ANSWERS to the several Reasons alleged in a printed Paper, for affirming the judgement given in the Court of King's-Bench, in the Case between Richard Brown Plaint and Ayliffe wait Defend. which is now depending by Writ of Error in Parliament.  
THE Act takes notice of Sir John Danvers's Crime, which was High-Treason, and intended to inflict the same Forfeiture as to his Estate, he having by Death avoided being Attainted, as would have been had he been in Life and Attainted: and he is reputed by the Act as a Person Attaint.  
The intent of the Parliament is manifestly otherwise; for Sir John Danvers was pardonned by the Act of Indemnity, as to all Personal Punishments, and there is a particular Clause in that Act, which says, it shall be construed most beneficially for the Subject; and though his Lands, &c. were reserved to further Forfeiture, yet the Estate Tail cannot be forfeited, unless you suppose him Attainted, which is a personal Punishment, and contradictory to the very Words and Design of this Statute; for there were several others involved in the same Crime, who were Attainted after their Deaths. Sir John Danvers not Attainted, by which it is plain, That the Parliament never intended an Equality of Punishment, but a Favour to the Posterity of Sir John Danvers. But a Construction according to the Objection, would put the Attainted and Unattainted into the same Circumstances, and confounded the Distinction made by the Statutes relating to this matter.  
The Words of the Act are as comprehensive as may be, and extend to forfeit all Lands, and all Estates, in them, by the comprehensive Words of Rights, Interests and Hereditaments, which must extend to the inheritance in Lands, or to nothing, the Offender being dead.  
The Words are not sufficiently comprehensive, for Rights and Interests are mentioned only in opposition to Possessions, and to make the Right which Sir John Danvers had to any Estate, of which he was out of Possession, forfeitable to the Crown. And as to the word Hereditaments, that cannot include an Estate Tail, as will appear by the Construction of former Laws, particularly of the Statutes of Bankrupts: for though the Statute of 13 Eliz. chap. 7 made all the Lands and Hereditaments of the Bankrupt liable to be sold for the Payment of his Debts, yet an Estate Tail was never taken to be within that law; but the Statute 21 Jac. chap. 19. to supply that Defect, gave the Commissioners Authority to sell them by express Words, viz. by the Words Estates Tail: and if the word Hereditaments could have given away an Estate Tail, there had been no need to have added the Words, Any Estate of Inheritance, in the Statute of 26 Hen. 8. which were the only Words that made Estates to be forfeitable for Treason, and were put in for that purpose.  
Estates Tail were alienable by common Recoveries and Fines, and thereby the Perpetuity created by the Statute of Westminster 2. de Donis conditionalibus, liable to be broken, are forfeitable; a Forfeiture being in nature of Alienation by the general Words of an Act of Parliament, as appears from the Statute of 26 Hen. 8 by which Act Estates Tail are forfeitable for Treason, under the general Words of Estates of Inheritance: and by the same Reason the Words Rights, Interests and Hereditaments, in the Act of Pains and Penalties, which is agreed to extend to carry an Estate in Fee simplo, shall as well extend to an Estate Tail: and it may be as well denied, that an Estate in Fee simplo as in Fee Tail, is forfeited by this Act, the Words being no more expressive of one Estate than the other.  
Though Estates Tail are weakened since the Statute of Westminster 2. de Donis, by subsequent Laws; yet as to this purpose the Statute Westminster 2. continues in its primitive Force and Vigour. And though by the Statute 4 Hen. 7. Tenant in Tail is enabled to bar his Issue by a Fine, yet he cannot do it by a Feoffment, because as to that particular Conveyance the Estate Tail is yet within the Protection of the Statute of West. 2. So though the Statute 26 Hen. 8. gives the Estate of Tenant in Tail, attainted of Treason to the Crown, by the plain Words of any Estate of Inheritance; it cannot thence be concluded, that the Act of Pains and Penalties shall give an Estate Tail, without using those Words, or any of the same import, And without any Attainder.  
And these words, any Estate of Inheritance, are not general Words, as is alleged, but properly expressive of an Estate Tail, because an Estate Tail is an Estate of Inheritance. But the words, Rights, Interests and Hereditaments, only explain the Things designed to be forfeited, but mention not what Estate in those things shall be forfeited, but leave that to the Construction of Law, which has always resolved that such general Words for this reason, shall not extend to an Estate Tail.  
The Act intended the Offenders Estates should not be enjoyed by their Children; for in the general Saving there is an exception of the Wife, Child, or Children of the Offender.  
This Saving extends not to this Case, for that was to save Estate, that would have been forfeited if no Conveyance had been made, but the Estate Tail would not have been forfeited, because that stands still protected by the Statute de Do 〈…〉.