AN ANSWER TO A LETTER TO A BISHOP Concerning the Present Settlement And the New Oaths.  
Printed in the Year, 1690.   

AN ANSWER TO A LETTER TO A BISHOP, &c.  
IT is not my present Task to inquire, nor is it material to the Cause herein debated to know, whether the Letter to a Bishop was composed by one or more: I shall city it as the Work of a single Person, and treat the author of it with all Christian candour and Charitable Decency, that he may conclude Christianity to be the practise of the Refusers of the New Oaths, as well as Conscience to be their Guide.  
I shall not pursue him in any other manner than the subject in controversy and his Discourse shall led me to, and his Arguments deserve; for the Design of these Papers is, not contumeliously or with bitter reflections to provoke or exasperate any person or party to a scurrilous Reply; but fairly to debate that momentous point of the Oaths wherein not a few persons are very deeply concerned.  
However plausible his Arguments about the Oaths may seem to an unwary Reader, yet on a serious and strict Review, most of the Allegations will be as transparent as the Lawnsleeves, to whom they are directed; and will be found to want a more close and solid substance to terminate the enquiry and satisfy the conscience of a considerate Refuser.  
The author saith, 
page. 2.  That he will not judge what Reasons of dissatisfaction some of his superiors may have. Perchance his Inferiors also may have the same Reasons to pled for themselves. It is obvious from those words to infer, that he is not certain of that point for which he writes, but may be under mistakes, because he knows not all the Reasons which may be alleged in contradiction of his Sentiments.  
I shall wave those strong and numerous Arguments which are taken from the matter of the old Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy, wherein we have solemnly renounced and abjured the Popish principles of deposing Princes, and absolving Subjects from legal Oaths; and passing by other various and dreadful Considerations, which forcibly dissuade from taking the new Oaths; I shall confine myself to an impartial Examination of what the Letter to a Bishop allegeth, and by fair and plain Answers make it appear that his Reasons are not sufficient to determine the judgement, to satisfy and secure the Conscience; but that the Gordian knot of the old Oaths remains as yet undissolved.  
There are two things proposed by our author, by the proof whereof he hopes to remove all doubts and scruples. The first is, That the Oaths of Supremacy and Allegiance to King James do cease to oblige us. 
page. 3.  The second, That we may lawfully transfer the Oaths on K. W. and Q. M. On the full proof of these the truth and the stress of the Cause depends; and, when they are fairly proved, they may be inducements to comply. But notwithstanding what he hath artificially and smoothly attempted by specious insinuations, the scruples remain unsatisfied, the light is as dim as it was before, and we cannot induce our judgments to comply with what the understanding doth not perceive; but whether the failure is in our faculties, that like vicious organs are indisposed, or in the arguments, which like delusive objects exhibit false representations, is now to be considered.  
The foundation that he lays to prove his first point is, 
page. 3.  That Oaths cease to bind when the Government of that Person to whom they are taken is at an end. This is an ill foundation, and there is no hopes that a firm building can be erected on such a basis. 'tis the onely thing he desires may be granted to him, in order to ascertain his Cause and establish his Argument. I would fain be obliging, and grant him what he craves, since 'tis but one thing civilly desired, could I be just to myself, and a friend to truth by such a compliance. In this postulatum there is both sophistry and falsehood, and therefore I cannot but deny it. It is craftily put, but it is not generally true. He was mistaken about it, when he thought, none would deny it; and that he is mistaken, is plain to him that reads the old Oaths; for therein we swore not onely Faith and allegiance to the King, but by our Oath we recognised his Right also; for in the Oath we declared him to be our rightful King; and this we testified in our Consciences and before God. Now, I think, none will deny, though an actual exercise of the Government may cease, yet then and there the Right may continue: a possession may be in one, and the right in another; or else what will become of the distinction de jure and de facto, in dead and in right. I would also willingly know, whether the Oaths to the Right of King Charles the First, did cease when he ceased to govern? And, I think, none will deny, but that his actual Government ceased a considerable time before he was murdered. Neither is it impertinent to demand, how the years of the Reign of Charles the Second are computed? from the years 1648 or 1660? To human appearance his Government seemed to be at an end, as much as King James's at present, and something more, if you put Ireland and Scotland into the balance. Can he be so hardy as to say, that our Oaths then ceased, because 'twas thought his Government was then at an end? and, was his Government at an end when he continued to reign? and, was he not said to reign, because his right continued, though he was out of possession, and could not actually exercise it any more in England than King James at present doth?  
When our author saith, The Government is at an end, he speaks with relation to King James, as his following words do manifest, and without such a reference his supposition would have been as impertinent as 'tis now notoriously false. By, an end, doth he mean totally, perpetually and irreversibly so? is he infallibly sure of this? if not, how can he be certain, that the Oath is at an end? is King James's Government totally at an end? and, doth he cease to be a King in Ireland? if it is said, Ireland affects not us in England, let it be remembered, that we have recognised him in the Oath to be rightful and lawful King and supreme governor in all his Dominions and Countries; and Ireland was then certainly reckoned in that number when we swore. It seems then by this author, that if one who had formerly taken the Oaths should be in Ireland, his Oath would not cease to bind, because King James's Covernment is not there at an end. According to this doctrine the Oath may be split, and commodiously said to bind, or not to bind, according to the diversity of Climates, and that the Latitude of the Conscience is to be measured by the Elevation of the Pole, and according to the Variation of the Longitude.  
To this Consideration I shall not here improperly add one more, about the New Oath, which( as it must be granted) was made to K. W. and Q. M. as King and Queen; and they are to be looked on in the Oath to be King and Queen, as the Convention hath declared them to be; and that is of England, France and Ireland; now I would be informed, what sort of King and Queen of Ireland, W. and M. are, since according to our author they are neither so de jure nor de facto. Not this way, because King James doth not cease to be King de facto; if de jure, then for the same reason, that they are so in Ireland, they must be so in England too, which yet the Convention abhorred to swear to. If the Right is in them, why should any scruple to recognise it by Oath? If not, where is the Right lodged? Is the Kingly right either voted or disputed out of the World? If it remains in King James, then the inference should be, Render to all their due, and seek not to deprive him of that which is his right. The Kingly right must be in James, or William and Mary, or in the People, or is altogether ceased: and 'tis worth a man's knowing what is become of it, that we might do right to every one, and no wrong to our own Consciences.  
Whereas 'tis said, 
page. 3.  that, The Oath ceaseth to bind, when the Government of the Person to whom we have sworn is at an end; I answer farther, That a temporary cessation of a Government( and no more can be certainly meant as yet) doth not voided the full obligation of the Oath, that is absolute. For though the variety of circumstances, and the necessity of affairs, and the impossibility of some performances, may for the present suspend the actual exercise of some duties, which in other circumstances the Oath might require, yet they do not totally null the obligation, when 'tis justly required, and can be truly and honestly paid; the Conscience is still bound, though the particular acts pro hic& nunc are forborn, and we may safely say with the Moralists, that the Oath binds semper, though not ad semper; always, but not at every time. From hence, and from our Author's Position, we may undeniably infer, That if the Government should revert,( and who can tell what will be, or shall come to pass) then 'twas not at an end; and if not at an end, then the Oath doth not cease to bind; and what satisfaction can any one give me, if I should be eventually, and certainly forsworn?  
Lastly, His desired Principle is not grantable, but 'tis denied as false, and detested as impious; for, where an Oath is made to divers persons distinctly, and successively, as the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy are to the King, his Heirs and lawful Successors, by the Oath I am as firmly bound( respect being had to the time) to these as to him. What consequence then can there be? what show of reason to infer, that because the Government of King James( taken in his own sense, whatever it be) is at an end, therefore the Oath doth cease to bind to his Heirs and lawful Successors? or thus, because King James ceaseth to be a King, I will be perjured to others; he is fallen from the Crown, and I will renounce my Oath, my Truth, my Sincerity, and my Conscience, all which I pledged and plighted when I swore; and the words of the Oath will declare what, and how I have sworn.  
Upon this hopeful basis we may conclude, what a noble Pyramid will be erected to entomb a living King, and the Consciences of his Subjects, and to bury both out of remembrance; but should I examine by a larger disquisition each particular in his Building, his edisice, like the Pyramids, would dwindle into an imperceptible extremity.  
His first advance is to give us several instances( the same, which are to be found in a certain 
Ascham.  Book, condemned by the Decree of the University of Oxon 1683.) whereby the Government of a particular person may cease.  
1. By Death, of which there is no doubt; and, which if it could have been proved of King James, some of his Enemies would have thought it a much better instance than all the rest.  
2. When the Person will govern no longer, and voluntarily deserts the Government.  
3. When he is conquered, and involuntarily withdraws himself, and can protect his Subjects no longer.  
These two last ways are all the rest, as he calls them, and by his disjunctive ( or) makes no more, as 'tis evident to him that reads the third page. of the Letter, and yet presently divides them into three, and omits the popular way of protection, which he had mentioned before; if the proof of one of these three had been sufficient to satisfy all honest men, as he thinks, was it not to think all honest men unreasonable, or his work superfluous, to undertake the proof of more? But how all these ways can be applied to King James, I think it a very difficult task to prove either to honest, or dishonest men, though he may not think it so; and for this very reason I judge it no easy attempt, because the ways contain, and evidently exhibit such things, as the unlucky men of a disputing Age call Contradictions; for( except he flies for refuge to the dispute of mixed actions in Morality) voluntarily and involuntarily are contradictory terms; and if it be proved that he was conquered, and forced away involuntarily, it will not easily be apprehended how he Abdicated; and( pag. 7.) he says, That the Government was subverted in the Parliament after Monmouth's Rebellion: And I am of opinion with him, that if the Government was subverted, the constitution was at an end( in his own words) except he will be so critical, as to say, that the Government may be subverted, and yet not at an end, which would be destructive both to his argument, and his method of arguing; and yet( pag. 14.) he affirms, that the King's voluntary withdrawing was a receding fully from his Government; and( pag. 21.) the late King fell perfectly here from all Sovereignty, by deserting the Government; whereas( pag. 22.) he saith, the late King did lose his Kingdom; and( pag. 4.) the late King ceased to govern as King of England a good while before the Prince of Orange Landed here.  
Now I would willingly know how the Government was at an end, when the King did not cease to Govern: or if it was at an end in Octob. 1685. how came it to an end by the King's leaving his Kingdom, when 'twas at an end above three years before? Is not this to kill a dead man, and to repeat, and re-act, what was never said or done before? Though, by the way, if the Writer of the Letter had respected Truth as much as his Cause, he might have opportunely, and easily, without the racking of his brains, distinguished between withdrawing out of the Kingdom, and receding from the Government; for though King James quitted the Kingdom, his Letters, Declarations, and the manifold Post-facts evidently demonstrate, that he did not voluntarily quit the Government, except the Author will say, that he knew the King's mind better than the King himself did, or could; to which our Author seems to pretend, by presuming to know some of the King's Intreigues about his return, which the King never discovered to him.  
I will add one Remark more, That whatever deference of honour he would be thought to pay to the Wisdom of the Nation met in the Convention, or however justly severe against the saucy Author of the Dissenter's Case, for want of Manners, he seems to fall under the same condemnation, by attempting to prove a Conquest, the thoughts whereof the Prince of Orange disclaimed, as wicked, in his Declaration; and the Convention, waving all pretences of a Conquest, vacated the Throne on the account of Abdication: How dares he then to say 'twas a Conquest, when the Convention voted it an Abdication; but if Conquest and Abdication be the same vacating, I cannot ken the subtlety of our Writer to distinguish them in the foundation and process of his discourse.  
Whoever shall impartially weigh, and compare these things together, will think it as improper, as inconsistent, to apply these contradictory ways to the case of King James: If then his general lump proves nought, 'tis to be doubted, the Particulars will not be found on trial very sound; nor that to be saleable in the Retail, which is not vendible in the Gross.  
But before I undertake the Discussion of any one of these particulars, I crave leave to tell the Reader, and thereby to obviate all unjust Censures, that my design herein is not to affront the present Powers, nor to justify any maladministration, nor apologize for any Violations of the subjects Rights, nor excuse any unjust Prosecutions, or illegal Proceedings. This would be a Theme for a Sycophant, as fordid and as gross as the attempt would be vile and barbarous to trample on crwoned Heads, to blacken all the Royal actions, and aggravate all their human failures into monstrous Crimes, and unpardonable Errors; whatever some Men in their great Wisdoms may think, the wisest of Men hath taught us, Not to curse the King in the Bed-chamber.  
Few there are who consider the anxious cares, the vexatious solicitudes, the numerous troubles, and the unaccountable miseries that seize the Crown, and continually haunt the Throne. It may be said of most Diadems, what Pope Adrian the Sixth said of himself, That it was a miserable thing to be a Pope, because he could not do what good he would. What base ends and projects do busy and designing Courtiers, under fair pretences, suggest to Kings, and with repeated Clamours, and specious Allegations, insinuate into the sacred Breasts of easy Princes most flagitious methods to accomplish their wicked designs.  
If all public Acts and Counsels were sent home to their proper Authors, the King's share would be found less than the proportion of many others; and if every one was to bear their own burden, the King might find ease, whilst others sink under their weight; 'tis neither common Charity nor Justice to load the King with all the corruptions of Courts, and the miscarriages in his Officers. If such proceedings were approvable, how many Grandees would be rendered altogether mute, when they should be required to answer for all the irregularities of Tenants, that should be committed in their Families and Lordships. Let the Nobles apply the instant case, and perhaps they may find a great parity of reason to pity and indulge a King, wherein they themselves may stand in need of Mercy.  
It ought to be considered, that scarce any illegal courses can be introduced among us without the concurrence of the Subjects; the unjustifiable Commands of a King, attended even with frowns and menaces, will prove fruitless and vain, without the instrumental compliance of sneaking Inferiors to actuate them, who by their dastardly submission may prepare a disingenuous method to ruin their own Posterity, if not themselves, in a turn of affairs, and change of Governors, and may be called to a severe account in a future Reign, though they escape a just prosecution in the present; the Injunctions of a King may be unjust, but can injure none, except the fellow Subjects put them in execution, which may prove as fatal to themselves, as injurious to others; and on that the Maxim in our Law, and the practise in the Government is founded, That the King can do no wrong.  
There was scarce any thing attempted by King James, but there were specious pretences of Law alleged to justify and maintain it; and many, whose Office it was( if not their Oath also) rightly to inform the King, and to do Justice between Him and his People, who either voted for its Lawfulness, or acted the thing. Were there not a Lord Chancellor, and a Lord Chief Justice in the Ecclesiastical Commission? Were there not two Judges employed in ejecting the President, Fellows, and Demies of Magdalen-Colledge? Did not many of the Judges give their Opinion for Law for executing deserting Soldiers in time of Peace, and for the Suspending and dispensing Power?  
Deplorable is the state of Kings, if they must be dethroned, because their Judges are not so wise, nor so honest as they ought to be: when by that Law their Opinions, and Determinations, and Constructions of the Law must go for Law, and yet it must be unlawful for Kings to follow their Judgments, and execute their Decrees and Sentences; and to act contrary to them, is either a breach of the Law, or an undue enlargement, or diminution of the Prerogative, or an encroachment on the People's Rights: How unhappily entangled are those Princes, who fall into such intricate Labyrinths, that they must necessary offend in whatsoever they are directed, or inclined to choose: 'tis not their Province to understand all the difficulties of the Law, nor the exact qualification of such whom they appoint to be Judges; they see with other mens Eyes, and approve by other mens Commendations. Now if those that are thus appointed undertake the employment, when they know the Law doth incapacitate them, let them suffer for this insolence and presumption; if they know not the Law, let their insufficiency hasten their chastisement and removal for the admonition of future generations.  
If it be objected, that King James knew some incapable, whom he preferred to Employments: It may be replied, 1. That the actual exercise of the Office by such, and not the nomination of them to it, is the breach of the Law. 2. That the Judges, whose Office it was to interpret the Law, actually concurred in the confirmation of them, and in the actual exercise of the Office by them, were joined in Commissions with them, acted with them, and were treated as legal Judges in their proceedings; which, 3dly, proves, That not the devices of the King, who can do no wrong, but the acting of the Subjects properly, and immediately deprave the Government; which Considerations, in some measure, will invalidate his first Proposition, which is now to be discussed.  
1. That the Oaths to King James, as King, oblige no longer, nor further, than he continued to be King, i.e. to govern as King of England; and that he ceased to govern as King of England a good while before the Prince of Orange Landed here; which was, as he says, pag. 7. in October, after Monmouth's Rebellion, when the King by resolving to continue some Popish Officers, altered the English Constitution, and made a complete subversion of the legal Government. Lo here an excellent rope of Sand to bind a loose Conscience; a most curious receipt, if well improved, to ease crowned Heads of the burden of their Diadems, and to gratify all ambitious pretenders, if they can prove but successful; a doctrine if well confirmed, that deserves the best preferment; but chiefly a most seasonable Caveat to all regnant Princes to beware of Popish Officers, and of perverting one single Law, which, besides other direful invisible effects, by this Author's argument, destroys a whole Government, and dethrones a King for ever, and may be as terrible to any other, as to a rightful Prince!  
I think our Author will not say that King James broken all the Laws of the Land; and at present I will not dispute with him, but suppose that he broke some of them; though to establish this supposition, and thereby make room for his Inferences, he should have evinced, that the Laws against Recusants and Dissenters did equally bind the King not to nominate such to Offices and Employments civil or military, as it did bind them not to exercise those Employments; the Laws were enacted against those that were incapacitated, not against those that should conser the places of Employment on them; it would be extremely rigorous for a Patron to lose the perpetuity of an Advowson, because his Clerk is a Papist; or a Corporation their Charter, because the Town-Clerk is a Recusant, or Dissenter: Doth every colonel forfeit his Freehold Estate if he nominates an unqualified person to an inferior Office? The Law provides a penalty for the Offendor, but that can be no offence which the Law hath not forbidden: It had been honestly done by the Author of the Letter, if he had proved,  
1. That the breach of some Laws completely subverts the whole Government, and unkings the supreme Governor; and that every act of injustice voids the Magistracy: It had been a notable Exploit, if he had proved the same of our National Laws, which Saint James speaks of the Divine, That he who offends in one, is guilty of all: If so, Lord have mercy on the generality of this Nation.  
2. He should have shown what those particular Laws were, produced the very particular proviso's, and branches of the Statutes, that were broken by King James, wherein the Kings of England have bound themselves, their Heirs and Successors, under a forfeiture of the Crown, if they break this or that Law, or preferred persons who were not qualified.  
3. He should have proved plainly and clearly, that the Oaths were taken on such a condition, and with such a reserve, that they did bind no longer than the King did punctually and exactly observe all the Laws, and that the Oaths ought to be, and have been constantly thus understood.  
For want of these proofs on this Head of discourse, I conclude, that by this Argument it doth not appear, that the Oaths do cease to bind; To say, that the King would govern no longer, is an Assertion that may please or delude a credulous person, who will not be scrupulous, because he resolves to comply, but will never be swallowed by him who is governed by sincere Truths, not bold Asseverations. Perchance some may understand hereby, that King James totally abandoned, and willingly quitted the Government, and that he never intended to resume it actually again, nor would, if he might and could, return to govern again. This is such a bare faced errand contradiction to common sense, that it would be little less than a shameful attempt to refute such a notorious falsehood; and to say, that he subverted all Laws, because he violated some of them; and that the Violation of a few, or of one Penal Law, presently dissolves the whole constitution of Government, is such a gross inconsequence, that if the nature of the thing would bear it, it might be felt, as the egyptian darkness was: If it be a true consequence, I know not, whenever we had a Government, when all our Laws were duly observed, and, I believe, never shall; I am sure they are not at present: And, will our Author say, we are under a Dissolution, when his Title-page calls it a Settlement? but whether a Settlement in our legal Possessions, or a Settlement out of them, sad experience, I fear, will resolve too many.  
Kings may cease to be Regular Governors, and yet continue Regnant Kings still; the Government, and the Right to govern may remain, when the Administration in some particulars is found to be illegal: this the Author frequently thought, when he frequently, according to the English Liturgy, prayed for King James after October, Anno 1685. That the King may legally employ Papists as inferior Servants, or as common Soldiers, I think, none can legally deny; That Popish Officers should not be employed, was the intent of the Law; but that the King would cease to be, when he should resolve to continue such( for their fidelity to, and courage for the King) as commissioned Officers, is an effect, that, I believe, the Law-makers were not sagacious enough to foresee, nor thoughtful enough to dream of: If King James by granting such Commissions, and thereby dispensing with one Law, did forfeit the Government, how came it to pass that King Charles the Second continued the Government, when he granted a Toleration to the whole Kingdom? and, is it not intolerable partiality, to be so severe against a King for dispensing with the Oath, when so many Protestant Officers, and the generality of the Kingdom, dispensed with themselves, by omitting to swear Allegiance, which the Law required of them?  
And is it expressed in the Statute, or can the construction of it be? that the King dispossesseth himself of his Kingdom, when he grants such preterlegal Commissions: but whatever malignity there is in such Grants, this is not the very unkinging Crime, as our Author states the point; for then King James would have ceased to govern when he granted those Commissions, which was before Monmouth's Rebellion. But the fatal demerit, and the complete subversion is founded on his Resolution to stand by the Grants of such Commissions. 
page. 7.  So that if he had only granted them, but not resolved to continue them, he had not uncrowned himself. By the same sort of logic one might argue, that the unlawfulness of the New Oath consists not in the taking of it, but in the resolution to stand to it, and keep it. I wish we were not more likely to suffer for the former Oath at present, than he is for the latter.  
I cannot but wonder at our Author's design in enumerating the serveral breaches of Law,( pag. 11.) as if his whole Government had been one entire opposition to all Laws,[ inferring according to his usual practise, a general from a few particulars] which breaches happened after the dismission of the Parliament in 1685. to what purpose, I pray you, when the subversion was completed before; except by a new-found rule in policy, a subversion can be more than complete.  
But what is wanted in reason, shall be supplied and supported by one single authority; to which end the old Lawyer Bracton is cited in these words, Non est rex, ubi dominatur voluntas,& non lex. And( pag. 12.) the Author hath another Citation, Nec nomen regis in eo constabit. An easy and happy way of arguing it would certainly be, if every good expression of an old Author could be converted into a good reason; is not this to argue from merit to reality, and to conclude every one to be no more than he truly deserves? What may not one continue a King, Judge, or Subject, though he ceaseth to be a good and a just one? Doth every man cease to be a man, who doth not govern himself in all things, according to reason? or, is every living traitor executed, that deserves to be hanged?  
Let us beware of such argumentations, for fear we should deprive ourselves of what we do not deserve to possess, and divest ourselves of all our legal rights; because we have not made the Law the rule of our obedience, and the measure of our submission. The Subjects indeed may forfeit their rights, for the Law and practise hath determined so, though some may think it intolerable, it should be so, because their crimes and misdemcanours are really intolerable.  
Whatever gloss the Author of the Letter put on Bracton, his meaning cannot be, that the King loseth his Authority by an arbitrary illegal act, for these are his express words in the close of the same Chapter; Si autem ab eo( sc. Rege) petatur( cum breve non currat contra ipsum) locus erit supplicationi, quòd factum suum corrigat& emendet; quod quidem si non fecerit, satìs ei ad poenam, quòd Dominum expectet ultorem; nemo enim de factis suis praesumat disputare, multò fortiùs contra factum suum venire. The same Bracton saith of the King; Omnis quidem sub eo,& ipse sub nullo, nisi tantùm sub Deo. He addeth also, Ipse autem Rex non debet esse sub homine, said sub Deo,& sub Lege, i.e. under the direction of the Law,[ for no other sense the words can bear] and only accountable to God, but not to man, who hath no power nor superiority over the King, as Bracton there argueth. 
Cap. 8. li. 1.  But if our Author thinks that every sentence of Bracton is good Law and good Divinity, let him favour the World with a Comment on these words in the same Chapter of Bracton, Virgo Maria, matter Domini, singulari privilegio supra legem fuit.  
We know, Depositions have not been impracticable in this Land, but a Forfeiture of the Crown we think( by our Author's leave) to be very monstrous here; and if rarity and deformity make Monsters, the Author's assertion will be a very ugly one, and no way reconcilable to the Oath of Supremacy. Who is sufficient and capable by the constitution of our Government to determine the cause and merit of a Forfeiture? Who shall erect the Court to examine the matter of fact, and to pass sentence on the allegations, but such diabolical Monsters as erected an High-Court to murder King Charles the First? To whom must the Forfeiture be made, and who shall take it? If the King be Supreme, and we have sworn he is so, can there be a Superior to the Supreme? and, where must the Dernier resort be in our Constitution, which must be acknowledged in all Governments, beyond which there lies no Appeal. The Crown of England is declared by the Laws to be Imperial, and the Statute of Praemunire, 16 Rich. 2.5. expressly saith, that it is immediately subject to God, and none other. If you'll say, he hath forfeited the Supremacy, this is a begging of the question, and the foresaid demands will return still. Suppose a Rabble or a Consult should vote a Forfeiture, and the King should gain-say it, what effect can the sentence have? If you fly to force and arms, this the Law utterly disclaims; and many of the chiefest Subjects have declared, that it is unlawful to take up arms against the King, upon any pretence whatever. And the Statute 12 Car. 2.13. hath declared, That by the undoubted fundamental Laws of this Kingdom, neither the Peers of this Realm, nor the Commons, nor both together in Parliament, nor the People collectively or representatively, nor any other person whatsoever, ever had, hath, or ought to have any coercive power over the persons of the Kings of this Realm: How this agrees with the late transactions, every one can tell without much labour to inform him.  
Where a forfeiture is supposed, there the King is accountable; but how he can be supreme, and over all, and all judicial proceedings issue forth in his name, and by his power, and yet be accountable to subjects, who have no power over him, who have sworn allegiance to, and supremacy in him, is to me unaccountable, and, in regard of our Laws, to all men invisible: Mr. Prinne's critical distinction would here do good service to our Author, who makes the Parliament the supreme power, and the King the supreme governor; but, hath the King no negative voice? can he govern supremely without a supreme power to govern by? and whatever power he pretended then to be in the Parliament, yet the fore-quoted Statute faith, that, by the fundamental Laws of this Land, the Parliament hath no coercive power over the King. And another Statute in the same King's reign hath declared the Militia to be solely in the King. Where can there be a supreme power, that hath not a coercive power? Let the point of forfeiture be as plainly proved from our constitutions, and let our Author tell us in what Statute Forfeiture is to be found; as we can, that the King is Supreme in all causes, and over all persons, and unaccountable, and subject to none but God; and then 'twill appear that he hath omitted something which he ought to have performed. But to call things by what names he pleases, and then to give what sense he pleases to those names, is not enough to satisfy inquisitive honest men.  
He who supposeth and would prove a forfeiture, must infer and aclowledge the excellent and useful doctrine of deposition, which, I believe, our Author hath renounced more than once or twice; for, I believe, he hath taken the old Oaths, and subscribed to the Doctrine of the Church of England in the Articles and Homilies more than thrice. For if a forfeiture be voted, and a King will not submit thereto, how can the forfeiture take place, except a deposition be enforced? and to what purpose is a forfeiture, except a deposition doth ensue?  
To this our Author subjoins a wild, uncharitable, and unaccountable supposition, and then makes a demand thereon; If a King should impose taxes by his sole authority, and levy them by borrowed French Dragoons, should annul our laws, rights and properties, and should require obedience without reserve, by what names should such practices be called? I answer, unjust, tyrannical, illegal practices; such unkingly violences would declare a wicked and merciless temper of mind, but would not properly null the Laws, which were not made, nor can be repealed by his single act; their obligation and sanction would continue, though they were grossly invaded and violated for a while. But if a King should attempt to alter the whole frame of Government, and make his free-born subjects bond-slaves, Must patience be the onely business in such a season? and, can a loyal heart either with honesty make, or with patience yield to such vile and indecent surmises? Did our Author really believe that King James intended such things? if not, why doth he suppose them? if he does, was it not a strain beyond episcopal rhetoric for our Author in his Addresses and Petition to style King James his most excellent and gracious Majesty after the cessation of his Government by maladministration, and not many months before his departure? if such practices import grace and excellency, may the invention of the compliment be the Author's honour, of which, I believe, none will bereave him, and to which at present I'll make no return.  
But granting what is disingenuous to suppose, if such practices should ever happen, which God avert from this Nation, the innocent and most Christian remedy which I know of, and which the Scripture allows, is, with patience to submit to that which legally I cannot prevent nor remove. The Law is our Director, which says, It is not lawful to take up arms against the King on any pretence; and submission is our refuge: Resistance by force of arms is not our counselor or Sanctuary, the Law pronounces it unjust to bear arms offensive or defensive against the King, and Christianity dooms it sinful; except we can pled one Crime to be a cure for another, and that the best remedy to preserve some Laws is, to break many more, that are more necessary to the safety and ends of Government.  
I believe there is scarce any one but will assert, that some inconveniences of an unjust Government are far more eligible and tolerable than Rebellion with all its deplorable attendants, effects and consequents: if we compare this years war and changes with the last years violations and oppressions, I believe, some may say, we have bought a very dear bargain, when some must sell their estates to preserve their properties, exchange their liberty for a prison, possessions for ejectments, and when the tradesman are ruined in hopes to increase the trade of the Nation.  
The two main hinges and fundamental supports of our Government are said to be, Legislation, and Administration, both which our Author says were subverted by King James, and both which shall now be considered.  
The legislative power is in King, Lords spiritual and temporal, and the Commons assembled in Parliament. The King is the Lord paramount, principal and supreme in that power, therefore the Laws are called the King's Laws, and the form of many is, that, The Commons pray the King, that it be enacted, and it is enacted by the King; the Lords and Commons beseech the King's Majesty. Now though the Laws be made by the advice and assent of the Lords and Commons, yet they are said to be enacted by the King's Majesty, whose royal le veult gives life, vigour and force to the petitions and draughts of the Lords and Commons, which before were but as dumb, formless and dead letters. The Lords and Commons are subordinate and ministerial in that power, being summoned and dissolved at the King's pleasure and by his rightful power; all their votes pass into laws by his impression and ratification, without which, all their debates and resolves can acquire no higher title nor stronger obligations than that of Counsels: Now if le Roy le veult actuate the Parliaments votes, and it is necessary( as our Author says) to make them to pass into Laws, then it will necessary follow, that without the King's consent no Law can be legally enacted; 
page. 5.  and to make Laws without and against the King, is, to break off one of the hinges of our Government, as our Author speaks; on which grounds it may be modestly and inoffensively inquired, whether the present settlement of the Crown by the Convention be a Law or no? If a Law, then le Roy le veult is not necessary to a Law, and so, according to our Author's principle, the Convention hath subverted the Government, by assuming the whole legislative power, which by the Law, as we grant, belongs not solely to them, and thereby have forfeited their right, and the right of the people: If no Law, why then is submission required as to a Law, under severe penalties? where there is no Law, there can be no obligation; and is it not hard and unreasonable to punish for that which no Law requires to observe?  
Our Author farther saith, 
page. 4.  That the three Estates are necessary to make a Law, wherein, I think, he is mistaken; for though Lords spiritual and temporal are of right to be summoned to Parliament, yet if either Estate be legally summoned, and refuse to appear personally, or by proxy, the act of the other Estate in the house of Lords shall be reputed as valid as if both appeared; and this appears by ancient practise; for though they be two Estates, yet they make but one House of Lords, which is determined by plurality of voices, whether Spiritual or Temporal; if the majority of suffrages of each Estate was necessary to every act of that House, the Statute of Mortmain, I believe, had not passed in the days of Edw. 1. nor the Act to take away Bishops voices in Parliament in the reign of Charles 1. their concurrence then is not necessary to the doing of that which without them can be sufficiently done; what their presence cannot legally prevent, their voluntary absence cannot null. An house of Lords is necessary to the enacting of a Law, but the presence of both Estates is not necessary to make that House, the majority of the present Estate conclude the absent also, and the reason is, because both the Estates sit in the House in respect of their temporal Baronies, which are of the same tenor from the Crown, though different in the manner of their descent.  
We are  told( pag. 5.) That the Essence of a King of England is, 
page. 5.  that he is one sitting on the Throne, and governing by the known Laws of the Land. From whence I infer, First, That the Coronation is not needful, because all that may be without this; for what is unnecessary, is no part of an essence, as some old Logicians have  told us: and yet with respect to his definition, there can be no difference assigned between Protector cronwell and some regnant Kings, but Coronation onely. If it be said, that cronwell governed not according to the Laws, yet the definition will agree to any Usurper that doth. If it be replied, that he cannot govern according to Law that usurps contrary to Law, then 'twill unavoidably follow, that he who hath the Essence of a King, must have a legal Right to govern according to Laws, and what then will become of a great part of our Author's Scheme. Secondly, Others may infer from hence, that then King Charles the First, in his Imprisonment, and King Charles the Second, in his Banishment, were no Kings, because they did not fit on the Throne, and govern by the Laws of England. Thirdly, I infer, That the known Laws of the Land must be such Laws as are known to the King, or else he cannot govern by them: but how can he know many of them, but by the information of his Counsel, and the interpretation of his Judges, wherein, if they happen to mistake, must he unhappily cease to be a King? or, in our Author's language, lose the Essence of a King?  
The Essence of a King of England I take to be, That he is a rightful supreme governor; a regular King I take to be one that governs according to Law; and a bad King, to be one that perverts and violates the Laws; now a bad King, by a violation of the Laws, and an invasion of the Subjects rights, no more ceaseth to be a King, than a bad Landlord ceaseth to be a Landlord by the invasion of some of his Tenants rights and customs; or a disobedient Subject ceaseth to be a Subject; for if his disobedience makes him no Subject, how many have lost the rights of Subjects, and how can they reasonably suffer by the Power to which they are not subject.  
Certainly our Author did not want Skill nor Learning to distinguish between the Power, and the abuse of it; between a Governor, and his ill administration; between a King, and his irregularities. Should it be meted to many of us with the same measure, we should be forced to quit that Kingdom, which King James is said to have Abdicated. But confused Arguments are most suitable and seasonable for times of confusion.  
The only Argument which he produces to prove, that King James subverted the Legislative Power, one of the Fundamentals of our Government, is, 
page. 6.  That he to all intents and purposes assumed the Legislative Power to himself; and this he did, because he dispensed with some few Laws,( one, according to our Author, was enough to dissolve the Government,) the consequence whereof he proves thus, Because no Law could do more than the Dispensing Power did. 
page. 7.  All this is of a thread, and so finely spun, that it will scarcely endure the gentle touch of a tender Examination; a small puff will blow all this into its primitive nothing; in all which he doth no more than stoutly affirm and suppose, what he should truly prove, viz. 1. That the breach of a Law is the repeal of a Law. 2. That the dispensing with a few, or but one Law, destroys the whole Legislative Power, and the fundamental constitution thereof. Now if the Dispensing Power did really and truly( which it did not) null the Laws to all intents and purposes, it did but reduce us to the same condition, wherein we were before the making of those Laws; and certainly we had then a Government, a Legislative Constitution, as extensive and authoritative as now we pretend to. 3. That King James by his Dispensing Power, and Suspending Power, did intend to Repeal those Laws; and that those that reaped the benefit of those Indulgences, did thereby believe and take them as repealed; for 'tis very difficult to believe, that such a public act should have such a general effect without the intention of the dispenser, or acceptation of the dispensed; especially since 'twas so generally known, what Closetings, and Regulations of Corporations, with other curious and precious Arts, were made use of to compass such a Parliament, as would repeal what the King had only suspended and dispensed with, and ratify all his Indulgences by their solemn Act; for if it had been thought, that the King could have perfected a Repeal without a Parliament, to what purpose were all those industrious artifices, superfine politics, and superlative fetches to procure a complying Parliament, without which, 'twas concluded, the design would be imperfect. 4. He should have proved, that the assuming of more Power by the King, did not only lessen, but totally destroy all that he had: this is a pretty method of Substraction by the art of Multiplication, of losing all by gaining more: The Courts at Westminster do not presently cease to be, when the persons in Authority there assume more Power than of right belongs to them.  
He farther saith, That the Kingly Power was subverted in the subversion of the Government, and this subverted by a dispensing with a Law. What! is the Kingly Power totally subserted, when it commenceth arbitrary, and is enlarged? or do all the Royal Rights fail, when some of the Laws relating to the Subject are perverted? by what Law or Reason can this be proved? and was our Government completely subverted by the Dispensations, when all the legal Courts of Justice were open; Terms, Assizes, and all sorts of proceedings observed; and when the Magistrates acted in their several stations and capacities, in their Courts, Gowns, Cities and Jurisdictions? or did we lose any particular Rights, because some evil-doers were pardoned? or were we illegally ruined on that very account, because some were illegally preferred, and we undone, because some were saved from their deserved penalties? Is there such a malignant influence, such a diffusive venom in one illegal Dispensation, that it mars all the Regalities, and inevitably dethrones the King without a possibility of Restauration? If this was known by our Author some years ago, why did he not then discover this hidden mystery, which was never heard of before, nor will ever be found, so much as in the Original Contract of the Demogogical King-makers? And why did our Author so frequently pray for the King, as his King, after the Subversion of the Kingly Power, and Rights of the People? and Address him with his Sovereign Titles, when he thought him to be no King; and submitted to him, as to the most rightful, actual, supreme Power? It had been far greater sincerity and integrity to have transferred all these things on the next rightful Heir, upon whom( by our Author's doctrine) all the regal Rights were devolved. But for what reason a King loseth his regal Rights, when he assumes an Arbitrary Power, I do not as yet perceive, nor can find in the Letter to a Bishop; the People's Rights may be subverted, when the Kingly Power remains, as well as, and something better, than, a King be conquered, and not his Kingdom.  
Hath the Constitution been totally subverted, when the Community hath invaded one or more of the Prerogatives of the Crown? if so, I doubt 'tis not yet patched up again.  
He tells us, that we swore to the Constitution; but what, when, and where we swore, he tells us not, and, I believe, no body remembers: He adds, we only swore to the King's Authority; but if he pleases to peruse, and read over his Old Oath, he will find, that he swore to the King, and to defend his Person; and there he will find also, that his Oath was not pactional, or conditional, but absolute, and independent; and there he will find no foundation for a distinction between the King's personal and politic capacity, which his last Assertion too plainly intimates.  
5. He should have proved, that the King's Dispensation is as valid, and as secure, as an Act of Parliament; or else how, to all intents and purposes, is it the making of a Law? or how can he say, the Law can do no more than the Dispensing Power? was the Law dead by the Dispensing Power, and its force totally and perpetually nulled? why then is it now revived without an Act of Revivor, and some of the penalties thought fit to be inflicted by the judgement of some of our Legislaters? What is repealed by Parliament is certainly voided, and there is no fear of suffering thereby; and what is enacted by Parliament continueth its force and obligation, though 'tis not at present put into execution; and like certain politic dilatory poisons after many days and months, proves dangerous, if not fatal: A particular dispensation doth not infer an universal dissolution; some persons thought( as our Forefathers, and ancient Lawyers did, and 'tis but what the Convention assumed to themselves) that the King might remit or dispense with the penalties of some Laws; yet I never heard, that they said, the King by his sole Power might make new Laws: Let our Author remember, what he hath often heard, if not red publicly at the close of Briefs, which is yet continued, Any Law, Statute, Act or Ordinance to the contrary notwithstanding.  
When all these Considerations are weighed, I hope others, if not our Author, may be satisfied that King James's Dispensations were not of that fatal consequence to the Legislative Power, nor a total dissolution of our Government, nor a subversion of the King's Power, nor our complete ruin, as he supposes them to be; except it be said, what is most true, that the clamours about them ministered occasion, and pretences to effect all those things that have ensued since. I wish there had been no grounds, nor the same arguments to retort all upon a Revolution of a later date; whether here, or elsewhere, too many can tell without consulting the Oracles.  
Upon our Author's principles he, as much as in him lies, subverted the Government by making new Laws without the concurrence of the Legislative Power; for he hath justified armed resistance, and asserted forfeiture, which is a doctrine of subversion: Are these Laws of our Kingdom, or not? if not, then he insists on that for legal, for which there is no Law; if they are Laws, let us know when, and by whom they were made, and where now to be found? If King James nulled our Constitution by making that a Law, which was no Law, and contrary to Law; doth not our Author, as much as in him lies, do the same?  
Beside, if we allow his principle, it will prove too much to justify the present settlement; 
page. 5.  for he hath  told us, That if the Parliament without the King make a Law, one hinge of the Government is broken off; and if it act, and fit contrary to Law, the other hinge of Government is broken also, and so the legal Government ceases. Now, according to his own arguing, the dispensing with a Law is to all intents and purposes the making of a Law; and is not, 5 Eliz. 1. both suspended and violated? since the present Parliament-Members have not taken the Oath of Supremacy, as that Act requires, before they can legally fit; and disables every one from being a Knight, Citizen, or Burgess to Vote in Parliament, that takes it not, with which disability the King himself cannot dispense, as Cook says,( 3. Instit. cap. Simony;) and if the King cannot, who, without an higher Supremacy, can? And 'tis further observable from the same Statute, that what is done by such disabled persons, is made null and voided; for they shall be reputed, as if they had never been returned for Knights, Citizens, or Burgesses. Will our Author now say, that this makes the Law of none effect, and erects an arbitrary and illegal Power? And can he say, that the Government subsisteth, when 'tis destroyed, by his own Position, and in his own Expression?  
He would seem reverend to crwoned Heads by a pretended averseness to aggravate their crimes: But can King James be rendered more black and enormous, or his Government more monstrous than he hath represented both to be; he hath affirmed of them a subversion of the Government, the ruin of the Subjects, and a forfeiture of the Crown; whereby he provokes Children and Subjects against him; and what can be added more, but a sentence to the Block? for which some of his Authors could have furnished him with as good, and as proper arguments, as they have done for a forfeiture: He spares not to particularise every thing that can be objected; and rather than the particulars shall want either number or weight, uncharitable conjectures and groundless censures about French Dragoons, &c. are added to the tale.  
Having thus discussed what our Author hath affirmed of Legislation, I proceed.  
In the second place, to consider the other fundamental of our Constitution, viz. Administration, and to debate whether King James did cease to be King, because he did not govern according to Law, as the Writer of the Letter saith, who gives a particular Catalogue of divers breaches of the Law, wherewith he chargeth King James.  
Before he had passed this peremptory sentence, it might have consisted with good manners, and would have prevented an unwary opposition, if he had considered what the Prince of Orange declared in the second Paragraph of his Declaration, viz. That King James's Counsellors overturned( and is not this a subversion) the Religion, Laws and Liberties of this Realm, and subjected, not secretly only, but openly, Conscience, Liberty and Property, to arbitrary Government: Here all is imputed to the Counsellors, and nothing to the King; in the Author's Letter all to the King, and nothing to the Evil Counsellors; and in the additional Declaration they are styled the Suberters of the Laws and Religion of these Kingdoms: But let the particulars of his List be as true as he would have them to be, is there any tolerable consequence in his arguing? Because King James did those illegal things, therefore he subverted the whole Constitution; except he could have proved, that the whole Constitution did consist in those particular Laws which he is said to have; and that because he did not govern by some Laws, therefore he governed by none at all; and because he broke some, therefore he violated all the rest. These consequences are so mighty wide, that something more than ordinary logic is required to tack them and the premises together. It is a bold adventure to call those Laws, which King James broke, the Essence of our Constitution; and the Essence of a King to govern according to those numerical Laws; yet this was the task, and this should have been the proof, and without it all the rest must be inconclusive. Is not a legal King our right, and part of our Constitution? and are there not many particular Laws which respect the King, his Person, Safety, Crown and Dignity, and many other Laws which respect the Subjects? and most of the branches of Magna Charta, which this Author cannot in conscience say were broken by King James? How strange and uncouth is it then to say, the whole Constitution was subverted, when the greatest part of it remained untouched and unchanged: the Essence of our Constitution no more ceaseth by the breach of some Laws, than a man ceaseth to be a man, because he hath lost some of his toes, or when the Cramp hath seized some of his fingers, or he hath broken a leg or an arm: neither doth an irregular King, for promoting or licencing some particular irregularities, any more cease to be a King, than a Mayor, or a Justice of Peace ceases to be such, if one keeps a disorderly Tiplinghouse, or the other doth not punish every Drunkard and Swearer, whom he actually knows to be such: the Office continues to be legal, though the Officer acts illegally, until he is legally discharged. But who can say unto the King, What dost then? or who is impowered by our Laws to give him his discharge and Quietus? and though an illegal act may render an Officer obnoxious to a legal Penalty, yet it doth not presently divest him of his legal Power and Right to the employment; for his Power is founded on the rightful authority of his Commission, not on the goodness of his personal Acts; from whence 'twill follow, that the Office of a King continueth, notwithstanding some illegal practices committed by him, unless an inferior Magistrate hath a firmer Title than the supreme Power hath; and if the Office of a King continues, he does not lose the Essence of a King; except it can be said, That one may have the true Office of a King, and not be a King.  
The Author of the Letter saith, He that doth not govern by Law, doth not govern at all. If by the Law he understands the whole Law, or the Law in general, with what truth or prudence can any one admit the consequence? how inconsiderate, unreasonable and intemperate must that King be, who rejects all Laws, and will govern by none? It is not conceivable, that any Prince should be so extremely furious, so voided of common sense and reason, as to attempt so much violence and injustice, as to violate all the Rules of Government to his own trouble and shane, and the confusion of the State, and the ruin of his People. But if by Law the Author understands some particular Laws,( which he must if he applies it to King James, for none, without impudence, can say he broken all the Laws,) how notoriously false, and grossly illogical, must it be, to argue from a particular to a general? But such are our Author's confused Methods and Assertions, by making something to be every thing, and some Laws to be all Laws.  
But granting that King james, did not govern at all, because he did govern by some particular Laws; how consistent is this principle with the practise of our Author, and others of his judgement, who frequently and solemnly in the House of God, and in their Prayers called King James their Sovereign Lord and Governor, after all the breaches of the Law now particulariz'd by him? Is it sincerity to own such a one to be a Governor, and yet to justify, that he did not govern at all?  
There is one thing that our Author saith, He had almost forgot, 
page. 11.  viz. King James's laying aside the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy, which he calls an instance of the Dispensing Power, and a condemnation of the Oaths as unlawful. Could he have truly evinced, that King James did dispense with the Oaths in such a sense, that thereby he did to all intents and purposes release and discharge all the Takers of the Oaths from the obligation of them, that would have given more satisfaction than all the Letter beside can truly effect: But this wants proof, and had nothing to support it but a bare insinuation: A dispensing from the taking of the Oaths, is certainly no relaxation from the Oaths already taken; though the Scrupulous are exempted, yet the Swearers are not absolved. Whatever King James thought of the Oaths, it doth not appear by any evidence from our Author, that the King thought the Oaths unlawful: If he had thought so, a Prohibition had rather been his duty, than a Dispensation an act of his favour; a Dispensation doth not necessary suppose or infer the unlawfulness of the matter, from which we are dispensed, any more than a permission of Conventicles infers the sinfulness of the Church-service, because the Dissenters are indemnified for being absent from it; or that the Old Oaths are unlawful, because the Convention hath abrogated them, and Abrogation is something more than a Dispensation. Suppose the King thought the Oaths unlawful, doth the Error of his judgement lay a good foundation to free us from that obligation, about which, we believe, he is very much mistaken? and unless he had been mistaken, he would not have canceled the obligation: And allowing this to be so, doth the discharge to the present King, on a mistake, totally exempt us from that bond of the Oaths to the Heirs and Successors, who may think otherwise of the obligation and lawfulness of the Oaths.  
Whatever the King might think of some passages in the Oaths, yet certainly a great part of the Oaths belonged to the King's Ancestors in the days of old; and the old homagium ligeum bound the Subject to be the King's man of life and member; and this was never thought opposite to Popery. If the King disliked that part which related to the Pope, yet he never freed any from the obligation to that obedience and fidelity which was a right belonging to the Kings of England, whether Protestants or Papists. If the forms of the Oaths were his complaints, certainly the Allegiance was never his grievance, unless it was, because it was no better kept. If he discharged his Subjects from those bonds, why doth he charge some in England, and hang others in Ireland for the breach of them? and why doth he in his Declarations require the Allegiance of his Subjects? If we suppose he thought the Oaths unlawful, can it therefore be inferred, that he hath actually released us from the Obligation? And supposing he hath freed some, hath he therefore freed all? And if he thought some part unlawful, will it therefore follow, that the Swearer is freed from that part which the King thought lawful and obligatory? or because some had the liberty not to take the Oaths, had others therefore indulgence not to keep them? because some would not swear, therefore others might forswear? This is a new sort of logic and Divinity adapted to the Cause and the Modes of the times. Where there are divers particulars conjoined in one Oath, that only part ceaseth to bind, whose matter is sinful; but to as much as is lawful, there remains an obligation to observe it punctually: He that remits part of a Bond, doth not thereby remit all; and he that lends Money to John-a-Nokes, does not thereby cancel all the Bonds of his solvible Debtors. To prove therefore this instance, he should fairly and justly make evident,  
1. That King James thought all the Oath, and every part thereof, unlawful.  
2. That what he thought unlawful, we were not bound to by the Oaths, nor by the Law of the Land to observe; so that if he had thought the Supremacy to be in the Pope, we were bound to aclowledge it so, at least not to be in the King.  
3. That by his Declaration he declared his judgement, and condemned the Oaths as unlawful.  
4. That by his Dispensation he cancelled their Obligation, and discharged all from their Bonds.  
5. That a remission of something in and about the Oaths to some persons, is an entire absolution of all from every thing contained in the Oath. If these things had been cleared, few scruples could have remained as to the obligation of the Oaths to King James's Person, but that he granted as real a Relaxation from the sworn Allegiance, as ever the noble and generous King Ferdinand did to the Neapolitans from their Oath and Homage, when in person he  told his Nobles, Gentlemen and Citizens, that because he was willing to secure their honour, and preserve them from ruin, whom he could not at present protect from the power of the French Forces, he freely absolved them, and gave them leave to make the best terms they could with their prevailing Adversaries.  
The whole scope of this specious Plea in the Letter may be summarily reduced to this,— Our Oath to King James ceaseth, because he ceaseth to be a King; he ceaseth to be a King, because he ceased to govern by Law; he ceaseth to govern by Law, because he hath completely subverted the Government( though the Covention in the Instrument of Government say onely, he did endeavour to subvert it;) he subverted the Government, because he subverted the fundamentals of our Constitution, Legislature and Administration; and this he did, because he suspended and dispensed with some few Laws: These are the links to bind a King and unshakle his Subjects; these groundless and inconsequent assertions are as true, as that King James finished our ruin,( for so our author saith( pag. 7.) when the King gave Commissions to Popish Officers and resolved to stand to it; and that he ruined the Government by his dispensations; as if there were no difference between sickness, and death; a maladministration of some things, and a destruction of the whole. According to this rule he may prove the present settlement to be a dissolution, because the hereditary Crown law is altered, and that the Parliament hath subverted the Constitution, as sitting without the King's Writ, or his Consent first had, and without taking those Oaths which the Constitution of our Government did require; and that many of the Kingdom have forfeited and lost their rights in the Constitution, because they have taken up arms against their rightful King James, then in possession of the Crown; which is contrary to Law and their Declaration: To justify which our Author saith, that King James ceased to be King, which very few at the Prince of Orange's invasion did either believe or think of; for since his date of subversion in 1685. had we no Government? did we live in a state of Anarchy? was nothing done by King James's royal Power, nor any administration of Justice in his royal Name? are all the Commissions granted since that time voided? and are all the Acts of Justice null and of none effect? if not, then King James did not cease to be King, because he governed as a King, though not according to every particular Law.  
All Promises, and solemn Oaths, and Declarations to a King signisie but little, when all must cease to bind, by saying, he ceaseth to be a King; this is a summary way to promote and justify all Rebellions; for if it be not true to say so, 'tis easy to pretend it; this is an excellent method and art to cut the Gordian knot, which could no otherwise be untied.  
The Author tells us farther, 
page. 12.  That the Declaration about taking Arms against the King was for the preservation of the Government; but doubless and principally of the King, who therein is expressed, but the Government is not; and if he pleases to consult the Statute, and consider the occasion of that Act, and what happened to King Charles the First, may perchance be induced to believe, that it was enacted for the King's safety, whom he thinks not sit to include in the application of it.  
Had King James prevailed against the Prince of Orange, these casuistical Salvo's would not have exempted some from the Charge of Rebellion and Treason, and from the Violation of their Oaths and Declaration, for which( according to our Author's Scheme) they could not have suffered without Tyranny and Usurpation, because long before King James ceased to be King, though none had the skill or the luck to demur to the Jurisdiction of any Court, by which they were fined and sentenced to execution.  
Strange was the Mystery, and dark was the Ignorance both of King and State, to have no King, and yet not to know it; to have a governing King, and yet no Government; an unaccountable happiness surely to enjoy three years peace and prosperity under a King that was no King, and in a dissolved constitution, that no body thought so; for whatsoever our Author saith, his practices declared, that he did not then believe it:  
I cannot but wonder, that none should have that fineness of wit, sagacity of apprehension, largeness of reading, or depth of judgement to understand this mystical demise; nor yet so much honesty or courage to assert the devolution of the Crown on the next Heir; if these things had happened, many warm debates and earnest tuggings about Abdication would have been prevented; which point also gives us as little encouragement or satisfaction to take the new Oath, as the pretence of a total subversion of the Government doth to the renouncing of the old Obligations; which point of Abdication I am next to consider whether it can satisfy our Consciences, that the old Oaths cease to bind, and that the new one may be righteously taken.  
Let it not seem insolent to debate that point of Desertion which the Convention hath already determined; there is a strong impulse, and it can be but highly reasonable to speak of that wherein our Consciences, Rights and Interests are so much and so nearly concerned; 'twas thought wisdom to debate it in the Parliamenthouses, within whose walls perchance neither the word Abdication was ever heard of before, nor the thing argued there; and for which no legal Precedent can be( at least hath not been) produced. Let it not now seem a breach of good manners to treat of that wherein our Religion and Interest is so much concerned: For whatever deference is to be paid to the Assembly of the Nation, I do not, cannot rely on their decisions so as to be infallible. Certainly many Assemblies have grossly erred, and shamefully miscarried; sieve times was the Sentence of the Spencers in four Kings reigns enacted and repealed: in six months time King Henry the Sixth and Edward the Fourth were both voted Usurpers, and rightful Kings; and if the Wisdom of a Nation( as a Parliament is called) should be the Rule of a Man's Conscience and Christian Conversation, it must be said, that they did very well who turned Papists, and renounced Protestanism in Queen Mary's days, and subscribed little less than Contradictions in her Father's; and they in foreign parts do well to continue Papists, Turks, and Heathens on the very same principle.  
The first time, 
Tho. White's grounds of Obedience and Government.  that( I remember) the word occurreth in the English Print, is in White the Popish Priest's book, wherein he treats of the Deposing of Princes; and shows the meaning of the word in our days, and in the days of Henry the Third of France: many years before White wrote his book, the said Henry is said to abdicate without either quitting his Government or his Kingdom: from that Romish Priest and some of his brethren too many politic principles have been sucked in by many of the English Nation; How ominous it is let others judge, I will not add any farther censure.  
Deposition and Abdication are two distinct terms, and of different signification in their ancient and modern usage; the first is involuntary, the second voluntary; but how to distinguish them in King James's Case, I do not know, nor do I pretend to art enough for such an undertaking, unless, by a dispensation from the critics, I may call a Deposition an Abdication in the Kingdom, and an Abdication a Deposition out of the Kingdom; mutato nomine, I know no other difference.  
It would have been a great satisfaction to a great many persons, if King James could have been proved to have laid down his Government, as really, as truly, and as formally, as the Emperor Charles the Fifth, or Christina Queen of Sueden did, though he had left no better resignation than Richard the Second, or Edward the Second, Kings of England, did sign; but no such Instrument was ever seen or heard of.  
In the case of Abdication it is acknowledged by the learned Grotius, by others, and by the use of the word in classic Authors, and by the practise of the thing, that ( Abdicatio) Abdication doth import a free and spontaneous session from the Government, without any just fears, fraudulent arts, or compulsary violence; when a King quits his Government with an intention, and full resolution of quitting it, and totally abandoning it for ever, without any thoughts or reserves of resuming it: If such a resolution of King James at his departure could be proved, it would be equivalent, or tantamount to a solemn resignation: But to argue as our Author doth, that King James by a voluntary withdrawing himself out of the Kingdom, receded fully from his Government, is neither truth in facto, nor truth in jure; neither sound in the supposition, nor conclusive in the consequence. Can it be found in our Law?( and, I hope, that must be our guide,) or was it ever heard from History, or Records, that a King of England, by sailing into France, lost his Right to England? An excellent topic for the French to pled, that he Abdicated France also by sailing into Ireland. Whether King James withdrew willingly, or unwillingly, I cannot see any reason how it should, or how it can affect his Right of Government, which doth not depend on his willingness, or unwillingness to go into France, but on the Gift of God, and the Laws of the Land.  
Now if our Author could make out by those Laws, that it is a total subversion of our fundamental Constitution for a King of England to go into France,( voluntarily, or involuntarily,) and a forfeiture of all his regal Rights to sail thither without the consent of the People in general, or of a Convention in particular, he would have argued much better, and more pertinently, than now I can commend him for.  
It is not pretended, that if King James withdrew unwillingly, that then his Government was at an end. I will therefore examine these two things: 

1. Whither King James withdrew willingly, or unwillingly?  
2. That, if he withdrew willingly, whether thereby his rightful Power ceased?    
1. The best way to clear the first, is to consider the circumstances of affairs, when King James went away, and his own sense of things; of which, without doubt, he was able to give the best account. So long as the state of things was peaceable and calm before the Landing of the Prince of Orange, we hear of no inclinations, or resolutions to quit the Kingdom, and yet that had been the season for so grand an affair of relinquishing his Government with a willing mind; nay, after the Landing of the Dutch, so long as his Army and Subjects seemed firm, his Intentions and Actions were in order to meet, and engage with the Prince, and not to fly the Kingdom: But when the Insurrections, and the princes Forces increased, and his Army decreased; when his Soldiers, who ate of his Bread, lifted up the heel against him; when his Children, his pretended Friends, his Servants and his Subjects forsook him; when his Affairs daily declined, and his Condition seemed little less than desperate,( and the event proved it so,) then 'twas that he resolved on a departure, but in order to make a better provision for the management of affairs, and procuring his own re-settlement in his Throne, with the peace of his People, and a legal settlement of all things in the Government in all its due requisites; the fears of danger, and the better hopes of safety, made him fly; and when he was gone, 'twas his desire to return, and to meet his People in a free and legal Parliament, and to preserve Liberties and Properties both in Church and State: For the proof whereof, I appeal to the King's own Letters to the Earl of Feversham, and the Lords and others of the Privy Council, wherein the King gives an account of Himself, and the Reasons of his departure; and who can pretend to know them better than himself? Who is best able to state the Reasons of the King's fears? the King, or our Author? or who is the best and proper Judge of them? and yet, if we believe the Author, he might have continued secure in his Palace, and taken care of the Government? Of what Government, I pray? 
page. 14.  of the Kingdom, that was dissolved and ruined according to him; and how could he take care of that which was at an end, and not in being? Thus the Author imposeth on his Reader, and a little forgets himself.  
He urgeth two Reasons( such as they are) to prove a voluntary session; 
page. 14.  one is, because the King was actually on a Treaty with the Prince. What then? doth an actual Treaty remove all fears and suspicions from a King, and make him willing to do every thing that he is not inclined to, and, as our Author says, he had not reason to do? Doth a Garrison willingly quit their Hold, which they think not tenable, when they in the interval of a Truce steal away, for fear they should not find honourable terms and merciful dealing on a fair surrender? His second Reason is just of the same weight, and is no more, nor better, than this: the Popish Parties design was to persuade King James to withdraw himself; therefore he withdrew willingly; there is need of the strength and length of an hundred Cables to hold these things fast together: How many things do Men with much averseness perform, to which they are persuaded by others? If the Popish Party thought the King in danger,( as the sequel hath proved it a little too true,) and were as willing, as obliged, to preserve him, they had reason to persuade him to depart; and what he did out of fear of danger, can never be truly deemed a spontaneous action; nor doth the generality of men think it so; but if he willingly quitted the Realm, it doth not follow, that the Disbanding of the Army was a demonstration of it; or that,  
2. He willingly quitted and surrendered the Right of Government; if he went, as he was persuaded by the Roman catholics Letter,( of which our Author gives an account,) that he might return, 
Pag. 14, 15.  and, as it is phrased, have his ends of us, in as bad a sense, as others have had of him; 'tis a plain evidence, that he did not torally surrender and abandon the Government, because he did intend to resume it as soon as he could; and shall a Man be blamed for parting with that which he could not keep, though he was willing? and for returning to his State before he can, and is able? And shall this be thought a just and sufficient Abrogation of our Oaths? And is this as formal a Resignation as the Queen of Sueden made, who never pretended an unwillingness to resign, nor a willingness to return to what she had resigned, since her retirement to Rome? both which are notorious to the World in the case of King James; his Letters, Declarations, and other Overt-acts in England, France, and Ireland, plainly demonstrate it, and of which no rational Man can doubt. Now if she raised no Forces, nor employed any Armies to continue in, or repossess her Throne, as King James did, and doth; if her Resignation was formal, solemn, and perpetual, without the reserve and power of Revocation; and King James's Divestiture was only pro tempore, 
page. 15. ( as our Author speaks, and, for how long, he would have done well to have  told the World,) their cases are not parallel, nor is their Government equally at an end; the Author hath instanced in the similitude, but 'tis much unequal in the application, as any one may perceive; shall then the strength of the obligations of our Oaths depend on the disbanding of an Army, which could no longer be kept nor paid, and a departure of a King out of his Kingdom, where he thought he could not safely tarry. To which Cases the Oaths in no wise reserred when we took them; and scarce will there be found any one that took them in that sense, which without a prophetic Spirit he could not certainly foresee. Fidelity is not confined to one numerical place; a Subject may be guilty of Treason without the Kingdom as well as within, and it ought to be remembered, that we have recognised the King's Titles in all his Dominions, as 'tis in the old Oath of Allegiance, and to him in all of them Allegiance is due.  
How we were left( by the King's departure) to a rabble and to a disbanded army let loose upon us, our Author, who hath said it, 
Ibid.  is best able to declare his own meaning thereabout; as for the common disbanded Soldiers they suffered more by their disbanding, than all the Kingdom from them; and if their case was examined, it will be found, that they suffered as many affronts and misusages, as an incogitant and furious rabble are wont to confer on persons in the like circumstances; fewer really feared them than they were afraid of, and many of them did scarce know whither to fly for succour or shelter; there was indeed a great consternation upon a bruit of the Irish Soldiers burning Towns and Villages, and most of the Fires that happened afterwards were generally imputed to mercenary and desperate Irish, but all was noise and shame, the hurt was none, the fears and frights were all.  
But why he should aggravate the Desertion by being left unto the rabble is not easy to divine, since the rabble was celebrated from a public place by somebody( as 'tis said, and perchance not unknown to our Author) for what they had done.  
If Queen Christina's Resignation and King James's session be compared, I must comply with the Author's saying, that our condition( and the consequence) is far worse than that of Swedland; for their Peace and the Laws continued without any alteration or interruption, but we are involved in an unnatural, bloody and expensive War, and God onely knows what bitterness, effusion of blood and ruin will be in the end. I wish we may not lose those things, which by ways, not very justisiable, we have sought to defend.  
We find no Law nor Precedent alleged by our Author to justify his stated Dereliction; but many Kings have withdrawn out of this Realm, and were not concluded to abdicate the Government, or their Right thereto. William Rufus went out of the Kingdom, and left no Commission for a Vicegerent; Edward the Fourth withdrew, when the Earl of Warwick appeared too strong against him; Charles the First fled into the Isle of Wight; and what is it that makes a difference between a withdrawing thither, or into France or Ireland? Charles the Second fled from Worcester Fight into( the same) France, and yet they were never thought to abdicate the Kingdom: If you say Charles the First went into his own Territories, I think none will say, that King James went out of all his when he went into France; for if that was not his rightful Territory, the Convention can tell why they bestowed the Title thereof on King William. Neither do I find it agreed, where the Epocha of the Abdication is to be fixed; if on King James his first departure, 'tis answered, he withdraw no farther than the Kentish shore, which belongs to the English dominion; and after this he was treated and owned as a King, sate in Counsel, and in a Royal manner signed an Act of Counsel, as 'tis publicly confessed. If the Aera be placed on his second departure, it may be asked, Did King James willingly consent to the change of his Guards? Did he willingly condescend to be hurried out of White-hall by a midnight Order? his Strength and his Forts were seized, and his Revenues employed for another's use, and the best thing that was left him, was an opportunity of saving himself by departing from that People, who in a surprising manner had first left him, and left him nothing, but his Person, to secure; which desolate and forlorn condition called to his remembrance the fatal example of his martyred Father, and his too true an observation, That the Prisons of Princes and their Graves are not far distant, as K. James writes in his Letter to the Lords of the Privy Council.  
Let none be so furiously rigorous as to say, he took no care for the Government before he went; if we impartially weigh all his circumstances, and the circumstances of that distracted time, what could be well expected more, than what he did? He left the Commissions of Peace, and the Militia, as well as Regal Commissions could make them? He left a Lord Chancellor,[ I dispute not here for his goodness, but his authority] but he was imprisoned; he left authorised Judges, but they were not permitted to act; and he sent a Letter to the Privy Council to take care of the Kingdom till his return; this was such an effectual Deputation, that if our author could have produced as plain a Resignation from him, the Cause would have been irrefragably gained, loudly proclaimed, and a Triumph assuredly appointed.  
But if none of these things had been done in England by King James, what was possible more to be done for Ireland than K. J. did, or that Kingdom could in all respects desire? considering what has happened; unless it was, that he left a Popish Deputy, and a Popish Army; if nothing else could be said, the event must necessary commend the wisdom( though not the legality) of that practise; for thereby he hath secured something of his just Right, and preserved a part of that Kingdom to himself, and thereby the greater hopes of regaining something that he had lost.  
'tis granted by our Author, 
page. 17.  that if King James departed willingly, he had notwithstanding animum revertendi, which shows most plainly, that it was not a total Dereliction, nor that he resolved to govern no longer, as the Letter hath affirmed; from which Supposition of a willingness to return, he makes many barbarous Inferences on K. J. 
Ibid.  his intention to come with borrowed Forces from France to destroy the Protestant Religion, and the Civil Constitution: This shows rather the rancour of his mind against K. J. his Person, than a sincere aim at Truth, to ascertain this Argument; he sets up a deformed mark, and then shoots at rovers, to beat it down; if unkind jealousies and feigned suppositions were good proofs, 'twas easy to exhibit a large scroll, that would not tend to our Author's satisfaction, nor the delight and honour of the times.  
He tells us( pag. 9.) 
page. 9.  He was not willing to aggravate the crimes of Princes: To recompense this tenderness to crwoned Heads, he invents those faults which he will not aggravate, and in civility creates a guilt, which, in truth, he could not severely chastise. As for borrowed Forces, whence could King James have them, but from France? and why should not a borrowing thence be as good, and as lawful to regain his undeniable Right, as for some of his Subjects to borrow Foreign Forces to drive him from his Kingdom, and keep him from his Throne.  
Our Author tells us, that it signifies nothing to the dereliction, whether King James intended to return, or not. Truly, in my poor opinion, it signifies, that he was willing to continue to govern, and therefore did not willingly cease to govern: But by the session was King James's Government at an end? and could not the Constitution subsist in such a case? Well! then it seems the Government was not at an end by the King's subverting Dispensations, as the Letter said before; but if it was at an end by the Dispensing Power, then the Constitution might subsist in such a case for three months longer, as well as for three years before; and that the Government( in respect of King James as Governor) did not cease by his departure, I appeal to the sense and practise of the generality of the Kingdom to confirm it, who by their constant Prayers owned him as supreme and rightful Governor, until the Convention met, and for some days after that time also; and very few thought otherwise of him, whatsoever some intended to attempt against him by some new-fashioned charming expressions, and innovation words. Many did not think what would be done; some thought that impossible, which was afterwards done; and many were surprised at the opening of the design, and more were amazed to consider what was done, after the Abdication-Vote was enacted.  
Our Author, in his supper abundant zeal to his Cause, doth positively affirm, that King James at his session made no provision for the Government; for the disproof of this, I refer the Reader to what I have already said; and if he did make provision,( such as he was able, and none can require more,) then, by the Author's concession, his Government was not at an end: He needed not to have put the case, Whether a Nation ought to continue without a Government, till the Governor thinks of returning; for King James was as willing to return, if he could, as others were willing to prevent him, and industriously contrived to keep him out, when he was gone: And did he not sand a Letter to the Convention about it? whether they would peruse the Letter, or not, disproves not his willingness to return; but the refusal declares theirs, that he should not: His willingness to leave us for ten years, is far less tolerable, than to absent for two or three months, let our Author say what he will.  
To suppose that a Prince should be willing to leave his Kingdom for ten years, without taking care for the Government, is such a gross imagination, such a piece of Knight-errantry, so disagreeable to common sense and reason, of which certainly Kings have a share, that for common civility to a crwoned Head, and for the honour of our Nation, we should wave such ungentile and unaccountable surmises, especially when the King's actions evidently confute them.  
If the Kingdom had prepared for his return on a firm settlement of affairs, on the just and lasting foundations of Law and Equity, Conscience and Religion, our Reputation might have been better provided for than now it seems to be, and the less scandal would have been taken against our Principles, Professions, and Practices; our Peace would have been secured, and a much better prospect of Happiness, than at present many can pretend to.  
To conclude this Head of discourse: If King James hath not quitted the Right of Government, then he hath not quitted the Right to the Obligation of the Oaths: If he is willing to govern, I cannot sincerely think but that he is willing my Bond of Allegiance should continue; and if he hath not released me from it, I firmly believe, no human power can. I am not bound, without sufficient proof, to believe what our Author doth; nor is his bare persuasion the proper foundation of another Man's judgement: He believes the King withdrew willingly; and therefore, he thinks, he may lawfully take the New Oath: Another is persuaded, that the King went away involuntarily; and therefore according to our Author's, and others concession, he ought not to swear. But whatever the Author's aim may sincerely be, certainly he never intended that any one Man should believe all his Letter: For if King James receded voluntarily from his Government, as he saith, and any one can and doth believe it, the same Man cannot believe that he went away involuntarily, through the force of a Conquest,( as the Author affirms also,) which is next to be considered. 
page. 18.   

Of CONQUEST.  
COnquest supposeth a War; and all Wars are either offensive or defensive: but to which of these to reduce the War on which the pretended Conquest is grounded, I cannot easily determine, considering some things and some sayings.  
A Man would think that the Invasion should make the War offensive: but to this I dare not assent, because the Prince of Orange in his Declaration saith, he came over to defend himself; and declares in the Dutch Abstract, that he came not with Intention to invade. Now I can't think, that to defend, is to offend any more, than an offensive and defensive War to be the same.  
Neither do I know how to call it a defensive War, since none of King James's Forces invaded the princes Territories, nor any of his Allies, nor threatened nor amnoyed in an hostile manner him, his Subjects, or his affairs; but all King James's endeavours were to defend his own Possessions, not to drive the Prince of Orange out of his. King James complained of no injuries from the Prince, required no reparations, nor threatened, nor declared any War.  
The Dutch, though in Alliance with King James, and knew the design of the Prince of Orange, and lent him Forces, and concealed and( as some say) disowned the design when by King James's Minister pressed about the Preparations; yet never pretended any fears or troubles, or War from King James: I can't comprehend how it should be a Defensive War, where was no actual Enemy, or pretended Adversary to defend themselves against: there can be no defence by force, where there is none with force to assault.  
But though we are at a stand, what Additional Title to bestow on the princes enterprise; Certain it is, that the bloody and miserable effects of it will enforce us now to call it a War; though we can't call the success of the Attempt in all its premises, ingredients, and concomitants, either a proper Conquest, or such an one as can free us from the Bond of allegiance, which we have sworn to King James, and his Heirs, and lawful Successors.  
We cannot aclowledge it a Conquest, for the ensuing Reasons, Instances, or Matters of fact.  
1. It appears in the Abstract of the Dutch Resolutions, wherein the Prince of Orange declares, That in his going over into England, it was not the least insight or intentions to invade or subdue that Kingdom, or remove the King from his Throne, much less to make himself Master thereof, or to invert or prejudice the lawful Succession. To subdue and conquer, I take leave to think the same: and to make a Conquest without an Intention of subduing, I think it to be such a lucky chance, that was never heard of before; and if something had not happened since, a Man of reason might have doubted of it, because of its rarity, as well as unlikelihood.  
2. The Prince in his Declaration, and in the Additional, and in his Letter to the English Army, saith, He came to defend and secure the Settlement of Religion, Liberties and Properties; that they who thought otherwise, had hard thoughts of him; he calls a Conquest a wicked attempt, a wicked design, and appeals to the English Nobility and Gentry that accompanied him, to cover him from all such malicious Insinuations of those that gave out he came to conquer the Nations. He then( though it be our Author himself, for I can't help him out of the Condemnation) who asserts the Prince came to make a Conquest, is guilty of malicious Insinuations against King William; and if a King condemns a Man for Lying, who shall dare to contradict him? If the Author pleads a Conquest, then he makes the Prince of Orange guilty of wicked designs and attempts: and this is to be as civil to the present King, as he was true and faithful to the former. If he thinks to evade this by his fine distinction of a Conquest of the King, and not of the Kingdom; the vanity of that distinction shall be exposed, before I part with the Subject of Conquest.  
3. The third reason for which we can't take it for a Conquest, and so not take the Oath on that soundation, is gathered from the proceedings of the Convention in the Instrument of Government, and their Act of Settlement, wherein Conquest is not so much as mentioned; which is something less than a bare waving of that Title: but they insist upon the point of Abdication, upon which they found their Votes of vacating the Throne, and on the account of both transfer the Crown on King William and Queen Mary: Accordingly King William thankfully accepts what they offered. Now to Vindicate the present Settlement,( as the Author of the Letter doth,) and to contradict the very foundation-work thereof; what is it, but to remove his very Basis, and alter his Corner-stone, and an intimation of no great deference of honour to those, who are called the Wisdom of the Nation? Neither is it very comprehensible, how the Prince of Orange could thankfully receive that as a gift, which was his own before by right of Conquest, and the title of Possession; for if it was his by the right of Conquest, the Convention had no right to give it: and if the Crown was a dead of gift and by the Election of the Convention he was made and declared to be King, and by the acceptance owned it to be their Gift,( or Offer, call it which you please,) then he had it not by Conquest. If it be said, that he remitted his pretence of Conquest, and relied on the Donation of the People: then his Plea of Conquest falls, and neither the Old Oaths cease, nor the New one to be admitted on that consideration. For since by the consent of all, the Oath is to be taken in the Imposer's sense, and founded on their own grounds; and since by their own Overt-acts they have disclaimed Conquest, it can be no security to a Conscientious man to renounce his former Oaths on that consideration.  
4. We cannot aclowledge it a proper Conquest of a Foreign Prince; but are verily persuaded, it was a down right Rebellion of the Subjects at home: For though the Prince of Orange was a Foreign Prince, and independent of the Crown of England, and thereby could not incur the guilt of a proper Rebellion: yet 'tis to be observed he invaded the Kingdom, not as a principal Aggressor; but as an Assistant, brought his Auxiliary Forces to help the English Subjects against their Natural liege Lord and Sovereign, and to maintain their Religion, Laws, and Liberties; to the doing of which, the Prince of Orange in his Declaration expressly saith, That he was invited by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, Gentlemen, and other Subjects; and more plainly in his Speech to the Gentlemen of Somersetshire and Dorsetshire, Nov. 15.— 88. he saith,[ You see we are come, according to your Invitation, and our Promise, &c.] 'tis evident then, that he was invited, and at the Instance of the English Subjects he invaded England to free them from what they loudly complained of. And in the Declaration the Prince says, He could not excuse himself from espousing the Interest of the English Nation. Indeed the Prince tells those country Gentlemen, that he wanted not their Military assistance so much as their Countenance and Presence; but withall he publishes in his Additional Declaration, That the Forces which he brought along with him, were disproportioned to that wicked design of conquering the Nation. And certainly how zealous soever the English Nation seemed for their Religion, Laws, Liberty and Properties against the late Illegal Usurpations; yet they entered into no Conspiracy, nor Combination to conquer, nor dethrone their King; nor talked of any Conquest, or vacating, before King James had( in their expression) Abdicated the Government: neither would the English endure the Expression of a Conquest, if the Dutch Soldiers would have dared to term it so: And Dr. Burnet, in his Sermon before the Prince of Orange, Dec. 23. 1688. hath these words; [ Our Deliverer— came, detesting the Imputation of Conquest that was cast upon him.] To all this it may be added, That after the pretended Conquest King James was owned to be our King, Lord, and Sovereign in all Churches, and in St. James's Chapel too. So that a Conquest is no more reconcilable to the public acts and honour of this Nation, than to the Practices and Declarations of the Prince of Orange. And after all our Author acknowledgeth, that the princes business was not to conquer here, 
page. 21.  but to preserve his and his Princess's right, and the Government in Church and State: And might not this be done without a War, or a Conquest? But it seems it was our Author's business to make a Conquest, which was not the princes design nor business; and by his Assertions to create a greater Victory than the princes Arms pretended to.  
5. The fifth reason is taken from the usual acceptation of a Conquest, which cannot properly be so styled, so long as there is a Contestation for the Throne, and an actual War between the Competitors of the Crown: And this is evident from the State of Ireland, and not a little from Scotland. The subduing of one Province, and of one Kingdom, entitles not the Conqueror to all the rest: And if King James was conquered in England, it follows not as yet, neither in facto nor jure, that he is totally vanquished in Ireland. That is a fair Conquest, when the Conqueror is peaceably secured in the Government, and the conquered incapacitated to make any probable, or hopeful attempt for a recovery.  
If it be objected, that this affects not an English Man, in respect of the Conquest, or in relation to his Oaths: I answer, it doth very much; for the swore Allegiance to King James's Right in all his Dominions and Countries, and Ireland is in that number: And he that swears to King William, swears to him as made, and declared King; and that is of Ireland, as well as of England; and the Proclamation, and the War, and Taxes import no less.  
To salue all which, and much more that might be said, our Author has a superfine distinction, and refined Evasion of conquering the King, but not the Kingdom; than which, neither the Schoolmen, nor the Jesuits ever invented a more nice decision But being more curiously subtle, than truly solid, it may perchance, to serve a turn, please a Logical Disputant; but will never weigh much in the present Case of Conscience, which is of so vast a concern.  
1. If the Kingdom is not conquered with the King, then the People have not lost their Rights, though King James did his: And then why should the Oath be enforced on the consideration of Conquest, whereby the Conqueror gains no Right over the People, nor the People lose any Right by the Conquest? If he gained any Right over the People by the Conquest of the King, then the People are conquered: or else how came he by that Right? If he hath no Right to the Service and Duty of the former King's Subjects, then it is unrighteous to impose that to which he hath no Right. If it be replied, that the Representatives( let them be as legal, as in truth they ought to be,) gave the Rights of the Crown to the present King; the Question will recur, How came they to be Masters of those Royal Rights? how came they to be Legal Proprietors of those Rights, which they had sworn to be invested in some body else? The Oath of Allegiance is the King's Right, and so saith the Law. If then the Right was in them,( and except it was, I don't know how they could transfer it,) they might have continued it in, and to themselves for ever: and then what advantage would have accrued to King William by the Victory of a single King? But if it be demanded how the Representatives came by this Royal Right, it must be answered by one of these two ways,( for I can't think of any other in the present case,) either by Conquest, or by a Demise: not by Conquest, for to this the Representatives pretend not for themselves; 'twas false if they did; and if 'twas true, then the Conquest was theirs, and not King William's: if by a Demise, then the Allegation of Conquest falls to the ground.  
2. If the King was conquered, and not the Nation; the Enquiry will deserve a satisfactory answer, of what the King was conquered, and what he lost by the Conquest: Certainly it must be said of his Kingdom, and this I take to comprehend the People as well as the terra firma: without those a Kingdom cannot be; and without this, at least the Right to it, ( nec nomen Regis constabit,) the Title of a King can't subsist. Will our Author adventure to say, that King James's Right to the Kingdom continues? If he doth, this will effectually answer and spoil all his Book: Or that King James was conquered from the Kingdom, and not the Kingdom from him? Why then it continues his still; and I hearty wish our Author may never be forced to the Experiment of distinguishing of being taken from his Estate, and his Estate being taken from him: And I assure the Reader hereby, that I don't pretend to that sagacity of knowing the great difference between losing my Money by being robbed, and by being robbed to lose the Money.  
3. Were the Dutch Soldiers like the Syrian Captains, to sight neither with small nor great, but only with the King? Were there no Papists, nor Evil Counsellors to be subdued? Against these King William came. Were there no Skirmishes, no Soldiers slain? Did none fly from King James to King William? And did none of the People submit? A flight and submission gives a Victory, as well as a battle and a slaughter in the Field. A Fortress is overcome, as well by a Surrender, as by a Storm. There are but few that engage in a Field-Combate, in comparison of vaster numbers that willingly submit: these are said to be conquered, when the others are overcome.  
4. Had the Subjects no Right in their King, nor to his Protection, nor to the Laws whereby he was inviolably invested with Kingly Power and Rights? If he then was conquered, and our fundamental Laws of hereditary Succession, in which we had a legal Right, diverted: How can our Author say, that the People's Rights were preserved, when the King lost his? Is not King William declared to be a King regnant, and not only a nominative one, as King Philip was in the words of the Lord cook?  
5. If a King may be conquered, and not his Kingdom; might it not be replied, that King William the First conquered Harold, but not the Nation? But you'll say, there was a Battle fought, and many Soldiers and much people slain. What then? by the help of his own distinction I will undertake to prove, that 'twas not the Nation, but Harold and his Army was conquered. And if the distinction would hold in any case, it might be something more usefully applied here, than in his own Case: For King James never fought here in his own Person. But forasmuch as Conquest is a harsh term, and not very savoury in England; lest it should comprehend as much as it doth signify, the Distinction was usefully and commodiously invented, and applied to secure our Titles, which we were willing to continue; and to null the King's, which we were not ever dutiful to preserve: For our author knew well enough what the Prince of Orange suggested in his Additional Declaration, that the Conquest of the Nation doth voided all lawful Titles to Honours, Estates, and Interest; so to preserve these 'twas cautiously resolved, to distinguish between the Conquest of the King and the Nation: for if our Conquest had been involved in the Conquest of King James, more must have been inferred than many were willing to grant. But since we are now on Mysteries of State, it would not be unacceptable, if the Author would turn the Tables, and resolve this inquisitive Age, how a Kingdom may be conquered, and yet the King lose none of his Rights. For suppose a King of England, Rich. 1. or Edw. 1. to be in the Holy Land, and the French or Scots in the interim to have invaded and conquered the Kingdom, just as the Prince of Orange hath now conquered the King: Would they not have been as much out of the Condition of Subjection, as now King James is out of a Condition of Protecting? and, Would his Rights( to apply his very words) have been secure and entirely preserved, though they had lost theirs? Perchance this side of the Question will be as intricate and obscure to our Author, as his is imperceptible and incongruous to us. And since Relatives and Reciprocals are now so much in vogue, this Correlative would deserve its consideration, with the rest of the like stamp.  
Our Author saith, That King William pretends not to a Conquest over the Nation. If this be a good Plea, then King James is not conquered, as far as we know; because the Prince of Orange pretends to no Conquest over him, but recognised him in the public Prayer Sovereign Lord and King in this Kingdom, after the pretended Conquest was made by him, and to which he is now entitled.  
But supposing it be a Conquest,( which we don't believe, and why should we, when the Prince of Orange declared against it, and the Convention did not grant it, but something else that was inconsistent with it; as it appears by the Instrument of Government, which if our Author thinks a good Law, why should he distrust their Wisdoms, and oppose his own to theirs, and do that which Sages have condemned, when they said, Neminem oportet esse Legibus sapientiorem?) Supposing it a Conquest, I say; yet the Conquest might not be founded on the Rules of Justice, nor confer a Righteous Title: so that, if we were certain of the Conquest, yet we might still distrust the Equity of the War; and if there be a failure in this latter, there can be but little reason to rely on the former by our Author's Concession.  
I shall not enlarge on that Title which Conquest can give: for this I refer the Reader to a late printed Abstract of a Learned Person who wrote on this Subject, when the Insolent Usurpers over Charles the First pretended a Title to Conquest, but shall only and barely propose some Requisites to a Just Conquest, and leave the full examination of them to others, whether they were punctually observed in the present Case, and celebrated Victory or no. I mean not hereby the usual and just Rules in the very Exercise of Arms, and Management of the War: but the constant Preliminaries which Just and Generous warriors, and the Learned Civilians require, before the Contest is begun, and violent Acts of an open Hostility attempted.  
To a Just War are required.  
1. That an Injustice or Injury be done and committed.  
2. That a Complaint be made by the Sufferer, to the Aggressor or Violator.  
3. That no Complaint, Redress and Reparation for the Injuries be denied.  
4. That after such a Denial, there be a solemn and public Denunciation of War made. This was thought so sacred a Condition by the Romans, that without it a Conquest was but sneakingly and shamefully stolen, nor fairly or gloriously won; and that such Conquerors were as great Delinquents in the manner of executing Justice, as the conquered Enemies were to provoke and deserve it. And how truly, or how punctually these Conditions were observed in our Case, I need not tell the World.  
The usual Reasons to justify the present Attempt are,  
1. To correct maladministration, and remove evil Counsellors, and to preserve the Government, the Subjects Rights, Laws and Liberties.  
But who, or what Law hath made the Prince of Orange a Judge in our Israel? How came he by the Right of Appeals from England, or to be a superior Sovereign to our Supreme governor? Doth our Law make him in time of Complaints and Grievances our dictatory and Regulator? or, Doth God and Nature empower Children to chastise their Parents? Will any indifferent person justify such Proceedings? or, Were such, in all Circumstances, ever heard of before to be acted by Religious Protestants? What King can long be secure? or, What Peace firmly preserved and enjoyed? Where such Allegations are sufficient to justify any unnatural War, may not the next Pretenders to the Crown practise the same methods, and be as innocent? Thanks be to God, our Condition was not so deplorable, that we were under a Ruin or utter Desperation: and I pray God the present Revolution may not hasten what we feared; and effectually accomplish what we only dreaded. The Sword is drawn, and the War begun; and who may live to see that sheathed, and this ended? Omne bellum facile sumitur, said aegerrime desinit: non cujus potestatis initium est, ejus& finis, said the Great Caesar: or, Who knows what bitterness will be in the End? We may live to be chastisee with our own Scorpions, and in the close perish by our own unhappy methods. Certainly those days must be evil, when those of our own houses are the most embittered Enemies, and implacable Foes.  
If the Justice of a War could have been founded on K. James his personal misdemeanours, it would have been but equitable to have drawn up the particular Charge of all those Crimes for which he deserved to have a War proclaimed against him. But in all the princes Declarations, I find not one single Crime imputed to him, but all the ill Administrations are changed on the Evil Counsellors. Now to punish and conquer one Man for the sins of another, seems not very agreeable to the Rules of common Equity. And if these Evil Counsellors contracted a greater degree of guilt, by endeavouring to alienate King James more and more from the Prince and Princess of Orange: what black and unnatural Character must they deserve, who attempt to alienate the Prince and Princess from King James their Father? I wish the Event had never given the unhappy Occasion of quoting this part of the Declaration.  
Whatever Interest or Right the Prince hath to the Succession; We, who have taken the old Oaths, have sworn to defend it: and in Justice 'tis wished, that he may never deprived of it. But yet a future expectance giveth not a perfect title to the actual Possession of it. What is future, is onely contingent: and none can be certain to enjoy it any more, than he can be certain to survive the regnant Prince. 'tis Injustice to despoil any one of his future Right and just Inheritance; and 'tis more to dispossess another of his actual due. To do one certain Act of Injustice, is an improper Course to prevent a less, because altogether uncertain: and and this is to put a pretender and heir into better circumstances than the rightful Possessor.  
2. The second pretence to justify the princes attempt is, The setting up a spurious Prince of Wales, to postpone the just Rights of others, and of himself in particular. The Consideration of this is of so vast importance to the Honour, Justice, Oaths and Religion of the Nation; and deserves the most serious, calm, wary and strict debate and examination. For if the Prince of Wales was the true Child of King James and his Queen Mary, he then is lawful Heir of these Kingdoms, and we are inviolably sworn to his Right; Why should an Infant Prince be injured, and multitudes involved in Perjury? The same Plea of Succession which justifies the Prince of Orange will justify the Prince of Wales if true born. Much more, if this is an Imposture, the matter deserves the severest Scrutiny, and the most impartial Manifestation to expose the Cheat to shane, to vindicate our Reputations, and satisfy our Consciences. To struggle for an Impostor against the rightful Heir would be Perjury; and to neglect our sworn duty to the rightful Heir would be no less.  
Presumptions, Suspicions and vulgar Reports, are not weighty Arguments to convince, nor true Reasons to satisfy; they are too weak to govern Prudence, and too shallow to direct the Conscience; they change not the nature of things; nor make them true or false. 'tis not what is said, but what is a proved Truth, that should be the Rule to guide us in this great and conscientious Affair. One Man's doubt doth not deserve another's full and firm assent; and some mens distrust is not a sufficient ground for another's peremptory disbelief. Whatever averseness there was in the Court, to satisfy many before, or at the Birth; there was a multitude of Testimonies to confirm it afterwards; and now 'tis confirmed the more, because nothing done since to disprove it, or them. The whole matter deserved to be re-examined; and the management inquired into by a legal Parliament, according to Promise; that so the Representatives might have acquired the full knowledge of this grand Affair, that thereby they might be prepared to satisfy the whole Nation, who have infinite reason to desire it. How many Scruples would be resolved? How many Doubts removed? How many minds would be eased, if it could be fairly proved whose Child this Imposture was? how, and by whom 'twas surreptitiously brought in; how the Plot was laid; and how the Intrigue carried on; who were the Contrivers and Managers; what Artifices were used to amuse some and delude others; what Improvements of Art, and Impositions on Nature, were used to produce such a Fatherless and Motherless Child; what golden Showers essected such a miraculous Birth; what sort of Aboriginal Native this Insant is; who, according to some popular Oracles, is like to be the Wonder of Ages, without beginning or ending of days?  
We are concerned by Oath for the rightful Heir; and by Oath let it be determined who the Heir is. We are  told by many late Writers, that 'tis not our duty, nor is it required of us, to examine Titles; but undoubtedly we are to resolve, and inquire, in order to keep our Oaths; and since by Oath we are engaged to the right Heir, 'tis necessary to be satisfied who this Heir is that hath the Title, which we must own, and to whom our Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy are to be paid. An implicit Swearing is no more commendable than an implicit Romish faith, and a blind Pepish Obedience; since the Oath is taken, 'tis our concern, and ought to be our enquiry and business, how it may and ought to be kept.  
How easy and usual it is to cry up, and clamour down what suits with our designs, and is agreeable to our purposes; and to change the judgement for no other reason, but because the scene of Assairs is altered. Bless the Prince of Wales was the Prayer for one day; and, hang up the Cheat was the Sentence of the next. 'twas interest then, to bless; and now 'tis Interest, and something worse, to curse the very same Person. But how ignoble, unmanly and unchristian such methods and changes are, a little honesty may suffice to convince.  
What Prayers, and what Solemnities were expressed here in England! What Formalities and Trasports of joy in foreign Courts! Addresses were made at home, and Congratulations came from abroad; and such seeming acquiescence in the general, that to pray for the Prince of Wales was not onely enjoined, but the Nation was contented to own him before God himself.  
Did not the Prince of Orange sand a Congratulation for the Birth of the Prince of Wales, and was not the Prince prayed for in the Princess of Orange's Chapel?  
Did ever the P. of Orange complain of any Imposture of Fraud in this Affair, before the Declaration came forth? and in the Declaration a vehement Suspicion is the sum Total; and upon that ground, the Birth of the Prince of Wales was reserr'd to the Enquiry of a Legal Parliament: which certainly the wise P. of Orange would never have done, if it had been a certain Imposture, and thereby expose his own indisputable Right and Title to an hazardous Dispute.  
This momentous Point calls for a most deliberate and impartial trial: every pious and tenderly just mind, can but desire to be satisfied herein; that the Nation may not hereafter halt between two Pretenders, and continue doubtful where to pay their duty, and show their sidelity, being entangled with the doubts and difficulties of Conscience, the Aims of Princes, involved in the miseries of a bloody Civil War.  
Was there no way to satisfy the Prince of Orange but by owning a forgery in the Prince of Wales? Was there Inspectio Ventris solemnly desired? and if desired, Was it refused? King James is not charged in the princes Declaration for denying one thing which ever the Prince of Orange formally and publicly required of him.  
And our Author confesses, that the Affair of the Prince of Wales is not strictly to be insisted on: which others think should necessary be done, whether the Birth be true or false. The Memorial hath collected a great number of Allegations and popular invidious Surmises; but hitherto they want the honest and legal evidence of sufficient Witnesses to prove them. And if the Birth is not strictly to be inquired into; why was it promised in the Declaration? why were Calumnies raised from thence to blacken King James, and Surmises and Arguments to alienate his Subjects from him, and promote the Cause, and provoke the minds of his Adversaries against him? Doth not that deserve a strict Inquisition, wherein the Oaths, Honour, and Justice of the Nation; and the Right and the Happiness of our Constitution and Government doth consist? It seems, and so 'tis believed; that what cannot be proved, is not strictly to be insisted on, according to our Author.  
Notwithstanding all that hath been said; if it should prove true, what some have suggested, that the Design of the Invasion was laid and carried on before the time of the Queen's pretended Delivery of the Prince of Wales, how decently would the pretence of the War, from that pretended princes Birth, be committed to its honest grave of oblivion?  
What other pretences others may have to justify the Prince of Orange's War and Conquest, I know not: this I know, that the Author of the Letter to a Bishop insists on no more: and whether the Objections or Answers are most satisfactory, is lest to the Reader's judgement to determine what he pleaseth; for 'tis out of my power to make him think otherwise than he resolves to think.  
Yet after all, I cannot but observe how cautious our Author is, not to lay too much stress on Conquest, lest that sole Plea should fail: and therefore he twists two more pretences with it to complete a Title; and saith, The Prince and Princess of Orange are in possession partly by Conquest, partly by Inheritance, and partly by the Consent of the Nation. Without all these together it seems the Title would not be whole and complete; for where a part is wanting, the whole is not entire: but how all these are consistent or exactly true, 'tis not easy to comprehend; if only the various passages of the Letter be truly compared, much less if the Acts of the Convention and the Instrument of Government are but cursorily considered, and a little compared. And it seems to me, whatever the Author pretends, 
page. 19.  he fairly quits them all, by saying, that the undoubted Right of Succession of the Prince and Princess of Orange was after the death of King James. If then King James be not dead, it is not their undoubted Right to succeed.  
The last Argument that is insisted on to persuade us to believe, that our Oaths to King James do cease, is, because be ceaseth to protect us; whereby, and according to which our Author, and other Writers, would have actual Allegiance and Protection so naturally reciprocal, that this failing, the other must do so too. To evince the falsehood of this Doctrine, I shall propose two things, 1. Argument; 2. Example; having first observed, that the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy are not taken on the condition of actual Protection. In the Oaths there are no Conditions or Reservations made or expressed: and 'tis to be remembered, that the Oaths are given to secure the Subjects duty to the King, not the King's duty to the Subject; which is obvious to him that reads the Oaths. And I dare appeal to our Author, whether he took the Oaths with a Condition of Protection the first time after King Charles the seconds Restoration.  
1. The Argument shall be taken from, and in the very words of the University of Oxford's Reasons concerning the Covenant, &c. drawn up by that great Casuist Dr. Sanderson, Sect. 7. of the Salvo's, Wherein the Zealots of that time, pretending to satisfy the Scruples of Loyal Persons, arising from the Sovereignty of the King, and the Duty of Subjects Allegiance, are brought in  
By saying, Which( seemeth to us a piece of unreasonable and strange Divinity) that Protection and Subjection standing in Relation to each other; the King being now disabled to give us Protection, we are thereby freed from our Bond of Subjection: Whereas,  
1. The subjects Obligation( Jus Subjectionis) doth not spring from, or relate unto the Actual exercise of Kingly Protection; but from, and unto the princes Obligation to protect,( Jus Protectionis,) which Obligation lying upon him as a Duty, which he is bound in Conscience to perform, when it is in his power so to do: the Relative obligation lieth upon us as a duty, which we are bound in Conscience to perform, when it is in our power so to do. His Inability therefore to perform his duty, doth not discharge us from the necessity of performing ours, so long as we are able to do it.  
2. If the King should not protect us, but neglect his part, though having power and ability to perform it; his voluntary neglect ought not to free us from the faithful performances of what is to be done on our part: How much less then ought we to think ourselves disobliged from our Subjection, when the Non-protection on his part is not from the want of Will, but of Power?  
It is most certain, that actual Protection, and actual Subjection, do not mutually infer each other; for all that are actually prorected, do not pay actual Subjection, as is evident from the many Traitors and Felons, and other Criminals in peaceable times; and though many pay actual Subjection, yet are they not actually protected, as, amongst others, the Society of Magdalen-Colledge can abundantly testify. If any one in a plainer Phrase shall say, That he that is actually protected, ought to pay Subjection,( including the Oath of Allegiance herein,) I must say, that this will open an entrance for all villainy, falsehood, Treason, and Usurpation whatever; and being admitted, will patronise all Disloyalty, Unfaithfulness, and Perjury.  
If a Massianello shall seditiously seize a whole City, and the strength of it; will any one say, that Allegiance presently becomes his due, because the true Lord of the City is not capable at present to protect the Inhabitants? Or if a Company of Night-Robbers seize the House, and the Inhabitants; and for the present defend them from the assault of some other Thieves: is therefore their faithful Obedience become due to the Robbers? and ought they for this present defence to swear themselves Liege Servants for ever?  
Our Author tells us, that King James is altogether incapacitated to protect us; and are we therefore incapacitated to be faithful to him? Because he can't do what he would; must we therefore do what we should not? Allegiance may be Suspended; but without the King's consent it cannot totally be Abrogated: For having passed over my Faith to him as his due, and he accordingly having accepted it, and continues to demand it as his due; I can't without Injustice take from him, what is his due to have, and will not part with. The Author is very wary herein; for though he says King James is altogether incapacitated, he doth not add for ever; for of this he can't be sure, and so here may be room for a future Apology, and to return to a future Allegiance, because of future Protection; which I hearty wish him on all occasions and mutations.  
The case of the Frontier Towns in Germany and Flanders, is not parallel to ours; if it was, a Foreign Example is no perfect rule to direct our Consciences. Is there not such a tacit Condition in their Oaths, confirmed by the acknowledged practise of all Parties, and the consent of their Governing Lords? Is their Oath the same with ours? Do their outed Governors require Allegiance from them, as King James insists to demand ours? If they are re-taken by force, or a permissive surrender, are they ever treated as Traitors, but rather governed as a new acquired Conquest? They do what they can for their old Masters; and when that is done, these release them to pass their Fidelity on another. But are we released by King James? or can we ourselves discharge our Obligations? Now though they change their Faith with their Lords, yet I understand not how they are necessitated thereunto, as our Author expresseth it. But if Protection confers a good Right, doth not the Principality of Orange belong as much to the French King, as England to King William? and how incongruous to our Author's principles must it be, to proclaim the Irish, Rebels and Traitors, for not being protected?  
To the Argument, I shall add,  
2dly, Some Examples to convince us, that actual Protection infers not actual Subjection. When King Richard the First in his return from Palestine was taken by the Duke of Austria, and made a Prisoner by the German Emperor for fifteen months; his Right to England did not cease, nor did the subjects Fealty fall, though he was then( in our Author's words) incapacitated to govern; and something more in respect of his Person, than King James is at present. The Imprisonment of King Charles the First,( and Conquest, and the Original Contract, and the People's Rights were then pretended, as now they are,) and the Conquest, and long Banishment of King Charles the Second, when he had not one Hold in his three Kingdoms, did not vacate the Oaths; nor would all sorts of rigour enforce the true Loyalists to quit their Faith, and forego their Allegiance. I believe our Author was once of that opinion, however there was as fair a Plea for Protection then, as can be pretended now. The last Instance shall be in David and Absalom; a Case more parallel to our present Circumstance, than I could wish, though I cannot help it. The Laws were too grossly and notoriously broken by David; and so much the worse was he, because the Laws were appointed by God himself: He committed the most injurious Sins, that one Man can be guilty of against another, which were Adultery and murder; and so, according to our Author's Doctrine, he ceased to be a King, because he ceased to govern according to Law. Absalom complained of Grievances, and promised Reformation and Justice, when he should be made Judge in Israel: by which pretences he stolen the Peoples hearts, and gathered a numerous and formidable Army: He is proclaimed King; he seizeth the Royal Palace; and the People were as ready to serve him, as they had been to be commanded by his Father. David flies, because he had not Forces enough left to fight, and defend himself,( so here is a Conquest too) leaves no Viceroy to govern the People at Jerusalem; flies over the River Jordan, and so Abdicates the nine Tribes and a half: and so not being able to protect them, their Faith became due to Absalom. Now here is a Scripture-Case too parallel to these days, and in every particular almost correspondent to our Author's arguments and allegations; like Elijah to the Child, Nose to Nose, Eyes to Eyes, Hands to Hands, &c. and so like is the Child, that the difference can scarce be discerned. I will make no other Application, but desire the Author of the Letter to satisfy the World, if David did not Abdicate, and was not truly dethroned or dispossessed of the Crown; and Absalom partly by Conquest, partly by hereditary Right, and partly by the consent of the Nation, was not in full possession of the Government, and in a capacity to protect the People: It matters not, in our Author's determination, whether a month or ten years? and whether the Oath of Obedience, in consideration of Protection, was not due to Absalom? and such an Oath he hath found out, Eccles. 8.2. For if it was in Solomon's time, 'tis no unreasonable supposition to imagine it to be in use in the Reigns of David and Absalom; since our Author saith, 
page. 30.  it was the manner of the Subjects of Israel and Judah to take Oaths of Allegiance to their Kings.  
Having now considered every Argument, and Allegation of every thing of moment, pertinent to the present case, as they occur in our Author; whereby he endeavours to prove, that our Oaths to King James do cease to bind us any longer: and having, as I think, given a full and sufficient Answer to every particular, I now proceed to consider  
2. The second grand Point of transferring the Oath of Allegiance on King William and Queen Mary, our new Lord and Lady; but how they came to be so, when the Nation was not conquered, let the Author tell. He saith there was a Contract between the Prince and the Nation. There was a Contract indeed between some of this Nation to change our Governor and Government too.  
That we are better protected now than formerly, Ireland can prove; the increase of Taxes, the failure of Trade, Free Quartering of Soldiers in private Houses, the loss of Places, the suspension of Persons do more than enough convince, though not satisfy us, that our Laws are preserved, and all of us governed according to Law, is as true; Witness the Laws relating to the Crown and the Parliament. Had we no other Motives to transfer our Allegiance, these would not contribute the best encouragements, nor be very amiable inducements: but Motives are not the things we hunt after, but satisfactory Reasons to inform our Understandings, guide our Judgments, and preserve our Consciences.  
If King James truly and really, to all intents and purposes, did cease to be King, and the Oaths as to him were truly and altogether fallen; yet that part, which relates to his Heirs, continues valid and still to oblige us. Now if there was no pretended Prince of Wales, or if he could be proved as spurious as some proclaim that he is; yet the Prince of Orange is not the next Heir in the usual course of Descent, according to the English Laws and Customs, and as we have sworn; and so the Oath, as we think, can't be honestly transferred on him, which by right belongs to another.