulis enim instantiis, posito (vi consequentiae) de tali subjecto fieri praedicationem, supposito interim quicquid de hoc subjecto dicitur dici 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, infertur hujusmodi praedicatio universalis: Quod ubi subjectum est vox communis secus accidit, posito enim de subjecto communi  
Propositio ergo categorica, vel est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, vel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Haec 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 quae non de subjecto toto dicitur sed quoad partem aliquam subjectivam: Illa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, quae de subjecto dicitur quoad totam ipsius latitudinem praedicandi. h. e. de partibus singulis subjectivis. Cujus subiectum si sit vox communis & multis applicabilis, iis omnibus applicatur etiam praedicatum, prout in plerisque universalibus; sin vox sic singularis & uni tantùm applicabilis, huic uni & praedicatum applicatur; prout in singularibus, & in propositionibus per Omne collectivum; (non enim eodem modo dicitur [omnes planetae sunt septem] & [omnes planetae sunt stellae▪] alterum enim collectiuè dicitur, alterum distributiuè: Omnes distributiuè idem est ac Singuli; Omnes collectiuè est singulorum collectio, at singulorum collectio est singularis, est que totum (non universale▪ sed) integrale; planetae sunt septem, at planetarum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unica est: Omne distributivum est syncategorematicum, Omne collectivum est categorematicum, est que pars subjecti; Unde non rectè concluditur, [Omnes planetae sunt septem, Sol & Luna sunt planetae, Ergo, Sol & Luna sunt septem,] nisi assumeretur [Sol & Luna sunt omnes planetae] non enim [Planetae] sed [omnes Planetae] est subjectum majoris, essetque praedicatum minoris, su●itur enim collectiuè.) Sive autem de singulis quibus attribuitur subjectum universale, sive de uno cui attribuitur subjectum singulare, dicatur praedicatum, ●trobique tamen nihil subjecti accipere licet de quo non dicetur praedicatum, quod secundum Aristotelem est formalis ratio propositionis universalis; quare & propositio de subjecto singulari est praedicatio 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, sive Dictum de Omni. Quod erat demonstrandum.   

Quantitas non differt realiter a re quantâ.  
AD quaestionis resolutionem, necessarium est de Distinctio. nibus in genere, aliquid praemittere. Distinctio ergo est vel Realis, Rationis, vel Modalis. Realis, quando extrema differunt ut res & res, sine aliquâ intrinsecâ dependentiâ unius ad aliud; unde statuuntur vulgò per divinam potentiam posse mutuò separari. Modalis, quando differunt quidem ex parte rei▪ ita tamen ut alterum includat essentialem▪ respectum seu con●exionem ad alterum; unde non possunt separatione mutuâ (h. e. ut utrumque separatum existat) separari; est que inter rem & modum, vel (secundariò) inter modos ejusdem rei, (modi tamen plerumque separari possunt mutuò, ab invicem, non a subjectis.) Distinctio Rationis, quando unum aliquod a parte rei, concipitur ab intellect● ut diversum; est que vel rationis ratiocinantis, vel ratiocinatae; haec ●it per inadaequatos conceptus ejusdem rei, & fundamentum aliquod habet in re; illa verò quando quid intelligitur sub diversis conceptibus sine fundamento in re.  
Per rem quantam, intelligo Materiam, quae est adaequatum subjectum quantitatis, cui primò in●ae●et, sic Thomas. 1. q. ●. a. 2. Forma nempe substantialis non est per se subjectum quantitatis, neque extenditur aut dividitur per se, sed ad extensionem & divisionem materiae, non secus ac existentia, & praesentia localis, aut situs, aliique modi, ut & accidentia absoluta, Calor, color, etc. (unde vel est modus substantialis, vel in hoc saltem imitatur naturam modorum. Siquis mallet totum Compositum dici subjectum quantitatis, mihi non nocet.  
Assertio prima▪ Quantitas non diff●rt a substantiâ quantâ plus quam modaliter. Probatur ex natu●â Modi, quam assignat Suarez. disp. 7. sect. 1 num. 17. Ubi supponit in rebus creatis praeter enti●ates earum quasi substantiales & radicales (ut appellat) inveniri quosdam m●dos reales, quae & sunt aliquid positivum, & afficiunt ipsas entitates per seipsos, dando illis aliquid, quod est extra e●istentiam totam ●● individuam & existentem; high tamen modi sunt ejusmodi entitatis ut non addant propriam entitatem novam, sed solùm modificant praeexistentem: & sect. 1. n. 10. tam essentiale est, inquit, modo esse actu affixum & modificantem rem cujus est modus ut repugnet de potentiâ absolutâ conservari sine illâ re, seu aliter quam actu modificando illam. E contra verò, quae realiter differunt ut res & res, possunt saltem per divinam potentiam separari, ut n. 22. & seq: Unde sic disputo, Quae non possunt per divinam potentiam separari separatione mutuâ, e● non differunt realiter; Sed quantitas & substantia quanta etc. Ergo. Major patet ex supra dictis. Minor probatur; Repug●at enim▪ quantitatem separatam a re quantâ existere, propter intrinsecam dependentiam quantitatis a materiâ; sive enim essentia quantitatis consistat in mensurabilitate, sive in divisibilitate, sive in extensione & positione partium extra partes, semper tamen manet necessaria connexio cum partibus materialibus; quomodo enim erit pars extra partem, ubi partes nullae sunt? quomodo mensurabitur aliquid aut dividetur ubi nulla extensio, nullae partes? quomodo dabitur figuratio & situatio seu partium positio ubi partes non sunt. Dices, dantur partes quantitativae, licèt non materiales. Sed contra, vel partes extensae sunt partes materiales, vel materia non est quanta: sin per quantitatem materia est quanta, erit quantitas extensio partium materialium, quod quî fieri potest ubi non est materia? Iterum, figura & situs necessario conjunguntur; hinc Suarez d. 52. s. ●. ●. 10. Figura ut sic non est positio (seu situs) sed illa dispositio totius in ordine ad locum secundum talem ordinem partium ex quâ sequitur talis figura; (quis non hic videt partes figuratas & sit●atas easdem esse?) si ergo figura sequitur ad situm, non erit ubi non est situs, situs autem cum sit modus substantiae non potest esse ubi non est substantia, & per consequens nec figura, ergo nec quantitas, quae sine figurâ non est. Dices, quidni quantitas possit esse sine figurâ? h. e. res sine modo? Respondeo, potest esse quantitas sine qualibet figura, non sine omni; sicut & corpus potest esse sine quolibet particulari Ubi, non tamen ita quin sit Alicubi; nec tamen ubicatio definit esse modus; Possunt ergo modi quilibet in actu exercito abesse a re modificatâ, non semper in actu signato, nempe quoties formaliter resultant ex it sà naturâ rei positâ: datâ verò tali extensione & dispositione par tium per quantitatem resultat talis figuratio v. g. tribus lineis taliter dispositis, resultat protinus figura ●ringularis.  
Argumentum secundum. Quorum modi non differunt realiter ea nec ipsa differunt realiter; At modus substantiae & modus quantitatis non differunt realiter, Ergo nec ipsae. Majorem suppeditat ●uarez, d. 7. s 1. n. 25. ubi statuit duos modos ejusdem rei differre modaliter, duos autem modos diversarum rerum differre realiter; Modi, inquit, in re distincti, ut sunt praesentia localis v. g. & subsistentia humanitatis▪ aut comparantur tantum ut sunt in ●âdem re, & sic distinguuntur solùm modaliter, qui quum ex se non habent propriam entitatem, etiam ex se non habent unde plus quam modaliter distinguantur, neque ex re quam afficiunt plus distinguuntur, quia supponimus esse eandem, non habent ergo majorem distinctionem quam modalem, & confirmatur, quia unusquisque eorum habet identitatem aliquam cum illa re quam afficit, ergo in illâ & per illam habent aliquam identitatem inter se, ergo retinent solùm distinctionem modalem; at verò si inter se comparentur modi afficientes res diversas, sive illi modi sint ejusdem rationis ut duae subsistentiae duorum hominum, sive diversarum rationum ut sessio unius & subsistentia alterius, sic distinctio est realis, non ratione ipsorum, sed rerum in quibus sunt, nam unusquisque habet identitatem aliquam cum re quam afficit, & illae res distinguuntur inter se realiter, ergo & modi ratione illarum. Haec ille. Realis igitur identitas modorum arguit realem identitatem rerum modificatarum. Ad Minorem devenio, quòd modus quantitatis non differt realiter a modo substantiae; insto in Figurâ & Situ. Figura enim est modus quantitatis, & situs modus substantiae, nec tamen differunt realiter. Quòd figura sit modus quantitatis, in confesso est apud omnes; Sic Smiglecius, Figura non est terminus quantitatis, sed terminorum quantitatis dispositio. quid hoc aliud quam modus? Scheiblerus in Metaph. Figura, inquit, est qualitas modificans quantitatis terminos, unde ●● non convenit quantitas, ei consequenter nec figura, quae modus illius est, convenire potest. Scaliger etiam ait, Figuram non esse quantitatem, sed in quantitate. Suarez item disp. 7. s. 2. n. 10. Est ergo figura modus quantitatis▪ Situm esse modum substantiae non minùs patet. Smigl. Situs est dispositio partium corporis in loco; quid hoc aliud quam modus? Scheiblerus, Ex●stimo, inquit, situm non significare peculiarem entitatem, sed significare modum quendam in ●â re quae denominatur, neque enim apparet indicium unde sumatur realis distinctio; Unde definit situm, accidens secundum quod corpus habet ordinem suarum partium in Ubi. Suarez, relinquitur, inquit, ut dicamus situm seu positionem esse aliquem intrinsecum modum corporis situatia quo sic denominatur sedens au● jaciens aut aliquid simile. Est ergo situs modus substantiae. Figuram verò & situm non differre realiter patet; nam eadem partium dispositio quae in ordine ad totum dicitur figura, in ordine ad locum dicitur situs; quod cum sit tantum respectus rationis, non sufficit ad distinctionem ●ealem, imò vix rationis ratiocinatae. Hinc Smiglecius, est situs, inquit, figura quaedam corporis prout existit in loco, eademque figura ut respicit corpus in seipso est figura corporis pertinens ad qualitatem, ut verò est figura corporis in ordine ad locum se● figura positionis partium corporis in loco, ita pertinet ad praedicamentum sitûs. Nec aliter Suarez; quum enim inter species sitûs enumerâsset asperum & laeve, hinc, inquit, videtur sequi etiam curvum & rectum, prout praecisè oriuntur ex positione partium in loco pertinere ad praedicamentum sitûs, quia etiam illae differentiae dicunt quandam dispositionem totius consurgentem ex positione partium, quod, inquit, admittere non est magnum inconveniens, nam revera statio & sessio ratione rectitudinis & curvitatis maximè differunt, non quòd ipsa figura ut sic sit positio (seu situs) & pertineat ad hoc praedicamentum, sed illa dispositio totius in ordine ad locum secundum talem ordinem partium, ex quâ sequitur talis figura. Figura ergo & situs, quorum illa quantitatis, hic substantiae modus est, non magis differunt quam ratione; quare nec eorum subjecta.  
Argumentum tertium. Entia realiter distincta non possunt fundare ●undem modum; sed Substantia & quantitas fundant ●undem modum. Ergo. Praecedens argumentum processit de subjectis adaequatis, quòd duo modi in diversis subjectis realiter differant, hoc procedit de subjectis partialibus & inadaequatis, quòd duo entia realiter distincta non possint esse subjecta partialia ejusdem modi; sed substantia & quantitas sunt subjecta partialiae ejusdem numero modi. Ergo. Majorem ponit Suarez, d 7. s. 2. n. 16. Patet etiam: sic enim idem realiter differ●et a seipso: nam situs v. g. si fundatur in substantiâ simul & quantitate, cumutrisque identificatur, quae si realiter distinguantur, ●a, quae cum his sunt realiter eadem, realiter inter se differunt, & situs, si utrisque idem, a seipso differet: Dices, unio formae cum materiâ est modus, fundatur tamen in utroque extremo quae realiter differunt, nam materia & forma uniuntur, quare & idem modus in rebus realiter distinctis. Respondeo, unio qua uniuntur materia & forma non simplex est, sed duplex, una in materiâ per quam ipsa unitur formae, alia in formâ per quam ipsa unitur materiae. Sicut in relationibus, v. g. Socrates & Plato sunt similes (puta in albedine) non tamen per eandem similitudinem sed per diversam, relatum enim & correlatum referuntur ad invicem per relationes diversas; nec enim relatio patris ad filium eadem est cum relatione filii ad patrem; & licèt in relationibus ejusdem nominis res non sit adeò perspicua, ratio tamen eadem est, habent enim distincta fundamenta; sic similitudo Socratis ad Platonem fundatur in albedine Socratis, similitudo Platonis ad Socratem in albedine Platonis, quae fundamenta cum sint realiter distincta, ita & relationes quae cum fundamentis identificantur: ut autem Socrates & Plato sunt similes per duas realiter distinctas similitudines, ita materia & forma uniuntur per duas realiter distinctas uniones (si saltem ipsae materia & forma realiter distinguantur.)  
Minor sequitur, Insubstantiâ simul & quantitate fundatur idem modus. Quod enim fundatur in subst●●tiâ quatenus qu●tâ, & resultat ex ips● quantitate, illud fundatur in substantiâ simul & quantitate; Sed sic figura, & situs. Ergo. Quòd Figura sit modus quantitatis, suprà ostensum est; Quòd non ultimatim fundetur in quantitate quin & substantiam modificet, patet ex ipsâ descriptione quam habet Suarez, disp. 42. s. 3. n. 15. quòd sit, `` modus quidam resultans ex corpore `` ex terminatione magnitudinis; est ergo modus in corpore resultans ex quantitate, substantiam pariter & quantitatem modificans▪ Nec enim negari potest, ipsum corpus, ejusque partes substantiales & entitativas (quas vocant) eandem figurationem & eosdem terminos habere quos habet quantitas. Idem de Situ dicendum est. Quòd ●itus sit modus substantiae ita notum est ut nihil magis; quòd autem non in substantiâ purâ fundetur, sed in substantiâ quantâ▪ aequè patet. Smiglecius, restri●gitur (inquit) situs ad corpus; ad situationem enim requiruntur extensio, & multitudo partium materialium, at extensio & materialitas non reperiuntur nisi in materialibus. Duo nempe requirit ad situationem, extensionem, quae est a quantitate, & partes materiales, a substantiâ; fundatur ergo situs in substantiâ simul & quantitate. Pariter Suarez. disp. 61. eâdem ratione negat situm substantiis incorporeis, nempe quia partes non habent sed sint●otae in toto & totae in qualibet parte▪ Figura igitur quae est modus quantitatis, & situs, qui est modus substantiae, non fundantur vel in substantiâ solâ, vel in solâ quantitate, sed in substantiâ simul & quantitate, seu in substantiâ quantâ; cum autem idem modus non fundetur in diversis realiter subjectis ne quidem partialibus sequitur, substantiam & quantitatem non esse realiter diversa. Nec dicendum est, unum esse situm substantiae, alterum quantit●tis: si corpus enim tuetur a proprio situ sine quantitate (idem valet de extens●one, positione partium extra partes, & reliquis officiis quan●i●atis) quid opus est aliâ situatione à quantitate? imò substantia esset quanta sine quantitate, situs enim ponit partes extra partes in toto, quod est formale quantitatis▪ Confirmari posset ulteriùs ex ●o quòd figura sit modus quantitatis, situs verò modus substantiae, figura autem & situs non differant realiter, nedum modaliter, & quidem vix ratione ratiocinatâ; idem ergo modus in substantiâ fundatur simul & quantitate; Sed de his supra. Atque hactenus Assertio prima.  
Assertio secunda. Probabile est neque modaliter differre substantiam a quantitate, sed tantùm ratione ratiocinatâ. Ad distinctionem rationis ratiocinatae requi●itur distinctio conceptuum cum unitate & indistinctione a parte rei: Hinc Suarez, d. 7. s. 2. n. 28. ut distinctio (inquit) judicetur rationis & non rei, satis est ut praeter distinctionem conceptuum nullum inveniatur signum ad distinctionem modalem aut realem cognoscendam, nam cum distinctiones non multiplicandae sint sine causa, & sola distinctio conceptuum non sufficiat ad inferendam majorem distinctionem, quandocunque cum illâ distinctione conceptuum non adjungitur aliud signum majoris distinctionis, judicanda semper est distinctio rationis & non rei: hinc infert, `` quandocunque constat aliqua, quae in re unita & conjuncta sunt, ita esse in conceptibus objectivis distincta, ut in re & individuo sint prorsus inseparabilia, tam mutuò quam non mutuò, tum magnum & fere certum est argumentum non distingui actu in re sed ratione ratiocinatâ. Haec ille. Cum ergo in materiâ & quantita re nullum appareat signum realis aut quidem modalis distinctionis, separationis mutuae vel non mutuae, tam ex potentiâ ordinar●â quam absolutâ, cum quantitativa extensio formaliter resultet ex partibus entitativis; probabile est, non differre plus quam ratione. Atque hoc concedit Suarez paenè, nisi quod mysterium Eucharistiae impediret, dist. 7. s. 2. n. 10. per mysterium (inquit) Eucharistiae certiùs nobis constat, quantitatem esse rem distinctam a materiâ, quam per cognitionem naturalem constare potuisset. Videmus ergo unde Jesuitarum pertinacia de reali quantitatis distinctione, ne scilicet periret mysterium Transubstantiationis; quod illi de fide tenent, nos pari confidentiâ negamus. Adjungam argumentum ipsius Suarez, quo probat ille durationem non distingui ex parte rei ab existentiâ rei durantis, dist. 59 s, 1. n. 8. quia existentia inseparabilis est a parte rei a duratione▪ & ● contrario duratio ab existenti●, & in unaquaque re utraque est aequè variabilis vel invariabilis, ut si existentia sit omnino necessaria, etiam duratio; si illa corruptibilis vel incorruptibilis, haee similiter; si altera permane●s, etiam altera; si una successiva, etiam altera; ergo a parte rei non distinguitur. Haec ille, de existentiâ & duratione. Pariter ego desubstanti● & quantitate, ubi materia ibi quantitas & contra, si materia non existat sine quantitate (ut fatetur ipse, d. 7. s. 2. n. 11.) nec etiam quantitas sine materiâ (quicquid ille contrà garriat in Transubstantiatione,) si materia ingenerabilis & incorruptibilis sic quantitas, si in augmentatione acqui●itur aut in diminution deperditur aliquid materiae sic & quantitatis, si in raresactione & condensatione manet eadem materia sic & eadem quantitas, si in his motibus variantur termini materiae sic & quantitatis, denique cum sint aequè separabiles aut ●nseparabiles, aequè variabiles & invariabiles, nullum apparet indicium cur plus quam ratione ratiocinat▪ distinguantur. Concludo igitur, quòd materia & quantitas non distinguuntur inter se realiter, ut res & res, & (probabiliter) neque modaliter, sed tantùm ratione ratiocinata, h. e. ut inadaequati conceptus ejusdem rei.  
Alia prae manibus erant quae put●ssem annexuisse; sed editio posthuma, esto & abortiva.   
FINIS.