THE DISCOURSES OF CLEANDER AND EUDOXUS UPON THE PROVINCIAL LETTERS.  
By a lover of Peace and Concord.  
Translated out of a French Copy.  
Printed at Cullen MDCXCIV.   

A TABLE OF THE DISCOURSES.  

I. DISCOURSE. THE subject and occasion of these Discourses. pag. 1.  
II. DISCOURSE. An examen of the Jesuits Policy according to Pascal's system in the fifth Provincial Letter. pag. 27.  
III. DISCOURSE. Of the Doctrine of Probable Opinions. pag. 70.  
iv DISCOURSE. About the same subject. pag. 123.  
V DISCOURSE. An examen of the fourth and fifth Provincial Letters. pag. 171.  
VI DISCOURSE. An examen of the first Provincial Letter, about the Purity of Language, style and rules of Dialogues, etc. pag. 232. 

An examen of the sixth Provincial Letter.    
VII. DISCOURSE. An examen of the tenth Provincial Letter, concerning Pascals reproaching the Jesuits, for teaching that the Love of God is not necessary for Salvation. pag. 308. 

Examen of the distinction between Probable in Practice, and Probable in Speculation; relating to the seventh, and thirteenth Provincial Letters. pag. 352.  
Examen of the Doctrine concerning the direction of Intention, relating to the seventh Provincial Letter. pag. 369.  
Examen of the Doctrine of Equivocations and Mental Reservations, relating to the ninth Provincial Letter. pag. 379.      

THE DISCOURSE OF Cleander and Eudoxus UPON THE PROVINCIAL LETTERS.  

The First Discourse.  
THE Character of the persons speaking in these Dialogues, as just and natural as it is, is not very common in this Age. They are two men perfectly neuters, in a controversy wherein the world is infinitely divided: their main care is, to watch against all prejudices, that might incline them more to one party, than to the other: And they continued in this right disposition of mind, in this evenness and equality of temper, till their own strict inquiries, sagacity and judgement, with an exact discussion of some decisive points of fact turn the scales, and determine them to join with those that have the truth on their side.  
The matter before them is, what men ought to think of the Provincial Letters, that famous book so esteemed, so decried; so commended, so detested; so useful to Christianity, say some, so pernicious and so scandalous say others. The subject well deserves attention: And that both the Jesuits and their Adversaries, and those also that have declared for, or against either party, should interest themselves in the examination of an affair hitherto so little cleared, or made plain.  
Many men of great quality having, for some years past, made that which is to be the subject of these Dialogues, the subject of their conversations, I might have introduced, without any improbability, or injury to truth, real persons, whose names are equally known and illustrious; but the gust or relish of our age, in this very different from that of old Rome, and old Greece, where the Crassus', the Catta's, the Socrates, and the very authors themselves under their own names used to be brought in speaking in such kind of works, obliges me to take another method: and therefore though they are the thoughts, reflections, reasonings and decisions of Mr. .......... and Mr. ......... which are here set down, yet must it be under the names of Cleander and Eudoxus, that they are to be understood to speak.  
A book published three or four years ago was the occasion of their first discourse about the Provincial Letters: this book is called, Le Paralelle des Anciens & des Moderns: but they were hindered, at its first coming forth, from reading it, by a long voyage they had made out of the territories of France: as soon as they had read it throu', having made, as they went along, several reflections according to their usual custom upon all new books, that are worth the while, Cleander put Eudoxus in mind of a passage, that had startled them, the discussion of which they had put of to the end, because it was like to be long, and that they had a mind, once for all, to satisfy themselves fully upon that chapter. It was the passage in the second tome, where the Provincial Letters are mentioned, and where all the persons in the Dialogue conspired to give those Letters the greatest commendation that ever was, or can be given of any work; 
Paralelle des Anciens & des Moderns. Tom 2. pag. 121.  here are the very words Mr. Perrault makes them speak.  The Precedent. 
You see than that Lucian and Cicero, who you acknowledge are able men, have made Dialogues; what men of this age will you compare to them?  The Abbot. 
I could compare with them many authors, who at this day are excellent in this way of writing. But I will content myself to make one only enter the lists with them: that is the illustrious Mr. Pascal with his eighteen Provincial Letters, which have been read by a million of men without ever tireing, I can assure you, any one of them, but for a single moment.  The Knight. 
I have read them above ten times; and notwithstanding my natural impatience, the longest always pleased me most.  The Abbot. 
In the language there is nothing but purity, greatness in the thoughts, solidity in the reasoning, finess in the raillery; and all over such a grace as one shall hardly found elsewhere.  The Precedent. 
I own that these Letters are very pleasant and diverting: but will you compare eighteen small, lose, flying papers, with the Dialogues of Plato, Lucian and Cicero, which make several great volumes?  The Abbot. 
The number or bigness of the volumes signifies nothing; if in these eighteen Letters there be more wit, than in all the Dialogues of Plato; more neat and delicate raillery, than in those of Lucian; but raillery inoffensive, never transgressing the Rules of decency and good manners; if there be more strength and more art in his reasonings, than in those of Cicero: lastly, if the art of Dialogue be found there whole and entire, ought not the smallness of the volume to be a commendation rather than a reproach? to speak truth, we have nothing better in this kind of writing; have you read the latin translation of them?  The Precedent. 
I have, and it is very fine.  The Knight. 
Did it please you as much as the original?  The Precedent. 
Full as much.  The Knight. 
I am very glad on't. You know that in Greek Lucian's Dialogues are admirably witty; but in Ablancourts translation, dull and insipid: and as to the Provincial Letters you say the French and Latin do equally divert you. Confess that I have catched you napping in the point of prejudice or prepossession.  
Most certainly, said Eudoxus, either this encomium is excessive, or else this book is a masterpiece of the wit of man: for not only the stile is pure, the thoughts noble, the reasoning solid, the raillery neat; but There is nothing but exactness, greatness, solidity, wit and grace. In one word, All the art of Dialogue is there whole and entire. They cannot more expressly free them from all sorts of faults, nor more fully include in them all manner of perfections. Mr. Perrault's Abbot has sometimes without doubt the faculty of tasting and judging well; I am only afraid for him and Mr. Pascal of hyperboles. That a million of men should have read the Provincial Letters, is certainly one, answers Cleander, which our language allows him: for the arithmetic of Grammarians is not so exact nor so scrupulous, as that of merchants and bankers. But for that which he adds, that among this infinite number of readers not one was wearied, he ought at lest to have excepted the Jesuits, who I am confident had no great pleasure in reading them.  
Why so? replies Eudoxus: I have seen many of 'em, who told me they had found that book very agreeable and diverting: not indeed, that they believed all that was there set down was true: for they pretend that his Railleries' always decent and civil, as Mr. Perrault styles them, are gross and infamous calumnies: but yet, like men of wit they distinguished the turn and manner of expression, which pleased them, from the things themselves, which vexed them.  
That in good earnest is a pleasant fancy, and I love them for it, says Cleander, that while all the world is made merry at their cost, they themselves should share in the diversion; after the example of Socrates, who laughed as well as the other spectators, at Aristophanes' Comedies, where he himself was played upon, and made the subject of the sport. And yet after all I believe if Pascals Letters had no other judges or approvers but these Fathers, they would run a great risque of losing part of their reputation. For which reason I think we should do well to take other rules for criticising on this occasion: and that, generally speaking, the best that we can follow, in examining the works of Pascal and his friends, and in examining the Jesuits books, is not to give too much credit either to the one or to the other. There is good reason for exceptions against both; and more especially in the affair in hand, rather than any other. This is like one of those knotty suits in law, wherein, by the number of justifications, recriminations, replies, and rejoinders, there appears nothing clear of either side. The public was never more divided: half the world have declared that the Jesuits are guilty of lose morals: the other half look upon the Jansenists as detractors and calumniators, for decrying so considerable a body of the church, in revenge to the zeal they have shown against their novelties and their errors. Those who have only read the Provincial Letters are of the first opinion: those that have read but the Jesuits answers are of the other; but for my part, who have read both, I know not yet what to think. Let us begin there, if you please: this is the chief point, or almost the only one we have to examine: for as to the politeness, the elegance, the wit and the purity of the language, I believe we shall both be of Mr. Perrault's opinion.  
What, says Eudoxus, briskly interrupting him, I am not at all satisfied with you, at the very moment you caution against prejudice, and show the evil of it, do you yourself give into it; and immediately, without hesitation, subscribe to the most extraordinary panegyrics that ever was made of any book written in our language? the greater, the more pompous, and the more unrestrained the commendation is, the more it ought to be suspected: and I do own, that it would be a sensible pleasure to me, to found some spots in this Sun, which they would have me look upon as the pure fountain of light.  
When the prepossession becomes general, replies Cleander, it ought not longer to pass under that name; at jest in the ill signification which is commonly given to the word. There is nothing but truth, evident truth, that can make its way throu', and be acceptable to all the world. And you yourself do agreed with me, that there are none, not excepting even the Jesuits, that do not do Pascal justice; upon the point, wherein I desire your concurrence.  
The maxim you advance, answers Eudoxus, how true and general soever it may seem, admits of some exceptions, most especially in works of the understanding. I allow that no book could ever have an universal and constant approbation, which was not extremely well writ. The case of that, and of the Preachers of the Court and of the City, is one and the same: a talon that is but common and indifferent, by whatever faction or party it may hap to be cried up and supported, will most certainly, early or late, fall to the ground: on the contrary, a vogue or reputation, followed with a crowd of hearers, and increasing, instead of diminishing, with the length of time, is a manifest conviction of an extraordinary merit, but as there are several degrees of excellence, I presume that a work, excellent in the main, being once supposed to be such, may afterwards, by the strength and power of prejudice and prepossession, pass for most excellent and incomparable. How many old authors are there, whose very faults are esteemed, and even their negligences admired rather than censured? has not this been observed by our author of the Parallel des Anciens & des Moderns, and by some critics a little bolder than the rest? and how do we know that this is not the good fortune of the Provincial Letters, and that Mr. Pascal being once allowed to writ well, and that in his work there was art, close transitions, neat expressions, a great deal of wit, and a great deal of ornament, men took not up an opinion, That there is nothing but purity in the language, nobleness in the thoughts, finess in the railleries, and all over such a grace as is hardly to be found elsewhere: that the art of Dialogue is there preserved whole and entire; and that there is nothing better extent in this kind of writing. Indeed I would not willingly engage myself to show you faults in every page, nor make a list of all his ill expressions, as long as that which the author Des entretiens d' Ariste & d' Eugene, sometimes since made, of those found in the translation of Thomas à Kempis De l'imitation de Jesus Christ; another pretended masterpiece, every where preached up for a model of the purity of our language; but perhaps as we go along I may found enuff to make you abate somewhat, in these very points, of the high thoughts you have of these Letters.  
You could not do me a greater pleasure, replies Cleander, and I freely confess the fault I have committed against our main maxim; and to make use of the author of the Parallele's expression, in the passage we have just now read, you have surprised me In the very fact.  
It is so natural, says Eudoxus, to suffer ourselves to be carried away with the stream, that it is not without much difficulty and reflection, that we can master our inclinations to rash judgement; we are naturally prove to judge of every thing, and at the same time to hate that application which is necessary to do it well; and so fond are we of truth, that we immediately leap at, and almost never fail to take any thing for truth, which has but the lest shadow or appearance of it. But you must know, that there never were more cunning contrivances, nor more traps laid to catch men, than there have been in this very matter: both sides cry out, have a care of prejudices, judge of the things only by pure reason, by experience, and the matters of fact.  
My dear reader, says Wendrock, in the preface to his latin translation of the Provincial Letters; I beg the favour of you that you would come prepared to read this book with a pure and unprejudiced mind; and to judge of it rather by your own insight and reason, than by the knowledge and understanding of any other; give me leave only to advertise you, that, in case you have suffered yourself to be prepossessed against these Letters, by the clamours of the Jesuits, it is but just, that before you begin them, you should lay aside all your prejudices, as every prudent reader ought to do.  
On the other hand, the Jesuits Apologist cries as loud as he can in his reader's ear. My dear reader, let not the writer of these Letters surprise you; or if he has already done it, let him not longer abuse your credulity; which advice I think myself obliged to give you.  
That is to say, says Cleander interrupting him, that both sides, by much exclaiming and adviseing against prejudices, do all they can to fill us with prepossessions; and by seeming to give us an antidote against poison, endeavour to make us swallow the poison itself.  
Very right, answers Eudoxus, and in such occasions as these both parties seldom fail of gaining their ends, when either of them is heard without the other.  
But I foresee, says Cleander, that to judge of the present matter, with that equity, and exactness you pretend, we shall have need of more than one Library. For I have not in mine, nor I fancy have you in yours, Escobar, Fagundez, Della-Cruz, Vera-Cruz and all the rest, whose very names so frightened Montaltius, that he had much a do to believe they were Christians.  
We shall have no want of that, answers Eudoxus, I have a friend, a Jansenist, who has all the Casuists of the Society, and who will be delighted to show them to us. But I do not believe we ought to begin there: before we come to the discussion of the passages in the Jesuit Divines, there are some general points, upon which we may argue without the help of a library. One of which, is Pascal's System of the Jesuits policy, to make themselves masters of the people's consciences, not for the greater glory of God, but for the greater glory of the Society. It is an article of large extent, and many things depend upon it: and in the Provincial Letters great care is taken, that the readers should never loose it quite out of sight: and if we take Wendroks' word, this is properly the business, and the subject matter of these Letters: this you may see by the title he has given his latin translation. 
* Lewis Montalt's Provincial Letters, of the jesuits moral and political doctrine.  Ludovici Montaltij Litterae Provinciales, de morali & politicâ Jesuitarum disciplinâ. Let us, I pray you, this week, read with care and attention the Provincial Letters, and the Jesuits answers, and every thing relating to this subject; that we may afterwards communicate our reflections to one another; which done, we will, if you please, descend to particulars; to the end that once for all, we may choose our sides. With all my heart, says Cleander, and you may depend upon it, that I will do it with all possible exactness, and all the care imaginable.  
It must be acknowledged, answers Eudoxus, that these Letters have given the Jesuits reputation a terrible wound; and that they have debauched and drawn away from them a vast number of their friends, in Court, City and Country. Nor has any thing more increased the number of their adversaries: never was there a diversion made to better purpose, nor with greater effect than this. That book alone has made more Jansenists, than Jansenius' Augustinus, and all Mr. Arnauld's books together.  
This book has yet done more, adds Cleander; it has made in France a kind of a third party, which shall be mine, in case Montaltius be not found to impose upon the Jesuits: it is of those, who abhorring novelties in the dispute of Grace, and in all other controverted points, submit themselves sincerely to the Church, without wrangling by the unsincere distinction of Fact and Right; and who likewise cannot bear the relaxation of morals, wherewith the Jesuits are reproached: and upon my word this party is almost as numerous as the other two.  
Without doubt it ought to be very numerous, says Eudoxus, and I look upon it to be somewhat like that, which was in France in the beginning of Henry the IV's. Reign, whilst he continued a Huguenot. The Zeal of Religion on one side, and the unjust pretensions of the Leaguers on the other, made an infinity of persons stand neuters, and hindered them from declaring either for the League, or for the King, before he embraced the Religion of his Ancestors. But I much doubt whether the conversion of the Jesuits would have as good an effect for them, as that of the King had for himself; and whether their innocence, if fully cleared, would wholly turn that party to their side. The indifferent, and the well minded honest people would do them justice: but how many are there who follow this third party, either because they were not considered, nor courted by the Jansenists, nor by the Jesuits; or because, how nice soever they are about the article of faith, they are not so in the article of charity?  
How many think you are there, who without examining, as exactly as we intent to do, the accusations against the Jesuits, have no other ground, nor other reason for the disadvantageous judgements they pass upon their doctrine, but the authority of the Provincial Letters; or the authority of some persons, who have taken no more pains than they, to inform themselves of the truth? how few in the world have taken care to defend themselves from being surprised in this matter, either by reading the Jesuits answers, which they have not so much as looked into; or by examining and comparing the passages, which these Fathers maintain were altered, mangled and transposed; or by certain reflections natural enuff, which ought to have hindered them from precipitating their judgement, in things of this nature and importance? believe me, that men, who in the same kind of offices and employments emulate or strive to outdo each other, men who in the Schools maintain and defend contrary opinions, and men who being of the same community or society, do greatly love its fame and reputation, and wish it might outshine and excel all others, are very prove to pass a rash judgement on the affairs of such, as may stand in their way, and give them any jealousy, or obstruct their glory or advancement. They are neither the rules of prudence, nor of the strictest morals which are than always followed: but however it be, the Jesuits will for a long time, feel the effects of the blow the Jansenists have given them.  
It is certain, answers Cleander, that the Gentlemen of Port-Royal showed themselves Masters in the art of policy and cunning: they were very near their ruin; the doctrine of Jansenius had been condemned at Rome; the condemnation received with all possible submission, not only in France, but likewise over all the Catholic Church; and the King, by an express Declaration, directed to all the Prelates of the Kingdom, had commanded the publication and execution of it: he had sent the Pope's Decree to the Paris Divines in Sorbonne, and an order in writing by Mr. de la moth Hodencourt, the than Bishop of Rennes, that they should take care, for the time to come, that nothing, though never so little deviating from this rule of Faith, should be taught or advanced, either in Theses or Lessons by the Doctors or Bachelors of their Society. Upon this order, they made a decree, prohibiting all Doctors and Bachelors from teaching or defending any of the propositions condemned, upon pain of being expelled the University. The Clergy of France, than assembled at Paris, had written to Pope Innocent the X. upon the conclusion of this important affair, Letters of thanks and congratulation, signed by Cardinal Mazarin and all the other Prelates. The distinction of Fact and Right, which seemed to be the parties last ressource, was, sometimes after, detested, by another Assembly of the Clergy, as a wicked evasion, and pernicious artifice of the Port-Royal's, to re-establish, insensibly, their errors. Nor could there possibly be any thing better done, to confounded and break all this party's measures, than the circular Letter written, upon this occasion, by the Bishops of this Assembly, to all the rest of the Bishops of the Kingdom; and their Letter, which, presently after, they sent to the Pope, to acquaint his Holiness with this new difficulty and contrivance.  
Mr. Arnauld's proposition, That the Gospel points us out a just Man in the person of Saint Peter, who upon an occasion wanted Grace, wherein it cannot be said that he did not Sin: after several consultations in Sorbonne, was condemned and declared rash, wicked, blasphemous, already anathematised and heretical: he himself turned out of Sorbonne, with disgrace, his name blotted out of the Catalogue of Doctors, and by the same decree, all that should come into their assemblies, and all the Bachelors, that, for the future, should hold Divinity acts, were obliged to subscribe to this censure and condemnation. In a word, there never was any party more scurvily handled and run down, than this was, both by the Ecclesiastic, and by the Secular powers. When these cunning men, all on a sudden, altering the Scene changed the whole face of things; and at the same time that some pitied, others blamed, and not a few affronted them, and rejoiced at their condition, they fell upon acting a Comedy, that made the Spectators forget all that had newly passed; they started a fresh game, and put a tric upon the Public almost without their perceiving it; and made them hunt the Jesuits, upon whom turning short they fell with violence, fury and cunning; having at first made a show, as if their design had been to run down the Sorbonne; they put them upon the defensive, and pushed them home so briskly, that they got ground, and gained the applauses of many, who a little before had no thoughts for them, but of rage and indignation. Infine many, after they had, for some time, looked upon them as corrupters of the faith, were insensibly drawn in, to consider them as the great defenders and restorers of Christian Morals, and the discipline of the Church.  
As, far as I perceive, replies Eudoxus, you are well instructed in this history.  
I was that year at Paris, answers Cleander, where I finished my Studies in the Law. I had some friends among both parties, which made me improve, more than ever, the curiosity I always had to know what passes in such kind of disputes. I knew a great deal of the intriqus of both sides, and I could at that time have written admirably well the history of Jansenisme.  
Since it is so, said Eudoxus, recollect I pray you the particular history at lest of the Provincial Letters, and tell me all the circumstances of that whole affair. This perhaps may not be unuseful towards instructing us in the cause now in hand. With all my heart, answers Cleander, I remember them very well, and can satisfy you immediately.  
Mr. Arnould perceived, that all the serious Apologies he could make for Jansenius and himself, could never miss of being seriously examined; he was likewise well satisfied, whatever good opinion he had of his own abilities; that having the Pope upon his back, the King, the Chancellor of France, the Assemblies of the Clergy, the Sorbonne, all the Universities, and all the Communities (for Jansenisme was every where anathematised) he could not be long able to support the cause. It is hard for a man to have so many accusers, to except against so many judges, to loose his cause in so many Courts, and yet all this notwithstanding to persuade the world that he is still innocent. Being than upon the very point of falling into a more grievous misfortune than ever he had met in all his life, that is, of being driven out of the Sorbonne, with the qualities of a dangerous fellow, a disturber of the public, an opiniator and a heretic, he framed a design, not to put by the blow, this he saw was unavoidable, but to make it matter of sport to himself and friends; and to contrive things so, that the public might laugh at it; in hopes that the people weary of the difficult questions, which, for a long time, had busied the Sorbonne, they might perhaps willingly take that occasion to divert themselves; and that than possibly the farce might blot out all the impressions the precedent serious Scene had left. And this it was, that occasioned the publishing of the first Letter to the Provincial: who was not a Jack of Lent, a man in the clouds, as many believed, but a real person Mr. Perier by name, Counsellor in the Court of Exchequer at Clermont in Auvergue.  
I know what he was, says Eudoxus interrupting him, it was he, that made the famous experiment of the quicksilver upon the Mountain Puy de Dam, at the entreaty of his brother-in-law Mr. Pascal.  
The very same, answers Cleander; but althô there are eighteen Letters, under the title of Letters to one in the country, and which at this day pass under the name of Mr. Pascal, yet were they not all written to that one and the same man: nor is it certain, as some will have it, that they were all writ by Mr. Pascal. You yourself may remember, that only the first ten are directed to the Country Gentleman. The six which next follow, were written to the Reverend Fathers the Jesuits, and the two last to Father Annat.  
I know that, says Eudoxus, but I am surprised at what you tell me, that it is not certain, that all the eighteen Letters are Mr. Pascal's. You see that Mr. Perrault, in his Dialogues, makes him the author of them all without any exception. It is, says he, the illustrious Mr. Pascal with his eighteen Provincial Letters. And he that writes the seventeenth Letter declares himself the author of the preceding sixteen. Wendrok also in his latin translation seems, every where to suppose, they were all the products of one pen; what than can make you doubt it?  
I have seen, answered Cleander, some Manuscript memoirs, by which it appears, that the three first Letters were Mr. Arnauld's; and where it is also added, that this Doctor having sent them to Mr. Pascal, though at that time there was some little misunderstanding between them, Mr. Pascal judged it not advantageous, to carry on the raillery farther in such abstracted subjects, as were treated of in those Letters: that in order to engage, or amuse the public, it was necessary to found something more material, and more intelligible: that the Casuists decisions, was a much fit subject for such kind of pleasantries, and that it was not difficult, to expose and bring them into play. Whereupon he proposed to him, in general, a Scheme how the work might be carried on: which was so very pleasing to Mr. Arnauld, and all the Port-Royal, that they wholly left to him their interests, as well the manner and conduct, as the execution of this affair: so that in a little time after, that is to say, about the end of February 1656, the fourth Letter under the former title appeared; which was the first of Pascal's, according to this account, which I will not warrant, considering the testimonies you have produced, of Mr. Perrault, of Wendrok, that is to say, of Mr. Nicole, and of the seventeenth Letter. And indeed the very stile of the three first Letters determins me to follow the common opinion: for there is in them too much lightness and humour, to come from Mr. Arnauld, and too much gall and bitterness, to fall from the pen of this Doctor.  
However it be, it is also pretended, that notwithstanding the great success of this fourth Letter, the Knight of Meree advised Pascal to lay aside absolutely the matter of Grace, which was also handled in this, althô in reference to Morals, and to give himself a greater latitude, than that subject would allow of: an advice, which he willingly followed to the Jesuits cost; whom he made answerable, in spite of all they could say in their own defence, for the most odious and most extravagant things in point of Morals, contained in the satire against the Casuists.  
These indeed are considerable particularities, says Eudoxus, and of which very few are informed. I have yet more curious and more certain ones to acquaint you with, continueth Cleander, you know what our writers of Comedies do commonly practise, before they expose their works to the judgement of the Public; they have their friends and approvers, who are sure to cry them up; among whom there is, commonly, some Lady of the first rank for wit and quality, who takes upon herself the fate and setting of of the play: and points out before hand to her friends, all the several places they are to clap and admire. It was concluded very fit and convenient, not to neglect this innocent kind of artifice, to help forward the success of the Provincial Letters. Nevers house, now the Palace of Conti, was than the meeting place of the wittiest persons and the most accomplished in Paris, invited thither, by the extraordinary civility, genteelness and magnificence of Madam du Plessis Guenegaud the Secretary of State's Lady. The Gentlemen of Port-Royal, with whom this Lady entertained a great correspondence, pitched upon her to bring the Provincial Letters into reputation, even before they were published. Those who oftenest waited upon her, were the Abbot of ........ who at that time was very remarkable for his wit and merits, but yet had not than thought of writing a book Of the duties of a Monastic Lise. Mr. ........ and Mr. ........ both afterwards Counsellors of State, and famous for their superintendencies, and their Ambassys. Mr. ........ than a Hugenot, Joucquet the superintendent's favourite, and some others. To these she read the sixth Letter, which had been sent to her in manuscript, and did not forget as they came in her way, to make them take notice of all the excellencies she herself had before observed in it.  
You will easily believe, that these Gentlemen did not refuse to give in their suffrages, not one of them was wanting in his duty on this occasion. The praises they every where gave this Letter made all the world impatient to see so great a masterpiece; which soon after appeared; and from Paris quickly spread itself over all the Provinces of the Kingdom; where it made such a clutter, such a hurly burly as put the Fathers of the Society into no small consternation.  
The Post never had so good a time on't, said Eudoxus interrupting him: copies of it were sent to all the Cities of France: and althô I was very little known to the Gentlemen of Port-Royal, I received from them a great packet, post paid, in a City of Britain where I than was. I imparted the contents to my friends, and we read the Letter with a great deal of pleasure.  
They took almost the same method for the following Letters, answers Cleander; the seventh by that means, got as far as into Cardinal Mazarin's hands, who, as all others did, laughed at it very hearty. The eighth came not out till the following month, on purpose, it seems, to have it wished for: for every thing relating to this matter seemed to be carried on with great art, care and circumspection. Very few knew for certain the hand from whence these Letters came: all others did but guests at the Author. The honour of them was given to Mr. de Gomberville, and this report was spread all over Paris: but he freed himself from it, by a letter he writ to his friend, Father Castillon, at that time, Rector of the Jesuits College.  
In the mean time this mighty success did not hinder a great many, after their sport and fit of laughter was over, from making some very serious reflections; nor from being scandalised at the outrageous manner wherein the Jesuits were railed at, and the reputation of a Society torn to pieces, which till than had not only passed for men of exemplary lives and good manners, but also of eminent and orthodox learning. The very Marchioness of Sablé though at that time very much in the interests of the Port-Royal, could not one day refrain from ask Pascal, if he were very certain that all he had written in his Letters was true: for if all there said be not true, with what conscience, says she, can you publish them, and every where decry so considerable a body as that of the Jesuits? Pascal answered her, that it was their business who furnished him with the memoirs to take care of that, and not his, who did but order and put them together.  
I know this particular point to be true, continues Cleander, from two very worthy persons of good credit to whom the Marchioness of Sablé herself recounted it, more than once, in the later years of her life.  
It seems to me, said Eudoxus, that in reality Pascal did not act very conformably to the principles of severe Morals: nor do I know, that he could found any one, in those principles he calls lose or relaxed, which, in an affair of this nature, would have allowed him to depend upon, or govern himself, by the eyesight and fidelity of another: especially knowing full well, that those, who gave him the papers, were declared enemies to the Jesuits.  
As to the rest, answered Cleander, after the tenth, the following Letters were not altogether pure attacks: for by this time Pascal was obliged to put himself upon the defensive: because the Jesuits pretended, they had convinced the Port-Royal of a great number of falsifications and impostures, upon which, it would not have consisted with their honour, to have been altogether silent. Mr. Nicole, under the name of Wendrok, soon after runs in, to their succour, or rather was put on, or let lose by the party, to finish and complete the ruin and defeat of the Jesuits. He begun, in a very loud and high tone, the latin commentaries, which he added to his translation of the Provincial Letters; and in them treats the Jesuits like a company of sad and miserable wretches. In a word, the whole contrivance succeeded, even beyond the contrivers own expectations. And thus you have a brief account of all I know, concerning the history of the Provincial Letters: of which, nothing more was at that time farther said.  
Cleander took his leave of Eudoxus, and they did not, as they had agreed, begin to speak any more of them for some days after; that they might have time to read over, and consider what had been written, on both sides, upon the subject of the Jesuits Morals.   

The Second Discourse.  
CLeander being come to Eudoxus' house, to begin their Discourses touching the matter proposed, found him in his Closet, still busied in turning over several books, for and against the Jesuits; wherein he had made a great many remarks, and laid them altogether upon his table. Ho than said he coming in, what think you now of the Jesuits polities, and the reflections Pascal has made upon this article? have you at last found the first part of Mr. Perrault's panegyrics of the Provincial Letters true? Is there nothing but solidity in his reasonings? for this is a point of reasoning: and it is an effect of Mr. Pascal's sagacity, to have discovered mysteries till than so cunningly concealed: it is also much for his honour, that he has opened the eyes of the world, in a matter of so great importance.  
Several things, says Cleander, make me suspect this System: it is indeed a System, as you very well call it: the question is, whether what he has there asserted, be solidly and strongly proved and made out; or whether, at the bottom, it be nothing but a pure hypothesis; which being proposed in a plausible manner, made the reader at first sight say, that this might very well be: and which being continued, and always supported, by the same kind of artifice, does so manage the understandng, that he is at last persuaded, it is a most certain truth.  
This, in reality, is the main point of the difficulty, answered Eudoxus, and nothing could be better stated. But let us look into the book: it is at the beginning of the fifth Letter, that Pascal lays open the policy and mysteries of the Jesuits: out of which Cleander read these words.  
See here Sir what I promised you: these are the first draughts of the good Fathers, the Jesuits Morals: of those eminent men, for learning and wisdom, who are all guided by the Spirit of God, which is more certain than all Philosophy; perhaps you think I am in jest: but I speak seriously, or rather, it is they themselves that speak in their book, entitled Imago primi saeculi; I do but copy their own words in this part of the encomium, as well as in that which follows. It is a society of men, or rather of Angels, who were foretold by Isaias in these words, Go forth you Angels light and nimble. Is not this a very clear prophecy of them? they are the Spirits of Eagles, a company of Phenixes, for an author has lately discovered, that there are more birds of this kind, than one, at a time: they have changed the whole face of Christianity: you must needs believe it, since they themselves affirm it; and you will quickly perceive it, by the sequel of this discourse, which will inform you of their maxims. I was very desirous to be fully instructed in them; and would not trust to what my friend had said of them, but resolved to see them with my own eyes, but I found he had told me nothing but truth: I believe he never tells a lie: you will see that by the account of our conferences. In one that I had with him, he told me such strange things, that I could hardly believe them; but he showed them in these Father's own books: insomuch that I had nothing to say in their defence, but that they were the opinions of some of their particular Divines, and therefore that it was unjust, to impute them to the whole body: and I assured him, I knew some of 'em, as severe, as those he had quoted were lose and remiss. Hereupon he discovered to me the Spirit of the Society, which is not known to all the world: and perhaps you will be very glad to understand it, which take in these his own words.  
You think, said he, to do them a great favour, by showing that some of their Fathers, are, as conformable to the maxims of the Gospel, as others, of them, are the contrary: and thence you will conclude, that the large opinions are not to be charged upon the whole Society. I understand you very well, for if they were to be charged upon the whole, they would never have suffered, that any of their Society should have published so different opinions. But since they have also some among them, who maintain licentious doctrines, you ought likewise to conclude, that the doctrine of the whole Society is not that which is strictly Christian: for if that consequence were to be made, they would never have tolerated such lose opinions in any of their Fathers. And what, answered I, could than be the design of the whole body? it is without doubt that they have no certain formed design, and that every one has the liberty to say, at all adventures, whatever he thinks upon any subject. That cannot be, answered he: so great a body could not subsist, by so rash and inconsiderate a conduct; nor without a Soul, that directs and governs all its motions. Besides that, they have an order to print nothing, without the approbation of their Superiors. But how, said I, can those very Superiors consent, to Maxims so very different? That is, replied he, what I would have you understand. Know than, that their intention, is not, to corrupt men's manners; not, not, that is not their design: but neither it the reformation of them, their only aim: that would be a piece of bad policy: but you may see what their thoughts are. They have so good an opinion of themselves, as to believe, that it is both useful and necessary for the good of Religion, that their credit should reach every where, and that they should govern all men's consciences: and because the Gospel and severe Maxims are proper for some sort of persons, they make use of them, as often as occasion requires. But because these Maxims do not agreed with the design of the greatest number of men, they lay them aside, when they have to do with any of this last sort; that they may have wherewithal to please and satisfy all the world. For this reason, having to do with persons of all sorts; of different tempers, conditions, and countries, they judged it necessary, to have Casuists suited to this great diversity. From this principle, you'll easily judge, that if they had not others, but Casuists of lose Morals, they would ruin their chief design; which is to get all the world into their own conduct and management; because, that those, who are truly pious and devout, would endeavour to seek and found out a more certain way. But since there are but a few of this sort, they do not need many severe Directors to guide them: they have a few severe ones, for the few devout; but a vast number of the lose ones for the crowd and multitude of those that seek for relaxation.  
It is by this obliging and accommoding conduct, as Father Petavius calls it, that they open their arms to all the world: for if any one comes to 'em, who is resolved to restore his ill gotten goods, you need not fear that they will put him by. On the contrary, they will commend and confirm him in so holy a resolution: but if another comes, that would have absolution without restitution; it will be hard, if they do not found means to do it, which they themselves will warrant. By this course they keep all their friends, and secure themselves against their enemies: for if they be reproached, with the looseness of their Morals, they immediately produce their austere Directors, together with some books they have made of the rigour and severity of the Christian law: and the simple people, and such as do not look into the bottom, the depth of things, are contented and put of with these kind of proofs.  
Thus they are furnished for all sorts of persons, and answer so well, according to what is demanded, that when they are in Countries, where a Crucifi'd God passes for folly, they suppress the scandal of the Cross, and preach Jesus Christ a glorious, not a suffering Saviour; as they have done in the Indieses and in China; where, they have allowed Christians, even the practice of Idolatry, by the subtle invention of making them hid under their  the Image of Jesus Christ; to which they teach them to direct, mentally, the public adorations, which they make to the Idol Chacim-choan, and to their Keum-fucum; as Gravina the Dominican objects against them, and as the Spanish Memorial presented to Philip the IV King of Spain, by the Franciscans of the Philippine Islands, reported by Thomas Hurvado in his book of Christian Martyrs page 427, does witness: insomuch that the Congregation of Cardinals, De propaganda fide was obliged to forbidden the Jesuits, in particular, under pain of excommunication, not to suffer the adoration of Idols upon any pretext whatsoever; nor to hid the mystery of the holy Cross from those they instructed in Religion: Commanding them, expressly, not to Baptism any that were ignorant in this point; and enjoining them, to expose openly in their Churches the Image of the Crucifix; as is at large set down in the decree of this Congreation dated 9th. July 1646, signed by Cardinal Caponi. You see now, how they have spread themselves over all the earth, by the help of the doctrine of probable opinions, which is the spring and ground of all this irregularity and corruption.  
It cannot but be acknowledged, said Eudoxus, crying out as soon as he had done reading, that all this is admirably well said. These little bits of Imago primi saeculi, are well brought in, and applied the best in the World: that plain short stile he gins with; those little jesting reflections, in two words, by way of parenthesis; Is it not a clear Prophecy of them ....... I believe he never tells a ; are, at once, both enlivening and diverting. In that natural plain way of relating a thing, that cunning artifice to prepare the reader's mind, by finding ways to remove all obstacles, which might hinder what one is about to say from being believed; there is not a word, that does not answer his end, and serve to disarm the Jesuits before hand. This particular fact, of the Idolatry in China, mentioned as it were but by accident, or by the by, and, without any seeming affectation, recounted in few words, but yet without omitting one single circumstance that might contribute to its being believed as soon as spoken.  
It's no small prejudice to the Jesuits, said Cleander interrupting him, that they do not own this thing, and that they pretend to have undeniably refused the imposture. That's no matter, pursued Eudoxus: I found myself persuaded by this, almost in spite of me; and I am of opinion, that a great many others ought to be so too. But observe how Pascal, in a few pages, has comprised and prepared all that was necessary for his chief design; which is to make all the Jesuits writers faults and mistakes to light upon, and be imputed to the whole body: say what you please, this is a bit they cannot swallow or digest; this little piece, this particular instance, is not to be answered. As to the rest, continueth he, let that go for nothing: For I see you ready, in your turn, to accuse me of being prepossessed in favour of Pascal: all that I pretend to say, is, that he has given this passage a  turn; expressed it so very finely, that nothing could be more persuasive, or at lest more seducing.  
Whatever you would say of it, answered Cleander, I see plainly, that the Jesuits are not very safe in your hands: and that without any great force upon yourself, you could stand up stiffly in defence of what I have just now read to you, in case you should not see it fully and perfectly refuted.  
Not so fast, replied Eudoxus, do not I pray distrust my equity. I have newly vowed, to be indifferent and stand neuter, between both parties, and nothing is able so to dazzle me, as to make me mistake the truth. 'Tis with the same disposition of mind, answered Cleander, that I am resolved to tell you, plainly, and without exaggeration, what may be said in favour of the Society.  
The end and policy of the Jesuits, said he, is, to make themselves Masters of all men's Consciences; now there are two sorts of Christians; some that are truly pious, who seek for a sure way; for whom the Jesuits have taken care to have some severe Casuists; but a few for the few; whereas they have a multitude of lose Casuists, who present themselves to the multitude of those that seek for liberty and relaxatien. Than he adds: See how they have spread themselves over all the earth, by the favour and assistance of the doctrine of probability, which is the source and basis of all this irregularity and corruption.  
You might have added the direction of intention, said Eudoxus interrupting him, together with the doctrine of equivocations: for these also, as Pascal tells us, are main points of the Jesuits Morals.  
That's true, replied Cleander, but these points, as great and general as they are, may be looked upon, but as particular points, which we may examine at leisure: and it seems to me, that, for the present, we ought to dive and sift into nothing but their politics: the wondered intelligence they have among themselves for one and the same end; and which makes them, by concert and contrivance, act, so effectually, for the glory and grandeur of their Society: and the admirable partition of the rigorous and the relaxed doctrine between their Doctors; of whom, some are enjoined to make the best of the first, and others of the second: all aiming, though by so contrary means, By the favour and assistance of the doctrine of probable opinions, at one and the same end. To have discovered this, if you believe Pascal, Is, to have found out the Spirit of the Society, which is not known to all the world. This is, in reality, the most curious part of this whole affair: and if the discovery of the partition be real and not chimerical, if this particular, single point, be very certain, all that he afterwards says of the Jesuits, may very well be believed. I should be not longer shocked or offended at Wendrock's invectives against these Fathers, nor at the horrible injuries, wherewith he treats and oppresses them. But I declare to you, that I cannot easily conceive, nor seriously believe, that such a project could have been formed, or carried on so long; that is to say till Pascal's time, or at lest till the birth, or springing up of Jansenisme, without any body's perceiving it; or that, during all the wars and disputes the Protestants have had with the Doctors of the Church of Rome, and wherein the Jesuits were always the first assaulted, not one of their obstinate enemies, should have thought of attaching them on that side: and that a thousand men should have set themselves, industriously, to examine, to meditate, to criticise upon, to decry their institute, to study their conduct, and to search into the secrets of their pretended politicss, and yet not to make this discovery, is a thing, which, really appears to me, incredible, and morally impossible.  
For, let us reason and argue a little, and sound, if it be possible, into the depth of this policy. By what person, I pray you, could this strange design be conceived and brought forth? was it by their founder Saint Ignatius? can we see, I do not say the scheme, but the shadow or lest idea of it in their Constitutions? do any of the decrees of their General Congregations carry a tendency to this end? can we point at any one of their Generals, from Saint Ignatius downwards, to this day that has plotted this conspiracy, so fatal to the Gospel, and the purity of our Savior's Morals? was it not think you Father Caraffa, he, who without dispute was one of the holiest men of our age, and who, after he had governed for some years, died, but just as Pascal had attributed so good and laudable an intention to the Society? for, infine to carry on a project fixed and determined after this manner, and such as Pascal proposes it, the execution of which depends upon the whole body, or, at lest, upon a great number of particular members, who must have the same prospects and designs, there must be one conductor and one soul, with whom all these several particulars must have a correspondence, to guide and influence the motion. When Titus Oats and Bedloe, some years since, made a scheme of a plot in England, which cost Viscount Stafford, Mr. Coleman, and the five Jesuits their lives, they did not forget a seeming probability and show of truth. They made the General of the Jesuits, by the Pope's permission, to dispatch all Commissions for the war, and dispose of all Offices of the Crown. The witnesses swore, they had seen a patent sealed with the Societies seal, by which my Lord Arundel was constituted Lord high Chancellor of England, by another, my Lord Powis was made Lord high Treasurer; by a third, my Lord Bellasis was declared General of the Army, that was to be raised against the King: of this army, my Lord Petre was appointed Lieutenant General, all signed by Joannes Paulus Oliva General of the Jesuits. In this manner things were particularly resolved upon and specified: the pretended head of the plot, and all the other conspirators, were very well known; and all this was believed by the common people of England, and God knows what horrid things were than said of the Jesuits politicss. I would feign see something like that, in this other conspiracy, of which the Jesuits are accused; especially, since Pascal gives us to understand, as he does in the fifth Provincial Letter, that this great abuse, and total subversion of our Saviors Morals, is, not the effect of hazard, nor of an extravagant fancy, but, a settled concerted matter; which althô it be not the Jesuits end, their principal end, it is, however, a mean agreed and resolved upon among them, and of which without any new deliberation they daily make use, every one in his way, to bring about their main purpose and design.  
It is pleasantly done of you, said Eudoxus interrupting him, to compare Mr. Pascal with Oats and Bedloe; those two gallant fellows, whose equally gross and infamous proceed had so incensed Mr. Arnauld, 
Tom. 1. pag. 292.  that in his Apology for the Catholics, he could not forbear calling them rogues and villains. As to the rest, I do not very well know, what answer Mr. Pascal would have made you, if the question had been put to himself: but I know, that in the place we have newly read, he seems to have obviated the objection, and answered it before hand. For being desirous to establish that principle, which makes so great a part of all his Letters, that this contrariety of severe and remiss Casuists, which is to be seen, as he says, in the Society, was not the effect of chance, nor of a liberty, that every one in it might have, of following his own caprice or wild fancy, in the choice of his opinions, this is the manner he speaks in.  
Ho what could there be, answered I him, the design of the whole body? it must needs be, that they have no certain fixed and determinate design, and that every one has the liberty to say, at all adventures, whatever he thinks fit. That cannot be, replied he; so great a body could not subsist with a rash, inconsiderate, conduct, or without a soul, that ruled and governed all its motions. Besides they have a particular order, not to print any thing, without leave from their Superiors. But how than, said I to him, can the Superiors consent to Maxims so very contrary? that is the thing I am to acquaint you wirh, answered he. Know than, etc.  
This is again repeated in the ninth Letter, as a point of the last importance. And do you not know, says his Jesuit, that our Society is answerable for all the books of our Fathers? I must needs instruct you in this matter, for it is very fit you should know it: there is an order in our Society, by which all sorts of Printers and Booksellers are forbidden to cell any of our Father's works without the approbation of the Divines, and the permission of the Superiors of our Society .......... Insomuch, that our whole body is responsable, for all the books of every one of our Fathers: whence it comes to pass, that no work of ours, which has not the spirit of the Society is ever published, and thus have I told you, in few words, what I judged was convenient for you to know.  
By this you see, continued Eudoxus, Pascal supposes, that this policy resides in the Superiors of the Society; and that it is, by concert and agreement with them, that the inferiors do act, in bringing about this design of the whole body; and he does not only suppose, but also farther endeavours to prove it, by observing and setting down, what is very true, that they have a particular order to print nothing without their Superiors permission.  
It is of these cunning words, replied Cleander, you would now discourse, words, which are thrown in, as it were by the by, without any seeming affectation, and which yet notwithstanding make the deepest impression upon the reader's mind. Upon the coming forth of the Jesuits Apologies, they never failed to make a great noise of this their rule, to print nothing without the General's consent. But this week, as I was looking over all these matters, I was very desirous to satisfy myself in this point, as well as in the others. To which end I went ere yesterday to visit a Jesuit of my acquaintance, a man of wit and consideration; and put him upon this subject. I told him, that this particular order, known to be among their rules, of printing nothing without their General's leave, was, by their adversaries, made use of to their prejudice, and, by virtue of it, all the faults of particular persons were attributed to the whole body.  
I see than, said he to me, that you also have been so good and easy, as to suffer yourself to be trapand, drawn in and caught in this net, as before you, several others have been. You call this a particular order, as if it were not common to us, with almost all communities and bodies of men where there is any regularity and subordination; and yet notwithstanding it is but against us only, that it is objected and improved. But the manner alone, adds he, of executing this order, will convince you, of the weakness of the arguments our enemies draw from this topic: it is true, that we have this rule or order, to print nothing without our General's permission, but it is not to be supposed, that the General himself reads and passes his own judgement upon all the books printed by the Jesuits in every part of the world. If that were so, his whole business would only be to read books: for there has been a General, under whose government there were volumes enuff made, upon the single controversies with the Protestants of Germany, Flanders, France and England, to have taken up and employed the whole time of his Generalship. But for your farther satisfaction, you are to know, that the ordinary method of licensing books is after this manner.  
The General gives the Provincials power, to approve of all the books in their own districts. But you must not fancy, that the Provincials themselves do read these books; not, not, their other employments do not allow them leisure for such a work: but they name three persons to do it, upon whose suffrages, they either give or refuse their approbation, and these three persons in passing their judgements are obliged to follow, not their own particular notions and prejudices, but (especially in matters of Divinity) the opinions commonly received in the Catholic Schools and Universities. This is usually the rule they follow, wherein a great many other very good ones are included. This is the way ordinarily taken for this business, and it is impossible it should be done otherwise. So that you see, there is little difference between a book printed, upon the approbation of three Doctors of Sorbonne with reference to the whole house of Sorbonne, and a book printed, upon the approbation of three Jesuit Divines, with reference to the whole Society of Jesuits.  
After the Father had thus entertained me upon this subject, he put me in mind of the persecutions, raised against the Society in Father Coton's time, and the beginning of their establishment in France; occasioned by books, brought from Italy and other places, to make the French Jesuits guilty of treason against the state, or to be looked upon as enemies to the liberties of the Gallican Church, and how the Court and Parliament, in those days, notwithstanding their prejudice, and the suspicions that were continually suggested against them, did always, in that affair, harken to, and perfectly govern themselves, by reason.  
Now the matter being thus, continued Cleander, and in reality not being possible to be otherwise, does it not appear to you, that the system of the Jesuits politicss, which Pascal has built upon this weak and ruinous foundation, is false and malicious? and this being allowed, would not the comparison I made, without pretending that it was very exact, be a little more so, than you thought of first? what a pleasant argument is this? the Provincial of a Province in Spain approves a book, upon the suffrages, or votes of three Spaniards of the Society; this book than being approved by the Superior, contains or comprehends the spirit of the whole society. Now the Jesuits having several different opinions, in their books, about one and the same matter, this diversity among their Divines, which is every day to be found, must be an effect of the General's politics, who presides over all, and who takes care for the glory and benefit of the Society, to make and keep up this diversity of opinions, at no lesle a price to the Church, than the subversion of Christianity, and the destruction of the Gospel: these are things, which a man, upon the lest reflection, would be ashamed to have once thought, or but even suspected.  
Eudoxus satisfied with this account of Cleander's, said to him: you have indeed hit the nail on the head, and this simple explanation you have made of the matter, discovers, by itself alone, the weakness, the essential weakness of all Pascals Letters. But however, do not value yourself too much, upon the honour of this my confession: for I myself, for a long time, have had some scrupules about this fine system, in spite of the dazzling manner it is proposed in: he includes, or supposes certain paradoxes, which are highly improbable, and too remote from the common ordinary notions and ideas: for, according to what Pascal pretends to teach us of the Jesuits government, all those, who have had any share in it, must needs have been, and still are, not only great politicians (a commendation which I myself know for certain, several of 'em do not deserve) but also most wicked profligate wretches, and the most resolved, and incorrigible libertins, who had absolutely renounced all piety, and Religion. But let me yet ask you, once more, what, according to Pascal, is the matter in dispute? nothing lesle, than the overturning and confounding the whole Gospel, the introducing Morals, perfectly carnal, instead of those taught us by our Saviour, the profaning our greatest and most august mysteries; and that in cold blood, by previous agreement and methods, by measures expressly resolved on, marking out, to every man, the part he was to act in this execrable conspiracy; wherein, some were to appear harsh and severe; others, gentle and accommoding. So that, not only the Superiors, but all their Divines, all their Confessors, all their Directors must engage in so damnable a plot; that is to say, two thirds of this great body: for, excepting the young men, who are not in holy orders, all, or almost all, some, more, some, lesle, are employed in conducting and guiding of Souls. Now, to come to the matter of fact, I am very confident, that neither you, nor I, nor any person in Paris, nor in any other parts of France, nor even those they call Jansenists, will ever believe, that any Jesuit, of their acquaintance, is capable of such and excess of impiety. I never yet saw the man, that said to me, of any one of them in particular: I know this Jesuit, to be a libertin, an Atheist, a man without conscience, and one, that would cell his Soul, for the glory and interest of his Society: on the contrary, they give them, in general, the honour of certain virtue's, which can, as little, subsist without faith and the fear of God, as faith and the fear of God can, with the principles of this damnable policy. The Jansenists, from time to time, do make some common places in their books, in favour of their own patty, which sometimes the Jesuits, finding them made to their hands, may, I hope, be allowed to apply to their own use. As for example, that which is said in a little book called Le Pere Bouhours convaincu de calumny, and which may serve for a handsome pithy conclusion to all I have said on this subject.  
He must be very corrupt himself and rotten at heart, in the words of that author, who imagined his neighbour could be guilty of such desperate wickedness and corruption; and none, but a man extremely fond of the esteem of the world, could fancy that others, by a formed design, would be willing to buy, at the price of their faith and of their Salvation, a vain name and reputation; or rather the mad foolish pleasure of being talked of, no matter whether for good, or for evil.  
I will not examine, continued Eudoxus, the truth of this reflection, but supposing it very probable, in reference to any one particular; it ought to appear much more so, in reference to the Superiors, Confessors, Directors and Missioners of the whole Society taken altogether; and it would be in my opinion, a lesle wonder, to see, among the Jansenist Doctors, one or two hypocrites, libertins in their hearts, than to see this great number of Jesuits, without God, without faith and without conscience.  
But what do I say, their Superiors, their Directors, their Missioners? After Pascal had unveiled and discovered all these pretended mysteries, and that the Provincial Letters had been read by all the Jesuits; after that, by virtue of these Letters, so many people believed they had a right to accuse them of their lose Morals; would none of all those young Jesuits, from whom till than they had hid the secret of their order, and who for the most part do not want wit, have opened their eyes, and abhorred to continued members of so corrupted a body? what desertion ought we not to have seen, by the favour of a motive so specious and so reasonable as that? for it is not the same thing in this, as in other orders: here is always a door open, or at lest one that is easily opened to those who are fully resolved to be gone. What fairer pretence could any such have had, to colour their baseness, or their inconstancy? and as for such, as are sometimes turned out of the Society, for their misbehaviour and ill conduct, could they have had a more sure, and a more easy way to be revenged, than to publish and reveal this mystery? or have the Superiors of the Society, over and above their politicss, the art to infatuat and bewitch men, or, at one bout, to make so great a number of persons, Atheists, that have entered into their order, for no other end, but to secure themselves, against the corruption of the world? now from what I have already said, it is clear, this policy of the Jesuits, could be not longer a mystery, to any of themselves; and not being a mystery, it would be a miracle, without example, if none among them should have been scandalised at, and afterwards discovered this so abominable and so horrid an impiety.  
It would be yet a much greater prodigy, answered Cleander, to see men of such colours or characters, as the Jesuits are sometimes painted in, strive for, and unanimously tend to the glory of their Society, by ways so different and so unequal, as are the employments of this Society. Some are seen in Courts, in credit and in reputation, respected, applauded, and honoured with the kindness and confidence of Princes; whilst, at the same time, a very great number die, of cold and hunger, in the forests of Canada: others go, with all imaginable joy and cheerfulness, to ruin their healths for the remainder of their lives, in the Isles of south, America; where of thirty, there are not found two, that in time are not destroyed by the very malignity of the air; not to speak of those, that have been hanged in England, burnt or buried alive in Japan, the common fate of a great number of their Missioners. For you must understand, 
Morale pratique pref. du a. tom.  that it is plainly said, and publicly printed, that the Jesuits, in those Countries, are not one jot better, than those of France. And let them say as much as they please, of their trading and enriching themselves in those far distant Countries, it is putting too great a value upon traffic and commerce; and I know none, how greedy soever of gain, that would be Merchants upon such terms. These good Fathers than will go, with great content and satisfaction, to have themselves roasted and eaten alive, by the Iroques and wild Americans, and to pass the winters, in the woods, with savages, without any other places of retreat, than a poor hut, or a cabane made of the bark of trees, where the smoke blinds and chokes those that are forced to retire thither, to defend themselves against the extremity and bitterness of the cold; and all this, forsooth, only to have the honour of establishing, over all the world, their lose Morals, and enlarging the glory of their Society; and to give to the Secular Preachers, sometimes invited to Preach upon Saint Ignatius' day, an occasion to compliment the Jesuits of Paris, for their zeal, their functions, and their Apostolic labours. If this be so, I do not despair, but that we may live to see, some time or other, a Society of highway men spring up, who, all joining together in the design of robbing, plundering and killing, will agreed among themselves, that some, of them, shall peacably enjoy their booties, and the fruits of the others labours, without ever exposing themselves to any danger; and that these, after they have sufficiently robbed and plundered, without enjoying any profit or advantage by all their labours, will give themselves up to be hanged and broken alive upon wheels, only for the interest, and the security of the rest of their companions.  
Self-love, said Eudoxus, is, in truth, too much self-love, to devote itself so absolutely and so entirely to the public good; such a kind of Man, is, in Morals, a chimerical whimsy, and it were mere madness to think, there could be found a man, who, out of zeal to the common interest, would wholly forget or deny himself, and sacrifice his ease and quiet, his pleasures, his satisfaction and his life, to the glory of the body, whereof he is a member, without once thinking of his own particular. I would say to him, and to all like him, what a Protestant Minister some years ago said to a Jesuit he met travalling towards China. He asked him what he had got from the Pope to engage himself in so long, so troublesome, and so dangerous a voyage: nothing, answered the Jesuit. Ho, said the Minister in his Dutch latin, Bene stulti estis vos. 
You are a company of silly fools. Let. ●n P. Verbiest.   
That would be, without doubt, answered Cleander, a very refined piece of vanity, and an act of pride, of a very particular nature: it is very rare to see, but two men of the same rank and quality, the same age, and, as near as possible, of equal wit and merit, agreed without falling out, or without hurting or injuring one another upon occasion, if they be but never so little touched with vainglory, or possessed with the spirit of pride: and yet one may see thousands of men, the vainest that ever were, if you'll believe the author of the system we are examining; of which the greatest part have wit and learning, and who, naturally speaking, aught to rival one another in employments; I say, one may see them, accept of, and do their duty without murmuring, in posts that are most extremely unequal, and between which there is as much difference, for the conveniences of life, for diet and for lodging, for conversation, for employment, and for all the natural satisfactions of the mind, as there is between the fairest and greatest Cities of this Kingdom, and the wildest and most dreadful Deserts of America and Monomotapa. Certainly, if this be the effect, either of vanity, or of policy, one may very well call it, a most extraordinary and incomparable Masterpiece. So that whatever the author of the Paralelle des Anciens & des Moderns thinks of it, I will deduct, out of the panegyrics he has made o the Provincial Letters, his Solidity of reasoning, or arguing, at lest upon this first and most principal article. I can, in this point, compare at best Pascal's cunning but to the artifice of skilful painters in perspective, who produce and expose pieces, which, at first view, pleasantly deceive and inveigle the lookers on, to make rash and false judgements; but such indeed, as are easily and soon corrected, by reason and reflection. Nothing, said Eudoxus, can be better, more full, and more expressive than this your comparison.  
I have something yet to say, answered Cleander, of greater force, and much more to the purpose; and which comes so naturally into a man's mind, who reads the Provincial Letters with never so little attention, and without prepossession, that, certainly, it could not have escaped your own thoughts and reflection. Pascal does not at all keep his word with us. He undertakes to give us the character of a policy particular to the Jesuits, as the most subtle and crafty, that ever was invented or contrived by the wit of man: he promises to make us see into its inmost recesses, and found out the finest and most  parts of this mystery; but how, I pray, does he go about it? no doubt one would think very learnedly and profoundly: but alas! after all, he makes the Jesuits choose, very wisely, means to arrive at their ends, which, generally speaking, are common to theirs, with all other orders; with all other communities, and with all Universities: and by consequence either do not prove, that these Fathers are more subtle than others, or else, that others are, full as cunning as they.  
And to make plausible this diversity of Directors, of which some are easy and complesant, others rigorous and severe, he has made the Jesuits the inventors of the doctrine of probable opinions in Divinity; by which, says he, the contrariety of decisions is not only permitted, but also made useful and necessary.  
That is not an ill thought, said Eudoxus, and this diversity of Directors, of whom some determine severely, others loosely, seems very like truth, and probable enuff according to the doctrine of probabilities, by which, very often some do, in reality, decide the cases proposed, in a contrary manner to what others do.  
That is true, answered Cleander; but as ill luck would have it for Pascal, it is too well known, that this doctrine is much older than the Jesuits: and that it is so far, from being peculiar to them, that before it was decried and run down, by the horrible, friteful figures, wherein it was represented, that is to say, till within these thirty or forty years, it was taught every where, in all the Schools of Christendom. Insomuch, that the Jesuits, 
Quaestio ●acti.  to free themselves from the imputation, have shown, by a book expressly written, that this opinion, whatever it be, is no more an opinion of theirs, than it is of the Divines of Sorbonne, or of those of Louvain, of the Dominicans, of the Franciscans, and of all others; maintaining, and, in my opinion fully proving, that they never taught any thing in this matter, but what was taught, by the chief, and almost all the Doctors of these several Schools and Universities. I will show you this book, whenever you will: for the proof of this matter of fact, which is most certainly true, would carry us too far away from our present business. In the mean time, give me leave, to make this conclusion: that, if the doctrine of probable opinions, be, the secret and essential point of the Jesuits politicss, the Dominicans, the Franciscans, the Augustins, the Sorbonne, the University of Louvain and all others, are to the full, at lest, as knowing as they, in matters of policy: and that, on one side, they do the Jesuits too much honour, in giving them more wit and more learning, than to all these famous Societies; and on the other, the greatest injustice in the world, by making them, under this pretence, the sole authors of the real or pretended corruption of Christian Morals.  
To which I will add; that you shall not only found, in all these several bodies, this wondered foundation of the Jesuits policy, I mean the doctrine of probable opinions, together with all that depends upon it; but I will also show you, and, in the same way, that Pascal has made use of, with so much wit, and so much charity to the Jesuits, that among the Divines of Sorbonne and of Louvain, among the Dominicans and other Religious orders, the two sorts of Directors, he mentions, the severe and the easy ones, are, without controversy, to be found; and by substituting the names of these communities, instead of the Jesuits, I will prepare you, by the fifth Provincial Letter, to hear their panegyrics, exactly like or equal to that, which Pascal has made for the Society. I may perhaps retrench out of it, the story of John d'Alba, that of the probable box on the ear at Compiegne, some strokes and touches of Imago primi saeculi: but searching on a little farther, I shall not miss of enuff and to spare, to make amendss for this retrenchment. And I shall found very near as much to divert myself upon this subject, as Pascal has done. I will make myself the same sport, and with the same series of collections, out of several authors, heaped up together, and disposed according to my own fancy; I will draw the same consequencies, make the same comparisons, the same invectives, and the same applications; and I will end with an address to the Dominicans, or to others as Pascal has finished his thirteenth Letter with one to the Jesuits, in these words. Let us than conclude, my Fathers, that since your probability makes the good opinions of some of your authors unuseful to the Church, and only useful to your politics, they serve but to show, by their contrariety, your double heartedness, the insincerity of your deal, which you have plainly discovered by declaring to us, that you have some of your Divines, on one side against murder, and that, on the other, you have many more eminent Casuists for it: to the end you may have two ways to offer men, destroying thereby the simplicity of the spirit of God, who curses all double minded people, who provide for themselves two paths to walk in, We duplici cord, & ingredienti duabus vijs.  
The Jesuits, answered Eudoxus, have long since in their Apologies made this observation, which effectually and irrefragably proves, if it be true, what you intended to make out, that Pascal's way of arguing in this matter is not solid, taking the word solid in its common ordinary notion and acceptation. But it seems the author of the paralelle has formed of it to himself a notion of much greater extent or latitude. Perhaps as a member of the Academy he may have, or pretend to have, a right over the signification of words. How weak soever the arguments we treat of may be in themselves, the wit which made use of them has given them some strength. Is it not to think and in some manner to writ solidly, to get directly to his end, and to know how to guide and conduct his readers to it; to engage them in his interests, to inspire them with what thoughts he pleases, and to make them say their author is in the right, and that his adversaries are for certain in the wrong? has not Pascal got what he aimed at; and obtained his design? he has made his book to be read by all the world, and be believed by many; he has made, almost, every thing he has said in this matter plausible and currant. Exact truth was not the rule he followed; at lest in the point we now speak of. Christian charity, a word much made use of in the Port-Royal books, has a little suffered by it, and nothing can be plainer, than that in this he has not acted by the strict laws of severe Morals. But it has produced at lest the effect he intended: for my part, I'll call this being solid, if it were but to pleasure or compliment Mr. Perrault. But to come to the point, the bottom of the matter, continues he, do you think that Pascal was in earnest, and had a mind to be believed in all he said? surely his only thoughts were to gratisy his friends, and gain himself a reputation: this it was without doubt which made him so very desirous to divert both himself and the public.  
Pardon me, said Cleander interrupting him, you do not fully consider what Pascal had in prospect: see what Wendrok says of it. Whereupon he opened and read him the latter part of his first note upon the eleventh Letter, wherein he speaks after this manner. To believe that Montaltius had no design in these Letters, but merriment and sport, or to make men laugh at the Jesuits cost, and divert the world by his witty writings, is to make an unjust and false judgement of them. He proposed to himself a more serious, and a more holy end, and aimed altogether at the Church and the Jesuits advantage.  
Aye marry Sir, this is fine, good indeed, and very likely, answered Eudoxus laughing, as if I did not know Wendrok and his friends, and understand their meaning; 'twas, no doubt, for the good and benefit of the Jesuits, and in mere charity to 'em, that they writ the Provincial Letters, and sent them about to every body; that they first presented them to their Proselits for a fifth Gospel; and that since, within these two years, their friends, the Religious of **** ordered them to be read in the Pensioners Refectory; that they published six or seven tomes of their practical Morals; and that in the Seminary of the Diocese of **** this book was formerly recommended, to such as were to enter into holy Orders, for their Spiritual Lectures; that they got all sorts of libels against the Society to be sent from Japan and from China, from the Philipine Islands, and from Paraquay; that they made the Jesuits Theatre the maddest, and as is said, the most extravigantly slanderous piece, that ever was seen, pass under the name, and for the work, of a most holy and illustrious Spanish Bishop; and that they still daily give themselves, upon every occasion, a lose against these Fathers, endeavouring any how to destroy and subvert their reputations; railing and inveighing bitterly against them, in their books, and in all companies, and conversations. Saint Paul, in his enumeration to the Corinthians of the effects of Charity, has forgot to make mention of any of these kinds; which makes me often doubt, whether Jansenist Charity be of the same species, or kind, with Christian Charity. And to speak my thoughts freely, I never saw any thing more odd, not to say more sacrilegious, than the union they make of the charity inspired by the Holy Ghost, with that gall, bitterness, and animosity, which, on all occasions, they show and express; and which they endeavour to inspire into all mankind, both in private and in public. I do assure you, that this very reflection, alone, would have hindered me from closing with this party, from being drawn in, duped, or made one of their cully's: and I am surprised to think, how men of wit could hope, or expect, long, to blind or dazzle the world by this method. For, tho' it be mightily corrupted, it has yet judgement enuff left, to discern and distinguish, whether some things proceed from the spirit of God, or from malice and passion.  
And as for me, adds Cleander, I never saw this admirable secret, of sanctifying the most grievous injuries and invectives, practised, on a hundred occasions, by Mr. Arnauld and his friends, without being moved to laughter. I am persuaded if Moliére had but brought a second Tartuffe upon the stage, he would have given him this character; and, thereby have diverted the spectators as much as by the first. But I plainly perceive, continued Cleander, that we are fully agreed about the idea we have formed to ourselves, of the scheme Pascal has drawn of the Jesuits politicss. You pardon Perrault his having called it solid, since the author has obtained his end, and that he had the skill, according to the design he had framed to himself, to make all he said pass for, or, at lest, appear, like truth; and at the same time to give the reader so much pleasure and diversion, as to hinder him from reflecting upon the weakness and vanity of his system: this I would have you pass by and allow me.  
You will also grant me, that looking narrowly into things, this policy, so particular, so mysterious, and, at the same time, so execrable, is a mere empty fantome; which, taken out of the fine and advantageous  he had dressed it in, has nothing in it even of probability; nor can have any, except in England or in Holland, where a Jesuit and a wizard or a conjurer passes, among the generality, for one and the same thing.  
Your thoughts and mine, answers Eudoxus, do perfectly agreed: but this being supposed, cannot we now make, at lest, upon this particular article, the same reflections that the marchioness of Sablé did, of which you spoke in our former conversation; and ask, with what conscience Pascal could divert himself and the world, by a notion or idea, which however empty and groundless it appears, and really is, to any one, that gives himself but a little trouble to examine it, leaves notwithstanding a most frightful impression on the minds of the greatest part of his readers? by what principle of charity, or honesty, has he endeavoured, in the following Letters, to fortify and strengthen this impression, till he has given this idea root and footing, and made it familiar to all people; and, afterwards taking it for an undeniable truth, he has made use of it, to enable him, to tear in pieces most unmercifully the reputation of so considerable a body, as that of the Jesuits: for, as you very well observed a little while ago, Pascals pleasantries got more ground and credit, than several at first thought they ever could or did deserve. From this hypothesis or supposition of the Jesuits Plot to aggrandise their Society, he claims a right, to say whatever he pleases; and makes them sacrifice all things even to the very Gospel, to bring it about he makes use of it, to have this Society looked upon, as the plague of the Church, and to make every thing they either say or do be suspected. Upon this principle a case is ill decided by a Divine of this Society, must not be allowed, as in another man, to be an effect of human weakness, but a wilful crime, and a premeditated attempt against the doctrine of Jesus Christ. They may pretend, but all in vain, that twenty of the most eminent Divines of the Society were of a contrary opinion; that was ordered, and done on purpose, for no other end, but to establish his system, of the division of directors into two sorts, the one rigid and severe, the others soft and complesant. Whatever course the Jesuits take to defend themselves, Pascal still renews his attacks against them, and reinforces all by this common place.  
That is to say, adds Cleander, that this false system, which is taken for granted in all the Provincial Letters, and from whence all that is besides contained in them, derives its force, is a most horrible calumny, and an imposture carried on, and continued from one end to the other.  
Why did not the Jesuits, answered Eudoxus, make this be perceived, when those Letters were first published? this foolish notion, which upon the first serious reflection falls to the ground, having been once removed, all the world after a fit of laughter would have entertained no thoughts, but of indignation against this Champion of severe Morals, and against those that had relaxed them, perceiving plainly that their actions were quite contrary to the maxims which they preached. Before the Jesuit went about to convince him, as they under took to do, of his nine and twenty particular falsehoods and impostures, they ought to have begun with this general and essential imposture. And this being once proved, than which nothing was more easy, all the world would have been prepared to receive the rest as they deserved: it would have ruin'd beforehand the whole strength of Pascals replies, all which turn upon this hinge, as well as his first accusations. The Jesuits not having soon enuff chased away this spirit or phantom, it became a bugbear, to friten from them an infinity of persons: and I confess to you, that, with this prepossession, I myself should have found very little difference, between the direction of Jesuits, and the direction of Antichrist  
And it appears to me, that those who believed Pascal have not done enuff: for upon supposition of a discovery made, of such a correspondence, and such a plot, actually on foot among the Jesuits, against the Morals of our Saviour, they ought, every man of ●um, to be drowned, or treated, as convicted and obstinate Jews are treated by the Spanish Inquisition: fire and faggot for such a crime, well and clearly proved and made out, would have been by far too small a punishment.  
What a sentence is this you pronounce? says Cleander laughing: God defend the Jesuits from falling under the hands of a true downright Jansenist, so severe as you in his opinion. I am satisfied, you would not be long about the work, or do it at twice, but be of the good Religious Spaniards humour, who, even while Saint Ignatius was alive, said very unkindly, 
Vie de S● Ignace.  That all the Jesuits from Perpignan to Sevill ought to be burnt. Pascal was not willing to carry things so far; 'tis true, that he said, very plainly, and without mincing of the matter, that the Jesuits had plotted and concerted among themselves, the destruction of Christian Morals, to the end their Confessionals and their Churches might be well filled: that this was a settled premeditated design; and that for the execution of this fine project, their Doctors and Directors had, every one, their several parts marked and pointed out: but he easily foresaw, that, upon his word alone, the work would not be presently undertaken, he did not expect that this, at first, would be believed like an article of faith; it was sufficient for his purpose, to make the thing probable: and but only to doubt, or suspect it, was enuff, in the minds of many honest Men, to produce the effect he aimed at: which was, to make them first mistrust the Jesuits, and afterwards to banish them their companies. Moore was not necessary, for an infinity of people, who have no great good will for them, to engage them to declaim aloud against the public disorders, or to bemoan, in soft whispers in their friends ears, the general depravation of manners, occasioned by the relaxation and corruption of the Society: and believe me, those very declamations and bemoanings, alone, are sufficiently powerful, to prepossess and fill people's heads with groundless fancies, and obstinate opinions; which was all that Pascal proposed to himself, or, at lest, the party by his means. After whom comes Wendrok, not raillying, like him, but speaking, against the Jesuits, the most frightful injuries, malice could invent; and persuading many, by the confidence alone of his assertions, to believe that all he had said was true. As for myself, I have seen a well governed community at Paris, and at Court a certain Lord, very pious and very conscientious, suppose as a matter of fact, of which there could not be the lest doubt, that the Jesuits Morals, were lose and corrupted Morals: a truth, say they, plainly shown and made out by the Provincial Letters, and by Wendrok. Father ****, a very inwardly devout and good Religious man, has always entertained me in this manner upon this subject. Mr. ****, a most virtuous and Saintlike Priest, advised me to break of all commerce with the Jesuits.  
What does all this prove, said Eudoxus, interrupting him, and almost angry, but that Pascal is the most skilful, the most malicious, and the most dangerous of all impostors? and that, by imposing upon the Jesuits a crime, as black and grievous, as it is chimerical and morally impossible, he had wit enuff to make plausible, so extravagant a calumny: and that he is guilty of all the false and rash judgements, that have been, already, and still are, daily, made upon this subject.  
Althô my thoughts, upon this whole matter, are almost the same with yours, answered Cleander, yet would I not willingly declare them so plainly, and without reserve. Pascal an impostor! that's an expression seldom made use of towards him: he is commonly called, the illustrious and the admirable Mr. Pascal.  
Very well, replied Eudoxus, but yet this illustrious, this admirable Mr. Pascal, whom you are somewhat shy and unwilling to call an impostor, was treated in the Court of Justice, just as impostors are used to be. His Provincial Letters were publicly burnt with infamy, by the judgement and order of the Parliament of Province, declaring Them full of calumnies, falsehoods, suppositions, and defamations: these are the express words of the sentence, which you may read at the end of the Jesuits answers to the Provincial Letters. You may also see at the end of the small collection made after the judgement of the Parliament of Aix, the commendations given by the Archbishop of Mechlin to those Letters; 
Approb. des Répons aux Provinc.  which he calls injurious, scandalous, and deceitful impostures, and graces their authors with the title of insolent detractors and calumniators. I remember, added Eudoxus, that turning over, lately, some old papers, I found one concerning this subject, and lo here it stands upon this shelf; it is the judgement given of the Provincial Letters, and Wendrok's notes upon them, by certain Bishops of France and Doctors of Sorbonne, who, by the King's command, had had the examination of them.  

We, the undernamed persons, appointed, by the order of the King, to give our judgement, of a book, called the Provincial Letters of Lewis Montaltius, etc. do certify and declare, that having carefully, and diligently examined this book, we found Jansenius' heresies, condemned by the Church, contained and defended therein: and that, not only in these Letters, but In the Notes also of William Wendrok, and in the Disquisitionss of Paulus Ireneus, thereunto annexed. That this thing is so evident, that it cannot be denied, by any, who have either read or understood this book: or, which is yet worse, who do not hold for heretical, what the Popes, the Gallican Church, and the Paris Divines have declared and condemned for heretical. We do further testify, that slander and insolence are so natural to these three authors, that excepting the Jansenists, they spare no body whatsoever: neither Popes, nor Bishops, neither the King, nor his Ministers of State, neither the Divines of the University of Paris, nor Religious Orders; and therefore we judge, that this book does deserve all the punishments, appointed by law, for defamatory and heretical libels:  
dated at Paris the 7th. of September 1660. 

HENRY DE LA MOTTE Bishop of Rennes.  
HARDOVINE Bishop of Rhodez.  
FRANCIS Bishop of Amiens.  
CHARLES Bishop of Soissons.  
CHAPELAS' Curate of Saint James', MOREL, BAIL, NICOLAI, GRANDIN, SAUSSOY, DE GANCY, CHAMILLARD, DE LESTOCQ.     
What say you to this, continueth Eudoxus? I am of opinion, that if Pascals friends had not been as kind to him, as he was to them, Pascal, the impostor, would not have been an expression so much out of fashion, as it is at this day. And I cannot but admire, that the good Fathers, the Jesuits, can suffer that all this should be forgotten by the public.  
Pascals' friends, answers Cleander, do give out, that all these orders, judgements, and censures were obtained, purely, by the credit, interest, and intriqus of the Fathers of the Society.  
They must of necessity say so, replied Eudoxus; what else could they possibly say? but are we, I pray you, bound to believe them? althô there had been no other thing, in the Provincial Letters false, but this one fundamental article, which of itself falls to the ground, the order of the Council of State, and the decree of the Parliament of Province, and the Bishop of Mechlin's censure would have been most just and equitable: and this very thing alone would have been a strong prejudice against all the rest.  
Nothing of prejudice, I beseech you, said Cleander, interrupting him: be but a little patiented; you seem too much disturbed: we have hitherto judged by pure reason, and not by passion; let us continued to do so still. The Jesuits politicss, in this respect, is a mere chimaera, a foolish fancy: Pascals system has nothing in it of likelihood, or probability; if the Jesuits have corrupted our Morals, it was not by concert or agreement with one another; and Pascals Jansenist has not done prudently, in declaring, so strongly, in the fifth Provincial Letter, against what they said to him, that the diversity of decisions, among the Jesuit Divines, did not proceed so much, from a plot and conspiracy, as from too great a liberty they all took, of saying whatever came into their thoughts: he should have reserved for himself this loophole in case of necessity: but, in spite of his teeth, notwithstanding all his evasions he must have recourse to that at last. Let us than examine whether he be not more sincere in the remainder, and whether the Jesuits cause be as good, and as easy to be defended in the other points, as in this. Let whatever Pascal has said, upon the empty and idle supposition of two kinds of Directors, go for nothing: this is a childish fancy, and a perfect jest, without the lest appearance of truth. Let us not suffer ourselves to be surprised, by these malicious and artificial trics, which, having no solid foundation, subsists but in the air, in the brains of whimsical men. Behold my Fathers, a further effect, a greater secret, of your politics, and a more pernicious consequence of your wicked designs; together with a hundred more such like discourses; all this is but whipped cream, a fantastical bubble, which is far from being solid, and signifies just nothing. Let us, if you please, begin first with the examination of the article of probable opinions, the foundation and groundwork if you'll believe Pascal of the Jesuits policy. With all my heart, said Eudoxus: but the matter is difficult and curious, and I know not whether we shall be able to compass it, without the help and assistance of some others.   

The Third Discourse.  
CLeander, coming to Eudoxus' house, where they were to go on with their conferences, found there the Abbot of *** a learned man, but free, openhearted, and exceeding upright, about fifty years old, and one, who, in all his life, could never endure to see men tric and deceive others: he could not comprehend, how men could possibly be insincere, and could easily pardon all faults, but that of double dealing; which astonished and vexed him so much, that he was often tempted, with Moliér's manhater, to renounce and quit the world, to avoid the vexation and displeasure of hearing a cheat and a liar commended, and applauded at the expense of truth. Pascal had the honour of being esteemed by this Gentleman for such a person. The wit, the acquaint expressions, and the facetious raillery, which he liked very well in other works, did not at all move him in the Provincial Letters: he could not bear hearing them commended; and he was want to say, that the only praise the authors deserved, was such as ought to be given to a skilful poysonner, who knew how to mix and prepare his poison so artificially, that all the world should found the tasting of it pleasant.  
Eudoxus, who used to be sometimes very much delighted with the Abbot's zeal for sincerity, had almost upon Cleander's coming in, put him into that humour: he had only shown him the second tome of the Paralelle des Anciens & des Moderns, and asked him, whether he had ever read that piece; he looked upon the title, and having opened it at a place that was marked, he hit upon the panegyrics of the Provincial Letters; of which he had not sooner read three or four lines, than he threw it down, saying, he neither had, nor ever would, read that book: is it possible added he, with indignation, that the public will never be revenged on these Letters, for their insolence, and the affronts they put upon the Sorbonne Divines, our Religion and its defenders; and that, after this book has been condemned to the fire, both by the Ecclesiastic, and the Secular tribunals, any one should dare, publicly, to give it such extravagant praifes?  
Cleander, who could not forbear laughing at the emotion and vexation wherein he saw the Abbot: saluted him, and told him, that his resolution could not but be very obliging to them two, who were than actually busy in drawing up an indictment against the person he was so angry at. Eudoxus further telling him, that he would do them a singular pleasure, to assist them with his notions and knowledge in a matter, wherein they had great need of his help. But we love, says he, to examine things calmly, without heat or passion: and therefore we entreat you would a little moderate that zeal which has so much transported you.  
What do you trouble yourselves about? replied the Abbot briskly: moderation is indeed necessary in Judges; and I perceive you two have a mind to make yourselves such in this cause. But as for myself, I am already fixed in the matter. I have chosen my part, and have long since known, what I ought to think, both of this book, and of its author, and from this moment I do declare myself the accuser and prosecutor both of the one and of the other: and a little warmth in acting this part, will not perhaps be very unbecoming  
This is the best in the world, answered Cleander; but, turning himself to Eudoxus, he added: let us be upon our guard, and not suffer, that the esteem we have for the Abbot, should make us too  to the Jesuits, or too averse to Pascal.  
I esteem the Jesuits, replied the Abbot; but it is not their interest which encourages me to this undertaking, but only the love of oppressed innocence and truth; and the consideration of the strange prepossession men have, in favour of this book; wherein means are daily used to confirm thousands, who would quickly come of, and quit their good opinion, if they would but reflect upon the causes that produced this masterpiece of calumny. All the world knows, that this work, is a work of recrimination. The Church had declared the Jansenists heretics; it was afterwards necessary they should make their adversaries appear, at lest, the corrupters of Morals. But tell me I pray what piece of this large subject were you upon? we have yet met, but once, about this matter, answered Eudoxus; and we have already done the Society justice, in a point of great importance: it is about the liberty Pascal has taken, to make himself and others sport with the system he has framed of the Jesuits politicss; founded upon a conspiracy between the Casuists, Directors, and Superiors of this Society, against the Gospel and the Morals of our Saviour, for the glory and establishment of their Society, at the price of their own damnation, and the damnation of an infinite number of other Souls. You may therefore reckon upon't, that neither Cleander nor I, are to be duped, or foo●'d, upon Pascal's word, into the belief of so incredible a thing as that, which has not appeared to us to carry along with it, even the lest shadow, or resemblance of truth.  
How, replies the Abbot, do you think that ever Pascal himself believed it? or that even Mr. Arnauld did? althô that, by an excess of honesty, this Gentleman always seemed, almost in all his books, to take for granted the truth of this matter of fact, the most chimerical and fantastical, that ever was invented?  
That which we are now to examine, continued Eudoxus, is the article of probable opinions; which Pascal has made the foundation of all the Jesuits policy, and which he calls the A, B, C, of their Morals. It is by that, he endeavours to give some colour to that pleasant division of accommoding and severe Directors: in which point, if you'll believe him, they are agreed among themselves. Nothing is now spoken of but the doctrine of probability; this is the common subject of prattle and discourse among the devotes and among the libertines. Some rage and storm against it, others make a jest of it, and very few dare defend it. The very Curate, of my little Village, spent lately above half the time of his Homily or Sermon, in arguing against the doctrine of probable opinions. In a word, the storm and outrage against it, is grown, in a manner, not only violent, but universal: and all the faults, that are found, all the ills, that are said of it, are commonly put to the Jesuits account; who, in the mean time, are silent, and say nothing: you would do us no small pleasure to tell us your thoughts of this matter.  
What I think of it, answers the Abbot, is, that a man, who is never so little skilled in this thing, needs but know how to make use of the first principles of common sense and reason, to see, clearly, the great dishonesty of Pascal, the injustice he has done his adversaries, and the ill ways he has taken, to obtain the end, he drove at, which was to decry and run them down, and make them odious to all the world.  
What terrible propositions are these you advance? said Cleander. If I do not prove them, answered the Abbot, I am content to be accounted by you, and by all honest men, for a knave and a calumniator: and if you can justify Pascal in this point, I do engage, notwithstanding the war, to go away to morrow morning, to search for Mr. Arnauld, in Flanders or in Holland, that I may, before him, solemnly profess and declare myself a Jansenist. In the mean time will you but hear me make out what I have asserted?  
After, that Cleander and Eudoxus had a while jested, with the Abbot, about his voyage to Flanders and Holland, he began, in earnest, to prove, what he had advanced.  
The injury, said he, that Pascal has done the Jesuits, does not consist, in the reproaching them with the doctrine of probable opinions: it is chief in this, that he charges that doctrine upon them alone, althô they have said nothing in it, but what has been said by other Societies, even before theirs was instituted, or ever thought of. For what can one think, when they see a man, by printed writings, spread, not only in Paris, but also all over France, citing and dragging the Jesuits before the public Tribunal, and crying out for judgement and justice, against them, in particular and by name; assuring us that he has discovered the source and secret of all their pernicious Maxims; and pretending to convince the Divines, the Directors and Superiors of this body, of introducing, teaching, and practising a doctrine, which authoriseth the most excessive irregularities; suffers men to enjoy and gratify, freely, the most brutal of their appetites and passions; and which turns the pure laws of Christianity into the filthy sensual Religion of Mahomet: calling them to an account, in a most pathetic manner, for the many souls they corrupt and damn every day: and, lastly, speaking of these terrible opinions, as the particular and specific doctrine of the Society; and beating, every where, an alarm against the Jesuits, and with so great a hubbub, that one could not but think, that all the Doctors and Divines, in Christendom, were to be encouraged to a Crusade, a war of Religion, against the most dangerous and most destructive enemy of Christianity. What idea, what character was there than given of the Jesuits? what honesty and what justice was there in all this proceeding; if it be true, that the Jesuits are as innocent as all other Orders and Divines; or if these are full as much, or more criminal than the Jesuits?  
Althô the doctrine of probable opinions were as pernicious as Pascal pretends, and as he has persuaded a world of people to believe, by the false glosses and expositions he has given of it in his Letters, yet would the Jesuits crime have been very much lessened, if the reader had been advertised, that this doctrine was not particular to them, but the common doctrine of all the Catholic Schools, of the Divines, both of Louvain and of Paris. The world, upon this single advertisement, would, perhaps, have suspended their judgements concerning even the quality of this doctrine: and seeing it painted in such horrible colours, would have been first fully satisfied, before they gave their opinions, of the sincerity of him that drew its picture, or made the report. And, without doubt, men could not have been so unjust, as to suffer that all the curses, which so abominable an error had deserved, should fall upon the Jesuits alone. They would not have laid the whole burden on their backs, but at lest have given others their share; and, perhaps, would have favoured, if not pardoned them, for having sinned but by the example of those, whose rank, profession and learning, had gained them the title and quality, of Doctors and Masters. But that, in the language of Port-Royal, the lose Morals, and the Jesuits Morals should become synonimous expressions, and signify one and the same thing to an infinite number of people: that the Libertins and heady obstinate Devotees, and often the envious and interessed, should so understand them in their conversations, in their books and in their pulpits; and, lastly, that the cabal should obtain their end, of distinguishing their own doctrine, and giving it an extraordinary lustre, by opposing it, to that of all the Catholic Divines, whose footsteps the Jesuit Fathers have but trod in, is in truth an injustice one cannot see, without horror and indignation.  
Mr Abbot, said Eudoxus interrupting him, no body can agreed better than you do; but the proposition you lay down, must be clearly proved; if what you say be true, that the Jesuits doctrine is no other, than what has been taught in all the Catholic Schools of the Church, not only Pascal, is very unjust, in making all the blame of it light upon the Jesuits, but also, as you have very well observed, the notice, or previous knowledge of that alone, would have made men think, that this doctrine in itself, is not so bad as he endeavours to make the world believe; but this is a matter of fact, for the making out of which, we shall have need of a complete library.  
If I had foreseen, replied the Abbot, this occasion of defending so good a cause, I should have brought in my pocket all the library we shall have use for; which is but a small book of forty or fifty pages, entitled Quaestio sacti, which plainly shows, that the doctrine of probability, is not a doctrine, particular to the Jesuits. The author recounts, and runs over all the most famous Universities of Europe, as well as the Schools of all Religious Orders; and there shows, that of all the authors, not Jesuits, who had treated, or touched, even by the by, the question of probable opinions, of whom he makes a very long list; he shows, I say, that to the year 1659., when he made this small piece, there was but one of them all, by name Antony Perez, who went a little astray in one point, from the common doctrine of all others; of which very point, in particular charity to the Jesuits, they would feign give them alone the whole honour. He further adds, and proves it admirably well, that the most learned Divines of the Society have, by common consent, restrained this doctrine; which some preceding Doctors seemed to have extended too far: and at last quotes a Jesuit author Comitolus, for the only man, who had attacked and fallen upon the opinions of all other Divines in the several parts of this matter: and from whom he pretends, that Wendrok has taken his strongest arguments, for the refutation of the doctrine of probability.  
From all which, the author, of this little work, concludes two things: the first, that it is against all the laws of equity, to oblige the Jesuits to justify and make good an opinion, which was common to them, with all other Divines: the second, that if it be a glory, to have absolutely declared against this doctrine, this glory, till than was particular, and only due to the Jesuits: and he complains of Wendrok, that being so much obliged to this Comitolus, he did not do him the favour, when he quoted him, to give the reader notice, that he was a member of the Society. You are very lucky than Mr. Abbot, said Cleander, for I have in my pocket this little book you so much value; and having spoken of it to Eudoxus, in our former conference, I have now brought it with me to show him: and here it is.  
The Abbot immediately took the book into his hands, and running it over with Eudoxus, he presently counted nine or ten Bishops, that is to say, almost all of this character, who have handled these matters, since the time of Saint Antonin, who is comprehended in this number: and he also read him the passages, and the names of the books, and the number of the pages, whence these things, relating to this subject are taken. Afterwards he made him read the opinions of three famous Doctors of Sorbonne, who have published whole bodies of Divinity. Mr. Gamache, Isambert, and Dural; to whom this author has added Mr. Bail, a Doctor of the University of Paris, and subpenitenciary of the Cathedral Church of that City; and at last he showed him in the following chapters the unanimous agreement upon this point, of all the Thomist Doctors, Dominicans, and of the Scotist Franciscans, and other Religious Orders, together with the Universities of Louvain, Salamanca and Alcala, etc.  
If it be so, said Eudoxus, there never was any doctrine, lesle particular to the Jesuits, than this doctrine of probable opinions. But Mr. Abbot, added he, have you yourself seen all these passages and quotations confirmed? and have you compared them with the text in the original authors quoted?  
As to this, answered the Abbot, I will say three things: the first, that the author of this little treatise is Father Dechamps, a Jesuit, a very exact and sure writer, a man honoured for his virtue with the esteem of the most illustrious persons of the Kingdom, and of such of the very Jansenists themselves, as know him: the second, that nothing has been written to prove these quotations false, now for above thirty years, since the book was published, which I am very confident would not have been omitted, had the author given the lest ground for it. I know but one Divine, a Dominican, called Father Baronius, that objects, weakly enuff, to Father Dechamps some circumstances, which signify nothing to the main essential point in hand, concerning the manner wherein it is proposed and maintained by this Jesuit; the third is, that of this great number of passages, I myself have examined and found at lest thirty of them true, of which I can speak with certainty and assurance. I will show them you, when ever you will, in two or three libraries belonging to some communities in Paris; where we shall also found some part of those which have not yet fallen under my hands.  
Eudoxus having in his library the three Paris Doctors and some Thomists, they immediately without further delay fell to the examining the first, every of them taking one of them in hand to search for the passages quoted in this little book.  
The Abbot, having read them very often, knew the precise pages, therefore opening that volume of Isamberts, where he treats of Saint Thomas' Prima secundae, showed them the question of probable opinions, handled from page 133 to page 140, there this methodical Divine gives first the definitions of the terms, and tells us what a probable opinion is, and what a more probable opinion: after which he puts the question in the second article; Whether it be lawful to follow a probable conscience, or a probable opinion: which question he himself thus answers. When our conscience tells us, that it is probably lawful and honest, to do a thing, we cannot by doing that thing be guilty of any sin: this, adds he, is the common opinion of all Divines: and than he propounds a second proposition. When there are, says he, two opinions, equally probable, touching the lawfulness of doing any thing, one may safely follow which of the two he pleases.  
In the following article he himself makes this objection of these two opinions, one is, that the thing is forbidden, the other, that it is permitted: the first is safe, because one cannot sin mortally by following it; but the second is not certain. I answer, adds he, that it is lawful to follow the least sure: and I prove it thus .......  
See the title of his fourth article. When there is a dispute about the doing or not doing of a thing, and that there are two probable opinions thereupon, is it lawful, to quit that which is more probable, and to follow that which is lesle probable? he thus resolves this question.  
When there are two such probable contrary opinions, that the one is more probable than the other, it is lawful to leave the more probable, and follow that which is probable.  
After this he propounds some difficulties, and in particular this rule of law. That in doubtful cases one is to take the surest side. He answers, That one must distinguish, and not confounded doubt with opinion, and directs his reader to the precedent article, where he made a more full explanation of the sense, wherein that maxim is to be understood.  
Lastly in the sixth article, num. 8. When there are, says he, two opinions, one probable, the other more probable, and that this also is more safe, and the other lesle safe, about my obligation of doing a thing that relates to myself: I am not obliged by the charity which I owe myself, to act by the more probable and more safe opinion; but I may without sin, quit the more safe opinion, and follow that opinion which is probable, though lesle safe; as before I have shown.  
Certainly, said Eudoxus, after he had read this passage, Father Dechamps has, not only, not made Isambert say too much, but has even forgot a great deal of what he had written.  
This is not yet all, answered the Abbot; let us see what this Doctor says, upon the consequences or dependences of the doctrine of probabilities. Whereupon he read the fifth article: where the author demands; whether a Doctor, consulted in a case of conscience, may answer according to the probable opinion, and not according to the more probable, althô he himself were of this last opinion: after he had cleared and expounded the several senses or meanings, wherein this question might be taken, he answered. That a Doctor thus consulted, was to consider the circumstances of the matter, which may hap to be such, that he may not only answer according to the lesle probable opinion, against the more probable, but that also it might be imprudent to do otherwise.  
Let us go on a little further, continued the Abbot, and read the eighth and ninth article. The title of the first was. Is it lawful to act against ones own opinion, and follow that of others? the meaning of this article is, etc. Isambert adds. Those that hold, that this is lawful, of whose opinion I am, do follow the common doctrine, which is not that of Adrian, but is the opinion of almost all Saint Thomas' Interpreters.  
The title of the ninth article is. Whether a man be sometimes obliged to follow the probable opinion of others, contrary to his own, which also is probable.  
The answer is, that there are some cases, wherein it is not only lawful, to act, against one's own opinion, but also where a Man is bound in conscience, to act according to the probable opinion of another, contrary to his own, though this also be supposed probable? and such may be the case of a Confessor, that hears the confession of a penitent, whose probable opinion, upon some points of his confession, is contrary to his own: and that also of an inferior, commanded by his superior to do a thing probably lawful, but which, in the opinion of the inferior, is not probably lawful. The Confessor is obliged, according to Isambert, to follow the opinion of his penitent, and the inferior, that of his superior.  
And take notice, adds the Abbot, that Isambert quotes Saint Antonin for his opinion, only with this restriction, that if the Confessor be the penitent's Pastor, he is obliged to comply with the penitents probable opinion, and absolve him; but if the penitent be not of his flock, one of his parish, he may than refuse to give him absolution.  
That which you now say, answered Eudoxus, seems to me a little hard: but the authority of Saint Antonin, and the reasons with which Mr. Isambert supports his opinion, persuades me, at lest, to believe, that it is not so easy, as one may think, to give a positive judgement in these matters. As far as I see, continued he, if Pascal had but taken the fancy in his Provincial Letters, to make Mr. Isambert speak in the name of the Sorbonne, instead of the good Jesuit that speaks in the name of the Society, he would have found matter enuff to have made him act the same kind of part.  
He might have made, replied the Abbot, if he had had a mind to it, even Saint Thomas himself say as ridiculous things, as those he has put into the Jesuits mouth: for this, it would have been enuff to have only propounded, and handsomely put into order, several points of this learned Saints doctrine, as he has done the Jesuits: without setting down the proofs, the restrictions, the explications, and the necessary precautions for making the practice of them lawful. But I will yet further suppose, that if a libertin would make a collection of all the false propositions, that have slipped from the holy Fathers, and give besides to some of their other expressions, the ill sense of which they are capable, mangle and dismember some passages, and leave out, or put in, here and there, a few words, he might make a book of them, much bigger than the Provincial Letters: and might as justly entitle it. The Religion and Morals of the Fathers as a certain book was formerly called, The Moral Divinity of the Jesuits, of which the Provincial Letters are but extracts, enlarged upon. And another of a much greater extent which has been since published under the name of The Jesuits Morals. And which was also publicly burnt at Paris, in the year 1670, upon the testimony of several of the Doctors of Sorbonne, for a scurrilous defamatory libel, full of impostures, calumnies, falsifications and heresies, etc. it was, as is said, the work of the deceased Doctor Perrault, Brother to your Perrault the author of Parallel de anciens & des Moderns.  
I am no longer astonished, said Cleander, that the Provincial Letters should have put this man into such raptures and extravagant fits of enthusiasm: both the Brothers were I perceive possessed and animated by the same kind of spirit. But let us I pray, said the Abbot, return to our business. The question, at present, is not whether the doctrine taught by Mr. Isambert, be good or bad doctrine: the merit and reputation of this great Divine aught, at lest, to oblige us to suspend our judgement a while. The point we are now upon, and, by what you see with your own eyes, is most certain, is, that the Sorbonne, as learned and as Catholic than as at this day, heard, without horror, a doctrine, daily instilled from their chairs which being found in the Jesuits books they would make pass for a dangerous and cursed doctrine. But give me leave, and I will, in a moment, found the places you seek for in Mr. Du-val and Mr. Gamache.  
I have found this in Mr. Gamache, said Cleander; it is in the 155 page, and not in 153 as Father Dechamps Printer has placed it.  
His first assertion is. That in the court of conscience a man is not obliged to follow the more probable opinion, it is enuff to follow an opinion absolutely probable, approved by learned men, till such time as the Church declares against it, or that the Divines reject and banish it from their Schools. Navar. Medina. But, in the mean time, one must take care, not to give scandal to the weak, by his exterior actions and must likewise have a regard to custom.  
Who are these weak, said Eudoxus interrupting him, are they not the Jansenists, who are so much scandalised at this doctrine? O my God answered the Abbot, the Pharisaic scandal, which in Divinity they oppose to the scandal of the weak, is, much more to be feared for them. You are always severe and ill humoured towards the Jansenists, replied Cleander, but suffer me, I pray you, to make an end of this passage, there are but two words more in it.  
His second assertion is. That the Confessor, whether the proper Pastor, or one deputed by him, may absolve his penitents against his own opinion, when they are of an opinion both lesle certain and lesle safe; provided it be a probable opinion and backed with the authority of some Catholic and learned authors; and in this case, he not only may, but is also bound to give them absolution.  
Here is certainly enuff of this, said Eudoxus, let us see, whether Mr. Du-val will say as much. Here I have the place ready; it is in his treatise of human actions. q. 4. a. 12. p. 115. in the paragraph entitled quid agendum sit in conscientia opinativa. Where he has, almost word for word, the same expressions which Mr. Gamache has made use of.  
The second conclusion is, that in the Court of conscience a man is not obliged to follow the more probable opinion, but it is sufficient to follow one, that is probable, and approved by able and learned persons, althô contrary to the sense of other learned men; which yet is to be understood with some restriction: that is to say, that this opinion is no more to be followed, if the Church determine the contrary, or the Divines banish it from their Schools. It is the opinion of Medina and Navarre in cap. siquis de paenit. Where they positively teach, that there is no obligation, to follow the more safe opinion, and that it is enuff to follow an opinion which is safe.  
Whilst Eudoxus, with Cleander, was reading the remaining part of Duval's doctrine, about probable opinions, the Abbot meeting with Mr. Bail's book de triplici examine spoke to them in these words. Let us, I pray you, do this Doctor of Paris also the honour of consulting him, he was subpenitentiary of our Lady's Church, a man, much valued, and very fit for his employment; thus he writes upon this subject. Althô many do universally teach in all parts of the Church, that one may, in conscience, safely follow the lesle probable opinion; it seems to me notwithstanding that this doctrine ought to be limited and restrained to the matter of precepts, and not extended to the matter of Sacraments. These words are in the 47 page of his fifth edition de examine paenitentium. You understand what he would be at. He pretends, that a man may not follow the lesle probable opinion, in a doubt relating to the matter of Sacraments, for some particular reasons, but only when the matter doubted of, relates to precepts, or commands, or to the knowledge, whether such or such a thing be lawful or not lawful.  
But let us see what he says in the foregoing page, where he speaks like a wise man, who perceived, that this doctrine might be mistaken and do mischief, by accounting an opinion probable, that was not probable; but who, at the same time, shows himself persuaded, that an opinion, when certainly probable, may be followed: For which cause, said he, it seems to me, that the doctrine of probability, which is become the common doctrine, has not been yet cleared and disentangled from difficulties, as much as the importance of the matter does require and deserve. I wish some able Divines would take the pains, to consider and resolve all the intricacies and objections which attend it. Not that I am not persuaded, but that he who follows a probable opinion, goes a sure way, how convenient soever it may appear: for that way is sure, which makes us avoid sin, and any opinion, which is truly probable, though the lesle probable of two, will notwithstanding secure us from sin. I do hold, and am persuaded, that a man is freed before God from sin, by following a probable opinion, and that he cannot be thereby guilty, even, of a venial sin. What say you now to this?  
That which I say to it, answered Cleander, is, that, most certainly, Pascal and those who furnished him with memoirs studied only among the Jesuits, and had read no other but their Divines. Besides Mr. Arnauld could not possibly have seen the Provincial Letters before they were published. For with what conscience could he suffer the Jesuits to be defamed, for the authors of a doctrine, he himself saw publicly taught in Sorbonne, by the Professors of his own time? but for his having since endeavoured, as he still daily does, to make these Letters gain credit, be more and more valued, and their contents improved, to the prejudice of the Jesuits, there must surely be some strong reasons we are ignorant of: for extraordinary persons, who exceed the common rate of men, and are engaged in mighty matters, as the heads or leaders of a great party, whose reputation they are to support, may possibly have, for themselves, some particular rules of conscience, which all the world have not a right to follow.  
What, said the Abbot, after such evident matters of fact, as these we have read, will you not plainly own as I do, that Pascal, Arnauld, and all other heads of the party who in this, and things of like nature, cannot sin through ignorance, are downright cheats and perfect hypocrites, that abuse the public credulity, malicious and envenomed men against their adversaries, who spare nothing they can think of, to destroy their reputation? to what end are all these shift, does not the thing speak of itself, and do not I plainly perceive what your thoughts are?  
One must not always say what he thinks, answered Cleander, and Eudoxus has yet said lesle of the matter than I  
I am almost angry, replied Eudoxus, at this wicked Abbot: who has turned all my notions topsie-turvie; I was in a very good humour, and well disposed to make you and myself some sport with these good Fathers, the Jesuits, upon the subject of probabilities; and now I begin to feel some remorse of conscience, for the rash judgements I formerly made, a thousand times, of them.  
I have not yet done with you, said the Abbot. I have still matter enuff to show you, to increase your scruples: but before I come to that, or make you see that the Thomists, the Scotists, and almost all other Divines, speak upon this point, the language of the Sorbonists, and have, with them, and the Jesuits, an equal right, to share in the fine title of the corrupters of Morals. I will read you an admirable and remarkable passage of Wendrok upon this occasion, in his notes on the Provincial Letters. You know, that these notes were read, corrected and approved, by Pascal himself; reach me down I pray you Wendroks' book.  
The Jesuits, continued the Abbot, made loud complaints of the injustice done 'em, by designing to make them, alone, answerable, for all the real, or pretended relaxations in Divinity. Them I say, who taught nothing in Morals, but the common doctrine, and who, being the last comers, did but tread in the paths traced out, by those that went before them. 
wendrok in proloquio.  Upon this Wendrok makes a large common place, and pronounces this fine sentence. That having partners does not excuse a crime: and afterwards adds. Pascal would have been well employed indeed, and spent his time to good purpose, in gathering together, and reading so many impertinent books, to found out, whether the Jesuits only were wicked and infamous fellows, An soli Jesuitae flagitiosi fuerint. So Mr. Nicole expresses himself in latin. Althô the Jesuits, continued he, had taken their relaxations from some others, yet notwithstanding, in reason, they ought to be reputed the authors of them. Why? because, that these pernicious doctrines had lain hid in some corner of a library, known to very few, and, by consequence, could not do much hurt: but the Jesuits have drawn them out of their lurking holes, and preached them upon the house tops; introduced them into Prince's Courts, to private man's houses, the Courts of Judicature and the Magistracy. Behold, added the Abbot, the writings of an infinity of Divines put into the number of impertinent books, and the Doctors and Professors of Sorbonne, accounted men of no value or consideration: their Divinity School compared to that of the Jesuits, is but like a small Village in comparison of Paris, and what their famous and most illustrious Doctors have taught, both by word of mouth, and by prints, is like a chip in pottage and does neither good nor harm.  
Let us proceed to other things, said Eudoxus interrupting him: this is really very insolent and extravagant.  
The Abbot said no more upon this article, but contented himself with this first victory, in favour of truth, and a right sense of things, in opposition to calumny and a foolish obstinate opinion. For Eudoxus, as naturally just as he was, was still a little headstrong and the more, that Cleander, who had read the Divines, and perceived that the Abbot's reflections might stand them in good stead, in the examination they had undertaken to make, judged fit to take the advantage of it. Mr. Abbot, said he to him, we must not stand still in so fair a road: let us go on I pray, and tell us your thoughts and all you know of this matter.  
With all my heart, said the Abbot, and I will propose to you a second matter of fact, for the truth of which, I will, upon the hazard of my honour, be answerable; it is, that Pascal and his friends have made of probable opinion a mere scarecrow, a man of straw, for the pleasure and the ease of fight it, with the greater advantage, and of making the Jesuits father a monstrous opinion which never was their own.  
For at last, by the favour and assistance of these opinions which Pascal combats, 
Lett. 5.  One Doctor, if people will believe him, may turn and wind men's consciences, 
Lett. 6.  backwards and forwards, just as he pleases, 
Lett. 5.  and always securely: make new rules of Morals. A Christian may without any hazard estrange himself from the rules, 
wendrek in not. ad epist. 5.  which the Scripture, the Councils and the Fathers have prescribed us; and an infidel and a heretic may safely continued in their false Religion. This, without doubt, is very horrible, and cursed be the poisoned fountain of a doctrine, so fatal to Christianity. But who does Pascal and his translator aim at? for I pray observe, what are the two general conditions, that the Jesuits do require, to make an opinion probable, and that a Divine may hold it for such? first, it must not be contrary to the rules of faith; nor, in general, contain any thing opposite to the truths received by the Church, nor be contrary to evident and right reason. In the second place, it must be supported with good reasons, and not lightly undertaken to be defended, against the common and ordinary opinion of Doctors. These certainly are bounds, which limit and restrain a Casuist, if any one should hap to desire it, from being able to make New rules of Morals. How is it possible for men, that take for a rule this notion, which the Jesuits give in their definitions, of a probable opinion, To go astray without danger from the maxims, which the Scripture, the Councils, and the Fathers have marked out for us? how can a heretic or an infidel continued safely in his false Religion? are the truths, received, and allowed of by the Church, different from those, which the Scripture, the Fathers and the Councils teach us? or can any men, respect, or set a value on the first, without taking the second for a rule?  
If they should say, that the Jesuits have not observed these rules, nor followed their own definitions, and could prove their having done so, without cutting of and falsifying their passages, or stitching several of them together; which, being joined, seem to signify just contrary, to what they really signify, when they are severally read in their proper places; I should be one of the first to oppose and condemn them. But let them not say, that their principles are monsters, which bring forth other monstors: nor from the silly things, that Pascal has made his Jesuit speak, in his fifth and sixth Letters, draw, as he does, conclusions, as impertinent and as extravagant, as they are false and wicked.  
Eudoxus did, in this also, approve the Abbot's reasoning; but yet desired, he would prove the definition he had given of a probable opinion: for Wendrok, says he, disputes the thing, and very few in the world are persuaded, that the Jesuits principles in this matter, are so restrained, limited and narrow.  
The reason is, answered the Abbot, because most people read only the Provincial Letters, and the translator of these Letters, and that either they will not, or commonly cannot consult the Jesuits books. An other reason is, they do not know, that Wendrok, in disputing this matter of fact, is, not sincere; and I will immediately convince you of it. I have in my closet some extracts, upon this subject, drawn by myself, out of the most famous Jesuit Divines: I'll step home and fetch them.  
The Abbot, who dwelled hard by, being gone out, Cleander and Eudoxus began to make many reflections. With all our love for truth, said Eudoxus, I know not, whether we should have been able, without the Abbot's help, to have got over all these rubs; since Pascal and Wendrok have so embroiled and perplexed things, and that the matter itself is so hard, to be clearly discussed, and that the too straitlaced and overstrained Morals are supported, by such plausible and specious maxims; when on the contrary, the truly Christian Morals are built upon maxims, of which some appear very strange and unfit to be followed or received before they are well weighed and considered, which is hard to be done by common understandings: these Gentlemen knew very well, how to take the advantage, by the opposition they have made between the one and the other. Moreover, they speak with so bold and confident an air, that one is, almost, afraid to doubt of what they say: and they have so trained up, and accustomed a world of people to talk as they do, that their most unlikely and improbable paradoxes are, almost, become the public common opinion.  
It was not only, answered Cleander, the difficulty of the matter, nor some outward appearances, which they knew how to improve, that gave them so much advantage over the Jesuits. These Fathers did, in truth, make answers which were sufficiently strong and solid; but so flat and ill put together (I speak of those which came out first) that there was no comparison between one of Pascals Letters, and the First answer to the Jansenists Letters. He got thereby such a superiority over them, that he not more looked upon them, as adversaries he was still fight with, but as despicable people, baffled, foiled, and thrown to the ground, trampling them under foot with equal scorn and contempt.  
It is very true, said Eudoxus, that the Gentlemen of Port-Royal gained wonderfully by this weakness: but is it possible, that the Jesuits of those days had no body that could writ?  
Father le Moyne, answered Cleander, was still living, and I am surprised, they did not oppose him to Pascal: this Father had an excellent fancy and a world of wit: and his way of writing, was lively, smart and florid: he had, besides, a good reputation among the most ingenious and best accomplished persons: and the apologetic manifest, which he writ several years before against the book, called La Theologie Morale des Jésuites, was as much in vogue, as his Currycomb for the Jansenist Pegasus.  
Perhaps, replied Eudoxus, the Society did believe, he was not like to outdo or equal Pascal's stile, at once so easy, and so . For Father le Moyne's great fault was, that his words were not well chosen, or very proper, that he used not to dress, set out and embellish his thoughts, with various, neat, and acquaint expressions: that he was always witty, but never endeavoured, to express himself plainly, or familiarly: and it may be, he himself did not think, he was an equal match for him, in this kind of combat, and therefore was not willing to engage. But whatever the matter was than, 'tis plain the Jesuits do not, now want, store of good writers, and that they knew how to be gainers by their first defeat. Within ten or eleven years after the Provincial Letters were published, there came forth a Letter to a Lord at Court ..........  
The author of that is known, said Cleander, interrupting him, and the man of the world the Society ought, at that time, to have set up in opposition to Pascal. He understood raillery very well, and would not have been troubled or vexed as the Jesuits than were; but would have given him as good as he brought, a Rowland for his Oliver, and have answered him in the same tone and language. Had this been done, the people would, at lest, have compared the Letters and the Answers: whereas in those days they hardly regarded what became of the Jesuits. But for these nine or ten years past, they have both defended themselves and attacked their adversaries, with vigour: 
La Detense des noaveaux Chrestiens & des Missionnaires do la Chine.  and without speaking of The defence of the new Christians and the Missioners of China, which gave the party a wound that still bleeds: you may remember that upon the subject of The Philosophic sin, there were four or five small books made, in behalf of the Jesuits, which were extremely well received, and with good reason: 
Peché Philosophique.  for they fell upon Mr. Arnauld, and his friends just where they should, where they lay most open, caught them fast, and would not let go their hold, but still pursuing their advantage, they did not only fully disprove them, but also took them up roundly, and told them their own to some purpose: bringing them always back to certain unanswerable points: as for example, to the submission which they owe, but do not pay, to the lawful powers, and to some notorious palpable falsifications, of which they were convicted, beyond the possibility of a reply. All this is inconvenient for these Gentlemen, who love not to be upon the defensive, and who found it much easier to attack others, than to defend themselves. But now concerning the Jesuits, who ventured to writ against Pascal, what think you of Father Annat; the author of the book called Jansenist sincerity, 
La bonne ●oy des jansenistes.  and to whom the seventeenth and eighteenth Provincial Letters are directed?  
Father Annat, answered Cleander, was, in my opinion, an excellent wit: and the Jesuits have published nothing better, than what was written by him, upon the matters which were than in dispute. This honest good man (who besides these two virtues, possessed that also of modesty, in the highest perfection possible) had a talent for writing, even in French, if he had a little more applied himself to the study of our language; there fell from his pen, from time to time, as fine, as lively, as pleasant and agreeable strokes as ever I saw in my life.  
I am of your opinion, said Eudoxus; and without saying any thing of his virtue, which I have heard commended, even by this very party, I have found him, as you have done, very exact in his judgement, and sometimes to express himself with great quaintness and raillery, which, let me tell you, is a thing very rare and extraordinary for a School Divine.  
Cleander and Eudoxus were entertaining one another in this manner, when the Abbot returned: and took out of his letter case, a piece which justified the matters of fact he had asserted. This was a collection, of passages, concerning the doctrine of probable opinions, extracted out of the books of several Jesuit Divines, and, especially, out of those which Pascal in his Letters treats so very scurvily.  
My paper, says he, gins very properly with reference to the business in hand: it is out of Layman, whom Wendrok quotes in his notes upon the fifth Provincial Letter, to show, that the Jesuits were in the wrong, when they complained that their doctrine was altered, on purpose to make it odious: he ought to be satisfied, that we govern ourselves, in this matter, by the testimony he himself gives us, of the matter of fact. These are this Jesuits own words.  
A probable opinion, according to the common notion, may be defined. 
Layman. tra. 1. cap. 5. parag 2. num. 6.  An opinion which is not certain, but which, notwithstanding, is founded upon a considerable authority, or upon some important reason: and an opinion ought to be judged, supported by a considerable authority, when it is, at lest, the opinion of a learned, and an honest man. Wendrok citys only this place in Layman, to show, that the Jesuits had no reason to complain of the consequences drawn from their principles: from whence it was concluded; That a Doctor may turn and overturn man's consciences as he thinks fit, and make new rules of Morals: that by this means a Christian may estrange himself without fear of punishment, from the rules prescribed us, by the Scripture, the Councils, and the Fathers.  
Althô Layman should have said no more than this, answered Cleander, interrupting him, Wendrok's arguments would have proved but weak and silly: for by giving this Doctor, as Layman has done, the quality of an honest and a learned man, it is clear, that, morally speaking, he would not have gone astray in his decisions, either from the doctrine of the Scripture, or the Church. One ought to presume that he, who is learned, cannot be ignorant of this doctrine; and that he, who is a man of probity, would not corrupt it: and if, of myself, I am not capable to judge of the matter, supposing he has these two qualities, I act prudently in following his decision.  
This is the very reflection, replied the Abbot, that Layman made, and that Wendrok should have made when he read him. 
Layman ibid.  It is nevertheless necessary, adds Layman, that this Doctor should not have taken up this opinion rashly, or inconsiderately, but after weighing and examining the reasons for the contrary opinion, and this is, what others, and especially those who are unlearned ought commonly to suppose.  
Hold, said Eudoxus, I have here the case of conscience of Mr. Sainte-Beuve; who, if I well remember, said expressly, that regularly speaking, and without having a particular reason to do otherwise, a man aught, without doubting or hesitation, to follow the decision of a person of this character. It is in the first tome, pag. 517, and the 169 case. Where this question is put; Whether one runs the hazard of his Salvation by depending upon the judgement of a learned and a pious man: which he thus answers. That one may with a safe conscience, stick to the resolutions of a man, known to be learned and pious; unless he have some particular reason to doubt the truth of his decisions. I will mark this passage, adds he, that I may some time or other show it to Mr. Nicole.  
But Layman stops not there, continued the Abbot: for see what he adds, for those that are capable of judging the opinions of Casuists. But one ought not, said he, to call that, a probable opinion, which one or more Doctors have invented, contrary to the common opinion; and which others, upon examination, have unanimously rejected, as an improbable and particular opinion; induced thereunto by good reasons, or by the decrees of the higher powers, which the first either had not heeded, or could not solidly answer. One may see what Saint Thomas, Sylvester and Navarre say upon this point.  
In the second place I say, that an opinion is probable, when it is supported by such a strong reason, as is persuasive enuff to make it to be believed, conformable to truth; and this is to be understood in reference to a learned man, who understands the matter, and has well weighed and considered the principles of the contrary opinion, (though by others commonly received) and fully refuted them. Vasquez, Sanchez, and Azor .. do teach this doctrine. But, notwithstanding, it must be limited and restrained by this condition: that other Doctors, coming afterwards to examine this particular opinion, should not look upon it, as improbable, and an erroneous opinion.  
Certainly, said Eudoxus, nothing can be wiser, better circumscribed, or more restrained than this: and with these conditions I see no manner of danger in this proposition. That the authority of one grave Doctor may make an opinion probable.  
This is not all, answered the Abbot: before these restrictions are applied to any matter of this kind, which, like all other Moral matters, are subject to be abused, and as subject also to contempt, as to calumny, because it is necessary to have regard to a thousand little nice circumstances, the omission, or addition of any one of which, is, sometimes, sufficient to tender this doctrine odious: before all this, I say, Layman, at the beginning of the same page, had laid down this principle.  
But, 
Valentia ●. 2. disp. ●. q. 12. ●. 5. q. 1.  said he, from the moment, that one of the two opposite opinions appears evident, by reason, or certain, by the rule of faith, the other can, by no means, appear any longer probable; as Valentia has very well observed, who also, said the Abbot, was a Jesuit.  
I leave you to think, continued the Abbot, if a probable opinion, which according to the Jesuits, ceases to be probable, and becomes improbable, as soon as it appears contrary, to what we are ascertained of, by faith, can destroy the Morals of the Scripture, the Fathers and the Church: or, if the principles, and definitions of a probable opinion, from which Pascal draws so many fine consequences, are the principles and definitions of the Jesuits: and whether Wendrok ought to have chosen Laymans' doctrine, for an example of lose Morals in this kind; or to show, that these Fathers had no reason to complain of Pascal's unfaithfulness, in reporting their opinions: for, even in the two lines, which he citys, mangled and disjointed as they are, there is enuff to justify this Divine, and to refute all the ridiculous conclusions he sets down, as natural consequences of this principle. At the same time Eudoxus and Cleander read Wendrok's note upon the place, and being surprised at his impudence and falsehood, could not forbear shrugging up their shoulders.  
The other quotations are shorter, said the Abbot: who immediately read them the passage in Suarez; where this Divine requires two conditions, for the making an opinion probable. 
Suarez tract. 3. in 1.2. disp. 12. sect. 5.  The first, that it be not repugnant to the authorities received in the Church, nor to any evident reason; and that it be not rashly taken up, contrary to the common and ordinary opinions of Doctors. The second, that it be built, upon some certain and solid foundation.  
Let us now see what Azor, another Jesuit, says, concerning the choice a man ought to make of opinions. One may consider them, says he, two ways: either with reference to the exterior court, or with reference to the interior court of conscience. I will first speak of the choice one ought to make of opinions in the exterior court; and I will afterwards explain, what opinion one ought to follow in the interior court of conscience.  
The first rule is, that, from the moment there is any judgement, or definition of faith made, in clear and express terms, whatever may be said to the contrary, by the gravest Doctors, the opinion that is founded upon this judgement, or definition of faith, or comes nearest to it, is to be held altogether true and certain, without giving themselves any trouble, on account of those Doctor's opinions.  
That is very positive, said Eudoxus, and this rule secures the doctrine of faith, and the Morals of the Gospel. But observe, that according to your text, this Jesuit speaks there of the choice of opinions in the exterior court; and the main question between us is, about the choice of opinions in the interior court of conscience.  
A little patience, and you shall soon be satisfied, answered the Abbot. After Azor had set down several other rules concerning the exterior court, in the beginning of the sixteenth chapter he thus speaks. Let us now see, in a few words, what opinion one may choose in the interior court of conscience: it is first demanded, whether the rules given from the ninth to the thirteenth chapter, ought also to be observed in the court of conscience; and answered; the three first, to wit, those set down in the ninth, tenth and eleventh are to be kept in the court of conscience also; because they there take place, and are as useful as in the exterior court, which is a thing clear of itself.  
The rule that I have now read you, continued the Abbot, is the first in the ninth chapter. Let us read Filiucius.  
He is one of the four and twenty old men, said Cleander laughing.  
Yes, answered the Abbot, and one of those, to whom Pascal does the honour to name and quote, to prove the disorders which follow the doctrine of probable opinions: however, let us read what he says upon the matter before us.  
It thence follows, that to the end, 
Filiucius' tract. 1. de Decal. cap. 4. num. 163.  an opinion may be probable, it must be generally esteemed to contain nothing erroneous, nor to be contrary to any Canon, or Decree of Superiors. 
Reginald. lib. 13. cap. 2. num. 103.  Let us also look upon Reginaldus who does but transcribe Azor.  
We have already seen enuff on this point, said Eudoxus; but I would be glad to know, whether the Jesuits have transgressed the bounds prescribed by themselves.  
Hold; we are not yet come so far, said the Abbot interrupting him in some anger: and before we get thither, you must own, that your Pascal, and his second, have made the world believe so; when seeming to explain the doctrine of the Jesuits, which they rather ought to have called, the doctrine of all Catholic Divines, who till than had written upon this subject, they conceal all the modifications and restrictions of this doctrine, on purpose, that they might draw from it, most dreadful consequences; which they not only do, but also have the impudence to assert, that by the doctrine of probabilites, and by the latitude the Society gives to probable opinions, they have banished out of Moral Divinity the Gospel and the Canons, to substitute in their place, the new notions and ideas of the Schools of these times.  
The Jesuits had in general defined, a probable opinion, An opinion backed, and supported by considerable authority, or by some important reason, against which there was nothing convincing to be offered. And, as if they had been Heathens, who did not reckon the authority of Scripture and the Councils in the number of convincing things, they reproached them, as if they had not made the Scripture, the Councils or the Fathers the rule of their decisions, but governed men's consciences by caprice, by wild and extravagant fancies, and the vain subtleties of their Doctors.  
Yes, I dare say it, continued the Abbot somewhat incensed, and I will justify it too: that, according to the common, ordinary method of the Jesuit Divines (out of which number I except some few Compilers, and some Abridgers, who have another end than the authors themselves whom they abridge) there is not one decision, of any case of conscience, that can have the Scripture, the Councils and the Fathers for a rule, where these sort of arguments do not lead the Van, or are not first to be seen before all others: or where the passages of Scripture, the Canons of Councils, the Decretals of Popes, and the Civil Law, when pertinent to the point, do not make their main essential proofs, or at lest the subject of their dissertations, when under any difficulty; and that never any authors went further, or waded deeper in the pure springs and fountains of Morals, than the principal Jesuit Divines. Witness Azor, Suarez, Vasquez, Layman, Lessius, and Thomas Sanchez. You need but open their books, to show the falsehood and the vanity of all these foolish impostures; of which there is no other proof, than the say and invectives of their calumniating Adversaries  
There is some pleasure Mr. Abbot in angering of you, answered Eudoxus laughing: and it is the Jesuits interest, that we should sometimes provoke you: you have told us wonders. And I cannot but own myself convinced, that, in reality, things have been outrageously exaggerated: that the author of the Provincial Letters has run too fast, and that the good simple Jesuit, who speaks in them, had no Letter of Attorney, no authority, from the Society, to say and grant all the impertinences, which Pascal has put into his mouth.  
That is not a sufficient satisfaction for Mr. Abbot, said Cleander, he would have things called by their proper names, a spade a spade: you agreed with him a little while ago, that it was a mere calumny, to impute to the Jesuits, as a crime, their teaching a doctrine, that had been taught by all the Bishops, who treated of that subject, and before they were in being, by all the Professors of Sorbonne, who have printed any books of Divinity, by the Thomists, the Scotists, the University of Louvain, and almost by all Divines. He also pretends, that it was yet a greater piece of malice, to disfigure and misrepresent this doctrine; to have given such a false and horrible idea of it; and to have lamed, or falily interpreted the definitions, for no other end, but that they might draw from them the most dreadful consequences imaginable. You call this to exaggerate, and he pretends that it is to corrupt, to poison, to lie and to calumniat.  
Mr. Abbot, answerds Eudoxus interrupting him: this is but a dispute about words. We both think the same thing, and so does Cleander too: this aught therefore to satisfy you, and encourage you, to communicate, what you farther know in this matter, since you see we have profited so well by what you have already told us.  
I might yet make you a great many remarks upon this subject, said the Abbot: but I profess to you, that I have much ado to hold, when I see Pascal and Wendrok treat, unworthily and unhandsomely, upon this occasion, under the name of Casuists, so great a number of persons, famous for their learning, and for their virtue, honoured in their time, and respected by the most eminent, and the most holy men, that were in the Church of God. In vain, to make themselves lesle odious and better believed, do they pretend to have no design, but against the Jesuits, whose destruction they aimed at, and against a few others, whom they were not solicitous to treat with respect. 
In epist. ● sect. 6. §. 5.  In this cloud of Casuists, as Wendrok expresses it, and insolently compares them to that multitude of frogs, which covered Egypt, when Pharaoh was King, of whom the Jesuits were but the smallest number, and to whom the paths were beaten out, by persons, whose character in the Church was always venerable to all true Catholics: I mean, the most learned Bishops of their time, the most remarkable Doctors, and the most famous Canonists: among whom is to be seen Saint Antonin Archbishop of Florence; who, in the point of probability, is just of the same opinion with others, notwithstanding all the falsehood's Wendrok is guilty of in this article, which so much disturbs and confounds him; and all the artifices he makes use of, to disguise the contempt he himself has, and which he would have others have, of this holy Divine.  
And if some Jesuits, as Suarez, Vasquez, Sanchez, Lessius, etc. are sometimes quoted in the writings of Divines, together with other eminent men, it is not, because that in their books, There is neither piety nor learning, 
Wendrok loco citato. §. 1.  as they have impudently given out, but because, that piety and learning are joined with as much clearness, solidity and order, as in the works of the most able Doctors. But for this, we must not take either Pascals or Wendrok's words, nor theirs, who have not read the works of these Jesuit Divines; but we may be assured, that the most learned, and most sound part of the Sorbonne Professors will own this truth; and that it will also be acknowledged, by all those of Louvain, except the Disciples of Baius and Jansenius: by the most learned Prelates of this Kingdom, by the grave experienced Penitentiarys or Confessors, who to their great advantage, have frequent recourse to them; and by the Popes, who have given great eulogiums and commendations to several of them. But we may in the last place refer ourselves, to the testimonies, formerly given, by their own Body, of their virtue and their sanctity; testimonies so much the lesle to be suspected, that no body than foresaw, or could guests, that Doctors so Catholic, and commonly so exact, and so solid as these, should ever be attacked for the corrupters of Morals by a Pascal, or a Wendrok.  
For I pray you, continued the Abbot, let us quite lay aside all prejudices, and impartially consider, what is this Pascal and what is this Wendrok, in the matters we are now upon. Wendrok has published some Moral Essays, Pascal understood some parts of Mathematics, and was polite. These two, oppose, in the same peremptory tone, the Fathers, to the Morals of the Jesuits, to the decisions of the Church, and to the determinations of the Sorbonne. The first had never seen, or read the Fathers, but with the eyes of the chief of Port-Royal, and the other, is so very weak, that he is really to be pitied, when he offers at any point of Divinity. The first wins upon his readers, only by his talon of buffonery, of jesting and fooling: the second imposes upon some, by his confidence and his boldness: but, indeed, it is strange he should be able to impose upon any, considering that he never, almost, expresses himself, but like a furious madman.  
They endeavour to make Religious Saints, whose piety was never before suspected by any person, pass for wicked and ungodly men; and to have learned men, who always had a great and equal reputation for wisdom and learning, and who solemnly profess to follow no other doctrine, but that which is commonly taught, in all Catholic Schools, to be reputed whimsical and extravagant. These two witnesses, who swear against them, were the forlorn hope of a revolted party against the Church, sent out, by Mr. Arnauld, to fall foul upon the Sorbonne and the Jesuits. They bring down several passages, out of several books and several authors: they order and dispose them as they think best for their purpose: they mix them here and there with their own reflections, and with the impertinences which they make a very odd man speak, brought upon the stage, for that very purpose; and, of all together, they compose a horrible, friteful, piece of work: whereas the greatest part of these passages, carried back to the places from whence they were taken, and joined, to the assertions from which they were divided; taken and understood according to the restrictions and modifications there set down, have, commonly, nothing but what is wise and agreeable to sense and reason, nor any thing, but what is conformable to the principles of sound Morals. I say, commonly, because, none yet are so foolish, as to pretend, that the Jesuits have more of the gift of infallibility, than other Divines, or than even the Fathers themselves have had.  
Mr. Abbot, said Cleander interrupting him, if you can give us as good an account of these passages, and these particular matters of fact, as you have done of those we have been upon to day, we shall be of your side; and hiss and laugh at the author of the Parallel des Anciens & des Moderns, for his article of the Provincial Letters.  
That I will do when you please, answered the Abbot. But I was insensibly the cause of a long digression about matters of fact, concerning which you had, perhaps, no design to busy yourselves.  
These matters of fact, replied Eudoxus, are in this affair essential; and sufficient to defend the Jesuits, and condemn their adversaries: nor are they altogether unuseful towards judging and deciding the dispute and matter of law. You made me take notice, as we went along, of some things, which persuade me, as I have already told you, that it is not so easy to determine or be positive in this matter, as it is generally thought; and really the more I have of late examined it, the more difficulty have I found to choose what side I would be of.  
I am myself, almost, as unresolved as you; said the Abbot. I am convinced of the falsehood of some articles, but in suspense for others. The next time we meet, He tell you all I know, and all I think, and than leave you to judge.  
The conversation about probable opinions went not farther; but they discoursed for some time after of the Provincial Letters. The Abbot, who is very quick and sagacious, and knows, perfectly well, how to distinguish, in any book between what is real and solid; and what is glittering and shewish: and between some rambling extravagant maxims, by which men daily supply the want of reason and justice, in the cause, they defend; made his two friends several important reflections.  
In the first place, he made them quickly sensible, that there never came out any book, that aught more to be disinherited than the Provincial Letters; whether one regarded the fource, from whence this work was derived, or the occasion of its being made, or the memoirs which were followed, or the manner wherein it was composed, or that, wherein it was published, or the judgement of those, who examined it, and whose duty it was to examine it to the bottom. And also plainly showed them, that this book was made by men, who were than, at lest, suspected in matters of faith: that the Sorbonne's censuring Mr. Arnauld's doctrine, was the occasion of it: that the Paris Divines, and their doctrine, in a point they judged essential, to justify the decisions of the Church, was in it turned to ridicule, and their assemblies, represented as so many farces and interludes of merriment and foolery, without any respect, for the most illustrious persons of the Kingdom, who by the King's command made a part of them: and, lastly, that these Letters were but a kind of comedy to entertain people at the expense of the Jesuits, because they were believed to have contributed most to the condemnation of Jansenius' five propositions.  
In the second place, he made it appear, that there never was a book, wherein some general and specious maxims were more abused; maxims, that were proper to surprise either superficial or lazy men, who would not take the pains to examine whether their application was either just or sincere: that it was therein all along said, that Christians could have no other rule of Morals, but the Scripture, the Fathers, and the Councils; and that the fancies, or imaginations of modern authors, if it were but for their novelty, aught to be accounted and pass for dangerous.  
The Abbot enlarged himself, fully, upon this article, which he excellently well cleared from all objections and difficulties. I would be glad to know, said he, for example, how a Curate, who had got all the Bible by heart, and had also got into his head the seventeen tomes of the last edition of the Councils, together with all Saint Austin, Saint Hierom, Saint Chrysostom, and the rest of the Greek and Latin Fathers, but had never read any one of the Casuists; how, I say, could this Curate take upon him, to hear Confessions, and resolve all the cases of Conscience, which his Parishioners might propose to him: or whether he could understand, from the works of Saint Austin against the Pelagians, or from those of Saint Prosper, how to determine all the difficulties, which relate to the impediments of matrimony; how to distinguish, between that, which makes it nul, and that, which renders it only unlawful: or, how could he there found all the expedients he ought to make use of, in these matters, to avoid scandal, divisions, quarrels and destruction of families? what might, or aught to be tolerated, or permitted, or hindered in regard to certain, nice, and tender circumstances and conjunctures? how this Curate, whether in City, or in Country, could be able to answer about the validity, or the nullity, the justice, or injustice of some contracts, and about the doubts, which a thousand different circumstances may occasion, even in such contracts as are lest disputed? how should he behave himself, in matters of restitution? wherein one rule, whether it be of the law of nature, or of the positive law, often seems to destroy another. How many difficulties, in matter of censures, irregularities, and dispensations, do daily arise, which the Councils could neither foresee, nor regulate, and of which experience, only, gained by hearing Confessions, gave occasion to treat, to clear, and decide them? a man may, almost, say the same things of every part of Morals; the Divine law, which is comprised in the holy Scripture, and the Ecclesiastic law, which is comprised in the Councils, are they not also, as well as the Civil law, the instruments God makes use of, to regulat the manners, the disputes, and the differences of men? and are they not likewise, at the same time, the sources, and springs, of an infinite number of difficulties and troubles? having these holy rules, say our reformers, what need have we of Casuists, and of all their great volumes, which fill whole libraries? and, I demand of them, since there are so many and so good laws, why are there such a number of Lawyers in the world, and so many commentaries upon those laws? and why, notwithstanding all this, are there still so many suits, wherein the Judges, who best understand all these laws, and all these commentaries, are, sometimes, hard put to it, much imbarrassed and perplexed in giving their Judgements?  
The Council of Trent declares to all penitents, that they are obliged in confession to tell the number of their sins, and their different kinds: the Confessors are obliged to explain to them those different kinds, to know them, and to make a judgement of them: are the means of doing all this exactly and prudently, which go very far and suppose no small skill in several sorts of learning, in School Divinity, in Moral Divinity, and even in Logic, to be found in the Scriptures, in the Councils, or in the Fathers? and without reducing things to the method that these Divines, so much despised, have done, into how many scruples, and difficulties would this decree of the Council put both the penitents and the Confessors?  
Not, not, one must not oppose the doctrine of the Scriptures, the Fathers, and the Councils, to the doctrine of Divines, and the greatest number of Casuists; no more than they must the Commentators and interpreters of the laws, to the laws themselves. One may indeed examine, whether their consequences are well or ill deduced; or whether the Fathers, in such circumstances, and in those particular cases, would have decided as they did: or whether, they swerved from the right way, or went astray by ignorance, by wilfulness, or by malice. The Ecclesiastic Superiors have a right, to provide and take care in this matter: but it is also the Christian readers duty, and they are in charity bound to it, not to believe Pascal upon his own word, nor trust his extracts, even when he quotes the books, the chapters, and the pages: the respect due to the persons he attacks, is a strong prejudice against him: and the judgement any one should make, upon his testimony or assertion, would certainly be too rash and too foolish. The most men ought to do, when they read him, is but to doubt, whether as declared an enemy as he is, he may not, possibly speak truth: but not to conclude all those guilty, whom he condems, and for no other reason, but because he is pleased to say, they are ignorant in the Church learning, occasions of scandal to Christianity, the corrupters of the Gospel, and the Morals of our Saviour; and that as soon as they appeared, they banished the Scriptures, the Councils, and the Fathers.  
I am as much persuaded as you, answered Eudoxus, that this Curate, you speak of, with all his knowledge in Scripture, Councils, and Fathers, would be often very much puzzled how to solve all his Parishioners difficulties, whether put to him, in Confessions, or in consultations, if he had not some special and particular rule to assist him, in the application of those general rules: and his fate would be the same with some Lawyers, who have the Institutes, the Code, and the digests almost by heart, and yet are not able to advice, or counsel aright one of their farmers, or tenants in a suit against his neighbour, about the bounds of his lands, his close, or fields, I know more than one Curate, or one Doctor, who declaim and thunder out aloud against the Jesuits Morals, and yet, in their closerts, Cardinal Lugo, Lessius, Sanchez, Layman and Azor are the advocats they consult, and by whose determinations they often gain a great deal of honour.  
You are in the right, replied the Abbot, and it is without doubt for this reason, that Saint Charles Borromeus, in a little treatise he has made about true Confession, does expressly enjoin his Curates, diligently and constantly to read, Manibus continuè terant, the Classic authors, so he calls them, who fully treat of cases of conscience.  
Saint Francis of Sales shows he was of the same opinion, in a little piece which he directs to his Priests, entitled, 
Avertissement aux Confesseurs.  an Advertisement to Confessors, wherein, after several advices about the method they ought to observe in hearing Confessions, he thus concludes. Father Valerius Reginaldus, a Jesuit, reader of Divinity at Dole, (observe that this is one of those, whom Pascal treats most rudely) has newly published a book, Of the prudence of Confessors, 
De la prudence des Confesseurs.  which will be greatly useful to all that read it. Here you see, my dear brethrens, the five and twenty articles which I thought fit to propose to you, etc.  
I have also seen a latin letter from the same Saint to Father Lessius, which was not printed with the rest, but was published elsewhere, the original of which is at Antwerp, wherein, after he had signified the great esteem he had for the Societies works, and for his in particular, he adds. I read some years since a very useful piece, de justitia & jure, which you published, where you solve, with much solidity and clearness, and better than any Divines I have seen, all the difficulties of this part of Divinity. Pray observe, adds the Abbot, that this book, with which Saint Francis of Sales is so much taken, and commends so much, is that very book, for which Lessius has deserved from Pascal, the title of the Favourer and Patron of Murderers, of Bankrupts, broken Merchants and Usurers, etc.  
You there touch upon a point of some consequence, said Cleander, and without all doubt, the authority and testimony of Saint Charles Borromeus, and of Saint Francis of Sales, ought not to be of lesle weight, than that of Pascal and Nicole. And if we add to this, answered the Abbot, 
The Bishop of Meaux  that one of our most famous Bishops, in his Synodal, or Diocesan Statutes, has very lately mentioned among other books which he advised his Clergy to read, the better to enable them to hear Confessions, Tolet and Azor, both Jesuits, the last of whom had the honour to be one of Pascals heroes of the lose Morals, perhaps the Jesuits may have occasion to flatter themselves into a belief, that all the world do not blindly run into his opinion or suffer themselves to be deluded, or trapand into Port-Royal nets.  
As the Abbot was going on with the Jesuits Apology, for which he was furnished with very good memoirs, Eudoxus was called away by a letter of consequence which required an immediate answer. But Cleander made the Abbot promise' he would be present and make one at the meetings and discourses which Eudoxus and he resolved to have about the Provincial Letters. They agreed to go next day to one of the libraries in Paris: to see, whether the Thomists, the Doctors of Louvain, and the rest, had taught the Doctrine of probable opinions, as the Jesuits and the Professors of Sorbonne had done. And also to confront and compare, exactly, the passages he had shown them, to prove that Pascal and Wendrok had altered and disguised the Jesuits principles. And likewise promised, if that appeared true, they would without difficulty forgive his calling them both impostors and calumniators: and that they would afterwards go on, to the examination of the particular passages, which, the Jesuits publicly say, were, for the most part, maimed, or falsified, or wrongfully transposed: after which the Abbot and Cleander took their leaves of one another, and parted.   

The Fourth Discourse.  
THE Abbot came the next day, at the hour appointed, to take up Eudoxus and Cleander, whom he carried to the Fathers of **** whose library, he knew, was very well furnished with the books they wanted. There he made a new conquest in favour of truth: it was over a young Bachelor of quality of Eudoxus and Cleander's acquaintance, who, by chance, happened to be in the library: and who, having saluted them, and understood the occasion of their coming, could not forbear laughing: he asked them how they came, at this time of day, to have any scruples about a matter, that for so many years passed no body had questioned. To make a doubt, said he, whether the doctrine of probable opinions be the specific doctrine of the Society, of which the Jesuits were the inventors, and the only, or, almost, the only defenders, having of their side but a Caramuel, or a Diana, at most, is to doubt, whether there be such a City as Rome in the world, or a Grand Vizir in the Ottoman Empire.  
Hereupon the Abbot spoke, and told him, that in such matters as these, there was nothing better, than for a man to see things with his own eyes; and that he would do them a pleasure, to help them to found out, what might, at last, confounded a Jesuit, whose confidence the Public had a long time suffered to go unpunished: that this Jesuit had been so bold, above thirty years since, as to make all the Religious Orders, a number of Bishops, the most famous Universities of Europe, and even the Sorbonne, in the sight of her own Doctors, complices of the extravagancies of the Society, in matter of Morals: that this was done, by a book licenced and printed at Paris: wherein, without entering into the matter of Right, or examining, whether the doctrine of probability be good or bad, he confines himself to the matter of Fact, that for near a hundred years, and until the year 1660, when his book was printed, this doctrine was the common opinion of all the Bishops, all the Orders, all the Universities and all the Doctors: that for one, that had opposed it, he could easily reckon ten, that had defended it: and that, of the three or four, at most, who had quitted it in some points, two were Jesuits. You see what his paradox is, added the Abbot, seeming to speak very seriously. And this author, continued he, to put his design in execution the more methodically, has reduced the whole doctrine of probability, to two propositions, which in effect contain it wholly: the first: That, of two probable opinions, one may follow the lesle safe. The second: That, of two probable opinions, it is lawful to sollow the lesle probable. The two Monsters which Pascal and Wendrok have fought with, as sprung from the damnable politicss of the Jesuits: and in this little book (which at the same time he drew out of his pocket) 'tis boldly, I say, affirmed, that these two propositions were taught, either separately, or both together, by this crowd of non-Jesuit Divines, which are all named, and their passages quoted. What insolence is this if it be not true?  
The young Bachelor, after he had, for some time, raillyed at the Jesuits pretention with Cleander and Eudoxus, who affected to seem as incredulous as he, said, he would willingly share in the unnecessary trouble the Abbot had resolved to give himself. Hereupon they fell immediately to work, to the turning over the books, which the library keeper put into their hands, as fast as they called for them: they followed the order of the chapters, and begun with the list of Bishops.  
They presently read, in Saint Antonin, the first proposition, expressed in these words. Eligere viam tutiorem consilij est, non praecepti. To choose the safer way, is matter of counsel not command. And because Wendrok, who was gravelled at this passage, had answered, that Saint Antonin spoke there, only of the choice of conditions, or states of life, and that he meant no more than this, that though it were safer to become Religious, than to live in the world, it was, notwithstanding, not a command to become Religious, but only an advice: they read what the Jesuit Author had writ upon that text, to refute Wendrok's explication. This Saint speaks there of an action, of which there is a doubt whether it be a sin or not a sin, which in reality is the ground of the question treated of, in this whole paragraph. Here are Saint Antonin's own words.  
It is said in the third chapter of Ecclesiasticus, 
1 p. tit. 3. §. 10.  He that exposes himself to danger, shall perish therein: from whence Saint Thomas and others do infer, that he, who does an action of which he doubts whether it be a mortal sin or not, does commit a mortal sin; because, that thereby he exposes himself to commit a mortal sin. When therefore in a matter of Morals, there hap to be different and contrary opinions, he that follows the larger seems to expose himself to the hazard of committing a mortal sin, it being possible, that this opinion may be false, and the other true.  
But to this it is answered, that he, who knowingly does a thing, wherein he doubts there may be a mortal sin, does commit a mortal sin, if while he does it, he continues in his doubt, even althô the action, in itself, were not sinful: and here the word doubt is taken in its most strict and proper signification; when, because of equal reasons on both sides, one does not incline more to the one than to the other: but when the doubt is light, and but by way of scruple, as a man doubts, when sticking to one opinion, in a matter wherein he is afraid the opposite opinion may be the true opinion; by acting with this doubt he does not sin, when he follows the opinion of some Doctor, and that there are probable reasons for this opinion, more than for the contrary, althô the opinion, which is followed, should be false, provided, that it be not against the manifest authority of the Scripture, or the determinations of the Church. And the reason of this is, that he who acts in this manner, does not act, with the doubt of a mortal sin, but in his action is guided by a probable opinion.  
The Bachelor could not easily agreed to this doctrine, or comprehend how a man could act with a doubt, and yet not offend God. The Abbot said, that, according to the principles of Saint Antonin, and those Divines who followed him, one must, in this matter, distinguish between a practical and a speculative doubt: that they hold, that the one does not necessarily follow the other, and that one may act with a speculative doubt, althô it be not lawful to act with a practical doubt. But in a word, continued he, the question here, is not of the Right, but of the Fact; nor whether Saint Antonin was in the right, or in the wrong; but only, whether the Jesuits do fully prove, that his opinion was the same with theirs.  
At lest, answered the Bachelor, Saint Antonin seems to say, that in allowing the lesle safe to be followed, one is obliged to follow the more probable opinion.  
The Jesuit, replied the Abbot pretends to no more: his drift is, only, to show that Saint, Antonin held, at lest, that one might follow an opinion which is but probable; and that, of two probable opinions, one may follow the lesle safe; althô there should be still danger, that it might be false. If we were to dispute the thing, we should, by this single principle of Saint Antonin, overturn all Pascal and Wendrok's Divinity on this subject.  
The next, they called for, was Didacus Alvarez, that man, so famous for his dispute de Auxilijs, when Dominican, and who was afterwards Archbishop of Trani, in the Kingdom of Naples. They looked for the title of the dispute 80 to wit. 
Ad. 1.2.  Whether, of two probable opinions, a man may follow that which he shall judge most convenient, and leave even that which he believes the more probable. This Divine, after he had brought down the opinion of Cajetan, and of some other Thomists, which seem to hold that one ought to follow the more probable, speaks thus.  
The second opinion is contrary to this, 
Num. 4.  and holds that every body may follow that opinion, which he judges probable. This is held by Master Medina, and with him by many other learned Thomists.  
Afterwards, he sets down a third, to reconcile the two others, by the restrictions wherewith it allows the lesle probable opinion to be followed, which are, that neither our neighbour, nor our Religion be concerned therein, and that there be not in it, any particular circumstances, to offend the honour of God: he also adds some suppositions. First he lays down as a thing not to be doubted of, that, when two opinions are equally probable, or, that there is very little difference in the point of probability, one may choose which of the two he pleases: secondly, that when a penitent has followed a probable opinion, for example, that which says, such or such a contract is lawful, his Confessor ought to absolve him, althô he should believe it more probable, and even certain, that the contract is unlawful: Because, says he, that the penitent, in following this probable opinion, has not sinned. 
Num. 9  After which he declares himself of this third opinion, and answers the arguments of Cajetan, which, for the most part, do only prove, that one ought to make use of the foremention'd restrictions, and which all the Jesuits, who taught this doctrine never failed to prescribe. Upon which the Abbot in a few words made these two reflections.  
First, that nothing can be more clearly taught, than that, on several occasions, It is lawful to follow the lesle probable opinion, althô that, at the same time, it should be the lesle safe. And in the second place, that the single testimony of Alvarez may save them the labour, of turning over Medina, and the other learned Thomists; to satisfy themselves that the doctrine which was attributed only to the Jesuits was common to them with the most able Divines of Saint Thomas' School.  
These reflections, which began to put the Bachelor a little out of countenance, made Cleander and Eudoxus smile, who, by the former day's discourse, were prevented from being surprised, as he was, at the things that were shown them.  
The Abbot went on, and showed the following proposition in 
(a) Quaes'. de Cons. difficult. 8.  Joseph Anglez, Bishop of Bozano in Sardinia, in 
(b) In praxi poenit. ca 22. qu. 3.  Thomas Zerola, and in 
(c) Edit. Venetae 1559. in l. 2. q. 19 disp. 86.  Malderus Bishop of Antwerp. When the penitents opinion is probable, althô the Confessors opinion should be more probable, he neither can, nor aught to refuse him absolution. And this in 
(d) Tract. de poenit. sacr. diffis. 1●. p. 731. edit. Salman. 1585.  Bartholemew Ledesma, an other Bishop of the Dominican Order. This conclusion is against Adrian, who says, that one is obliged to follow the more safe opinion, even supposing that the contrary opinion is also probable. But notwithstanding our conclusion is very true, and this conclusion is, that it is lawful to follow the lesle safe and the lesle probable opinion.  
They opened a second time 
(e) Loco citato.  Malderus Bishop of Antwerp, to show this assertion in express terms. It is sometimes lawful to follow the lesle probable opinion, and to reject the more probable, althô this should be the more safe opinion. 
(f) Tom. 2. dis. 2. q. 4. p. 9  Bonacina was found to be of the same opinion. We may, says he, without sin follow a probable opinion, and leave the more probable and more safe opinion.  

(g) Tom. 1. col. in lib. 2. Decret. p. 408.  Barbosa Bishop of Vgentio, the great Canonist, was also in his turn consulted, and found to be of the number of the approvers of this doctrine.  
At last when they came to Caramuel, I durst not said the Abbot propose him to the Jesuits adversaries for a Judge: for though he were a Bishop, they have treated him so ill, and the Jansenists have given such an idea of him, and of Escobar, that men cannot hear their names pronounced, but they presently fall a laughing. Besides, perhaps, he extended this matter too far. But without regarding his opinion, may we not, at lest, hear him as a witness of a matter of fact, wherein he was very well versed. This opinion, says he, 
Num. 302.  here in his Moral Divinity, which he dedicated to Alexander VII, is, at this time, the common opinion of all the world, that men may, with a safe conscience, follow the lesle probable opinion. The common opinion, adds he, is, that it is lawful to follow the lesle probable and the lesle safe opinion, and to reject the more probable and the more safe opinion.  
See now, continued the Abbot, eight Bishops, besides Caramuel, all men particularly distinguished, and remarkable for their learning and their piety, who hold the first part of the doctrine of probability, and seven, that hold the whole, pure and entire. What an honour is this for the Jesuits, that all these learned men are accounted as nothing in respect of them? and that, in a common cause, they should be regarded as the chief, who alone deserve to be attacked, and that all these Prelates should not be thought worth the trouble of being so much as named?  
They are in truth Bishops, said Eudoxus laughing, but they are but Italians, Spaniards, or Flemings; and if I were a Bachelor of Sorbonne, as this Gentleman is, two of their Doctors would weigh more with me, than all those people, who, perhaps, might have been disciples of the Jesuits. In that point, said he to the Abbot, it were well, if you could justify the quotations of your Father Dechamps: as for Cleander and me, who are not so much concerned in the matter, we will still go on to make the Thomists ready for you.  
The mischief on't is, said the Abbot, that some of these had quitted the world before the Jesuits were come into it: and that others had printed this doctrine, before any Jesuit had written in Divinity. The rest were either Dominicans, or Doctors of Louvain, and appeared very indifferent for the interests, or the doctrine of the Society. But I will willingly refer myself in the matter to the Doctors of Paris. Hereupon they took Isambert, Du-val, Gamache and Bail, quoted by Father Dechamps. Wherein, were read to the Bachelor these plain propositions, which were the day before shown to Endoxus and Cleander. That one is not obliged to follow the more safe opinion: and that one may in conscience follow the lesle safe, and lesle probable opinion and quit the more probable and more safe opinion.  
He was very much surprised, and said he would see not more; but how than, added he, comes it to pass, that all the world say it is the peculiar doctrine of the Jesuits, the secret and foundation of their corrupted Morals, and of their Politics? and how happens it, that Pascal and Wendrok, quitting all others, fall only upon them? and that they speak of these Fathers, and of their opinions in this matter, as the scandal of Religion, saying, that the heretics ought not to judge of the Church's doctrine, by the doctrine of the Jesuits, and that the Catholic Universities, the other Communities and Religious Orders do not partake in their errors? you fill my head witha world of scruples, said he to Eudoxus and Cleander; I myself, upon this account, have a thousand times exclaimed against, and run down the Society: the matter passes for a thing evident and certain by the charity and the care of the Jansenists, and is become so public, that I did not believe I was guilty, in this, of rash judgement, nor of detraction, or calumny.  
I am well pleased, answered Eudoxus, that you have so tender a conscience: but, after all, is not Pascal, Wendrok, Mr. Arnauld, and all their friends of weight enuff to hinder and secure your judgement from being rash, althô it should be false? believe me, that if you would unburden your conscience of these sins, you ought to go and confess them to Mr. Curate of ****, however severe he be in other matters, he will not refuse you absolution on this account; but let me advice you to tell him the case with all its circumstances: for if you speak to him of rash judgement, or of detraction, in general, with reference to the doctrine of some Divines, he will believe you speak of Mr. Arnauld, or of Jansenius, and that will not be for your advantage. Tell him it is of the Jesuits, and he will comfort you; he will enlarge your conscience, as if you had been a weak scrupulous person; he will inform you, that it is not always any great crime to speak little trifling things of one's neighbour; and that, when they hap to be said of the Jesuits, they may sometimes have a very good effect.  
The Bachelor hereupon having taken leave of them, they stayed sometime longer to compare many passages with the texts of the authors cited, which they found very exact. But beginning to be weary of a labour, which was not at all pleasant or agreeable, they only chose five or six more of the most positive, to verify them, and especially those of the Dominican Divines. They pitched upon these Divines rather than any others, not only for the reputation their School is in, but also because there have been, of late, some particular persons of their Order, very ill instructed, without doubt, in the opinions of their Doctors, who affected to make all the inconveniences, real, or pretended, of the doctrine of probable opinions fall upon the Jesuits alone.  
But before the other passages were compared, the Abbot desired Eudoxus and Cleander to take notice of what Father Dechamps asserts in his book, 
Quaestio facti.  to wit, that the Dominican Divines, who had handled this matter for near these hundred years, had all agreed, in teaching these two propositions together. That one is not obliged to follow the more safe opinion, and, that it is lawful to follow the lesle probable and lesle safe, and quit the more safe and more probable opinion. Insomuch, says this Father, that I have not found one of those I have read, nor of those quoted by the authors I have read, who has given the lest ground to believe, that he was of a contrary opinion.  
The first, of all the Thomists he begun with, was Bartholemew de Medina, whom Antony of Sienna, in his Bibliotheca, qualifies with the title of the complete and excellent Divine, distinguished as much, by his probity and his piety, as by his learning. 
q. 19 a. 6. c. 3.  These words are to be seen in his commentaries upon Saint Thomas' prima secundae, printed many years before any Jesuit had handled this matter. From thence arises a great question, to wit, whether a man be obliged to follow the more probable opinion: and after he had proposed the contrary opinion, he thus determins. My opinion is, that if the opinion be probable, it is lawful to follow it, althô the contrary opinion should be more probable: which he afterwards proves at large.  
Cleander having read, among the remaining authors, the name Dominic Bannes, desired he might be consulted: he was, said he, a man of some weight and value, and one of the Directors of Saint Teresa: they opened his works, and found in his treatise upon prima secundae these words. There are two sorts of opinions; 
q. 10. a. 11. dub. 3. c. 4.  for some relate to actions, for example, to know whether such a contract be lawful or not. Others concern the things themselves, to know whether a thing be so or so: whether this house belongs to me, or to another: I say than for the first kind, that men may follow a probable opinion, and reject the more probable.  
By this 'tis plain, said Eudoxus, that the Holy Teresa's Director is, like the rest, of the lose Morals; and for which there is no remedy: for the Inquisition, which bore with this doctrine, would never have suffered a Port-Royal in Spain, nor the publication of Pascals Letters. Witness, said the Abbot, what happened the last year. A Religious man undertook to get the Provincial Letters, translated into Spanish, to be printed at Madrid, that they might, as was said, be sent into the Indieses; to give the Christians, there, the same kind of character and idea of the Jesuits, as was endeavoured to be given to the Catholics of France. But what's worse than ill luck? the Inquisition got notice of it, and cited the Religious man; who, being questioned about this new book, found about him, answered, he knew not what it was: that it was directed to him, without telling him from whence it came. But the printed leaves appearing still fresh, he was convicted and shut up till farther orders.  
Cleander asked him if the Jesuits knew this story? they know it, answered the Abbot, and would be very glad, they had not so much cause as they daily have to complain of such kind of proceed. After this, they read, in the little book, the rest of the Thomists quoted, without taking the pains to search into their own particular works, out of which, no doubt, the passages are most faithfully extracted.  Gregory Martinez. First conclusion. 

Tom. 1. in 1.2. ad quaest. 19 art. 6.   
It is not only lawful to choose, of two opinions equally probable, that which one pleases, but it is further lawful to follow the lesle probable, and to quit the more probable. This second part is contrary to Sylvester and Cajetan, but yet it is the common opinion.  Peter Ledesma. 
It is more probable, 
In sum. part. 2. tr. 8. ca 22.  and it is conformable to the law of God, and the law of nature; that it is lawful for a Judge to reject the more probable opinion, and to follow that opinion which is probable. This is the opinion of Master Medina, of Orellana and several other Doctors, and chief of Saint Thomas' Scholars upon the 2.2. q. 67. a. 4.  
Ho! for this bold stroke, said Cleander, the Jesuits will reform the Dominicans Morals: for I very well know, that upon the chapter concerning Judges, the direct contrary is commonly taught by the Society: and that their principal Doctors 
(a) Suatez Vasquez, Valentia, Sanchez, Tannerus, Becanus, Conink, Granado, Salas, Filiucius, Layman, Reginaldus, Gotdonus, ●. etc.  have declared against this proposition. And they bring for it very strong and good reasons; and do solidly show the difference there is between these, in particular, and other cases, where neither the interest of our neighbour, nor the honour of Religion is concerned.  
There followed in the list of Dominicans, 
(b) To. 1. disq. mot. disq. 3. art. 20.  Vincentio Candido Master of the sacred Palace. 
(c) Ad. 1.2. dis. 208. frag. 1.: nu. 549.  Ildefonsus of Saragosa whose works were printed at Rome, by order of the General Chapter of Dominicans; a circumstance, upon which one may argue strongly, and which Pascal would not have forgot, if the treatise of Divinity of any Jesuit, who had taught the doctrine of probable opinions, 
Pag. 182. Controu. 14.  had been published by order of a General Congregation of the Society. This list ended with Paul Blanchis and John Haquet.  
The Abbot further proposed the justifying or proving some passages of the Doctors of Louvain, quoted by Father Dechamps. But Cleander and Eudoxus said they were abundantly satisfied. They only took the pains to count the Authors of the other Orders, and the Doctors of all the Universities mentioned in the following chapters: the number was about threescore: but they read, attentively, and with pleasure, the reflections made by Father Dechamps in the last chapter of his little book, which really are very much to the purpose.  
The first is, that which the Abbot had before made them, and which, as one may say, does, naturally, present itself to their and every body's eyes. To wit; whether there be the lest reason, or the lest equity to attribute to the Jesuits, as their particular and peculiar opinion, a doctrine, largely spread in the writings of the Divines of all Religious Orders, and of the Doctors of all Catholic Universities: and above all, when Mr. Isambert writes in France, that it is the common opinion of the Doctors. Ita communiter Doctores; that Bonacina writes the same thing in Italy: Ita communiter Theologi; that others say it in Spain, and others in Germany. Haec sententia est communis in Scholis. 
Navarre, Io Caram. Ep. Misiensis.  Illa sententia est hodie omnium.  
The second reflection is, that, it is yet more ridiculous and more unjust, to make the Jesuits authors of an opinion, taught by so many able Doctors before they had a being. It is the most common opinion of Divines, said Peter Navarre in the year 1597 This opinion is supported by the greatest number of Doctors, by the greatest authority, and by the strongest reasons, said Salonius, an Augustin in the year 1592.  
The third is, that the Jesuits have applied themselves, above all other Divines, to limit and restrain this doctrine, which certainly may be abused more than any other Moral principle, if it should not be taken as it ought to be; and which, in reality, was stretched too far by some Doctors, before it was treated of by the Jesuits. For this reason, Suarez, Vasquez, Sanchez, and other the most learned Divines of this Society, have plainly demonstrated, and convinced all the Divines of their time, that this doctrine ought not to take place in reference to Judges in their Judicatures, nor to Physicians in the application of their Medicines, nor to Professors of Divinity, in the choice of the opinions they ought to teach: and these last, in particular, are bound in conscience, according to the Morals taught by the Jesuits, to follow the most safe opinions in matters of Religion, and such as are conformable to the common practice of the Church, and morally certain in the matter of the Sacraments.  
Lastly the fourth reflection, which, by the way, they had touched upon in the precedent discourse, is, that from the time this doctrine was in vogue till the year 1660 there had been but one Author who attacked it in its full extent, and that this Author was an Italian Jesuit, Comitolus, from whom Wendrok had taken the best part, of what, with any colour of reason, he had said upon this subject, but very disingenously, without acquainting his readers that this Comitalus, whom he had cited, was a Jesuit.  
They were going to leave the library, after the Abbot had shown his two friends in the books of several Jesuits the definition they give of a probable opinion, together with the restrictions added to it, by Layman, Suarez, and their other Divines, the extracts of which he had shown the day before: and had thereby made an end of convincing them of Pascal and Wendrok's unfaithfulness, who give a very false notion, and make a very wrong scheme of this doctrine, to no other end, but that they might have an occasion to calumniat the Jesuits. Just as Cleander, casting his eyes, by chance, on the 33 page of Father Dechamps book, which lay open, saw there the name of Father Morin, the Oratorian: what, said he, laughing aloud, do the Jesuits bring to their succour, even the very Oratorians, upon the chapter of Probability?  
Because that is an extraordinary thing, let us see, said Eudoxus, what Morinus says to the business. In his eighth book of Penance ch. 4. nu. 19 these words are to be found. Franciscus Suarez troth. 3. ad 1.2. disp. 12. sect. 6. nu. 10. prudenter mihi videtur circumscribere casus, in quibus necesse est opinionem certam praeferre probabili, & probabiliorem minus probabili: mihi enim videtur certum & evidens, aliquando probabilia certis praeferri posse: quibus igitur indicijs & argumentis haec dignoscemus? quando, scilicet, inquit Suarez, ex justitia vel charitate tenemur vitare damnum, quod re ipsa subest, vel periculum ejus, etc. Suarez seems to me to determine very prudently the cases wherein one ought to prefer a certain to a probable opinion, and the more probable to the lesle probable: for it appears to me certain and evident, that sometimes a probable opinion may be preferred to a certain one: how shall we come to know when this is to be done? that is, says Suarez, when either justice, or charity does oblige us, to prevent the damage that may hap by the thing itself, or the danger of it, etc.  
Let us go, said Eudoxus, the Jesuits have carried the cause and they will carry it before any impartial judge: any man of sense, who will but hear and examine it, as we have now done. They went abroad to take the air a little wearied by the application their curiosity had given them, but mighty well satisfied they had cleared and disintangled the truth of things, from all the clouds and obscurities, wherein it had a long time lain industriously concealed and folded up.  

The following part of the fourth Dialogue.  
AT their return from taking the air, they alighted at the Abbot's lodging, where, after they had, for some time, talked of indifferent things, being at a stand, and the conversation fallen, Eudoxus thus briskly took it up again. But what think you, in the main, Master Abbot, of the question of probable opinions? let us lay aside the matter of fact, and the sense of others, and tell us your own thoughts of the thing itself.  
I should be hard put to it, answered the Abbot, if I were obliged to declare myself in this particular. 'Tis a matter wherein it is as easy to destroy all, as it is hard to establish any thing: where the extreme, and directly contrary opinions, seem to have insupportable consequences; and where the middle, which some are willing to hold, seems not possible to subsist, without reestablishing the foundations of the two opinions, which they pretend to destroy.  
This is a very strange proposition, said Eudoxus: but if it be true, the positive, magisterial air, which some certain people put on, and affect in this matter, is not to be endured.  
The greatest part of these men, answered the Abbot, have dived very little into the business, but suffered themselves to be carried away with the stream of the party, they first met; or to be dazzled with outward appearances, which have in them nothing that's solid; or else to be shunned with the clamours and outcries raised, by concert or agreement, in Flanders and in France, and which have been echoed and heard as far as to Rome. But here they move more slowly, and walk with a graver pace, and are not in so much haste, nor very forward to decide in so nice and tender a point. All that I can say to you, is, that I cannot bear Pascal and Wendrok's opinion, and that I do yet suspend my own judgement, concerning the opinions of other Divines.  
It looks well notwithstanding, said Eudoxus, to say, that one is obliged always to follow the more safe opinion, though it should be the lesle probable. Has not Wendrok said wonders in his first note upon the fifth Provincial Letter, where he proposes his system, and fights with all his forces that of his adversaries, represented by the single body of the Jesuits? For these Fathers are there brought to answer for all the Thomists, all the Scotists, all the Doctors of Salamanca, Alcala, Louvain and Sorbonne; for all the Canonists, and all the Bishops you have named to us, and to whom had they spoke to them in their proper persons, it would certainly have been very rude, to have offered so many injuries, and said so many contumelious things, as he has done.  
All that is admirable, answered the Abbot; and above all this fine principle, upon which all the rest depends, that no probable opinion is safe, and that it does not excuse from sin, if it be not true; 
Sect. 4. paragr. 1.  opinionem probabilem securam non esse nisi vera sit. Insomuch that any judgement upon which I lean, whether it be to govern myself, or to direct others, that consult me; this judgement, I say, how probable, and how well soever founded, if it be false, makes me a criminal and guilty before the tribunal of the divine justice. It is, without doubt, this extravagant and erroneous principle, of which the absurd consequences are easily known, that has contributed most to make this opinion fall to the ground.  
For, notwithstanding, all they could do, the Doctors and Directors, most zealous for the reformation of Morals, were not able to make it serve their turn in spite of all that was most specious in this severity, and of the honour, and reputation it would have brought to their direction and advice, and notwithstanding the inclinations, and the interest they had to give into the notions of one kind of devotes, by declaring loudly and universally for the more safe opinion, they are agreed, that there is no solidity in this doctrine, and convinced by reason and by experience that it is both impertinent and impracticable.  
Not to be able to quiet the conscience, but by evidence, which is wanting often and almost always in moral things, to reduce all the Judges even after they have done their duty exactly to doubt (I speak of well grounded doubt, and not of a scruple) whether they do not make themselves liable to go to the Devil almost by all the judgements they pass. For the most just and impartial are daily divided amongst themselves; that is to say, that necessarily the one, or other of them in this opposition of opinions, judge and decide the contending parties differences upon false principles, or by misapplying true ones, and that thereby they do an act of injustice, which neither their application, nor their examination of the affair, nor the care they take to follow that, which seems to them the more probably true, nor the authority of the most able Lawyers, can excuse since that after all this they lay hold on a false opinion, and which at the same time is contrary to justice. To throw into the same uncertainty, by the same reason, all Lawyers, Advocates, Proctors and Attorneys, almost for all the causes they take in hand, among which 'tis certain there are very few that have as clear a right of their side, as there is truth in a mathematical demonstration; and all those that have litigious rights and causes, for all the suits they bring and maintain. To give the same kind of trouble to all Directors, and all Confessors in an infinity of decisions, especially, in the matter of restitution, where it is as little safe, to oblige as not to oblige to restitution, and where it is equally dangerous, on both sides, to offend, or sin against justice: and to all Merchants, in, I know not, how many circumstances, of their trade and deal, and generally to all men, in an infinite number of conjunctures, where the daily commerce of life does engage them, and wherein they are governed by probable opinions only: all this appeared very intolerable.  
Besides this other principle, which Wendrok farther supposes, for the establishment of his doctrine, that invincible ignorance does not excuse from sin, is a principle, whatever efforts are made in its favour, that reason cannot admit, and which is repugnant to the notions, all men have, of the goodness of God, and which of late, was also censured at Rome, and which, in effect reestablishes some of the condemned propositions of Jansenius, and undermines the foundation of some of the most important doctrines of the Council of Trent.  
After all, the ineffectual remedy for all these great inconveniences, and the only one suggested by Wendrok, is, to address one's self to God, as if a man could be certain, every moment, of a particular revelation from on high. Notwithstanding these reasons, they were, I say, obliged to quit this fine piece of Divinity. But it does not appear, that either Wendrok, or his friends were much troubled for't. The opposition that was than made to this specious severity, together with the pretended looseness of the Society's Morals, served well enuff to decry and run down the Jesuits; this was all these Gentlemen aimed at, and they had all the reason in the world to be satisfied with the event.  
I very lately puzzled, said Cleander, upon this subject, a Doctor of the severe Morals by a difficulty I proposed to him, concerning the contracts for incomes upon the loon of money. It is certain, said I to him, that these kind of contracts can be justified, only by probable reasons. They have been in use, or, at lest, well warranted, but within these two or three last ages. In the beginning they were accounted, by several Doctors, usurious contracts, and altogether unjust, whereby twice as much money was repaid as was at first received; since it will plainly appear, by redeeming, at the end of twenty years, the agreed for sum of a thousand pounds a year, after the rate of five in the hundred, and cleaving for the whole time the arrears, that the money first borrowed with just as much more was fully paid back. This business was than disputed, with so great variety of opinions, that even to our days the dispute of the three contracts was still kept on foot. It is also certain, that this kind of contract is to be justified by a good intention, which men have to purchase, by parting for ever with the principal, not a certain sum of money yearly paiable, (for money is not to be bought with money) but a right of exacting, every year, a certain sum from him, to whom the principal was given. This is a very nice and tender point. He ought to have answered, said Eudoxus interrupting him, that two Popes, Martin the fifth, and Callixtus the third, did tolerate, or approve these sort of bargains, in the Decretals they made upon this subject.  
He gave me this answer, replied Cleander, but I thus pursued my argument; besides said I to him that the Popes can neither derogate from, nor destroy the law of nature, to which, many Doctors do affirm and maintain, that, this contract is as opposite and contrary, as is the most formal kind of usury. Besides this, many of those, we know, who hold that the most safe opinion is always to be followed, do not hold, that the Pope's authority is sufficient, to make an opinion certain, if it were before doubtful; and that these two Popes do not approve of this contract, but on two conditions, not to mention some others, which they do also require. The first is, that the rent or incom should be in the manner of a mortgage, and settled upon some certain, fixed, fund, of a nature to produce a revenue, for example, upon an estate in land, or upon a house. The second is, that, this fund failing, the rent should be not longer paid: conditions which made easy the greatest difficulties the Doctors had raised upon this kind of contract.  
But in France, these conditions are not observed, he that borrows money binds all his estate, in general, and his own person into the bargain; that, if his estate should fail, the person should always remain bound. Pius the fifth, since these two Popes, and the Council of Bourdeaux, held in the last age, say, that these two conditions, which I have mentioned, are necessary. Whence it is evident, that it is more safe, not to have, not to make, or receive such kind of contracts, or bargains, at lest, after the manner they are made in France. For to examine this business well to the bottom, they have not found, for these two or three hundred years, any new demonstration to justify this contract, more convincing, than the reasons at that time proposed to support it; nor a more solid refutation of their arguments who condemned it; that is to say in one word, that there is but a great probability to justify this kind of bargain or contract.  
This probability than is not an assurance, that it is conformable to the law of nature, however it may be allowed of, by custom and by reasons, which seem very probable, to honest good men, and to the greatest part of the learned. But if these learned men, who are but Schoolmen, Canonists, or Casuists, be deceived in a matter, so subject to error, what shall become of an infinite number of Christians, of all estates, conditions, and employments, who daily either give, or take money, at this kind of interest? What shall become of us in France? where the conditions are not observed, which the Popes believe necessary, to hinder this contract from being dangerous, and with which many Doctors did not yet judge it safe enuff, and without which abundance of others accounted it unsupportable. It is manifest, that in this, all follow the probable and lesle safe opinion. I assure you, added Cleander, that my man was so puzzled, he knew not what to answer.  
I do not at all wonder at it, said the Abbot, any man of sense cannot but see, that these arguments are unanswerable, and plainly demonstrate, what a folly it is, to build on certain general maxims, which, at first, seem clear, though they are indeed but dazzling, and the application of them, in an infinite number of occasions, absolutely impossible. A thousand such like arguments, as you have told us might be made, upon this subject, and which can never be answered. I know continued he, that in the first heat of the pretended reformation of Morals, 
Case de Conscience de S. Beuve tom. 1. p. 583.  this case was proposed: they drew themselves out on't, as well as they could; but upon every little difficulty, and dissatisfaction found in their answers, by those who consulted them, they were forced to acknowledge, that men were not obliged always to follow the more safe opinion. But, in a word, when once any doctrine makes an universal trouble and disorder in civil affairs, that very disorder ought to pass for a moral demonstration that it is false; and that it is against the order of Divine Providence, and, by consequence, against the eternal verities, of which common sense and reason are but the expressions which make part of the rules, God has given us for our conduct. And thence it is, that such a doctrine has so short a duration, the common fate of all extravagant and unreasonable opinions.  
But is what you affirm certain, said Eudoxus, that this opinion is laid aside? for I still meet, every day, men, who, in speaking of these matters, do generally declare, that we must always follow the more safe opinion. This being most  to the law, as they express themselves, and most contrary to concupiscence, that this was the method of all true Christians, and that the doctrine of probability was never known, or taken, in any manner, by the Fathers and the believers of the first ages, for a rule of the manners, and conduct of the Disciples of Jesus Christ.  
How easy it is, answered the Abbot, for a man, to make himself a Doctor of the severe Morals, such a degree, or Doctorship, requires neither study nor learning; there is no more necessary for it, but a little confidence to determine positively in company, and to condemn, or damn all the world; I do not speak of these sort of men, when I say Wendrok's doctrine, upon this point, is out of date. I speak of the most able Confessors, and Directors of the best credit of this age; who do not, at all, follow it, either in their practice, or decisions; because they have found its principles false, and its consequences extravagant, and who, in these days, commonly hold for a maxim, that when two contrary opinions meet, the lesle safe becomes very safe, by the strength of the reasons whereby it exceeds its opposite; I speak of the Divines, who, for several years passed, have in their writings treated of probability, and, who, except two or three, that are obliged to swallow a hundred absurdities, and to engage themselves in a thousand contradictions, do confine themselves to the refutation of this doctrine, that one may follow an opinion, which is both the lesle probable and the lesle safe opinion, and to prove, that one may not follow the lesle safe, but when it is the more probable opinion; but nothing is more false, than what these pretended Doctors of Wendrok's character, as little skilful in Divinity, and full as bold as himself, have had the confidence to advance, that the doctrine of probability was never acknowledged in any manner by the Fathers or believers of the first ages for a rule of manners.  
They stand very much upon it, notwithstanding, said Cleander, and, build a great deal upon this negative argument. It is true, answered the Abbot, that it was not than disputed in the Schools, whether a probable opinion might be followed, when it was the lesle safe; but it is also true, that, in practice, the most holy men did govern themselves by it without scruple, when they met with difficulties, which could not easily be determined by the chief and inviolable rules of our manners, the Scripture, the Canons, and the laws and constitutions of Ecclesiastic superiors; and when there was any dispute about the sense and meaning of these very rules, 
Let not him that eateth not despise him that eateth and let not him that eateth despise him that eateth not.  in some circumstances, and the opinions were divided, every one took what side he pleased, and said with Saint Paul Qui non manducat manducantem non spernat, & qui manducat, non manducantem non spernat. This puts me in mind, continued he, of a very nice conjuncture, of the Christians, in the time of Julian the Apostate, reported in the Ecclesiastical history, and which will serve for an example and proof of what I say.  
This Emperor, 
Baro. ad ●n. 362.  among the acts he made use of to engage his subjects in Idolatry, gave order, that all the victuals, exposed to sale in the market of Constantinople, should be defiled by pagan superstitions; and particularly directed, that all, there to be sold, should be first offered to Idols. The Christians of this great City did believe, that, in conscience, they ought not to buy any thing in the market, insomuch, that as long as this order was in force, they only fed upon the corn which the rich had in their granaries, and which, without grinding, they got dressed as well as they could.  
The same Prince published, and put in execution, such an other edict at Antioch; but the Christians there, were of a different opinion from those of Constantinople; they bought, and, after their usual manner, eat of what was publicly sold. The Church, which was much edified by the conduct of the Christians at Constantiople, was not at all scandalised, at the Christians of Antioch; and Theodoret, who reports this matter, does approve and justify it, by a passage of Saint Paul, in his first Epistle to the Corinthians, Whatsoever is sold in the shambleses, 
Cap. 10.  that eat, ask no questions for conscience sake. Those, of Constantinople, knew this passage of Saint Paul, as well as those of Antioch; but they understood it in a different manner; which occasioned two probable opinions, of which the more safe was that of the Christians of Constantinople, and the lesle safe that of the Christians of Antioch.  
Here is the usage of probability, said Eudoxus, established, as much as possible, by the contrary practices, and behaviour of the Christians of these two Cities; and by that of the Church in reference to those of Antioch, for, without doubt, Theodoret, by approving the fact, did not believe they were obliged to follow the more safe opinion.  
The very Scripture itself, answered the Abbot, 
L. 1. Macha. c. 2.  can furnish me with examples of this nature, about the decision of the great case of conscience proposed in the Jewish Church in the time of the renowned Antiochus viz, whether it were lawful to fight upon the Sabbath day, the Jews had, than, neither the Ark nor the Prophets to consult, but debated the matter in a council of war, and concluded, they might fight upon the Sabbath day; this was the lesle safe opinion, which seemed contrary to the law, and to all the former precedents of that nation in matter of Religion.  
If Wendrok, said Eudoxus interrupting him, had been of this council of war, and had read in it his dissertation upon the fifth Provincial Letter, Mathatias and Judas Machabeus would have been, infallibly confounded and turned into ridicule.  
No doubt on't, answered the Abbot, but to return to the Christians of the first ages; when I reflect upon the manner of their conduct, it seems to me, that men were never more governed by probable opinions, than they were at that time; nor ever practised more the maxim, which teaches, that one may in conscience follow the opinion of a Doctor of reputation for probity and learning; that a Bishop, a Priest, and a Deacon having gained the people's esteem and good opinion, their judgement and sense of things were received as Oracles, and blindly followed, in such matters, as the Scriptures, or the Counsels had left undetermined. Whereby you may see, that Wendrok, and all his adherents are much out in their account; for after this, how can it be said or maintained, that there are no footsteps of probability in the Scripture, or in the holy Fathers, or in the practice of the first ages of the Church?  
As concerning the Fathers, said Cleander interrupting him, I'll tell you a pleasant adventure, of which some days ago I was a witness, and comes now into my mind properly enuff. I was at the Bishop of ****'s house; where there was a great deal of good company, and, among others, a Jansenist Abbot, who turned the discourse to the Morals of the Jesuits; of whom he talked wonders, especially touching the article we are now upon. The Prelate, being a man of wit and judgement, and not an opiniator, growing weary of his too tedious discourse, said laughing, I must tell you, Mr. Abbot, of a decision lately made in the Indieses, by the principles of probability; but, upon condition, that you'll get it inserted in the eighth tome of La Morale pratique before it be finished by Mr. Arnauld. I do promise, answered the Abbot very readily, that, if you judge it worthy, it shall have there a very good place. You yourself, replied the Bishop, shall be the judge; the matter of fact is this.  
A French Merchant, who had a very handsome wife, was shipwrecked in the Indieses, and saved himself in a City belonging to the Spaniards, being a stranger, he was carried before the Governor, a violent brutal man, who, at first sight, fell desperately in love with the woman; the Merchant had notice of it, and, being very much disturbed and uneasy, went to the College of that City, and desired to speak to a Casuist and a Divine; he told them the difficulty he was in; saying that he knew from good hands, that the Governor was so passionately in love with his wife, that he would gladly Mary her, if she were not already Married. For he does not yet certainly know, says he, that she is my wife; persons well informed of the matter do assure me, that he is resolved to have me murdered, in case he finds me to be her husband; or that I should oppose his Marriage. And, on the other side, if I suffer him to Mary her, he'll give me an employment, that will make amendss for the great losses I have sustained by shipwreck. I can very well conceal my Marriage, there being no body here acquainted with it, and make her pass for my kinswoman, and relation, as she really is, and so near, that I was forced to get a dispensation to Mary her. I am sure she will do any thing I shall bid her; but I would not willingly offend God. I have had a thousand times the benefit of his Divine protection, and, even now, he seems to inspire me with some confidence, that he will hinder the execution of the Governor's ill designs against my wife.  
Hereupon the Divine, who spoke first said, that he very much pitied his case, and declared to him there was nothing else to be done, but to give an heroic proof of his faith, by offering up his life, a Sacrifice to Almighty God; for if he were asked, whether the woman were his wife, and he should answer she was his kinswoman, this must needs be, either a , or an equivocation; neither of which is lawful: but the greatest evil of this business was, that he could not advice his wife to conceal her being so, and to say she was but his relation, without visibly exposing her to commit adultery, and making himself a complice; that, if he had so great a confidence in the Divine succour, he ought still to hope, and rely upon the goodness of God, for delivering him from his present danger, by some particular way he could not foresee; but to believe that God should change the Governor's heart, in reference to his wise, or preserve her, from the crime to which she herself would consent, could not but be a most damnable presumption. This was not a Jesuits decision, said our Jansenist Abbot.  
Have a little patience, continued the Prelate; the Casuist too spoke, in his turn, and declared to the Merchant, that he was of another opinion: that as to the first point, in saying this person was his kinswoman, he should not tell a ; he should indeed thereby conceal the truth, but not say any thing that was false; wherein there is nothing of evil: and, as for the act of adultery, to which his wife was exposed, this could not be imputed to him for a fault; that by praying to God, and trusting in his goodness he satisfied his duty; and if to take this course was to tempt God; to presume that he would save his life in a conjuncture wherein his death was morally inevitable, would be to tempt him much more. But in going this way, he was to take care, not to have the precise intention to avoid death thereby, but withal he ought to be ready, as he said he was, to do any thing rather than offend God.  
Ho there spoke the Jesuit, answered the Jansenist, and if the other also were one, here is directly Mr. Pascal's division, of the Jesuit Directors, of which some are severe, and others lose even to excess.  
Without donbt, said the Bishop, the Divine's opinion was the more safe, and the more probable, and the Casuists, the lesle safe and the lesle probable. Most certainly, answered the Jansenist, who earnestly desired to know, whether the matter of fact was true, which he approved as excellent for the Morale Pratique. The Bishop, perceiving him catched and drawn in, said to him laughing, indeed, Mr. Abbot, what I have told you, is but a Parable, of which I will now tell you the meaning. The Merchant's case is, in reality, that of Abraham, to which you are not a stranger; who, to avoid the danger of death, advised Sara to say to Pharoo's people, and to Abimelech's, that she was his Sister, 
Epist. 3 ad Olympiad.  without saying that she was his wife. The Divine was Saint John Chrysostom; who plainly condems Abraham, as a man, who consented to the adultery of his wife; who delivers up the sheep to the wolf; who deceiv's, and who is an example to the greatest Saints, to let them see what they are capable of, notwithstanding all their Sanctity. But the Casuist is Saint Austin, 
Lib. 22. contra Faust. c. 33. & seq.  who said in express formal terms, that Abraham, in saying Sara was his Sister, had done no ill; because he only concealed part of the truth, and told nothing that was false, Tacuit aliquid veri & non dixit aliquid falsi.  
That is not yet all, continued he, the action of Abraham, said Saint Austin, looks, at first, like that of a husband, who gives up his wife to commit a crime; but it will not appear so to any, but to those, who know not how to distinguish, by the light of the eternal law, between good and bad actions. This Patriarch, pursued the Father, did not consent to his wife's adultery .... but, by concealing she was his wife, and saying she was his Sister, his intention was, that these strangers and ungodly men should not kill him, lest that after his death they should treat her like a captive. He adds the circumstances, and the reasons mentioned in the exposition of the case of conscience, and in the Casuist's answer; and above all, that Abraham was in hopes, that, whatever happened, God would protect his wife. Where you see, concluded the Prelate, that Saint Austin makes good use of the direction of intention; and that he decides, at last, the case of conscience like a Doctor who believed one might follow the lesle safe opinion, as Abraham himself had done. It is certain, neither of them reasoned very well, if they did not judge, that this lesle safe, was, at the same time, the lesle probable opinion; and if they believed it such, we must say they were, of the same opinion with those, who hold, that the lesle safe opinion may be followed, even when it is the lesle probable.  
Our Jansenist, continued Cleander, was a little surprised; and the trouble he was in; diverted the company very much; he stiffly maintained, that nothing like this could ever be shown him in Saint Austin. The Bishop of *** hereupon reached down the sixth tome of this Father, and showed him, at large, the case and the decision in the 22th book against Faustus; giving him also to understand, that it was not in conscience safe, nor so much as probable, that they might run down their neighbours, with that passion and madness, wherewith his good friends the Jansenists seemed possessed, in declaiming eternally against the Jesuits: and that it would be much more edifying to practise, without preaching, the severe Morals; than to preach them, every where, and yet practise directly contrary to what they preach. This advice, answered Eudoxus, seems to me to be very wisely and seasonably given; and, if those who speak so disadvantagiously of the Jesuits Morals, would but reflect, upon the memorial, and the testimonies by which they are induced to speak of them, after that manner; and upon the reasons they might there found to believe the contrary of what is said, upon the motives that there present themselves to make a man distrust the sincerity, or the knowledge of those, that decry them most, perhaps they would believe, that this, at best, was but the lesle probable opinion; and that it was lawful to speak thus, and to believe all that their enemies had published of them. But alas it is but too true, that the men, most zealous for severe Morals, do, as often, as there is occasion, dispense with their most essential rules.  
And what do they now think at Rome, asked Cleander, of this fine maxim, that men are always obliged to follow the more safe opinion? they there condemn it answered the Abbot; at lest Alexander VIII passed his censure upon this following proposition, That it is not lawful to follow a probable opinion, even the most probable, among all those, that are probable, Non licet sequi opinionem, vel inter probabiles probabilissimam, this proposition, is the immediate consequence of the other; for, if a man be obliged to follow the more safe, it thence evidently follows, that it is not lawful, to follow the contrary opinion, how probable soever it may be.  
That is manifest, said Eudoxus, let us here than take our leave of Wendrok, with his mad extravagant Morals; but, continued he, I cannot however easily give into the opposite opinion; which teaches, that one may follow the lesle safe opinion, even when, at the same time, it is the lesle probable: why rather should they not hold the middle opinion, according to which, men, may take the lesle safe, only, when it is the more probable.  
I am of your mind, answered the Abbot, and have all the inclination possible to follow this middle opinion; and a great many of our present Divines desire it; but, having very well examined the whole matter, I found, that the Doctors, of this mitigated probability, are altogether as hard put to it, as the others. It requires an entire book to show you all the trouble given them, by those, who hold the doctrine of the lesle probable opinion, and that which they themselves also, in their turn, give to those, who follow this opinion. I have at my house some volumes that might instruct you in the business, in case your curiosity and your patience could carry you so far.  
I do not intent it, replied Eudoxus, and in all appearance, I shall content myself in this matter, with the plain, naked, notion, you have given me of a probable opinion, which, if I well remember, is an opinion not contrary to faith, nor to the principles of faith, nor to any evident reason, that plausibly answers all the arguments of the contrary opinion, and is, besides, supported by one, or more, important reasons, that is to say, reasons capable to make an impression upon a wise man, so far, as to satisfy him, that the opposite opinion is not certain.  
You take the thing very rightly, said the Abbot, but you must also observe, that all these conditions ought to agreed, even to the opinion they call the lesle probable. For all the Doctors of different Nations, different Universities, and different Orders, who have so unanimously taught, that the lesle safe opinion may be followed in conscience, have always supposed, that the lesle probable opinion, was truly probable; and that if the contrary opinion be so evident, and certain, that it takes from it its probability, it will not longer come within the state of the question. Insomuch, that those among them, who say one may follow the lesle probable opinion, do only say, that an opinion may be followed, which constantly has, and even by the very confession of those, or, at lest, the greatest part of those who oppose it, all those conditions, as well negative as positive, as they are commonly called. By which, as you may see, the doctrine of the Fathers, of Tradition, and the Counsels is secure; since the first precaution of these Divines, is to set down all this, as an inviolable rule, and to declare improbable, every thing, that is contrary to it, from the very moment it becomes contrary.  
Althô this doctrine, thus explained, said Cleander, should not be true, it is, at lest, evident, that it is not extravagant, nor impious, nor abominable; and althô it should not have been embraced, by so many learned and illulustrious persons, as it has been, for so long a time, I would not look upon it as such. This is the only thing, answered the Abbot, that I pretend at present to make you conclude; and by this alone, I carry the cause against Pascal and Wendrok, in favour of the Jesuits, and, an infinite number of other famous Divines.  
As for me, said Cleander, till these disputes he, once for all, determined, I would, in the mean time, be glad there were a rule made, whereby all men should be prohibited from declaiming, and roaring out against this doctrine, of the lesle probable opinion; and against the other propositions that relate to it; under penalty, that any one that did, should be obliged, in practice, to follow the contrary opinion which in words he holds and maintains, That will never be done, said the Abbot; there are too many concerned to suffer it; the very Directors themselves would oppose it. What for example would Mr. **** say, if one of his she penitents, reflecting upon part of her fortune, and doubting whether it were well or ill acquired, should not in the matter refer herself to him, upon pretence, that one single Doctor cannot make an opinion probable, much lesle safe, and that she should therefore require him to produce the opinions of a dozen Doctors under their hands and seals?  
What would Mr. Abbot of **** say, if, because the opinion, which allows the plurality of Benefices, to a man already possessed of one of a considerable value, is, by consent of all the world, the lesle probable, and the lesle safe opinion; he should in that point, be obliged to quit in practice, the doctrine of the lesle probable opinion; against which notwithstanding he fly's out, and furiously runs it down in all places?  
What are you in good earnest, said Eudoxus, and does the opinion, which holds the plurality of benefices lawful, pass for the lesle probable opinion? most assuredly answered the Abbot, and it is really so. Never any probable opinion, compared with its contrary, was more certainly the lesle probable opinion, than that is. Those who talk otherwise, either do not speak seriously, or else do not understand the right notion of probability. 
Sess. 24. c 17. Quod lib. 9 a. 25.  The manner of the Council of Trent's expressing itself, and what Saint Thomas argues upon the subject, and what the Casuists, lose as they pretend them, say of it, evidently show, that, commonly speaking, all, or most of those, who enjoy plurality of benefices, are secured, but by the favour of the lesle probable opinion; of whom, hardly, any are to be excepted, saving those, whom the Ritual of Alet does, in effect except, to wit some good Churchmen, who, with a well directed intention, and for want of fit persons, Hold several Live longer than otherwise they would ....... who cannot easily rid themselves of them, knowing the ill use that is often made of them ..... and who, in the mean time, do all they can, to hinder men from being scandalised at their example.  
I understand you, said Eudoxus, but in truth, if I should govern myself by prejudices, what you tell me, touching plurality of benefices, would be sufficient to convince me, that one might in conscience follow the lesle probable and lesle safe opinion. For how many Bishops, Abbots, and Regulars, do we hear loudly preach and cry up severe Morals, and yet possess more benefices than one good one? Besides, abundance of 'em have their Confessors and Directors, in the famous Seminaries of Paris; where nothing is so much talked of, as the severe Morals; and where some, even of those who possess pluralities, do actually devil or reside. It must therefore needs be, that the Confessors of these beneficed persons, and the Confessors of their Confessors, and the Superiors, and most considerable in their Seminaries, do believe, that they may in conscience, follow the lesle safe, and the lesle probable opinion. After this, the Jansenists must surely be very impudent, to attack the Jesuits upon a point they are so far from abhorring in practice.  
The Jesuits, answered the Abbot, would be very happy, if certain persons of some Seminaries, would not make them criminal, for a doctrine, which they themselves do so publicly follow, and justify by their practice. But this does not at all hinder them, from instructing, at the very beginning, or, at lest, from very easily permitting, the young Abbots there educated, to cry out against, and, on every occasion, run down the Morals of the Jesuits, and to ridicule them, for their doctrine of probable opinions; and for an excellent model of this charitable raillery, the Provincial Letters are often put into their hands, together with Wendrok's elegant notes upon them. You may assure yourself, that I do not speak at random of this matter; but am very well informed of all their proceed; what is there done and what is said upon this subject.  
But let us I pray you, said Eudoxus, return to our Abbot of **** so zealous against probable opinions: no doubt, but this Gentleman, with all his Priories and Abbeys, must needs have chosen his side, and concluded that it was worth going to the Devil for fifty or sixty thousand livers a year. For, after all, it being certain, according to the Casuists themselves, that the only ressource, for those who hold pluralities, is the doctrine of the lesle probable opinion, I dare not condemn those, who believe, in good earnest, that it may be followed: but as for this man, whose zeal, or rather fury, startles, at the very sound of probability, I would feign know, how he understands the thing? Is it not to pronounce the sentence against himself? and can there ever be a person to whom God may with more justice say, Ex ore tuo te judico serve nequam? 
Out of thy own mouth I condemn you thou wicked Servant.   
I do expect, said Cleander, that the first time I meet this Abbot, he should tell me by what Morals he ordinarily governs himself in this matter; and I will propose to him before witnesses, one of these three things; the retractation of all he has hitherto said against this doctrine; or the quitting one of his three live; or the renouncing the share he pretends to in paradise. But, in a word, continued Cleander, turning to the Abbot, you have undertaken no small task, and are very well employed indeed to defend the Jesuits in this their favourite doctrine, as it's commonly said to be.  
I know not how you understand the matter, answered the Abbot; but their conduct and proceeding in it, seems to me very clear, and the most reasonable in the world. When their Doctors first entered the Universities and the Schools, they found this, the common, ordinary doctrine, and the most followed of all others, particularly by Saint Thomas' disciples; could they have acted more prudently, than in conforming themselves to it? some of them did not agreed to it, but taught the contrary opinion, not only in the Classes, and in the Schools, but also in their public printed books; they did it, without opposition, and with their Superiors approbation.  
Since the violent exclaiming and flying out against this doctrine, far from doing themselves the honour of protecting it, every man, among 'em had the same liberty he enjoyed before; of late, they taught the contrary to it in their College at Paris; and I am very well informed, that the same thing was done at Lions, and Tolouse, at lafoy Fleche, and at Rome. They have, lately, maintained it in public Theses, in their College at Paris, of which I myself was an eye witness. Others have taken the resolution, I have done, to decide, or affirm nothing positively in this matter. The books within these few years written by the Society, in favour of this opinion, were not so much to defend it, for an indisputable doctrine, as to show, that it had been poisoned and painted in such horrible colours, to no other end, but that their Doctors might pass for the great corrupters of Morals. They modestly represented to the public, that if there was any evil in this doctrine, they did 'em wrong, who endeavoured, to make them answerable for it; they being neither the first, nor the only persons who had taught it; and that it was the utmost malice, to single out and distinguish them, on this account, from a crowd of Bishops, Doctors, and Divines, with whom, and after whom, they had but joined in opinion.  
Their adversaries seemed to think they had a mind to condemn and banish it: I do not believe they had, or aught to have any such intention; for being propounded and taken, as in reality it is and aught to be, with the usual precautions and restrictions, and such, especially, as the Jesuits, among others, have added, and, having besides been maintained, by this infinite number of learned Doctors, of whom I have shown you the list, it has nothing in it, that could make it deserve to be condemned and exploded. The Jesuits do abhor it, as their adversaries have represented it; they condemn both its principles, and its consequences; but under this disguise they disown it to be theirs. In a word, let but the Church speak, or the lawful powers declare themselves, and, than notwithstanding the numbers, and the merit of the Doctors, who, for these hundred and fifty years, have defended it, they would condemn it, and their Superiors would, I am certain, forbidden its being any longer taught, in all their Colleges. They have always challenged and defied their adversaries, in the point of submission and obedience. Let but the Church declare herself upon the arricle of probability, as she has done upon the doctrine of Jansenius; and than the Jesuits would not afterwards be seen, to stick and boggle, nor to have recourse to the distinction of Fact and Right, nor to any such like pitiful, and trifling shifts, and artifices.  
The Jesuits have, of late years, condemned theses and positions, and disowned certain propositions, too lightly advanced by some particular members, deposed and turned out of employment, those who had taught them, when they found 'em incorrigible, and blindly subscribed, in matter of doctrine, to all the orders of the Church. I wish to God, we might see their example followed by a party, who do not oppose the Society, for any other reason, but because, they know the Jesuits the chief supporters of the Catholic doctrine, the destruction of which is these gentlemen's ultimat design. But this character of submission and obedience, was always the character of the true and faithful Sons of this holy Mother the Church; as that, of wrangling and obstinacy, cheating and knavery, was constantly the mark of faction and error.  
Here the Abbot made an end; having first convinced Cleander and Eudoxus, of the justice of the cause he had undertaken to defend. They made him afterwards promise, that he would see them again next day, to examine the other accusations Pascal had charged upon the Divines of the Society in his Provincial Letters.    

The Fifth Discourse.  
Immediately after dinner, Cleander and Eudoxus carried the Abbot to the Jansenist's house, Eudoxus' friend, of whom they had spoke in the first discourse, and who had by him all the Casuists of the Society. They had great hopes to engage him to dispute with the Abbot, that they might have the pleasure to see, how each of 'em would behave himself, and which would come of best, in a matter of fact, to be made good, only, by looking into the books; and wherein nothing could be necessary but eyes, to decide the controversy. But as ill luck would have it, the new adversary they had intended for the Abbot was not at home; yet notwithstanding, they went directly to his library; whither as they were going Eudoxus said to the Abbot, we have really lost half our design: For our intention was, to found out for you a stout antagonist; who might a little moderate that ardent zeal, which makes you so warm in defence of the Jesuits. We two are a very unequal match for you; and the victories you obtain, by the advantage of truth, would be the more glorious, if they were a little better contested.  
I do not found, answered the Abbot, that you are of so gentle and pliable a mould, so easy as you pretend; you do indeed yield to truth, but not before you are convinced; and it was well for me, and absolutely necessary, to have had good proofs and authentic pieces ready to produce. For, notwithstanding all your compliments, and commendations of my sincerity, I have not found you very forward, to take my word touching the matter in hand. But, however, I must confess you are very much in the right, and take the course every one ought to observe in their inquiries after truth.  
Tell me in good earnest, said Cleander, whether you are as able to defend the Jesuits, in the rest, in all the other particular points, wherewith they are reproached, in the Provincial Letters, as you have seemed to us, in the general article of their conspiracy, against the Morals of the Gospel, in their empty, chimerical, division, of strict and lose Directors, and in the particular one, the doctrine of probability.  
You yourselves, answered the Abbot, shall be the judges; all I can say to you is, that I will not spare their Divines, when ever I found them faulty. But I desire you would not, upon Pascal's word, and his odd notions, conclude every thing, without farther examining, to be lose Morals, which in his Letters he calls by that name: And, if by chance, we should hap to found some Jesuits go astray from the rules of true Morals, be content to treat them, as you would, in the like case, treat other Divines, as you would a Doctor of Sorbonne who got his book approved by three of his brethrens; or a Dominican, whose work had the approbation of three Divines and a Provincial of his own Order. Blame them; but without imputing to the whole body, as a contagious disease, the sins of a particular person. Nay, I will freely give up, even, the whole Society to your censure, if in any determination, evidently ill, I do not found out, among its members, ten, twenty, for one, who have taught the contrary: These conditions are not, I think, over advantageous for the Jesuits, and yet if with all these they carry the cause, you cannot but conclude, that the right is on their side.  
Nothing can be more equitable, than what you desire, said Eudoxus; let us begin at one end and go, gradually, on to the other, the list of real, or pretended lose decisions gins in the fourth Letter. Wherein upon opening, see said he, what Pascal makes the Jesuits here speak, by the mouth of the good Father; who discovers to him all the secrets of the Society. We do maintain as an undoubted principle, that an action cannot be imputed for a sin, if God does not give us, before its committal, a knowledge of the evil that is in it and an inspiration exciting us to avoid it.  
In the first place, this is false, cried the Abbot, and I boldly affirm the contrary; and that in the sense Pascal gives this proposition, not Jesuit ever taught any thing like it. Let us see, said Cleander, how well you can make out this beginning. Let us examine, continued the Abbot, how many several ways, according to the Jesuits, this proposition is false. First it is false in an infinity of actions, to which men are not moved by any passion, or transport; and which nature of itself does abhor; the Jesuits, according to the principles of the common, ordinary Divinity, do affirm that a man may sin, and sin mortally, althô God should not have given him actual grace, or an inspiration to avoid the sin. I will explain myself by an example, which will make you easily comprehend both theirs and my meaning.  
I have read some where or other, that a Christian, a skilful Painter made a slave by the Turks, having presented to Mahomet the second, who understood painting very well the picture of Saint John Baptist's head, the Emperor liked it, and said to the painter, that it was a very good piece; but yet had one great fault; which was, his not having given to the head, that turn of the mouth, which is commonly seen in heads, that are cut of. And having said this he called to him an other slave; drew out his Cymiter, and struck of his head; to let the painter see by this horrible experiment the defects of his picture.  
The Jesuits all do, and will, say upon such an occasion as this, and an infinite number of others, where liberty, impunity, and very often the mad, foolish, vanity of designing to pass for a libertin and an ungodly man makes some people, daily, commit, in cold blood, in spite of conscience, and of nature, actions altogether unworthy either of a Christian, or a man. I say on such occasions as these, men, without being prevented with that grace, which is called actual, or a Divine inspiration, do frequently commit very great sins: because according to Saint Augustine's opinion, 
Lib. de Spir. & li●. c. 2●.  The image of God in our Souls, was not so defaced by original sin, but that there still do remain some strokes and touches, by virtue of which, nature and reason alone are sufficient, to restrain men from committing such brutalities; and even to make the most vicious do, sometimes, actions conformable to the law of God. And in this point, Saint Thomas does perfectly agreed with Saint Austin, and the Jesuits.  
In the second place, the Jesuits tell us, that when a man, foolishly, and with knowledge of the hazard, puts himself into a near and dangerous occasion of sinning, the providence of God is, not, at all, engaged to secure him; and that though God should not have given him any grace; in the instant preceding the sin, to which he exposed himself, this sin, notwithstanding, would be imputed to him.  
Thirdly, that the sins, the blasphemies, for example committed by a drunken man, while drunk, are likewise imputed to him, althô, by reason of the condition he than is in, he can have no actual knowledge of the evil he commits, nor any inspiration to avoid it.  
Fourthly, they teach, that customary sins, for example, the false oaths, and imprecations made, by a common swearer, are all imputed to him, althô he commits these sins without reflection, or the actual knowledge of what he does, unless that being truly touched with sorrow for the sins he had committed in this matter, he do not hearty detest the custom he has got, and destroy it, as much as lies in him, by a real and sincere repentance.  
Lastly, 
Suarez, Vasquez, La●man, Sauchez, Lugo Vasentia, Tannetus &c  they all teach, that the sins of vincible ignorance, that is to say, the actions, committed against the law, and a command, wherein they ought and might have been instructed, are also imputed to those, who commit them; althô they were done without any actual knowledge of the evil, and that they had no inspiration before hand. After this, he showed them, in several of the Jesuits books, he there found, and wherein these matters were handled, the doctrine he had expounded to them.  
You may now perceive, added the Abbot, whether this proposition, That no action can be imputed for a sin, if God gives us not before its committal the knowledge of its evil, and an inspiration that stirs us up to avoid it; whether I say this proposition, which according to the Jesuits, is so many ways false, be, among them, an indubitable principle, as they are here made to say.  
It is true, said Eudoxus, that, as to this last point, the Jesuits could not declare themselves more positively, than they have done in their book, entitled, L'erreur du Péché Philosophique combattuë par les Jésuites. No body could defend themselves better, than they have done upon this occasion; wherein it was certainly seen, and with good reason, that they took the thing to heart. Here is the book you mention, said the Abbot, drawing it out of his pocket. Ho! said Cleander laughing, nothing is more evident, Mr. Abbot, than that you have prepared yourself for this combat. Ha! could you doubt it, answered the Abbot? could you believe I could have been so perfect in these matters, if I had not reflected on them anew; and would it not have been a piece of rashness in me, to have spoken of them, before two men of your sense, without having first considered very well, what I was to say; and before two witty men, who, notwithstanding all their equity, would have had, like many others, some small malicious pleasure, to see the Jesuits found somewhat lesle innocent, than, I say, they are in the things, whereof they stand accused. Here in the nineteenth page is the place you speak of, continued he.  
Yes, Sir, of so great number of Jesuits, Interpreters of Scripture, School Divines, Controversits, Casuists, or Canonists, Writers of Spiritual treatises, Preachers, and even Philosophers themselves, I defy you, to found one single man, who, treating of ignorance, or inadvertence, in reference to our duty, has not distinguished, that which is blamable, from that which is not; and who has not said, that neither ignorance, nor inadvertence, does ever excuse from the evil one is ignorant of, by a criminal wilful neglect.  
Behold, said Cleander, an induction general enuff, and very exact; which, without leaving out one, runs through all the several sorts of writers; and it must needs be, that the Jesuits have said nothing but truth on this occasion, since no body has thought fit to contradict them, or show the contrary. That therefore which the Jesuits would say, continued the Abbot, by the proposition, which Pascal attributes to 'em, or rather, that which they would say, by some other propositions, which comes near to that, and which he reduces to it, to poison more easily their doctrine, is no more than this, that every actual sin is voluntary, either in itself, or in its cause; that men do never offend God by necessity; and that to be criminal, even in the state of corrupted nature; they must be free agents, and under no necessity. You are not now to learn the reason, why this would please neither Pascal nor his friends. 
* This doctrine of the jesuits is the contradictory of that which was condemned in ●ansenius by Innccent the Xth. and Alexander VII.  Well, said Eudoxus, we are satisfied in this article. But I am not yet, answered the Abbot; read again, if you please, this very passage, and that which follows.  
Eudoxus read, a second time, this passage of Pascal. We do than maintain, as an undoubted principle, That no action can be imputed as a sin, if God gives us not before we commit it, a knowledge of the evil that's in it, and an inspiration to incite us to avoid it. Do you now comprehend what I would be at? astonished at such a discourse, according to which, all sins of surprise, and such as men commit, without once thinking of God, cannot be imputed ........  
Hold there, said the Abbot, what notion have you of these words? They give me to understand, answered Eudoxus, as all the rest of the Letter does, that, according to the doctrine of the Jesuits, as Mr. Pascal explanes it, there can be no sin of surprise; that all the crimes of hardened libertins, who run headlong and wilfully into a forgetfulness of God, are not longer sins; and that, as he says, some pages after, when once a man has prevailed upon himself, to think not more of God, he cannot afterwards offend him; that he is very silly, who sins but by halves; that these half sinners, who still retain some love for virtue, shall all be damned; but as for the thorough paced sinners, hardened sinners, sinners without any mixtures of goodness, complete, and perfect sinners, there can be no place found for them in hell.  
But, by the exposition I have made you, answered the Abbot, and by all, I have shown you, in the Jesuits books, can you form to yourself the fame kind of notion; not, by no means, said Eudoxus; I conceive just the contrary; for it is evident to me, that there are many sins of surprise; as your habitual swearers fully demonstrate; and that the forgetting God, being voluntary in libertins, it must necessarily be, according to the Society's Divinity, that they are guilty of all the crimes they act, during this forgetfulness; and that they will be infinitely more punished for them, than the half sinners who have still some love for virtue. In a word, we must acknowledge, that this of Pascal is a mere calumny.  
I am now content, answered the Abbot, but if you desire to satisfy yourselves, yet more fully upon this subject, read the Jesuits second Letter concerning Philosophic sin. See, how in that they explain it. 
Pag. 5.  The new heresy imputed to us, 
Pag. 40.  is, to maintain that all ignorance, and all forgetfulness of God, althô voluntary, and blamable, as in Atheists, Idolaters, Libertins, and all other sinners, whose examples the accuser has made use of, to expound this heresy, that all manner of ignorance, and all kind of forgetfulness of God, are sufficient, to secure us against committing any sins, but philosophic sins, which do not offend God, we all condemn this as an abominable heresy; but, at the same time, we say, it was never taught by any of our writers.  
Read this book also, 
Art. 2.3.4. etc.  de l'erreur du Péché Philosophique combattuë par les Jésuites pag. 17. etc. here you will see the whole doctrine, of the Society upon this subject, perfectly expounded; that which, as well the Jesuit Divines, as the Thomists, and all others mean, when they say, that to offend God, the malice of the sin is required to be known, is, that one must reflect upon the evil that is in it, as the Libertins often do, in spite of their forgetting God. In a word, you'll found in these two books, all that relates to this matter, admirably well handled, and cleared from all difficulties.  
The Abbot also made them read a passage in Suarez, where he explains what inadvertence is; 
Suarez de actibus hum. disp. 7.  and does it, in the most handsome, and most intelligible manner, so abstracted and so hard a subject is capable of; which, for its difficulties, was purposely chosen by the Jansenists, to confounded those things, which every body is not able to make plain and clear.  
Let us go on, said Cleander to the Abbot, you have, for certain, saved the body of the Jesuits; but I know not whether you are able, upon the same article, to save Father Bauni, qui tollit peccata mundi, says Pascal, 
Who takes away the sins of the world.  and as was formerly said by Mr. Hallier, when he fell out with the Jesuits.  
Althô I were not able, answered the Abbot, I should be but little concerned for't. And I am persuaded, the Jesuits themselves would not be much troubled, and would be the first to condemn him, if he had maintained the doctrine, Pascal ascribes to him. But let us see how the matter stands.  
Than they read in Pascal the words of Father Bauni, 
Collection of sins.  taken out of his Some des Péchez written in French. To sin and be guilty before God, a man must know the thing he would do is evil, or, at lest, doubt, or fear it; or judge, that God takes no pleasure in the action he is about, and that he has forbidden it, and, yet notwithstanding, skip over all rubs and difficulties, go on and commit it.  
After what I have told you, said the Abbot, of the doctrine, held by all the Jesuits, it is not difficult, to understand the meaning of Father Bauni's proposition. To sin, says he, and make a man guilty in the sight of God, he must know, that is to say, he must not be ignorant by an involuntary ignorance, that the thing he is about to do, is not good; at lest he must doubt it, etc. how do you prove, asked Cleander, that this was his meaning.  
That, is not my business nor the Jesuits, answered the Abbot; they accuse them; they give an ill sense to one of their author's propositions; their adversaries, who are the accusers, aught to convince them and make out their allegations: but I will not be so exact with you, nor stand upon that formality, since it is your desire I will prove it.  
First, Bauni teaches, or supposes, every where, when occasion offers, that voluntary ignorance, which is called vincible does not excuse from sin. This is positive, and makes his proposition blameless. Read, said he to 'em, the 775 page of the edition of la Somme des Péchez, whence Pascal has taken what he reprehends, and see how this Father proves, by Scripture, that voluntary ignorance is blamable. Such ignorance, 
1 Cor. 14.38.  says he, is vicious, according to the Apostle's saying to the Corinthians, ignorans ignorabitur.  
But this position, That voluntary ignorance does not excuse from sin, is so indisputable, continued he, and so certain among the Divines, that when they treat of the knowledge requisite to sin, they do not believe it necessary, to advertise, that they speak only of the knowledge, which is opposed to involuntary ignorance. This is supposed clear of itself, and is understood in all the propositions, which a thousand Divines have made, like that of Father Bauni; 
Not. in 4, epist.  and Wendrok was never more wicked, or more ignorant in Divinity, than when he argued upon this matter against that Jesuit.  
In the second place, the reason which Bauni sets down for his assertion, is, of itself, sufficient, to make his meaning known; and this reason, is the same with Saint Thomas', upon the like occasion; which is, 
Bauni pag. 906.  that a man is not to be blamed for any action, that is not voluntary: these are the express terms Bauni makes use of, immediately after his proposition. Whence it only follows, that to sin a man must not be ignorant by an involuntary ignorance, that the action he does is evil; because, no other ignorance hinders the action, from being wilful, and by consequence, according to Bauni; from being a sin. I understand this, said Eudoxus, and to me his meaning seems very plain and manifest.  
In the third place, to confounded and bring to nothing all the other malicious reflections, which Pascal and Wendrok make upon this doctrine, the Abbot made Eudoxus and Cleander read, what Father Bauni added, presently after, to explicat the same assertion. The will, says he, carries itself to, fastens upon, and earnestly desires the forbidden object; which it may do, either formally, or virtually, or very silently: formally, when, by an express act, it loves, or hates, embraces, or rejects, what is represented to it, by the understanding either as good or as bad. It's thought to consent to it, virtually, (mind well the following words, said the Abbot) when the actual and formal consent, before given, still continues; as we ought to believe it does, when it is not recalled, interrupted, or hindered by some contrary act.  
You see, added he, that to commit a sin, Bauni does not require an actual reflection in the very instant of sinning; and that, according to him, it is enuff, this knowledge should have preceded, to the end that the inadvertance a man may have, even in the instant of acting, may be blamable.  
He also showed the 92 page, where he speaks in this manner. To swear a thing, which even might be true at random, and with the danger of being forsworn for want of having well examined it before hand, is a mortal sin; in as much as that danger is thought voluntary in its cause, which is the ill and pernicious custom of men's swearing rashly, and without heeding what they say.  
Could a Divine, that talks at this rate, understand the present proposition in this sense, that, without an actual reflection, in the very instant of sinning upon its evil, no man can ever be guilty of a sin? it is than evident, that his proposition, naturally, signifies nothing else, but that to sin, one must know, or at lest doubt, whether there be no evil in the action he is about, that is to say, he must not be ignorant by an invincible ignorance that it is sinful.  
It is manifest, answered Cleander, by what you have said, that this was the good Father's meaning. But why do not the Casuists take care, not to make such equivocal propositions, as give men a handle to catch at an occasion to misconter them? you do not sufficiently thank me, replied the Abbot, for having taken the pains to prove a thing, which required no proof, and to refute so frivolous an accusation, as that was. However, I have yet patience enuff left, to answer, without being angry, the instance you put me. You know, that in the business of arts and sciences, it is the usage of words, commonly received among men, of the same calling, that takes away equivocation, and determins the sense of a proposition. Now, among Divines, as I have already given you to understand, this usage, in reference to the present matter, leaves no ambiguity in Father Bauni's proposition; and before the author of La Theologie Morale whom Pascal has followed, no body had thought of giving any other meaning, than that, which we have given it.  
For, when the Divines dispute of the nature of sin, they all say, after Saint Austin and Saint Thomas, that to be voluntary is essential to sin; and they explain the definition, and what it is to be voluntary, by the example of the sins to which this quality does evidently agreed; that is to say, by the sins committed, with a perfect knowledge and a formal reflection on the evil of the actions. After which, either in answering the objections, or otherwise, they never fail, to extend this definition to some kinds of sins, to which it does not agreed so clearly. Such is Original sin, which they show to have been, in its, own way, voluntary; such are the sins, custom makes us commit by surprise, without any actual thought; such are the sins, caused by the ignorance, which is called vincible; and it is, according to this method of Divines, which is the method also of Saint Austin himself, that Father Bauni has defined sin; saving, that, upon occasion, he extends his definition, as he has done in pursuance of what is commonly practised in the Schools, to the other sorts of sins, which are voluntary only in their cause.  
If this be so, said Eudoxus, Father Bauni was far from being in the wrong, for explaining himself in that manner; but, on the contrary, they were very much out; and showed a great deal of malice, or of ignorance, who made a business on't, or objected any thing against him upon this account. I will convince you, that this is the common custom, said the Abbot, not by the authority of Jesuit Divines (they perhaps may be suspected) nor even of the Thomists or Scotists, but by the very Theses of the Sorbonne. Read this passage of the Jesuits answer to La Theologie Morale upon this subject. Thus the Apologist spakes page 7. part 2. I have before me while I am writing this a Thesis defended in Sorbonne, in the year 1640, the 3. October by one Peter Bunot, Mr. Morel Precedent, approved by Mr. Forget, at that time Syndic, and Curate of Saint Nicolas of Chardonnet wherein are these words, Ad omne peccatum praerequiritur expressa cognitio malitiae moralis, vel expressa dubitatio ne actui eliciendo talis malitia moralis inexistat.  
Father Bauni's proposition seems to be but the translation of this Thesis, which says, in Latin, that which he has said in bad French. The same Apologist quotes also an other proposition, exactly like it of Mr. Du-val Professor of Sorbonne, adding what is very true, that Saint Thomas, Saint Bonaventure, Saint Antonin, Gerson, etc. speak, in this matter, just as Bauni has done.  
I found you are strongly provided on this point, answered Eudoxus. I am yet stronger than you imagine, replied the Abbot; I'll appeal to the authority of a Judge, I am sure you will not refuse; casting his eyes, at the same time, towards the shelf, whereon he had espied upon his coming in, the writings of an author he was about to quote. I pray, said he to Cleander, who sat near it, reach me down that parchment manuscript. Cleander took it down, and read upon the back of the book, Traité des péchez dicté en Sorbonne par Monsieur de Sainte-Beuve. Is it possible, cried out Cleander, that Mr. de Sainte-Beuve should, at this time of day, be Father Bauni's security in this matter?  
The Abbot, who, had seen these writings, of which there are thousands of Copies spread all over France, opened the place, where he treats of this subject, and gives it to Eudoxus, who began to read, that which follows in Latin. To make an irregular motion in the sensual appetit become a mortal sin, 
Trac. de pecc. dis. 5. sec. 1● art. 3.  there must be a full and perfect reflection of reason, by which this act is formally known to be bad, and prohibited; unless that, perhaps, the man, should freely, and knowingly, have given occasion for that irregular motion or delight. The first part is proved; because if this advertence be but by halv's, the action cannot be perfectly voluntary, as it ought to be, to make it a mortal sin, therefore, etc. the second is proved, because, if the bore action, the matter itself, and not the evil of it, be but reflected on, than that, which otherwise might be criminal in it, not being voluntary, does not become sinful.  
Ho! without doubt, said Eudoxus, Bauni is now safe enuff. I am sure Mr. Arnauld and all his Party would much rather pardon him, than, with him, condemn Mr. de Sainte-Beuve. But let us proceed.  
Since you have put me upon the proof, continued the Abbot, I could found in my heart to tyre you with my quotations; as indeed I could easily do, considering the many passages I have ready to produce upon this subject. But since you ask for quarter, I will give it you, upon condition, you'll listen to one which I must needs read you. All its strength and authority depends upon one of Mr. Arnaulds' best friends, a Doctor of Louvain, whose name and qualities I'll give you an account of, after I have read you his doctrine. Here it is, just as I saw it in the Thesis, faithfully reported by the author of the book, entitled L'erreur du Péché Philosophique combattuë par les Jésuites.  
To sin mortally, a man must have a perfect, entire consideration, an express knowledge of the sin, or of the danger there is of committing one, or, at lest, a formal doubt, or some fear, that the action may be sinful.  
Mind now the reflection made by the author of the book just now cited, addressing himself to his adversary. Do you not think, that this was dictated by some Jesuit? and yet nevertheless do you believe him? it was Doctor Pontanus, the famous approver of Austin of Ypres, whom the Church has condemned, and of the Mons translation of the new Testament which he could not understand (for he was ignorant of the French) it was, I say, this Pontanus one of the Jesuits most vehement enemies, that signed this Thesis, and presided when it was defended ...... for, it is one of the statutes of the University of Louvain, that no Doctor should approve, or preside at any Thesis, if any thing be therein contained, contrary to the opinion of the University.  
We have already more than enuff, said Eudoxus; I pray let the rest alone; and let us also pass by what Pascal reproaches Father Anat with: I remember to have read this passage in that Jesuits book; he intended but to say, that God commands us nothing that's impossible; and if it was to be supposed, that it was impossible for us, without actual grace, to avoid sin, God would either give us this grace, or else would not impute that sin to us: which doctrine, is contradictory to that which is condemned in Jansenius. This is neither the case of Libertins', nor of hardened sinners; nor of customary sinners, nor of those, who sin by ignorance, or a voluntary inadvertance of their duties. This single passage, when I read it, made me think that Pascal was not well able to make this out: since to support his cause, he was forced to have recourse to so weak a proof; and that it was not usual with Father Anat, to mistake, or speak improperly in matters of Divinity.  
Notwithstanding, answered the Abbot, see how Pascal triumphs; do but hearken to that, which immediately follows Father Anat's proposition. Ho! how pleased I am, said I to him, to perceive what fine consequences may be drawn from this doctrine. I clearly see what will follow; what mysteries do offer themselves to me. I see more men, without comparison, justified by this ignorance, and this forgetfulness of God, than by Grace and by the Sacraments. What enthusiasm, continued the Abbot, what vision, or rather what terrible malice is this?  
Let us here take our leave of Father Anat, said Cleander interrupting him; but let us not yet suffer Father Bauni to escape. I see another thing in this Letter, which deserves some reflection: it is what Pascal says, that his book la Somme des Péchez was condemned at Rome, as well as by the Bishops of France; and this also which Wendrok adds, that this proposition of Bauni was formerly censured in Sorbonne.  
I had much rather, answered the Abbot, have to do in this matter with your Jansenist, Master of this library, than with you. For before I would answer him, or make him take notice of a small touch of Jansenian honesty in this very passage, I should ask him what his thoughts were of the censure of the Roman Inquisition, whether he would be content, that we should, on both sides, refer our disputes to this tribunal; if he would, the Jesuits might freely abandon, or give up Bauni to the Inquisitors severity; but than they would have not farther need to make any Apology or defence for themselves against the Provincial Letters, since they are all to be seen, at large, condemned, by the decrees of the Inquisition.  
Ha! what do you say, said Eudoxus interrupting him, it is but two days since I read in a letter from one of these Gentlemen, on occasion of the Mons new Testament, 
Letter à un Confeiller.  that it is very often a mark of the goodness of a book to be censured at Rome. If this be so, said he laughing, Bauni and Pascal, far from being confounded, or thunderstruck by any sentence of that Court, could not be blackened, or so much as wounded in their reputation. It must be acknowleged, continued he, that there is something very odd in this business, and wherein it does not seem to me, that the Jansenists pretensions are consequent to themselves, for that a book, made by a Jesuit, being put into the Index expurgatorius should be sufficient to make it infamous, but that the putting into it the Provincial Letters and the Testament of Mons, which translation has been condemned by two Popes, should be a sign, or testimony of their excellency, and make them be the better liked, esteemed, and valued, appears highly improbable; and till better made out, can never be believed by men in their senses.  
However it be, answered the Abbot, they do not much trouble themselves at Rome, in giving the public their reasons for putting a book into the Index. That is sometimes done, for the omission of some formality in the impression; and sometimes for asserting, or laying down, some principles, differing from some maxims of the Canonists of Italy, with whom those of France do not always agreed; something of this kind there might have been in Father Bauni's books, concerning the jurisdiction of the King's Officers over the Clergy; which possibly might have displeased the Inquisitors, and in reality, 'tis well known, that those, who solicited their condemnation, urged it upon this motive; even those who daily endeavour, to make themselves be valued in France, by running down the Ultramontanes, and pretending themselves zealous for the Liberties of the Gallican Church. But, that which is most remarkable is, that the Provincial Letters were always looked upon at Rome, as defamatory Libels, full of calumnies and impostures; and which is more, full of errors, and, all over, stuffed with Jansenisme. You have nothing now to do, but to guests, for which of these motives, chief, they were condemned by the Inquisition.  
As for what relates to the Bishops of France, pursued the Abbot, let us again read Pascal's words. It is some prejudice, said my Jansenist, whispering softly in my ear, that this book was condemned at Rome, and by the Bishops of France. Would you not believe, said he, turning towards Cleander, when Pascal says Father Bauni's book was condemned by the Bishops of France, that this must have been done, in a National Council? I conceive, at lest, answered Cleander, according to this expression, that it must have been done in an assembly of the Clergy.  
Not, replied the Abbot; all this was not more, but that Bauni was censured by the late Archbishop of Sens Gondrin, by the late Bishop of Beauvais, and by the Bishop of Comenges, who, not many years since, died Bishop of Tournay.  
Was it no more than that, said Cleander? this is as if the Emperor should make an Imperial decree, or proclamation against one of the Germane Princes, who should dare to declare against the Prince of Orange. Bauni was a Jesuit, and a great Anti-Jansenist, which was sufficient to make him loose his cause at that bar.  
I will say nothing else to you of the Sorbonne, continued the Abbot, but that it is inconcevable, they should than censure in a Jesuits book, a proposition, which they had heard, with respect, from the mouth of Mr. de Sainte-Beuve; and which they had publicly defended some months before, as you have seen by the Thesis I have quoted to you; and should endeavour to make Father Bauni believe he had taken it in a different sense, from that which is commonly allowed in Divinity, and which it ought not to have, according to its proper principles, and which he could not have given it, I do not say, without heresy, but without the greatest extravagance imaginable. Believe me, in all the wranglings and disputes they so often had in those days with the Society, the Jesuits laboured under great difficulties, not so much to defend themselves, but to defend themselves, with that moderation they always thought themselves obliged to observe, even at the expense of their own interest, and without being wanting to the respect they were willing to show, to some communities, or bodies which did not treat them with the same kind of respect, and of whom some particulars had pressed hard upon, and pushed 'em with the greatest rage and malice possible.  
It is certain, said Eudoxus, that the Jansenists than studied all the means they could think of, to make all the world fall furiously upon the Jesuits: and they had a wondered effect; what they insinuated into several Communities, does yet remain in some; where great pains are still taken to feed and keep up the humour.  
That is but too true, answered the Abbot, but let us make an end of examining this Letter; where there is nothing more, particularly relating to the Jesuits Morals. Only give me leave, to make in two words a short reflection among other things, which, of themselves are obvious enuff, chief concerning the malice of the author of the Provincial Letters.  
This reflection, is upon the great weakness of Pascal's whole discourse, upon what, I pray you, are all these consequences of lose Morals, in favour of the Libertins, the ungodly, the revengful, the blasphemers, and the Epicureans, founded, of which he makes the Jesuits the authors? they are really built, but upon what he has thought fit, to make his imaginary Jesuit say, touching a necessity of an inspiration from God, and an actual reflection upon the evil of a wicked action, to make it to become a sin. All this is grounded, upon the proposition of Father Bauni, and that of Father Annat, who never meant what is attributed to 'um. The single distinction of sin, into that which is voluntary of itself, and into that which is but voluntary in its cause; and of that which is committed by an invincible, and involuntary ignorance, and that which is committed by the other ignorance, called vincible and voluntary, does quite dispel and drive away all these his frightful phantoms or bugbears.  
By that distinction, all Pascal's libertins, all his impudent unchaste, barefaced, sinners and his Epicureans, remain, according to the Jesuits principles, guilty and convicted of all the crimes, from which he pretends these Divines have absolved them. The little I have explained to you of their Divinity, has made all this clear, and palpable; and yet nevertheless, it is a wondered thing, that in all the specious, fine accusations of the heresy of the philosophic sin, (which was looked upon at first as a thunderbolt, that would have crushed and broken the Jesuits to pieces, though all of a sudden it fell and came to nothing) men should be referred to the fourth Provincial Letter, as to a writing, that contained an evident demonstration of the matter of fact, after which the Jesuits ought not to be allowed or admitted, to make any defence or excuse for themselves, of which I leave you to judge.  
Mr. Abbot, said Eudoxus, interrupting him, to do you a pleasure, I'll repeat to you, what I heard a very judicious man at that time say. He had newly read the Jesuits second Letter, and the book you cited a little while ago, L'erreur du peché philosophique, etc. he said he would laugh not more, nor take any farther delight in the pleasantries of the fourth Provincial Letter; but yet would make himself amendss, by reading the serious and vehement accusations of the new heresy of the philosophic sin; at every article of which Mr. Arnauld made him laugh more than once. His reason was, that the Jesuits had demonstrated two things in these books; first, that none of their Divines ever doubted but the ungodly, the libertins, and the customary sinners, were guilty of sin, and aught to be eternally punished for those very crimes, which they commit with lest remorse and most quiet. Secondly, that the contrary cannot be inferred, or proved from their principles; since it is certain, they all hold, not one excepted, that neither ignorance, nor inadvertance, neither blindness, nor custom, when wilful, can excuse sinners, or hinder them from incurring the penalties of Hell, the due reward, and natural consequence of their ill actions. These two matters of fact, said he, which the Jesuits have clearly proved, and so as to convince all the world, destroys the whole appearance of any probability, in the pleasant things said in the fourth Provincial Letter; and, consequently, leaves them insipid, without salt, and without wit. For there is nothing flatter, than raillery without a cause, a jest, without the lest foundation of truth, or reason, which therefore all men of sense have in horror and indignation.  
For which reason, the anger, and sometimes the fury of Mr. Arnauld, in his five accusations of the Jesuits, for the philosophic sin, make men as often as they read them, ask what this good man would be at? he has in hands, the the Professor of Dijon's writings, as he himself tells us, he has no more to do but to read them. This Professor himself has published them, and by good proofs made them authentic; to the end the whole world might be witnesses of the purity of his saith, and of his opinions. The Jesuits condemned the expression in his Thesis, and owned there was reason to contradict him. They cry out, and tell Mr. Arnauld, that he makes objections, and spirits for himself to answer and frighten away; that except the opinion of involuntary ignorance, which excuses from sin, hardly any thing of the rest, is either a conclusion, or a principle of their Divines: this they urge, and this they do indeed demonstrate. At that time, I believed this matter but by halv's, continued Eudoxus; but I am now as fully persuaded of it, said he to the Abbot, as you yourself can be. Let us therefore proceed to the fifth Letter.  

The following part of the fifth Discourse.  
WE have dispatched, said the Abbot, in our former Dialogues, a good part of what is handled in this fifth Letter; of which the main subject, is the doctrine of probability. There remain only some particular cases to be examined; the first, that offers itself, said Eudoxus laughing, is a small matter, nothing, in a manner; he only reproaches the Jesuits, that, with a subtle direction of intention, they permit the Christians of China and the Indieses, to commit Idolatry. Let us read it, it is at the 75 page of my edition. By this means they have (Directors) for all sorts of persons; and answer so well, according to what is demanded of them, that when they are in countries, where a crucified God passes for folly, they suppress the scandal of the cross, and only preach a glorious, and not a suffering Jesus; as they have done in China and the Indieses; where they have allowed the Christians to commit, even, Idolatry, by that subtle invention of making them hid, under their garments, the image of our Saviour; to which they teach them to refer, mentally, their public adorations of the Idol, Chacinchoan, and of Keum-fucum; as Gravina the Dominican reproaches them, and as the Spanish memorial presented to Philip the IV King of Spain, by the Cordeliers of the Philippin Lands, reported by Thomas Hurtado in his book of Martyr's page 427 does witness. Insomuch that the Congregation of Cardinals de Propaganda Fide, was obliged to prohibit the Jesuits, in particular, under pain of excommunication, from allowing, on any pretence whatsoever, the adorations of Idols; and from concealing the mystery of the Cross, from those they instructed in Christianity; expressly commanding them, not to receive any to Baptisin, who had not a full knowledge of it; and strictly enjoining them, to expose a Crucifix in all their Churches, as is at large set forth, in the decree of this Congregation, dated the 9 July 1646, signed by Cardinal Caponi. Thus you see by what means they have spread themselves over all the earth by the favour of, etc.  
I do profess to you, said Cleander, that these things are so very surprising, the heads of the accusation so black, and also far fetched, that I had always much ado, to believe them true, upon the report of the authors of la Morale-pratique.  
Ha! why not, answered the Abbot; are you also as hard to be persuaded of these other curious particularities? That the Jesuits were the cause of the persecution in Japon; which was always attributed to the Hollanders; and that it was not the Dutch, but the Jesuits, who made the Kings of China and Japon believe, that the Spanish Monks endeavoured to get a footing in those countries, for no other end, but to subject them to the King of Spain: that the Jesuits did not only cross and drive away the other Missioners, but also persecute them to death. That it was public all over Spain, that they had thrice poisoned a Doctor, 
Morale pratique. tom 1. pag. 209.  called John Espino, and committed a thousand other such peccadilloes, of which they assure us they make no more scruple, than French high way men would do.  
You railly, Mr. Abbot, said Eudoxus interrupting him; well than, answered he, let us speak seriously. I say, if all these fine things, which they tell us, are true, the Popes, the Kings of Spain, and the Kings of Portugal, are a thousand times more to be blamed, than the Jesuits. For 'tis to them, that all these complaints, all these memorial, and all these petitions against the Society were made: and, yet notwithstanding all this, these Popes, and these Kings, insensible of the interest of the Church and of their States, sand the Jesuits to China and the Indieses: pray, and press them, to cultivate the harvests, that are there; althô they are every day told, that they spoil and ruin them: and which is more, they exhort 'em to continued and to behave themselves, as hitherto they have done; expressing, on all occasions, how much they are satisfied with their conduct.  
To this purpose Vrban VIII, under whom the informers began to tell their stories in Rome, declared himself in his Bull, directed to the Christians of Japon, in the year 1626. And Alexander VII in 1655, writing to the Empress Helena, the wife of Yum-lié, at that time, Emperor of some of the Provinces of China, and in a decree of the year 1656, expressly, approved the Jesuits proceed in China. Clement IX, in an other decree, in 1669, confirms that of his Predecessor. 
3. Dee, 1681.  Innocent XI did the same in what he writ to the famous Father Verbiest, and afterwards in an other letter to the Christians of Tunquin, when he sent them back the Jesuits, as they had, for a long time, earnestly desired: 
7. jan. 1689. 25. july. 1690. and 2. Sep. 1691.  and as did also Alexander VIII and Innocent XII in their Bulls to the Emperor of China. Wherein the first gave great commendations of the Jesuits, and the second confirmed all his Predecessor had said in their favour.  
This is for certain very strong, Mr. Abbot, said Eudoxus, but a little too general: let us come to the matter of fact. The Decree of 1646, and the allowance of Idolatry.  
It seems to me, answered the Abbot, a little briskly, that all I have said to you comes directly enuff to this matter of fact; and that, without much arguing, it is easy to conclude, by the Popes, and Kings of Spain's proceeding, by their Bulls, and Decrees, that all, which has been said upon this subject against the Jesuits, are mere, perfect, calumnies; and that, if their enemies could produce as strong proofs against them, as those I have alleged for their justification, we should soon see finer declamations against them, than those wherewith they have already filled six or seven tomes of the Morale-pratique. But this is the fate of these Fathers; some whimsical, chimerical, vision of any one of their enemies, or a popular report, raised, God knows how, is enuff to blacken them; and yet to acquit and vindicat their reputations, the authentic acts must always be expected. A hundred years hence, the Bombs of Namur, will be a matter of fact, altogether as clear, and certain, in the annals of some Port-Royal man of that time, as the Gunpowder treason in England is, in the accounts of the Protestants of that Island. Yet, since you will have it so, let us come to this fine passage of Pascal; upon which I will make you some short remarks, which I will justify and make good, either here or at home.  
First, as touching this decree, mentioned in the Provincial Letters, Pascal must needs have spoken without book; and neither he, nor those who engaged him to writ, ever saw or read it; there was no decree made by the Propaganda on this subject in 1646. but in 1645. nor was it dated in the month of July, but in the month of September, nor signed by Cardinal Caponi, but by Cardinal Ginetti; and thus all these little circumstances, which Pascal affects to set down so exactly, to gain himself more credit, serve but to make his testimony the more suspicious, as coming from a man, very ill informed, who writes at random, and upon the credit of very uncertain memorial.  
But from these simple falsities, let us go on to calumnies. Not one of those, who reads this passage of Pascal, but thinks the Jesuits were heard and convicted of all these crimes, in a full congregation, and condemned by a decree, and afterwards admonished, and obliged to change their practice, in the instruction of their Proselytes, and new Converts, and forced, more especially, to make them detest Idolatry, and the adorations they had allowed of to Chachin-Choam and Keum-fucum, or Confucius; and, yet notwithstanding, there is nothing more false; and since you desire the particularities I pray hearken to the story.  
After the Missioners of other Orders went into China, several memorial against the Jesuits, were sent to Rome, upon the subject we now discourse of; but more especially, among others, two. The first, was from two Bishops of the Philippin Islands, and the other, from a Dominican Missioner, called John Baptist Morales. The Bishop's memorial did not give the Jesuits any long trouble; for, some time after, 
In 1633.  these two Prelates writ to the Pope, that being informed of the contrary, of what they had writ before upon false relations, they thought themselves bound in Conscience, to justify the Fathers of the Society, against so unjust accusations, and to defend with all their might, the innocence of these Fathers, as well as the truth itself.  
Father Morales did not forbear proposing his difficulties to the Congregation, of which these following were two. Whether it were lawful to prostrate before the Idol Chin-choam and to offer Sacrifice to Confucius. The Jesuits, who very well saw, that these questions were made in prejudice to them, had nothing to defend themselves with, to the world, but the Philippin Bishops retractation. I say to the world, because the Congregation, without summoning them, was content, themselves, to answer Father Morales' questions; in the greatest part whereof, not more than in these, there was no manner of difficulty. Hereupon followed a decree of the Pope; wherein the answers of the Congregation were approved, and a prohibition made of proceeding otherwise in China, than according to those answers: one of which was, that it was unlawful, to Sacrifice to Confucius. This prohibition than, was, not particular to the Jesuits, as Pascal says, (and that is a remarkable circumstance of the calumny) but to all Missioners in genearl, and in particular, of whatsoever order, profession, or institution, they were of. Omnibus & singulis Missionarijs cujuscunque, Ordinis, Religionis, & Instituti; and to the Jesuits also, etiam Societatis Jesus. This is the form of the stile, they have, for a long time, used in all decrees, relating to Religious Orders: and all this as the decree goes on, till the Pope, or the holy See, shall otherwise ordain; Donec Sanctitas sua, vel sancta Sedes aliud ordinaverit. Words, which, of themselves, do plainly show, that the holy See desired to be more particularly informed of the matter of fact. for as to the matter of right, there was no ground, or pretence for another review, or deliberation; especially touching the pretended Sacrifice offered to Confucius. This thing speaks of itself.  
And his Holiness afterwards was better and more effectually informed; for, some years after Father Martini the Jesuit, being come from China to Rome, fully acquainted both the Pope and the Congregation, with the whole affair; and how all that had given occasion, for the suspicion of Idolatry, was but some certain ceremonies, made at the reception of Doctors, in honour of Confucius, which are purely civil, and have no manner of relation to Religion; and that there was no Sacrifice, nor any thing like it. Whereupon the Congregation made an other decree, in favour of the Jesuits, in the year 1656, of which without doubt the author of the Provincial Letters, or his Commentators would not have really been, or seemed to be ignorant, if it had been, but as much against, as it was for, the advantage of the Fathers; whose innocence was thereby fully justified; and after which, all other Morals, but those of Port-Royal, would have obliged Pas●l, publicly, to retract, what he had thereupon writ in his Letters. This, indeed, answered Eudoxus, who had very attentively listened to the discourse, is, to talk knowingly. But where have you learned this piece of Knowledge, said he to the Abbot?  
I have drawn it out of the spring head, answered he, out of the most authentic pieces that can be had of such a matter; and perhaps we shall found them here, or, at lest, extracts of them. If your Jansenist be as curious, as you say he is, he will have, with all the tomes of the Morale-Pratique, the works of a Jesuit, who has refuted some part of them; for, in these kind of disputes, men seldom fail, to have what is writ, on both sides, pro and con.  
The Abbot went to the shelf, where the tomes of la Morale-Pratique stood, and thereon found the book entitled, Défense des nouveaux Chrestiens & des Missionnaires de la Chine, etc. He showed to Eudoxus in this book, 
1. part. pag. 196. 2. edit.  the extracts of most part of the pieces, which proved what he had newly said, and particularly the extract of the decree of 1656. where he made him chief observe, that which here follows relating to the pretended adorations of Consucius.  
In the third place, they demand, whether it be lawful, for the Christian Students of China, when they take their degrees, to practise the ceremony, observed in Confucius' Hall; because there is not there any Sacrificer, nor Minister, of the Idolaters. The Students, and the Philosophers alone, do meet there only to acknowledge Confucius as the● Master, and this, with such ceremonies, as at their first institution, were only political, and terminated wholly to an honour purely Civil. For those, who are to take their degrees, come together into the Hall, and there wait for the Doctors and Examinators; and that which they do, after the Chinese fashion, before this Philosopher's name and picture, is no more, than the same kind of ceremonies and respectful gestures, which all Scholars make to their teachers and professors whilst alive. After they have thus owned Confucius for their Master, the Chancellor gives them their degrees, and than they withdraw. You are also to know, that this Hall of Confucius is a College, and not a Temple, properly so called, and that it is open to none but Students.   

The Answer.  
The holy Congregation has judged, that, conformably to the demand here made, the Christians in China may be permitted the use of the abovementioned ceremony, because it appears to be not more, than a pure civil respect.  
Truly, said Eudoxus, since these Gentlemen had no mind to acquit the Jesuits from any blame upon this article, they had very good reason, not to mention this second decree.  
I will show you something yet more positive, answered the Abbot; and that is the Jesuits Apology, made upon this occasion by the Dominicans themselves, Dominicans of some weight, and of more than common consideration, in the Order: Let us read, said he to them, this Apology in the Deffense des nouveaux Chretiens. The author of which, after he had set down several testimonials justifying the Jesuits conduct, speaks in this manner.  
I know not whether Mr. Jurieu, 
Defense des nouv. Chrest. 1. Par. p. ●10.  and the author of la Morale-pratique may not be tempted to believe, that some Jesuit has writ, or dictated this letter (of Father Peter of Alcala the Dominican, of which this author has made an extract,) they may if they please satisfy themselves in the matter; but what will they think of the following testimony, which contains in it many others? it is the famous Dominican, Father John of Paz, an ancient professor in Divinity, Rector of the University of Manile, Prior and Provincial of his Order. This Father, in his answers, to the doubts of the Missioners of Tunquin, printed at Manile in the year 1680, upon the questions debated in China, touching the pretended Idolatry (for they regard Tunquin also) having given his opinion, altogether conformable to the Jesuits, or rather to the decree of 16●6, he affirms, that his answers are founded, upon several relations of the Religious of his own Order in China ...... 
Parag 20. f. 198.  hoc mihi constat ex variis relationibus Religiosorum nostri Ordinis in Regno Chinae assistentium ...... but what need the suffrages of particular men be insisted on, so long as there are those of three superiors of the first rate; I mean three Provincials of this holy Order (of Saint Dominic) to wit the Reverend Fathers, Charles Clement Gant, Francis of Palma, and Philip Pardo? For these three have, several times, recommended to their Missioners in China by the authority they had over them, to conform themselves absolutely to the Society's practice, in what relates to the decree of Alexander VII, forbidding them to writ any thing to the contrary. All this, is to be seen in a letter, of the Reverend Father Dominic Sarpetri, or of Saint Peter, directed to his Provincial, and the Definitors of the Chapter of his Province; together with the treatise he had writ about these matters. The author of la Morale-pratique may one day see it, but, in the mean time, we will give an account of an other small piece, writ by the same Missioner, which contains an abridgement of what he has proved more at large in his treatise.   

A Writing of the R. F. Dominic Sarpetri called of Saint Peter Missioner of the Order of Saint Dominic in China.  
I Brother Dominic Marie Serpetri, otherwise called of Saint Peter, by nation a Sicilian, of the Order of the Friar's Preachers formerly approved, for a Master, or Teacher of Divinity, etc. do certify all, who shall see these Letters; first, that being sent by the Superiors of the Province of the Rosary of the Philippines of my Order, to Preach the Gospel in the Kingdom of China, and having applied myself, by the command of the same Superiors, with all possible care, for the space of eight years, to examine the superstitions of the Chinese Sects, I am persuaded, that the practice of the Jesuit Missioners in that Kingdom, in permitting, or tolerating some ceremonies, used by the Chinese Christians in honour of the Philosopher Confucius, and their deceased ancestors; that their conduct is, I say, not only without danger of sin, being approved by the Congregation of the General Inquisition, but, also considering the principles of the chief Sects of China, that this opinion, is more probable than the contrary, and otherwise very useful, not to say necessary, to open for the Infidels a gate to the Gospel ....  
Secondly, I do certify, that the Jesuit Fathers have declared and preached, in the Kingdom of China, Jesus Christ crucified; and this not only by word of mouth, but also by a great number of books, which they have made: that they do explain to their new Converts, with a great deal of care and pains, the mysteries of the Passion; that in some places of these Father's Residence, there are Confraternities of the Passion; and that, very lately, the persecuter of our holy faith, Yam-quam-sien extremely reproached the Preachers of the Gospel, with adoring a man crucified, for the God of heaven and earth; and all this he proved out of the books written by the Jesuits.  
Hold a little, said Cleander, interrupting him, till I do compare this with what is said in the Provincial Letters. They answer so well, according to what is demanded, that in countries, where a crucified God passes for folly, they suppress the scandal of the Cross, and only preach a glorious, not a suffering Jesus; as they have done in China, and the Indieses. Go on now if you please.  
In the third place; I certify, and, as far as is requisite, do protest, with an oath, that I have not been prevailed upon, by the entreaties, or persuasions of any man whatever, but only by the mere love of truth, to give this double certificate or testimonial ..... for coming to understand, on occasion of some doubts proposed, in 1645, to the sacred Congregation, by Father John Baptist Morales, a man truly Apostolical, and actuated by a Christian zeal, that some men, ill inclined to the Society, had published in Europe, and in the Indieses, that the Missioners in China, did not preach Christ crucified, and that they allowed their Christians to commit Idolatry, being hereupon afraid, that I should seem by my silence to approve the calumnies of those people, and being also desirous to repair, to the utmost of my power, the injured reputation of those Fathers, I resolved to declare my opinion in the foresaid manner, submitting it, nevertheless to a more infallible judgement, to wit to that of the Church of Rome. In witness whereof, I have writ this letter with my own hand, in the house of the Canton, where we are kept prisoners and in exile, this fourth of August 1688.  
Ha! what can be added to this, said Eudoxus very much surprised? But do you know, answered Cleander, that the author of the Apology, or la deffense des nouveaux Chretiens, etc. invites any, who should scruple the truth of the pieces he has cited, to come and see them in the Jesuits College at Paris, where the originals, or very authentic and undoubted copies are kept? And do you also know, that I myself have satisfied my own curiosity in this matter? what, said Eudoxus, have you than read the book, and seen the pieces he quotes? tell me seriously what you think of them?  
The judgement I make of this book, answered Cleander, is, that it is an excellent piece, folid, instructive, well writ, and because of the variety of its matter, very diverting: it is, otherwise, very modest, and comes from a man, who knows how to contain himself upon occasion where the bore reading of what he writes often raised in me an indignation against those he confutes. The heinousness and enormity of the crimes imposed upon the Jesuits, and the evidence of the matters of fact, and of the proofs by which he demonstrates their falsity, produces several different emotions in the minds of the readers, which invite and oblige them to a constant attention; and yet nevertheless, the author, with all his moderation, has let no advantage slip, which the matter could furnish him with against his adversaries. In one word, this Apology, does not only destroy all these black calumnies, we now discourse of, and which have been so far fetched, but also begets a prejudice against those, who have maliciously undertaken to spread and improve them in Europe and, for my own part, I can truly say, that nothing has made me more distrust the Provincial Letters, than this book.  
I will found a time to read it, said Eudoxus, to satisfy myself, and to gratify Mr. Abbot, who, certainly, can have nothing more to add to what you have said. I could yet, observe to you, answered Mr. Abbot, an other falsity of Pascal's in this place we are now examining: and that is, what he says of the Jesuits permitting Idolatry, not only in China, but in the Indieses also; which is more than ever was objected by any of their calumniators; who always confined themselves to China: and they had good reason not to extend their reproaches to the Indieses; which had they done, the imposture would have been much more easily discovered. Neither Spaniards, nor Portugaise, neither English, nor Hollanders, traded in China; whereas all these Nations drive a trade in the Indieses; from whence the Jesuits might have had as many witnesses of their innocence as there were Merchants.  
It is however, convenient to remark one thing, as we go along, and that is, that the toleration of Idolatry in Japon, would have been much more necessary for the Jesuits than in China. For, after all, the persecutions which they suffered in this great Empire, were more than either banishment, or imprisonment; whereas in Japon, they were almost always in continual hazard of their lives. Near upon a hundred Jesuits there Martyred, some by the dreadful torment of water, others, by being buried alive, and some, by being burnt by little and little, might, easily have freed themselves by directing mentally their adorations to a Crucifix, hid under their habits, whilst they seemed openly to make them to Idols, as, is pretended, they allow their new Converts to do in the Temples of China. For surely, they ought to be allowed to have wit enuff To let Charity, according to the Proverb, begin at home.  
Ha! what, Mr. Abbot, must I help you out in this matter, and make, upon this passage, an other important observation, which you have forgot? the main piece, which Pascal citys, for a proof of the Jesuits Idolatry in China, is, a Spanish memorial presented, as is said, to Philip the IV, King of Spain by the Cordeliers of the Philippin Islands; which writing you may remember was supposed, and falsely attributed to these Religious, to give it more authority: the true author not daring to publish it under his own name. This author was one Diego Collado, who, before, had made use of such kind of artifices, in other Satyrs of this nature; an unquiet, troublesome fellow, convicted, like an other Oats, of an infinity of contradictions, and impostures; wherewith his memorial are filled, and to whom sufficient justice has been done, in the very history of his own Order; which recounts the many great troubles and disturbances he had occasioned among them. The Jesuit Father, who showed me the pieces, that are already inserted, or yet to be, in the Apology of their Missions, gave me an account of this particular thing, and showed it me in the history of China, writ in Spanish by Navaret, an other Dominican, and a most obstinate accuser of the Jesuits, whilst he continued in his Order. But, being afterwards made an Archbishop, he became their great commender, their Patron, and their friend: his friendship and esteem was so very great, that he founded them a College in Saint Domingo, the Archiepiscopal City.  
Really, said Eudoxus, this is not the lest considerable point of your animadversions, upon this first article of the fifth Provincial Letter: but it is hard, I confess, to make a more solid remark.  
The matter deserved the pains I have taken, answered the Abbot; this article of Idolatry, is, for the Jesuits, the most cruel passage of all the Provincial Letters; and I have often told them, that it was, in some measure, the decisive point of all the rest: for, this being once supposed true, all that follows would be taken for granted; at lest would not appear incredible. But, the falsehood of it being once clearly proved and made out, the obstinate rage and malice of the Society's enemies, would be evidently seen, to the scandal and indignation of all good men. The examination, continued he, of the other particular articles in this Letter of Pascal, require not so much discussion; which we shall therefore soon run over.  
These are Escobar's cases about fasting, said Cleander; here they are, look upon them, together with the fine preface of the twenty four old men, and the four animals: let us read this passage in Pascal; it is really pleasant enuff. He, who cannot sleep, if he does not eat his Supper, ought he to fast? no by no means. Are you not satisfied? not altogether, says I to him, for I can fast very well, by making my Collation in the morning, and eating my Supper at night. See what follows, said he to me; they did not fail to consider every thing. And what would they say, if one could be content, without any Collation in the morning, to Sup only in the evening. To this it is answered, That notwithstanding a man is not bound to fast; for no body is obliged to change his ordinary course of eating. O what excellent reason, said I, is this!  
This is very ridiculous, answered the Abbor, and it must be ingenuously confessed, that Escobar, who is not always so much Escobar, that is to say, in the Jansenists language, so lose, as these Gentlemen would have the world believe, it, must be acknowledged, said he, that he very well deserved to be raillyed for this his fine decision. I myself condemn him for it; I only add; that Escobar did not learn this answer, as far as I can understand, either from the four animals, Suarez, Vasquez, Molina, and Valentia, or the twenty four old men; and, also, that the good man was mistaken (as he often is) in quoting, for his opinion, Filiucius, who in his treatise of fasting says nothing like it. I am much pleased with you Mr. Abbot, said Eudoxus, I perceive your downright honesty, and do very much commend you for it. As for myself, I cannot endure some of the Jesuits friends, who, right or wrong, will defend them in every thing. Can they think, that when men put on the habit of the Society, they with it also put on, as if it were another garment, the gift of infallibility?  
Those friends, answered the Abbot, would perhaps show the same moderation, that I do, if their enemies had as much justice and equity as you. Both run to extremities; but the last are more to be blamed than the first. As for the other questions, about fasting, continued he, which Pascal calls diverting, if he would but have taken the pains to read Saint Thomas in his fourth book of sentences, 
Dist. 15. q. 3. a. 4.  he might be sure to found many more such to divert himself with.  
They are not very material, said Cleander; but how will you answer what he charges Escobar with; that to drink wine, out of meals, and even several times does not break fast?  
Reach me hither (I pray you) Saint Thomas' Sum, said the Abbot to Eudoxus; wherein he read to them the 147 question of the secunda secundae art. 6. where the Saint thus teaches; the question, in the title is, whether the command of fasting, obliges a man, to make but one meal; Vtrum requiratur ad jejunium quod homo semel tantùm comedat. He makes this objection; those who fast are not forbidden to drink, several times, at several hours of the day, they are not therefore forbidden to make more meals than one. Non est prohibitum quin pluries bibamus diversis horis diei: ergo etiam non debet esse prohibitum jejunantibus quin pluries comedant. He answers, that the fasting, enjoined by the Church, is not broken, but by those things, which at the institution of the fast, she had an intention to prohibit; but she had no intention to command abstinence from drink; and by consequence it is lawful, for those, who fast, to drink several times a day. Et ideo licet pluries jejunantibus bibere ..... that if a man does not drink moderately, he sins and loses the merit, or reward, of fasting, as he also does, who makes but one meal, and eats not moderately. Si quis autem immoderatè potu utatur, potest peccare, & meritum jejunij perdere; sicut etiam, si immoderatè cibum in unâ comestione assumat. It is Saint Thomas, who thus speaks, continued the Abbot, not Escobar, and his opinion is followed by a multitude of Divines.  
I have nothing more to say, answered Cleander; Escobar is very safe, his security is beyond exception. But, said Eudoxus, Saint Thomas, at lest, declares, that if a man should drink too often on a fasting day, he would be guilty of the sin of intemperance.  
Pascal, answered the Abbot, who omits none of the circumstances, that might make Escobar's decision appear lose to those who are ignorant of Saint Thomas' opinion, takes great care to add, whatever could restrain it. Listen than to Escobar, who, in this matter, is but Saint Thomas' Echo, This does not hinder, said he, but that if you be not moderate in your drinking, you may commit a sin against temperance, althô you do not commit one against the precept of fasting. Immoderatio autem potest temperantiam violare sed non jejunium.  
Ho ho! said Cleander, if Pascal had but translated these words also of the Casuist, they would have turned all the edge of his wit, or rather have left him no room for any; this would have made all his jests and raillery about the hippocras, appear very dull and insipid, and Escobar, whom he designed to make ridiculous, could not possibly have been laughed at. Here follows Filiucius upon the same subject, continued Cleander; which Pascal has made his Jesuit thus translate. Is he, that has tired himself by some action, as by pursuing a wench, obliged to fast? no, by no means; but if he have tired himself, on purpose to be thereby dispensed from fasting, shall he, notwithstanding, be bound to fast? althô this should have been his design, yet shall he not be obliged to fast. Ho! very well, could you possibly have believed this, said he to me; truly Father, says I to him, I can hardly yet believe it. Ho what! is it not a sin for a man, not to fast when he is able? and is it lawful to seek occasion for sinning, or rather are we not obliged to avoid them? that would be very convenient; not always, said he to me, but according.  
Let us read Filiucius himself, said the Abbot; who having found the passage quoted, prayed them to pass by Pascal's translation for a moment, and hearken to his. Dices secundo, an qui malo fine laboraret, ut ad aliquem occidendum, vel ad insequendam amicam, vel quid simile, teneretur ad jejunium? You will put me a second question, to wit, whether a man who had wearied himself, in prosecution of some ill design, as by endevoring to kill his adversary, or by running after his mistress, or by some such business, should be obliged to fast.  
Respondeo talem quidem peccaturum ex malo fine: at secutâ defatigatione excusaretur à jejunio. I answer, that this man's evil end would make him guilty of sin, but yet, supposing him quite spent and tired, he could not be obliged to fast. Ita Medina, nisi fieret in fraudem secundum aliquos: It is the opinion of Medina, if it be not done on purpose, to avoid fasting as some Divines do say. Sed melius alij culpam quidem esse in apponenda causa fractionis jejunij, at eâ positâ excusari à jejunio. Ita Antoninus, Medina, Sylvester. But others say better, that the sin consists, in a man's putting himself into a condition not to be able to fast; but that being in such condition he is freed from the obligation of fasting. This is the opinion of Saint Antonin, Medina and Sylvester.  
Ha' what! said Eudoxus, if to the end I might not fast to morrow, I should get myself blooded to day, both in my arms and in my feet, so much as to make me faint, would Pascal, notwithstanding, condemn me to fast to morrow? I believe if he were my physician, and did not hinder me, that he himself would be guilty of sin. I conceive, as Filiucius said, that I myself should commit a very grievous sin, by proposing to myself such an end, and that to have put myself into a disability of fasting, would be a sin, twice as great, as the single sin of not fasting, could, otherwise have been. But, certainly, if I were in this condition, I should not believe myself obliged, even, to ask a dispensation from the Curate.  
I leave you, said the Abbot, to compare my translation with Pascals'; and also the decision of Filiucius, Saint Antonin and others, with the notion, or idea he gives of it, in his captious way of proposing the matter. Thousands of people, who read these Letters, only, to divert themselves, and who depended upon what Pascal said, have treated this Divine, as ridiculous, impertinent, extravagant, and a corrupter of Morals: but you see with what justice. Besides this, Filiucius had made use of two examples to explain his meaning; one of which, had nothing in it offensive; Pascal passes this by, and lays hold of the other, which, put into French, seems not very modest or decent; whereas in Latin, and in these sort of books which are never read by the common people, nor by Laymen, the thing, is, in itself, indifferent, and very far from being ill: there appears in all this proceeding a great deal of affected malice. But what say you to the consequences he draws from this decision, and the instances he puts to the good Father he is in discourse with? Ho what! said he, is it not a sin not to fast, when one is able? is it lawful to seek occasions of sinning, or rather are we not obliged to fly and avoid them?  
I say, answered Eudoxus, that all this, is flat and dull enuff, and wicked in the highest degree. Wendrok, in defending Pascal, added Cleander, struggles hard, and in a very strange manner, to bring him of, from this unlucky business. Upon this occasion, one told me, but t'other day, that in all places Wendrok railed against the Jesuits like a Carter, but in this, he cursed and swore like a boged Carter; and yet, notwithstanding all, he still stuck fast where he was plunged very deep in the mud. The comparison is not very neat or cleanly, but yet it very fully expresses the matter.  
The farther we go, said Eudoxus, the more I suspect, that the books of the Society's Casuists, are not so fertile of monstrous decisions, as the Jansenists, and those, who believe, or seem to believe them, do every where publish. For, if they are to be met in such crowds, why do they choose those the Jesuits are able to justify by the very bore exposition of the text; and that in such a manner, as common sense must bear them witness they have taken it right? why do they give them occasion to cry out against impostures? why do they furnish them with matter for the just complaints they have so often made, that they falsify the texts of their authors, to make themselves sport, and turn them into ridicule, to give their readers a malicious kind of pleasure? you shall see more examples, than one of this sort, answered the Abbot; but let us now look back, and read the remainder of this Dialogue.  
See, said Cleander, here is the place we broke of at. Is it lawful to seek for an occasion of sinning? not always, said he to me, but according; according to what said I Ho ho! answered the Father, and if they should suffer some inconvenience by shunning the occasions, are they, in your opinion, obliged to avoid them? but this, at lest, is not Father Bauni's opinion, as you may see page 1084. Absolution ought not to be refused to those, who continued in the near occasions of sinning; if they are in such a condition, as not to be able to quit them, without giving the world occasion to discourse, or without receiving some great inconvenience by it themselves. Father I am mightily pleased at this.  
Eudoxus, who, at the same time, read in Father Bauni's book, the place quoted by Pascal, said to Cleander, interrupting him, I do not found it so here; nor does Bauni make mention of the near occasion of sinning; and this is an essential falsification, the contrary is expressly set down. For as much, said he, as that the cause, which inclines and carries a man to evil, is not of itself bad, nor contrary to any precept, or Ecclesiastic decree, nor such, as, of its own nature, morally obliges, and necessitates those, who make use of it to sin, and therefore cannot be reckoned for such a near and disposing occasion to ill, as the penitent aught, of necessity, to avoid, that he may be capable of receiving the Grace of Sacramental Absolution.  
Let me see, I pray you, said Cleander, Bauni's text; which after he had read, he cried out, this, I am sure, they may confidently call an other great imposture, and sufficiently circumstanciated, if I may be allowed so to speak; there is nothing wanting to make it so; it is very plain, and beyond all dispute.  
The case here spoke of, continued Eudoxus, relates to the ordinary, and common occasions of Merchants, and dealers, whose way of traffic obliges them, To see, speak, and treat with women, wives and maidens, whose looks and conversation make them often fall into sin; and all this amounts, but to know, whether a Merchant, who cannot quit his trade, without the loss of his reputation, and the injury of his family, having otherwise a firm resolution to abstain from sin, dummodo firmiter proponat non peccare, may be allowed to receive absolution; or, whether the Confessor be obliged to refuse it, or force him to renounce his trade. Is this to say, as Pascal writes it in Italic letters, impudently citing the page, that absolution ought not to be refused to those, who remain in the near occasions of sinning? where is the sincerity! I have always heard it said, that a near occasion of sinning, is, that which never almost is resisted, as Bauni has just now told us, and as it is called by all other Divines, an occasion that morally obliges to sin. But althô there are continual occasions, wherein we are engaged by some kind of employments, which make us often fall, this does not hinder, but that these occasions may be also often resisted; and there is a great deal of difference between the near occasions and continual occasions. What shall than become of this Merchant, if he do not turn Hermit or Carthusian? for in most secular employments, men are obliged to treat with married and unmarried women, to talk with them, and to see 'um. If the Curate of Saint Eustache's, should observe this moral, there would be yearly, at Easter, abundance of shops to be let in Saint Denis' street in Paris.  
I have several times discoursed, said the Abbot, with Doctors of Sorbonne, with Jesuits, and Religious of other Orders, concerning the near occasions of sinning: about the difficulty one ought to make, of absolving those, who are in them, either willingly, or by necessity; and do you know, that abating the extravagance, to which some Confessors do sometimes carry this point, I have seldom met any more severe in this matter than the Jesuits.  
A Jesuit, answered Cleander, said to me once, upon an occasion like this we are discoursing of, that it was observable, that in the Cities, where they had Houses, some people, remarkable for their callings, and condition of life; and known to have need of the gentleness and indulgence, which the Fathers of the Society are said to show to sinners, were, seldom or ever, known to come to their Confessionals at Easter; an evident and manifest sign, that they elsewhere met with better bargains, with more accommoding, and complying Confessors, than the Jesuits.  
I know some, added Eudoxus, who, believing that aspersion, happened to be shrewdly trapan'd; for the Knight of ....... one of your acquaintance, once, upon a time, assured me, that Pascal's memoirs were neither true nor certain; for, having relied upon them, he went to the Jesuits once to Confession; but that, in all his life, he had never been handled so roughly; that his absolution was deferred; and that upon some conditions, which appeared to him very hard to be observed. The Provincial Letters were, at that time, much in vogue; and the Knight was deceived, and drawn in by them; who made no secret of this part of his case, which he was not ashamed to discover: and indeed the rage he was in, for being deluded, made him every where cry out, that Pascal was in that, at lest, a mere impostor.  
The Confessors, answered the Abbot, are much to be pitied; they are accused without being able to defend themselves; and if some persons, of the same character with your Knight, who do not think their reputation lessoned, by telling they were refused absolution, did not, from time to time, vindicat the Jesuits in this point, abundance of people, would judge of them, just as an Oratorian whom I know by sight and name, for a long time did. He was in the country with a Jesuit of my acquaintance, who is not now of the Society. This Jesuit had refused to give absolution to a man in those parts, who either bragged, or complained of it; the Oratorian, much surprised at the story, asked the Jesuit very seriously, whether any of their Order ever refused absolution: it is commonly said among us that none of you ever do. After such little digressions as these, which were now and than made to refresh themselves, and prevent being tired, they went on with reading the Provincial Letters.  
This, Father, does very much rejoice me; there remains now not more, than to say a man may, on set purpose, seek occasions of sinning; since it is lawful not to eat, or fly from them. Even that, also, is sometimes permitted, added he; the famous Casuist, Basil Pontius, has said it; Father Bauni quotes him, and approves his opinion, as you may see in his treatise of repentance q. 4. p. 94. A man may seek an occasion directly and for itself, (primò & per se) when either his own, or his neighbour's spiritual, or temporal, good leads him to it. Truly, says I to him, I seem to be in a dream, when I found Religious men spea● after this manner.  
This turn of Pascal, said Eudoxus, that he seems to dream, when he hears Religious talk at this rate, does suppose, without doubt, some very wicked thing in this decision. Not at all, answered the Abbot, it was only to make a more neat transition to the matter of probability. See what a pleasant thing follows.  
Ha' what! Father, tell me in conscience, whether you yourself be of that opinion? no truly, said the Father: do you than speak, continued I, against your conscience? not at all, said he; I did not in this speak according to my own conscience, but according to Pontius, and Father Bauni's conscience, and you may safely follow them, for they are two able men. What, Father, because they have put these three lines in their books, is it lawful to seek for occasions of sinning? I did not believe, we were to take your Casuists for a rule, but only the Scripture and the tradition of the Church. O good God cried out the Father, you put me in mind of the Jansenists. Cannot Father Bauni and Basil Pontius make an opinion probable? I am not satisfied, says I to him, with a probable opinion: I desire to have a sure one. I see, plainly, said the good Father to me, that you are ignorant of the doctrine of probability; if you understood it, you would speak, after an other manner. Truly I must needs instruct you in this point; you shall not loose your labour by coming hither: for, without a right notion of this matter, you will not be able to understand any thing: it is the foundation, and the A. B. C. of all our Morals. I was ravished to see him fall upon what I wished for. Is not this pleasantly brought in, continued the Abbot? and aught he not to have been guilty of a small calumny, rather than to have lost so pretty a turn?  
I speak thus, not that I disagree as to the truth of this quotation, on that I lay no stress: Father Pintereau and Father Causin in their answers to la Theologie Morale denied, that these words were in Bauni, having taken one of this Divine's assertions for an other; where Basil Pontius is also quoted upon such a kind of subject, which they believed was that, which the author of that book had attacked. This mistake made Pascal triumph in his fifteenth letter. But he was well employed in the mean time; a little clearing and disentangling of things will here discover a most evident calumny; which consists, in that the words of Pontius, cited by Bauni, do contain, with reference to the place from whence they are drawn, and according to the sense there given them, no other, than a wise and most reasonable doctrine; and yet Pascal makes his readers take up such a notion of the words, as that they might from them infer, a most detestable doctrine. Let us look upon them, as they stand in Pontius himself. Althô he be an Augustin, your Jansenist friend will in all appearance, upon Pascal's quotation, and joining him with Bauni, take him for a Jesuit: for I see, he has placed him on the same shelf, and in the midst of the Casuists and Divines of the Society.  
The words are to be found in the sixth chapter of his addition to his book de Matrimonio, where this Divine proposes, whether a Catholic may in conscience marry a heretic, who may be thereby endangered to be perverted, when there is otherwise a great deal of reason to make the match. An cum periculo perversionis, said he, in the title of the chapter, possit ex aliquâ magnâ causà contrahi matrimonium cum haereitco. The interest of the state and Religion is concerned in the marriage; there are hopes by it to draw the Catholics out of oppression; whom a heretic Prince, or Princess' Ministers treat with the utmost severity. These are the examples propossed by Basil Pontius at the beginning of the chapter; and he answers, that, notwithstanding, the Catholics danger of being perverted, the Marriage may be made with a good conscience; provided the Catholic, confiding in the mercy of God, does sincerely resolve, to continued faithful. Dum tamen contrahat cum firmo proposito non labendi, fidensque de divina misericordia & gratia fore ut eripiatur ab eo periculo fine crimine.  
He supports his assertion by the example of Judith; who exposed herself to so dangerous occasions, to save her Town of Bethulia. And also by the Marriage of Hesther, with Hassuerus. By the authority of Saint Ambrose, Saint Austin, Saint Thomas, Cardinal Cajetan, and a number of other Doctors; Whence he thus concludes, concerning these and all other such Cases, it is manifest, that all persons do sin in exposing themselves to danger, without some very pressing cause or necessity obliging them to it; but it may be done without sin, when such an occasion requires it: and it is not necessary that this cause should be the spiritual good of the Soul, but it is sufficient that it be a considerable, temporal, advantage, as is seen in Hesther's Marriage, and the conduct of Judith.  
I desire to know, continued the Abbot, whether there be any thing extravagant in this doctrine; and what ground Pascal had to say, I fancy myself in a dream when I hear Religious men talk at this rate? and whether, on the contrary, he himself did not really dream, or rave, when he pretended to found in it such great occasions of scandal?  
I'll make a farther remark, said Eudoxus, who at that time was reading the passage in Bauni; and it is a second circumstance of the calumny. Bauni does not use Pontius' words, to prove a man may expose himself to the danger of sinning, for a temporal advantage; but, only, by an argument called à fortiori, to confirm his assertion, That one may sometimes absolve a person that is in a dangerous occasion, without obliging him to quit it, when there is just cause not to do it, provided the person be truly penitent for his sins past, and have a firm resolution not to sin any more. This occasion, said he, a little lower, ceasing to be a near one, in the notion of Divines, from the moment it ceases to be voluntary: and it ceases to be voluntary, from the time, that with a steadfast resolution not to offend God, there is a necessity to continued in it. I am perfectly of your opinion, added Cleander, to the Abbot, that Pascal had very great need of this transition, to set of, and make some sport with his subject. But let us go on, and make an end.  
The remaining part of the Letter we are examining, said the Abbot, relates to the doctrine of probability: but it is to no purpose to enter again into this matter, after all that has been already said upon it; especially since my design is, not to take notice of all Pascals impostures. Nor will I say any thing of an opinion, he, in the same Letter, attributes to Reginaldus, and Father Cellot; That in Moral questions the new Casuists are preferable to the Ancient Fathers, althô these come nearer to the Apostle's times. This point has been already debated, and I am of opinion, that we ought not to imitate Pascal in his repetitions.  
Here they stopped; Cleander and Eudoxus assuring the Abbot, that they were extremely scandalised at Pascal's falsifications; and at the unfaithfulness of the memorial he made use of in writing the Provincial Letters: than they agreed at what hour to meet again the next day, to examine the following Letters.    

The sixth Discourse.  
SOme unexpected business hindered the Abbot from meeting at the time appointed. Eudoxus and Cleander, nevertheless, resolved to go on with their design; not in judging of what he had said about Morals, wherein they believed they should need the Abbot's assistance; but of an other part of Perraults commendation, of the Provincial Letters in his Paralelle; which gave them an occasion to criticise upon the stile, and purity of the language, etc. They began with the first Letter; and plainly showed, by several instances from the beginning of this Discourse to page 217, that this author was too lavish in his Panegiric, and very much out, when he affirmed, that in these Letters there was nothing but purity in the language, 
Pag. 217.  greatness in the thoughts, and wit in the railleries, and that the art of Dialogue was here to be found whole and entire.  
They were beginning to fall upon the second Letter, just as the Abbot alighted. While we were waiting for you, said Eudoxus to him, we were endevoring to take up a better opinion of Pascal, and an other impression than what you yesterday left of him in our minds. We also endeavoured to lessen the horror of that frightful idea you gave us of him when you so often convinced him of calumny and imposture.  
How could you go about it, said the Abbot, for the proofs I brought, are perfectly unanswerable; and a man, that has but eyes and understands how to read, cannot but be satisfied of their force and their solidity.  
We made no reflection upon that, answered Eudoxus, we only examined, what right he had to the qualities of an extraordinary wit and an excellent writer.  
Those are the qualities for which he is to be most valued, replied the Abbot, and not at all incompatible with what I said of him yesterday. Pascal is a man of wit, a good writer, and very perfect in the art of slandering: he is pleasant, bold, expert, and happy in the trade of lying. The bore reading of the Provincial Letters discovers the two first qualities, and the observations we have made upon them do palpably demonstrate all the rest.  
You are than, it seems, convinced, said Cleander, that these Letters, whatever otherwise they may be, are at lest a Masterpiece of wit, and in this kind one of the wonders of the world.  
Ho, not so, answered the Abbot, to say that it is a pleasant piece, and wherein there is a great deal of wit, and art, is, what one in justice is bound to say: but to say, that it is a Masterpiece, and without faults, a great many faults, a man must be very much Pascal's friend, or persuaded by his friends to a mighty degree of obstinacy. I am of opinion, that he writes easily, naturally, and with life, but he neither writes purely, nor exactly, and Mr. Perrault, in saying there was nothing but purity in the language, did not speak like an able, or at lest like a sincere Acadamist.  
How you decide the matter! Mr. Abbot, said Cleander laughing, we durst hardly say so much, after we had ran over, and seriously examined the first Letter.  
If I should show you, answered the Abbot, the copy I have at home, you could hardly found one page without some strokes of a pencil, pointing out faults against the purity of the language, or the elegance of stile, or the art of Dialogue, and very often, also, marking out, a poor, mean thought, or a pitiful conceit.  
Are there as many, proportionably, in that, as in this? said Eudoxus, showing him the first Letter, which they had newly examined, and scored in abundance of places. Very near as many, answered the Abbot. Cleander, turning over the book interrupted them, and said, I have here met a passage, which really shows, that Pascal understood the rules of Dialogue: but it also shows, that he did not always think of them time enuff. It is, at the beginning of the sixth Letter. I will do it, said he, (meaning the repetition of the discourse he had with his Jesuit) and I will do it more exactly, than I did the other. For I have now brought my table-book, to mark down the quotations of the passages, and I am very sorry I did not bring it with me the first time.  
This precaution, and this little word, thrown in by the by is, indeed, necessary, to make the matter have some seeming truth in it; a main essential thing in all Dialogues. For it is not probable, he could remember, exactly, all the places the Jesuit had cited out of the Casuists, and yet he had reason to mark them, since he was to give an account of the Conversation to his friend in the Country.  
But that which is very pleasant, and made me say, that Pascal does not remember the rules of Dialogue time enuff, is, that in the precedent Letter, where he relates a former discourse, he had had with the Jesuit, where at he said he had no table-book, there are yet full as many passages quoted; the books, the chapters, and the very pages therein are set down, at lest, as exactly as in this. Not to speak of that list of near fifty Casuists, Divines and Canonists, whose names seem to him so difficult to be pronounced, that he asked his Jesuit, whether all of them were Christians, and yet, notwithstanding, he made a shift, even without a table-book, to remember them all, very exactly.  
This is a very good remark, answered Eudoxus; but in all appearance, this precaution, being taken up after the thing was over, must have been the effect of the observation of some one of Pascal's friends, who discovered this fault of his a little too late. This, perhaps, was the reason, added the Abbot, laughing, that we have found in his fourth and fifth Letters so many false citations, and so many mangled passages out of Laiman, Bauni, and Filiucius. If Pascal had had his table-book than, he might have been more exact; but it is manifest, that in writing his discourse, he spoke by heart. As to the rest, added the Abbot, if the than critics of Port-Royal did oblige Pascal to make mention here of his table-book, that his following Letters might appear more true, and free from the faults he committed in the two former, they afterwards altered their opinions; for in the latter editions, they have omitted this precaution of the table-book, which by correcting the fault you speak, of had made it more appear.  
It is true, answered Eudoxus, reading this place in the edition in twelves, which he had in his hands, that this article is left out; but now we are upon this subject, continued he, I found that Pascal had not yet sufficiently reflected upon the rules of Dialogue, when he supposed his Letters were become public, and, in his eighth, writ to his friend in the Country, that every one in Paris was guessing at the author; some saying it was a Doctor of Sorbonne, others, fathering them upon four or five persons, who, like himself, were neither Priests, nor Churchmen. This alone, takes away all appearance of truth, from the conversations related in the eighth, ninth, and tenth Letters. For to be able to continued these discourses with his Casuist, it must be supposed, the Jesuits were ignorant, that the former Letters ran about, and were spread all over Paris; and did not know, that all the world were delighted with them; that their mysteries were discovered, and all honest men enraged at them. Now, most certainly, this ignorance of the Jesuits in a point that touched them so near, seems too gross to carry any likelihood of truth with it. Pascal was very much out here, and did not sufficiently reflect upon the matter.  
There is yet, answered the Abbot, an other more considerable fault, which runs through all Pascals Dialogues, and it is, that he overstrains and carries too far the character of his chief Actor. The first and great Personage of his Dialogues, is a Jesuit, a well meaning good man and without trics; who frankly tells all he desires to fish out of him. This is not much amiss, and Pascal has, by this contrivance, a fair game on't. But of this plain simple Jesuit, which at first he made him seem to be, he has insensibly made a natural, a sot, and silly to the highest degree. He laughs at him, and mocks him to his face; he openly rallyes him without his perceiving it; he foolishly runs into snares, that any one might plainly see were laid to catch him; he makes him speak the greatest impertinences imaginable; and all this he makes him do, in the name, or as the mouth, of the whole Society; and takes all he says for granted; believes his quotations true; the sense he gives them; the principles he lays down; and the application he makes of the whole.  
I know there were Critics at Port-Royal, who also found this fault with the main point of his Comedies. But it was answered, that, notwithstanding, it was to be passed over, and the same method to be still continued; that the Provincial Letters with this fault, had all the effect that could be expected from them; that the nicety was unseasonable; that very few would take notice of it; and that when once the greatest part of the world was got into a vein of laughing at any thing, or upon any subject, the most exact and observing must, whether they will or not, carry on the same humour.  
However it was resolved, that before the following editions, there should be an advertisement to the reader, wherein this Person's character was to be justified, as much as possible; in the same manner, almost, as Molicre had apologized for his Manhater in his preface to his Comedy, le Misanthrope. This Father, we are told in the advice to the Reader, is a good man, as there are many such among them, who would have hated the wickedness and malice of his Society had he been acquainted with it ...... he that heard him was neither willing to shock him, nor to consent to his doctrine; but received it with a double meaning raillery; which might have sufficiently discovered his sense to any person lesle prejudiced than this Casuist.  
Double meaning raillery, answered Eudoxus! witness what Pascal says in his fifth Letter, after the passage out of Bauni, concerning the seeking for occasions. Truly, says I to him, I seem to be in a dream, when I found Religious men speak in this manner. What double meaning raillery is this? of all Pascal's railleries, continued he, there are not three, that can be called by that name. The writer of this advice to the Reader calls this Jesuit a good man, he ought, without doubt if he would have spoken properly to have called him an Idiot. Such a man could never have had in the Society, the quality Pascal gives him of a Casuist. And what this man says is so false, that among the Jesuits there are many like him, that there could hardly be found two like him, among all the most solitary hermits in the world; and I do verily believe, that one must go to Bedlam, to meet with such an other example of madness and folly.  
Pardon me, said Eudoxus, one needs go but to the Jacobins: the Dominican in the second Letter, is, altogether, as silly as the Jesuit is in the others. These two personages are both cast in the same mould: but I think it would have done well to have made some little difference between their characters. I not sooner meet the Jesuit in the fourth Letter, than the Jacobin comes into my mind. But to speak freely, Pascal's having made the one to resemble the other so exactly, is no sign that his wit or fancy was over fertile or luxuriant.  
As I was lately reading with one of my friends, added the Abbot, Horace de Arte Poëtica, we paused a while, to consider one of the most essential precepts, given by this Poet of the art of Dialogue, extremely ill observed in Pascal's Letters, and comprised in these three verses. 
Si quid inexpertum scenae committis, & andes  
Personam formare novam; servetur ad imum  
Qualis ab incepto processerit, & sibi const●t.  And 'tis what is daily said, that when a man has once given a character to a new personage, brought upon the Stage, he must take care to carry it on exactly, every where to the end of the Scene or Play.  
The figure, or character he has given the Jesuits in his Letters, is most certainly new, and altogether peculiar to Pascal. In the beginning of the Scene, he gives them, successfully enuff, the character of wit, policy, and address, of men who understand how to insinuat themselves into the Courts of Princes, to get into the confidence of great men, to win the people's affections, and make themselves Masters of their Consciences, by certain arts that for a long time had been kept secret. But after he had improved as much as he was able, to their disadvantage, the mystery of probability, the better to back and support this notion and idea, and to confirm his readers in it, he proceeds to the direction of intention; which in his way of explaining is very ridiculous; he makes the Jesuits speak of it, in so pitiful a manner, say so many poor things, and advance so many extravagances, and so gross and undisguised impieties, that the first thought of a reader, who reflected never so little, must be to ask where is all this pretended policy and cunning of the Jesuits?  
What? did the Jesuits design to establish themselves in all parts of the earth, to make themselves Masters of the people's consciences, to govern in the Courts of Princes, to get into the confidence of Prelates, and Magistrates, and all this by authorising robberies, violences, murders, duels, simony and the disobedience of inferiors towards their superiors? in one word, by all those things, which give men the most horrid apprehensions, and most capable of disturbing the peace of the public, of giving Princes the greatest disquiets, and of scandalising the most honest men. And which is more by printing and publishing all this, in France, Spain, Germany, Italy, and Rome, as Pascal is pleased to suppose.  
But do you remember, added the Abbot, what he says in his thirteenth and fourteenth Letters? for it is in those, chief, he takes upon him to preach against and run down the Jesuits. There after he had culled some lines out of the texts of several of their authors, which in his seventh Letter he had attacked, and which the Jesuits had defended, and which in these two Letters he had again stitched and put together, with all possible art and malice, he addresses himself to the Jesuits, as if they had been The Devil's agents, devoted to execute this insernal spirit's orders, and declared enemies to the Gospel. They are, not longer, those refined, skilful, politicians, those Master-hypocrites, perfect in the art of disguising their thoughts; they are men, whose own words and assertions, without any artifice, or wresting, make them, openly, accomplices with all the most revengeful and malicious Duelists and Murderers. What think you? do these things hung well together? and is this his character all of a piece?  
This observation, answered Eudoxus, seems very well carried on; and opens a way for judging of some particular passages in the Provincial Letters, after a very different manner from the judgement the world has hitherto passed upon them. But, if you please, we will pursue our design, and begin with the examination of the sixth Letter. That was my own intention, said the Abbot, and therefore I am well pleased with your proposition.  

The following part of the sixth Discourse.  
CLeander and Eudoxus, to make the more haste, had, the day before, agreed to compare Pascal's quotations, one by one, with the Jesuits books, and divided between themselves the several passages. They had also marked in the authors, the matters in question, so that now they had not more left to do, but to open their books, and communicate their respective reflections to each other.  
The first article in this Letter, is part of my province, said Eudoxus. Pascal, accuses there the Jesuits, of interpreting the Pope's Bulls in favour of sinners, and in particular, that, by which Gregory the XIV has declared murderers unworthy of the sanctuary and protection of Churches, and that they ought to be drawn out thence by force, and put into the hands of justice.  
Before we go any farther, said the Abbot, interrupting him, what think you of these Gentlemen? do they not do very handsomely to reproach the Jesuits with the interpretation of a Bull? they who had the impudence and the rashness, to laugh at, and make sport with, the decree, or Constitution, made by one Pope in matters of faith, confirmed by an other Pope, and received by all Christians, they, whose chief Hero fully informed of the censures of two Popes, and of the most eminent Prelates of the Kingdom, against the Mons Testament, had yet the confidence to say and Print, that they could not meddle with, or fall upon this book without being guilty of folly and impertinence? 
Nou. def. to 2. pa. 563.  Let them freely submit to, and sign the decrees of Innocent the X. and Alexander the VII, against Jansenius' propositions, without an interpretation or a comment, and than the Jesuits will defend themselves about the interpretation, whereof they are accused: till than, the testimony of the Jansenists in this point ought not to be received against Jesuits.  
This would be a puzzling instance, said Cleander, to a Jansenist: but you know very well, that I am not one: but after all, the Jansenist may be in the wrong, and yet the Jesuit not in the right. Let us see than, said he to Eudoxus, whether you can bring of Escobar from this business an other way.  
I have taken some pains about the matter, answered Eudoxus, and I have also known by experience, on this occasion, how useful Mr. Abbot's help has proved to us in our examination of the Provincial Letters. I read at first the beginning of the sixth Letter, to which I pray you listen.  
Sir I told you at the end of my last letter, that this good Father, the Jesuit, had promised to make me understand, in what manner the Casuists do reconcile the contradictions that are between their opinions and the Pope's decisions, the Counsels and the Scripture. At my second visit, he did, really, instruct me in the matter; and I'll repeat to you what passed between us. One of the ways we have, said the good Father, to reconcile these contradictions, is, by the interpretations of some terms. For example, Pope Gregory the XIV has declared, that Assassins' or Murderes ought not to enjoy the benefit of Sanctuary in Churches, but to be drawn out thence. However our four and twenty old men say, tr. 6. ex. 4. n. 27. That those who kill men, treacherously, ought not to incur the penalties of this Bull. This seems to you, to be contrary to the Pope's decree; but they reconcile it by interpreting the word Assassin as they do by these words. Are not Murderers unworthy to enjoy the privilege of Churches? Yes by the Bull of Gregory XIV, but we understand by the word ASSASSIN, those who have taken money to kill a man treacherously. Whence it comes to pass, that those, who Murder, without receiving any reward, but only to oblige their friends, are not called ASSASSINS'.  
The first thing I did, said Eudoxus, was to consult the text of Escobar, to see whether it were faithfully reported; and I was surprised, to found the assertion, directly contrary to what was cited. he that treacherously kills a man, whether by sword or poison, is excluded from the privilege of the Church's Sanctuary. Proditoriè aliquem occidens, seu ferro, seu veneno, caretne Ecclesiae immunitate? Caret. Now you see another plain falsification to increase Pascal's list. But, reading on Escobar's text, I found the bad opinion I conceived of the accuser, did not prevent, my taking up, from the following words, a disadvantageous suspicion of the person accused. A man is said to kill treacherously, when he kills one who did no way distrust him; for which reason he who kills his enemy is not called a traitor, althô he had lain in wait for him, and struck, stabbed, or shot him behind. This, at first, seemed to me, to have all the air and contrivance of a distinction and the subtlety of a Casuist. I read on: Have the Assassins' or Murderer's a right to the privilege of the Church's Sanctuary? Not, according to the decree of Gregory XIV. I understand by the word ASSASSIN, a man who has taken money, on set purpose, to lie in wait, surprise and kill an other; who is not upon his guard, nor distrustful of him For which reason, he, who, without receiving any money, kills a man only to pleasure his friend, is not called an ASSASSIN. As to the rest, all those, who are accessary to the murder, who favour, or give the Murderer succour, or carry him of, are deprived of the right of Sanctuary.  
The first part of this decision, continued Eudoxus, appears as lose, as the last seems severe; and I could not tell what to think on't. As to the matter of Bulls, I have heard it said, in general, that they are written in a particular stile and language, which a man must understand well to judge of them aright. This made me suspend my judgement upon this point; but I went immediately to consult a neighbour and a friend of mine, who is a very able Canonist, and asked him his thoughts upon this decision of Escobar. After he had read it quite through, he told me, no body could speak more justly, or more learnedly than this Jesuit had done. In all appearance, said he, you are most scandalised at the definitions he gives of the words Assassin and Treachery, and the restrictions he adds to them: but your surprise will he over, as soon as you have heard the history of this Bull.  
You must know than, continued he, that the immunities and privileges of Churches, have always been, and, still, are, to this day, looked upon in Italy, as a point of the last importance; which the Popes, on all occasions, have extremely recommended to the Ecclesiastical Magistrates, and which they have commanded them zealously to maintain, against the attempts of secular Magistrates; but yet, notwithstanding, abuses having crept in, and this privilege, having been the occasion of many horrid crimes, some Popes, particularly, Sixtus IV and Pius V, thought fit to restrain them, and by their Bulls made on this account permitted, that certain criminals might be drawn out of the Churches, and delivered into the hands of secular justice, without regard to any immunities whatsoever.  
Afterwards the secular Magistrates extended these Bulls farther than the Popes intended; which obliged Gregory XIV to make a new decree, for the more exact regulation of these things, and for the taking away all difficulties, contentions, and disputes; wherein he declares, more particularly, the criminals and the crimes, that were to be excepted from privilege, together with the manner of proceeding on such occasions. Those, who kill men treacherously, and Assassins' and Murderer's are in the number of criminals excepted; Qui proditoriè proximum suum occiderint, aut Assassinij. But in the end, he forbids, that any other crimes, or criminals, except such as are expressly mentioned in the Bull, should be excluded from the sanctuary and privilege of Churches.  
You must likewise know, said he to me, that, in the explication of these kind of Bulls, men take care to speak with all the exactness and rigour of law, and as much, as possible, not to give the terms any other signification than what is received and authorised by the stile and usage of lawyers. Now in the law, proditoriè occidere, and the word Assassinius have no larger a signification than that, which Escobar here gives them; whereupon my Canonist made me read Calvin's Lexicon juris, Bartholus, Ambrose, Farinacius, Covarruvios', and Clement the VIII. He moreover added, that if Escobar had spoken otherwise, he had not followed the doctrine of lawyers, nor the terms, nor intention of the Bull, and, contrary to the prohibition, would have restrained, more than he ought to have done, a privilege, of which the holy See is very jealous. But perceiving I had brought with me Escobar and the Provincial Letters, he guessed the occasion of my doubt, and said to me, that Pascal was in the wrong for attacking Escobar upon this point; and if he had not a little falsified the matter, he had in it betrayed, at lest, his own ignorance. I answered, that I would freely pardon his ignorance, provided it were invincible, but for that I would not swear.  
Your Canonist, said the Abbot, might have also added, that Escobar, in speaking so, had but followed the usage of all Italy, and Spain; where this Bull is observed after the manner wherein he has explained it. You may see than, concluded Eudoxus, that here is another point dispatched to the honour of Pascal, who had waded too far into a matter he did not understand.  
That's true, answered the Abbot, but whatever opinion you take up of the imprudence, or ignorance of Pascal, do not forget his falsification of this passage: which you yourself acknowledged in the beginning, where you saw he made Escobar speak the direct contrary to what he had said. We shall be sure to keep an account of all, replied Eudoxus.  
Do you imagine, said Cleander to Eudoxus, that it has cost me lesle pains, than it has done you, to inform myself fully in the charge Pascal has drawn up against the Jesuit Vasquez, touching Alms? you must know than, that I read over last night at full length, this Divines treatise upon this subject; which took up my time till midnight: but I do not at all repent the pains I have taken. For it is hard to meet, upon that subject, a work more instructive and more judicious, or where more is decided by the authority of Scripture, Fathers and Canons. And as for the fourth chapter, which Pascal has found fault with, I wish that all our beneficed Priests and Abbots, who thunder against, and run down in words, the lose Morals, would read it with attention, and practise it exactly: I should than willingly refer myself to their opinion.  
What you say does very much surprise me, answered Eudoxus: for mind I pray what our Pascal says upon the point. In the same manner, it is said in the Gospel, Give Alms of your superfluities, or of what you have to spare, and yet, notwithstanding, many Casuists have found out ways, to free the richest persons from the obligation of giving alms; this also may seem, to you, contrary to the rules of the Gospel; but it is easily reconciled, by interpreting the word superfluities, or to spare, in such a way, as that no body shall have more than enuff; and this the learned Vasquez has done in his treatise of alms ch. 4. What worldly men hoard up to raise and better their own and their relations state and condition, is not called superfluous: for which reason you will hardly found, that any of these people who live in the world, have more than enuff, not not even Kings themselves.  
What, said Eudoxus, has Pascal falsified this passage also of Vasquez? yes, answered Cleander, this passage also is falsified; and it is only by virtue of this falsification, that Pascal concludes from Vasquez's doctrine, That the Casuists have found out means to free the richest people from the obligation of giving alms. This conclusion does not at all follow from this Divine's doctrine; but it is directly contrary to it; the reading the whole passage, of which Pascal has quoted but one part, will, without more ado, convince you of this truth.  
The falsification consists in this, that Pascal has made Vasquez say, in general, That one could hardly ever found any thing superfluous among secular or worldly people. Whereas Vasquez had only said, That it could hardly be found, that worldly men had any thing superfluous, with reference to their state and condition. Take notice of these last words to their state, which Pascal has retrenched and left out, you'll quickly see of what importance they are. Vasquez, in the place quoted, comparing the obligation of beneficed persons, with that of pure lays in giving of alms, speaks after this manner.  
First I hold, that Ecclesiastics, as well as Seculars, are obliged to succour and relieve their neighbours, in their extreme necessities; as for other great necessities graves necessitates, the Ecclesiastics are obliged to ease and comfort them, at lest, out of what is superfluous to their condition, and sometimes out of what is necessary to it, as I have already said even of Secular man's obligation; Graves etiam necessitates statûs proximorum & alias graves tenentur Ecclesiastici sublevare, ut minimùm de superfluo statûs & aliquando de necessario, ut supra de saecularibus diximus. But, continued Vasquez, there is a very great and notable difference, between Seculars and Ecclesiasties. For first, laics are not obliged to go and seek out the poor, but only to give alms to those they meet; whereas Ecclesiastics, and chief Bishops, as Corduba has very well observed, are obliged to go and seek them; because they are the Fathers of the poor, and the care of them does particularly belong to them. Secondly, because lay-men have a right, to treasure up part of their patrimony, to altar or better their own, or their relations circumstances and condition. And what is thus reserved is not called superfluous in this respect. Et tunc illud non dicitur superfluum. Whence it comes to pass, that upon this account, it can hardly be said, that lay-men, even Kings, have any thing superfluous to their condition. Vnde vix in saecularibus invenies etiam in Regibus, superfluum statui. But neither Bishops, nor other Ecclesiastics, can make use of their benefices, to enlarge their fortune, or raise themselves, or their relations to any higher degree. Because, that out of the revenues of the Church they have only a right to an honest livelihood for themselves; and therefore hardly any, that have good live, but either have, or may have, what is superfluous to their state and condition, if they live modestly and manage well.  
Pray read not more, said Eudoxus, interrupting him; the falsification you have taken notice of, is, not only, an undoubted matter of fact, but it is yet also true, that this passage alone, is sufficient to show, the vanity and the falsehood of all Pascal's reasonings. For not only Ecclesiastics, and beneficed persons, are here treated, as severely, as they could wish, and much more roughly than many desire, but we likewise see, he obliges the Seculars also, to relieve their neighbours, as well in their extreme, as in their other, great and considerable, necessities, At the expense of the superfluous part of their fortune, and even of that which is necessary to their state and condition of life.  minimum de superfluo statûs & aliquando de necessario ut supra de saecularibus diximus. How than is it possible, to draw such a conclusion as Pascal makes from such a doctrine; That as to a man's salvation it would be as safe, according to Vasquez, not to give alms, provided he have but ambition enuff to hinder him from having any thing superfluous, as it is safe, according to the Gospel, to have no ambition, that you may have wherewithal to give alms and relieve the poor? This conclusion appears now to me as false, as the expression always seemed obscure, ill turned and very much wrested.  
I do not intent, answered Cleander, laughing, thus to loose the pains I have taken in studying the doctrine of Vasquez. Have the patience, I pray you, to hear the substance of it. 
Cap. 1. dub. 3. n. 19  I'll give it you in few words, and it will not be unuseful for the defence of this Doctor. After he had demonstrated out of the Scripture, and the Fathers, the indispensable obligation the rich lay under, of giving alms, he demands upon what this obligation is founded, and sets down the several opinions of Divines, upon the matter; and, among the rest, that of Cardinal Cajetan, who says there are two grounds, or reasons of this obligation. The first, the extreme necessity of our neighbour, and the second, the superfluous wealth of the rich; insomuch that by the right of nature, the goods of fortune, being equal and common to all, and their appropriation to particulars being made but by the law of nations, he that has any superfluity, or remainder, above his use and condition, is not the real Master of that remainder, but only a Steward, to distribute it among those who are in need.  
Vasquez does not accounted these two reasons of Cajetan to be solid enuff, for the establishment of the precept of giving alms; and, particularly, refutes that which he takes, from the obligation of giving what is superfluous, by virtue of the law of nations. 
Num. 24.  For said he, to speak precisely, if to have any remainder of wealth, over and above a man's use, founded a reason and obligation, a man would be obliged to part with it, althô there should be no poor to receive it, which would be absurd. Whence he concludes, that the obligation of giving alms, is not founded, properly, upon man's superfluities, but upon charity; which requires me not to refuse my superfluities to my neighbour, when under a necessity. And I am of opinion, that this is both very well and truly said.  
Besides, 
Num. 27.  Vasquez makes several kind of superfluities; the word superfluity, having in it many relations, or meanings; that which is superfluous to one thing, may be necessary to another, and what, in the language of Divines, is superfluous to nature, is not always superfluous, in reference to decency, and the the conservation of that state of life, wherein God's Providence has placed us.  
Afterwards, upon occasion of the several degrees of obligation all men are under of giving alms out of their superfluities, Vasquez explains two ways, wherein wealth may be said to be superfluous to the possessor's state and condition. He says it may be said to be superfluous, either with reference to the state he is actually in, or with reference to a higher state, supposing he may have a right to raise himself to that state, and may do it without sin. Quem ego licitè possum acquirere: So that the same thing may be said to be, and not to be superfluous in different respects. It will be superfluous to my present state, if it be not absolutely necessary to the conservation of my being. But it will not be superfluous, with reference to the state I may lawfully acquire, if I cannot otherwise raise myself to it. Whereupon Vasquez puts a case of conscience, to wit, whether a man, seeing his neighbour ready to fall from the condition he is in, be obliged, under pain of mortal sin, to maintain him in it, by giving him the money, wherewith he designed to raise himself to a station he might lawfully aspire to. And he answers that he is not obliged.  
That is to say, answered Eudoxus, that if I am a Counsellor of Parliament, and see one of my Brethrens forced to quit his place, because he is unable to support the expense, I am not obliged to give him the money, with which I intended to purchase a Master of Requests office, to which I might lawfully aspire.  
This instance, said Cleander, explains the thing perfectly well. And thence Vasquez concludes, that, even, according to the principles of Cajetan, who agrees with him in the notion and distinction of superfluity, a man will be under none, or small obligation, to relieve his neighbour, supposing this obligation be taken precisely to depend upon what he has of superfluity. This is only a consequence ad hominem, to speak in the language of the Schools, to demonstrate to Cajetan, that the reason, upon which he found'st the obligation of giving alms, is not a true reason. His argument is indeed both strong and good, said Eudoxus.  
Listen now, answered Cleander, to the conclusions he draws from the principle he lays down, that the obligation of giving alms is precisely founded upon charity, whereby you will see, whether this Divine be over lose in the matter. This, in his opinion, is the order charity prescribes for succouring our neighbour. You are not obliged to relieve your Brother, 
Cap. 1. num. 25.26.  at an equal loss to yourself with what he would have undergone for want of your succour. But you are obliged to assist him, at the expense of any lesle part of your own fortune, than that which he is like to loose. So that, says he, I am not bound to save my neighbour's life, at the loss of my own; but I am bound to save it, at the expense of all my fortune; and in all other cases the rule is proportionably the same. Otherwise, How can the love of God devil in me, if in such a necessity, I esteem my honour and my wealth more, than the life of my neighbour?  
This being supposed, continues he, if my neighbour be in danger of death (which is commonly called extreme necessity) or if he be just falling into a great fit of sickness, I am obliged to relieve him, with all that is superfluous to the entertainment and subsistence of myself, and those who depend upon me ...... If I do not expose all my fortune, to prevent my neighbours falling into this evil, I do not keep and follow the rules and order of charity.  
Secondly, to observe this very order, if my neighbour runs the risk of losing his reputation, this being a thing more precious than gold, or any office, or employment to be bought with gold, I am obliged to secure him from this evil, though I should thereby fall from my present state and condition, and which is yet more, althô my family should suffer by it, yet ought I, in this case also, to succour him with all my possessions, beyond what is just necessary to support nature.  
Thirdly, if this man, by some loss, be upon the point of having his fortune ruin'd, I am obliged to help him with all that is superfluous to my own state, but not with what is necessary to maintain it. Because I am not obliged to succour him at an equal damage to what I would hinder.  
It is not enuff, replied Eudoxus to say, that this Moral is not lose or large; I am very certain abundance of people would found it extremely strict and severe, and, in some particulars, perhaps, a little too extravagant.  
Let us return to the falsification, continued Cleander, and oblige Pascal to argue in form by the principle he borrows, or pretends to borrow from Vasquez. This than is Pascals argument.  
A man is not obliged to give alms but out of his superfluities. But the rich will hardly be found according to Vasquez, to have any superfluities, therefore the rich, according to Vasquez, are never, almost, obliged to give alms.  
I'll allow the first proposition to be true, 
Letter 12  but the second is not Vasquez's. He did not say the rich had seldom any superfluities, and therefore the consequence Pascal draws from thence, does no way concern this Jesuit. This is clear, said Eudoxus. Let us now therefore, answered Cleander, make a formal argument of Vasquez's proposition, as it really stands without any falsification, and see whether Pascal will found his account in it.  
One may say, according to Vasquez, that the rich have rarely any thing superfluous to their state and condition, but the rich are not obliged to give alms, but out of what is superfluous, therefore, according to Vasquez, the rich are obliged rarely to give alms.  
The Jesuits will here say, that the first proposition in the sense Vasquez gives it, and according to the distinction he has made, of the state a man is in, and the state he may lawfully aspire to, is very understandable, reasonable, and true. The second proposition, is false, both according to him and all Divines. For he, as they do, holds that the rich are obliged, on many occasions, to give alms, even out of what is necessary to their state. This will appear by looking on his doctrine, concerning the order, prescribed by charity, and it is what we have just now read.  
It is than true, said Cleander, making an end, that Pascal has falsified this passage; and that the inferences he makes contrary to the precept of alms, cannot, without falsifying it, be drawn from Vasquez's principle. Whence it seems clear to me, that Vasquez is very innocent; and that in this point, Pascal has not acted like an honest man, or a good Christian.  
The Abbot, with a great deal of pleasure, saw Cleander and Eudoxus do justice to this excellent Divine, and attentiuly heard them without any interruption. But, yet, he could not forbear making them observe an important thing, for the full justification of Vasquez. Take notice, said he to them, that he there discourses only of a sum of money, wherewith lay-men have a right to better their estates and condition, and which is not superfluous to them on that account, as it would be to beneficed persons; and that all this has no relation to ordinary alms, which is a quite different case. I will make this matter plain to you.  
Tho' a King should give a hundred Lovis d'or's a week to the poor; and a man of thirty thousand livers rend spend ten Pistols a month in alms, they would not, regularly speaking, strip themselves of any thing necessary to preserve, or raise their state and condition. Such a sum could not hinder the Prince from fortifying his frontier towns, nor from increasing his fleet, nor the man of thirty thousand livers rend from purchasing a new office, for some one of his family; and by consequence those small sums are to be allowed superfluous to their state and grandeur; so that this was not the matter in debate. Now though Vasquez should, with Cajetan, found the obligation of alms, upon superfluity, and not upon charity, and the needs of our neighbour; althô he should not oblige the rich, as, in some circumstances, he does, to succour his neighbour, even out of what is necessary for maintaining his estate and condition; yet would the obligation of ordinary alms always remain. For from the moment there is a question of one, two, three, or four Louis', for the preventing, for example, an Artisan from being broken, and his family undone, for want of being able to purchase the necessary tools, or instruments for carrying on his trade, the rich man, of whom I speak, and to whom this man makes his address, and who sees that his refusal will ruin the poor unhappy wretch, and his family, is obliged in conscience, according to Vasquez, to give him so much alms, as will not deprive himself of what is necessary for the conservation, or even for the lawful advancement of his state and condition.  
And yet, notwithstanding this, what an idea has Pascal given of Vasquez? it is, said he, in express words, that His Doctrine frees the most rich from giving any alms. Can there be any thing more disingenuous or unjust?  
In truth, answered Cleander, Pascal does not reason right, nor understand these matters. But that, which has most moved my indignation, is the obstinacy and cruelty wherewith he still continues, and pursues his invectives against this Divine. After his sixth Letter came forth, the Jesuits made an apology for Vasquez; which consisted in a short, plain, exposition, of his doctrine, in substance the same almost you have now heard me make. Pascal replies, and handles again the same thing in his twelfth and thirteenth Letters.  
Rather say, said Eudoxus, interrupting him, that he confounds it anew on set purpose. If I were to make a rejoinder to his reply, and to a thousand such others, I would do no more than so often set down the very same explanation you have now given us of Vasquez's doctrine. This beat's down all before it, and has made all Pascal has since said, as well as all he had said before, fall to the ground. If a man be never so little skilled in Divinity, he will quickly perceive, that Pascal understands it not; or rather that he will not understand what he pretends to refute. But before we go farther, have so much goodness, I pray you, as to satisfy me about two new proofs, he has added in his twelfth and thirteenth Letters, to show that the practice of the precept of alms, according to the principles of Vasquez, will be reduced to nothing. First, says he, because he does not oblige men to give alms in ordinary necessities: Secondly, because he adds after some decisions, Hoc intelligo & caetera omnia, quando scio nullum opem laturum. Can it than, says Pascal, often hap, that in Paris, where there are so many charitable persons, it may be known, that none will be found to succour the poor man who begs it?  
The first reproach, answered Cleander, is founded upon a scurvy equivocation; and the second, is mere sophistry and perfect wrangling. To found out the equivocation, you are to know, that Vasquez, with all other Divines, makes a distinction of three degrees of necessity, wherein our neighbour may be, in reference to alms; 
Cap. 1. num. 9  one is called extreme, the other great or pressing, and the third common necessity. Necessitas extrema, gravis seu urgens, & communis. Extreme necessity, is, not only, when a man is at the point of dying if he gets no alms, but, also, when there is ground to believe, that, probably, he will be reduced to this condition. The necessity called, great or pressing, is, when there is reason to apprehended your neighbour is in danger, not of death, but of some considerable damage, or inconvenience. Common necessity is, that, which commonly an infinity of poor people suffer, whose poverty puts them into no danger of death, or sickness; such, for example are those, who are ordinarily called the poor; who have no way to live but by begging, whereby, however, they make a shift to support themselves.  
Vasquez teaches, that the precept does not only oblige, under pain of mortal sin in extreme necessities, as some famous Divines seemed to have taught, but that it obliges also, in great or pressing necessities. As to common necessities, he follows the opinion of the greatest part of Divines, who hold, that, in this respect, the precept does not oblige under pain of mortal sin. And that a rich man, going along the street, does not sin mortally in not giving alms to all the beggars who ask him.  
Instead of the term common necessities, Pascal was pleased to substitute that of ordinary necessities; that he might be able to say, Vasquez had made voided the precept of alms, by asserting, that it does not oblige in ordinary necessities. But who is it, that cannot see the malice of such a translation? for althô the necessity, which is called common, in the notion of Divines, be ordinary, 'tis not the only necessity that is so. Great and pressing necessities, in which, according to Vasquez, the precept does oblige, are neither extraordinary, nor very rare. Last year, by the scarcity of corn, they were become very ordinary; they are this year also more ordinary, and the best years that can hap, they are never very rare.  
There is always an infinite number of modest, bashful, poor, who have much more need of assistance than common beggars; and for this reason it is, that the Divines say, a rich man is not obliged, strictly speaking, under pain of mortal sin, to give alms to all the beggars he meets. Nevertheless many, and Vasquez among others, oblige, under pain of mortal sin, to succour those other poor in their pressing necessities; and thus you see it is to abuse unjustly and maliciously the term necessitates communes, to draw that consequence from it, which Pascal has done against Vasquez.  
When a man is once engaged, said Eudoxus, interrupting him, he catches at any thing, and strives, as well as he can, to bring himself of. What would the world have said, if Pascal had made no reply to the Jesuits, who bragged and published, that they had convinced him of a notorious imposture?  
The other article, continued Cleander, is a pitiful, wrangling, business. Vasquez, by these words, Hoc intelligo, quando scio nullum opem laturum, meant no more but this, that if I know another will relieve this poor man, I am not than, under pain of mortal sin, obliged to succour him. Pascal thereupon argues strongly; can it often hap, said he, that in Paris, where there are so many charitable persons, one should know, that no body would be found to assist the poor we meet? as if Vasquez had intended, that before a rich man was obliged to give alms, all the Ladies, who make it their business to beg for the poor, and all the other charitable persons of Madrid and Toledo, should come and make before him a declaration in form of law, that no body would receive the unfortunat wretch, who now begged his commiseration.  
But could Pascal have once thought to have made so frivolous an objection as that, if he had read Vasquez's treatise with any attention? For, in the second chapter, he teaches in express terms, That if many rich persons know a poor man's necessities, and do not succour him, they are all guilty of sin; because every particular person is obliged to relieve him; and that it is ridiculous to think the contrary. It is not therefore Vasquez's opinion, that a rich man may take his measures from others, unless he know that those others will effectually succour the poor man.  
This is not worth the refutation, answered the Abbot; you only found by it, that the Jesuits are not to be pardoned in any thing. Their Adversaries lay hold of every thing; and let no advantage against them slip; there is not a word, nor an expression, never so little doubtful, upon which they do not think they have a right to cavil and wrangle with them. Such a thing as this cannot but be a great prejudice to their cause, but to their adversaries would be but a very slight one.  
And to confirm what we say, continued the Abbot, a moment after Pascal had given the Jesuit, who speaks in his Provincial Letters, this character of extravagant impertinence, do but observe, how he makes him conclude this article in his sixth Letter. I see plainly, Father, that this follows from Vasquez's doctrine. But what can be answered if it should be objected, that to secure Salvation, it would be as safe, according to Vasquez, to have ambition enuff to hinder superfluities, as it is safe, according to the Gospel, to have no ambition, that men might give alms out of their superfluities? it must be answered, said he to me, that both these ways are safe, according to the Gospel. The one, according to the Gospel, in the most literal and most easy sense; the other, according to the same Gospel interpreted by Vasquez; by which you may perceive the great usefulness of interpretations.  
There is in this answer, said the Abbot, a most ridiculous extravagance; and which exceeds all the bounds of probability. But you know the division that is commonly made on such like occasions. One part of the folly is attributed to the character of the person represented; and the excess, or other part belongs, by consent of all the world, to the author. That which follows, answered Eudoxus, relates to the Pope's Bulls, I desired my Canonist, before I went from him, to instruct me in the matter, for I found his learning might save me a great deal of trouble. The matter I had a mind to hear debated was, to know upon what occasions a Religious man might put of the habit of his Order, without hazard of excommunication. Of this affair Pascals Jesuit speaks after this manner.  
The Popes have excommunicated Religious who put of their habits, and yet notwithstanding our four and twenty old men discourse thus upon that subject, tr. 6. ex. 7. nu. 103. Upon what occasions may a Religious man put of his habit, without incurring the penalties of excommunication? he gives an account of many; and among others of this. If he puts it of upon a shameful account, as to go a robbing, or to go incognito into places of debauch, with an intention to put it on again presently after. So that it is visible the Bulls did not mean such cases as these. I could hardly believe this was possible; and therefore prayed the Father to show it me in the original. And I saw that the chapter where these words are, is entitled, The practice according to the Jesuits School, wherein I read these words: Si habitum dimittat ut furetur occultè, vel fornicetur.  
And what advantage, said Cleander, interrupting him, could the Jesuits have by treating such kind of rogues so civilly? I do not see their end in this kind of policy: and though their Divines should be as extravagant as Pascal would have us believe, this exception is, of itself, too odd to let us think they could have made it, if it had not been grounded upon some maxim of the law, or upon some clause of the Bull.  
You judge very prudently, said Eudoxus, and my Canonist told me upon this occasion, that Pascal, having so fully studied his Escobar, must be supposed to have found little or nothing in him worthy of reprehension; since he stood so much upon such frivolous things. He therefore explained the business to me in this manner; there are, says he, many decrees against Religious, who put of their habits, and go out of their Cloisters, without their superiors leave. The chapter here treated of, 
In sexto titulo. Ne Clerier vel Monachi  is,  periculosa, which forbids the Religious, upon pain of excommunication, rashly to quit their habits, to go to the public Schools, or to any other places. The Canonist put the question, whether, by virtue of this chapter, every Religious man, from the moment he puts of his habit, incurs the penalty of excommunication. And they do all answer, that this decree, together with all others, ought to be understood, according to the intention of the Legislator; that is to say of the Pope, who made it: whose intention appears by these words,  periculosa Religiosts evagandi materia subtrahatur: To the end, an occasion may be taken from the Religious, of running out of their Cloisters, to the danger of their Salvation. So that a Religious man, who disguises himself, and in that dress goes out of his Monastery, to walk and divert himself, is excommunicated; therefore by a much stronger reason, a Religious man, who lays aside his habit, to rob, or go incognito to bawdy houses, would, without doubt, incur the penalty of excommunication.  
This being supposed, the Canonist sets down several occasions, wherein a Religious man may put of his habit, without hazard of excommunication; some, wherein he may do it without sin, and others, without mortal sin. Pursuant to this, Escobar puts this question, Quandonam Religiosus potest sine excommunicatione habitum exuere? and he answers, that in the following cases he does not incur excommunication.  
1. If he lays aside his habit but for his ease, either to leap, or run, in some place, where no body can see him, Si in loco secreto exuat ut commodius ei sit, vel ut melius cu●●t vel saltet. 2. If being oppressed by his immediate superior, he disguise himself, that he may go with more security to found out his mediate superior. Vel si injustè gravatus à Praelato immediato fugiat ad Superiorem sine habitu, ne agnitus comprehendatur. 3. Or, if he should quit his habit upon some criminal design, for example, privately to rob, or, to do something worse, with an intention quickly to put it on again. Vel si ad turpem causam, v. g. ut furetur occultè vel fornicetur, illum dimittat mox reassumpturus. And these are his last words, which Pascal was pleased to translate, or rather to paraphrase thus, if he lays it aside for a shameful cause, as to go a robbing, or incognito to a bawdy house, whereas it is very plain, that this was not at all Escobar's sense or meaning.  
For his design by these exceptions, and these examples, is to instruct a Confessor, in the exact and precise sense of the decree; which only prohibits Religious men from changing their habits to go out of the Monastery and to live or act abroad with greater liberty, and by which the Pope had no thoughts of excommunicating one, who should only lay aside his habit in the Convent, althô he should do it even with an ill and dishonest intention.  
I replied to my Canonist, that what he said, appeared probable enuff, but that Pascals' paraphrase also did not seem very unreasonable, nor ill grounded. For though a Religious man might put of his habit, to rob within the Monastery, because, for example, he was to pass through some hole, where his habit might be troublesome, it is very rare that he could commit the other sin within the Convent; and therefore Pascal seemed to have a right to interpret, as he has done, Escobar's text and meaning.  
Escobar, said he to me, writ in a time, when that was not so rare as you imagine, even here in France, in several Monasteries in the country, which have been since reformed; but, said he farther, Escobar's book, cited by Pascal, is but an abridgement by way of question and answer. I'll show you this Divine's sense cleared and explained at large upon this point of the Canon law. It is in the third volume of his Moral Divinity. 
Tom. 7. p. 144.  There, after he had set down the text of the chapter ut periculosa, Escobar says positively, that from the moment a Religious man quits his habit, to conceal what he is, he incurs the censure of excommunication, and that, though he should not take another, althô he should keep a part, quitting, for example, the upper garment, without putting of the under, yet, notwithstanding, if this be sufficient to hinder him from being known for Religious, he is to be judged, according to the intention of the law, to have quitted his habit. See now, said he, whether this agrees with Pascal's comment; who supposes the Religious man, a robber on the highway, or in the streets of Paris, and running incognito to places of looseness and debauchery.  
I cannot, said Cleander, but still admire Pascal's ingenuous zeal for the reformation of the Jesuits doctrine: for, I pray, take notice, that he has chosen some cases and passages very difficult and obscure on one side, and which, on the other, being dismembered, and cut of from the text, and proposed without certain circumstances, which very few are able to supply, have something extremely shocking, by which the common people are wholly drawn aside from, and made ready, or prepared to rise up, as it were, in rebellion against the Society.  
You will see in what follows, said Eudoxus, a Masterpiece of this artifice and cunning. It is without doubt a fine stroke, and must needs have given the Jesuits a great deal of trouble, under pretence of not transgressing the bounds of good manners, he only points at a passage, in Escobar, relating to a Bull of Pius V against Priests, given to a crime not to be named, but upon great necessity. I saw indeed, said Pascal, this passage of Escobar the evening before, but I durst not tell it you, for it is a friteful thing.  
The thing is indeed friteful, said my Canonist, if Pascal intends the matter; for the crime there spoken of is one of the most infamous, that can be committed; the particulars also to which Escobar descends, can hardly be read without some trouble. But could it be imputed as a fault in a Doctor of Physic, to hold himself obliged to expound to his Scholars, certain diseases, about which they might some time or other be consulted? Prudence obliges men to writ cases of conscience in a language, not commonly understood by all the world; and in books which are usually read by none but Priests, employed in hearing Confessions; who daily meet with worse things than those mentioned by this author. I fancy if one be guilty in this point, is it not Pascal, who sets people a laughing to see what is not at all proper for them?  
But if by saying, that it is a friteful thing, he means Escobar's decision, he shows himself in this also to be either very ignorant, or very malicious. For all that Escobar says upon this subject, may be reduced to this; he gives an account of the opinion of another Spanish Divine; which is, that this Bull, probably speaking, is absolete, and therefore does not oblige in conscience to the penalties it imposes. This is a mere matter of fact, which Escobar does not warrant, and, besides, it is not more surprising, that this Bull should not be received, or put in practice in Spain, than that it should not be received, or put in practice in France, where, in reality, it never was.  
In the second place, supposing it had been received, Escobar explains in what circumstances it does, or does not oblige; and that by an undoubted principle of law, according to which, the Pope's very well know their decrees are always to be understood; to wit, that when they speak of any sin, it is of a sin perfect, or complete in its kind, except the contrary be plainly expressed.  
In the third place, Escobar adds, that before the Judges declaratory sentence, the criminals, in the court of conscience, do not incur the penalties of this Bull. And these penalties are, to be deprived of their charges, or benefices, if they have any, and to be degraded, and delivered up to the secular arm, to be punished, after the manner of lay-men, that is to say to be burnt alive. What Escobar there says, is undeniable, according to the principle he lays down, that no penal law obliges the guilty to accuse themselves; and certainly it would be a great, and very particular extravagance to say, that a wretch, actually guilty of this sin, was obliged, in conscience, to go and discover himself, to the end he might be degraded and burnt alive.  
This is ridiculous, answered Cleander, but, I pray you, continued he, addressing himself to the Abbot, satisfy me in one thing relating to Escobar. In this abridgement of Morals, often quoted by Pascal, Escobar gives some chapters the title of Praxis circa ...... ex Societatis Jesu Doctoribus, and after the decisions, he puts into the margin the names of several Jesuit-authors. Are all these decisions, really, taken out of the authors by him cited? This is a matter of consequence, for a man cannot but conclude from Pascal, that the whole Society speaks by the mouth of Escobar.  
It would be great injustice to all the Jesuits, replied the Abbot, if men should make them answerable, for all that Escobar says in those chapters. 1. Because, that in many Moral points, it is the same thing with the Jesuits, as with other Divines, Canonists, and Lawyers; one is of one opinion, another of another, and therefore it would be nonsense, to take Escobar's doctrine, for the doctrine of the Society; because he might, for example, have followed Vasquez, so long as Suarez and Laiman are of a contrary opinion.  
2. Escobar commonly thinks it sufficient, to make one of these authors support his opinion, if he finds in him, the principle, from whence he imagines he has rightly inferred his own conclusion: wherein he is not more infallible, than other Divines, who are often mistaken in their arguments; and indeed Escobar, himself, does sometimes mistake in that matter. 3. Escobar is a great Collector, not very exact, and for want of care, often quotes falsely; witness the case of fasting, which we have already mentioned; wherein he citys Filiucius, and yet Filiucius says not one word, of what he makes him speak in his margin.  
As far as I see, said Eudoxus, interrupting him, if the Jesuits had the same notion, you have, of Escobar, they would not treat him with much ceremony, but freely give him up to Pascals censure and discretion. Nor do I know, whether even Bauni would found any great kindness from you, at lest, if I may judge by what I have formerly heard you speak of him, and that without any reference to the Provincial Letters.  
I do not say so, answered the Abbot, they are both men of merit, and commonly argue, and decide very well; I would only say, that in some places, they either mistake, or expressed themselves scurvily; and that there was reason to reprehend them, provided they would treat them in their reprehensions, after the same manner, they would treat Divines of any other Body or Order; and that the Jesuits, far from adopting the doctrine of these authors, did reject it, conformably to the opinions of their best Divines; among whom these are far from being reckoned of the first form.  
But if it be unjust, to judge by these passages, of the remaining part of these two Divines doctrine, 'tis yet much more unjust, to do it for the whole Society. As there is no author in whom faults may not be found, so are there none, who may not be defamed by publishing nothing but their faults; exaggerating and exposing them on all occasions, without ever mentioning what is good in their books. And as there is no body, whose members are all sound and without fault; so can there be none, which, under the like pretence, may not be decried and run down. But, said the Abbot, we are insensibly gone astray from our subject.  
That which follows for the most part in this sixth Letter, continued Eudoxus, has no relation to the Jesuits, but to Diana and Caramuel, who are not of their number. Let us pass by all that, and come to Valentia, upon his case of simony. You, said he to Cleander, are to make a report of this matter.  
Let us first do Pascal justice, said the Abbot interrupting them, and let us own, that so very nice and tender a point, could not be touched more finely than it has been by him; and upon which it was, for him, of the last consequence, to turn his reader's fancy. It is about half a page before the case of Valentia, in your edition in quarto. I pray listen to it attentively.  
Alas! said the Father to me; our principal end was no other, but to have established the Gospel maxims in their utmost severity; and it is sufficiently seen by our conduct, and the regulation of our manners, that if we suffer any relaxation, or looseness in others 'tis more by condescendance, than design, to which we are forced; the men of this age being so much corrupted, that finding ourselves unable to make them come to us, we are necessitated to go to them.  
Pascal very well foresaw, that the behaviour of the Jesuits, their ordinary way of living, and the regulation of their manners, which he was willing to acknowledge, would be a strong prejudice, and a general objection against the belief of those horrid things, wherewith he intended to reproach them. He was sensible, that they always had been, and still were, in so good a reputation in the world, that, till the appearance of the Provincial Letters, all which had been said against them, and so often published by their enemies in France, Germany, Spain, and Rome, had made no great impression upon the men of sense, even upon those, who were the least  to the Society.  
And, really, when the Provincial Letters come first out, an infinity of honest people said, that the regularity of these Father's lives, was, alone, a sufficient apology for them. That there was not the lest liklyhood, or probability, that a Society, where vice is lesle suffered than in any other, and where, the manners and behaviour of the particular members are commonly very regular, and exact, should think of introducing, or countenancing corruption in the world; that it is natural enuff, to be easy and indulgent to one's self, however severe a man is to others; that, on the contrary, 'tis not man's temper to be rigid and severe to himself, and soft and gentle to his neighbour. And in the last place, that it was hard to conceive, that so many persons, who, on one hand, did all a Christian, or a Religious man can do to be saved, should, on the other, in favour of sinners, do that, which must necessarily damn both themselves and those sinners.  
Pascal foresaw this difficulty, and was ware of it, even when he writ his fourth Letter; wherein he first began to attack the Jesuits, and did than, all he could to lessen the force of this prejudice and argument against the belief of all he should say upon that subject. He does here again the same thing, as you see, and that in a very cunning, skilful, manner; and it was, without doubt, such places as these, which made your Acadamist Perault say, that all the art of Dialogue was to be found in the Provincial Letters.  
Eudoxus and Cleander agreed to the truth of this remark; and that there was in this transition of Pascal, as much wit as malice, and so without more ado fell upon the passage in Valentia.  
I know not, said Cleander, the reason, why in the several editions I have seen of the Provincial Letters, the citations upon this article are so faulty, and the pages in Valentia quoted with so little exactness. I thought it was done, by mistake, which obliged me to read, at length, this Divines treatise of simony; but before I tell you my opinion on't, let us read Pascal.  
We have therefore maxims for all sorts of persons; for the beneficed, for Priests, for Religious, and for Gentlemen ...... Let us begin, said the Father, with the beneficed persons. You know the trade, that is, at this day, driven about benefices; wherein if we should govern ourselves, by what Saint Thomas, and old authors have written upon this subject, abundance of Churchmen would be found guilty of simony: for which reason it was very necessary, that our Fathers should, by their prudence, moderate things, as these words of Valentia, who is one of Escobars four animals, will give you to understand. It is the conclusion of a long discourse, wherein he sets down many expedients, of which, in my opinion, that in the 1042 page of the third tome is the best. If a temporal good be given for a spiritual, that is to say, money for a benefice, and the money be given as the price of the benefice, 'tis plain downright simony: but if it be given only as a motive, to induce a man to resign, NON TANQUAM PRETIUM BENEFICII SED TANQUAM MOTIVUM AD RESIGNANDUM, it is not simony; althô the person, who resigns, considers and expects the money, as his principal end Tanner, who is also of our Society, says the same thing in his third tome page 1519, &c  
I expected, said Cleander, to have found, at large, this conclusion in Valentia, and did believe that the seven or eight lines of this Letter, written in Italic characters, were but the translation of that conclusion. But I was indeed busied to good purpose, to seek for't in the chapter or third point quoted by Pascal. This paraphrase, is so different from the text, that, in good earnest, I could not guests to what part of the treatise it had relation. For Pascal, having in his French mixed these latin words, Non tanquam pretium beneficij, sed tanquam motivum ad resignandum, I did believe he designed it for a mark, to found out, the more easily, the place he meant to speak of. But I sought for it in vain, not being able any where to found it. Pascal also says, that what we have now read, is the conclusion of a long discourse, where Valentia gives many expedients to show, how men may trade in benefices without sin; but neither could I by this mark found out the place he intended to speak of.  
At last, by guessing, I thought I had found, what he would be at: it is in the beginning of the third chapter, where Valentia puts this question; Whether simony be committed, as often as a spiritual good is given for a temporal, or a temporal for a spiritual? and he answers, that to do so, is not always simony. It must be said, continued he, and it is the common opinion of Divines, that there are, generally speaking, two ways, by which it may hap, that men may give a spiritual good for a temporal without simony. The first is, when the temporal good, is, only, a motive of giving, or of doing some spiritual good. The second is, when the temporal, is, but a gratful acknowledgement, or compensation of the spiritual good, or the spiritual of the temporal. He proves his assertion, by the notion of simony; which he takes, as all Divines do, for a kind of contract, after which he adds these words, The conclusion therefore of my argument is established, or confirmed.  
I had, I say, reason to believe, pursued Cleander, in reading his sixth Letter, that this was the place Pascal principally pointed at. 1. Because, that Valentia there, really, answered the question propounded; that it is not always simony to give a temporal good for a spiritual, nor a spiritual for a temporal. 2. Because, he speaks of the distinction, of two ways of giving a temporal for a spiritual good, as a payment, or as a motive. 2. Because he adds these words, See my conclusion established or confirmed, to which Pascal seems to allude; and lastly because I can found no place, to which the quotation can better agreed.  
But since the answers, and the replications, and the defence of those replications, and the false citations, have infinitely puzzled and confounded this whole affair, I think the best and shortest course, is, to do as we have done in the case of Vasquez, and other matters; that is to say, to examine in itself the doctrine of Valentia; and to judge by the exposition thus to be made, whether this aught to be objected as a crime to the Jesuits. Now what I have to say upon this point is this.  
First, seeing, that in this dispute, Saint Thomas was quoted on both sides, I thought it fit to read him upon this subject; of which he treats in 100 q. 2.2. after I had read and compared it with Valentia, I perceived, that this Divines treatise was nothing else, almost, but a comment upon Saint Thomas' question; and that this holy man's doctrine, was the foundation of what was held by this Divine.  
In the second place, I observed, that in the places where the matter is handled, Valentia, without determing any way the question about benefices, treats the thing in general, to wit, whether a spiritual good may be sometime given for a temporal, without simony, or a temporal for a spiritual; and that all he there does, and the only thing, almost, is, to explain, with Saint Thomas, how notwithstanding the precepts which forbids simony, a temporal good may be often given, according to some customs, allowed by all the world for a spiritual good: how it is not simony in the Church Ministers to receive money, on account of their spiritual administrations. How it is not simony to bequeath a fund to a Church for an annual Mass. How a Church is not guilty of simony, by engaging to say an Obits or Mass, for those who give such, or such, an alms, or offering. And also how money may be given, for certain, sacred, and spiritual actions. Upon this last point, Valentia directs his reader to Saint Thomas' 3. art. where he has for examples the giving money to the poor, to engage them to pray to God for us, the giving money for Processions to get Prayers said for the dead, and other such like matters.  
Thirdly, Valentia, by the distinction which at first he mentioned, of a temporal good given for a spiritual, as a motive, or gratful acknowledgement, explains how the retributions for entertainment of the Ministers of the Church are given, and received, without simony: and how they may in conscience take them, because they are given, not in payment, but by way of a grateful acknowledgement.  
In the fourth place, he says, that a fund bequeathed to a Church, on condition of a Mass, the money given for Processions, the alms given to the poor, on condition to have their Prayers, etc. are all received, without simony; because given, but as motives, to engage those, who accept them, to pray and do these spiritual duties for the givers. In all this, added Cleander, not only, nothing appears false, but it also seems to me, that no body could do, or speak otherwise.  
In the last place, since it is principally upon the direction of intention, and upon the distinction of a thing given, as a motive, or grateful acknowledgement, and not as a payment, that Pascal attacks Valentia, to give his doctrine an ill air, or make men take up a bad opinion of it, I was desirous to see, whether these distinctions, and directions of intentions, were, as well as the rest, taken out of Saint Thomas; and I found all this was purely the doctrine of this learned and holy man. Hereupon, Cleander, opening one of Saint Thomas' Sums, showed Eudoxus examples in it, almost, upon all the articles of the question.  
To receive any thing given for the administration of spiritual matters, 
Art. 2. in conc●. & in corp.  as a payment is simoniacal; but it is lawful to receive it, as a retribution for his entertainment, or necessity.  
To exact these retributions approved by custom, is not simony, 
Ad. 4.  provided the intention be directed only to the observation of the custom.  
Saint Thomas says the same thing yet more fully in the following article; 
In concls. & in corp. ad 2.  as for the money given to the poor it must be answered, that those who give them alms, to the end they may pray for them, do it not, with an intention to purchase their Prayers, but only out of a principle of liberality, and as a motive to engage them to pray to God for them .... The procession made at a funeral, 
Ibid.  is judged a grateful compensation for the money given.  
It is not lawful for the admission of Religious, 
Ad 4.  to take or exact any thing, as a payment, but it is, notwithstanding, lawful to receive something, if the Monastery be poor ... In like manner, it is lawful to be the more easy, in receiving a person, who, by giving great alms to the Monastery, shows he has a great deal of devotion for that place.  
But above all, mind what follows, said Cleander, It is also lawful, to excite this person, by temporal good turns or offices, to have a devotion for this Monastery; to the end he may be inspired and inclined to enter into it; althô it be not lawful to make a bargain to receive, or give any thing for his admission. If Escobar, instead of Saint Thomas, had made this distinction, and allowed this direction of intention, Pascal would not have passed it by, nor failed to have soon found a place in the Provincial Letters for these last lines.  
Cleander, after he had read all these passages to Eudoxus and the Abbot, pursued the point in this manner. I do confess to you, that after I had compared Saint Thomas and Valentia's principles, I was enraged to see, that the most criminal part of these distinctions, was attributed to Valentia, though he had but transcribed it out of Saint Thomas. But I was yet more enraged at Pascal's citation, and way of reporting Valentia's text. Who, having with Saint Thomas, said, that a spiritual good might be given for a temporal, or a temporal, for a spiritual, and proved it by the same examples this holy Doctor had made use of, is nevertheless made by Pascal, to speak in this manner. If a spiritual good be given for a temporal, that is to say money for a benefice, and that the money be given as the price of the benefice, it is plain, downright, simony; but if it be given, only, as a motive, to induce the beneficed person to resign, Non tanquam pretium beneficij sed tanquam motivum ad resignandum it is no simony.  
Who could believe, but that these are the very words of Valentia, seeing them not only put down in an Italian character, but that the Latin words, also, are inserted with the French Non tanquam pretium benefi●ij, sed tanquam motivum ad resignandum, as if they had been the author's own text, joined with the translation? and yet, notwithstanding, this Latin proposition is, altogether, an impudent contrivance of Pascal, or his friends, there not being the lest footstep of it in any part of the whole treatise of Valentia.  
Eudoxus, extremely surprised, said, that this could not possibly be; for which reason he himself resolved to read over, exactly, the chapter pointed at by Pascal; where having found nothing like his quotation; see, says he, crying out the height and perfection of impudence and imposture. I perceive, pursued he, clearly, the cheat. This principle, that a spiritual good may be sometimes given for a temporal, being once laid down and nakedly applied to the matter of benefices, has something in it very odious: for which cause Pascal was pleased to give his commentary this turn.  
But why did not the Jesuits than take the advantage of such a falsification? for it is very visible, gross, and full of affectation; it was not, only, an unfaithful translation, whereby the author's thoughts were made weaker, or a strained sense put upon his expressions, but whole lines were falsely fathered on him, and Latin words, inserted in the French, which are not to be found in the text, pretended to be translated. Here are many essential words, both French and Latin added, which from a very harmless principle, makes a most scandalous proposition.  
The Jesuits, answered Cleander, instead of making, as we have done, a plain, simple, exposition, of Valentia's doctrine, compared with the doctrine of Saint Thomas, amused themselves with distinctions; which, in reality, were good, but not at all necessary. Whereupon their adversaries, quitting Valentia, began to wrangle and quarrel with them; and thereby starting a new game, cheated and deluded them, but, as you very well say, they ought to have been more staunch, made use of that occasion and stuck precisely to the matter of fact. They should have obliged the Jansenists, to have shown in Valentia, the words cited by Pascal; however such men, after such a cheat as this, are unworthy of any answer, till they have made public satisfaction by owning and condeming the tric. But this, in all appearance, they will be careful not to do.  
I have upon this point, said the Abbot, confounded twenty Jansenists with the very book in their own hands: you have each of you hit upon the main difficulty, and the most essential part of the calumny. For in as much, as the application of Valentia and Saint Thomas' principle to the matter, to which they applied it, is very reasonable, and in as much, as the application they make of it, is necessary for instructing Ecclesiastics, how to purifyings and raise up their intentions, in such holy Ministrations, so much the more impious and ridiculous would this principle be, and so much the more dangerous in the matter, to which it is applied by Pascal.  
If a man should say to a poor body, here I'll give you a crown, on condition you'll pray to God for me; and that another should say to a beneficed person, Sir your living is worth fifteen hundred livers a year, give it me, here are for you ten thousand livers in ready money; which I do not offer you as the price of your benefice, I have no such thoughts, but only as a motive to engage you to accommode me with it. Can any thing be more different than these two propositions, any thing more innocent than the first, or more extravagant than the second? the first is a common practice among Christians; clearly justified by the doctrine of Valentia; upon whom the second is grossly imposed; which is as far from his thoughts as light is from darkness, or truth from error. This learned Divine maintains, that it is not always forbidden, to give a spiritual good for a temporal; and he proves this assertion, by declaring expressly, that that, which obliges him, and all other Divines to hold this opinion, is, that, otherwise, the custom, universally received in the Church, must be condemned; pursuant to which, the spiritual services, rendered to the people by the Ecclesiastics, are done on condition of certain temporal retributions, which serve for the entertainment of the Ministers of the Altar. 
Pag. 3. n. ●.  In contrarium autem est, quod si ita esset, oporteret damnare universalem usum Ecclesiae, quo ferè quidquid spiritualis ministerij confertur in populum, confertur pro aliquibus subsidijs temporalibus, quibus Ministri alantur. He explains, at the same time, how simony is avoided, upon these occasions, that is by giving a temporal good for a spiritual, not as the price, or payment, but only as a grateful compensation, or recognition, or as a motive whereby the person, out of a principle of gratitude, is engaged, to grant the spiritual good, intended to be obtained by the temporal.  
Durst Pascal contend or dispute, that thus to give a temporal for a spiritual good, was not an usual custom among Christians, or that this usage was not lawful and innocent; or, lastly, that a man ought not to have the intentions Valentia suggests, and to exclude those, which he does exclude in this matter. Durst he say, that from Valentia's principle, determined and restrained to the subject treated of by him and by Saint Thomas, it might be concluded lawful, to give money for a benefice? let him therefore make Saint Thomas himself speak, as he has made Valentia, and the whole Church say, whose custom we see is founded upon this principle of Valentia, and only sanctified by the intentions prescribed by this Divine to Christians, and to the Ministers of the Altar; that their practice is to be extended much farther, than the principle itself. But to argue and speak exactly well upon this subject, it is necessary to study it, much better than Pascal has done.  
The Divines, after Saint Thomas' example, established the distinction of a temporal good given, as a motive, or as a payment; but it was only to be made use of in fit and capable matters; and in such instances, as we have already mentioned. It may, also, sometimes, take place in the matter of benefices; as in that particular case, which neither Saint Thomas nor Valentia have forgot.  
A Bishop has received many great services from a person, who is neither incapable nor unworthy to enjoy a benefice: the Bishop gives him one; in this there may, and there may not, be simony. If the Bishop, out of friendship and mere acknowledgement, has done him this favour, it is not simony. But if he gives him the benefice, as a recompense, acquitting him of all obligations to this man, in so much that he believes himself thereby dispensed from paying his salary, or the money he had advanced for his service, it is simony. So that, let the Bishop direct his intention never so much to the motive of friendship or acknowledgement, the benefice is really given for payment. Let but the heart of those, who confer, change, or resign benefices, be but as right, as the distinctions of these Divines are reasonable and solid, and they will never be mistaken: but if the rectitude of their intentions be wanting, and they will but listen to the dictates of their consciences, they shall soon perceive, that these distinctions, ill applied, are not sufficient to set them at ease.  
Here is an article, answered Eudoxus, that has held us a long time, and with reason; for there were many things in it to be disintangled and explained. But before we go to another, satisfy me in a small matter of fact; which during this discourse, wherein it was often mentioned, has given me some trouble, and which I have suffered to pass by, that I might not interrupt you. You have spoken, several times, of some latin words, inserted by Pascal, in the quotation of Valentia's passage, touching the money one might give to a beneficed person for his benefice, Non tanquam pretium, sed tanquam motivum ad resignandum. Which I do not found in my edition, and yet, notwithstanding, it is one of the most criminal circumstances of the citation; and that which most demonstrates Pascals' unfaithfulness and disingenuity.  
I know it very well, replied the Abbot; these latin words were retrenched out of the following editions, after they had wrought in the first, all their intended effect. The party were apprehensive of the bad consequences of such a falsisication as this; of which it was very easy to convince the author, and upon which, after conviction, it was natural enuff, to make troublesome and pernicious reflections; and therefore, without saying any thing, they left it out; and I do not believe, that even the Jesuits did ever perceive it, at lest they never complained on't. But yet in this edition in quarto, you may see the words at length. If a temporal good be given, for a spiritual, that is to say, money for a benefice, and that the money be given, as the price of the benefice, it is plain simony. But if it be given only as a motive, to incline the beneficed person to resign; NON TANQUAM PRETIUM SED TANQUAM MOTIVUM AD RESIGNANDUM, it is not simony.  
If with all the other falsifications, said Eudoxus, which we have hitherto seen, upon so many different subjects, there should yet be found some other of this size and force, I should not think there was no ground for the Proverb at that time currant, He lies like a Jansenist. But shall we be as long employed in discussing the passage in Tanner another Jesuit, whom Pascal makes an accomplice in Valentia's pretended crime? Tanner, added the good Jesuit in the Provincial Letters, Tanner, who is still of our Society, says the same thing, in his third tome page 1519.  
Not, said Cleander, for by reading but one column, you will see they have calumniated him, just as they have Valentia. They opened the book, and read him, and except the general proposition, that it is sometimes lawful, to give a spiritual for a temporal good, they found not one single word, which came near what was attributed to him by Pascal. He expresses himself, also, with more circumspection than Valentia has done: and the decisions he draws from his principles, do so clearly show, he speaks but of the cases mentioned by Saint Thomas, that he, who pretends to found there any thing else, must needs be a whimsical, maggotpated fellow.  
It must be acknowleged, that this is horrible, answered Eudoxus, and I could hardly have believed it, if I had not seen it with my own eyes. But however, continued he, it cannot be said, that Pascal was never in the right against the Jesuits. And as for myself, I cannot but condemn the following decision according to which, a Priest, besides the ordinary retribution of the Mass, he says to the intention of one person, may receive from another also, about a third part of that retribution, by yielding up to him, the share he himself has a right to pretend to, in the fruit, or benefit of the Sacrifice. This decision, is in Escobar, I have compared and found Pascals quotation of it true.  
You would therefore be very much surprised, said the Abbot, if I should tell you, that Escobar, even by this decision, does combat a relaxation in Morals. I should indeed, replied Eudoxus, be extremely surprised at that: for the question he proposes in this place, seems to me, to be very impertinent, and also to be very ill decided.  
The thing, notwithstanding, answered the Abbot, is, as I say; and he argues against this relaxation, after the example of the holy and learned Canonist Narvar, whose principles and doctrine he follows. 
De celeb. Miss. & in Man. cap. 25.  This man speaks of some Priests of his time, who, abusing what Saint Thomas had said, that the satisfactory merit of the Sacrifice of the Mass, is infinite, take money, without any ceremony, for their Mass from several persons; and pretend by the same Mass, to satisfy the obligation they were under, to all those persons; because, said they, that the Sacrifice, though offered for an infinity of worlds, was an inexhaustible treasure of satisfactions. This obliged Doctor Navarre to consider the point; wherein making use of all his subtlety in Divinity, he distinguishes that part, which the whole Church has right to pretend to, in every Sacrifice, that which belongs to the persons for whom by name it is offered, and lastly that which is peculiar to the Priest; of which, said he, he may yet quit to others some part.  
And do you approve of all this, said Cleander, speaking to the Abbot.  
Not by no means, answered the Abbot. Escobar, as well as Navarre, would have done much better, to have set forth in general to the Priests, the shame and infamy of this mean and sordid covetousness; which made them act as they did on these occasions, rather than to have set down all these distinctions, of which the practical consequences can no way agreed with the spirit of the Church; and this also was the sense of the most able Jesuit Divines, as Suarez, Laiman, de Lugo, Vasquez, Turrian and many others; which they very fully expressed, as often as an opportunity offered: and these persons, in my opinion, do much better represent the Society, than this Spaniard, though supported by the distinctions of the famous Navar.  
This was one of the School subtleties; against some of which if mwn cried out and stormed a little, I should not be scandalised; provided a judicious choice, and a faithful and exact list were made of them; which would be very much shorter than is commonly thought; and provided, also, they would not falsely give out, that subtleties, were the fund, the marrow, and as it were the whole quintessence of School Divinity; and that, on the contrary, they would give notice, of what is most true, that these kind of faults are very rare, in comparison of an infinite number of excellent things, very useful for the understanding of Religion and Christian Morals; which are to be found in this sort of learning. And, in the last place, that the little, which may be reprehended, or rejected, should not be wholly put to the account of the Jesuits; who most certainly, to say not more, have not a greater share in it, than others.  
Here is, said Eudoxus, a project of accommodation, very fit to be propounded to some, peevish, learned men of my acquaintance; who are always in an ill humour against the Schoolmen; the greatest part of which persons, answered the Abbot, never read them; but they speak out of prejudice and prepossession; the discovery of an Epoch or period of time, by a manuscript, or a medal, is something more, in their esteem, than the discovery of the Indieses by the Portugees. Should but a Schoolman fall into a mistake, in such a point as that, it would be, in their opinion, a hanging matter; and always to be punished with the last contempt. But let us return to our subject. Do you believe, added he, that Pascal could long keep the character of a sincere and true judge or cretic? I do not say that, answered Eudoxus, and even Father Bauni's three following passages, which were joined together, though taken out of several places, gave me, at the very first, some suspicion, which I soon perceived was not ill founded. To show that the Jesuits do say pro and con, when they please, observe but how they speak in the Provincial Letters.  
Father Bauni does in this exceed all others; there is some pleasure in seeing this learned Casuist penetrate into the pro and con of the same question, relating to Priests, and to found reason for both sides, so very witty and subtle is he. In one place, in the tenth treatise pa. 474, he says, that a law cannot be made to oblige Curates every day to say Mass; because such a law would, indubitably, hand dubiè, expose them to the danger of saying it sometimes in a mortal sin. And notwithstanding, in the same treatise page 441. he says, That Priests, who receive money for a daily Mass, aught to say Mass daily, and cannot excuse themselves, by their not being always prepared, because they may always make an act of Contrition, wherein, if they are wanting, it is their own fault, and not the persons who engaged them to say Mass.  
By reading this, continued Eudoxus, I could not conceive, that it was to speak pro and con; so different are the subjects here treated of from one another. But, instead of any contrariety in the passages cited, I found out the malice of the person, who quoted th●m. f we do but translate the latin, there is in this matter, neither contradiction, extravagance, nor impiety, but all the discretion possible.  
This is his assertion: I say in the third place, that when a Priest agrees with a person to say Mass for him once a year, or every day, he sins if he does not discharge this duty, either by himself, or by some other ....... if therefore he does not do it, he ought to give back the whole money to the person from whom he first received it.  
He afterwards makes this objection. This would be, to put the Priest into an almost unavoidable occasion of sinning; to which he makes two answers, Cui argumento duplice hac responsione occurritur. The first, that, by an act of Contrition, he may return to God, and if he does it not, it is his own fault. This answer is not good, said Cleander, interrupting him and laughing, at lest, according to Pascal's principles; for it supposes, that Grace is not wanting, when, for want of it, a man is unable to fulfil, or obey the command.  
For this time, I pray, let us not meddle with Jansenisme; that is not now our business, answered Eudoxus. Hearken to the other part of Bauni's answer. The second is, said he, that a Priest, not being obliged, by virtue of his agreement, to discharge this holy Ministry in his own person, and being at liberty to do it by another, it depends on him, if he himself be not prepared, to get Mass said by another; wherein there is neither sin nor danger. What say you to that, continu's Eudoxus? can any thing be better stated, or fuller of sense, than every point of this decision? and is not Pascal, think you, a man of honour, for suppressing, as he has done, the second part of this answer, not only to found a contradiction, in what this Divine has said, but also, to let his readers think, that he had, in conscience, obliged the Priest to commit Sacrilege?  
I pray look upon this third passage, reported by Pascal. May a Priest, having first been at Confession, say Mass the same day he committed one of the worst of mortal sins? no, said Villalobos, because of his impurity; but Sanchez says he may, and without any sin; whose opinion I hold safe, and to be followed in practice: & tuta & sequenda in praxi.  
This is a bold stroke, said Cleander; have a little patience answered Eudoxus; when I myself first read this place in Bauni, I was a little shocked, but running over the table of the book, I fell by chance upon a word, that engaged me to read the sixth chapter of the fourth treatise, whereby I found what his real thought was in this.  
There he puts the same question, with reference to married persons, and teaches, that, after even the most lawful actions in this matter; the respect due to the holy Eucharist, obliges them, not to approach to it presently; and that they cannot be wanting in the decency required in order to that mystery, without venial sin. He adds, that there may, notwithstanding, be reasons, which may lessen, or wholly take away the sin; the scandal, for example, which, in certain circumstances, might hap, if these persons should not communicate: the solemnity of a great feast, or the extraordinary desire of communicating, where with God might inspire one in such a conjuncture. Thus it is evident, concluded Eudoxus, that when Bauni speaks of Priests and Curates, whose duty he particularly treats of, in the chapter, cited by Pascal, it is but in relation to some accidents, where the sin, on one side, and the necessity of saying Mass on the other, holds them in suspense. Whereupon, in the first place, he teaches, that a Priest, supposing he has made a good Confession, has all the essential dispositions, required by the Council of Trent for the reception of the Eucharist; that is to say, that he is in the state of Grace: which, in spite of the imaginations of all our new-fangled innovators, is most certainly true. In the second place, when Bauni said, this opinion was safe in practice, (he who thought it in married persons a venial sin) he intended no more but that a Priest, or Curate, might, without sin, follow this opinion, when the functions, joined to his Ministry, did not absolutely dispense with him from saying Mass, which sometimes does hap.  
And in such a circumstance, a Country Curate, for example, might possibly be, whose parishioners, if they lost Mass upon a Sunday, by his forbearing to say it, would take up strange suspicions of him. Let a man upon this decision consult, not our pretended reformers, whose mistaken severity has sometimes caused, on such like occasions, a great deal of scandal, but any Divine of good sense, who knows how to apply the most solid principles of Morals to particular accidents and cases, and he will quickly found, whether he can think otherwise, upon this subject, than Bauni has done.  
It is manifest, said the Abbot, that this must be Baunis opinion, after what he has said of married persons. But these , and so well grounded expositions, are not to be made by the Jesuits: one part of a book is not enuff, to defend the other, and upon every decision in Morals, their Divines aught to have repeated all their principles, restrictions and circumstances, and prevented all manner of difficulties and objections. If they fail to do that, their adversaries would be sure to make extracts of their books, and get these extracts censured, and afterwards published, with beaten of drum, or sound of trumpet, all over Europe, and the Indieses, that the Jesuits doctrine had been condemned. But is this all you have to say upon this place?  
Yes, said Eudoxus, for as to what Pascal has made his Jesuit speak, touching the preference the Divines of the Society give the Casuists, before the Fathers, and such other trifling matters, we have already said enuff. It is true, answered the Abbot, but yet do you not look upon what he has advanced, in general, against the Jesuit Filliucius, as a calumny, to wit, that the laws of the Church, by being not longer observed do loose their force and virtue, cum jam desuetudine abierunt? this proposition, so expressed, may be a false and dangerous maxim; whereas, in the instance Filliucius makes use on't, and whence Pascal has drawn it, it is the most reasonable in the world. I have really seen, said Cleander, abundance of people very much scandalised at this proposition, taken in the sense Pascal has given it.  
This maxim, answered the Abbot, is of use in the Civil and the Canon law. Saint Thomas, Saint Antonin, Gerson, and others, as well Divines, as Lawyers, do very often make use on't: and the very terms of Filliucius, are taken out of the law. But the application of it, may be, either, good, or bad: let us therefore see, how it is applied by Filliucius. According to Pascal's quotation, you will found it in the second tome treatise 25. nu. 33.  
They read it, and saw, that Filliucius does, there, treat of the punishments, decreed against blasphemers, in the old Testament by Moses, or, in the new, by Counsels and Decrees of Popes. Whereupon he says, that the Confessors in their Confessionals, aught to enjoin those penalties if they had been still in use. But that some were never received in the Church, and others were become absolete: At vel receptae nunquam sunt, vel jam desuetudine abierunt. Is any thing more true, than this matter of fact? and was this maxim ever applied more properly? this notwithstanding is the place Pascal makes use of, to prove, that the Jesuits laugh at the ancient discipline; and make all its rules give place, to the frivolous maxims of their Casuists.  
That which follows, said Cleander, is a part of my task: but I must ingenuously confess, that my courage failed me, and I grew weary. You'd easily believe, that the comparing and confronting of texts and citations, could not be a very agreeable entertainment for a man of my humour. I was not longer able to endure so toilsome and unpleasant a work; and therefore, resolved to refer myself for the rest, to the testimony and integrity of Mr. Abbot.  
What, replied Eudoxus, laughing, do you give ground or fall back? this is not very fair nor stout. But I am very glad, I have gotten, over you, the advantage of perseverance; however, I cannot but frankly own, that, like you, I have already had strong temptations on this subject, and could not have answered, much longer, for my own patience. For, whatever pleasure I take, in seeing Mr. Abbot clear and unfold so neatly, as he does, these things, in the intangling and perplexing whereof, all Pascal's wit and cunning consisted; the matter is still very knotty and obscure, and obliges me to too much study and application.  
Besides, the little we have seen, is more than enuff, to guide us in the judgement we ought to make of the Provincial Letters. Perrault's panegyrics of them, cannot be more clearly justified, than it has been by Mr. Abbot; I am above all things for The solidity of his arguments, and for his railleries always pure and decent. The Jesuits have no cause to complain; for it cannot be more solidly proved, by any person, who contains himself within the bounds of good manners, that their Society is the plague of the Church, a body of wicked and extravagant sots and madmen, that aught to be banished out of the Commonwealth, or shut up in Bedlam. It is not to detract, slander, calumniate, impose, or falsify, when all this is done with Pascals wit and pleasantry.  
Raillery a part, we are indeed infinitely obliged to you, continued he, speaking to the Abbot, and we pray you, not to give yourself any farther trouble, to prove to us, that Pascal, and those who furnished him with memoirs against the Jesuits, stood much more in need, than these Fathers did, of an exhortation to make their Morals more strict and severe. He, that has given occasion for this masterpiece of calumny, and who daily studies to improve it, would edify all true Catholics by recanting, or disclaiming it. This recantation would certainly be necessary to discharge his conscience of a world of things, for which his great age cannot but advertise him, he must, very soon, give a terrible account to God.  
Oho, answers the Abbot! you are well employed indeed to preach to Mr. Arnauld and endeavour to fill his head with scruples. I assure you, he has no more to do, but to die; the pieces for his Canonisation are already prepared. And of this you cannot doubt, if you do but reflect, upon the veneration paid by his Party, to the memory of the Abbot of Saint Cyran. Notwithstanding the authentic testimonies of Mr. Vincent, founder of Saint Lazar, which they have retrenched out of the last edition of the life of this holy man (for that faction gains their point in all their undertake) but which God's Providence has still preserved elsewhere. Notwithstanding the testimonies of the Abbot of Priéres, of the than Bishop of Langres, of the Archbishop of Sens Bellegarde, and which is more, of the late M. Caulet, Bishop of Pamiers, a witness very troublesome to Port-Royal, notwithstanding what F. Gondren, General of the Oratorians both said and knew, and several other witnesses of untainted reputations, of the pernicious designs, which this Abbot had contrived, and was carrying on against the Church, and of his heretical and extravagant opinions; in spite of all this, I say, the Abbot of Saint Cyran must pass for a Saint, if what is daily said by the Party, was to be believed, and for a great Servant of God, unjustly persecuted by Cardinal Richelieu, who looked upon him as another Luther; judge by this, what will be said of Mr. Arnauld, whose zeal had quite another kind of success, than that of Mr. Saint Cyran.  
But infine, continued the Abbot, you quit me at too easy and too cheap a rate; I had a mind we should have carried on our work, at lest, to the tenth Letter; for those which follow are little more, than replications and frequent repetitions of the same sort of impostures. But in this you shall command; I, for my part, can only offer you, which I freely do, to proceed, or continued what we have begun, when ever you please I will tell you more. I have in my head a small design, and which is pleasant enuff, of drawing up a scheme of the speculative and practical Morals of the Jansenists; a design, that could very easily be put in execution: I should have no occasion to sand to the Indieses, or have recourse to memoirs, brought five or six thousand leagues. Not not, I would confine myself within the bounds of France and Flanders; where most of the pieces I should have need of, are certainly to be found: I would follow the order of time, beginning with the Rise and Origin of these differences and disputes, and bringing it down to our own days; the books, and Original pieces of the process against the Abbot of Saint Cyran, would, among other things, furnish me with a great deal of matter. And I know a thousand little stories, of several, that have, and still make, a figure among the party, which would give me occasion enuff, to make the subject both pleasant and diverting. The single process of Perrette of Lions, Mr. Arnauld's she penitent, and by him supported against the Dean of Senlis, this Devotee's Uncle, and Guardian. This suit alone, I say, well told, with all its circumstances, would, I can assure you, make a small tome that would not tyre the readers.  
Mr. Abbot, said Cleander, you must needs go on with this design; it would, without doubt, be very successful: but do you know, that I have taken the pains to writ down our former discourses; that we have communicated them to some of our friends; that they already run about Paris; and that I am resolved to take the same course for the remainder?  
I am of a meek, peaceful spirit and temper, answered the Abbot, and would not willingly be an aggressor: but since you bring me into play by publishing our discourses, you may very likely expose me to be libelled by the Jansenists: which may perhaps put me also, into the same humour, and make me, at lest, endeavour an equal return. As for the rest, how tiresome soever, you may found the examination of the Provincial Letters, you must, notwithstanding, grant me upon this point two favours.  
The first is, that you may have something in this matter perfect, at lest, in some manner, you must give yourself the trouble of reading two, or three small, lose, sheets of paper, concerning several general topics, treated of in the Provincial Letters; and which, together with the doctrine of probability, make, according to Pascal, the whole fund of the Jesuits Policy and Morals; that is to say, the direction of intention, the distinction of probable in speculation, and probable in practice; equivocations and mental reservations. You need not trouble yourself with inquiries after the author; you will, in a few words, see in them all that is good or bad, as to these points of doctrine; and whether the Jesuits are blamable, excusable, or commendable, for what they have writ and taught upon this subject: the reading of the whole, will not take up an hour of your time; and yet you will found it sufficiently instructive in this matter; whereof the greatest part of men, have little or no knowledge, but very slight and superficial notions. The cases made use of for examples, are drawn out of the seventh and eighth Provincial Letters, and the others following, which you would not take the pains to examine.  
The second thing I ask of you, is concerning the last article of the last Letter of ten addresses to Pascals friend in the country, which he calls The Mystery of iniquity completed: because it relates to the love of God, which, according to him, the Jesuits say is not necessary to Salvation. We must, if you please, meet one of these days in your Jansenists friends library about this article, and than I hope to make amendss for the occasion you lately lost of seeing us two engaged in the discussions of much lesle important matters.  
Eudoxus and Cleander answered, that it would be a sensible pleasure to them, to see the papers he mentioned, and that for their conversation with the Jansenist, they would take any time he should think fit to appoint.    

The seventh Discourse.  
EVdoxus coming to the Abbot's house, and finding Cleander already arrived, said to him, we shall not fail, to day, of meeting our man. He had notice of our intentions, and is now actually waiting for us in his library. Let us take coach than, answered the Abbot; I am ready, only give me leave to take two or three papers, of which, I foresee we may have need. But yet before I go, I pray let me know what kind of man is he I am to deal with: I cannot for my life understand why you should be so very shy, as hitherto you have been, to tell me the qualities of an adversary, with whom you have so often threatened me.  
What need you trouble yourself, replied Eudoxus, laughing; have I not said enuff of him already, in telling you he is a Jansenist? however, since you are so desirous of being more fully informed of his character, it's fit you should be satisfied. But yet, since he is one of my friends, 'tis possible, you may not think my account of him so fit to be believed; and therefore Cleander, who has seen him often with me and knows him well enuff, may speak of him more disinterestly, and with greater freedom.  
He is an admirable man, said Cleander, and a perfect original. He has a great quickness of fancy, and an extraordinary readiness to express himself; which is to supply his want of wit, and he is so very wise, as seriously to value himself upon being a Jansenist: and loses no opportunity to make all men believe he is what he is; for he thinks to get, by this means, the title of a great wit. He has been but two years at Paris; he was before the chief Magistrate of the small town of ....., during which time, he had frequent correspondance by letters, with Mr ...... and Mr ...... for whose interest and service, he made himself business enuff; and they were overjoyed, for having found in that country, an emissary of his credit and reputation. They have, for a long time, looked upon him, as one of their forlorn hope; and I myself have often compared him to a fireship; for the loss of which men are not much concerned, provided it does but first do execution and blow up some of the enemies great ships. Eudoxus has been acquainted with him several years, and I have known him ever since his coming to Paris. If his answers do not altogether satisfy you, his manner of making them will, at lest, divert you.  
That is to say, answered the Abbot, that you have as great an expectation to be made merry, as you have to be instructed. But without more words, they took coach and drove directly to Timante's lodging: this is the name, by which this new antagonist of the Abbot's is to pass. Eudoxus went straight up to the library, where he found him: and having saluted him, told him he had brought the Abbot with him, of whom he had spoken the day before. He is, said he, an obstinate, headstrong, Molinist; who has lately resolved, to undertake the defence of the Jesuits against the Provincial Letters. I'll put him into your hands to deal with; and having conquered him, make him, I pray, submit, and do honour to the great Saint Austin and the honest party.  
You have had the experience, more than once, answered Timante, that upon this subject, I am never taken unprovided. Give me but an adversary worth the trouble, and you shall found I will give you a good account of him. Without more a do, they went immediately down to Cleander and the Abbot. I will very gladly, said Timante to them, make one in the discourses Eudoxus tells me, you have begun upon the Provincial Letters: you are a Molinist, continued he, addressing himself to the Abbot; and I declare to you, that I myself am a Jansenist; and ready to maintain the truth of these admirable Letters, as I would that of the Gospel. For there is nothing in them, but pure truth, without any mixture of error, lies, or mistake.  
I have a long time known, answered the Abbot, that the gift of infallibility has been allowed Mr. Arnauld by his party; but I did not know, till now, that they granted the same privilege to Pascal. As for myself, I do not take upon me to defend the Jesuits doctrine in so universal a manner: I consider they are like other men, and believe them capable of being sometimes mistaken. But, however the matter stands as to other points, concerning which, Eudoxus and Cleander may some other time tell you their opinions, we are now come hither, but to inform ourselves, by the help of your great library, of one single point. The matter is, to know whether, what Pascal has reproached the Jesuits with, touching the precept of the love of God, be true or false.  
Ho! truly said Timante, this is a doubt quite out of fashion; and I admire Cleander and Eudoxus could have patience to hear you upon this subject. I know not, answered Cleander, whether Mr. Abbot has the art to remove, or to make charms; but which soever of these is his talon, it is certain, he has given us a very different impression, from what we had before of Pascal. He has shown us the Jesuits books, and, in them, has often made us read the direct contrary of what this writer pretends to have found; and I could almost be tempted to believe, he had done the same things by these books, which some say, the Jesuits did with that of Jansenius, after the condemnation of the five propositions, which, being shown in this book, to some persons, and they not thinking it possible, Mr. Arnauld could have been guilty of a , when he affirmed he never saw them in it, said these Fathers had falsified Augustinus, and inserted in him the condemned propositions, which they were sure could not be in the original edition; to which Mr. Arnauld's affirmation related. I should have thought as much, I say, concerning Bauni, Valentia, Vasquez, and several others, if the copies we made use of, had not, for the most part, come out of your library; where I am confident, you have none but good editions.  
A man must really suffer himself to be charmed, answered Timante, to take up such extraordinary sentiments as those you seem to be possessed with. What, does not Mr. Pascal speak truth in the Provincial Letters? where he quotes, not only, the books, but the very chapters, pages, and numbers; and mentions even the several editions? and are not the Jesuits the patrons of lose Morals? I dare you to say otherwise in Paris; unless you say it, before certain people, who are frighted out of their little wits with the bugbear of Jansenisme: and yet among them, you will found some, who in the point now in debate, will not stick to declare themselves Jansenists; and who will subscribe, without hesitation to all the Letters, except the three first, wherein the author raillies about sufficient grace, the potentia proxima, and the assemblies of Sorbonne.  
Let us quit the general thesis, said Eudoxus interrupting him; and let every man think, or be of what opinion he pleases; let us come to the point, that brought us hither: are you not much edified, continued he, to see how we interest ourselves about the love of God? what do you maintain upon this article for Pascal against the Jesuits?  
I am ready to maintain, said Timante, 
Letter 10.  Pascals proposition in all its latitude, that The Jesuits teach, that the love of God is not necessary to Salvation. And what will you do, said Eudoxus to the Abbot?  
I will maintain, answered he, and am prepared to prove it, that the Jesuits do teach the direct contrary, to what in Pascals words this Gentleman has affirmed. It is indeed your business to prove it, replied Cleander. Timante denies the matter of fact, and you affirm it, show us therefore how it stands in the Jesuits books.  
We should for a long time found employment, said the Abbot, if we should read, one after another, all the writers of the Society, who in express terms say, that the love of God, is necessary to Salvation. I speak not of the books of Meditations, Spiritual Exercises, Christian Practices, and an infinity of other works of Devotion; wherein the Jesuits Preach up nothing so much, as the love of God. I pass by their Rodriguez's, the Saint-Jure's, the Hayneuve's, the Suffren's, the Duke Pont's, and a thousand others, whose books you can not sooner open, than found this truth in them. But I will confine myself to their Divines, whose names would make too long a list. You may however see it, in a book Printed at Louvain in 1689, entitled Sexaginta quinque propositiones nuper à Sanctissimo Domino nostro Innocentio XI proscriptae, à Societatis Jesu Theologis diu ante Sanctissimi Domini decretum consensu communissimo rejectae. Where there are not lesle, than thirty cited. Will you be content with nine or ten, such as are the chief, and looked upon as the Oracles of the Order?  
I'll quit you for one half, answered Timante, in a bold and Magisterial tone. Abate Mr. Abbot nothing, said Eudoxus, and be not too forward; for I have found, by experience, that he is very exact in his quotations. Let us begin, said the Abbot, with Cardinal Bellarmin. Take the pains, I pray you, to reach me down his fourth tome. Listen to these his words. The holy Scripture does not only say, 
L. 6. de gr. & lib. arbitr. cap. 7.  that charity is the gift of God, but farther commands us to love God: it does not command us only to conserve the infused habit of charity, but also obliges us, to love God with all our heart: for the laws have for object, the acts of the virtues they command, and not the habits.  
The Abbot also read in Cardinal Lugoes treatise of Penance, 
Disp. 7. sect. 12. n. 250.  these words. The command of loving God, is absolutely founded upon the law of nature; and althô there had been for it, no positive law from God, yet should we be obliged to it, as all Divines do agreed. You here quote Cardinals, answered Timante, that is to say, men, who in quitting the Societys' habit, quitted also their wicked maxims.  
You do not know, replied the Abbot, nor are you obliged to know so exactly, the chronology of all the Jesuits books: Bellarmin and Lugo were still Jesuits, when they wrote those I have cited; and when the last said, all Divines were agreed about this precept, he comprehended, without doubt, in this general proposition all of his own Society, at lest, as much as others. But since, continued he, you will have no Cardinal Jesuits, I will pass Tolet, whose testimony I was about to allege, and only stick to those, who were but Jesuits. I see on your shelf of Divines, the tome of Suarez, wherein he treats of the three Theological virtues: The Abbot opened the book, and in his treatise of charity, read these following words. 
Dis. 6. sect. 1.   
First, I say, that this precept concerns all men, and this is evident from the sixth chapter of Deuteronomy, You shall love your Lord your God with all your heart, etc. and by the tenth of Saint Matthew, This command of loving God, is the first and greatest command of all .. the reason of my conclusion is, that this love is a necessary means to Salvation, and that these kind of means have always the obligation of a command.  
Certainly, said Cleander, interrupting him, when Pascal said, that the Jesuits taught the love of God was not necessary to Salvation, he ought to have excepted Suarez out of the number; for it is impossible, for any man to speak upon this subject, more clearly, than he has done in what we have read. Hujusmodi dilectio est medium necessarium ad salutem. In the mean time, to judge by the esteem this Divine is in, not only with the Society, but also with all others, whether if the Jesuits had been obliged to determine, which of their Body they would have pass for the chief Divine, they must not have chosen this man. They have not, in reality, as I have been assured, any one, whose doctrine is more the doctrine of the Jesuits, than this author's doctrine is; nor who is more generally followed.  
I will add to this, said Eudoxus, what was lately told me by one of my friends, who travelled much in Spain, to show the great opinion they have of this Divine in that country; where, he said; the reputation of Suarez was so great, that in most Universities, he was quoted in their disputes, and the Defendants, to whom his authority was urged, durst not refute him, but were obliged to reconcile, whatever was out of him objected, with the doctrine of the Thesis: he also told me another thing pleasant enuff, that in many towns of Spain, and particularly at Perpignan, the inhabitants, even the Artificers, as well as other tradesmen, are divided into two factions; one Suarists, the other Thomists; in so much, that in the public sports and recreations, the men are chosen out of these two different parties; and that the acclamations were frequently heard at bowls, sometimes, of the Suarists and sometimes of Thomists, according to the various success of the gamesters, all, ready to fall together by the ears, the one party for praemotio physica, and the other for Scientia media.  
Timante, notwithstanding the trouble he was in, on account of the passages cited by the Abbot, out of these three famous Jesuits, could not forbear laughing at this odd proceeding of the Spaniards; and would willingly have carried this digression farther; but the Abbot immediately returning to the point, said to him, you see by what Eudoxus and Cleander have spoken, that if the Jesuits could have thought themselves honoured in the Schools by the name or reputation of any one of their Doctors, as the Thomists do by that of Saint Thomas, certainly they would on this score have preferred Suarez to Molina. And, indeed, few Jesuits do follow Molina, in comparison of those, who stick to the principles and opinions of Suarez, Vasquez and Bellarmin; and they are Molinists, but because they maintain, and with reason, that the doctrine of Molina, is without error; wherein there is none to be found, without misrepresenting and disfiguring it, that they might have a handle and pretence to refute it with the greater advantage. But since you have given me the name of Molinist the very first moment I have the honour of seeing you, it is fit I should make good and maintain my character with credit and reputation; and that I should also demonstrate to you, that if Molina be to be believed, Pascal must have spoken falsely, when he asserted, that the Jesuits taught, The love of God was not at all necessary to Salvation. I shall found, in lesle than a minute, the place I want: I have it, listen therefore, I pray, to what this Jesuit says.  
I am persuaded, that we are obliged, 
Tract. 5● de just. disp. 59 n. 6.  by the precept of the love we own to God, under pain of mortal sin, to defend his interest, to oppose every thing, which may wound his honour, or his glory, and to do every thing, which, we believe, may be useful to this purpose; and that we ought to do it, even with the hazard of our lives; which does not hinder, 
Num. 7.  says he two pages after, but that there may be, a particular command of the love of God, as a thing due to him, and that this love may be commanded, as a necessary means to obtain the possession of God and of eternal life.  
After this, the Abbot showed in Tanner, these words; 
Tom. 3. disp 2. de spe & charit. q. 4. dub. 4. n. 62.  The command which obliges us to love God, is like a first principle, known, and acknowleged by all the world.  
He found in Valentia, this which follows. When we inquire, how and when the command of loving God does oblige us, we do presuppose, as a thing most certain, that there is such a command. For this is evident both by Scripture and by reason. 
Tom. 3. disp. 3. q. 19 pun. 1.  And a little lower, I say, in the first place, that we are obliged, by this command, to love God; not to love him with a common love, but as our last end, and by consequence with a sovereign love, preferring him above all things in the world.  
Layman also speaks, in this manner. The precept of the love of God, is called in the 22th. of Saint Matthew, the first and greatest command of all; because it relates to the first act of the most excellent virtue, and the most necessary to Salvation.  
See likewise, what Becanus' opinion is, 
De Sacram. c. 35. q. 6. n. 4.  in this matter. There is a twofold command of loving God, the first is general, and comprehended in all parts of the Decalogue, which obliges us to keep the law of God: the second is positive and particular, and obliges us to make an act of charity, whether this act be produced by, or is the motion of our love to God, or a detestation of our sin for offending God.  
Thomas Sanchez thus argues. 
In decal. l. 2. c. 35. n. 1.  Nothing is more certain, than that there is a command of loving God; the reason is, because the act of loving God is necessary to Salvation; He that loves him not, said Saint John, is dead already; but all that is necessary to Salvation, is commanded.  
Have you than a mind, said Eudoxus, interrupting, and addressing himself to Timantes, that Mr. Abbot should turn over, and confounded all your library? there is no more room on your table for these folios; have you not seen enuff to convince Pascal, either of rashness or of lying? of lying, if he has, as he ought to have done, consulted all these authors; of rashness, if he has advanced, upon the credit of an other, That the Jesuits taught the love of God was not necessary to Salvation. These are the most learned and most famous of all their Divines; and most of the others do but copy, or abridge, what they have written. What answer can you make to all these matters of fact?  
I answer, said Timantes, equally troubled and surprised, by another enumeration made by Pascal in the same place, according to which the Jesuits of France are of a contrary opinion. Observe but the words of Mr. Pascal's Jesuit. Thus our Fathers have freed men from the troublesome obligation of actually loving God: and this doctrine, is so advantageous, that our Father's Anat, Pintereau, le Moyne and A. Sirmond himself, defended it vigorously, when others had a mind to run it down. It seems to me, added Timantes, that F. Sirmond alone, is to be valued full as much as Sanchez, Suarez, and Layman, and perhaps many more all joined together.  
The Abbot, at these last words of Timantes, fell a laughing, what said he to him, do you believe the Father Sirmond here spoken of, to be that famous Father Sirmond, who, in spite of the Jansenists utmost envy and malice, preserved so great a name and reputation among all the learned, not only of the Catholic Church, but also of all other sects and parties whatsoever. He is not, at all, the person intended: your error nevertheless is very pardonable, since it is founded but upon Pascal's malice.  
And, really, when after Father Anat, and Father le Moyne, men known, and, upon many accounts, very valuable, these words, and Father A. Sirmond himself, are seen to be added, by way of gradation, who would not believe, but that this must be meant of the renowned Father Sirmond: he was the only one publicly known in the world, and known commonly, but by his surname. The preference, in point of merit and authority, which the word himself gives to the person here spoken of, above Father Anat, and Father le Moune, leaves no place to doubt, but that he must be the person intended. Among two thousand men, who should read the Provincial Letters, there would not be found six, that should not believe the Society's reputation wounded by this reproach on one of their members, who is accounted the chief ornament of their whole body; and I do on this account, forgive your having opposed him, to Suarez, Sanchez, Layman and Molina: and also to the two Cardinals, Bellarmin, and de Lugo.  
But really, the man Pascal speaks of, is a man very little known, and of no consequence: however, it shall not lie at my door, if we examine not, what relates to him: for there wants a great deal to make the idea given of this Father Sirmond's doctrine, to be true: but first, let us see, whether Father Pintereau, Father Anat, and Father le Moyne, do vigorously defend it. For in this also, there is an equivocation, to say not worse of it, as great, as in the name of Sirmond. Have you, said the Abbot to Timantes, the Jesuits apology against la Theologie Morale?  
I have, answered he, all that has been written on both sides in this matter; but I do, notwithstanding, own to you, that I have read very little of what the Jesuits have writ in their own defence. They are too serious, and do not divert me as Mr. Pascal does; and besides, all he says, has a certain air of truth, which is of itself persuasive, and makes it unnecessary to read all those rhapsodies, his adversaries have heaped up together, with design to refute him.  
This method of hearing but one side, answered the Abbot, laughing, is very wondered, for the enabling men to make a right and equitable judgement between two contending parties. Which words he had not sooner ended, than he took into his hands the book attributed to Father Pintereau, 
2. part. p. 52. & 53.  entitled, Les impostures & les ignorances' du libelle intitulè la Theologie Morale des Jesuits: par l'Abbé du Boisic. He read in it the passage cited by Pascal; where the author does but maintain these words of the Council of Trent; 
Ses. 14.2.4.  That Attrition, produced by the fear of hell, disposes the sinner to receive Grace in the Sacrament, althô, that, without the Sacrament, it is not sufficient to justify him. There this Divine shows, that the opinion, which holds, that Attrition, with the Sacrament does justify, is the doctrine of, almost, all Divines, especially since the Council of Trent; that althô these Divines do not treat the contrary opinion as heresy, yet many of them do esteem it very rash; because the words, of the Council upon this subject, do appear so positive and express; and which is more, he quotes a censure of Sorbonne, in the year 1638, which says the same thing; a man cannot see in all this text of Father Pintereau, one single word, which shows the love of God is not necessary for Salvation. How than and by what rules of honesty, durst Pascal place this Divine in the number of those, who maintain the opinion he attributes to Father Sirmond, That the love of God, is not necessary to Salvation? Cannot one than defend, with Catholic Divines, the Council of Trent's doctrine concerning Attrition, without being suspected to destroy the precept of the love of God?  
He! do you not see, replied Timantes, that in the words quoted by Mr. Pascal, your Jesuit treats the obligation of loving God, as a difficult and troublesome thing?  
Nothing is to be changed in the terms, said the Abbot; Pascal thus sets them down. It was therefore reasonable he should take away that troublesome and difficult obligation man was under, by the law of rigour, of exerting an act of perfect Contrition, to be justified, and that he should institute Sacraments, which might supply its defect, with the help of a more easy disposition: if he has said, that this obligation of a perfect Contrition, was troublesome and difficult, he has said so, after an infinite number of Divines; and this is very true, in the sense, wherein so many learned men have said it. An act of perfect Contrition, which includes an act of the pure love of God, is the most heroic act of Christian virtue; and most directly opposite to self-love; of which it stifles and excludes those motions, which appear the most lawful. He there speaks of a sinner, who by that means was to quit his sin, and make an effort to break his chains, and his will of iron, as Saint Austin calls it, which keeps him fast bound: for this act a man needs one of the strongest graces, that is in all the treasures of God's mercy. Infine, this is an act so hard, and so contrary to corrupted nature, that the Divinity of Port-Royal allows it to very few men in the world; and it was partly upon the account of the difficulty of making on't, that they formerly excluded from the Communion, so many penitents for whole years, and even at Easter, in spite of the commands of the Church.  
Who than can doubt, if this doctrine be true, that Attrition, with the Sacrament, is sufficient to justify a sinner; but that it is a particular favour, granted by the new Testament, to those under the law of the Gospel, and an advantageous effect of the blood of Jesus shed for us, and applied to sinners in the Sacrament of Penance; since it is an easy way of returning to God, which they had not, who lived under the yoke of the old law. What occasion is there than of crying out, as Pascal does immediately after, O Father, you put a man out of all patience, and the things that you have said to me cannot be heard without horror? This is followed with a whole Sermon full of new impostures and calumnies; and wherein several passages of Scripture, concerning the love of God, are abused, to give the bloodiest wounds, that ever could be given to brotherly love and Christian charity.  
They made an end of reading what was in Father Pintereau upon this subject, and what related to it, in the Apologies of Father Anat, and Father le Moyne. Where the whole is reduced, not to maintain the opinion of Father Antony Sirmond, such as is attributed to him, but to defend the man, by endeavouring to show, that his accusers had not understood his meaning aright, and that there was nothing worse in his expressions, than in the expressions of many other Catholic Doctors, against whom, they had never objected any thing.  
Timantes, whose trouble and confusion increased, in proportion to their going on, foamed and sputtered at this, and, after beating about the bush very much, to very little purpose, addressed himself briskly to the Abbot, and said: Infine Sir, declare yourself, do you make any difficulty to give up and quit to me even this Father Sirmund? We shall soon see, answered the Abbot, whether we shall capitulate at last; but I would gladly first try, at lest, whether I, also, may not be able to defend him.  
That does not appear to me very necessary, said Cleander interrupting him, to satisfy our curiosity: Eudoxus and I, wish neither good nor harm to the Ghost of this good Father, who has it seems been dead above these fifty years: besides the reputation of the Jesuits, for which you interest yourself more than all of us, is already sufficiently secured, 
 Apologet pour la doct des sesuites.  by the crowd of authors you have cited out of their Society; This private man, to make use of the Poëtic stile and terms of Father le Moyne, was neither a Giant, nor a man like Geryon in the fable, with several bodies, that upon the authority of his little book, it should be said of all the Jesuits together, 
The●l. Moral.  They have gone so far in impiety, as to maintain, that an interior act of the love of God, was but counselled and not commanded.  
All this is very true, answered the Abbot, but you see, Timantes is not so easily contented as you; he argues upon other principles, and I am going to satisfy him. Say rather, replied Timantes, that you are a going to wrangle and cavil with him.  
Not at all, said the Abbot, my design is only to extricat and clear things a little. I have, more than once, observed, that one of Pascals secrets, is to puzzle and confounded matters; that he possesses, in perfection, the art of magnifying objects, and that giving them afterwards to Wendrok, who is naturally, as is said, very fanciful, he turns them into spectres, or bugbears, against which, Don Quixote like, he fights with all imaginable rage and fury; and with a heat and fire, which makes him, from time to time, commit very gross solecisms amidst those fine Latin phrases, that made him pass for the Cicero of the party, in the opinion of all those, who understood nothing of the matter.  
Solecisms in Wendrok, answered Timantes in a fret; those are the Jesuits calumnies: there is better Latin, and more elegance in his notes and translation, than there is in Petavius, Sirmond, Maffeus', and all their writers put together. The dispute, at present, is not of Wendroks' solecisms, said Eudoxus, interrupting him, but certain it is, that Mr. Abbot showed me some lately, of which I had not taken notice, and which might, possibly, have escaped you also, as well as me: but let us put this matter of to another time. You must, Mr. Abbot, now satisfy, if you can, Timantes upon the point in hand.  
This indeed is my intention, answered the Abbot; let us therefore return to our subject, and read the passage in the tenth Letter, wherein he himself found these words. I will pass by all that fooling, where the wit of the man so insolently sport's itself with the love of God; but, pursued he, our Father Antony Sirmond, who triumphs upon this matter in his admirable book of the Deffense de la vertu, where he speaks, as he tells his reader, French in France, discourses thus in the 2d. to. sect. 1. p. 12.13.14. etc. Saint Thomas says, that a man is obliged to love God, as soon as he comes to the use of reason: that's a little too soon: Scotus says, every Sunday: upon what is this founded? others hold, when one is grievously tempted, yes, in case there be no way but this to avoid the temptation. Sotus says, when one receives a benefit from God; good to thank him for't. Others say at the hour of death, that's late indeed. Nor do I believe, that this aught to be done upon the reception of some Sacrament; Attrition with Confession, if they have convenience of making on't, is sufficient for that. Suarez says, that a man is obliged to it, some time or other; but at what time? he makes you yourself judge of that, for he himself knows nothing of it; nor indeed do I; for who should know what this Doctor did not? And he concludes, at last, that a man in rigour, is not obliged to any thing, but to observe the other commands without any affection for God, and without giving him his heart, provided he does not hate him. And this he proves at large in his second treatise. When the Abbot had read thus far, he said to Timantes, you are Sir a Divine without doubt.  
Not indeed Sir, answered Timantes, neither was Mr. Pascal, but this did not hinder him, from arguing extremely well upon all Moral matters; wherein a man needs but common sense to make a right judgement. A man must have something else besides that, replied the Abbot, to judge well of some subjects; and I cannot upon this, give you the satisfaction I desire, without entering a little into Divinity: bear with me I pray you but one moment, I shall not be long.  
First, there never was a Divine, that absolutely denied we had a precept of loving God, and that the observance of it was necessary to Salvation: but after the Doctors had, for the better clearing of things, made a distinction in this matter of several kinds of precepts, they were divided upon some points.  
2. This precept, they say, is, at once, both a general, and a particular precept; because it is impossible to fulfil, or obey it, in its full extent, without the observation of all the other commands; of which we cannot violate a single one, without wounding and destroying the love which we own to God. They accounted it a particular precept, because it enjoins acts of a certain particular virtue, that is to say, acts of love, which, in their kind, are wholly different from the acts of the other virtues, by which we observe, or keep the rest of the commands.  
3. The precept of charity, is, both negative and affirmative, a precept is called negative, when it is considered with reference to the things it prohibits to be done. 'Tis called affirmative, when it is considered with reference to the things it commands to be done. Thus, the precept of the love of God, is negative, in as much as it forbids us to hate the supreme good; which is to be understood, not only, of a formal hatred, a sin, of which, seldom any but the Devil is guilty, but also of every other sin; because that every sin comprehends, or includes a distance and separation from God. This precept is affirmative, in as much as it commands us, to make, on some occasions, acts of the love of God: for example at the hour of death, or upon our first coming to use of reason, which represents God to us, as our ultimate end.  
The Divines farther teach, that a precept may oblige either, by itself, by its own virtue, or by accident: their terms are per se and per accidens. It obliges by itself, from the moment it enjoins me, independently, and without reference to any other precept, to do an act of the particular virtue, to which it has a relation: thus the precept of charity, will oblige me by itself, if, independently on all other precepts, it obliges me, to make acts of the love of God. A precept obliges by accident, when I am bound to acquit myself of some incumbent duty, or to resist some temptation, and that neither the one, nor the other, can be performed without doing the act commanded by this precept: thus finding myself, in some circumstance, obliged by the precept of repentance, to make an act of perfect Contrition, the precept of charity, upon this occasion, obliges me, by accident; because that the act of Contrition, being a detestation of sin, proceeding from the pure motive of the love of God, I cannot fulfil the precept of repentance, without making an act of the love of God.  
Infine, all Divines agreed, that there is a precept or command to love God; that this precept is negative; because it includes a prohibition of doing any thing against God; and that it is affirmative also; because it obliges us to some particular duties. They likewise agreed farther, that it is a general precept, extending itself to the observation of all other commands; and that it is, also a special, or particular precept, obliging us, at lest, by accident, as in the case of the necessity of Contrition and some others. The whole current of Divines do, I say, agreed in all these points; and Father Antony Sirmond also agrees with them in the treatise we are now upon. And it is not of this, he is accused, but in accusing him of another thing, they conceal, or dissemble his having taught, even this; which alone, if made known, would have sufficed to have lessened a great deal, the horror they endeavoured to bring upon his whole doctrine. The single question than, that can here be put with reference to the doctrine of this Divine in particular, is to know, whether, supposing all these other obligations, wherein the whole world agrees, this precept, as far forth, as it is special, or particular, and affirmative, does oblige us, not only by accident, but also by itself, to make formal acts of love, by which we say to God, My God I love you with all my heart.  
To that this author answers, that there is one command of God, by which we are obliged to have this love; which he calls affective, 
Pag. 21.  as there is likewise one, by which we are enjoined to have this other love, which he calls effective, and the love of execution. Which, consists in an exact observation of his commands; but that the command of affective love, is a command of sweetness, which God does not give under pain of damnation, because, said he, a Father does not say to his Children, Love me, or I will kill you. And that, 
Pag. 27.  on the contrary, the command of effective love, or of execution, is a rigorous command, because if we do not fulfil it, we must go to hell.  
This is somewhat subtle, said Eudoxus interrupting him. A little too much, answered the Abbot, and if Timantes should say but that, we should soon agreed. I say, replied Timantes, that this proposition, is execrable and impertinent, and tends to the subversion of all Morals, and the entire corruption of manners.  
Forbear a while, I beseech you, answered the Abbot, your hyperboles and exaggerations; such things are good for nothing but to blind and dazzle men, who are not used to make reflections. Let us look into things a little nearer. Do you believe, that it is this love affective, which troubles and confounds the common sort of Christians, and gives them pain in their way to heaven? no, truly, it is the love Sirmond calls effective; it is this exact fulfilling the commands of God, which discourages and overcomes nature. Let us, on the contrary, suppose, that there should be no command at all, of affective love, but that the command of effective love should subsist and be accomplished; behold than the world reformed; there would be no more injustice, nor envy, nor jealousy, nor dissensions, nor impurities, nor debauches; since this reformation, the exercise of effective love, and the observation of the precept, which commands it, is but one and the same thing. Let this doctrine than of Sirmond, be as false as you will; to say it tends to the relaxation and corruption of manners, is to give the world a very false alarm.  
Let us come a little closer to the matter, descend to particulars, and propose, according to the principles of Sirmond, this case. A man exactly observes all the commands of God, either out of that saving, pious, supernatural, fear, spoken of by the Council of Trent, and by it affirmed, in opposition to Luther, to be a gift of the Holy Ghost, or out of some other good motives of a different virtue from charity: a Christian, for example, hears Mass very devoutly on Sundays and Holy-days, and he hears it out of a motive of the virtue of Religion, which obliges him to honour him, whose infinite excellence and perfection merits the homage and adoration of all the creatures in the world: he communicates often, with this prospect and consideration, fully persuaded, that God is infinitely honoured by this action, by reason of the victim which is offered in the holy Sacrifice. The same motive, hinders him from swearing, blaspheming, and from being immodest in the Church. By a motive proportionable to this, he honours his Father and Mother, as persons, who to him are in the place of God. He submits himself entirely to his other Superiors, by the motive of the Obedience he owes his Maker. He gives alms to the poor, by the motive of mercy: he fasts for Mortification, and in Obedience to the Church. In one word, sometimes by one of these motives, and sometimes by another, he avoids offending God; or if he does offend him, he presently returns again, and detests his sin in the Sacrament of Penance, encouraged by the motives of some one of these virtues I have spoken of. By behaving himself in this manner, he observes the negative precept of charity, and fulfils the command of effective love.  
Now the question proposed by Father Sirmond, is, to know, whether a man living in this manner, without any other formal act of the pure love of God, would violate the command of charity, and sin mortally.  
This is not altogether the case, said Timantes, interrupting him; you omit an essential circumstance, remarked by Mr. Pascal, or rather, you add such a one, as hides the poison of this doctrine; it is, that Sirmond would have it, that this man keeps the Commandments without any affection for God, and by consequence observes the law, not as a Christian, but as a jew. Hearken to what Mr. Pascal says upon it.  
Father Sirmond, said he, at last concludes, that, in rigour, we are obliged to nothing more, than to the observation of the other Commandments, WITHOUT ANY AFFECTION FOR GOD, and without giving him our heart, provided we do not hate him. This is, what he proves at large, in his second treatise. Mind well, I pray said Timantes, these words without any affection for God.  
I have observed them very well, answered the Abbot, and have also, at the same time, taken notice, that they contain a most notorious imposture. Here's the book; I defy you, to show me in it those words. Read the 16.19.24. and 28 pages, quoted by Pascal. If you found them there, I will own myself the impostor I have called him. Father Sirmond, in this whole question, where he opposes love affective to love effective, excludes nothing from effective love, but only the motive, or the sole affection of pure charity, by giving it the motive of some other virtue. His design, in the treatise, is chief to examine this point, whether it be permitted, to act by hope, or fear, or any other motive, but the pure love of God; as he speaks in his preface, and as it is impossible, for any one, not to see, that reads this treatise, either in whole, or in part. But to convince you, we need but hear how he explains himself in his decision of this question.  
The Abbot in the 22th. page, read these words. He, who does not found himself inflamed with this Divine fire, and yet notwithstanding, keeps himself, out of some other good consideration, so mindful of his duty, (observe, in your turn, said the Abbot, these words, out of some other good consideration) that he has no affection in his heart, thought in his mind, passion in his Soul, nor power in his person, whose interest he does not quit, to accomplish, or fulfil, in all things, the main will of God. even in cases, where he may be disgraced, for governing himself as reason dictates, or directs. He that is in such a state, obeys the rigour of this great Commandment, and does that, which is necessary and sufficient to Salvation.  
It is therefore false, pursued the Abbot, that this author is content, that Christians should observe, or keep the law as a Jew purely, in an exterior manner, without letting his heart have any share in it; since he exacts, that it should be done, by some, holy motive, and that it be strong enuff, to make us in all things prefer God's interest to our own. For liften, I pray you, to what he farther adds. So that we never put any thing in balance with him, nor waver between his service, and that of the creature, wilfully uncertain, to which of the two we should give ourselves up, much lesle, that we should not prefer any thing to him, nor suffer ourselves to act contrary to his william.  
And well, said Timantes, in turning the thing even as you say, and as you pretend, your Sirmond understood it, will you maintain this doctrine in all its points?  
I do not say that, answered the Abbot; for I am, with the multitude of Jesuits I have cited to you, of a contrary opinion; and believe, as they do, that the precept of charity does, in rigour, oblige us to make, from time to time, formal acts, as they express it, of the love of God, and distinguished from the acts of obedience, of fear, of religion, and of that love effective, whereof he speaks. But, without defending the doctrine, a man sometimes may, as I have already said, defend the author, and therefore see, I pray, what, I believe, a man may yet say to justify him.  
1. He is not the first Divine, that has spoke in this manner: have not you, said he to Timantes, the book writ at Louvain, by Doctor Dubois, Royal Professor of the holy Scripture in that University, concerning the propositions in Morals condemned by Pope Alexander VII in 1665 and 1666? Yes I have, answered Timantes, and nothing is written in that country, upon such kind of subjects, but is sent me by some of my friends among the Doctors of Divinity: look you here it is.  
This author, replied the Abbot, seems to be a sincere man; he is not at all of the opinion you and I disapprove; 
Art. 1. ad prop 1.  on the contrary he refutes it; but before he does so, see how many authors he reckons to have taught it. Into which number he put Bannez a famous Divine of Saint Dominicks Order, Cardinal Cajetan of the same Order, Marchantius, John Sanchez, who must not be mistaken for the Jesuit Sanchez, Jansenius Bishop of Gant, Molanus a Doctor of Louvain, the greatest part of these persons would have been, for their learning, quality, and characters, much more worthy adversaries for Pascal, than this good Father Antony Sirmond: but alas his business was to seek for adversaries, only from among the Society.  
A certain person lately made me make a reflection which may be of some use to the Jesuits: it is, that the Jansenists cry Victory, and believe themselves secured against all their adversaries attacks, and sheltered against the Church's excommunications, if they can but discover some Thomists, whose expressions come near theirs upon the subject of Grace, notwithstanding the contempt they have, at bottom, for the doctrine of this School: which they treat by the name of folly, when they speak in confidence to one another, believing it, with their Master Jansenius, very distant from the thoughts, ideas, and system of Saint Austin. Why, therefore, should not a Jesuit be freed from blame, or at lest excused, when he can produce, as may be done here for Sirmond, famous Doctors, Cardinals and Bishops, raised to these dignities, by the merits of their learning and their virtues? Another author, with whom I am not acquainted, who calls himself Florimond du Plessis, citys in favour of Sirmond, the most eminent and illustrious of all the old Divines. Saint Antonin, Sylvester, Almain Doctor of Paris, the learned Tostatus, Gerson, and many others, whose expressions are perfectly like his.  
In the second place, this Jesuit had shown no inclination for this opinion, but because he believed it the opinion of Saint Thomas. Let us see, what he says pag. 15. Saint Thomas said he, 2.2. q. 44. a. 6. seems to answer not, and to content himself, for avoiding damnation, that we should not otherwise do any thing against sacred love. Wendrok, answered Timantes, has fully shown, how much Sirmond was mistaken in attributing this doctrine to Saint Thomas.  
It is very hard, replied the Abbot, for any man to argue more in the air, to shoot at random, or wider from the mark, than Wendrok has done about this article, in his long dissertation. Whoever rightly understands the state of the question, and the Divines doctrine, which I have endeavoured to explicat and unfold upon the command of charity, will see, that almost all Wendrok quotes out of Saint Thomas against Father Sirmond, may, by this Divine be admitted, without any danger, and does not at all prove, that Saint Thomas' thoughts were any way different from his. But this is not the question now in debate, whether this author be, or be not mistaken, concerning the opinion of this holy Doctor, or whether Wendrok has reasoned well, or ill upon the point: it may be always, truly, said, that Saint Thomas' opinion, well or ill understood, was Father Sirmond's rule: and it is also most certain, that Saint Thomas' way of expressing himself, gave him the occasion of thinking as he did. Let us see, said Cleander, in Saint Thomas the passage, by which he supports himself; we shall easily judge by that, whether his mistake be excusable, or not.  
The place cited by Sirmond, was immediately opened; the Angelical Doctor there puts the question; 
2.2. q. 44. a. 6.2.  Whether a man in this life can fulfil the precept of the love of God; and among other difficulties which he raises in this matter, he makes this objection; Whoever does not fulfil a precept, sins mortally; if than in this life no man can fulfil this precept, no body can be without mortal sin. After he had explained in what sense a man might, and in what sense he might not, in this life, fulfil this precept, he thus answers the objection: It must be said, that as a Soldier, is not to be blamed for not getting the victory, provided he fights valiantly, in like manner he, who in this life does not fulfil this precept, does not sin mortally, provided he does nothing against Divine love. Ita etiam qui in via hoc praeceptum non implet, nihil contra divinam dilectionem agens, non peccat mortaliter. This passage, said Cleander, might have deceived any other, as well as Father Sirmond, supposing he be deceived.  
After all, answered the Abbot, I believe he did not rightly understand Saint Thomas in this place: but the manner alone, wherein this good Father concludes the question, would deserve his pardon, althô he should have been the first author of this opinion; which before him, so many others held. See how he ends this article. It is our duty, 
Pag. 29.  not to abuse his fatherly goodness, but to act as much and as soon as possible by a principle of love, of disinteressed love, of filial and of cordial love: for this is to be carefully heeded, that, althô God, of his great goodness may save us, by the paternal conduct of fear alone, by which he disposes us, to receive the effect of the Sacraments, nevertheless, as this way is the least pleasing to him, so is it also, neither frequent, nor lasting, and we are easily turned from it ...... God has said, He, who has my Commandments and keeps them, is he that loveth me. He loves me by his works: to this he is in rigour obliged by my law: but also, adds he, he who does not love me, does not keep my say; not truly he does not keep them long: for which reason, the great Saint Antony said, there was no sure defence against the attacks of the Devil, but the love of Jesus Christ: all others, are transitory and unconstant. Is to speak in this manner, added the Abbot, the way to ruin and destroy the love of God in the hearts of Christians?  
As for my own part, said Eudoxus, I am mercifully inclined, and clearly of opinion, that if there should, ever be a new edition of Wendrok, the title of his third note, aught to be changed, Antoniuses Sirmondi adversus hoc praeceptum intolerandi errores proponuntur. It is enuff to call it a mistake, a vain Theological refinement, and as Mr. Abbot was willing to term it, a false subtlety, impertinently inserted in a spiritual treatise. Sirmond, without it, might very well have maintained, as he has done, the doctrine of the Council of Trent, against those who had the confidence to teach, that every action, which has not the pure love of God for the motive, is a sin.  
I will not go back, answered the Abbot, from what I said, to make you hope, I might capitulate, after I had for some time defended myself; I think I have done this well enuff, and I am ready yet to add, even somewhat more, provided Timantes would, on his side, use the same kind of freedom. We must see, said Timantes, what new propositions you have to make, to induce me to this capitulation.  
I will own, continued the Abbot, that Sirmond's distinction of The Commandment of rigour, for the love effective, and The Commandment of sweetness, for love affective, is a little chimerical. Who speaks in this matter of a command, speaks of a thing opposed to counsel, or advice, and by consequence, of a command of rigour. I will also say, that this doctrine, separated from the text, where it is very much softened, has in itself something very hard, and fit to be rejected, and that the pretended authority of Saint Thomas, or of Cajetan, Jansenius of Gant, or others, ought not to make it current.  
This is something, said Timantes, but what would you have me grant you in exchange? I only ask, answered the Abbot, that the Divines of the Society, of whom you have heard me cite a great number of the most considerable, having all thought, and spoken quite differently from Father Antony Sirmond, you would not, for the future, say The Jesuits teach, that the love of God is not necessary to Salvation: nor call that, the doctrine of the Society.  
This is, answered Timantes, a large article, and of great importance, which I cannot grant, without first consulting with the Gentlemen, who speak so every day; and whom I value too much, not to continued to talk as they do.  
Since you will not than, replied the Abbot, conclude any thing, without these Gentleman's consent; it is fit, when you consult them upon this point, to tell them, that a world of men are scandalised at the doctrine, and falsifications of Pascal in his tenth Letter; where pretending to attack the doctrine of the Jesuits, or rather of the most celebrated Divines upon Attrition, he does, not only, propound it, in such a manner, as that it is not to be known by these Fathers, but that it is also easily perceivable, that under this pretext, he would feign run down some points, decided by the Council; that this proposition Attrition with the Sacrament is sufficient, and this, The act of the love of God is not necessary to Salvation, have no relation to one another, as he would have it to be understood: that the Jesuits, defending the first, after an infinite number of Divines as conformable to the doctrine of the Council of Trent, do, at the same time, fight against the second; that the one ought not, nor cannot be drawn into consequence, for the other; not even in any particular case, which some may think aught to be excepted, out of the general thesis; that they will show them reason, and very good reason, when they desire it, for the diversity of the Divines systems, touching the time, wherein a man is obliged to make an interior, formal act of the love of God; but on condition, these Gentlemen will, also, propose their hypothesis, and opinion upon this matter; to the end it may be examined by the rules and principles of true and solid Divinity .........  
You are there cutting out a great deal of work for Timantes, said Eudoxus interrupting him; let us I pray you leave all these particulars, and speak of an accommodation, but of an entire, universal accommodation. I have a proposition to make, which, at first, will be surprising to you; but you shall hear the conditions. It is to unite us four in the same party, and the same interests. Mr. Abbot has been hitherto devoted to the Jesuits; you Timantes, to the Jansenists; Cleander and I have always kept a kind of neutrality; it is not fit to see, such friends as we are, thus divided; to what ever side we turn, we shall be well received; the Jesuits would esteem themselves happy in a friend, and a defender, so zealous, so quick, and so resolute as Timantes: and if Mr. Abbot would become a Jansenist, his conversion would, no doubt, make the party great gainers.  
What you propose, is a matter of consequence, said Timantes, interrupting him; let us hear what are the conditions. The conditions, answered Eudoxus, have nothing in them, but what is just and reasonable; you that are so equitable, will accept them without boggling; and I am also confident, that neither Mr. Abbot, nor Cleander will reject them. It is not, to make a discussion of the justice, or injustice of both parties, nor to enter into the particulars of all the points of doctrine disputed between them. Let us lay aside all prejudices, by which each party endeavours to gain an advantage over the other, and only mind one thing, to wit, the advantage of sincerity and fidelity.  
This I agreed to, very willingly, said Timantes; you know I pretend to those virtues more than any man living; and you take me on my blind or weak side; but this point is of large extent, and the Jesuits will have need of a great many apologies, before I can be drawn to 'em by this way. I intent, replied Eudoxus, to reduce the matter to one single point, wherein you are fully instructed, and which you need but just run over again. To what point demanded Timantes?  
To the very Provincial Letters, answered Eudoxus; do but only justify the fidelity and sincerity of your Gentlemen in the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh Letters, of which we have already begun to have some doubts and suspicions, and Cleander and I are yours.  
This is a small thing, a very easy business, said Timantes, but I would be glad that Mr. Abbot would, also sign the treaty on these terms. I do engage to make myself a party to it, answered the Abbot; but be sure you keep your word upon the penalty of valuing yourself hereafter, as much upon the name of an Anti-Jansenist, as now you do upon that of a Jansenist.  
I accept the condition, replied Timantes, so certain am I not to hazard much by the bargain. Moore than you are ware of, said Cleander; have you ever confronted, or compared Pascal's citations, with the texts of the Society's Divines? I have not, answered he, but we will immediately do it if you please. The most unnecessary and unprofitable labour, will be always agreeable, when I undergo it for your sakes. It is too late to begin it to day, replied Cleander, do it at your leisure, but be sure you do it exactly, and when you think fit give us an account.  
It is fit, said the Abbot, that we should make this piece of drudgery as easy to you as is possible, considering that to a person of your brisk, lively humour, such a task should not be a very pleasant pastime. I will therefore quit you for four or five points: of which the first shall be, to show, in the assertions, or principles of one single Jesuit, the whole, or the lest part of what is attributed to all the body in the fourth Letter, concerning the sins of libertins, or hardened and impious men. The second, to make good the accusation against them in the fifth Letter, of their permitting Idolatry to the new Christians in China, and of their having, for that end, put in practice, the direction of intention, and teaching their Converts, that they may outwardly adore Idols, provided they do but inwardly direct their adorations to a Crucifix, hid under their garments; and that also which is added, that these Fathers do not expose in that country in the assemblies of their new Converts, the Crucifix, but only discourse to 'em of the glorious Mysteries of our Saviour, without saying any thing of a suffering Jesus.  
The third, is, to justify Pascal's honesty and fidelity in reference to Filiucius' passage, touching fasts. The fourth, is, to show, in Valentia, the passage quoted by Pascal concerning simony. If a temporal good be given for a spiritual, that is to say, money for a benefice, and that the money be given as the price of the benefice, it is plain simony. But if it be given as a motive to induce the beneficed person to resign, NON TANQUAM PRETIUM BENEFICII, SED TANQUAM MOTIVUM AD RESIGNANDUM, it is no simony. The fifth, is, to tell us, what right he had to cut away from, or dismember the text of Bauni, touching the obligation a Priest is under, of saying the Masses he has agreed for, with him who gives the retribution. This text, whole and entire, seeming to have nothing in it, but what all men may, and aught to allow, nor any thing contrary to that, which Pascal does oppose. If you give me but a good account of these five points only, continued the Abbot, I shall be wholly yours, and pursuant to Eudoxus' proposal, change my side. That shall not hinder, answered Timantes confidently.  
If you fail in your undertaking, added the Abbot, I will not, however, oblige you, to change your party, at lest till I have convinced you of some other things: which if I do not do, I will own myself vanquished and submit. 1. If I do not clearly show you, that the doctrine of probability, is not an invention of the Jesuits; that it is not peculiar to them; and that they do not teach it, but with a crowd of Doctors of all Schools, all Orders, and all Nations; that they do not teach it, in the manner Pascal pretends; and that what he says of it in his Letters, is full of falsifications and impostures.  
2. If I do not justify the Jesuits touching the Idolatry of China, by authentic pieces, and records, by most full and positive testimonies, such as will make you admire the boldness and impudence of the Societys' enemies. 3. If I take not from you, all doubts and scruples, concerning the innocence and purity of Valentia's doctrine of simony, and that of Vasquez about Alms.  
You speak, said Timantes, interrupting him, and very much astonished, with great confidence and assurance. Does not Pascal, in his former Letters, set down the very articles, pages and numbers, of the Jesuit authors he quotes? does he not put all his extracts out of them into Italic letters? he does so, answered the Abbot, both in his former and in his latter Letters; and this draws the belief of all those, who do not examine the texts and compare them with his quotations, and the indignation, of all those, who do give themselves that trouble.  
What, said Timantes, Pascal the honestest man of his time, to falsify, impose, and calumniate? you are certainly in jest, this is not possible: nor could any thing be more unlikely, according to the character I have had of him from good and able men of his acquaintance.  
Let him be as honest a man as you will, answered the Abbot, what I say are matters of fact; which I undertake to prove; and when I have done it, choose whether you will preserve for him the quality of an honest man, or give that of cheats, impostors, falsifiers and calumniators, to those, who furnished him with memorial and extracts against the Jesuits. Make this division how you think fit, it is very indifferent to me.  
Do you know, said Cleander, that what Mr. Abbot promises you to do, he has already done for us; and what he has affirmed, we have seen, with our own eyes, in the authors themselves, having actually confronted and compared the Provincial Letters, page by page, with the texts, cited just as they follow in order, without any choice; and that, except one or two inconsiderable points, which Pascal had reason to found fault with, these Letters are one continued series, or complication of falsifies and impostures; which prepossesses a man with a terrible prejudice against the other articles, concerning the greatest part whereof, he has offered to undeceive us when ever we please?  
The Jesuits, answered the Abbot, are so little of the opinions ascribed to them by Pascal, that they would, without hesitating, subscribe to the condemnation of most of the propositions he contends against, taken in the sense he gives them. But that, which is wondered, and a new calumny of their enemies is, that these propositions, for the greater part, as Pascal has framed 'em, the better to refute 'em, having been most justly condemned at Rome, it was every where reported, that it was the Societys' doctrine, which was there condemned. The Jesuits in France, have suffered all this to be said, and indeed, they have done well, not to trouble themselves much about the matter. But the Flemish Fathers had not so much patience. For, they have fully demonstrated, that hardly any one of the condemned propositions, had been taught by the Jesuits; and if any one of them be found, in one or two Divines of the Society, they were neither the first, nor the only persons that taught them; but that there had been always, some non-Jesuit Divines, especially among the Thomists, who lead the van: and that for one Jesuit, who fell in with those opinions, the main part, or body of the Divines of the Society, were of a contrary opinion.  
These are very strange things, which you advance, said Timantes interrupting him; and I am apt to believe, that what you say of Pascals being furnished with false memoirs, might have happened to yourself; and that the Jesuits, imposed upon you, and persuaded you they were true: but be it as it will, since you pretend to have been already fully informed in this matter; it is not my business any longer to make head against, or oppose you, at lest, till I have satisfied myself, and taken the same pains, that you have done. Let us therefore, for the present take our leave of this subject, and talk of other things.  
And thus ended the discourse upon this matter, whereof Eudoxus and Cleander did not expect so moderate a conclusion from their Jansenist: whom the Abbot's phlegm and stayed temper, had, all along, kept within certain bounds, which, on such like occasions, had been very usual for him to transgress.  

OF THE DISTINCTION OF Probable in Practice, AND Probable in Speculation.  
THIS distinction, which some Divines have made use of in their decisions, has, from time to time, very much incommoded Pascal: It has made many of his railleries, which he believed the most witty, become false and insipid and his most vehement invectives appear altogether impertinent, and not at all to the purpose; and I am persuaded, this was one of the distinctions he was most afraid of.  
My business now, is, to discover the sense of this distinction, whether it be solid, useful, or even necessary in Morals; or whether it be only an artifice, by which the Jesuits have served themselves To ruin Religion, 
Let. 13.  without sensibly wounding the state: this is Pascals own expression.  
It is certain, there always was a great deal of difference, between the practice and speculation, in an infinite number of subjects, especially in matters of Morals. But not to devil upon a common place, let us examine, whether this distinction, may be admitted, even in the instance, wherein Pascal condems and raillies it: it is upon the chapter of murder and other violent acts, whereof he has spoken in his seventh and thirteenth Letters.  
As all this writers artifice and cunning consists, in confounding things, so the Jesuits whole justification upon this point, aught to consist, in a plain unfolding and explication of the matter; in order to this, I will first presuppose some propositions, the truth of which none can deny.  
1. When it is asked, whether, on some occasions, it be lawful to kill, or strike, it is, always, without prejudice to the Evangelical Counsel; where our Saviour bid us Not to resist a wicked man, that treats us ill: to turn our left cheek to him that has smote us on the right; and to let him have our cloak, that would by violence take away our coat. There is not a Casuist, who does not agreed, that this conduct, in a Christian, is infinitely to be praised, and perfectly heroical.  
2. But as it would be impious, to think otherwise, so it would be extravagant for a Divine or a Canonist, to regulat, by these Counsels of Perfection, the strict obligations of a Christian in this matter; and to condemn him to hell, because he would go to law with a man, that took away his goods unjustly; or because he would defend himself against a man, that should draw his sword to kill him, or lift up his hand to hit him a box on the ear, or to cudgel him. The question here, is, not what is most perfect, but only what is lawful; nor that which is counselled, but that which is not forbidden. I made this supposition, at first, to show, what pitiful antitheses, or oppositions Pascal has made, from time to time on this occasion, between these Evangelical Counsels, and the doctrine which he attributes to the Jesuits.  
3. Althô that life, honour, money, and other temporal goods, are infinitely lesle valuable, than spiritual and eternal richeses, they are yet however goods, and goods which men have a right to keep and defend, against those, who would take them away unjustly: that this right is founded upon the law of nature, and the right of Nations, authorised by the Divine, written Law: that to pretend the contrary, as some heretics do, would be to over-turn the order established by God, and to give wicked men occasion of offering violences, and insulting over good men. It is upon this ground, that all Divines agreed with Saint Thomas in this general maxim: 
2.2. q. 64. a. 7.  Secundùm jura licet vim vi repellere, cum moderamine inculpatae tutelae. That a man is allowed, by all kinds of law, to push back, or return violence for violence, provided he contains himself within, the bounds of a just and moderate defence. But all the difficulty is, to define, or determine, what these bounds are; and the difficulty is by so much the greater, as by how much we are naturally inclined and disposed by our passions and self-love to extend and transgress them.  
4. All hereupon do further agreed in the following propositions: that a man ought not to do himself right, when the wrong done, or intended may be prevented or repaired, by a superior power: that to avoid death, at lest we may take away his life, that attacks us, with a full design to take away ours: that the person assaulted, if he cannot otherwise defend himself, has a right, at lest, in some circumstances, to do the aggressor a greater mischief, than what he apprehends from him: so althô money and all householdstuff, are much lesle valuable than life, yet notwithstanding, 
Cap ●. de homi. cap. 3.  Saint Thomas and the Canon Law, founded upon the 22th. chapter of Exodus, teach, that it is lawful for a private man, to kill a robber, if he finds him forcing open the door, or breaking into his house in the night; and the same law adds, that one might kill him by day, if he offers to defend himself with weapons.  
All this being supposed, certain, there arise, upon this subject, a thousand difficulties, of great importance, to be resolved, by the Canonists and Divines: whereof this, which has a relation to the present question, is one: it is a case decided by the Jesuit Reginaldus, wherein he makes use of the distinction Of Probable in Speculation, and Probable in Practice, 
In praxi, libr. 21. nu. 62.  mentioned by Pascal, in his seventh Letter. I have chosen this example, because, it is very proper to make the business in hand be easily understood: and that, afterwards it will be easy to apply, what I shall say upon this subject, to other cases of this nature, reported by Pascal, in his seventh and thirteenth Letters: where the falsifications are horrible, especially in the citations of the passages in Reginaldus and Lessius.  
Reginaldus, after he had explained the circumstances wherein it is lawful to take away the life of an unjust aggressor, adds this which follows. It is to be observed, that, in this respect, it is very indifferent, after what manner an unjust aggressor undertakes to destroy a man he resolves to kill: whether he makes use of arms, poison, or false evidence; or, whether he does it, by himself, or by another. For what signifies it, by what means he endeavours to make me perish, when once it is supposed, that the way he takes will have its effect. From this principle, Reginaldus draws many conclusions; the last of which Pascal proposes for an example of the Jesuits cursed doctrine, concerning murder. Here you may see it, not as reported by Pascal, but as it is in the author himself.  
Infine, says Reginaldus, if I meet you, when you are going to bear a false testimony against me, which is sure to occasion my death, so as 'tis impossible to be avoided, and that I have no other way to escape, Nec alia est ratio effugij, it is lawful for me to take away your life, as from a man that is going to take away mine: for what matter is it, whether you do it, by your sword, or by the hands of the hangman?  
The circumstances of the case carefully to be regarded are, 1. That this adversary is actually going to execute his wicked design against me: Si eas ad ferendum contra me falsum testimonium. 2. That this design will be effectual, and its execution morally certain; Ex quo accepturus sim mortis sententiam. 3. That I have no other means to avoid it. Nec alia est ratio effugij, that is to say, that I can have no access to the judge, to make my innocence appear; that I can neither hid myself, nor run away. Without speaking of a fourth condition, which Reginaldus has put down in the beginning, to wit, that I ought to be sure of my enemy's ill design; and that how strong soever the proofs may be, so long as there is room to doubt, it is not lawful for me to make use of such a precaution. Notandum est primò mihi non licere quidem, quandiu res dubia est, occidere eum à quo mortem injustam mihi parari suspicor; etiamsi vehementia sint indicia, quòd ita res habeat.  
But yet this is not all: not content with these precautions, he adds, that, as to this case and some others of the same kind, a man must take notice of the advice he gives in another place, in relation to practice, to wit, in number 63. Quoad hoc autem, & alia hujusinodi, in praxi habenda est ratio cautelae proponendae in sequenti numero 63. versiculo, CAETERUM. And there he declares, this conclusion to be of the number of those, which, as probable as they seem in speculation, are not to be followed in practice; because of the many inconveniences morally inevitable which attend it; Quamvis in speculatione pars affirmans non careat omni probabilitate, in praxi tamen non est sequenda. Let us now examine the distinction of probable in speculation, and of probable in practice, with reference to this case. The example will, as I have said, make the thing very easy and intelligible.  
Reginaldus' answer in the case propounded, is probable in speculation: for what reason? because it is founded upon a principle of the law of nature, wherein all the world agrees, that it is lawful for me, to avoid death at the expense of his life, that would infallibly take away mine. Moreover this answer, is a consequence drawn by analogy with this other decision, of the truth of which, no body makes any doubt; I see a man watching and just going to kill me; I have therefore right on my side to prevent and kill him if I can.  
It cannot be denied, but that Reginaldus' conclusion, considering things in themselves and in general, is rightly inferred from this principle, and that with probability enuff, and that it also has an analogy with the other case; which is sufficiently plain, and admits of no difficulty: for as he said before, 'tis altogether indifferent, whether I lose my life by poison, or by steel: whether my enemy kills me with his own, or the common executioners sword. This is what the Divines call a proposition probable in speculation; that is to say, with reference to general principles, from whence it is drawn; in the doing whereof, they consider nothing but only the principles, and the connexion the proposition has with those principles, without regard to any thing else.  
But as probable as it is in speculation, it is not probable in practice, said Reginaldus; and it ought not to be followed In praxi tamen non est sequenda. For what reason? because the practice would be subject to great abuses; give occasions of many murders; and also because that this thing, of defending one's self, as much founded as it appears to be upon the right of nature, is morally inseparable from hatred and revenge, etc. These are the reasons of his assertion in number 63. and by which it may easily be comprehended, how a proposition how probable soever it may be in speculation, may not yet be always probable in practice. Reginaldus' proposition follows from a principle, received by all the world, but yet it would have very great inconveniences in practice.  
I now therefore ask, whether these two propositions be not true? the first; that this answer is probable in speculation; the second, that, it is not probable in practice? nay are they not even evident? and supposing them true and evident, is there any scandal, or any danger, in advancing, or explaining them in a book of Divinity? could Reginaldus have decided the matter in a more severe manner than by saying; In praxi non est sequenda, this proposition is not to be followed in practice?  
The love of life alone, and the heat of passion, in a man, who sees himself upon the point of dying with infamy by the malice of his enemy, will make the right, which, he believes, he has of killing him, appear, not only probable, but also evident; and that without ever having read the arguments, or reflections of Divines upon the subject: he will not spend time to weigh, or consider this principle, but prevent his man if it be possible. Who shall stop him than, in case he may be stopped, but his Confessor, or some friend directed by the doctrine of Reginaldus?  
The thing being thus unfolded, or explained, (which was needless but for such as have not the lest tincture of Divinity) have not the Jesuits a right to demand justice from the Public against Pascal for the insolent turn or application, which he has made to them, of part of his discourse, on occasion of this distinction in his thirteenth Letter?  
See, said he, in what manner your opinions begin to appear under this distinction, by means whereof you do but ruin Religion, without wounding, yet sensibly the state; whereby you believe yourselves secured; for you imagine, the credit you have in the Church, will hinder your being punished for your attempts against truth; and that the precautions you set down to prevent these permissions from being easily practised, will secure you against the Magistrates; who not being Judges of cases of Conscience, have properly no concern but for the exterior practice. Thus an opinion condemned under the name of practice, is made good under the name of speculation: but this basis, or ground being once established, it is not difficult, to raise or build upon it the rest of your maxims.  
Can there be any thing seen more flat or dull, and, at the same time, more roguish, or more wicked than this discourse? but it was the same spirit that maintained in the thirteenth Letter the calumnies at first advanced in the seventh: and which will clearly appear such, by only comparing Pascal's citations with the texts of the several Jesuit authors by him quoted. I shall content myself to instance in that which I have newly made use of, to explain the distinction of probable in speculation, and probable in practice: these are the words of his seventh Letter.  
According to our learned Reginaldus in his 21 book, chap. 5. num. 57 We may also kill the false witnesses, which a calumniator has raised up against us. If that be Reginaldus' proposition, it is very horrible; supposing this proposition true, as general and as little restrained as it is, there is no calumniator, or false witness, nor any man that cooperat's to the death of an innocent person, that may not in conscience be killed; and it is not to be doubted, but that it deserves to be anathematised. But first, hold a little; is this Reginaldus's proposition? where are the circumstances, so wisely and so expressly set down by this Divine, of a pressing danger, of a certain and inevitable death, without any manner of means either of hiding or escaping? circumstances, which appeared sufficient to other non-Jesuit Divines, even in practice, to make a man, in this occasion, found the defence just and lawful. In one word, he has made Reginaldus to say absolutely and in general, That the false witnesses raised against us may be lawfully killed. And yet notwithstanding the result, or conclusion of his whole doctrine is, as we have seen, that one can neither kill, nor counsel the kill of them, even in the most pressing circumstances. Was there ever any calumny so horrid, and so extravagant as this?  
Can a Divine, that concludes, after a serious weighing and examining all the difficulties of the question (and it is not to be denied but that there are considerable difficulties on both sides) can a Divine, I say, who concludes, as Reginaldus has done, be suspected to flatter or indulge our passions, and authorize revenge? and would not any other, than a Jesuit, have appeared to Pascal to have determined this matter in the most severe manner that was possible? must not a Jesuit Divine dare to propose the difficulties on one side, as well as on the other; nor show, that he perceives what they are? and shall he be condemned of lose Morals, for following, even the strictest opinion, because he follows it with some doubt? what, may not a Casuist arguing upon this matter say? If we proceed by general principles; if we argue by analogy to such and such other cases; if we stick only to speculation, and the consideration of the nature of things, this opinion is probable: but if we regard the inconveniences, which are almost inevitable in the practice; if we mind a man's ordinary temper and disposition in such a rencontre, it is not probable, and by consequence ought not to be followed in practice. Must not a Casuist express himself in this manner, althô the subject obliges him to do it in a thousand instances? can he not do it without being accused to allow that, which he says expressly ought neither to be done nor permitted?  
The object of this science is practice; and all conclusions which are not practical but purely speculative, are not properly moral conclusions; they are no decisions; they are without consequence in reference to actions, because they are not the rules of our manners. It is not therefore their decisions wherewith Reginaldus and Lessius are reproached in the seventh and thirteenth Letters; not only because their texts are there falsified, but also because the proposition, which properly contain their decisions, are directly contrary to that which is attributed to them.  
It is however fit not to leave unanswered the objection Pascal makes the Jesuits upon this subject; 
Let. 1●.  taken from a passage in Escobar touching the distinction of probable in speculation, and of probable in practice. Escobar, say they, in the first of his six tomes of Moral Divinity in the Preface n. 15. teaches, that every probable opinion in speculation is also probable in practice. What a great misfortune it is, that Escobar should not be of the same opinion with others? but it is not one of the secrets of the Society, to make one of their Divines first say, that an opinion is probable in speculation, and not probable in practice, and afterwards to make another advance, that every opinion probable in speculation, is also probable in practice; to the end, that people should accustom themselves to follow their caprice and their passions, and so by degrees widen and enlarge their Consciences for the committal of the greatest crimes?  
No doubt but Reginaldus writ to Escobar from Lions to Madrid, to concert with him this pleasant artifice: or, that their General himself took care to make this division of doctrine with so commendable and holy prospects. O the prodigious cunning of that thought! by which we are almost returned to that wondered secret, discovered by Pascal in his fifth Letter, of the agreement of the Directors and Jesuit Divines with their Superiors, to make some of them strict and severe, others lose and accommoding Doctors and Directors: but as ill luck would have it, Escobar agrees with the rest, even in this point, and if there be any difference, or dispute between them, it is but a dispute of words.  
First, in his Examen Confessariorum, styled in the Provincial Letters, The four and twenty old man's collection, he thinks and speaks upon this subject after the usual manner as Pascal himself confesses; and as for his book of Moral Divinity, where he says, that what is lawful in speculation, is lawful also in practice, if Pascal had read on a few pages beyond that cited he would have perfectly understood this Casuists meaning; which is very good, and which has, in reality, nothing in it contrary to what he had said elsewhere, nor to what is said by others. His words are these.  
If after having foreseen the inconveniences arising from practice, I yet probably judge, 
Lib 2. theol. mor. prob. 5.  that this practice is lawful, I may accordingly make use on't. But yet nevertheless I do acknowledge every thing which is lawful, is not always expedient, because of outward circumstances. And moreover, if the Prince, or supreme Tribunal, should forbidden it by their declarations or decrees, than the opinion, contrary to these orders, would cease to be probable: for example, there were some opinions of Angelus, Armilla, and Sylvester, which were probable before the Council of Trent; and yet notwithstanding since the Council, it is not longer lawful to follow them in practice: and therefore for my part; from the time it is said, that an opinion is not probable in practice, I hold that neither it is probable in speculation; because that the inconveniences which are found in the practice, do demonstrate its falsity.  
What can all this mean, but that Escobar would not have an opinion called probable in speculation, when, though never so well grounded upon certain general principles; admitted by all the world, the inconveniences, which are found in practice, do hinder it from being possible to be held probable in practice: whereas other Divines would have it, that the inconveniences, which hinder it from being probable in practice, do not hinder, but that it may be said to be probable in speculation, so that it appear conformable to the general principles, from whence it is drawn in a probable manner. But all do agreed, as well as Escobar; that because of these inconveniences, it ought not in practice to be the rule of our actions.  
To do a pleasure therefore to Escobar, I will forbear calling such an opinion probable in speculation; and yet to accommodate myself with others, I would very willingly call it so. I should not by that wrong any body, and my condescendance would be altogether without consequence as to our manners: and so also would be, all the other Divines different ways of expressing themselves. According to this notion of Escobar, which has nothing in it but what's very reasonable, I will say, That one may safely follow in practice the opinions which are probable in speculation; because I shall be ascertained before I call them probable in speculation, that they are probable in practice, and according to the notion of others, I will say, That it is not lawful to follow in practice all the opinions which are probable in speculation; because the quality of probable in speculation does not include all that's necessary to make it probable in practice; and I will before all Divines defy Pascal, with all his vain and sophistical declamations, to gainsay, or found fault with this point of my doctrine.  
Now to make an end, and give a short and precise account of all I have said, see to what it is reduced, according to Reginaldus and according to others, to whom they have done the same injustice. See, I say, to what all the mystery of the distinction of probable in in speculation, and of probable in practice is reduced. The end of this distinction is, first to show, that in matter of Morals, it is not enuff to argue by certain general principles, whose consequences, how well soever drawn, may sometimes have very sad sequels if by them alone, we should govern our actions. And in the second place, that there are many things, which considered in themselves, and with reference to general rules, do not appear to be sins, but yet for all that, it is morally impossible to practise them without sin; because, that the corruption of the heart of man, the violence of the passions, which the objects do excite, and the vehement impression which the presence of good or evil makes, do seldom leave the mind in such an even situation and tranquillity, as is sufficient to hinder the transgression of those bounds, which reason and the laws of God do prescribe. Is than to say, that a thing is probable in speculation, and not probable in practice; that it is prohibited to be done, that it ought not to be advised, nor its practice permitted, to invent an artifice to ruin Religion, and the Gospel, by only managing the state so, as not to wound it openly?  
But the conduct alone of Pascal and his followers, so seeming zealous for strict, in opposition to lose Morals, sufficiently proves, that, generally speaking, there is a great deal of difference between speculation and practice. One equivocation, one mental reservation, as they affirm, in their books and in their conversations, are damnable sins; and yet in practice, the lies, falsifications, and malicious turns, which they give to the doctrine and opinions of many Religious and Learned Persons, are the most innocent things in the world, and the most lawful, provided they do but fall upon the Jesuits, or some of their friends.   

OF THE Direction of Intention.  
THIS wondered principle, says Pascals Jesuit in his seventh Letter, is our great method to divert the intention, which is of such mighty importance in our Morals, that, in some manner, I dare compare it to the doctrine of probability.  
Let us now endeavour to penetrate into the bottom of this secret also, and discover it to the world better than Pascal has done. The whole doctrine of the direction of intention consists, in teaching, that in things that are of themselves indifferent, the intention, according as it is good or bad, makes an action either good or bad; that a good action ceases to be good, for want of a good intention, and that, generally speaking, the intention, is a thing of that consequence in Morals, that it makes, in a thousand instances, the only essential difference of our actions; or to express myself in the language of the Schools, it is that, which form, or constitutes every one of our actions in their several species or kinds.  
I could, by following the Jansenists method, fill the text and margin of this small writing, with an infinity of passages out of the holy Fathers, concerning the Intention; but I will content myself with two words, taken from Saint Austin and Saint Thomas, which sufficiently express, all that is comprehended in the proposition I have now laid down. 
●n Psal. 31.  Bonum opus Intentio facit, it is the Intention which makes an action good, 
2.2. q. 69 ●●. 7. in corp.  says the first. Morales actus recipiunt speciem secundùm id quod intenditur: it is the Intention which makes the difference of actions says the second. It is in this sense also, that the Fathers understand the words of the Son of God in the Gospel: If your eye be clear, 
Math. 6.  your whole body will be full of light. That is to say, if your intention be pure, what you act will not be a work of darkness: so that this principle of Divinity, has nothing in it, but what is highly orthodox and reasonable: it is very common and very necessary, and therefore to call it wondered and make it a secret of the Jesuits policy, is the most absurd and the most ridiculous thing in the world.  
But, perhaps the Jesuits abuse it in the usage, by a wrong, or an impertinent application of it to some matters. I do not intent here to refute, at large, all Pascal's calumnies upon this occasion. I will content myself, with singling out, or pointing at a few; and showing in two words, that the Jesuits application of this principle to the several subjects, is neither impious, nor extravagant: particularly in the matter of simony, of usury and of violence; wherein they are reproached by the Provincial Letters, to have made use of the direction of intention. Valentia says, that a man may, sometimes, give a temporal good for a spiritual: Escobar holds, that a man may expect some advantage for lending a sum of money: Reginaldus tells us, that we may sometimes pursue and beaten a man that has insulted and affronted us; and all this without sin, provided, that the intention be well directed. And Bauni prescribes, even an express form reported in the eighth Letter, where the direction of intention is put into practice, to make a contract lawful.  
Abstracting from Pascal's railleries, and the malicious turn he gives these things, which is not now the matter in question, is it never lawful to pursue, to beaten, or to kill an unjust aggressor? it is sometimes, without doubt; and it is even always lawful, when a man contains himself within the bounds of a just and moderate defence, Cum moderamine inculpatae tutelae. In continuing within these bounds, may not he, who defends himself, have a good, or an ill intention in beating him, by whom he is attacked? may he not do it to be revenged, or may he not do it only to defend himself? it is certain, it may be done either of these two ways; and therefore the direction of intention may very well take place in this matter.  
Is it never lawful to give a spiritual for a temporal good, or to make profit of one's money? without doubt nothing is more lawful: the Priests daily receive money for their Masses, and men do hourly make contracts of partnership, and contracts for a yearly income; if I give a Priest money as a payment of his Mass, I am guilty of simony; but if my intention be to give it only out of a principle of pure gratitude, or for alms, or for some such motive. I am not guilty of simony.  
I have given a man twenty thousand pounds, at five in the hundred, if at twenty years' end he pays back my principal, he will found that for twenty which I gave him, I shall have received forty: with what conscience, and by what rule of equity, can I receive back as much more as I paid? if in giving out this money, I intended to purchase a right of receiving yearly a thousand pound out of an estate of land, for example, that was mortgaged to me, I do nothing against justice; but if I had only an intention to employ my money, to get by it a great deal more than I gave, I become an Usurer: if in giving my money to a Merchant to be made use of in his trade, on condition that he will restore it with profit, for example, at five in the hundred, I become this way also an Usurer; but if I have a real intention to enter into partnership with him, my conscience is secure.  
Since the intention than in matter of contracts, is always essential to make them valid, or lawful; and since when a man is to defend his life, his fortune or his honour, the intention, is one of the things that contributes to the making this defence just and lawful; why should not the Jesuit Divines be allowed, as well as others, to teach, that in these matters, if a man will not sin, he must take care to act with a good intention?  
Valentia, in his treatise of simony, propounds the question just as Saint Thomas did, he handled the same cases, and resolved many of ●um, as Saint Thomas had done, by the direction of intention. Why should the direction of intention be a most innocent thing in Saint Thomas, and yet in Valentia be a wicked thing, and a mystery of the Jesuits policy?  
Bauni expounds the manner of making a contract by which men may lawfully make profit of their money; and by doing of it otherwise they would be guilty of Usury; what evil is there in this? now to speak truth, he does in this example suppose the doctrine of three contracts; but he is neither the author, nor the only defender of it: it was maintained before him by abundance of very learned non-Jesuit Canonists and Divines: being also useful and so much practised as it is in commerce, and the direction of intention not being more forced, or strained in that, than in many other contracts, which are allowed; why must it be a crime in him, to follow it, as long as neither the Church, nor the Ecclesiastic Superiors have thought fit to forbidden it?  
Escobar says, that it is Usury to exact any thing above the principal, on account of the loan; but that to hope by lending money to a person that wants it, for example to buy a piece of land that lies conveniently for him, one should get his friendship by the pleasure he does him, or some favour upon occasion, is not Usury even in thought; nor is it Usury in act, when afterwards, by putting him in mind of the pleasure he did him, he endeavours to excite his gratitude, that he may thereby obtain from him the service he stands in need of; what is there unjust, or unreasonable in this distinction? must a man pass for an Usurer for doing such an act of kindness for another, who he foresees is like to be within a little time, in a condition and credit to serve him? do men look upon the good offices they receive on such accounts as Usuries? and is there need of any thing but common sense to justify those who are here accused with so much malice, or so much ignorance?  
Infine, when Reginaldus teaches, that it is probable in speculation, but very rarely probable in practice; that in some circumstances which he sets down, and of which Pascal says not one word, a man may, but yet in the instant only wherein he is offended, pursue the person from whom he receives the affront, he gives notice, that this must not be done, with an intention to do evil for evil, but only to do that, which is necessary and no more, to save his honour; is this restriction unuseful, or capable to empoison his answer? can this decision with all the precautions which attend it, be more abused than the example of David may, who commands Solomon to rid himself of Joab and Shimei upon the first occasion that offers? without the direction of intention, what should we think of this order of David?  
Not, neither Reginaldus nor the others have here advanced any thing new, touching this direction of intention. They have said, but with Innocent III, that all laws do allow men to repel force by force; not with an intention to revenge, but to defend themselves. 
C●p significasti.  Vim vi repellere omnia jura, legesque permittunt, non ad vindictam sumendam, sed ad injuriam propulsandam. They follow Saint Thomas, when they say, that we may sometimes repel injuries, in case we direct our intention to the good of the injurer, to repress his insolence, and to conserve our own honour and authority. 
2.2. q. 72. art. 3.  Illatas contumelias nonnunquam repellere homo potest propter bonum illius qui contumeliam infert, ad reprimendam illius audaciam, & ad tuendam suam dignitatem & auctoritatem.  
What than have the Jesuit Divines done in this matter? they have taught, that a good intention, on these occasions, was so necessary, that, without it, men may be guilty of great sins; and what has Pascal done? he has turned the thing quite otherwise, in publishing, that the Jesuits made use of this direction of intention, to excuse the most horrible of sins. The Jesuits have advertised, that, in the most just defence, a man must take care, not to suffer himself to be transported with passion, that he must have no other intention than that of defending himself: and Pascal by falsifying and dismembering the writings of the Jesuits, has given out, that they excuse the greatest crimes and violences, provided men have but a good intention in their committal.  
The Jesuits have taught, that in giving a spiritual good for a temporal (and the business there is not of giving ready money for a benefice, but Prayers, Masses, Foundations and such other things) one must, on these occasions, have no intention of giving the temporal good, as the price of the spiritual; but that one must have another intention, which is, to engage the person out of gratitude, to Pray to God for him, to say Mass, etc. and Pascal upon this, Prints without ceremony, or any more ado, that Valentia and Tanner had succeeded admirably in justifying the traffic that is driven now a days for benefices.  
After he had reported what Father Bauni had said, to exclude from a contract an Usurious intention, and had put into his Letter the good Father's bad French, in such a manner as was most proper to make men laugh and ridicule it; he makes his Jesuit say, very insipidly: Usury consists, according to our Fathers, almost in nothing but the intention of taking this profit as Usurious; and it is for this reason, that our Father Escobar makes the sin of Usury to be avoided by a plain simple turn of the intention. And at the same time he reports, or rather citys the passage in Escobar, of which I have just now spoken, and quotes it for a ridiculous decision; althô it be impossible to decide it otherwise without madness or extravagance. This than at last is the great All they can make the direction of intention amount to, with which the Society has been so much reproached. This wondered principle in the Jesuits Morals, the importance of which would make one almost, compare it to the Doctrine of probability.  
After all, we leave it to God to judge of Pascal's intention in his most unjust and cruel persecution of the Jesuits. It is not impossible, but that he might have had the same end and designs, and have been actuated with the same kind of spirit, wherewith the Abbot of Saint Cyran, the Saint and Oracle of the party, was at last found to have been inspired; who upon a time, confidently said to the Abbot of Priéres; 
Information du procés de l'Abbé de Saint Cyran.  That the Body of the Jesuits, as being mischievous to the Church, aught to be entirely ruined: to which he further added, that it was God himself who destroyed the Church; that the time for its edification was passed; that the Bishops, Ecclesiastics, and Religious Persons, of the present age were, generally speaking, destitute of the true spirit of Christianity, of the spirit of Grace, and of the Church: that all the Religious of his Order, had they been true Sons of Saint Bernard, would have spent their whole time in studying, how to ruin School Divinity: that Saint Thomas himself had quite spoilt the right Science of Theology by human reasoning, etc. O how Devout and Edifying is all this Learned Discourse? and what can you, or any one imagine, ought a man to judge of a Sect or Party, whose Head or Founder thinks and talks at such a rate? who yet notwithstanding, if their own words may be relied on, is not only to be valued and esteemed, but also to pass for a zealous Christian, and a perfect Saint?   

OF Equivocations and Mental Reservations.  
ONCE more, let us begin with Pascal's text in his ninth Letter, where the Jesuit makes this following discourse. I would willingly now talk to you of the easy methods we have found out, to avoid the sins people are apt to fall into in conversation, and in the intriqus and transactions of the world. One of the most troublesome things in these occasions, is, to avoid lying; and especially when they would have a thing that is false believed to be true: for which purpose, our doctrine of Equivocations is admirable: by which it is lawful, to make use of ambiguous terms, to make them be understood in a different sense from the speaker's own meaning, as Sanchez, op. mor. p. 2. l. 3. c. 6. n. 13. I know that very well, Father, said I; we have published so much, continued he, that, at last, all the world is sufficiently instructed in the matter. But do you know, what must be done when equivocal words are not to be found? I do not, said I; I questioned it very much, answered he, for the thing is new: it is the doctrine of mental reservations, etc.  
O how agreeable and diverting is all this! there is really nothing wanting but truth to make it so. For if Pascal has not here made use of equivocations, or mental reservations, he has lied, at lest, three or four times, as shall be soon perceived. This matter is not a little curious, and there are very few people, that understand it, as it ought to be understood. I will collect and put together all the strongest and best arguments, on both sides, that have been made use of, upon this subject: for I will not in this matter adopt any opinion for my own. 
I. d. a● bus● restrictmental. c. 12.  The author of the Provincial Letters is not the first, who has attacked the Jesuits upon this article. Malderus, Bishop of Antwerp, citys and refutes a book writ by a Calvinist, and Printed in the year 1609. 
Some articles of the jesuits doctrine and of some other Doctors of the Popish party.  entitled Articles de la Doctrine des Jesuits, & de quelques autres Docteurs du parti du Pape; where this particular point is mentioned. But I do not intent to draw from thence any advantage for the Society. My design, is, to examine things in themselves without prejudice or prepossession; and only to make appear how difficult it is to make a right choice in this matter.  
1. Althô equivocations and mental reservations are often confounded together, there is, notwithstanding, a great deal of difference between the one and the other. Every proposition that has more senses than one, is called Equivocal; and that also which the speaker foresees the hearer will take in a different sense or meaning from that which he gives it in his own mind. Such was the answer of Abraham, when he told the Egyptians that Sara was his Sister; foreseeing that they would take this word Sister in another signification, than that which he himself gave it. It is called a mental reservation, when a proposition, which, being literally taken, appears to be false, but being restrained by something that I retain in my mind it is found to be true. A man, for example, that is earnestly importuned by an other to lend him money, tells him, I have none. This answer is false, but it would become true, if it were joined with the words, to lend you, which he did not add.  
2. There is no manner of doubt, but that, in these equivocations and restrictions, there is something, which at first sight, appears opposite, or contrary to sincerity and simplicity, or single heartedness; which often seems to be very odd and unnatural; but after all, those, who are concerned in this dispute, have a right to desire the reader to suspend his judgement for a few moments, till he has examined the reasons on both sides; let us therefore grant them this favour.  
3. All Catholic Doctors unanimously agreed, that it is never lawful to tell a ; and that a lie, being an ill thing of its own nature, no reason, no cause, nor any motive can possibly make it lawful.  
4. This principle, once laid down and received of all as indubitable, has occasioned many great difficulties in Divinity, as well in reference to practice in some conjunctures, as on account of the exposition and meaning of several passages in holy Scripture. Men are obliged on several occasions to speak in a very particular manner, which manner of speaking seems hard to be reconciled, or made consistent with sincerity. As to the Scripture, when God, or the blessed Saints, or Angels do speak in it, it is not lawful to say, there is any thing of a ; and when it only reports the words of some persons commended in it, and whom we are to esteem as great and eminent Servants of God, it is also very hard to found in their say any thing contrary to truth. Notwithstanding there are passages of both these kinds in Scripture, which have been very difficult and puzzling to Interpreters, and cost even the Holy Fathers, in all times, no small pains to explicate them aright.  
5. These two sorts of difficulties, without which, in all appearance, none would have ever thought of ask, whether the usage of equivocations and mental reservations be lawful, were the cause, that many Divines, Interpreters of the Scripture, Canonists of every School and every Country, have accounted them, even necessary, on several occasions: but yet nevertheless, straitening them within bounds much more narrow, than they commonly say, who, under this pretence, have undertaken to decry and run down their adversaries. For all the Doctors, who have handled this subject fully and at large, do not fail to show, and point out, its abuses, and to give their readers great cautions to beware of them.  
6. Since on one side these difficulties I speak of are the principal proofs of those, who are for this custom, and that on the other, the consequences, which it seems to draw after it, are the strongest arguments of those who are against it: my main business in this discourse shall be, to oppose the one to the other, and to consider and weigh them exactly, without dissembling, or concealing any thing, that may raise the value, or give the advantage to either side. In the next place, I will examine whether the Jesuit Sanchez, who is by name and most strongly attacked upon this point be guilty; and whether his accuser has done him justice or injustice. Here follow the chief reasons of those, who absolutely condemn the usage of equivocations and mental reservations.  
First, they say, they are palliated lies, and the exposition alone, that is made of the nature of equivocal propositions, either in general, or in particular, in the examples brought, do show, that they are but subtleties, invented on purpose, to persuade us, that men do not lie, when they speak most expressly against their thought.  
In the second place, the design and effect of the one and the other, is to deceive and lead into error those we speak to.  
In the third place, they tend to the destruction of civil society and human conversation: for if he, that speaks to me, be persuaded, that equivocations and reservations are not lies, how shall I know, that he does not actually make use of them, even at the moment he seems to me to speak, with the greatest sincerity and simplicity imaginable?  
In the fourth place, the passages in Scripture, and in the Fathers which inspire me with horror against double dealing, and make eulogiums of the contrary virtues, do visibly fight against double meaning words and answers; which makes the man who hears me, take up quite different notions from what I seem willing he should conceive. Infine, these subtleties are new, and altogether unknown to the men of old. This is the sum, or precise account, of all that can be said against equivocations and mental reservations. Let us now see what is said to defend them.  
And first, an infinite number of Divines and Canonists, who after much meditation upon this matter, could not resolve absolutely to condemn their usage, do agreed, that they are sensible of the force of these arguments; they would yield to them with all their hearts, if they could found out some other better secret, to avoid certain troubles and abundance of inconveniences, to which human society would found itself exposed, in case that equivocations and mental reservations were absolutely forbidden.  
Besides that, they believe them founded upon the practice of Saints, on occasions, wherein they are not condemned by the Scripture, nor by the Ecclesiastical history, and where they are often defended by other Saints. Let us begin with these last articles.  
Among several examples in the old Testament, I will content myself at present with that of Abraham. This Patriarch, obliged by famine to retire into Egypt, 
Gen. ●●.  was afraid jest the King, or some of the Inhabitants of the country, charmed with the beauty of Sara, should murder him, that they might marry her. To avoid this danger he said to his Wife, the Egyptians, seeing your beauty will say, this Woman is that Man's Wife, and they will kill me, that they may enjoy you: say therefore, I conjure you, that you are my Sister. Dicturi sunt Vxor ipsius est, & interficient me & te reservabunt; dic ergo, obsecro te, quod Soror mea sis. The thing happened just as he had foreseen: being therefore questioned upon the matter, both answered directly as they had agreed, and saved themselves by the equivocation of the word Sister, which in that country had two significations. Abraham found himself under the same circumstances and trouble at Geraris in Palestine, and there behaved himself after the same manner.  
Isaac his Son, finding himself in the same place, in the same kind of danger, on account of Rebecca his Wife, acted just as Abraham had done. 
Gen. 26.  Cumque interrogaretur à viris loci illius super uxore suâ, respondit, soror mea est. Timuerat enim confiteri quòd sibi esset sociata conjugio, reputans ne fortè interficerent cum. The Son for this was neither punished, nor reprehended by God, not more than the Father: both of them did the same things, at the time that God promised them a numerous posterity: he also protects them in a miraculous manner on these very occasions, where to avoid death, they lay hold of means which are pretended to be so very unjust; and which must have been so, contrary to the respect and to the obedience we owe to the Master of our lives; so injurious to his goodness and to his power, upon which these holy men had so much reason to depend.  
Saint Austin, far from accusing, in this, these two Saints, takes their part against a Reformer of his time. Faustus the Manichean. He maintains, that in this rencontre Abraham did not lie, althô he answered the question but by halves, and not at all, according to the thoughts and expectations of those that spoke to him: for, says he, Abraham, being asked, did not answer, that Sara was not his Wife; but they enquiring what relation she had to him, he answered, she was his Sister, but did not deny she was his Wife: he concealed the truth, but did not say any thing that was false. 
Lib 22. cont. Faus●. c. 33.  Neque enim, utrum ejus uxor esset interrogatus, non esse respondit: sed cum ab eo quaereretur, quid ei esset illa mulier, indicavit sororem, non negavit uxorem. Tacuit aliquid veri, non dixit aliquid falsi.  
A little after he defends Isaac, as he had before defended Abraham. What evil had he done in all that, said he, since he did but imitate his Father? the same reasons defend him in the same kind of instance, wherein Abraham committed no sin. The same holy Doctor speaks after the same manner, upon the same subject, in several places of his works. But let us come to the examples of some Christian Saints.  
I will say nothing of the answer of Saint Francis, who being asked whether he had not seen a man pass by, who was pursued for murder; answered, putting his hand into his sleeve, He did not pass this way: perhaps that such nice men, as I have to do with, would make little account of this, look upon it as an idle story, and give little credit to the writers who report it.  
The example of Saint Athanasius, who flying upon the Nile escaped, by an answer like this, from the hands of those who were sent by Julian the Apostate to seize him, is too well known to need to be here particularly mentioned. I will tie myself to two others, which hitherto have been lesle spoken of: the one, is, of Saint Paulinus, the other of Saint Fulgentius, both great admirers of the doctrine of Saint Austin. Does not that, joined with the approbation, which this holy Doctor himself has given to the conduct of Abraham and Isaac in the instances I have brought down, make a very strong argument for the Divines, especially when they defend themselves against men, who, every where, value themselves upon being the Disciples of Saint Austin?  
Saint Paulinus in a piece of Poëtry, 
Natal. 5.  which he composed in honour of Saint Felix of Nola, tells us, that this Saint, being upon the point of being arrested for a Christian by the heathens, who were in quest of him, God by his miraculous power hindered them from knowing of him; they asked himself, where they might found Felix. The Saint perceiving, by this enquiry, the succour sent him by Jesus Christ, and the miracle he wrought in his favour, answered them, laughing; I know not this Felix whom you seek for; which made them pass him by, and proceed.  Persensit & ipse faventis Consilium Christi, ridensque rogantibus infit: Nescio Felicem quem quaeritis. Illicet illi Praetereunt ipsum. 
It is not to be doubted, but that, if Felix had told a  upon this occasion, he would have made a very scurvy return to the kindness our blessed Saviour showed: but if he did not tell a , what can we think, but that he had recourse to the equivocation of the name of Felix, or to some mental reservation? it seems otherwise impossible to save him from a .  
But a plainer and more express equivocation, is not to be met with, 
Cap. 12.  than that of Saint Fulgentius: it is in his life, written by the Deacon Ferrand, his Disciple, and dedicated to Bishop Felician, this Saints Successor in the Bishopric of Ruspa. This Deacon reports, that Saint Fulgentius, whilst a Monk, having suffered great persecution in Africa, took a resolution to go and visit the Solitaries or Hermits of Egypt, of whom he had heard wondered things: he took his way through Sicily, and landed at Syracuse; whereof Saint Eulalius was Bishop; but without quitting entirely his Monastic profession. The holy Prelate received Fulgentius into his Monastery, as he used to do other strangers, whom he treated with great hospitality. He discovered in two conferences he had with him, the extraordinary merit of this passenger, and pressed him to tell him the causes that made him quit Africa.  
Fulgentius, says the author of his life, apprehending he should be guilty of vanity, if he should acknowledge the motive that made him go into Egypt, answered him in these terms, I am going to seek my parents, who I hear are travelling in that country: Parents meos requiro, quos illis in partibus vivere peregrinos audivi. The Bishop, having some suspicion that he did not speak sincerely, and half diving into the sense of this ambiguous answer, learned from another Monk, who those were whom Fulgentius meant by the word parents; in so much that Saint Fulgentius, seeing himself discovered, was obliged to confess the truth. But said the historian, he might truly call those his parents, whose examples he intended to imitate.  
If that be not a full and formal equivocation, there never was any: for Saint Fulgentius seemed to take the word parents in its ordinary signification, and yet really intended by it those, who were to be his Fathers in Christ; and he also gave to the word perregrinos, a sense as metaphorical as this was, understanding that those he spoke of were travellers upon earth, advancing or going on to the celestial country.  
You see than, that Saint Austin approves the couduct of Abraham and Isaac, and that Saint Paulinus does approve that of Saint Felix: you see also, what has been practised by Saint Athanasius, by Saint Felix himself and Saint Fulgentius, which seems manifestly to authorize equivocations and mental reservations: it appears to me, there needs little more to make a probable opinion in this matter.  
But the Divines, whose doctrine I here explain, do believe they have yet something stronger to support it. They pretend, that the usage of reservations and equivocations cannot, in prudence be absolutely condemned, without having first seriously reflected upon certain places of the Gospel, where they seem to be practised.  
What, say they, is this thing called equivocation? it is an ambiguous word, that has several significations, or a proposition composed of ambiguous or doubtful term's, which the speaker foresees aught to be taken by those, who hear it in another sense or meaning, than he himself understands it in; of which there are two plain examples in the Gospel.  
In Saint John Cap. 11. the Son of God said to his Disciples: Lazarus our friend sleepeth, but I go that I may awake him out of sleep. It is evident, that this is an equivocal proposition: it is also certain, that the Apostles took it in its natural signification. Lord, said they, if he sleeps, he shall do well. It is also certain, that our Saviour foresaw they would take it so. Jesus, said the Gospel, spoke of his death, but they thought that he had spoken of taking rest in sleep.  
The second example, is taken out of the second chapter of the same Evangelist, where our Lord said to the Jews, Destroy this Temple and I will build it up again in three days. He spoke of his body, and the Jews thought, as naturally enuff they might, that he spoke of the Temple of Jerusalem. It is very well known, that our Saviour had no ill intention in speaking after this manner; and that what he aimed at, was not to deceive those he spoke to; but that signifies nothing; for say the Divines we condemn as a sin all equivocations, that may possibly wrong any other person whatsoever, and all those whereby the speakers have a design to deceive and surprise their hearers.  
There are also found in the Gospel mental reservations, and that not made out by arguments or by consequences, but such as appear, to every reader, formal enuff and of themselves sufficiently evident.  
In the seventh chapter of Saint John, The Brethrens of Jesus said to him, departed hence and go into Judea. Our Saviour answers: Go ye up unto this feast; but as for me, I will not go. Non ascendam: having so said, adds the Evangelist, be abode still in Galilee; but when his Brethrens were gone up, than went he also up unto the feast, not openly, but as it were in secret. Non manifestè sed quasi in occulto. This proposition, Non ascendo ad diem festum istum, considered precisely, according to the words, would be false, but by adding to it this word manifestè which our Saviour had in his mind, it becomes true.  
I know what reflections were made by the Cretics upon this passage, because of the variety of the Greek manuscripts; but I also know the invincible reasons by which it is proved, that the reading of our Vulgata in this place, is certainly the true reading. Here are also two other passages, wherewith I will end the proofs which these Divines believe they may draw from the authority of Scripture to confirm their opinion.  
One is taken out of the thirteenth chapter of Saint Mark; where after our Saviour had made his Disciples a descriprion of the terrible things that should hap at the day of Judgement, he adds, But of that day and of that hour knoweth no man; not not the Angels which are in heaven, neither the Son; but the Father only. We are notwithstanding, bound to believe, that the Son of God did really know that day; and from the beginning the Agnoitae were accounted heretics, for saying, that our Lord did not know it; and the Greeks called them by that name, to show, that their error consisted, partly in attributing this ignorance to the Son of God. The Arians would have made use of this passage against the Catholics; but the Fathers refuted them with all the zeal and strength that was possible.  
This proposition, say the Divines, would than be false, if taken expressly according to the terms: The Son of God knows neither the day nor the hour of the last Judgement. It must needs follow by consequence, that the truth of this very proposition depends upon a sense, that our Saviour gives to these words, and which is not expressed by the words themselves; that is to say, that in speaking them, he had besides a particular meaning, or understood something else, which was only in his own mind; and which therefore, conclude they, could be nothing but a mental reservation.  
But that which is remarkable is, that the Fathers, and particularly Saint Austin, gives us, when he explains this passage, a form of mental reservations, exactly like that which the Divines propose. Our Lord, according to Saint Austin said, that he knew not, when the day of Judgement would be; not, that he was really ignorant of it, but because he knew it, not to discover, or, as may be said, to betray it, 
In Psal. 9  ad prodendum. Ipsi judici occultum esse dictum est, non ad cognoscendum, sed ad prodendum.  
Let us here set down the example, which is commonly made use of, to explain what a mental reservation is; my Father's enemy is in quest of him to kill him, he asks me where he is? I make answer, that I do not know; this answer, is likewise false in itself, taking the terms or words, precisely as they stand; but let us add to them, not by word of mouth, but only by thought, ad prodendum, that is to say, I do not know where he is to betray him, and than it becomes true, at lest in the same manner, that Saint Austin finds our Savior's proposition true.  
Infine, continued these Divines, the passage in the fifth chapter of the book of Tobit, appears inexplicable without an equivocation or a mental reservation; and one needs do no more than read it to be convinced of that. Old Tobit there demands of the Archangel Raphaël, whence are you? Vnde te habemus? the Angel answers, ex filijs Israël, I am an Israëlite. After several questions Tobit inquires again, Of what Tribe, and what family I pray art thou? The Angel answers, do you not seek a guide for your Son? what signifies it to you, to know my family? but that you may be freed from all fear, I will tell you, that I am Azarias, ego sum Azarias Ananiae magni filius. Thou art, replied Tobit, of an illustrious stock or family.  
Mind how the Divines argue upon this place. In all these passages, where the propositions, taken according to the terms and their natural meaning, are not true, a man is obliged to acknowledge, that there is in them a lie, or an equivocation, or a mental reservation. One cannot, without blasphemy, acknowledge there is a ; and therefore must admit, either an equivocation, or a mental reservation: and thus, neither an equivocation, nor a mental reservation, can in their own nature, be so ill, as a , and one may, with some restrictions, or conditions, make use of them without sin.  
These than are the authorities and the difficulties, that at first made the Divines suspend their judgement of a thing, which the first idea made them reject; and which made them conclude after turning and tossing about this question, and considering it on all sides, as much as was possible, that equivocations and mental reservations could not be lys, nor things in themselves absolutely ill: that there were conjunctures and occasions, wherein they were not at all criminal, and that they were of the nature of certain things, which ordinarily are bad, because of the circumstances, but which are not bad in themselves, and which only become ill, by being made use of, without necessity, and the lawful precautions. But, before I proceed to the other ground or reason, upon which the Divines build their doctrine in this matter, it is not amiss to see, what is said against it, by those who declare themselves for the contrary opinion.  
A very able man, in a work where he has collected and heaped up a great deal of learning, has found a place for a dissertation concerning equivocations and mental reservations, where he puts this proposition in the front of his discourse. Mendacium omne lege divinâ retitum est, 
P. Alex. tom. 9 p. 3. Saec. 4. dissert. 43. pag. 483.  adeoque & restrictiones mentales, quae sunt veri nominis mendacia. Every  is forbidden by the law of God; and by consequence, mental reservations, which are real lies. And in the remaining part of the dissertation, he speaks of equivocations, just as he had done before of reservations.  
He proves his position, by a number of passages, out of the Scripture and the Fathers; and infine he propounds many objections: among these objections are to be seen part of the difficulties which I have set down; there are others also, of which I have not spoken; but upon which I shall make some reflections, by way of instance or replication, to the solutions by him given. Than which method, nothing can better show the difficulty of the matter.  
Father Alexander answers the Priscillianists very well, that Abraham did not lie neither in Egypt, nor in Abimelech's house; and he grounds his answer upon the authority of Saint Jerom and Saint Austin. But I would gladly know, what answer he would make, if a Priscillianist, in case there still were any, should make him this reply?  
You say, that equivocations and mental reservations are lies; but it is impossible to excuse Abraham from lying on this occasion, without saying he made use of a mental reservation, or an equivocation; therefore according to your principles, it must be confessed, that he told a : this Priscillianist might thus prove the minor of his syllogism.  
In the present question, we call a proposition equivocal, which has several senses or meanings; and which we foresee will be taken by the person to whom we speak, in another sense than that which we give it in our own mind, and which notwithstanding is the most natural; especially when we make such a proposition expressly and with intention, to hid from him the truth, which by his question he is desirous to know. These are the characters by which an equivocation appears most contrary to sincerity and comes nearest to a ; but it is visible, that all this agrees perfectly, with the answer made by Abraham in the circumstances he was in, when asked whether Sara was his Wife; and he answered she was his Sister; he therefore, on this occasion, made use of a very formal equivocation.  
But the way this Doctor maintained, according to Saint Austin, that Jacob did not lie, when he robbed Esau of the blessing, designed for him by Isaac, would give the Priscillianist a yet much greater advantage. Jacob makes three propositions on this occasion, which can hardly be justified from being lies. 1. His Father, who was blind, inquires of him, Who are you my Son? Jacob makes answer, I am your first born. Ego sum primogenitus tuus Esau. 2. He adds, I have done as you commanded me. Feci sicut praecepisti mihi: althô his Father had said nothing to him. 3. Jacob continues, Eat of what I have hunted, my Father, comede de venatione meâ: althô he had not been a hunting, and that what he had prepared for him were two Kids, which his Mother had made him take out of the flock.  
1. Jacob did not lie, in saying I am Esau your first born Son, said Father Alexander; for what reason? because Esau had before sold his birth right to Jacob for a mess of lentils; and so Jacob in this sense might call himself the elder. It must than be, says the Priscillianist, by virtue of the equivocation in the word primogenitus, or first born, that he does not lie; but when he said I am Esau. Ego sum Esau, this word is not in itself equivocal, and not showing as the word primogenitus the right of eldership, nor the birth time, he must needs in saying that, have made use of a mental reservation. I am Esau, not in person, but by way of representation; not in reality, but by virtue of my privilege.  
2. For the second proposition, Feci sicut praecepisti mihi, I have done as you commanded me. Father Alexander says, It is true, with respect to Isaac's first intention, althô it be not true with respect to another lesle principal intention. For in commanding his eldest Son to go a hunting, Isaac's chief intention was, to make him merit by this action his last blessing; but his lesle principal intention, was to give this order to Esau, whom he believed his eldest Son, being yet ignorant of the mystery and the design of God. So Jacob, having performed his Father's principal intention, said to him without a , I have done what you commanded me.  
The Priscillianist might make a great many reflections upon an explication so confused, and so strained as this is; but Father Alexander could not, but confess and agreed with him, that the shifts, the several wind and turn, which they make Jacob take to secure his proposition from the falsehood which appears in it, do, at lest demonstrat, that if it be true, it is but with relation to some meaning, which he gives it in his own mind, and not in reference to the meaning, which offers itself, and naturally arises from the words: it is easy to see, of what consequence this confession must be to the present subject.  
3. But as for these other words of Jacob, continues Father Alexander, Comede de venatione meâ, Eat of what I have hunted, they are altogether true, for Jacob had brought two Kids, which he had sought for and chosen from among the flock; and he understood by the word hunting or venison, the animals he himself had taken, and his Mother had dressed.  
Without making the Priscillianist argue any farther, I leave the reader to judge of these answers, and I will only say with all respect to the person who made them, that if I had undertaken, as he has done, to declare against equivocations and mental reservations, I would, without ceremony, have abandoned the opinion and explication of Saint Austin, Theodoret, and Saint Gregory, and would with others have freely confessed, that Jacob was guilty of several lies: or, if I would have followed the interpretations of these these three Fathers, I would have acknowledged, on this occasion, with many other Divines, that equivocations and mental reservations were not lies. Whoever pitches on a middle way, will found it insupportable, not possible to be maintained; and every body must allow, that to join his answers with his assertion, is to say two things contradictory, to deny and to prove at the same time, that the usage of equivocations and mental reservations is lawful.  
It is the same thing as to the manner he takes to explain the Angel Raphaëls answer to Tobit. Ex filijs Israël. I am of the Children of Israël. This is true, says Father Alexander, because be came from the Cities of the Children of Israël, that is to say, of the faithful, whom God has given him in charge: or because that Israël in Hebrew is the same thing with God governing ....... Raphaël, adds this Father, said also truly, that he was Azarias' the Son of the great Ananias, because he had taken the shape and figure of Azarias, who was the Son of this Ananias ...... besides in Hebrew Azarias signifies the succour of God and Ananias signifies the Grace of God. Moreover the Angels are the Children of God, and Raphaël being sent by God to succour Tobit in several dangers he was like to fall into, and being an Angel, he might truly say, I am Azarias the Son of great Ananias. And thus Father Alexander explains this passage.  
That all which was spoken by the Angel Raphaël on this occasion might be truly said, is not to be doubted, since it was an Angel that spoke in this manner; but that all this could be truly said, without equivocations and mental reservations, is hard to be conceived: for since these propositions are not supposed true, but by giving them another meaning, than that which naturally arises from them, and that they deceived him to whom they were spoken, and could not but deceive any body that should hear them, they are not therefore true, with respect to the words, of which they are compounded; but to make them true, something else must be added, which was only in the thought of the speaker, and by consequence, here is another argument for equivocation and mental reservation.  
It is also fit to add the explication, 
Tom. ●. Dissert. 39 p. 275.  which Father Alexander gives in another place, of that passage in Saint Marc, of which I have already spoken. I answer, says he, in the third place, that our Lord did not know the day of judgement for us, but for himself alone: that is to say, that he really knew it, but that he did not know it, to tell it us. Respondeo 3ᵒ Christum nescivisse diem judicij nobis non sibi. Id est, licet absolute sciverit, nescivit tamen illum ut nobis ●evelaret. By all this, the Divines, forced by these difficulties, to have recourse to the usage of equivocations and mental reservations, for the explication of this matter, are confirmed in their opinion, perceiving that those who oppose them, are themselves, at last, obliged to do the same thing.  
A Religious man of another Order, contending also against equivocations in a work full of zeal, if you'll believe himself, but which if read, will be found full of bitterness and gall, made use of another shift, or rather of other terms than those of Father Alexander, to free himself from the same difficulties and troubles. And particularly upon that passage in Saint Marc, he says, that our Saviour did truly affirm, that he knew not the day of judgement, because he said, that in sensu praeciso & formali; in a formal and precise sense; he did not know it, said he, in quartum erat purus homo, in as much as he was a mere man.  
Passing by this expression, which is altogether Nestorian, I would be glad to know. 1. Whether the proposition, precisely taken, according to the terms or words, be not false; The Son does not know the day of Judgement. 2. Whether it does not become true, by these words, which express the formal and precise sense, in as much as he was a pure man. 3. Whether it be not true, that these words were in the Son of God's mind, and not in the proposition, when he made it. If all this be true, these words spoken in a precise sense which they do not express, make a clear and perfect mental refervation. For it must be remembered, that by a mental reservation we understand a propolition, which taken, according to the terms, is false, and which is not true, but with reference to other words which the speaker reserves in his own mind. But all this is here to be met with; all therefore, that this writer has done, is to change the name of mental reservation into that of the formal and precise sense. He argues much after the same manner upon the example of Jacob, upon that of the Angel Raphael, and upon Judith's discourse to Holofernes.  
But what is pleasant in all this is, that if once the formal and precise sense be admitted, instead of equivocation and mental reservation, and that it is allowed not to be bad in itself, to make use of the formal sense or meaning, I may say of that, all that can be said of mental reservations and equivocations; and draw from thence, all the same conclusions, true or false. I will say, it is a piece of subtlety of the new morals, and that by favour of this formal and precise meaning, all manner of lies shall be palliated. Every man may be considered under several qualifications, or according to the School language, has many formalities whereupon to ground a formal and precise meaning. For example, when I speak to a Merchant, I do not know whether he will answer me as he is a Merchant, or as an inhabitant of Paris, or as a Father, or as a man precisely: the formal and precise sense being, at lest, as well able to secure us from lying as equivocation: I may be in doubt, whether he that speaks to me, does not make use of it: And by this means all civil commerce, is overturned; there is not longer any thing in the world, but dissimulation and double dealing; and we can have no more confidence in any person.  
I do not pretend to make any comparison between this other writer and Father Alexander, either for capacity or probity. That man's ill conduct did honour to his opponents; he apostatised sometime after from his Order, and was afterwards arrested and made a close prisoner for other reasons than his mental reservations.  
But I dare positively say, that Ftaher Alexander's answers are not better than his: that the principles of the one, go as far, as those of the other; that if one may speak, after the same manner, that Jacob spoke to Isaac, without being guilty of any sin; if one may, without a , call hunting or venison two Kids presented to an old blind man; and say they came from hunting them down, because they took them out of the flock; assure him in formal terms, that he was the elder Brother, althô he were but the youger; say I am Esau, I have done what you commanded me, althô he had received no order from him, and that he was not Esau. I say, if all this was lawful for Jacob, and that he could do it without a , and without sin, as Father Alexander teaches, because he gave to the word elder to Esau and to hunting, other significations than Isaac by his questions took them in, and which all men besides; give them I say, that this reason will produce the same consequences, with that of the formal and precise meaning; and that this principle being once laid down, it would be very indifferent, whether they freed from lying and from sin, a man that should now use the same conduct by virtue of a formal and precise sense or meaning, or by virtue of equivocations or mental reservations, or any other name Father Alexander shall be pleased to invent, to distinguish his own system from that of other Divines. I will not at present carry this reflection farther, because the subject will again oblige me to do it in another place. We will now go on to the second foundation of the opinion, which holds it lawful, to make use of equivocations and mental reservations, in some conjunctures: and these are cases of conscience upon which the Divines consulted, found themselves under some difficulties and trouble; it will be enuff to propose three or four of them.  
1. A man is entrusted with a secret of state, the discovery of which would have no smaller consequences, than the ruin and destruction of the whole Kingdom, the profanation of the Churches and Altars, and the total overthrow of the true Religion; this person is interrogated by a spy, or by a traitor, whom he knows to be such, and that he is besides a cunning skilful knave, of a deep insight, and infinitely penetrating into things. The circumstances are such, that if he seems to hesitat, boggle, or elude him; in a word, if he does not clearly, and positively say, it is not so, there needs no more, to make this traitor discover what he would conceal. What should a man thus catechised do? on one side, he may not lie, though the whole world were at stake; on the other, the charity and the fidelity he owes his Prince and his country, will not allow him to expose them, by violating the secret to all the terrible evils wherewith he sees them threatened. What side is he to take? he would willingly sacrifice his blood, and a thousand lives, rather than betray them; but this is not now the matter in hand.  
2. A profligat, wicked, brutal, furious fellow, whose violence I am not in a condition to stave of, is in quest of my Father to kill him, of my Sister to dishonour her, of my Prince to give him up to his enemies. I am under the same circumstances and the same troubles in this respect, that he was in I just now spoke of, to whom the state secret was entrusted: if I do not boldly say, I know nothing of them, or the person you seek for is not here, one of the three sought for must be lost; what is to be done?  
3. A man discovers the secret crime of another; if he does not retract, the fortune, the honour, and the life of the man he has defamed is in danger: he goes to Confession; his Confessor tells him, that he cannot be absolved, if he does not remedy the evil he has caused: but the penitent answers, what I have said, as secret as it is, is true, and if I should recall my words, I should be guilty of a new sin, because I should tell a : what must he resolve?  
4. Infine, nothing is more inviolable, than the secret of Sacramental Confession: let us suppose a Confessor, questioned about the sin of his penitent, in the same circumstance, or conjuncture, with those persons spoken of, in the two first cases; that a cunning man, if you will have it so, should have made him say certain things without thinking of 'em, and which he believed indifferent: they are, notwithstanding, such, that being once spoken, they will give ground to suspect the penitent: if the Confessor interrogated about this matter, be at a stand, if he makes use of the general, and ordinary answers upon these occasions; if he does not say plainly and positively, that he has not told him such a sin, he increases the suspicion, and gives occasion to him, that set the share, to pursue the matter. What shall the Confessor do in such a case?  
These cases than, I say, with many more of the like nature, and the difficulty there is in solving them otherwise, have made the greatest number of Divines say, that it is lawful, in some circumstances, to hid or disguise the truth by equivocation, when men would have us speak it, who have no right to know it, and when it is our own, or our neighbor's interest that they should not know it. Let us now look back and join to this the passages and examples in Scripture, of which I have spoken; the explications the Fathers have given of them, the practice of many Saints, the opinion of some other Saints concerning this practice, and infine, the manner of their answers, who accuse the Divines, that maintain it; which is such, that, at the same time, they roar and cry out loudest against equivocations and mental reservations, they are notwithstanding, forced to come back to them, and re-establish, under other names, the things they had undertaken to abolish, and fall into the same inconveniences, supposing there be any, wherewith they reproach them. I say, supposing there be any, for the Divines, who have had recourse to these principles, for the pressing reasons I have mentioned, have taken care to prevent inconveniences, by the wise precautions they have prescribed or set down upon this subject: and this is that which now I must needs explain in a few words, to the end, men may have a full and perfect understanding of this whole matter.   

The remaining part, of the Treatise of Equivocations and Mental Reservations.  
THE same charity and the same equity, that moved the Jesuits adversaries to attribute to them the doctrine of probability, as their proper and peculiar doctrine, and which had its birth in their Schools, have also made them answerable for the doctrine of equivocations and reservations. The falsehood of this accusation, is a matter of fact, which might also be as easily made out, as that which relates to the doctrine of probability: but it is sufficient in general, to advance upon this point, that it can be readily shown, that all the Jesuits have said upon this subject, always very different from what their enemies have made them speak, is not only grounded upon all the reasons, and all the authorities we have spoken of, but also upon the principles of the most famous and the most ancient Lawyers, Canonists and Divines, of all the several Schools. Let only that be read, which was written by the eminent Navarre before any thing was published by the Jesuit Divines, what was taught by the most renowned Doctors of Saint Thomas' School, as Saint Antonin, Sylvester, Victoria, Medina, 
Ban. in 2 2 q. 69. a●. 2. in 3 P●com. dub. 1.  and above all, the famous Dominic Bannes, and it will appear, that what I say is true.  
But without entering farther into the examination of this matter of fact, we must know, that the Divines, and others, who agreed, that the usage of equivocations and reservations, is a thing lawful in certain conjunctures, and when there are sufficient reasons for it, are notwithstanding divided among themselves, about that, which makes the difference between a , and a mental reservation. I will explain this in the example of the penitents Confession and his Confessor.  
All do unanimously agreed, that a Confessor, interrogated, whether his penitent was guilty of such or such a sin, or had told it him in Confession (supposing him in such a circumstance, as that he cannot otherwise keep the secret of Confession) may in conscience answer, I do not know that he has; or, he told me no such thing; althô he had really told it him: and all agreed, that than he did not lie. In this case it is demanded, what does hinder it from being a , considering, that the answer taken according to its terms is false, and contrary to the answerers own thoughts and knowledge.  
Some pretend, that that which hinders this from being a , is precisely the reservation, which the Confessor has at that time in his mind, where he has this thought; he has not told me this sin, in such a way, as that I may tell it again. This proposition, say they, is very true, and does not contradict what I have said by word of mouth, which is one half on't. So there is no  in this: for a  consists in the opposition there is between the thoughts and the words.  
Others say, that this is too great a subtlety: that althô the Confessor may really have such a thought yet, notwithstanding, if he had nothing else, his answer could not but be a : but that which hinders it from being so, is, that the person to whom the Confessor makes this answer, he told me no such thing, might and ought in prudence to think, that the sense of his answer is this: he did not tell me such a sin in a way that I could tell it you. The proposition he makes in saying, he did not tell it me, having than, morally speaking, this sense in respect to him who puts the question, as well as with respect to him who answers, is no . Whence it follows, that, as to the practice, it is the same thing, which way soever you take it; and that all the dispute between these Divines, is, but about this purely speculative question, to know, what precisely it is, which frees such an answer from being a .  
What I say of the Confessor, aught, in proportion, to be applied to the case of an important secret; or to the case of a Judge, who should not interrogate according to the forms of Law, or should do it without jurisdiction: and to several other cases, upon which one might argue after the same manner.  
The greater part of the Jesuit Divines, and among others, Azor and Laiman follow the second opinion, which, in reality, appears the more reasonable, the more natural, and the more conformable to simplicity: but which equally concerns the purity of Morals neither more nor lesle, but just as much as the other: of this opinion also, is Malderus, that learned Bishop of Antwerp in a work of his, upon this subject.  
Father Condren, that holy, and wise General of the Oratorians, propounds an other system, not very unlike this: it is in a small writing of his, made upon the question of equivocation, at the entreaty of Cardinal Richlieu, and, in all appearance, upon occasion of the dispute, which than began to grow warm about this matter.  
He first lays down three principles. The first, says he, that a  is a sin; the other, that we must keep the secret we are entrusted with, and that to betray it, is an infidelity, odious both to God and man. The third, that there are truths, the knowledge of which, is hurtful to our neighbour, and sometimes to the public, and sometimes to ourselves, which charity obliges us not to publish, althô we should be required.  
We ought, continues he, to inform ourselves of the means God has left us, to satisfy the obligations both of charity and fidelity, without falling into a . Since it is certain, that a man can never be obliged to sin, and that, in the ways of God, we have always the means not to offend him, which we ought carefully to seek after.  
The first means, is, to refuse to answer .... it is the most sincere, but not the most universal, and sometimes that would be tacitly to declare, what we ought to have hid.  
The second, is, to answer readily one thing for another, as Saint Athanasius did Julian the Emperor's Soldiers, who sought to take him. But this means is not universal, not more than the first: since that, etc.  
The third, is, to conceal the truth, under some figure, of which the most common are hyperboles, ironies, amphibologies, ambiguous or double meaning words, antiphrases, or opposition of contraries, and equivocations: for the Doctors do agreed, that there is no sin in speaking figuratively, which must be understood, when a man makes use of the figures as he ought to do.  
This prudent Director, reasons upon all this very wisely; and concludes, that this third way, is not universal, nor lesle defective than the others: that it is often useless, that it seems opposite to simplicity, or single-heartedness, and that, in many circumstances, it would be criminal.  
After he had rejected all these expedients, which had been invented to avoid lying, he thus decides the question. The whole difficulty arises from men's confounding a  with a fiction, and their comprehending, under the name of this odious sin, ..... all the appearances that may be lawfully given, without violating justice, charity, simplicity, or any other virtue, and which, in many rencounters or accidents, are of obligation for conserving justice and the precept of charity, which thus ordains .......  
The holy Scriptures are full of such fictions, which we ought to reverence, and cannot reprehend. But to the end no body should abuse this truth, some rules are to be observed.  
1. It is not lawful to feign, or give appearances to deceive any person, unless it be for his good, or that one has a right to deceive him, or for a lawful and innocent delight, or for some other just reason for his good. Thus the Archangel Raphaël feigned himself to be of the Tribe of Nephthali, and endeavoured to persuade Tobit even by words, by naming one Ananias for his Father, althô there was no such thing.  
2. When Men have a right to deceive; thus Judith abused Holophernes and slew him: Thus Jacob made his Father believe, that he was his first born, because he was so by a right.  
3. When it is for recreation, in time and place; for to make it just, it ought not to be continual, but according to the necessity one is in, and that the fiction is innocent. There are many other subjects, which give Men a right to feign, wherein care must always be taken, that justice and charity be not wounded, nor any other virtues.  
Father Condren, after this puts himself some objections. To take away, says he, all the the doubts that may arise, we must satisfactorily answer, or remove two principal grounds, or arguments they have, who hold that all fiction in words is a .  
The first is, the holy Scripture, which absolutely condems lying; to which we ought to answer, that the Scripture does not call just and reasonable fictions, of which we have spoken, lies; nor ever blames them: but only such, as are unlawful, and ordinarily contrary to justice, or charity, or some other virtue.  
The second is, that every man is bound to speak truth to every man: which ought to be understood, according to justice and charity, and as far as he is capable and worthy to receive it, and that it does neither ourselves, nor our neighbours any wrong: for otherwise it is as little lawful, to discover a hurtful truth to a Man, as to put a sword into a mad-man's hand.  
There is, besides, a third argument: that our words are the natural signs of our thoughts, and that by consequence, it is a sin against nature, when they are not conformable to one another: it must be answered, that words are the free and voluntary signs of our intentions, rather than of our thoughts, which nature has given to man and submitted to his will to be made use of according to right reason ..... a man has a right, and even an obligation, to defend himself, his honour and his fortune, and all that belongs to his neighbour, by his words, as well as by his hands: in the same manner, as he is prohibited, or forbidden to hurt by word, as well as by action, etc. This is the whole of Father Condren's doctrine, relating to the present subject, upon which these three reflections may be made.  
The first, that it clears and takes away an infinity of troubles, which occur in practice and the commerce of life, for by thus distinguishing feigning from lying, and reducing to lawful fiction all the propositions, and all the answers, which have, for their end, the security and assurance of the rights of justice, fidelity, and charity, a man is drawn out of, or freed from, pain, or trouble: and all the reasons and difficulties, for which men had recourse to equivocations and mental reservations, are quite removed and at an end.  
For example, that a Confessor interrogated, about the sin of his penitent, a subject about the secret of his Prince, a Son about the place where his father, whom they would kill, is hid, may answer, that they know nothing of what is demanded; or may say, the direct contrary to what they know: their answer will not be a , but shall be reduced to a lawful fiction: and this fiction shall be lawful, or unlawful, according to the circumstances a man is in at the making of it; and pursuant to the obligation or right, which he may have, to manage the interest of justice, fidelity, and charity, either in regard of his neighbour, or himself.  
But the second reflection, is, that this doctrine would give our reformers as much occasion, at lest, if not a great deal more, than the doctrine of reservations and equivocations, to cry out against the relaxation of Morals: for, on one side, this fiction does authorize and justify, all that is authorised and justified by equivocations and reservations; and that without being obliged to seek for any art or shifted: and on the other side, as that which makes a fiction lawful, according to Father Condren, is the right, and even the obligation a man has to defend himself, his honour, his fortune, and all that appertains to his neighbour, without which he confesses, that it would be a real : so likewise does he acknowledge, and with truth, that those, who approve most of equivocations, do own, That they ought not to be made use of without good cause, nor for every purpose. And that the too great liberty of such a practice would be a mere illusion, and a kind of double dealing, odious to all men, of good sense and, even insupportable, and contrary to right reason, and very often to the equity and justice we owe to one another, sometimes to charity, and in a manner always to Christian simplicity; that it would destroy public and private faith, and even human Society, and entirely ruin sincerity, if this licence had not its laws, to bound and regulat its usage.  
These are Father Condren's words, which are enuff to make the calumniators of so many learned and holy Divines blush for shame, if they have never so little left, but let that be how it will, it is evident, that, as for the practice, it would be, at lest, equal if not the same thing, which of the two systems be pitched upon.  
Infine, the third reflection is, that however easy, or useful, this hippothesis of fictions, grounded, upon the authority of a man, so wise, and so holy, may be; how reasonable soever it may appear; how ever proper it may be, for the explication of several facts and passages of Scripture; and in a word, how great soever a desire, men may have to follow it, for 'tis seeming conformity to good sense; yet notwithstanding, it answers but one part of the difficulty, and does not at all, satisfy that, for which the Divines believed themselves bound to have recourse to equivocations and mental reservations.  
The difficulty is, that according to Saint Austin, and after him, according to all Divines, the essence of a , consists in a man's speaking contrary to his thoughts: now this fiction, if one adds nothing more to it, does not hinder a man from speaking contrary to his thoughts. For the Confessor, in saying his Penitent did not kill such, or such a Man, the Minister of state in affirming, that the King did not intent to besiege such or such a town, both the one and the other think, and know at the same time, the direct contrary of what they say. It therefore seems, that a fiction would be a perfect . For to take away this evil quality the Divines, grounding themselves upon the examples, authorities and important reasons we have seen, determined, or made choice of the system of equivocations, and mental reservations: nor have they otherwise given it a greater latitude, than Father Condren believed himself obliged to give his system of fiction: for they did not fail to restrain theirs, as he has done his, by exceptions, and by rules, which prevent all those inconveniences, not possible to be avoided, without these modifications or restrictions, whatever principles men lay down, or whatever side they take.  
But the necessity of the system of equivocations, or of some other, which comes to the same thing for the practice, being supposed and demonstrated, this article of modifications, or manner of restraining its usage, is essential for the justification of Divines, and to point out and make palpable the the exceeding malice of the author of the Provincial Letters.  
To prove, that the Divines did not propose their doctrine but with these restrictions, there is no need to stuff this writing with an infinite number of plain formal passages, drawn out of their works, which I could very easily do; it will be sufficient, that I may free the reader from the toil of so troublesome a work, to repeat part of Father Condren's words, who had taken care to read exactly the Divines upon this matter, before he returned an answer to the desires of a Minister of state, so knowing in Divinity, and so clear sighted and judicious, as Cardinal Richlieu was.  
Those, says Father Condren, who most approve of equivocations, do confess, that they ought not to be made use of without good cause, nor upon every occasion; and that the too great liberty of their usage, was an illusion, a mere cheat, and a kind of double dealing, odious to all men of good sense and even insupportable and contrary to right reason, and to the justice which we owe to one another, etc. Therefore without dwelling longer upon this matter of fact, let us come to Pascal's dishonesty and insincerity.  
The exposition alone, which I have made, of the difficulties and importance of this question, as well as of the conduct of the Divines in their discussion or examination of it, sufficiently show, how very frivolous the railleries of this writer are: but to understand how criminal they are, we must consider the manner, wherein he affects to propose this Doctrine.  
Thomas Sanchez the Jesuit, who is, even at this day, for the canonical matters he has treated of, the Oracle of Italy, Germany and Spain, and of England also, is the Divine he has pitched upon, among others, to divert himself with upon the subject of equivocations and mental reservations. I will here content myself with comparing Pascals translation with the text of this Divine, without much arguing, and with making only some short remarks upon it; see how Pascal makes this pretended Jesuit speak, with whom, and at whose expense, he makes himself sport in his ninth Letter.  
I will now, said this good Father, acquaint you with the easy methods we have found out, for avoiding Sins in conversations and in the intriqus of the World.  
Pascal, in this place, would have the World believe, that they are obliged to the Jesuits for this fine secret of equivocations; and yet if he had read Sanchez, he would have seen, that upon this article, he speaks according to the opinion of, 
Num. 15.  almost all Doctors. Ex fere omnium ment.  
One of the most troublesome things in this matter continues Pascal's Jesuit, is to avoid lying, and especially, when one would have a thing that is false to be believed true.  
What an admirable fellow is this Pascal? Especially, says he, when a man would have a false thing to be believed true. But Sanchez says expressly, that it would be a sin in any man, to equivocat with design to deceive his neighbour, and that when there is a just cause to make use of equivocations, the only end, a man ought to have, is to conceal a truth, which for important reasons ought not to be made known. Quoties adest justa causa his usendi equivocationibus, animus utentis non debet esse ad fallendum proximum, sed ad occultandam veritatem quam non expedit revelare. In so much, that if a man, making use of an equivocation, to hid, for example, a secret of state, or a sin told in Confession, should have any other end, or prospect, than, precisely that, and should endeavour to deceive his neighbour, he would commit a sin.  
And here comes in the distinction and direction of intention, which Saint Austin himself teaches Divines, 
Cap. 2.  when in his book of lying, he says, that the malice of this sin, consists in the desire, which a man has to deceive. Culpa mentientis est in enunciando animo suo fallendi cupiditas, and that there is a great deal of difference between lying, and hiding a truth. For, says the Father: althô every man that lies, would conceal the truth, yet notwithstanding, it is false to say, that every man that would hid the truth does lie. 
L cont. mendac. cap. 10.  Non enim hoc est occultare veritatem quod est proferre mendacium; quamvis enim omnis qui mentitur, velit celare quod verum est, non tamen omnis qui vult celare quod verum est, mentitur. Sanchez than, does not allow, that a man should make use of an equivocation, To make a false thing be believed true; but according to Saint Augustine's opinion, To conceal a truth, which for important reasons ought not to be made known. These are his own proper terms: let us return to Pascal, who makes his Jesuit thus continued.  
For which purpose, to wit, to make a false thing be believed true, our doctrine of equivocations is of admirable use, by which as Sanchez says, it is lawful, for a man to make use of ambiguous words, or doubtful expressions, to have them understood in a different sense from that wherein he himself understands them.  
By Pascal's good leave, Sanchez did not say, that this was lawful, he only said, that this was no , and he proves it very well. Quoties verba sunt suâ significatione ambigua, pluresque sensus admittentia, nullum est mendacium ea proferre in sensu, 
Num. 13.  quem proferens in illis vult & concipit But by the principles of Sanchez, there is a great deal of difference between these two propositions, that it is not a , and that it is not a sin: for althô it be not a , yet according to his opinion, it would be a sin to equivocate without just reason. 
Quarta regula sit etc.  It is not at all lawful, said he, to make use of ambiguous, or double-meaning words, even of those which have this ambiguity in ordinary and common usage, at lest, unless there be a lawful cause to give us a right to do it. And this is a rule, which he establishes expressly, to prevent the abuse of equivocations, because, said he, that the commerce of life requires the avoiding ambiguities. Hoc enim victus communis hominum postulat. Compare but these two texts. Nullum est mendacium, it is no . Nullo modo licet uti verbis ambiguis nisi, etc. it is by no means lawful to make use of doubtful words, except etc. With this translation of Pascal. It is lawful to make use of doubtful words, and tell me what sincerity there is in such a proceeding? it is, as if a Casuist had said in latin, that a man may without lying, discover the secret crime of his neighbour, but that it is not lawful to do it, but in some cases; and that Pascal should make him say absolutely and without restriction, That it is lawful, and that a man may, without sin, reveal the secret crime of his neighbour.  
This maxim, That it is lawful for a man to make use of ambiguous terms, that they may be understood in any other sense than he himself understands them: thus propounded in an indefinite manner, as Pascal proposes and attributes it to Sanchez, is false, and very much to be condemned: whereas being restrained, by the most wise rule, and the exceptions which I have related, it is a doctrine very common among Divines; and in practice, contains nothing contrary to public good, nor more prejudicial to human Society, than all the other systems men are obliged to invent, to remedy the inconveniences to which a Man may be often exposed, if he had no way to hid a truth. What difference is there than, between the opinion of Sanchez, and the idea Pascal has left of it in the minds of his readers?  
This Divine treats of mental reservations with the same precautions he had set down in his doctrine of equivocations: and Pascal is again guilty of such an other falfification as I have already observed, when he makes him speak these following words. A man may swear, he has not done a thing, althô he had effectually done it, by understanding, or meaning that he had not done it on a certain day or, etc.  
Sanchez, in this place, does only teach with Angelus, Sylvester and Navarre whom he quotes, and with many others who were not Jesuits, not that a man might absolutely do it, but only, that he might, Without a , make use of these restrictions, when he has good and juct reasons for it: and at the same time he proves, that without such reasons, it cannot be done without sin: Althô it be not a , says he numb. 16. by which the negative precept, that forbids lying is violated, it is notwithstanding a sin of omission, against the affirmative precept, that commands us to speak truth: the common good of civil Society, obliging us to answer positively to the matter we are questioned about, unless he that is interrogated have a right, for some just cause, not to discover the truth in question. But he proves, that, in such a case, a man may conceal it without a : and he proves it by the Scripture examples which I have lately mentioned, and of which Father Condren makes use, to establish his system of fiction: by the example of the Angel Raphaël, speaking to Tobit, by that of Judith to Holofernes, and by that of our Saviour, who told his brethrens, that he would not go to Jerusalem, etc. to which Sanchez adds, that, even when there is a just cause of acting in this manner, if a man does it with an intention, or prospect of deceiving his neighbour, he is guilty of the mortal sin of perjury. Re bene inspectâ est mortale perjurium.  
The dishonesty and infidelity of the author of the Provincial Letters, is not only sufficiently seen by the little I have quoted out of Sanchez, but also, that one ought not to judge in this matter, of the doctrine of some Jesuits, and so many other Divines, by certain propositions, detached or drawn out from the text, on purpose: because he was sensible, that being thus separated from their restrictions, they had in them, something paradoxical, and shocking to those, who know not, or do not examine things to the bottom. How many were scandalised at the doctrine of equivocations, because that these two propositions were confounded together: An equivocation is not a , and an equivocation is not a sin, and they were confounded upon the false prejudice taken up; that an equivocation could not be a sin, but because it was a ; and yet the first proposition, That it is not a , is at lest, highly probable; and the second, That it is not a sin, is sometimes true, and sometimes false, according to the different circumstances, wherein an equivocation is made use of. It is almost the same thing in the case of mental reservations: for by distinguishing as I have done, the question in reference to pure speculation, and in reference to practice, there will hardly be any ground to differ, or argue farther upon the matter.  
But how many People, for want of attention and reflection, divided the names of pure morals, and lose morals upon this subject, between the opinions they believe opposite to one another, and which yet in the bottom are really the same? a Jesuit, out of his respect and adherence to the opinion of Saint Austin, frees Jacob's saying to Isaac from being a . Ego sum primogenitus Esau. I am Esau your first born Son, and the other things which follow: this is well enuff liked; but because he adds, that these words cannot be excused from being a , but by having recourse to equivocations and mental reservations, there needs no more to run down this Jesuit, and to publish him every where an abettor, or follower of lose Morals  
And yet on the contrary, Father Alexander passes for orthodox, and a Divine of severe Morals: and for what reason? only because that in his dissertation he declares aloud against equivocations and mental reservations. But by thus declaring himself, how does he save Jacob from lying? this is done, says he, in that by answering his Father, that he was Esau, not in person, but by a kind of representation; that he was the elder, not by birth, but by a right purchased with a mess of Lentils. Where, I pray, is the difference between Father Alexander and the Jesuit; unless it be, that the Jesuit gives things their proper names; that he calls a spade a spade; the most formal equivocations, equivocations; and the most manifest plain, mental reservations, mental reservations: and that Father Alexander, in attacking these equivocations and reservations, does authorize them the most openly, that's possible, by only taking from them, a name, against which it is the mode or fashion of the present age, to declaim with noise and vehemence?  
But since they began to argue upon this question, which is pretended so important to Morals, it is very strange and surprising, that among so many Persons, who have declared themselves against equivocations, there should not be any one found, whose Zeal had produced a work, able to give satisfaction in the matter; wherein the true state of the question should be fully proposed, all the difficulties of the different hypothesis, explained and cleared, all the disputes about words, avoided, the matter of pure speculation distinguished from that, which relates to practice, the reasons, on both sides in their full force impartially set down, in order to their being exactly weighed and considered; and infine, where nothing should be done out of prejudice, nor by aversion to, nor obstinacy for, either party.  
I dare not flatter myself, that my dissertation has all these qualities; but it may give occasion to a more able and more knowing person than I, to writ one, wherein all may be found. I am, at lest persuaded, that I have made a scheme, exact enuff, of this matter, and I think the whole may be reduced to this precise account.  
1. An equivocation, is here called, a proposition, that has several senses, or meanings, and which he that speaks, understands in a sense, which he foresees his hearer will not take it in: and a mental reservation, is a proposition, which taken according to the words is false, and cannot be true, but by joining to it some other thing, which is in the speakers thoughts, but not exposed in the proposition. The question is, whether one may without lying, and without sin, make use of an equivocation: or mental reservation thus defined?  
2. Not whether it may be done commonly and upon every occasion; all the World agrees, that it cannot: and that whenever Religion, Justice, or Charity are concerned, they cannot be made use of without sin: and that even, when the interest of these capital virtues is secure, it cannot be done, without just and considerable reasons; that practice being contrary to Christian Simplicity, so long as an important reason does not prevail, and take away from equivocation and reservation the character of double-dealing.  
3. It must likewise be examined, whether the examples and passages of Scripture, which are usually proposed in this matter, do not contain great difficulties.  
4. whether in the explication of these passages, Saint Austin in particular, without mentioning other Fathers, did not make use of the Doctrine of equivocations and mental reservations: or at lest, whether his exposition does not suppose it.  
5. What can be answered to the practice of Saint Athanasius, Saint Fulgentius and Saint Felix of Nola, etc.  
6. Whether the Case of the Confessor, the state secret, the secret of natural affection and duty, and of a criminal interrogated by a Judge with jurisdiction, and such others, can be decided, without recurring to equivocations and reservations.  
7. Whether being once supposed certain by the decision of these cases, and by the other reasons which support the system of equivocations, that they are not, as lies, bad in their own nature; whether, I say, this being supposed, I may not make use of them, when I am concerned, to keep a truth secret, which my neighbour's interest or my own, when just and lawful, obliges me to conceal: and whether the rule, which Father Condren gives, in his system of fiction, may not take place in this of equivocations: That a man has a right, and even an obligation, to defend himself, his honour and his fortune, and all that appertains to his neighbour, by his words, as well as by his hands.  
8, Infine, whether the different systems, upon this matter, do not come to one and the same thing as to practise; whether, that of the fiction, by Father Condren, or those of the figures, hyperboles, ironies, and of the Formal and precise sense, or meaning, are not subject to the same inconveniences, as that of equivocations, be not as susceptible of the same precautions and restrictions, as the others: and whether, really, the Divines, who maintain it, do not employ, or prescribe these precautions and restrictions: and whether, in comparing all these systems together, any other difference can be found, but that which consists in the terms or expressions.  
I do at lest, believe, that the exposition I have made, of the difficulties in this matter, and of the troubles the Divines found themselves in, whatever side they turn themselves to, will convince all persons of equity, that abundance of men, in the world, often speak confidently, of the things they lest understand: and that, if a man should ask many the sense and state of some certain questions, upon which they railly, or pronounce most positively, he would very much confounded them.  
It was no small piece of skill, or cunning in Pascal, not to wade too far into matters; and to make things be looked upon but on some sides, which were sure to have all the effect he designed in the minds of his readers: men would not have laughed nor seemed delighted if he had discovered the rest to them.  
But does not this artifice, and this superficial manner of handling the most difficult questions of Divinity, joined to so many other prejudices. give a right to the Divines Pascal has attacked, to make use of the words of Saint Austin, upon a like occasion? when the question is, said he, to clear the doctrine of some books, it is the greatest rashness and imprudence imaginable, to consult those, who for some certain causes, have declared a mortal war against the authors of those books: Nihil est profecto temeritatis plenius .... quàm .... librorum sententiam requirere ab his qui conditoribus illorum atque auctoribus acerbum, nescio qua cogente crusa, bellum indixerunt. Aug. lib. de utilitane credendi. cap. 6.  
And may they not also add, these other words, which the same Saint spoke to the Manicheans of his time: who to have the pleasure to ridicule, and inveigh against Catholics, attributed to 'em extravagant opinions? do not longer deceive yourselves, said he to them ... all the grave and eloquent invectives you make against such fooleries concern not us, those impertinent opinions which you attack, with equal vehemence, and childishness are not, at all, our opinions: those who upon account of these satyrs, go over and embrace your side, do not condemn our morals; but only discover their own ignorance, and demonstrate that they do not know what our doctrine is. 
L. 1. de moribus Eccl. Cathol. cap. X.  Definite errare .... in has enim & in hujusmodi nugas graviter copioseque invehi soletis, quare nos invectio vestra non tangit; sed aniles quasdam vel etiam pueriles opiniones eò inepitore, quò vehementiore oratione percellitis: qua quisquis movetur, & ad vos transit, non Ecclesiae nostrae damnat disciplinam, sed eam se ignorare demonstrat.  
Sperastis in calumnia, & tumultu, & innixi estis super eo.  
You have put your trust in calumnies, and built your hopes upon the noise and tumult, wherewith you have bread and published them. Isaiae. 30.  
OUR holy Father Innocent XI, when, by his Decree of the second of March 1679, he condemned and prohibited to be taught several propositions, relating to Morals, did declare, that they are prohibited, sicut jacent, that is to say, taken according to the terms, or words, without reference to the author's books, from whence they might be drawn, whether they have, there, a good or an ill meaning. Whereupon the publisher of these Discourses thinks himself bound, to remark to the Reader; that, if in these, he has given a  interpretation to any one of those propositions, for example, to that of Vasquez concerning Alms, it was never done, taking them as they lie, sicut jacent, couched, or expressed in words, but only with reference to the Divine's text, which qualifies them. On the contrary, he does protest, out of the respect which he has for the holy See, that he does condemn all those propositions, condemned, whatever the subject matter be; sicut jacent, according to the order and intention of our holy Father the Pope.    
FINIS.