A sum OF moral PHILOSOPHY SVCCINCTLY GATHERED, ELEgantly Composed, and Methodically handled, BY THAT LEARNED scholar AND WORTHY DIVINE WILLIAM PEMBLE Mr of Arts and late Commoner of Mag. Hall.  
Mores honesta verbis, verba Moribus.  
{αβγδ}  
AT OXFORD. Printed by John Lichfield Printer to the Famous university, for Edward forest. An. Dom. 1632.   

To the Reader.  
BEhold( unpartial and courteous) reader, I present unto thee one whom I need not name the whole book so fully speaks him, it being the character of him, whose name the frontispiece bears: here he yet lives although dead, for the book breaths that which he once was& when he was, he lived that which the book teacheth, for such was his admirable composure, that his very actions were a moral Lecture, having exacty learned that of Minutius, non loqui Magna said vivere. I will not make any elegy of the Author, nor encomium on the book, when as the one deserves rather the regestring in annales, then the light torch of a running pen; for the other unless my guess fail me to a judicious brain, and a well seasoned heart, it will commend itself, it having a mixture of learning& delight, whereby it will both instruct and please the reader, and to say truth such was his dexterity, that by rhetoric he could insinuate to a persuasion,& by solidity of argument evince thee to assent. But if perhaps the book in all points answer not the worth of the Man, or thy expectation, let it not detract from his deserts, or beget a prejudice in thy conceit, since the work is Posthumus, and( I am persuaded) never by the author intended for the public censure; neither is the Printer much to be blamed, since he is so careful to preserve any of thy blessed relics ( Pemble) yet vnslaine, from the unhappy fate of the urn. Lastly since to offend is humanae sortis, whatsoever errors thou mayst find either in Author or Printer, the one thou mayest in thy Iudgement correct; the other in humanity condone. So mayest thou in some sort vindicate the Author, and gratify the Printer. Farewell.   

All discplines are 

1 theorical 

1 real 

1 metaphysical 

1 Inspired as Divinity contained in the Bible.  
2 Acquired of which writ 

Aristotle  
Avicenna      
2 mathematical 

1 arithmetic.  
2 Geometry.  
3 music.  
4 Astronomy.    
3 physical concerning 

Principles  
Generation 

Of natural things        
2 rational 

1 grammar.  
2 rhetoric.  
3 logic.      
2 practical 

1 active 

1 Oeconomickes.  
2 ethics.  
3 peacocks.    
2 Factiue as skill in 

1 navigation.  
2 Hunting.  
3 Husbandry.         

A sum OF moral philosophy.  

1. ethics.  
MOrality is the Art of behaviour, prescribing directions for manners arising out of use and customary conversation.  
Manners are either 

1 real, making a good man {αβγδ}.  
2 complemental, making a faire conditioned man {αβγδ}.    
The virtues arising out of both {αβγδ} goodness is positive. compliment varies according to 

1 Time.  
2 Place.  
3 Person.    
The one necessary, the other indifferent, if used there is a grace and ornament, if not the impeach is not great.  
goodness is wrought by actions of virtue.  
natural for men to work: or life termed by the Pythagoreans {αβγδ}, a farthel of Actions: Beasts are dull and at command, aguntur non agunt: men only are active, as having 

Wit for judging.  
Will for prosecuting.    
Actions are to be perfected by 

virtue for directions.  
Fortune for success.    
virtue is lame without Fortune, and Fortune blindeheady and headless without virtue Our working is either 

1 In a state politic.  
2 In a family Oeconomicke.  
3 In private touching ourselves only Ethicke.    

In ethics are four causes of Actions.  
1 The final, the utmost is felicity, the special and immediate end, any particular good being in show or substance good.  
2 The formal as 

virtues  
Vices   making our 

Bonum 

Verum.  
apparence.     Actions 

Good  
Bad,    
3 material, as Passions, whereon our virtues must work.  
4 Efficient as 

Wit that makes prudence.  
Will that makes prae election.     
This is your subject of all ethics.   

II, Of Particular Ends.  
NO Action so sudden, but proposeth some end: As actions are sundry, so are particular ends: Our appetite affects them as either in show or substance good. 
Omnia apperunt Bonum.   
Desire naturally is for preservation; evil as it is evil is an enemy to being: Hence the aim of all Appetite must bee some good Appetites are either 

1 natural, as common Inclinations to a genenerall good of being: as for the Earth to bear downwards, the fire upwards,  
2 sensitive called appetitus sensitivus, whose issues are, to wit 

grief for things to to be avoided.  
2 Pleasure for things to be prosecuted.    
3 rational, partly from the understanding, that iudges the good: partly from the will that affects it: this is in men only, the other in beasts.    
Hence ariseth three sorts of Good, viz. 

1 Bonum Entis: The object proper to the natural.  
2 Bonum sensus: Whose satisfaction is delight.  
3 Bonum Moris: Whose manager is Reason.    
If reason be governess, we apprehended true good.  
If led by Passion, we follow appearances.  
Passion sets a colour on evil,& persuades the good of it.  
Hence are all vicious desires.  
Our way for such objects is with Annibal to bear the gilded pillars in Iuno's Temple, 
Cic. 1. Divin.  before we venture to feast on them.  
— Verispeciem dignoscere call  
Ne qua sub arato mendosum timeat auro.  
Things are desired, either as 

1 useful only to others, not for themselves, so riches in themselves are nothing, but are desired for use only.  
2 useful both for others,& desirable in themselves: so Virtues of themselves are comely, and are as means to happiness.  
3 Desirable only for themselves, not for others as felicity the last good, {αβγδ}, finis finium.    
That we often fail of the end intended, is for the want of either 

1 Iudgen ent in choice of the right means.  
2 Ability in not prosecuting that we haue chosen.  
3 constancy in not persevering in what wee haue chosen, and began to prosecute.    
The excellency of one end above another is known,  
1 If that end haue the most worthy means directing to it  
Hence the end of Policy is above others as having the means of other practic ends subalternate to it.  
2 If it comprehend the special end intended by actions of less worth, as the art of Horse-man-shippe is referred to art Military.  
Hence the end of one is more excellent then the other.  
Felicity is the best of ends: our soul affecteth it: virtues work it: Constancy in goodness perfects it: itself is the upshot of all wick ends.   

III. Of Universall Ends. Felicity.  
FElicity is the proposal of the best good.  
We propose our good either as informed by passion or judgement: Passion goes by opinion, an as opinion is staggering, so must such proposals be. Hence, to some pleasure, to others wealth, to others honour is Felicity; all are pleasures for the time, but content not.  
This Felicity is not true, but forged.  
True felicity is from an uprightness of judgement.  
That we may find it out, seek we what in a man can be Of 

1 Greatest perfection.  
2 Sole sufficiency.  
3 quietness of mind.    
1 Perfection is required to all goods, but the height of perfection to the best goods.  
2 Sole sufficiency that there be 

1 Contentation in what we enjoy  
2 No want of what wee enjoy not   This keeps us from repining.  
3 Quiet of mind that there bee 

1 Integrity towards God.  
2 True dealing with men Body or fortune  
3 Not doting on the goods of Body or fortune  
4 stoping extravagancy of passions.   But using them always as helps not as ends.  
A breach in any of these mars tranquillity.  
In a man we consider a double carriage, either as 

1 living in this life only moral.  
2 Preparing himself for a future life, Christian.   Hence stoics and platonics held, we were free of two cities 

1 The greater,— Heaven.  
2 The lesser,— The World.    
This world as it bears the image of the heavenly, and is the way of our journeying thither: So the actions of the one truly moral, are not in opposition to the Christian Each of these lives haue in their end 

1 Greatest perfection.  
2 Sole sufficiency.  
3 Truest quietness of mind.    
The felicity of the one is presence of all good, when the soul is separated.  
The means to get this general is Religion.  
The felicity of the other is presence of all good, whilst we live.  
The means to get it, is common honesty, or universal justice.  
living in this world our work is either in 

soul only.  
soul and Body.    
The work of our soul only is immanent.  
The perfection of it is contemplation.  
The object and aim of it is Truth.  
The satisfaction is content and quietness of mind.  
The means to attain it, is Sapience and Pondering.  
That is an habit generally wrought by two particulars 

1 understanding for conceit, and apprehension of principles.  
2 Science for inference of conclusions.    
This true felicity, sith in it is 

1 True perfection,  
2 Sole sufficiency,  
3 quietness of mind   is termed Felicitas contemplatiua.  
Our work both in soul and Body is transient, so called because the action of the soul were secret were it not, that the spreading of the body displayed it: The operations of the soul properly are punctual and indivisible: As they partake of the body, so they open themselves both to the view, and use of others: Hence arise actions of practise, their special aim is the good of others, 
Homo animal politicum.  and sith we are not for ourselves only, but to be useful to others,& society arises out of community of nature our special felicity, for use must bee wick.  Felicitas Practica. 
There are two special Felicities then.  
As sin and 'vice being in all a double misery 

1 darkness of understanding for discerning truth.  
2 Depravation of will for affecting goodness.    
So to remedy these our perfection must be 

contemplative for the one.  
wick for the other.    
These come not of the strength of men, sith the blind cannot judge of colours, the perverse cannot will goodness.  
They are given of God, if any gift comes from above to man, saith Aristotle; {αβγδ}.  
It is most fit it should bee our felicity, {αβγδ}.  
The stern to manage these must be faith.  
Without it 

Contemplation is curiosity.  
Good actions but fashion,& vainglory   This is the aim of the heathen goodness.  
With it 

Contemplation is wisdom.  
Action is 

1 Duty to God.  
2 Charity to our neighbour  
3 Salvation to ourselves.     This alone is mans felicity.   

IV. temporal happiness described.  

Felicita● est Actio.  THe perfection of things is in their operation: idleness, and want of Action proceeding from Impotency: Hence Felicity being the perfection of man is action.  
To will and intend suffices not, but doing is requisite,  
In masteries the crownes are not given to the likeliest in person, but to the best in performance. Arist. Ethic. 1. c. 8.  
Actions is a power common to all; communities commend not, sith commendation aims at a special, and preferring before others: Thence Felicity the highest of goods must be a special action of man, that proceeds from the soul not as it is vegetative, 
Animi.  and sensitive( so agreeing with Beasts and Plants) but as it is rational, only proper to man.  
In the reasonable soul we consider two parts, the one 

Governing. 
Secundum Virtutem.   
Governed.    
The governing part is by 

Wit,  
Will regulating our souls actions, and stoping their unwarrantable excurrence: This called Recta Ratio, or Virtus.    
The part to be governed is the seat of Passions.  
Though they naturally sprout from the stem of reason, and are proper to men only, yet in themselves they are wild and unruly, but strength of reason must order them, Our perfection is not 

in the latter which must obey.  
but in the former, which must govern.    
Reasons in strength and actions of virtue are nothing, 
In vita p●rfecta.  unless they are continued: Perfection of good must bee with out Ruptures: The intercedents of an after evil mars the glory of the precedent good actions: Hence felicity must be a work of honesty to the end of our daies.  
This felicity ends with our life, and therefore temporal.  
The other begins after death, and is eternal.   

V. Things required to temporal happiness.  
happiness is a virtue common not for ourselves only, but for the good of others.  
An happy mans employment must be beneficence: his reward esteem and credit among the people. 
Tria bono●um genera req●irun●●● ad ●elicitatem.   
That he may be best in performance, and highest repute, he must haue the goods of 

mind.  
Body.  
Fortune.    
The mind as most inward, so affordeth goods most proper to felicity; A man for moral goodness is to be judged for the goods within: Things outward as of the Body and Fortune are often changeable. They are not overmuch to bee desired, yet if offered they are to be received; we take them for continency, not necessity, as useful to set forth our virtues both to the good and view of others.  
Riches and the goods of Fortune serve for the weal of the body, the body for the soul, the soul for God. {αβγδ}.  
Thus the goods outward are in direction to the goods inward: they make not a man happy, but adorn him; they give his lustre, not his being.  
The thing that makes happiness properly and principally is virtue; yet Fortune must grace it; as the Stones& Timber make the house, yet for sight we could wish it pargetted, before we dwell in it: And though a man can foot it well, yet he need not refuse a Coach if offer be made. Seneca.  
virtue without Fortune is like a King that hath a sure counsel, though his underlings be rebellious; he is able to keep him in guard, though abroad there be mutinies; he may bee happy in himself in despite of Fortune: like as a strong man can bear, if a greater weight should be laid vpon him, and can suffer could, though in the interim his teeth chatter.  
An happy man useth ill fortune, as a good captain bad arms, though vnframable, yet using them according to art military, or as a skilful craftsman showing his art on a shoe of bad leather, both may do well, but better, if their means were better.  
The goods of the mind are either 

1 Wit for judging.  
2 Will for choosing, what we haue judged.  
3 Power for prosecuting what we haue chosen.  
4 Ability for ordering our Prosecutions,    
Habits are the lowest gifts of the mind.  
1 They are gotten by use and custom, the other art natural.  
2 They work on passions, whose grounds is sense.  
The other are without sense, sith 

1 Prosecution  
2 Choice.  
3 Iudgement  
4 Power  
5 Wit.  
6 Will.   are inseparate substances.  
Habits are only for the corporal.  
Their kinds are 

intellectual,  
moral.    
The intellectual, some by doctrine,& instinction, and are 5, to wit, 

1 understanding for contenplation  
2 Science for contenplation  
3 Sapience. for contenplation  
4 Prudence. for action,  
5 Arte for action,    
The moral come by use, and custom, viz 

If ruling passion, it is virtue.  
If ruled by it, it is 'vice.    
Their properties are 

1 To be begotten by vs.  
2 Being gotten long to continue with vs.    Qualitas acquisita difficultèr mobilis. 
The difference betwixt the work of nature, and of manners is, Nature first begins with the habit, then comes to the action, as first we haue the power of laughing, before the act: Manners are first in action, then in habit.  
The goods of the Body are 

1 Health.  
2 Strength.  
3 Grace of person.    
Though virtue could appear in deformity, yet it is more honourable in a comely parsonage; as the Ruby planted in Iron hath his lustre, yet it sparkles more in a bed of Gold.  
The goods of fortune are 

1 Wealth.  
2 Worth of birth.  
3 Reputation and credit.  
4 Friends.  
5 Goods of Posterity.    
1 Goods either in 

Money.  
Goods.  
Lands.    
The use and end 

1 For necessity principal.  
2 Then for pleasure 

1 Not of pampering.  
2 But of recreation.      
It is requisite for pourveiance: Poverty and Want are repining: necessity of having armeth to Importunity and impudence in procuring: Thence the beggars life, though most to be pitied for want, yet deserves least favour for their boldness. The Pythagoreans would haue an happy man wealthy, but not in abundance: That much prosperity is like over-much light, it quells the eye-sight. That wee must wish for no more prosperity, then may fit us for action, as the Pilot takes not the ship of most weight, but of most convenience for coasting: That the evils of much prosperity are greater, then they of adversity; as in the body superfluities work more dangerous diseases, then defects: That as affliction compels our mind; so height of wealth puffs it up, and empties it: Hence we see the rich often injurious and encroaching: A happy man by wisdom prevents these.  
2 Worth of birth, this is requisite, that there be no stain of blood. Low birth deiects the mind.  
Bastardy is dishonourable, as debarring inheritance to the common rites of a Citizen.  
lewdness of parents is a disparagement to the child, as Diogenes seeing a boy wantonly given, gave this the reason of it, that surely his father was drunken, when he begot him: Contrarily it was Diophantes brag, that he could prevail in any demand with the Athenians, sith his father Themistocles could do so before him.  
3 Reputation is either viz: in 

Height of place, as preferments.  
Good opinion of our fellow citizens.    
1 Preferments are properly due to the best: Lewd gouernours come in rather by intention then right: Optimates is an attribute to those, that for the common good so carry themselves, that Sud consilia optimo cuique debentur: They are defined by Tully, Optimates sunt, qui nec nocentes sunt, 
Cicero pro Sextio.  nec naturâ improbi, nec furiosi, nec malis domesticis impediti: Hence he ranges even rustics and trades-men, so they be honest.  
The reason may be, the ground of evil society must be religion, and justice; without it can neither bee restraint from injuries, nor punishment of evil doers, nor reward for the well deserving. Wealth and Power make a Society spracke, and passable, but iustice informs, and acts it: This is as the soul to quicken it, that as the organ to vent and spread it: Hence the right of governance principally is due to the best in life.  
2 Good opinion in the minds of others is proper to the virtuous.  
It opens itself in 

Words  
Works   of service.  
Three things breed in a man credit 

wisdom.  
Honesty.  
love and kindness. 
Arist. 2. Rhet.     
The special of these is Honesty: for a man truly honest hath that wisdom, that he can distinguish the good from the bad; to follow the one and avoid the other: and his love is such, that he will labour to benefit all, and injury none: This repute for good actions common and ordinary opens itself into praise for actions extraordinary, into honour, glory and admiring: honour and admiration ascends upward, and is the title due to the extreme point of goodness: We yield it to things of most distance,& farthest out of our compass: Hence all things most admired are most perfect: for the persons most admiring are of the lowest condition; therefore Pythagoras boasted he had got his good by Philosophy, that he had learned to wonder at nothing, sith admiration proceeds rather out of the gaze of ignorance, then from a true view of iudgement.  
As in Nature there is excess and defect, as in monsters, so in manners also.  
Things honoured and admired are out of the reach of Envy.  In vicina versamur invidiâ, simplicius long posita miramur 
Hence good cannot be envied, since Envy is not at lower perfections: Praise is a title due to virtue, and is the reward of it; we attribute it not simply, but in comparison; nor is a man so much praised for his absolute good, as because in that good he exceeds others, that are in comparison worse then himself: Hence praise stands in a proportionate preferring before others: Non vt optimis par sit, said vt malis melior.  
Glory is simply without reference to defects of others: it admits no proportion by reason of distance: praise may bee given and taken of equals: Glory is for a superior onely; praise recants downe-wards to confer with defects, and after conference to extol the better deserts of the other: Glory admits not of comparing, but is a title absolute.  
Hence Felicitas bonum 

honourable.  
Non laudabile.    
4 Goods of posterity as of 

Children  
Kindred   somewhat to be respected of an happy man.  
It follows him after death as a compliment of his glory, yet so that it nothing detracts from him, if the contrary happen.  
5 Friends are requisite to happiness partly for 

use.  
Comfort.    
1 For use, sith a man cannot rely vpon the purchase of his own hands only, but he often requires an help: Management of things are sundry, and sith they must each haue their several dispatch, they cannot so well be compassed by one.  
2 For comfort, sith a man is pliable to utter himself to some one of trust: Troubles are incident to all; and there is ease in revealing them.— Strangulat inclusus dolor. again our nature abandoneth solitariness: Presence of friends keeps us from feeding on our own hearts, like Bellepheron in the wilderness.  Ipse suum cor edens hominum vestigia vitat. 
To friendship three things are required, 

1 Virtus, vt pulchrum.  
2 Consuetudo, vt iucundum.  
3 Usus, vt necessarium.    
virtue the ground, that must b●gin it.  
Pleasure, and conversation, that continue it.  
use and help, that must show, utter and exercise it.  
As it is the prop and stay of mans life, and follows immediately from the sociablenesse of his nature, so it relies on three goods  
The end of all appetites 

Bonum honestum.  
Bonum utile.  
Bonum iucundum.    
Friends must not be 

suddenly gotten.  
many in multitude.    
1 sudden friends haue but small root of love.  
It was Zeuxis answer when he was reprehended for slow painting, that he must bestow time in drawing those lines, which he hoped should continue for ever. Observance of their passions and qualities must precede, before we enter to cl●se with them.  
1 Whether they be agreeable in manners to vs.  
2 Whether they encroach not too fast into our acquaintance, for towardness of this is an occasion of suspect: for such a one is either a common friend and so less entire, or he comes to you but for advantage and so for advantage will betray you.  
2 Multitude of friends empties affection, as the channel must haue many shallowes, that is cut into sundry streams. One bragged to Chilo, that he knew not many his enemies: he replied that by that he knew not many was his friends. Friendship is a tenor precise, and proper to one, not to bee enlarged to multitudes: Agesilaus would use all in courtesy, but he was familiar and friendly but to few.  
The Giant that had 50 bellies, was fain to haue an 100 hands, and had by this no more benefit of sustenance, then they that to one belly haue but two hands. Amicitia tantum inter deuce.  
Men of worth haue many fellowes, few friends.  
Friendship is when they follow principally for virtue.  
When they follow for goods outward 

Countenance.  
Power.    
1 Countenance: It is greatness of retinue useful to men of place. In place decus, in bello praesidium.  
2 Power: It is faction, and by it they raise themselves, depress their adversaries. In government it is good to use men of one rank equally: for to countenance some extraordinarily is to make them insolent, and the rest discontent. In favour it is best to use men with much difference, and election for it makes the persons preferred more careful, and the rest more officious.   

VI. The stoics tenant of happiness.  
happiness being the perfection of man must bee in things that most honour him, nothing so worthy of him as virtue. It proceeds immediately from his soul, as partaking both of wit and will.  
Hence as beasts are devoid of both these, so they cannot be styled 

virtuous.  
Happy.    
To live according to virtue, and the prescript of nature is accounted all one. The Reasons are three.  
1 Nature is the finger of God in creatures, whose work is for the best, and virtue is nought but the perfection of God.  
2 Man by nature an image of God, as virtue and goodness flows immediately from the one, so ought from the other.  
3 Our soul hath will and wit: Wit the apprehender of Truth, and will of Good: the conjoining of both is mans nature, which of itself must both judge and affect true good: this only is virtue. virtue is termed by them any special action proper to any special nature: Heavens, Elements, and dead bodies are by nature active, and virtuous: As things are most material, so are they less quick: Hence souls are most virtuous, and this virtue is their felicity.   

VII. Of Passions in general.  
PAssions are the matter of virtue. 
Materia Virtutis.   
They are the nailes, that fasten soul and body together.  
In them we note their 

1 Rising and increase.  
2 Issues and consequence.  
3 Prevention and stoping.    
Their rising partly from 

1 The souls nature.  
2 The occurrences of objects.    
The soul grows in passion 

1 Not by the understanding part.  
2 But by the sensitive part, which 

1 Iudgeth a Truth.  
2 Induceth a colour of Truth.      
The sensitive works for passion 

Abroad by the five outward senses.  
Within by the imagination or fancy.    
The work of the phantasy is to resume what the memory hath retained, and the common sense judged, and out of them to make collections of appearances.  
These appearances go masked under the habit of 

Truth.  
Good.    
If of truth, they persuade a weak understanding& so breed, viz. 

1 Curiosity  
2 Folly  
3 giddiness   and hence are 

1 heretics.  
2 Poets  
3 Fond students.   these err in the Theory.  
If of good they persuade a weak will, and breed some passions, which make men vicious and err in the practike: That which makes a fancy venturous& resolved in these collections, is opinion proceeding naturally from the soul, and as phantasy is a part of it, so opinion must be the issue of it.  
Hence arise the tenants against the stoics.  
1 Passions are a natural part of the soul.  
2 They may be moderated well from their excurrence, but cannot be thoroughly barred of their existence in vs.  
3 They are not in themselves evil, but in their degrees.  
4 They are often profitable, and means to further virtue, as fear teaches us to avoid evil, self-love to prosecute our good, Mercy and pitty teaches a King: Clemency and anger wheteth our valour.  
5 Their excess is not positively evil, but vpon circumstances, as with my friend I may be angry for his fault, but bee reconciled again: with my foe I may be more implacable.  
6 Though strengthened by opinion, yet not proceeding from without us, but natural apprehensions within.  
7 In a man two parts 

understanding  
Sense   both in reluctance to the other.  
1 understanding takes the good of most worth for honesty.  
Hence ariseth conscience, or {αβγδ}.  
2 Sense takes the good of most 

Pleasure.  
Profit   hence are passions.  
The will hath two inclinations to follow, either 

Reason, or  
Sense.    
In iudgement we often condemn, what in passion wee prosecute.  
— Video meliora, proboque.  
Deteriora sequor—  
objects that move our phantasy are 

evils to be avoided.  
Goods to be followed.    
The ground that persuades our soul to appehend these objects, is self-love.  
This as it is 

1 Ruled by reason is good: and the duty of man.  
2 Ruled by Sense is bad: and nurseth passions.    
It may be defined,— An inordinate inclination of the affecting too much pleasure of the body against the prescript of right Reason.  
The issues of passions are 

general.  
special,    
1 The general are.  
1 Rebellion against reason.  
2 Division in themselves.  
3 Insatiable in their extent.  
4 Importunate for action. Hence they work headiness, and sudden resolution.  
5 Desirous of things 

1 Foolish.  
2 Inconvenient,  
3 Impossible.    
6 Inconstancy of prosecution.  
2 The special are.  
1 driving the body to distemper by 

1 Raising the humors.  
2 Altering the Complexion.  
3 Forecing new motions.    
As in fear the blood chilleth, in anger boils, in grief the heart closeth, in ioy opens.  
2 Blinding the Iudgement; The Reason is,  
The understanding receives her notice from the fancies impression: which befriending Passion representeth often to the Iudgement not true and real, but apparent and conceited shapes.  
3 Perverting our will.  
The will inclines oftener to passion, then Iudgement, because passion is given more to choice and liberty.  
The Iudgement is precise and settled to one part.  
The prevention of passions is to 

discover  
Temper   them  
1 discovery is had,  
1 From the use of company; as Augustus judged of his two daughters Iulia and Livia, finding one delighted to converse with grave men, the other with yongsters; pronounced the one stayed, the other light.  
2 From the view of complexions; as the choleric breeds anger; the sanguine pleasure, slegme, sloth; melancholy, sadness.  
3 From the use of talk, as if it be 

1 sudden.  
2 Often.  
3 Personally impeaching.  
4 Censuring.    
2 To discover ourselves observe we what our enemies speak of vs. They are ready to seize on what is faulty in us, when ourselves are blinded with self-love.  
After the discovery ou● Passions must be tempered.  
The temper of them must be reason, and wisdom checking the sense, and stoping the Excurrence of phantasy.  
Men by reason teach birds to speak, dogs to hunt, horses to curveat, though sense persuade the contrary.  
And we discharge ourselves of the meat wee haue eaten with pleasure, when we hear it was polluted or forbidden.  
The way to temper them is not to roote out but to prune them, as the taming of Horses is not to take away their motion, but their skips: and Lycurgus should not so much cut down the vines ro bar drunkenness, as haue planted cisterns of water to haue allayed the heat thereof. It was Zeno his saying of musical instruments, that even barren wood& dead guts would speak, if strained to their pitch, and ranked in order.  
wisdom must be our Astrolabe to take the height and elevation of our passions, if they ouer-grow.  
Our ways to slack them are,  
1 To bend to the other extreme; as if my sight be scattered by view of white, I must regather it by viewing a black object: And Epamminandas way to stop his surfet on sweet meats, was to close his banquet with a draft of vinegar.  
2 Abstinence from things hurtful, though lawful.  
3 Stop all occasions, that are motives to set passion on head.  
4 bar self conceits, and fanciful apprehensions.  
5 yield not to inconstancy and fleeting.  
6 Labour to mortify the Flesh.  
If passion be too violent, that we cannot slacken it, our labour must be,  
1 To stay execution; As Archytas professed to his bailiff that carelessly kept his ground, that were he not angry, he would tell him part of his mind: And Plato would not himself beat his man, while he was moved, but gave him up to Spensippus to be handled by him.  
2 To conceal it in what we may; for it breeds disrespect, if wee open our yielding to it: this made Plutarch to be upbraided by his servant, when he could not dissemble his anger that it was a shane for him to be angry, sith he had written a book to the contrary.  
A man( saith Plato) is sometimes his own lord, when reason rules him; sometimes his own vassal, when sense and passion.   

VIII The division and number of Passions.  
THe bent and aim of all passions are either, 

The gaining of a good:  
The avoidance of evil.    
Good& evil are gained avoided by 2 inclinations of the soul 

1 The concupiscible that affects.  
2 The irascible that prosecuts& venters on what we affect.    
Both these haue their objects 

Good.  
evil.    
The attaimment of the 

Good breeds pleasure.  
evil breeds grief.    
Thence 

Pleasure  
grief   are the heads of all passion.  
The passions aiming at good are either 

1 love.  
2 Desire.  
3 Hope.  
4 boldness.  
5 Pleasure.    
The good presented is affencted first by 

love  
Desire   these proceed from the concupiscible,  
Then it is prosecuted for attaimment by 

Hope  
boldness   these proceed out of the ●rascible.  
Then being attained there resorts pleasure: this only for the good present, the other for the Good absent.  
The passions aiming at the avoidance of evil are.  
1 Hate opposite to love.  
2 Abomination or detesting, opposite to desire being but the vehemence or high degree of hate, as desire is of love,  
3 despair opposite to hope.  
4 fear to boldness.  
5 pain or grief the Issue of all, when the evil is in presence.  
As 

Goods  
evils   come 

Nearer or  
further of   their attaimment, so they partake more or less 

Pleasure of  
grief,    
These 10 Passions are simplo, seeing they partake either of Pleasure alone, or grief alone,  
There are seven mixed passions.  
These work either 

on ourselves.  
or on others.    
1 They that work on ourselves are 2.  

1 shamefastness  
2 Repentance mixed of 

1 fear for infamy.  
2 Sorrow for fault.  
3 Desire of Amendment     
2 They that work on others, are either 

for them  
or against them.    
1 For them are 2.  
3 Pitty whose object is the evil of another, which wee would haue removed.  
mixed of 

grief for the evils befalling  
Desire for the removal of them.    
4 zeal, conceived in the behalf of one we love.  
mixed of 

1 grief for the wrongs done.  
2 Anger against the party wronging.  
3 love to the party wronged.  
4 boldness to right him in what we may.    
The passions that work against another either 

In thought only.  
Or in dead.    
1 In thought, 1.  
5 jealousy or suspicion mixed with 

grief.  
Anger.  
fear.  
Hate.    
2 In dead, 2.  
6 Anger mixed with either 

1 grief for wrongs.  
2 Hate against the party wronging.  
3 Desire of revenge.  
4 boldness in venturing.    
7 Maligning: this is different from anger, sith anger is moved vpon wrong done: This without that motive: only because it is well with another.  
This contains 

Envy muttering at anothers good.  
{αβγδ}, joying at others fall.    
The former mixed of 

Hate  
grief.  
Desire of falling.    
The latter of 

Hate.  
Ioy for the evil fallen.    
This of Passions in general.   

IX Of love the first Passion.  
THe object of love is goodness; the issue ioy and content.  
It is either with or without passion.  
1 Without Passion it's in 

God  
Angells   both haue wills which are the affectors of good and this affecting is love.  
1 Gods love is partly in 

reflex to himself.  
Communicating good to others.  
viz. the creatures.    
1 By reflex into himself, he views his own goodness:& goodness is the Loadstone of love.  
2 He communicates to creatures goods of 

Nature.  
Grace.    
1 Nature is general to all,& comprehends the works of 

Creation  
Preservation  
temporal.   In this is the true Bonum Entis, which God loues.  
2 Grace is special to some and comprehends the spiritual acts of his love as 

Redemption  
Satisfaction  
Glorification   In this is the true Bonum moris, and this is Gods love.  
2 Angells love is by contemplation of 

God.  
the works of God.    
They see in all perfection of good, the fountain is God, the streams scatter into each part of the world: things they cannot hate, only sin they hate, which is as nothing.  
This love hath these tenants.  
1 It is in the best natures, and the perfection of them.  
2 As the best things are most lovely, so they are most in imparting their loues to others.  
3 It is Impotence to bee hating, envying, murmuring, all which are opposite to love.  
4 It cannot be perfect in man, it is truest in God,& nature; these are not interrupted by Passions.  
5 The bond of matrimony hath not truly this love, sith it is spiced with lust: we may rather term it the union of affections willed by God for Avoidance of further evil.  
6 It works for the best things with reluctance to sense.  
2 love with Passion is either 

Proper  
Improper.    
1 love improper is in beasts, {αβγδ}, the Empresse of Nature.  
Birds build their nests, and spare their own crawes to fill their young ones: the Partridge flags before the Faukner, and ventures the taking, that her young ones may escape. The most timorous creatures grow most resolute in these combats: In the worst natures are some sparkles of love: As in Gold-mines amongst much earth shines a lustre, and in beast are rude lines of mans natural affection; As in wild figs and oliues are the spices of the sweet, though in harsher manner:  
2 love proper is in men alone.  
It is either of 

ourselves.  
or others.    
1 love of ourselves called {αβγδ} either 

1 True according to reason, or  
2 Fancied according to Sense.    
1 True self-love apprehends that which is simply good, both in present and future.  
It respects the goods of the soul before those of the Body.  
It chooses the less good of most durance before the greatest good of less continuance.  
It is the Well-head of charity.  — Charitas incipit a seipso. 
And the spur of virtue, sith by it we benefit ourselves.  
2 The properties of it are 

Wishing  
Working   the best to ourselves.  
3 Consent with our own parts, as of 

Reason.  
Passion.    
4 loving to retire into our own thoughts.  
5 joying at our own good, and grieving at the contrary.  
Hence it is the attribute only of good men.  
2 The evil follow shows, and opinatiue good, which failing breeds sorrow: the good man aims at truth, and therein contents himself.  
2 Conscience suffers not the evil to view their own thoughts, they are at odds with themselves; Sense and Reason are hard at combat with them: love cannot be there, where there is difference.  
3 self-love causeth Ioy; evil men, though they haue ioy of sense, they haue grief of Reason, and their ioy is not for durance, but ends in Repentance.  
4 Intemperance is the badge of evil men, whose work is to breed diseases in 

soul.  
Body.    
A good man so loues himself, that he will either stop raising or labour their allaying.  
5 As goodness is wisdom, so evil is Folly, which blindeth us that wee cannot distinguish the good from the evil, but choose at random, and so prove ourselves without self-love.  
The opposite of self love is either a stupid neglect, or a desperate hate of himself, they that mingle-mangle themselves, are of this rank: self-love fancied according to sense is the badge of fools; It is the seed-plot of Passion, the bathe of Flatterers, the nurse of vices in manners real, of fantastic humors, in manners of compliment.  
It ariseth from 3 heads, viz. 

1 blindness of understanding.  
2 Easynesse of comparing ourselves with others.  
3 partiality in judging to our own side.    
The Issues of it are 4.  

1 Admiration of ourselves.  
2 Arrogancy of Speech.  
3 Easy excusing our own faults.  
4 Despising of others admonition, and counsel.   
The ways to restrain it are.  
1 Prise the Act of any above thine own particular, as many eyes see more then one, and many hands make better riddance.  
2 amplify others virtues depressing thine own.  
3 Be sparing in vaunts, seldom in excuses.  
This self-love bars the admittance of goodness; it comes not, unless it be taught. Sought it cannot be, unless it be acknowledged wanting; self-love bars this acknowledgement.  
Multi ad solidam eruditionem pervenissent  
nice se pervenisse iam putassent.  
love to others is directed either to 

God. or  
our Neighbours.    
1 love to God is only in a sanctified will none can truly hate him but sinners: The reason is because, God is love, and sin is in opposition to God.  
2 love to our Neighbours is either to 

Enimyes or  
friends.    
1 love to our enemies is one of the cunning'st points of Charit●, and an imitation of the divine nature.  
1 Pardoning them, if they repent, as the Lions do the beasts, that submit themselves.  
2 Pardoning them, though persisting, and being without submission.  
3 Not pardoning them only, but working a good for them.  
The Necessity of this love is,  
1 Because God loveth us being his enimyes, and we must do, as we would be done unto.  
2 There is none so bad but hath some what excellent in him, and none so harmed us now, but he may do us good hereafter; and for this is to be loved.  
2 love to our friends is either 

for public respect. or  
private, and particular.    
1 love for public respect is the love of our country, that is the duty of all; but it is most splendent in heroickes, who pawn their life for it.  
It was questioned, whether this love was engrafted by nature, or assumed by custom? 
Ob Lipsius.   
1 If it come by nature, why doth not the poor love as well as the rich?  
2 How comes it, that many for gain leave their country, never to return, sith, where we love, we love to converse: Some haue been Traytors against it, and Neroes to fire it.  
We answer, Nature cannot be so strict, right, and even, but sometime she breeds Monsters: gain may withdraw mens hearts, and fasten them to foreign coasts.  
The poor love their home, but rich men more, because they reap the goodness of their country in a larger manner.  
Mens love of country is first for themselves, as we fear storms, least ourselves pinch for them, and we quench a fire, least our own souls be fired by it.  
2 love for private respects is either 

1 Ascending to our superiors.  
2 Descending to our inferiors.  
3 Betwixt equals.    
1 That in decent is far more hearty then that in ascent. Hence fathers are more loving to children, then children to fathers:  
2 That betwixt equals stands vpon more Indifferency of Points; and in the best counterpoise of either they may fall to Iarringe: Hence Brothers and Sisters fall to jarring, and friends haue many distastes.  
These Loues are linked either by bonde 

natural, or  
Civill.    
1 The natural bonde is threefold,  
1 under God to parents, who challenge of us 

1 Honour.  
2 Maintenance, if need so require.    
It was Solons law, that none should be free from their duty, but those that had learned no trade of their fathers.  
Parents are either of 

1 Blood, that frame us in body.  
2 Manners, that by direction frame us in soul; such are teachers.    
It was Socrates his tenant, that by nature both these had challenge of love: it is also doubted by many, whether Alexanders debt was not as ample to Aristotle his master, as to Philip his father.  
2 Our bond of nature is to 

Brethren  
Sisters.    
They challenge of us,  
1 counsel.  
2 Liberty of Conference.  
3 Pleasure of Conversation.  
4 helps of Fortune; So we wrong not ourselves overmuch in furnishing them: 
Vivet extento Proculeius aevo  
Notus in fratres animi paterni.   
Brothers love is 

1 Honoured by our friends.  
2 Envied and feared of our enimyes.  
3 useful to ourselves.  
4 joyous to our Parents.    
King Eumenes his Mother professed herself happy in this, that of 4 sons 3 youngest squired the body of the eldest, and that Eumenes was nothing jealous or mistrustful of them: Nature hath made them in a family feet to bear up our body both in equality and proportion; If they exceed, they cause halting, if they trip at one another, they cause falling.  
A Lady of Persia made it a great dispute, whether they were better to loose her brother, or her son; she said they could get a new son, but a brother, sith her Parents were dead, they could not.  
Brothers dislike( it may bee) often admits remedy, but their hate is inreconcileable: As the jointures of Art, though riven with rents, may be glued again, but Natures breach cannot.  
The special motives of their dislike are 2.  
1 If we leave their commerce, and follow strangers as if wee should cut off our flesh and inch in the room of it a strange piece: And the Arcadian Poet in Homer, when he had lost his leg, for his best help was to hop on a leg of Wood; strangers willbe distrustful of us, sith we leave our own.  
Can you style your friend brother, when you cannot account a brother your friend: as absurd a thing, as if you mangled his natural body: but hanged his idol with laces and Garlands.  
2 If we are always checking, and thwarting their courses, as Laco said by his short wife, of 2 evils, the least is to bee chosen: So if our brother be bad, rather let him haue his fourth, then demerit his hate.  
Though the dog bite and the horse throw us, yet wee keep them, and wee suffer Apes, cats and lions, though sometimes harmful.  
winking at faults in company is usual, when we would not displease, though it be not so honest, yet for avoidance of further evils, it may be tolerated.  
Wee must bee our Brothers friend, not his judge,  
3 Our bond of Nature is to our kin either of 

Blood, or  
Marriage.   both galling offices of love proper to the family. as Invitation to 

Marriage feasts.  
funerals.    
2 The civill bond of love is to 

1 Citizens.  
2 countrymen.  
3 Strangers.   As particular respects vary, so this order varies.  
It is the engaging of man unto man in heart began by use and acquaintance: It acteth, as one soul in 2 bodies.  
There are 2 branches of it 

1 Wishing.  
2 endeavouring the best for another not for his own but the others sake.    
The main motives of it are the 3 goods 

1 Pleasure.  
2 Profit.  
3 Honesty.    

1 Pleasure are the aims of Epicures; loues as they are divers, and fanciful, so such loues must bee.  
2 profit are the aims of Epicures; loues as they are divers, and fanciful, so such loues must bee.  
3 Honesty makes love more settled: it appears not as Alcibiades changing his coat to the fashion of the Place, but as Socrates keeps his tenor.   
This love gets his growth by 3 knots 

1 Affecting.  
2 Acquaintance.  
3 Trust.    
The Twine to wind and fasten it must be a Resemblance of Manners.  
motives to make me effect one  
1 I see him sympathise with my 

Ioy  
grief   befreinding Brutus.  
2 He accounts my friends his and my enemies his; So Cicero loved App●us Pulcher for Brutus his sake, and by it bound Brutus the more to him.  
3 He is pleasant-hearted and jesting; If I iest with him he takes it not amiss.  
4 He reports well of me behind my back and rather in secret show his mind then in public it should be  told me.  
5 he delights in my Company.  
6 he goes neat, but curious in apparel: this was Demosthenes and Hortensius his trick to get them favourites, when they first began pleadinge.  
7 He lives peaceably with others, which persuades me, he will do so with me too.  
These things may move affecting in me not acquaintance, sith the 

Flatterer  
Dissembler   may do as much  
motives to move me to acquaintance.  
1 he reports well of me before mine enemies, and if they except, he defends me.  
2 I see him honestly given, not giddily.  
3 He doth me a good turn, so it be noe prejudice to himself.  
4 He is noe busie-medler in my matters.  
5 He overthwartes me not in talk, especially being either serious or angry.  
6 He keeps the 7 former motives without dissimulation.  
These move acquaintance, and I would trust him in matters obvious, and ordinary, but in things secret, and nearly touching me, I may not, unless he had wisdom joined to his Honesty.  
motives to move me to trust him.  
1 He hath all the 7 former circumstances without dissimulation and the 6 latter with wisdom.  
2 He is wary, that he be not felt by others to open himself by Ignorance.  
3 He doth me a good turn though to his own prejudice.  
4 If I haue wronged him, he will not revenge it, though having opportunity.  
5 He suffers wrong for my sake.  
6 He discloseth to me his hart, opens his faults, sheweth me his hopes and fears.  
This makes the up shot of love, and the Bond of fellowship. As the Diamond engraues the Diamond, and fire increases fire: so his love increaseth my love, and makes up an union between vs.  Saris de Amore primâ Passione.  

X. Of Desire the 2. Passion.  
DEsire is the stop, and scale of love: it adds vehemency to our assecting.  
The object of it is some pleasing good; The issue delight.  
Goods are made pleasant unto us either by 

Nature or  
custom.    
1 By nature are such as in themselves haue no pain.  
2 By custom the hunts-man affects the could winters-walkes, and the student loveth his watchings, and they are desirable to him, though in themselves are painful, but are pleasant for the End.  
Desire is partly 

with Hope.  
without hope.    
1 If a thing desired be within compass of attainment wee raise up our powers within, and watch helps abroad to gain it, then desire is joined with Hope.  
2 If it be not likely to be gained, it leaves hope, and spends itself only in wishing.  
Thus we desire 

Mines of Gold  
Managements of States   though there bee noe hope or expectance of it  
About Desire are these tenants  
1 It is a note of want, and Impotency. Thence the covetous are said always to bee wanting in their greatest Abundance.  
2 It is never but with grief, till the thing be obtained, and in the attainment it ceases. Hence it cannot be in God, seeing in him is noe Want, grief, or Passibility of Nature.  
3 We cannot desire things, we know not.  
4 It is limited only by satisfaction; without it grows eager importunity.  
5 It is grounded only vpon sense: Angells properly haue it not nor plants.  
6 It appears first in beasts: In a more pregnant manner it is in men, seeing in them the sensible part is more various, as having opinion to float and to cast their desires to infinite resolutions, which beasts want.  
Desire is either 

Proper, or  
Improper.    
1 The Improper is an Inclination to the regaining of a Good; this is called Appetitus naturalis, by which the Earth beareth downward, the fire upward, and by it appears in all natural Bodies.  
2 The Proper is in men principally.  
This is for the bettering either of the 

Reasonable part, or  
Sensible part.    
1 For the reasonable, there is a desire of knowledge naturally in-grafted in the soul.  
2 For the sensitive part, the desires are either necessary as of 

meats.  
drinks.    
natural not necessary, as Venery, which though it be necessary to man in Specie, yet is not to this or that man in Individuo: Neither natural, nor necessary, as are all fantasies, and conceited Appetites.  
The 2 former is common to men with beasts.  
The last comes by an Opinatiue apprehension of Colourable goods it openes itself most in excess of things: It grows boundless and infinite, for as opinion is infinite, so these desires brooded, and hatched by it must be infinite.  
Fancied Desires are either. 

Extraordinary  
Ordinary.    
1 The Extraordinary are caused by diseases, as the choleric desires hony, the Fever-sicke Wine, others eat chalk, coals &c. or are incident to great bellies, whose longing proceeds from a raw could Humour; If they fail of it, they either endanger themselves, 
Livinus lib.  or their infants; it comes especially, when they travel for Wenches. The Low-countrey-women of all others are most given to these desires, because of their coldness of Temper.  
2 The ordinary ariseth from Voluntary Passions.  
They bend either to 

Pleasure.  
Profit.    
1 The desires bending to Pleasures are mainly to soothe the 5. Sences. These are craving and excessive all joined make up luxury. Cleopatra in her Voyage to Anthony had all these, odours for her smell, music for her ears, cakes for her taste, costly hangings and soft-Pillowes for her sight and touch.  
The like was noted of Antiochus in his war against the Romans.  
The 2 special sences that luxury seeks to please are 

Touching.  
Tasting.    
From th●se arise 2. importunate ones 

1 Lust for Venery.  
2 Liquo●ousenes for 

meats.  
drinks.      
The Excurrences of both these are a certain sign of a corrupt, lewd, and intemperate soul.  
1 Lust is in beasts, but exceeds in men.  
1 Beasts haue it but at set times, men at their Pleasure, ad Libitum.  
2 Beasts haue it less violently, men, so, that many haue wrought their deaths for it.  
The only way to alloy it, and to excel beasts is 

Right reason.  
Religion.    
Our caveats against it must be to avoid wanton 

1 words.  
2 G●stures.  
3 meats.    
It never admits moderation, and warrantise, but only in the bond of Marriage.  
2 Liquorousnes for meats and drinks aims not at necessity, but pampering: thence it cannot be truly in beasts, who feed not but for hunger.  
This Desire is seen in us either 

Eating overmuch.  
Too greedily for the Time.  
Inseasonably at all times.  
Feeding rather on delicates, then strong meats.    
It is Seneca's saying of the Belly. Parvo contentus est, si des illi quod debes, non quod potes.  
2 Desires ayeming at profit are either of 

Wealth, as covetousness.  
Honour, as Ambition.    
1 covetousness is for the Purse, it gapes after money, either to haue it only in possession, this is Parsimony: or to haue it for use, and purveyance, not of natures, but of Superfluities: This desire may be termed Vaunting, or ostentation.  
parsimony is only to haue, not to use; It is the truest note of Poverty.  
Increase rather feeds, then alleys it: he that still drinks, 
Plutarch.  and cannot be satisfied, needs rather purging, then filling.  
These extort from others not to benefit themselves: but wee rather hate the Viper, that stings only to kill, then the bear or lion, that kill only to eat.  
They make others to want: yet themselves are like the Bath-masters Asses, that carry on their backs the Rubbers and the cleansing Towells, yet they themselves are all miry with filth: They never profit, but by their death. As a kind of mice feeding in the gold-mines eat the oar, yet redeliver it not till they be exenterated.  
This Desire grows infinite, and ariseth from 3. heads  
1 Imitation of them, whom we see to prosper and we wish to be as they are.  
2 We make Wealth our End, not our means Concupiscentia finis solum infinita; means to Ends are bounded, sith the end is beyond them.  
3 Riches are for use; they are not of themselves good; As man cannot be sure of his estate, but he may require helps from them, and as losses are ever imminent, so riches are ever desired for prevention: Desire of money for Ostentation aims wholly at superfluity: if at necessaries, the poor might equal the rich in this Kind: And Diogenes might by this as well vaunt himself in his tub, as Alexander in his Throne. One came to Scopa Thessalus, but to beg some of his superfluous stuff, his answer was that the grace of his Wealth was seen in superfluities rather, then in necessaries. If Ismenias at Thebes, and Callias at Athens both the richest of their times bare no greater port, then Epamminondas, or Socrates, we might term their Wealth blind, and heartless: Therefore Telemachus in Homer passes over Nestors household, where all was frugal, nothing superfluous, but amplifies in rich terms the gaudy and costly furniture of Menelaus.  
This Desire Ends in expense, as the former in keeping,  
They are opposed as logic and rhetoric, the one resembles the hand in spreading, the other in closeing.  
logic is for the covetous to learn to count {αβγδ} computo. As rhetoric for the Vaunter to Vent, and utter himself: this is the chief factor for gains both to antic, and modern pleaders.  
— Ciceroni nemo ducentos  
I am dederit nummos, nisi fulserit annulus ingens, &c.  
The way to stop both these golden desires is contentation in our present estate: this is called by Socrates the souls riches.  Brevissima ad divitias per contemptum divitiarum via. 
Seneca.  
2 Desires of honour termed Ambition is either of 

Low and competent  
Highest, and best   Honors.  
It ariseth from 2. heads.  
1 Presumption of our own worth.  
2 Pride over others.  
The abates of it are 

Humility in respect of ourselves.  
Charity in respect of others.    
As we may not merely want this desire, so wee must not let it exceed in us; The excess breeds envy in all; the defect is faulty only in those, which haue desert, occasion, and fit means to game their honour.  
Men of Worth to extenuate their goods, and gifts, when necessity requires their trial, is to bury their goods with them, and to wrong the weal public  
This desire in the mean is only allowable.  
If it be of lower Honors it is termed Modesty, if it perch to the highest, it is magnanimity, and is only for great hartes, and the best perfections.  
Both these are grounded on four conditions.  
1 That we challenge no more honor, then what in the opinion of the best we haue deserved.  
2 That we get them by lawful means, not by out-stripping others.  
3 That we rest without seeking more, having gotten the former,  
unless they bee 

Easily offered.  
forcibly put on vs.    
4 That we keep our Place, and defend it against all backbiters, and murmurers.  Satis de cupiditate Secundâ Passione.  

XI. Of Hope the 3. Passion.  
AS love and Desire is to affect good, so 

Hope.  
boldness.   to prosecute it.  
The 2. former come from the concupiscible, as a Lord to will.  
The 2. latter as a steward to purvey, and proceeds from the Irascible.  
love is the base, to Desire; so Hope to boldness.  
1 It is always the apprehender of Good.  
2 The goods must not be in presence, but in future.  
3 It must be of a thing not easy, and without search, but hard to compass.  
4 It must not be so hard, but it must apparently be in possibility to attain.  
It hath these tenants.  
1 It is neither without assurance, though not of the thing, yet of persuasion.  
2 It makes us take delight in things painful.  
3 The surer the hope is, the greater is the Ioy, when the thing is attained.  
4 It brings security, and barreth fear.  
5 The adjunct of it is Expectation; herein is some grief sith we yet want the good, which we would haue in presence.  
6 It is a note of imperfection of being: whence it is only for this life, it goes not beyond.  
7 It moves our powers of 

body  
soul   for atchiuements.  
The Persons given to Hope are,  
1 They that rather haue deserved, or intend to deserve well of vs.  
2 They that haue potency of friends and best means.  
3 They that haue hot, and quick spirits, which enlarge our harts to attempts.  
Hence young men, and Drunkards are most given this way.  
Old men are least hoping 

1 For the coldness of temper, making them unfit to attempt.  
2 For their experience of many dangers, and stoppages, which contrary, and cross their hope.    
4 They that quickly apprehended the good, but fore cast not the stoppage in the way, that hinders the good: Thence fools, and Inconsiderate persons build only vpon Hope.  
The kindes of Hope.  
Hope is either 

1 natural.  
2 supernatural or theological.    
1 The supernatural is a virtue only infused by God.  
The second Sister to 

Faith.  
charity.    
2 The natural is either 

Improper.  
Proper.    
1 improperly it is in beasts: As the Dog springs the Deere within compass of attaineing, hopes to take him: So the hawk the Pattridge.  
How should beast haue hope, sith hope comes from the understanding?  
beasts haue their natural instinct which proceeds from God, and understanding without them: 
Sol:  by it they judge of things future, as the Emmot foresees the could Winter, Mice leave the house, when it begins to fall, and Ravens oft foretell weather.  
2 Hope Proper is in men only.  
It is either of things. 

Necessary that must be.  
Possible, that may be otherwise.    
1 Things necessary are hoped for: as the Iewes calling, the worlds End, the Resurrection, which cannot be otherwise, because God hath appointed it.  
Things Possible are attained 

Partly by ourselves.  
Partly by others.    
Then our Hope relies much on others help.  
motives to raise hope.  
1 show the means to be strong and pregnant.  
2 That the evils feared are not in proportion to the goods expected.  
3 That to men of religion we must not urge the general only but the particular Providence of God.  
4 To grave men use rather few and strong reasons, then many and weak: To the common sort use probabilities rather of circumstance then realties of substance, because of Ignorance they are led most with conjectures.  Satis de Spe 3a. Passione.  

XII. Of boldness the 4th. Passion.  
boldness hartens our Hope, as desire doth our love.  
Its object is mixed 

Evils to be removed  
Goods to be attained.    
It goes under the name of Conscience and Courage: It begins with reluctance, and struggling, but ends with Victory.  
Courage is either 

sudden vpon sense.  
Deliberate vpon Reason.    
1 That vpon sense grounds only vpon a presuming hope, weighs not every occurrence of danger, begins with resolution, but seeing dangers arise unlooked for, slackes and often failes, before it overcome: Thus quick in the onset, but slow in the Issue.  
2 That vpon reason begins slowly, endeth ventrouslie, views every circumstance, fore-layes the uttermost of dangers: If it happens less then his account, it heartens him the more, he resolves to conquer by out-faceing danger.  
An example of both is seen in Lucius Paulus, and Terentius Varro the 2. Roman general at the overthrow of Cannae.  
Courage hath his 2, extremes 

Heady rashness.  
Base cowardice.    
The parties most courageous are.  
1 Whose temper of Body is such, that they are hot spiritted; which happens in three sorts of men,  
1 Whose heart is little, because of combring and closing of spirits, whereas in the larger hartes their diffusion causeth fear.  
2 Whose lungs are greatest and fullest of blood: This argues plenty of heat, and much quickness.  
3 Who are heated with much Wine: Thence the Germans used it principally in their consultations of war: And Alexanders drinking was thought to add some-what to his courage.  
2 They that haue many and strong helps, are venturous.  
3 They that be most subject to choler.  
4 They that rely on Gods promises, and cast their hopes vpon him.  
Hence it is, That Martyrs are most resolute.  
5. They that haue a Conscience of their Innocency: on the contrary they are most fearful, which haue been most injurious.  
6 They that haue oft escaped dangers: hence old Souldiers are more venturous, then fresh-water-men.  
7 They that see not inconveniencies, and stops: Hence the wiser sort are more cautelous, and none so desperate, as he, that foresees least.  
5. motives to make courageous.  
1 show the Excellence of the Victory: The means easy, and present, that must compass it.  
2 If our equals and inferiors haue overcome: why should not we hope the like? It was Cicero's argument to persuade the sufferance of evil: If children at Sparta could endure strokes without groaning, why should not men? And amongst men if the barbarous vaunt before their enemies, why should the learned trembl●.  
3 Set them into anger: this makes a boiling of their blood, and by consequence courage: Anger is wrought by laying open their wrongs, and disgraces offered without a cause.  
4 show the 

Paucity  
weakness   of their enemies, that they either 

Will not  
Dare not   oppose them.  
5 That in former combats they haue had success, and why not in these standing in the same proportion.  
Our main work must be to 

persuade hope.  
excel fear    Satis de Fiduciâ 4a. Passione.  

XIII Of Pleasure the 5th. Passion.  
THis is the aim and upshot of the 4. former Passions: 

Love  
Desire   are like the qualities of lightness in fire, which inclineth it to make 

Hope.  
boldness.   like the motion or Passage of it.  
Pleasure resultes as the quietness and rest of the soul in her object: it is never hearty before the goods are in presence.  
It is generally in men and beasts; it is termed properly pleasure, or delight: As it is in men by Opinion, it is called Ioy, Gaudium.  
This in men hath 2. 
Aquenas.  operations, sc: 

1 Enlarging the hart: hence properly it is called laetitia, quasi latitia.  
2 Forcing outward gestures, and so it is called Exultatio.    
The tenants touching it are,  
1 Noe Passion is so vehement: So that many haue dyed of it; the reason is because it opens the hart, and being overmuch passes out the spirits, that keep in life.  
2 The greater Ioy, the greater content, and in men it is the consequent of happiness.  
3 It is never true, and of continuance, but where there is Peace of Conscience.  
4 It is the Adjunct of virtue.  
5 It is increased by Variety of objectes.  
6 It purifies the soul, helps concoction, expelles superfluities, hence the merry haue 

Good wits.  
Faire complexions.    
7 It is for goods present: though we joy for remembrance of things past, or for hope of things future, yet they are apprehended by us in a sort of Presence.  
motives to raise delights in a man are,  
1 persuade him to a 

love  
Desire   of those things, we would haue him delighted in.  
2 mark his inclination, sort, profession, and frame yourself to the like practices.  
3 amplify the goodness of the thing, we would haue him delight in, not by describing it in gross, but viewing every particular: Thence Poets in their loue-legends describe every part of their Mrs th● more to delight.  
4 show the continuance of this Ioy, that it breeds not after-repentance Variety c●useth delight, and uniformity raiseth loathing.  
Pleasure is 

common to men with beasts  
Proper to men alone.    
1 That in common is the Issue of sense, and comes from a natural appetite,  
It is 

negative for the avoidance only of trouble.  
positive for the gaining of some real good.    
This grounded on 2 conditions, viz. 

1 The attaineing of a good convenient.  
2 The persuasion that we haue attained it.    
2 That proper to men is voluntary and hatched by Opinion.  
It is either of 

Mind or  
Body   The Pleasures of the mind are best, yet all not warrantable, as the 

prove  
Malicious   take delight in their passions, yet their minds are corrupt: these begin in hope, but end in shane and grief.  
The truest delight of the mind without repentance is 

1 Meditation on God, and heavenly things.  
2 The view of learning.    
Eudoxus wished to be burned with phaethon, so he might stand near the sun to contemplate the nature of it: And Archimedes left not his drawing of lines, till a sword was drawn through his body.  
Pleasures of the body are sensual, and quickly Exceed Measure.  
The Properties of them are 

1 inconstancy and fleeting.  
2 satiety,& cloying like rank meate.  
3 Ending in repentance.  
4 They quench the thirst no more then Salt water, that wets the palate, but inflames the stomach.    
They are persuaded by three Enimyes. 

1 World.  
2 Flesh.  
3 devil.    
The worldlings take 

Present  
Apparent   Ioy for future, and real pain.  
The good had rather suffer here, and play hereafter.  
sensual pleasures proceed from the divers affecting of the Sences, as music, and odours affect the ear and Smell, pictures the Eye, &c. The strongest delight comes from the sense of touching, The reason is, Delight is caused of love: we love those things, that most besteed us, of all the Sences touching is most useful; without which it is impossible we should live: And as the goods affencted by it are more dear; so the pleasure, when it is attained, must be more moving.  
These bodily exercises in their excess distracted the minds, and hinder the use of right reason.   

XIIII. Of Hate and Detesting.  
THese are the 2. opposites of 

love.  
Desire.   Hate begins the dislike, dedetesting is the vehemency of it.  
The object of both is evil: It is either of the 

thing.  
Person.    
1 The thing hated principally is sin, and for it we dislike of the Person  
sin is against the law of 

1 Nature this breeds the hate of either 

Moralists.  
Heathens.    
2 Grace, this breeds the hate of Christians.   sith all partake of nature, and are bound to its laws.  
2 The Person we may not simply hate. It is proper to Ubicunque homo est, ibi benificio locus est. 
Seneca   
3 heads of Sin move ●ate 

1 Irreligion towards God.  
2 Injustice towards men.  
3 A self inclination to evils without outward motives.    
If these heads grow stronger, and are done wilfully, it transcends hate, and mov●s detestation.  
The principle object of it is atheism.  
1 It is the ground-plot of all other sins.  
2 It is an evil of Will, not of understanding; we cannot allege Ignorance for that, which the creature reveals. It is voluntary presumption.  
3 atheists are most unfit for Society.  
Their commerce is either 

1 Scoffing.  
2 impudence.  
3 vain.   of that Constitution, as is most contrary to wisdom, and moral gravity.  
These things move the greatest detestation.  
Hate is either 

In common against states.  
Particular for private respects.    
1 That in common aryses, if 

Their religion be in opposition to ours.  
Their laws be against nature.  
Their oft injuries done be without hope of righting.    
2 Hate for private respects, is 

1 Against a wronger of many, as 

1 Tyrants  
2 Extortioners.    
2 Against a wronger of himself only for the indignity of his person.    
This is set down by its life 

1 Towards God.  
2 Towards himself.  
3 Towards his Neighbour.    
His entry into the World is shameful, his stay, and departure hence with misreport, like a snuff leaving a stink, when the light is out.  Satis de odio,& detestatione.  

XV. Of despair a●d fear.  
THese 2. are opposite to 

Hope.  
boldness.    
Their special Art is in avoiding the future evil, which seeing they cannot master, they yield.  
1 despair ariseth from fail of helps.  
2 feat from the Imminence of evils.  
The tenants of despair are 3.  
1 It deiecteth the mind.  
2 It makes venturous to try the utmost of dangers.  
3 It is deepest in them, who before had greatest hopes.  
The tenants of fear are 3.  
1 It is never moved, but where some spice of hope is, for things without remedy are rather despair, then fear.  
2 The greater the things feared, and of long continuance, the greater is the fear.  
3 It prepares Patience, awakes industry whereas despair is only in suffering.  
It ariseth from 3 heads 

1 The debility of the person.  
1 The greatness of the danger.  
3 The certainty and imminency thereof    
fear is either of a 

Person.  
thing    
1 Of a Person it is either 

1 filial, which is properly love.  
2 Servile, which is only for escape.    
The persons most feared by us are.  
1 Great men offended with vs.  
2 Lewd men made powerful.  
3 They who stand in bodily fear of vs.  
4 High stomachs wronged by vs.  
5 They, who haue our life and credit in their hands  
We fear them either 

1 As in themselves faithless.  
2 To be provoked ●y 

1 gain.  
2 threats.  
3 Danger on their part, want of service in our part      
Persons not ●uch to be feared are.  
1 They that are soon angry, and soon pleased.  
2 They which open themselves too much in menaces and threats.  
3 They that disclose their purposes. They close heart concocts malice. Vlysses is said to dissemble his disslike for the wooers riot; but revenged them at occasion. Anthony and Dolabella frayed not caesar, though they conspired against him: he answered he feared not those fat, and open fact Traytors, but two lean ones Brutus and Cassius which proved his deaths-men. Demissos animo,& tacitos vitare memento.  
2 Things feared are evils bringing either 

1 Destruction to the whole man, or  
2 Baine to any part of him.    
Evils are of 

1 Sin, malum culpae.  
2 Punishment, malum paenae.    
1 The former is feared by the best men.  
2 The latter is feared by the worst.  
The parties most fearful are,  
1 They, whose quantity of heart is such, that it diffuseth the spirits.  
2 They, that know their own weakness, and others ableness to hurt.  
3 They, that amplifye on the evils feared.  
The parties least fearful are, The 

Wise  
just   who count no evil but 

sin  
Disgrace   which they endeavour to avoid.  
1 The most courageous.  
2 They that prefer honour before their lives.  
3 They that haue strength of means to back them.  Satis de desperatione,& metu.  

XVI Of grief.  
grief is the End of the former Passions, and ariseth from the presence of evil.  
It is of 

Body.  
mind.   that of the min● is more dangerous.  
The tenants of it are;  
1 It never touches things of absolute perfection, as God, Angells, &c. but is there most frequent, where is most plenty of evils, as in hell.  
2 It drieth the Body and engendereth melancholy by could blood.  
3 It makes one unfit for Action.  
It grows vpon us by 

1 yielding too much to pleasures.  
2 entertaining a conceit of evils present.    
The Way to resist it in ourselves.  
1 Propose to yourselves examples of Patience, as of Marius. Ita tulit dolorem; vt vir& vt homo maiorem far sine causa necessariâ noluit.  
2 resolve to resist evils. As that soldier, that stands it out, often wins, when the coward dies by flight. Animi contentio Sola officij tanquam custodia.  
3 That the evils now are not so great, but the goods ensuing counterpoise them.  
The way to alloy it in others is comfort 

persuasion of a good to come.  
removal of an evil present.    
In it are 2. things.  
1 The time to apply it, when the grief is ripened, not newly begun; As Surgeons first let the sore soften, before they begin to draw it.  
2 The manner of applieing it is 

general.  
special.    
1 The general by these places.  
1 show how greater evils haue happened to others, then we now suffer. It was Socrates his saying, if of all mens evils heaped together all should haue equal share, each would rest content with their present estate.  
2 Our evils be ordinary, and do what we can, we shall haue 

1 Cares of mind.  
2 Diseases of Body,    
3 If the thing be ●●●●eable, show the means of regaining it; if not, yet it is a folly 〈◇〉 mourn for it:  
4 That God sees, wha● is better for us, then we for ourselves.  
2 The special is according to the main motives of grief.  
1 These are 

Death.  
temporal misfortune.    
2 Our comfort death is.  
1 It is vnavoydable by fate, and all men must, and do taste of it.  
2 It is noe evil, but a passage to a better life.  
3 Our life hath many troubles, and anguishes, death is the quiet of them.  
4 If we grieve for the dead, then either, because they are not or because they are in torment; If they are not, why grieve we more for their now not-being, then for our children yet unborn; If they be in torment, it is seen, they were evil, we were the better rid of them.  
Of deaths they are most greveous, that are 

sudden.  
untimely.    
Against these our comforts are 3.  
1 We ever bear Corruption in our flesh, that in a moment may kill vs.  
2 Dying young makes us less fixed to the world, and fitter for God. {αβγδ}. He calls us hence as from a banquet, lest overmuch sitting should make us surfeit.  
3 The thing cannot be sudden, sith we are ever liable to evil. We ought ever to expect it.  
2. Our comfort for temporal misfortunes.  
1 They come from Gods decree, and so are necessary to fall on vs.  
2 They are profitable unto us, and debar our insolence.  
3 They may befall any as well as vs.  
4 Shall we grieve ever or leave at last? If ever, to great a misery we impose on us: if we will l●●ue, why resolve we not at first.  
The Persons most given to 〈◇〉 ●●●fe are 3.  
1 Whose temper of Body is Mela●cholie.  
2 women, because of their easiness in yielding.  
3 They, who haue given themselves to overmuch Ioy: This falling must end in depth of grief.  Satis de dollar.  

XVII. Of Samefacenes.  
It is a mixed passion joined with 

fear of infamy.  
love of Honesty.    
It ariseth partly 

before a fault.  
After a fault.    
It is only in good natures, but vnsteddy, soon failing, and easily revoked by council: It it commendable in youth, but not in the Aged.  
The Effects of it are 2.  
1 It moves to virtue; thence termed Purpura virtutis.  
2 It calls blood into the face. Reason and Passion move the heart; the heart, the spirits, the spirits the blood.  
Now shane consists of 2 passions 

1 fear, that gathers blood to the hart.  
2 love, that sends it abroad to the outward parts.    
If we fear only disgrace, and haue no love to good, our blood keeps within: This is the sign of a bad nature, which being convicted of faults looks not red; but pale in the Face.  
If we fear not only disgrace, but love and desire amendment, our blood spreadeth outward, and causeth blushing. Aristoteles his daughter being asked, what she counted the fairest colour, answered the ruddy caused by an ingenuous blushy.  
It is a note of the best natures, and fittest for counsel.  
The reason, why t●● blood sheweth itself most in the face is, because as the blo●● is moved by the spirits so the spirits are most quick, 〈◇〉 animate the organ of sense; and the Organs of sense princi●ally are about the face.  
The extremes of shane are 

〈◇〉, an overbashfulnes  
2 Impudence, the defect of shane.    
bashfulness in itself is not evil, but may often be a provocation to evil. It is grounded vpon an overlenity of nature, and easiness of yielding. The object of it is fear of infamy. The persons whom it may hurt are 5.  
1 Young men as leading them to an vnset'led and floating carriage in manners.  
2 It makes them easy to suitors, without respect of their choice.  
3 Incontinent persons; It makes them unable to resist evill-motions, though in the yielding they grieve at it.  
4 It debarreth their courage in punishing faults, and makes them loth to displease.  
5 They, which are rich, powerful, kind-hearted, and haue many helps to further others.  
1 It makes the rich 

Rash lenders.  
Heady suretys.    
2 The kind hearted by it either 

1 Follow the riot of bad company.  
2 bear false witness for their Acquaintance.  
3 soon take pains for others.  
4 join their to unworthy men.    
3 The powerful haue many suitors, and by it are made easy to yield to any demand, and proffer without election.  
The way to bar it is to acquaint ourselves with resistance to motions, denials of suits, if they be not honest, and convenient, but hurtful to the granter.  
The Inhabtants of Asia were all slaves, because they could not pronounce this word {αβγδ}. And Brutus said.  
Impudence passes not fear of Infamy.  
The difference betwixt it and bashullnesse is, that the bashful retain a love of virtue; the Impudent do not.  
Perijt, cvi perit pudo●,  
Satis de pudore.   

XVIII Of Repentance.  
REpentance is an act of Conscience arising from the thought of an evil done. 
What it is   
It is either 

1 theological, because of offences done against the law of Grace.  
2 moral because of things done against the law of nature, or common Honesty.    
1 Repentance theological is in Christians alone.  
2 moral is in Heathens.  
It is raised by three motives 

1 Infamy.  
2 Punishment.  
3 Hate of 'vice.    
1 That arising from fear of Infamy, and punishment is slavish, and incident to the most.  
2 The best repent for the hate of 'vice: For as they love good for the good, not for reward: So they hate evil for the evils sake, not for the punishment.  
The parts of repentance are 2. 

1 Hate of the evil done.  
2 Resolution of amendment.    
It is descried 3. ways 

1 By contrition of the hart.  
2 By confession of the mouth.  
3 By satisfaction by good works.    
Its properties are three.  
1 Repentance must be with vehemency of grief, least, while our grief for the fault slackness, our care for amendment slackness also.  
2 It must not be for a time, but for continuance, sith evil is ever to be hated, and good ever to be resolved vpon.  
3 It must not be deferred, least delay breed custom of evil, and custom hardness of hart.  
The stops of repentance are 7.  
1 shane to confess● our faults, or pride in not acknowledging them.  
2 Delighting in our sins.  
3 Hope of long life.  
4 despair of obtaining grace.  
5 Presumption of Gods mercy.  
6 long custom of sinning.  
7 Examples of bad men, which haue long flourished, yet never repented.  
The tenants of repentance are 5.  
1 Repentance cannot be in a nature merely good, as God, nor merely bad, as the devill; but in such only as are partly good, and partly bad, as in men.  
These are 

Bad by nature; hence they offend.  
Good by grace; hence they amend.    
2 It is only in things, that we to fall: Beasts haue it not: those actions are not voluntary, but necessary, which cannot be repented off.  
3 It ariseth from a knowledge, and taste of sin committed: thence children haue it not.  
4 It groundeth on hope: They that die desperate haue it not, sith the desperate are swallowed up with grief: The repentant receive grief for the evil past, but ioy for the future good, and future things more move then those past.  
5 Repentance is joined with shane, as Impenitence is joined with jmpudence.   

XIX. Of Pitty.  
Pitty looks outwardly to the evils of others, but by reflex to our own.  
It is mixed with 

grief for the evils fallen.  
Desire for their remedy.    
evils that raise pitty are 4 

1 grief ●f mind.  
2 Tortu●●f Body.  
3 Dan●●r of others death.  
4 Mis fortune in goods.    
The evils move most 

1 If they are so near to fall, that we fear them.  
2 If so lately fallen, that we freshly remember them.  
3 If their then present falling bars our Expectance of contrary profit.    
The ground of pitty is our communion of nature.  
The extent of it is a Desire to help.  
This desire hath 2 conditions 

If we we are able to help.  
If iustice permit.    
1 Greiuing for such as laws, and Iustice will haue banished, is womanish.  
2 For those we are not able to remedy, it is fruitless.  
The tenants of pitty are 4.  
1. The better nature, the more it is inclinable to it.  
2 It is means to provoke charity.  
3 It compares the evil fallen with the desert, and concluds the person unworthy to suffer it.  
4 It brings us to acknowledge our own misfortunes.  
The parties most pitying are 5.  
1 Old men partly 

As not being so stomackefull, as the young.  
As having more experience of Dangers.    
2 Weaklings 

women  
Children   they think for their infirmity, they may soon suffer the like.  
3 Schollers, as being by books acquainted with many examples of dangers.  
4 They that haue felt former evils, and now are rid of them.  
5 They that haue opinion of anothers worth, they count it below his deserts to be in evils.  
The parties least pitying are 5.  
1 Who are most given to 

Anger  
boldness   they recount not the evils, that may befall them.  
2 Scoffers and they who are ready to wrong others.  
3 They that are in ex●remitie of distress: As in cities besieged parents eat their own children; whereas otherwise they used to pitty them. Their care is for the remedy of their own harms, little for others: thence they that fear imminent dangers, pitty not others, but care for themselves.  
4 They that are in height of fortune not likely to fall. Thence tyrants and rich men pitty least,  
5 They that haue prejudice against others behaviour, what befalls them, they count it desert, and do less grieve at it.  
The persons, whom we pitty most, are 4.  
1 Acquaintance rather then strangers.  
2 Our equals either in 

1 Yeares.  
2 Manners.  
3 Profession.  
4 Office.  
5 stock.    
2 They who suffer those evils, which wee ourselves feared,  
4 Men bearing their harms with 

1 Patience  
2 Courage   by it we count them unworthy of them,& so pitty them.  
The way to raise pitty for others.  
1 show the valour, and the worth of the person, that suffers.  
2 The greivousnes of the evils befallen.  
3 The like may happen either to them, or their friends.  
Conscience of a mans own case moves it.   

XX. Of zeal and iealousy.  
1 zeal is a Passion grounded on love.  
It is 

1 grief for a fault committed.  
2 Desire for a good intended.    
It borders on repentance, and is the issue and effect of it.  
It is ever with fervency: It is most dangerous, unless it be regulated with knowledge.  
It is either for a 

Good quality.  
the good of a person.    
1 The former is in the best, who●re ●ealous of good for goodness itself.  
2 The latter comes from the respect of a person conceived in the behalf of one, we love.  
It supposeth 

Wrong done to our friend  
Desire of remedy   or grief for it.  
2 jealousy is a passion conceiting an evil in another, that perhaps is guiltless of it: it comes only by conjectures.  
It proves often injurious.  
It breeds trouble in ourselves, and distrust to our friends.  
The way to bar it is, not to skanne the actions of others, but with a favourable interpretation.   

XXI. Of Anger.  
ANger is a compound of sundry passions: As 1. Pleasure in revenge. 2. grief in recounting the wrongs. 3. Insolence in overbearing 4. Envy in repining at the welfare of others: The proper Act of it is desire of hurting.  
The tenants of it are 5.  
1 A just injury requires as just anger; and it is stupidity not to be moved with it.  
2 It is not bent against men in general, but to some in special only. Thence Timon is not said to be angry with all but hate all.  
3 Noe passion is more indiscreet then it: thence it's ridiculous, and to be contemned, none more violent, thence terrible, and to be feared.  
4 Being moderate it whets Valour; but over-earnest it weakens revenge.  
5 To be suddai●●● moved is a sign of weakness; hence it agrees more to the sick, then the sound, to old folkes then to young: And to Women.  
— quip minuti  
Semper& infermi est animi exiguique voluptas.  
Ultio continuo; sic collige, Quod vindicta  
Nemo magis gaudet quâm faemina.—  
Adjuncts of anger are these viz. 

1 Vexation of mind.  
2 Ignorance of his own strength.  
3 Vndecency of gesture.  
4 wrongful opinion of others.    
The causes raising it are 

general.  
special.    
1 The general disrespect shewed 4 ways. 

1 By derision in words.  
2 Injury in deeds, as against. 

Body.  
Goods.  
Name.    
3 Ingratitude for good turns 

1 friends.  
2 inferiors either in 

1 Blood.  
2 Authority.  
3 Wealth.  
4 virtue.      
4 Want of due observance from our.    
2 The special are according to the nature of special persons.  
1 If we haue too settled a persuasion of those we converse with, if they fail in the contrary to our expectation, our choler riseth: Hence credulity inflames anger.  
2 Curiosity inflames it, if we busy ourselves too much in love, and frivolous matters: Crosses in either of them fret vs.  
3 If we delight in one thing more then another, when we should use either with indifferency: As in an household, if our stuff of this fashion like us better then that, and we take pleasure in it, the loss or the mislaying of it frettes us  
The ways to alloy anger in others.  
1 prove the wrong done vpon 

Ignorance.  
Constrainte.  
sudden P●ssion.  
Mischance.    
2 That it was done to our own harm, as well as his.  
3 show sorrow for it, for outfacing grows of impudence, that of disrespect, the nurse of Anger.  
4 Be not opposite in talk.  
5 Dissemble our Humility, and fear: the angered by this are less prove to revenge.  
6 seem to be serious for his good, and overcome this wrong with other passages of kindness.  
7 speak not against men of his sort and quality though their persons grieve him not.  
8 scoff at none whatsoever, but be affable to all. Isocrates. ad Daemon.  
To bear anger in ourselves the ways are 4.  
1 use noe hart grief but 

Sports.  
Games.  
Merriments   yet bar insolent delights, sith these are overbearing, and anger others.  
2 resolve to resist choler by not easily accepting disrespects.  
3 A sudden fear, or grief vnexspected allayeth ones anger.  
4 If a wrong be offered, rather contemn the offerer as wanting wit, then think ourselves disgrased by it.  
How to behave ourselves in anger. 3.  
1 Bend ourselves to a contrary passion; as Socrates with his friend laboured to look most pleasantly on him.  
2 Retire we ourselves from Company till the passion hath spent itself.  
3 Not to revenge before our anger be past.  
Persons most given to anger. 4.  
1 Weaklings, as Children, women, sick men, old folkes.  
2 They, that are ambitious, and standing for offices.  
3 They, that require much awe and reverence of others.  
4 They, that know their deserts well, yet are scorned.  
The parties, with whom we are least angry.  
1 They, who reuer●nce us which argues, they do not disrespect vs.  
2 We cannot be a●gry with him, whom we fear; sith anger implies hope of revenge: fear not.  
3 Men doing things vpon choler, less anger vs.  
4 Anger cannot be against those, whom we cannot hurt, as gods, and kings, that are out of our reach.  Satis de Ira.  

XXII. Of Maligninge.  
THis Passion hath 2 partes 

1 Envy greiving at another Good.  
2 {αβγδ}, joying for anothers evil.    
1 It is in the worst-natures, and is opposite to common society.  
2 It is principally betwixt equals, as men of the same sort: hence we envy not those, that are in eminency above us: A common soldier never envies Alexander; one of his nearest captaines may.  
3 It aims especially at the goods of 

Honour.  
Fortune.    
4 It eats up a mans hart by freting at others.  
5 It ariseth from pride of our own deserts.  
The way to avoid it in ourselves is to think that there must not be an equality of Gifts and goods in all: that as men are diverse, so they must haue distinction of place, and if any excel, we ought not to repined.  
Great men avoid the Envy of others 3. ways.  
1 Let them show themselves gentle, and affable to all.  
2 employ their goods to the uses of others.  
3 They must not think to be singular in any thing, sith that is envious. Nemo de nobis vnus excellat, This is the law of the Ephesians, who therefore banished Hermadorus.   

XXIII The Efficient cause of virtue.  
virtue is effected by 3. things 

1 Nature  
2 Precept.  
3 practise.    
Nature begins the inclination; Precept directs it; Practise perfecteth it.  
Nature works virtue either from the 

soul only.  
Temperature of the Body.    
In soul are 2 Partes 

understanding.  
Will.    
The understanding is either viz. 

1 speculative, working for contemplation: the Issue of this is Sapience or pondering.  
● wick, working for action: The Issue of it is Honesty or moral virtue.    
1 The acts proper to ●he wick understanding are 3 

1 Conscience.  
2 Consultation.  
3 Prudence.    
These judge things to be 

Good.  
evil.    
Then the will records them 

1 For affecting it if it be good.  
2 For avoiding it, if it be evil.    
Of wick understanding.  
As the speculative is the discerner of truth from falsehood: So the wick of good from evil: Both judge from principles,& undoubted opinions: The wick judges only of moral principles arising out of the law of nature: Grounds, that Atheists assent unto in the general; though they will not follow them in particular.  
The principles of these are,  
1 Honour God.  
2 love honesty.  
3 obey 

Parents.  
Magistrates.    
4 love our Country.  
5 Hurt no man, but do, as you would be done by.  
6 yield every man his own.  
7 use all sociably, and in fellowship, as far as stands with our 

Credit.  
Benefit.    
8 Execute common malefactors for the common quiet sake.  
9 Suffer distinction of Lordships, lands, bounds, mens private possessions, &c.  
These rules all nations assent unto, and from these institute their common weals, Ius gentium. The breach of these is accusable by nature, and this accusation is termed Conscience.   

XXIIII Of Conscience.  
COnscience is the immediate act of our soul, arisi●g from a natural apprehension of good, and avoydanc● of evil: It cannot be totally extinguished in any.  
It bring us 

To know our faults.  
To condemn them.  
To haue will to prosecute the contrary.    
It is either of 

faults past; so it 

checks.  
condemns.    
future, so it retains.    
It is best in the mean, and most dangerous, when it is to 

Large.  
Nice.    
1 The former calls evil good, and breeds presumption.  
2 The latter counts of the best good as evil, and breeds despair.  
It grounds vpon this syllogism.  
Noe evil is to be committed:  
This particular is evil, Ergo.  
Not to be committed.  
The Maior is drawn from the wick understanding out of the rules of Nature. The minor ariseth from view of particulars, which are variable, and may often deceive; if our apprehension of them bee false, our Conscience must needs err.  
Error of conscience proceeds from these heads.  
1 From ignorance, if we know not what is to be 

Chosen.  
Refused.    
2 Negligence in not fitting ourselves, and getting direction from others, if we find our own weak.  
3 Pride in not humbling our conceits to others, that are 

Wiser.  
Honester   then vs.  
4 Singularity in following our own private spirit.  
5 Passion, that inclines conscience to follow appetite. Perit omne judicium, cum res transit in affectum.  
6 Pusillanimity in distructing all things, and fearing to venture on any thing, least we offend: If we do any thing against conscience, be it good or bad; the act utterly is sinful.   

XXV. Of Consultation.  
COnsultation is grounded on these rules.  
1 It is not touching the End, but of the means directing to it.  
2 Things past are not to be consulted off, but things future.  
3 Not necessary things, but contingent.  
4 Things nothing appertaineing to us are not to be consulted off.  
Our consultation is either 

By ourselves alone.  
By others.    
1 We consult with ourselves if the matter be 

1 Of a great secrecy.  
2 suddenly befallen.  
3 If we haue not a friend to impart it.    
2 To consult with others observe them to bee 

Honest.  
Wise.  
faithful.    
The question in our consultation is,  
1 Whether the thing be convenient for us,  
2 Whether possibly to be compassed.  
1 It is judged convenient if it be, viz. 

1 Safe for us, not discommodious.  
2 Not against the 4. rules of Honesty. 

Prudence.  
Iustice.  
Temperance.  
Fortitude.      
2 Possibility of compassing it found out from view of all these means, we must use in working that end.  
The particular ways of Consultation are.  
1 Whether the thing be profitable, or disprofitable.  
2 Whether honest, or dishonest.  
3 When 2. profits are proposed, we question, which is greatest,  
4 If 2. things be honest, which is most honest.  
5 When one part is only honest, the other only profitable, which is rather to be prosecuted.  
In morality, the least honesty countervayles the most profit and is to be preferred before it: In peacocks or persuasion must be according to the auditory, with whom wee deliberate.  
Before the Vulgar our consultation must be most inclining to profit, sith they are most addicted that way; before the better sort stand rather for honesty and Honour.   

XXVI Of Prudence.  
PRudence is a special quality of a moralist, being the sole directresse, and governess of all his actions.  
It is only in things ambiguous, and borders on Consultation.  
It consists in 

choice.  
Iudgement.  
fitness of Application.    
It long consulteth, and quickly executeth.  
It corrects things past, directs the present, foresees the future.  
The special rule of it, is silence in revealing our purpose.  
The ways to get it are.  
1 industry in 

Disputing  
Reading   matters wick.  
2 Observations of mens carriages.  
3 Noting what effects proceed out of what causes.  
4 Acquaintance with sundry positive laws especially of our own land.  
5 using to invent much of our own, not to stand strictly on authority of others.  
The partes requisite to prudence are.  
1 Memory for retaining experiences past.  
2 understanding for judging moral principles.  
This gotten by— 

Hearing.  
Inventing ourselves.    
3 That wee may be ready to hear is required docility, our readiness to learn.  
4 For invention is required, Solertia, a ripeness of finding out means.  
5 When we haue 

Learned,  
Experienced,  
Invented,   wee must confer one thing with another, and discourse of the convenience of it. Hence to prudence is required reasoning.  
Ra●io.  
6 Out of this discourse arise precepts for action.  
These observe 3. things.  
1 Direction for fit means to fit Ends. Hence is required Providence.  
2 Weighing each circumstance of the business: Hence Circumspection is required.  
3 avoiding all stopps, and impediments: Hence is required Caution for evil.   

XXVII. Of the Will.  
THe seat of the Will is the Heart, where passions reside  
As the brain is the seat of the understanding.  
The will prosecutes what the understanding judges.  
The object of it is Good: Of the understanding Truth.  
Will without passion chooseth the true good: with passion the forged and apparent only.  
If goods be evident, it affects simply without praise; if doubted, there is first deliberation.  
It hath 2 partes, viz. 

1 Approbation, or willing.  
2 refusal, or nilling.    
For execution it commands in men 

Passions.  
Faculty of motions.    
1 The former it rules by persuasion, as by an Aristocracy or state regiment, whereby government is not so absolute, but the rest may interpose.  
2 The latter it rules by command, as a Lord over his servant, without relent in the one, or reluctance in the other.  
The tenants of the will are 2.  
1 It affects nothing, but what the understanding hath weighed first and contrarily the understanding conceits nothing, but the will persuades; their offices are joint and mutual.  
2 It cannot be constrained being of greatest freedom and liberty: Though we haue not freedom of will, to come from worse to better, in matters of grace, yet in matters civil we haue, sith it comes from a common motion of goodness conceived by the wick understanding.   

XXVIII. The Former causes of Vertue.  
TO examine this we inquire what is the 

1 Nature.  
2 Properties.  
3 several kindes of virtue.    
1 Its nature is to moderate the passionate part of the soul, It is termed by Plutarch, A disposition of the understanding part, according to Reason.  
This reason either 

1 Rules the passionate parte, so termed virtue.  
2 yields unto it: so it jades up 'vice.    

Defin. Habitus.  Aristotle defines it thus.  
1 It is not connatural, but bread by custom, thence termed Habit.  
2 Of Habits some 

1 Inforciue as the understanding, that compelles us to assent unto an evident truth.  

Praelectivus  3 On choice, and praelection, and such a one virtue is.    

In medio consisten.  3 Praelection and choice may be of things utterly nought, as when 2 evils stand compared, and in competition, but the choice of virtue must rely on the mean for his Center: whereas evils spread to the extremes, and multiply degrees: goodness acknoledges one only point of perfection, The golden mediocrity.  
Mediocrity changes according to circumstance of 

1 Time.  
2 Place.  
3 Person.   if it were set, and definitively one.  
It were virtue for all to use it alike, but the beggar may not be liberal of his purse, though a king may; And Milo the wrestler may eat large meales, when the weakeling taking the same proportion may be termed riotous: The spittle of a man to a man is wholesome, but to a Serpent death: and what is virtuous to one, may prove a 'vice to a neither. This Mediocrity is to bee ruled by Iudgement of each circumstance, which prudence must prescribe.  
Directions how we shall attain the mean.  
1 Of the 2. extremes see which is most opposite to virtue, and avoid it.  
2 Sift out the 'vice, our nature is most prove to, and labour to avoid it, by taking the other extreme: As a man being given to be prodigal let him labour to be covetous. Ab extremo ad extremum non pervenitur nisi per medium. So wee straighten sticks by bending them as much the contrary way, as they are bent the other way.  
3 resolve to resist bodi●y pleasures, and embrace them of the mind. 2 The properties, and notes of virtue.  
1 No moral virtue, but is placed between 2 vices. 

1 The excess to be depressed:  
2 Defect to be raised.    
2 Its ever in action, and the action must be with 3. conditions 

1 Knowledge. Scientèr.  
2 perseverance. Constantèr.  
3 willingness. Volentèr.    
3 Delight in goodness is a sign of the virtue gotten.  
— Sorrow argues, we do it unwillingly.  
4 virtue is conversant especially about the Moderating of sith these are the grounds and ends of all the rest. 

griefs.  
Pleasure.    
5 It is exercised about the highest, and hardest employments.  
6 It is amiable to all men, even to strangers, and enemies.  
The grounds of virtue 3. 

1 Religion towards God.  
2 Charity to our neighbours.  
3 Cherishing ourselves according to reason.    
The comprehension of all virtue is universal Iustice: by it we yield our duty to 

God.  
Neighbours.  
ourselves.     

XXIX. The several Kindes of virtues.  
virtues are either 

1 common to all.  
2 special to some persons.    
1 The common are requisite to all, though perhaps few haue them.  
They are either 

1 Proper, or full virtues  
2 Improper or half virtues.    
1 Full virtues are directed either 

1 To our private good only.  
2 To the good of others.    
1 Our private good is gotten by the governance of 2 passions 

1 Desire.  
2 fear.    
1 Our desire is of things 

natural.  
Adv●ntitious.    
1 natural 

Of nourishment: The virtue that tempers this is Sobriety.  
Of Venery: the virtue, that allays this is Chastity,    
The conjoining of both is called Temperance.  
2 Goods adventitious, as of 

Wealth; the virtue for this is content.  
Honour; the virtue for this modesty, or a decent competition, of what we deserve.    
3. Our fear is allayed by Fortitude.  
2 virtues directed to the good of others are.  
1 Iustice of 

Exchange.  
Distribution.    
2 Bestowing of gifts for the 

great ones, termed Magnificence.  
Smaller sort, Liberality.    
3 Courtesy, and pleasantness of Conversation.  
2 The half and imperfect virtues are 

1 Veracity, or a habit of telling truth  
2 Grace of carriage.  
3 emulation.  
4 ꝯtinence.  
5 Patience.    
2 The virtue special to some persons is the heroical spirit, which cannot be incident to all, but only to the highest, and best perfections.   

XXX. Of Temperance.  
THis contains 

1 Sobriety touching 

Meats  
Drinks   both these haue their 

1 Propertys.  
2 Effects.    
2 Chastity, tamer of lusts.    
The propertys of Temperance.  
1 With moderation to desire absent delights, and to use them present honestly.  
2 To affect only such as are lawful, and honest.  
3 For attaining, or enjoying them to do nothing, that may prejudice 

1 Health.  
2 Credit.  
3 private Estate.    
The effects of Temperance 

1 soundness of body.  
2 Strength of understanding.  
3 promptness of both acquiring, and exercising all other virtues.    
excess. mean. defect. Intemperance that vnbridles our appetites, and gives the onset to all kind of 'vice. Temperance Stupidity, the utter refusal of all natural necessary delights; a fault so seldom, that the Ancients could invent, no name for it.  Aut Deus est, aut Truncus iners, qui nescit amare. 
excess Sobriety Defect. In 

meats, gluttony.  
drinks, drunkenness   mean. Overmuch abstinence from necessary 

meats  
drinks    
Castitas 

1 Caelibatus  
2 Coniugij.    
Of Chastity.  
Chastity is the containing of bodily lust to the unmarried moderateing of them to the married.  
It is in 

Mind.  
Body.    
The breach of it is not from the act only, but from the thought and affection of defiling.  
The Integrity of mind and body is termed Virginity, the Quee●e of virtues. If we abstain in body but with reluctance of mind, it is termed Containing, A virtue civil, sith law cannot take hold of us, but not full moral.  
excess. mean Defect. Vnchastity in 

1 Words.  
2 Gesture.  
3 Actions.  
4 Thoughts   Chastity 
1 Defrauding our bodys of pleasures lawful: This is vicious.  
2 In none, but the married, which must not defraud one another.   
It effecteth 3 things 

1 Diseases to the body.  
2 Deformities.  
3 Corruption to the mind.     

XXXI. Of Content.  
THis virtue moderates the desire of wealth.  
There are ●. parts of it 

1 A grateful acceptance of our present estate  
2 Barring desires of more, then benefits our use.    
The properties of it are.  
1 It breeds quietness, and Tranquillity of mind.  
2 It cannot be incident to fools, and ambitious men.  
3 It is a token of a good nature, and wise discretion to know sufficiency.  
4 It is the truest riches; whereas the enjoying of the greatest possessions with desire to get more, is the truest poverty.  
5 It ventures not wealth in rash misspending, but keeps what is gotten with out fear, till occasion, and use force him to spend.  
excess mean Defect 

covetousness, whose effects are 2.  
1 A desire of gain.  
2 It persuades us to all 'vice for the attaining it.   {αβγδ} 
Neglect of our state temporal.  

The effects hereof are 2.  
1 idleness in our Vocation.  
2 Extremity of Want.     

XXXII. Modesty, and Magnanimity.  
BOth these are conversant about honour: The ground of them is desert.  
Their proprietys. 3.  
1 To sue for honour deserved.  
2 To accept it offered.  
3 To stand for his place, when his honour is deservedly yielded to him.  
Their difference.  
Modesty is of lower, and less honour, as our desert is lower, and of less things.  
Magnanimity is for the most generous hart, to desire the best, as his virtue is in supereminency above others.  
Modesty hath these rules.  
1 It argues, that both ourselves and others haue fit approbation of our virtue.  
2 It is resolute against carpers, and wrongful imputers.  
3 It is humble in not acquiring further, then shall benefit vs.  
4 It shows itself in 

Words  
Gestures   either for the 

Wishing what we deserve.  
refusal of what we deserve not.    
excess mean Defect. Ambition hatched by presumption modesty Ouer-seruilenes called {αβγδ}. It ariseth from Ignorance of our own worth, not daring to show ourselves in the world.   

XXXIII Of Magnanimity.  
MAgnanimity is for the highest perfection. It aims at the best honour, so( Whereas Honour is the repute of the Multitude) the perfection of it is greatest, when that repute is most transcendent and general. Thence the person truly magnanimous must haue the whole farthel of virtues, that he may benefit all, that speak well of him, and hurt none to avoid ignominy.  
The Adjunct of Magnanimity must be the highest place, and office.  
The Rules are. 8.  
1 The person having it counteth his honour received due unto him both for others good, and his own desert.  
2 He cares not for common censures.  
3 He rather gives then takes rewards.  
4 He remembers not Injuries.  
5 He is pliable to all sorts of persons, with satisfaction to them, and credit to himself.  
6 He admires not others 

Words,  
Deeds,   sith he himself on 

Pleasure  
Occasion   is able to do the like.  
7 He is sparing in censuring others, yet living.  
8 He puts not himself vpon voluntary dangers, yet undergoes the utmost, if it be put on him.  
excess mean Defect Pride Magnanimity Pusillanimity, or unfit, dijection called {αβγδ}  
Pride is in 

1 Vaunting our own parts.  
2 Suffering others to attribute more to us then we deserve.    
It ariseth from philauty.  
It betrays itself in 

Words.  
Gesture.  
apparel.    
It hath these tenants. 5.  
1 A proud man admireth none but himself.  
2 The way to abate him is to let him know, that wee scorn him.  
3 He is unjust, as attributing all to himself, and derogating from others.  
4 It is most inclining, and most dangerous in falling.  
5 It is hateful in all, but detestable in poor folk.  
Pusillanimity doth vndervalue our worth.  
The rules of it are. 4.  
1 It is ingratitude towards God to receive gifts, and by our reservednes to lessen them.  
2 It makes other jealous of our parts, when we ourselves distrust them.  
3 It is the mother of idleness.  
4. It defrauds other, that may get by vs.   

XXXIIII Of Fortitude.  
THe Passions that exercise this virtue are 

1 Care to be raised.  
2 boldness to be repressed.    
It is the endurance of evil for 

Honour  
Honesty   sake  
evils are 

internal from ourselves, as Vices.  
external, as dangers falling from without vs.    
1 The internal the most valiant ought to dread: his fear must be to nothing but sin.  
2 The eternal are 

1 Extraordinary as 

Prodigies.  
Strange 

Lightnings  
Thunders &c.   from God    
2 Ordinary, and befalling in common.    
1 The former none contemn, but 

Atheists.  
fools.  
Madmen.    
2 The valiant mans virtue is only in contemning the latter.  
2. evils ordinary are 

1 general to all as, Death &c.  
2 especial, to some as 

Exile.  
Diseases.  
Misfortunes.      
Death is the principal object of fortitude, sith 'tis the most terrible of all other evils.  
1 As barring us from the exercise of all moral virtues: the upshot of all goods.  
2 As bereaving us of all temporal commodities, the objects of our delights in this world.  
All death is not properly the object of fortitude, but the most honourable, as dying in war.  
1 Sith it is with highest honour.  
2 With most good to the public wealth.  
The effects of fortitud are 3.  
1 To triumph over our enemies.  
2 To keep our own state quiet from the wrong of others.  
3 To assure us in extremities.  — Aut cita mors venit, aut victoria laeta. 
The encourages of this virtue are 5.  
1 Words of cheering from the honourable, and wiser sort.  
2 Examples of others showing their words by their deeds.  
3 exercise in skirmish.  
4 Hope of reward; if not of spoil, yet of Glory.  
5 The enemies weakness, and vnprovision.  
The tenants of Fortitude are 3.  
1 The danger that it undergoes must haue 3. conditions.  

1 They must be honourably undertaken; not on sudden passion, or resolution.  
2 They must be in show, that they may be commended by the weal public.  
3 They must not bee for private respects, but for public.   
2 The Valorous must not be stockish but haue some feeling of wounds, yet voluntary he endures them for his ends sake.  
3 It is not lawful for him to kill himself, sith he doth it for avoidance of further evil, which is cowardice, nam — Timidi est optare necem, Ovid metam.  
5 sorts of men seem to haue fortitude, yet haue not.  
1 They that undergo dangers only 

on hope of reward for fear of punishment. 

As pressed Souldiers.      
2 They that war only, because they haue had experience in the war, and cannot show their skill otherwise.  
3 They that run to skirmish in hot blood.  
4 They that overcame often, and for hope of like success venture more,  
5 They, that weigh not the extent of the danger, they are soon resolute.  
excess mean Defect. rashness of venturing this grounds most on the passion of boldness. Fortitude cowardice. This grounds most on the Passion of fear.   

XXXV. Of Iustice.  
justice is the mother, and foundress of other virtues: it 〈◇〉 in every constitution of state 

public.  
Private,    
It is grounded in proportion and valuing.  
It is either 

universal comprehending all virtues.  
Particular for some especial 

State,  
Person.      
1 universal 2. parts 

Discretion to yield each his due.  
Obedience to the law.    
The laws are either 

Written, {αβγδ}.  
unwritten, {αβγδ}.    
1 The written are the positive laws of the land grounded on the 

Law of 

Nature.  
Nation.    
customs of places.   and they are 

public.  
private.    
1 public 

indicted by the whole state, as Statutes.  
Proceeding from the King alone, as edicts, and Proclamations.    
2 Private is for special contract; as leases, bonds, deeds, and all which haue force of law.  
2 The not-written is the law of 

Nature.  
Nations.    
The precepts of this Iustice are, viz. 

1 live honestly.  
2 wrong none.  
3 yield every man his right.    
2 Particular Iustice is. 

distributive designeing to each man 

Office  
Rewards,  
Punishments   according to desert.  
2 commutative in matter of exchange, and bargain between man and man.    
The breach of the 

Former is favour, an acception of persons, {αβγδ}.  
Latter, deceit.    
4 things prevent both kinds of Iustice 

1 love of money.  
2 favour to the person.  
3 fear to displease great ones.  
4 rancour, and malice.    
Iustice of distribution considers 2 things. 

Reward for the person deserving.  
Punishment for the person offending.    
The objects of it are either 

Honour to the good.  
Reward to the good.  
Chastening to the bad.    
Its tenant is.  
It is not positive but varies according to the quality of the person: As in any army all must haue their pay, but the captain more then the common soldier: And it were injustice to make them equal in reward, that are unequal in desert. The like in punishments.  
excess mean Defect. Injustice in dispensing to us above our desert Iustice Injustice in yielding us less then our desert.  
Both are termed Injury.  
The excess is Injury to others, and robbing them of their due, and bestowing on us that deserve it not.  
The defect is injury to ourselves sith others can haue, and wee not.  
The Rule of Injury is.  
1 That it is suffered still with repining and unwillingness: thence a man cannot do himself Injury, sith as he receives the wrong, he is repining, and as he offers it, he is voluntary: And we cannot will and nill at one time the same thing.  
Iustice of Exchange respecteth not the quality of the person but the worth of the thing: It is principally in buying and selling and in all matters of contract.  
This differs from the other, for this goes vpon quality( so much for somuch) that not: They are in trades, thus is merchandise, the mean is money.  
In ancient time they used to give wears for wears: afterwards they gave Metals by weight for them. Now for more Convenience of portage they haue invented money, to wit, metal in stamp and by it they exchange commodities.  
The extreme in general is unjust exchange.  
excess mean Defect, When we sell for more then its worth Iustice commutative when wee sell for less then it is worth.  
In the former we wrong the buyer, and it is the greater fault; In the latter we wrong ourselves, and it is more tolerable, sith ourselves are the cause of it.  
The mean rule for this Injustice is.  
1 He is more in fault, that doth the wrong, then he that takes it, It was Socrates his saying. awl. Gell Noct. Att. l. 2. c. 9   

XXXVI Of Liberality, and Magnificence.  
THe act of this virtue is releiuing others wants, without prejudice to our own.  
Their difference is 

Liberality is for less gifts.  
Magnificence is for greater.    
The Object of both is money or mony-worth.  
Liberality is of lower abilities.  
In it are considered 2. Conditions 

End.  
Manner.   of giuing.  
The end only is to benefit others in honest sort.  
They that give 

1 To receive 

Like  
Greater   profit  
2 Vpon ostentation.  
3 On long importuning and suite.   are not counted liberal  
The manner of giving is bounded circumstances 

1 Who the 

giver,  
receiver,   is.  
2 The time that the gift ought to come.  
3 The place where:  
4 The quality of it.  
5 The quantity of it.    
1 The Person must be 

Freehearted to any.  
Wise to bestow on the worthiest.    
1 Though the receiver be lewd, yet, if he be in poverty, his poverty makes him worthy of relief.  
2 The time must be without pause. Bis dat, qui cito dat.  
3 The place must be considered of 

1 If we give only for honesty sake, take a public place, that others may witness it, sith famed is the Trumpet of virtue.  
2 If for poverty and alms blow no trumpet; a place of most priuacy makes the gift most acceptable, Vbicunque est homo ibi benificio locus est. Seneca.    
4 The quality must be such, that it be not to the hurt of the receiver: it must rather be for profit, then for pleasure.  
5 The quantity with moderation between either 

Too much.  
Too little.   drawn from consideration of the want of the receiver, present use of the giver, that by giuing he not disfurnisheth himself for his own employments.  
excess mean Defect. Prodigality in wasting a mans private estate Liberality Avarice, or Niggardize: this is willing to receive all, give not.  
Avarice is worse then Prodigality.  
1 It is further removed from liberality, whose act is in giuing, sith the niggard gives nothing and the prodigal gives too much.  
2 The niggard defraudes both himself and others: The prodigal harms himself only, and benefits others.  
Magnificence is a virtue only for great ones.  
The Magnificent must be high above others in 

1 Blood,  
2 Office,  
3 virtue.    
excess mean Defect. 
Riotous misspending.  
The 

End of it ostentation  
Cause 

1 Folly.  
2 Neglect of our private estate.      Magnificence sordid Parsimony fearing to spend when 

Honour  
Necessity   require   

XXXVII. Of courtesy and Vrbanity.  
THis virtue shows itself in 

Serious  
Sporting   Conversation.  
The act of it is pleasure, and plyablenes of behaviour.  
The End of it to 

please others.  
Demerit their good opinion.    
It hath 2 parts 

easiness of access.  
slowness to take offence.    
The stern to guide it is Gravity, least our affability turn to lightness.  
It was said of Cato Maior: Erat in illo viro comitate condita gravitas.  
The rules of it are 3.  
1 It is most honourable in high persons.  
2 It is Varied according to the circumstance of 

Time.  
Place.  
Person.    
3 It intends our 

own Honesty.  
Anothers profit.    
For courtesy in serious matters the extremes are.  
excess mean Defect. 
1 Popularity in great ones.  
2 Soothing in the lower rank.  Comitie Morosity, as seeking neither to please any in honest causes, nor be displeased by any.  
Affability in sports is called vrbanity for 

Taking  
Giuing   jests.  
excess mean Defect. Securrility for abuse Vrbanity Rusticity making not able to give, not Willing to take jests.   

XXXVIII. Of Grace of Carriage.  
THis virtue makes not a man 

real for honesty.  
But complemental.    
Its rules are 

general  
special   for fashion.  
1 general. 7.  
1 go cleanly in apparel.  
2 keep our body from loathsomeness.  
3 Haue a fit composure of 

Gesture, especially for 

Head.  
Hands.    
Gate, and all with out affectation, and niceness.    
4 Haue convenience of speech for 

fitness of words.  
Discretion of reply.  
Moderation of sound; that it be not. 

Over-loud.  
affencted.  
Harsh.      
5 bar insolent 

1 Gesture.  
2 Shrickes in ●●ughter; let not that be often, but as occasion is offered: and that not so much apprehended by us, as the company also.    
6 use due reverence to our betters, observance to strangers, pleasure to our Acquaintance, Courtesy to our inferiors.  
7 Take meate and drink mannerly.  
special rules are had from consideration of each 

Person.  
Degree.  
Quality.    
Persons differ in 

1 sex 2 yeares.  
3 Manners 4 Fortune.    
Towards all our Carriage must be honest and pleasing.  
1 Honest pleasure is made by 

Speech.  
Gesture.    
1 Twixt difference of sex this behaviour is requisite: women must be 

Little speakers not forward for action.    
Men must take up the talk.  
Their talk must be serious of 

Learning.  
Not things sorrowful, but of mirth, and obvious passages.    
Their gesture is learned by dancing.  
2 Difference of yeares is either in, sc. 

Youth.  
middle Age.  
Old Age.    
ways to be graceful with young.  
1 They are soon angry: cross them not in 

Word  
dead   to raise passion in them  
2 inquire not of his faults: If a friend, tell him in private, if a stranger, he scorneth thy rebuk.  
3 Tell them of good hopes, and great adventures. young men are credulous and confident: and if you persuade them to the hope of a good, they will love you for it.  
4 Our speech must rather be of pleasure, then profit.  
5 Bee merry and jesting, and seem to like of their company.  
3 To be graceful with old men 5 ways.  
1 Be not resolute in tenants discoursing with them: they are soon testy, if they be croste, and love rather a young man doubtful in controversies, then ouer-holding; sith they know the hardness of finding out a truth, and the earnestness of youth in holding a possible falsehood.  
2 They are suspicious, wee may not grow in too fast with them, or force into their company.  
3 Our speech must rather be of profit, then honesty, since they are generally covetous.  
4 show reverence to age, not for fashion, but as spying some sparks of authority in their persons.  
5 They are talkative, feed them with speech, but rather second them in their conceits, then to sift them from contradictions, take heed of often replies, they must rather be forced by Question, then they proceed voluntarily.  
To ask them questions, save only of things necessary, and pertaining to themselves is against good manners.  
The middle aged keep an indifferent tenor betwixt both 

young.  
Old.    
Our way to be graceful with them is to keep the middle strain for 

Honesty, which likes young men.  
Profit, which likes old men.    
Difference of manners is seen according to the difference of passions and the way to behave ourselves in such a case is from the observance of his 

Passion.  
Age.   which haue been formerly described.  
Difference of fortune is seen in 

Nobility of birth.  
Height of office.  
Riches.    
Our behaviour to these must be 

yielding in word,  
Submission in body  
Assigning titles, 

this is most honest for vs.  
Pleasing for the●.       

XXXIX. Of emulation.  
emulation stirs us up to virtue and heartens us to Imitation.  
The object of it is a good quality in others and attaineable by vs.  
It is with grief, that others haue outstripped, and with hope of over-taking them.  
It differs from Envy; sith that is in the worst; this in the best natures: Licurgus in Sparta commended it to youth, naming it the nurse of virtues.  
In itself it is profitable, but in excess rayses 

Hate.  
Envy.    
The parties most given to it are,  
1 young men, sith they are ever in rising.  
2 They, who haue equality of 

Trades.  
Professions.  
Abilitys.   as the Roman aemulates the Athenian the scholar, the Carthaginian the Merchant, &c.  
3 They, who count themselves of worth, and hope to attain to as much perfection as another.  
excess mean Defect. Indignation for anothers rising. emulation Abjection of mind, as not weighing, whether wee bee out stripped or noe.   

XL. Of Continency.  
THis is conversant about the restraint of 

Desires  
Pleasures   especially of 

Nourishment.  
Venery.    
The difference between a continent and temperate man is: The temperate hath his passion of desire subdued within The continent not without foil and reluctance; passion dwelling within like a dangerous Citizen: though stopped from rising, yet ever feared.  
Hence Continency is not properly a virtue, sith passion is not brought to consent with reason: And incontinence is not properly a 'vice, sith it doth that fact, but in Iudgement condemns it.  
The Intemperate doth it, ●nd approves i●, sith his 

Will is corrupted  
Iudgment is blinded.    
The opposite of ꝯtinence is Incontinence:  
The Incontinent before the act hath knowledge of what is right and fit to be done: in the Act he is carried by Passion, which blinds him that he cannot apply that knowledge: After the Act he remembers the fault; and begins to repent.  
He falls into this 'vice by 

Heedlesnes, as not willing to forecast his danger,  
Infirmity, ●s not able to resist his Passion.    
Falls from infirmity are less curable, then falls of headiness, sith the one comes from a debility of nature; the other but from an heat of Passion.   

XLI. Of Patience.  
THis differs from Fortitude, as ꝯtinence from Temperance: The Act of it is bearing of harms, but with grief, and trouble of mind.  
Hence it is noe perfect virtue, sith virtue must be 

with Ioy.  
Voluntary.    
excess mean Defect. Stockish obduration: The Spartans used their children to it in beating them, yet not suffering them to lament. Patience Impatience: A womanish yielding to vnavoydable evils.   

XLII. Of the heroical Spirit.  
THis riseth a degree of Eminence above the rest.  
It differs from other virtues as heat from Warmth.  
It extends itself to a 3 fold eminence 

Of understanding: so that famous lawgivers and special sages are heroical.  
Of Grace; so Excellence of faith is heroical. Of moral behaviour.    
It is grounded on a 

strong composure,& temperature of Body.  
strong composure of mind.    
It is set forth by 3 helps 

Many abilities for Action.  
Constancy of continuance.  
Prosperousnes of success.    
The opposite of it is Sauagenes, A general falling from all good duty without Iudgement to know, or will to wish the contrary.  
These are the Catalogues of virtue. virtue tempers Passion.  
Passion gets his mean from Wit, and Will. And these intend for their felicity.  
Detur in offensae vitae mihi tangere metam.  
Finis. Anno Domini: 1624. 9o Decembri●    

Jndex.  

1 WHat ethics is?  
2 Of the particular end of ethics.  
3 Of universal ends thereof,  
4 temporal happiness.  
5 Things required to temporal happiness.  
6 stoics tenant of happiness.  
7 Of Passions in general.  
8 The divisions and number of Passions.  
9 Of love the first Passion.  
10 Of Desire the 2d Passion.  
11 Of Hope the 3d Passion.  
12 Of boldness the 4th Passion.  
13 Of Pleasure the 5th Passion.  
14 Of Hate and detesting.  
15 Of despair and fear.  
16 Of grief.  
17 Of shamefastness.  
18 Of Repentance.  
19 Of Pitty.  
20 Of zeal and jealousy.  
21 Of Anger.  
22 Of Maligning:  
23 The efficient cause of virtue  
24 Of Conscience,  
25 Of Consultation,  
26 Of Prudence:  
27 Of the Will:  
28 The formal causes of virtue.  
29 The several kindes of virtue.  
30 Of Temperance.  
31 Of content,  
32 Of Modesty,  
33 Of Magnanimity,  
34 Of Fortitude,  
35 Of Iustice.  
36 Of liberality and Magnificence,  
37 Of Courtesy and vrbanity,  
38 Of the grace of Carriage,  
39 Of Emulation,  
40 Of Continency.  
41 Of Patience,  
42 Of the heroical spirit,   
FINIS.