A REVIEW OF THE OBSERVATIONS UPON SOME OF HIS Majesty's late Answers and Expresses.  
Written by a Gentleman of Quality.  
OXFORD, Printed by LEONARD LICHFIELD, Printer to the University. 1643.   

A REVIEW OF THE Observations upon some of His Majesty's late Answers and Expresses.  
IN the Contestation between Regal and Parliamentary authority, finding by the frequent Declarations of the two Honourable Houses made unto the People, (like so many Appeals of the Body representative, to the Body at large,) that the Sovereign judgement of all things is (upon the matter) brought unto the People, I see not, but that it is both lawful, and even the necessary duty of every private man, that hath any understanding of the things in question, to publish his particular judgement & apprehension of them; That from the most free and universal agitation of the truth, some judgement from that vast body may be rendered to the appealors' satisfaction. And so, having conceived that the Author of the Observations upon His Majesty's late Answers, hath upon this subject broached divers State-doctrines, neither agreeable to our Laws, nor yet to true Christian Religion: and that yet, (to the prejudice of the Truth,) they have, as truths, got a strong prepossession of men● minds; I have thought fit to offer such notions upon the sum of them, as I conceive aught to bring them to a more serious re-examination. Saving therefore to His Majesty His Right of Animadversion into the particular falsities, insolences, and seditious calumnies in the several passages of that book; I only apply myself to the sum and scope thereof, and that I find to be to this purpose.  
First, That God is no more Author of Regal power then of Aristocratical, and as much Author of usurped Dominion as of Hereditary. That Power is originally inherent in the People, and but derivative in Kings. That the People are the efficient and final cause of Kings. That the name of King is not greater than of People. That though the King be singulis major, yet He is universis minor. That He is not to be accounted a God, a King, a Lord, a Father etc. to the People conjunctim, but divisim only. That Treason (so fare as it concerns the Prince) is not so horrid in nature, as oppression in a Prince, etc.  
In the better examining of these, we find; That God creating man single, left him not other means of multiplying, then only by propagation, and in propagating, he gave the Rule and Sovereignty of the issues propagated, to the Father of whom they were propagated; and in defailance of the Father, He gave the Rule of all the younger (and consequently of their descendants too) unto the firstborn, 
Gen. 4.7.  (as we may see where God tells Cain; Thy Brother shall be subject to thee, and thou shalt bear rule over him. So that all men in the beginning were born Subjects, either to him that naturally was their Father, or to him that by right of primogeniture was representatively the Father. After the Flood, the then common Father of the world, having a family of three Sons of differing condition, and they (for the plantation of the then unpeopled world) by God's determinate fore-councell dispersed into three distant parts of it, the elder Brothers right of Sovereignty over those younger, (through distance of place, and want of occasion and means to exercise it.) became wholly neglected, as upon like severance and search of new places of Plantation, it, in other places, often after became. But every Planter becoming so by himself a Father, soon became a Family, and from a Family grew into a City, so into divers Cities, and at length into a Kingdom. And though we first hear of the irregular Kingdom of the descendant of Cham, yet find we also, that Shem the eldest and blessed Son of those three, was grown into the Sovereignty of a Kingdom, and was the first King that ever was in the world: for by the judgement and computation of the Learned, Melchisedeck the King of Salem, could be no other than very Shem himself. Neither had the ten Tribes of Israel, (when revolting from the son of David, they said, they had no part in David, nor Portion in the son of jesse,) any other meaning then only to infer; That David being neither their Father by nature, nor in primogeniture by representation, they were free from that natural subjection unto his son, which otherwise (they implied) they were bound to be subject to. And indeed, (if there had not been an especial ordinance of God in the case) it had truly followed; that being neither descended of Jesse, nor jesse the first borne of their common Father; the rule of subjection which followed nature, had not tied them to obey his son. The fifth Commandment itself proveth this natural bond of subjection, when (as all Churches expound it) it commands Obedience to Governors, under the name of Parents only. And that (according to Gods saying unto Cain) Sovereignty did rightfully follow primogeniture, we may see it in this; that as God promised jacob the Sovereignty, so he procured him the Birthright, formally transacted by Esau's sale of it. Therefore a King being no other than a common Father, by either natural or legal Right; neither the People, nor any other Power then only God (the Father of nature itself) can properly be said to be the author of the being of Kings.  
Next, God hath not authorized Kingly Power in nature only; but by his express promises before the law, and by his ordinances concerning it, in the law, even before ever the people of Israel sought a King: also by settling over his People the government of a King: by sacrating that office with anointing: by his own assuming of the name of King: and by setting forth our Saviour's Dominion over his Church, by that name and office. In all which if God hath done the like for authorising aristocratical or usurped Dominion; then is the Observour in those assertions to be justified: but if not, then is he in them an Author of lies. Yea, God is more Author of what he ordains and directs, then of what he only permits; and therefore more Author of good, then of evil. Wherefore to say usurped Dominion refers as much to God as author thereof, as lawful hereditary Dominion doth, is not only false but also blasphemous.  
As for Power inherent in the People, how should one imagine such a thing? unless also he would imagine People to be juvenes aquilone creati, men like grasshoppers and locusts bred of the wind, or like Cadmus his men sprung out of the earth; where none deriving from any pre-existent Parents, had all of them equal original and power, and therefore subject to no civil Power but what by agreement they themselves ordained? But where man is borne of a Father, to whom, by the law of God and nature he is subject, he is so far from having inherent Power originally in him, as that he hath not his own original being but only in subjection; either to his immediate Father, if his Father were absolute, or to him and his common Father, if his Father were a Subject. Now if man, in his particular and natural capacity, hath not original Power of himself inherent in him, he cannot have original inherent Power, by any civil capacity whatsoever.  
And though, upon the overthrow and breaking up of Kingdoms, instance may perhaps be given; that People have made themselves a King, yet does not that prove, the People to be the original of Kingly Power; no more th●n going upon crutches, after loss of a leg, proves crutches the original and natural way of going: for people being by misfortune deprived of their natural common Father and Sovereign, must of necessity entertain such supply of their loss, as their fortune can best afford them. And even in that case too, their making of a King, was no other, than the choosing of one to bear the known Office of the true and natural common Father. For we must note, they never made Kings by giving them power constitutive, to do so; and so; (as they must have done, if Kings had had nothing but commissionary authority from the people,) but they made Kings, only by choosing one to bear the office and person of the same Governor, that the law of nature had before described and authorized to command and govern.  
Though therefore the ten Tribes of Israel rebelled against Rehoboam, for refusing to relieve their grievance, made jeroboam King, and God forbade Rehoboam to war against them for it, yet this proves not, That people have power of making Kingdoms or Kings. For God himself had first declared, that he would rend ten Tribes from the Kingdom of judah, and that jeroboam should be King over them. And had Jeroboam and the people attended God's will and pleasure in it, (as David after his anointing did) he had been a King and they a Kingdom not of their own making but of Gods. But to show how quickly the by-affections of the people pervert the right work of God, when they look not as well unto the way, as unto the end: we may see, that for all this, new Kingdom & King were of Gods appointing, yet when the people would in a way of their own, take upon them the Crowning of the man appointed, God disclaims the authorising of what they did. They set up a King (saith God) but not by me. 
Hosea. 8.4.  and in recording the fact (both in the first of Kings, and again in the second of Chronicles) the Scripture directly telleth us, that they rebelled. That therefore God forbade Rehoboam to fight against them, did not approve what the people had done, for God tells the reason why he forbade them; not because the people had done well, but because the thing was of God, which if God had not revealed, Rehoboam might, and aught to have reduced them to their obedience: and howsoever the thing itself was of God, yet to teach us, that the people have not authority to do the thing that he hath ordained, without his espceiall appointment, we see that when Abijah, (Rehoboams son) with four hundred thousand, against eight hundred thousand, pitched a battle upon the right of that Kingdom, and committed the cause to God, though jeroboam had entrapped him in an ambush, God gave such a sentence against jeroboam and his people, that after an overthrow and slaughter of five hundred thousand of them, they were disabled from ever recovering strength in all Abijahs days. And that Subjects for luck sake may take heed of making new Kingdoms, or Kings: this King (the only instance of people's King-making, and yet in making of whom the people did only anticipate God's purposed work) became the instrumental efficient of their final destruction, & (setting up the Idolatry which the people themselves had first affected) his sin through all his successors so adhered to them, as that it never left them, until it had extirpated them from their own, and transferred them captives into another Country. To conclude this point, when we hear God himself styling himself a King, a great King of Kings, and telling us that the Kingdom is the Lords, &c: who without reluctance of conscience and even horror of it, can yield the power of Kings to be derivative, and the People to be the original of it? for then, God by setting himself forth in the name of a King, does instead of presenting himself, in a notion of magnificence and Sovereignty, present himself under the notion of an inferior and of a derivative, from a more Sovereign and original Power: whereas we see God never expresses his Power by the name of an Elder, or of a Magistrate, or any subordinate Authority how good or honourable soever. Yea to be King of Kings, is then no more, then to be the derivative and creature of Kings.  
As for the People's being the efficient and final cause of the King. If one knew in what sense the Observour would be understood, he were soon answered. For if he would be understood according to the propriety of his words, (as indeed that which he would maintain does need he should,) Then is that position not only false, but an impious falsehood, even full blasphemy: for properly God, and none but God, is the efficient and final cause of all things: there being no difference between the efficient cause and the Creator. But if the Observour means, that the people be the instrumental cause of Kings; the instrumental cause and mediate end, are terms of so extreme and notorious difference, and consequence, from efficient and final cause, as it is by no means to be pardoned him that he should mean the one, and say the other. Besides, to understand him so, does overthrow all that he drives at: for if the People be but the instrumental cause of Kings, then can they not be the end of Kings, no more than the instrument of any work can be the end for which the work was made, but contrarily the work is the end of the instrument, and therefore greater than the instrument. As for the people, they are so fare from being the final end of Kings, as that they are not any way the end of them. For government is the end of Kings (of which the People are but the Subject) and God alone is both the efficient cause and final end, both of the Government, Governor, and Subject to be governed.  
As for that which he affirms, That though Kings be singulis majores yet are they universis minores, and that wherein soever they be to be accounted. Gods, Lords, Fathers, Heads, unto the People; they are not so to be understood, otherwise then as to the particular persons of men, considered singly not jointly, what an impudent insolence is it that one that has use of reason, should so wickedly belie the principles of it, to so infinite a consequent of absurdities. For if Princes be Kings, Lords, Fathers, Heads, &c: to the single persons of the Subject only, and not to the universality of them, than is every single Subject by himself alone a body politic, whereof the King, as King, is Head, and so hath as many Kingdoms as Subjects: & every one being distinct in relation one from the other, have not, nor can have any civil communion among them; neither can any of them have to do with the civil Affairs one of another. And further, (which is not only false, but destructive to the public weal and safety of all Kingdoms) If Kings be not Heads of the public community of their People, as well as of the private particulars of them, than is the public community out of the King's Protection, and Kings are discharged of all care of the public. For the mutuality of relation betwixt Protection and Subjection, suffers not the one to move, but within the limits of the other, and if the universality must be under the King's Protection, it must be also under His Subjection, for which cause the ancient and constant wisdom of our Peers and Commons sitting in Parliament as the Body representative of the whole Subject of the Kingdom, do in the Preamble of their Acts, in that quality, to this day, recite themselves His Majesty's loyal and faithful Subjects. So that in this point the Observour insolently controls the Wisdom and judgement of the representative of the whole Kingdom, as well as contradicts the principles of reason.  
Lastly, whereas he saith that Treason so fare as it concerns the Prince, is not so horrid in nature as oppression in a Prince. Without excusing any way or diminishing the faults of Princes, in any the least act of oppression, let every one but ask his own conscience, whether is more horrid in nature, Superiors to wrong Inferiors, or Inferiors their Superiors: Masters their Servants, or Servants their Masters: Husbands their Wives, or Wives their Husbands: Fathers their children, or children their Fathers: and he will soon find the impiety of this assertion. And whereas now the Observor professeth his good will and affection to Monarchy. You may by these grounds which he hath laid, and by his propounding to us for a pattern to our Kings, the condition of the Prince of Orange, and for our Kingdom, the pattern of the Commonwealth of Venice, know how false a meaning he hath, and what his design is; even to loosen the sacred tye of Obedience toward our Liege Sovereign, and with it the firm and settled stability of the Kingdom, and to prepare men's hearts and persuasions, to the receiving of some new form of Government, according to the fancy of the common People.  
Having therefore with false principles endeavoured to found the original of all Sovereignty in the People, as hoping thereby to find means to pluck it out of the King's hands: he than proceeds to persuade, that not only natural reason, but even the frame of the Kingdom, and the positive laws thereof, do all concur to maintain the highest Sovereignty to be in the People. But when he should make that apparent by the manifest judgement and Acts of our Law; not being able to do that, he seeks by sly insinuations, to have that admitted and swallowed, which to prove he knows were impossible. Therefore pretending to show the original, the progress, and changes of sovereign government, all from, and by the authority of the People, even from the fall of Adam to the present. when it should be expected he should show the Sovereignty of this Kingdom to be derived from them, he runs himself into a puzzle, and then breaks off and tells us what he thinks, and he thinks, that when most Countries have found out an Art and peaceable order for public Assemblies, whereby the people may assume its own power, to do itself right, without disturbance to itself, or injury to Princes; he were unjust that would oppose that art and order. That Princes may not be beyond all limits of Law, nor tried upon them by private parties, the whole Community in its underived Majesty, shall convene to do justice, &c: and so he goes on insinuating, that our Parliaments are such public Assemblies, wherein the Community in underived Majesty convenes to do justice upon the King.  
Truly I am not so well affected to arbitrary Government, as to admit the judgement (much less the thought of one man) to be proof of Law and Government, We shall therefore by Gods help examine how well this new conceit agreeth with our Laws and ancient settled frame of Government. But this is obvious a forehand, that it is so fare from being true that most Countries, have found the art and order of Assemblies wherein the People may assume the power of doing themselves right. As that unless you will call the Assembly of some mere popular Republic, such an assembly: there is not the ordinance of any such assembly to be found in all the world. and the reducing of our Parliaments to such Assemblies, will suit as well, as the shaping of our Kingdom to the frame of the commonwealth of the Venetians, or of the Hollanders.  
That we may know therefore that our Parliaments are no such imaginary Assemblies, in which the people in underived Majesty convene to assume any Power supposed to be theirs originally, and with that Power to do themselves right. Even the Observour himself hath assured us, when in his fast and lose play, he unawares confesseth that the composition of our Parliaments are so equal and geometrical, and all parts so orderly contribute their office, as that no part can have any extreme predominance over other. This is most true that he confesseth. God grant that no endeavour to the contrary may ever deprive the Kingdom of the right benefit of this happy and well composed Ordinance. But now then if our Parliaments be ordained Assemblies, composed of three necessary different parts, one Sovereign, the others Subject, some appearing for their own interests, others representatively for them that sent them, and all balanced in such a geometrical equality, as is proper for the conservation of their several rights and interests from any extreme predominance of one of the parts above the other. Then can they not be assemblies of resumption of the people's supposed power, for in such imaginary assemblies, there must be a dissolution of all constitute orders, degrees, and qualities of the parts, and all the members must be reduced to a natural coequality undistinguished by any difference, of quality, degree or privileges whatsoever: so as there must be neither King, nor Peers, nor any office or power of the former State remaining, but all resolved into a mere Chaos, till all be new framed by the deity of the people. So fare therefore are our Parliaments from the nature of such assemblies, as that the endeavour of introducing of such Assemblies is most seditious, traitorous, and destructive, not only to the person and dignity of the King, to the Crown Imperiall and to the Kingdom itself (whose well balanced rights have (beside other ties) been so often, so solemnly, and by so many of us, even by our whole representative body sworn to be defended) but even to the rights, privileges, and being, of the blessed Ordinance of our Peace and welfare our very Parliaments themselves.  
For we must know, that our law (taking notice, that in every State, there are three parties capable of just or unjust Sovereignty; that is to say, some Prince; the Nobles; and the People) judged no government so safe and assured, as where every of the three parties capable of Sovereignty, were in some sort admitted to a participation of it, but so admitted, as that still the Sovereignty should clearly remain to Him that ought to be the Sovereign. And to this end, our law (having first through the piety of our law-giving Princes obtained a just & regular course of government; the stability whereof it found to be more concerned in the power of making laws, then in any other power belonging to the Sovereign) did for preventing innovations that might subvert that settled regularity: in such a sort establish the frame of State and government, as that the Prince should have his hands bound up from using the legislative power without the concurrence of the Peers and Commons. But then, to the end that they (whose consent was brought in only to prevent the evil which absolute power might work against the settled frame of the State) might not themselves become that evil, which they were called to prevent: The Law gave to them no more interest in the legislative power than it had still left in the hands of the Prince, to wit, to every of the three parties, the King, the Peers, and the Commons, an equal power of assent or descent in making of new Law. And so by opposing the single power of every one of them, to the votes of every other two; made so secure a balancing of their powers one against another; as that no practice of any two of them can do any thing to the prejudice or diminution of the third, without that third party itself do give consent unto it.  
Nor did the providence of the Law here rest. But considering that in the power of making Laws it had now opposed the powers of two numerous bodies, against the power of the single Sovereign. It foresaw, and feared that by the Sovereign's consenting to Laws for the ease and benefit of the Subject, things might pass to the prejudice and diminution of the sovereignty, if the single person of the sovereign (surcharged with the care of the manifold affairs of the Kingdom) should be left all alone to advise and dispute His Right against all the wisdom and solicitation of the numerous body of the Subject. To prevent that: it ordained, that the King should at His own discretion swear unto Himself a body of Council, to advise Him in the concernements of His Sovereign Rights, and safety (which is His privy-councel) and a body of Council at law, to advise Him that He may neither do, nor suffer contrary to the rule of Law. And through this even Counter-poise & balance of all the three States of Parliament (as through a means wherewith God hath especially blessed us above other Lands) do we enjoy the assurance of a regular freedom, under the government of a just and legitimate sovereignty. In which, if without the free concurrence of every of the three ordained parties, there shall be any invasion and exercise of the legislative power; then shall the well balanced frame of legitimate law-making be overthrown, and with it, the rightful being and use of Parliaments destroyed.  
But the Observor having not ascribed such underived Majesty to Assemblies of the Community, to the end to maintain the rights of Parliaments, but to innovate Parliaments to the destruction of their true being, and to the transformation of the State and government. Howsoever that fol. 15. he tells us only of some defects in Parliament that might receive amendment: yet let's he slip, that those Defects, are Divisions between the two Houses, and between the King and them. Now Division being almost inevitable, and power of dissenting necessary for balancing the three differing parts of Parliament, to prevent this power of dissenting, were to destroy the balance and being of Parliaments, and to make them Courts of popularity, where they that please the People should absolutely carry all things. Though therefore he here discovers his design, yet being assured not to bring it about, but by misleading the most faithful and well-affected both to true established Religion & Government, He covertly pursues His purpose altogether under the show of vindicating the Rights, Privileges, & being of Parliaments.  
So, whereas our Parliaments are assemblies wherein the whole State in three distinct formal parts convenes in Council, & wherein every of those three parts have free power of allowing or disallowing of any thing propounded for a law, and wherein the law taketh notice of no vote, nor act, for any general law, save what doth pass with concurrence of all the three parts of the Assembly, The Observor tells us, that for the King to say, that without the King's concurrence and consent, Parliaments are without all power, this at one blow confounds all Parliaments, and subjects us to as unbounded a Regiment of the Kings will, as any Nation under Heaven ever suffered under. And his reason is, If Kings may so frustrate Parliaments, He may by the same means frustrate all inferior Courts, & then farewell Law, Right, Liberty, and all things. O impudence! does His Majesty in this claim more, then either the House of Peers to itself, or the House of Commons to itself challengeth? Nay, claims His Majesty more than He acknowledgeth due by the Law to each of the two Houses, as well as to Himself, freely to assent or disassent to what is propounded for a Law, and do not, and have not, both they and His Majesty and both their Predecessors ever practised that power? so as we have had scarce one Parliament wherein either King or Peers, or Commons (or perhaps every one of them) have not severally dissented from the votes each of other two and tie their dissent frustrated the votes of the other two, and yet (God be praised) our Parliaments do, and (we hope) still shall continue, notwithstanding such undermining foxes would bring that three fold Cord of our State, into the singlestring of a popular Assembly, and all things so into confusion?  
And how false is the consequence that if the King by dissenting may make void, the sentence of the two Houses of Parliament He may also void the sentence of any inferior Court of justice? When in Parliament, the law hath appointed the King Himself to give His own Vote and consent, personally if He will, or by His Letters under His great Seal, if He will. But in inferior Courts hath appointed none to give sentence or judgement but only those judges who in a definite and formal way are ordained to be the only Ministers and Deliverers of the King's justice and judgement in that behalf, so as no personal or instrumental assent or descent of the Kings, can alter or frustrate the sentence or judgement of any inferior Court, because that though the judges there give the King's judgement, and not their own; yet the Law having authorized none but them to be the givers of the King's judgement there, it taketh no notice of any other judgement in those Courts, then only of the sworn judges themselves, and though the King, the Peers, and Commons in Parliament have every one the power, by any one of their votes to frustrate the votes of two of them, from becoming the judgement of the whole Court: yet cannot the Vote of either the King, the Peers, or Commons alone, or of any two of them, frustrate or change the judgement of any inferior Court. And it is further to be observed that in those Courts the judge's judge as strangers of matters that concerns others only and not themselves and therefore render judgement in invitum, against the will of one of the parties at least, in which case because expedit rei publica ut finis sit litium, if all the judges agree not, yet judgement shall be given according to the judgement of the Major part.  
But now (contrary to the use of inferior Courts) The parties in Parliament in (those things that concern the public) meddle not as mere judges, but as Parties interessed, with things that concern every of their own Rights, in which case it is neither Law nor reason, that some of the Parties should determine of that that concerns all their mutual interests, invitâ altera parte, against the will of any one of the Parties. But that all Parties concur, or else their mutual interest to remain in the same condition it was before, For Parties cannot meddle with judging in invitum, but per consensum, and therefore no major part of the three Parties in Parliament, but the consent of all three, must make the judgement of that Court, otherwise two of the three Parties, may totally or in part oppress the third, and then one of those two, oppress the other, and be a sole arbitrary Tyrant. The King and Peers may oppress the Commons; the King and Commons, may oppress the Peers, the Peers and Commons may oppress the King: and then the Peers being easily suppressed by the Commons, what shall hinder but that some Appian decemvirate (that under show of zeal of reforming Church and Commonwealth, may carry the sound and well-affected Subject with them) After they shall have not only possessed men's minds with the lawfulness of their authority, but possessed themselves of the Militia & all the Power of the Kingdom, and two or three year kept all that power in their hands, pretending they cannot sooner perfect their Laws of Reformation (though indeed they do but time it out, till they secure all unto their private ends) (as Appius in all things did) what then (I say) shall hinder, but that by means of some such decemvirate among the Commons, some Appius may invade an absolute Sovereignty over us, or missing that, resolve yet all our settled State, into an unsure troublesome Aristocracy? or Republic?  
The better to prepare the way to some such upshot. The Observor finds a defect in the frame of our State, he cannot see how Parliaments can have sufficient power, to restrain Tyranny, if they can do no Act without the King's consent. And he finds, that if Princes in matters that concern the public, be admitted to prefer weak opinions (as he calls them) before Parliamentary motives, than Parliaments are vain, Princes unlimitable, and Subjects miserable.  
The Observer will be more wise and faithful than the Law itself, and looking only one way, tells us of insufficient provision for restraint of regal power, without some coercive superintendent be placed over it. But the law that looks every way, tells us, that the erecting of such a superintending power, would unsoveraigne our King, and make that superintending power Sovereign and when it were made, the exercise of it would be subject to more dangerous extravagances then regal power is, and yet less capable of regulation than it. Therefore the law (knowing that there is none but God, qui custodiat ipsos custodes, that can restrain supreme Governors, and knowing that nothing in this world can be reduced to so absolute a perfection of settledness, but that in the last means it must merely depend upon the providence of God) after a full consideration of the weakness and imperfection of every several form of Government, concludes, that the Sovereignty was better placed in the hands of a sole Prince, then in a popular, or Aristocratical hand, and that a positive known law, without any coercive superintendent, was a sufficient and the best boundary of regal power, against any irregularity whatsoever, especially when the law (being backed with a Parliament of all the orders of the Kingdom) shall thereby find means of discovery and manifestation, both of the truth of the law itself, and likewise of the violation of it. For the law, and the transgression of the law, being both at once made manifest and notorious, that will so sufficient a security of the future observance of the law, as Princes will not further endure to violate it; because (as the Poet says) 
Nec pueros coram populo Medea trucidat,  
Aut humana palam coquit exta nefarius Atreus.   
Infamous acts will not endure to be committed in the sight of all the world.  
Therefore to say truth the Observor's conceit of having some superior power to enforce the law that should regulate the power of the Sovereign Prince, is a mere false conception, of an heart as traitorous to God as to his Prince, who would have absolute security by an arm of flesh, when no such can be given to it. For, to regulate his Prince, he would not only have a law, but a superior power to enforce that law; and such a superior power being once erected, that must also be either boundless, or must be circumscribed with a law: if circumscribed with a law, than also must that law have a superior coercive power, to enforce it, and so must we have superior Power, over superior Power, usque ad infinitum, and yet at last, leave the most superior power, in that liberty which the Observour calleth boundless, arbitrary, and tyrannical. And how absurd a thing is it to imagine, That when the Law hath trusted the sovereign Power in the hands of the King, it should again distrust Him and unsoveraigne Him, and place in another the sovereignty of the same sovereign Trust? and with a second absurdity leave in the King's hand the Power of calling together and dissolving the power whereby He himself should be constrained? and (to make up all) should by authority of that power, constrain all the Heads of the people, and even the representative body of that power, by solemn oath, to declare that the King is not only Supreme Governor, but that He is the only Supreme Governor, when (such a superior power admitted) he can be neither only, nor at all, Supreme.  
But the Observour aiming more to subvert what is established, then to reduce things unto their first establishment, quarrels still with the Regal power; and he reasons, that whether or no the Law gives the single Person of the Prince as full and free a Vote to assent or not assent, as it doth to either the House of Peers or House of Commons, yet is not the Prince to use the liberty of His Vote licentiously, but advisedly and by Council, and what Council can He have more wise, faithful and impartial, then theirs that represent the whole Kingdom, who cannot be supposed to have private ends as Courtiers, Cavaliers, and private men may have?  
Truly that Princes ought with great respect to hearken to the advice and information of the great Council of the body of their people, who can so much as make a question of it? But why should these things be objected to His Majesty? For what Prince of all his Predecessors hath so much hearkened & condescended to his great Council, as His Majesty at once hath done unto this present Parliament? Not any one; Nay, not the whole succession of His predecessors since the granting of the great Charter hath done the like. Witness the condescending to the Earl of Staffords attainder, the damning of Shipmoney, and of all Monopolies, the Star-Chamber, and high Commission Court, the taking away of the Votes of Bishops & of Popish Lords, the parting with the long used power of imposing upon merchandise, bounding of Forests, and yielding to the regulation of whatsoever further grievance should be found in the commonwealth. And (for a seal of observance of all) the granting of a Triennial Parliament, and the perpetuating of this present Parliament. With what dispensation of the violating of Christianity can a Subject (through all these presumptions to the contrary) charge his Sovereign with averseness to public counsel, and inclination to private why perers? O that being at once possessed of so many not long since unhoped for satisfactions, we might not want hearts to enjoy them and acknowledge them.  
But the two Houses thought the Kingdom in imminent danger, and desired it should be put in a posture of defence, and His Majesty by evil Counsel refused and deserted them. Truly the Observour neither doth nor can show, that His Majesty, upon the Parliaments apprehension of danger, refused to take order for the defence of the Kingdom; for the contrary thereof is true. And in His seeking to secure it by a military posture, He so fare condescended to the satisfaction of His Parliament, as that He offered to change the persons, that in any County had the charge of the Militia, if His Parliament made any just exception to any of them. And for His Majesty's coming to the Parliament to Westminster, even in that also He so fare harkened to them as that he offered, that if, to secure future seditions, they would make some exemplar punishment of the Actors in the late seditious Tumults there, He would even come thither. And being refused in that: He notwithstanding, offered them to come to any other indifferent place. As for the place where they now sit, who (that hath vowed His Faith to the Laws of the Land, and to the Privilege of Parliament) can in such conscience as He will answer God withal, hold that a place of indifference and of freedom to vote in, where the people in Tumult demanded of the House of Commons to know who were the Lords that refused to vote with them, and where some of the Peers were assaulted by the multitude for having differed in their votes from them, and yet none of those Tumulters were punished or ever questioned for it?  
But ere we leave this point of harkening to the advice of Parliamet, we must consider too, that though we grant it behooveful for the King to hearken to His Parliament, we must not understand it so behooveful, as that there should be inevitable necessity laid upon Him, that He must follow whatsoever they advise, for then at one blow we overthrow the fundamental Law & frame of Parliaments. If from any of the three formal parts of the Parliament we take away the freedom of voting, to assent or descent, we break the threefold cord of the State, we cast away the balance of it, & even dissolve the very frame itself. If when for necessity of State, the Head assembles the whole body in Counsel, (where the Law gives the Head one vote of three, and allows Him a Body of Privy Council to maintain the proper Rights of the Head) the Head may not use that Power which the Law giveth it, no not in case the two other parts contest & claim part of the Right belonging to the Head, & where (by Law) the Vote of the Head is opposed in balance, to the moderation of those two powers; as well as their powers are opposed in balance to the power of the head; but that the Head must do all things according to the advice & counsel of the two parts, which are the body of the Subject. Then all that solemn form of Law, that calleth the Head, Sovereign: that authoriseth the Head to swear a body of Privy Council; to convoke the Nobles and Commons in public Counsel; to call to that Counsel whom He thinker good: to take homage of the Peers, and Oath of Supreamacy of the Commons: and having used their Counsel, at His judgement to dissolve it. All this (I say) is then a mere misleading formality of the law, The Sovereignty (against all our Oaths and expressions to the contrary) is not in the King but in the people; the King is the only Subject, and but a common vouchees, whose concurrence is unavoidably employed; His will, his understanding, and his power (though he be acknowledged Head, Sovereign, and chief residence of authority) is all subjected to the body of the very Subject that in Parliament doth swear subjection to Him. The tripartite frame of a Parliament of three Estates, is a vanishing apparition: there is really nothing but a mere popular assembly, not of Subjects but Sovereigns. The Crown Imperiall and Kingdom itself, (though asserted by our solemnest Acts of Recognition and oaths of the body representative,) are mere non entia, we are but a Republic, and the chief Head of the Kingdom hath not (beside the name) more of a King, than the Duke of Venice, or the Prince of Orange. And this being hid ever since the first beginning of the Kingdom; the whole generation of the Subject ever since, hath by the injury of our Laws, been most impiously mis-worne in their allegiance; and the error hath never been discovered till the whole Kingdom (having now solemnly sworn to stand to, and defend the Laws) cannot receade from their wrong-sworn obedience, but with the guilt of universal perjury, and under the burden of that guilt, expose an old grown Kingdom, to the hazards of a new framed Commonwealth. All this does necessarily follow, if we take away the freedom of the King's assent and descent in Parliament; or bar Him of the use of His Counsels advice therein.  
I should little need to say any thing concerning that which the Observour so much pretends that Communities, and universalities of men, are void of corrupt affections and of private ends, and that therefore their desires are always lust, and their council faithful and impartial. But when in the fallacy of this persuasion there lies (I fear) a great part of the sin, for which Gods anger now so publicly doth show itself upon us, I would be loath to pass it over without any touch at all. I fear we are too diffident to rest upon the ordinance of God: I fear we are too confident of ourselves, as if our own natural providence (if we were left unto it) were beyond any other means of safety, although it were the ordinance of God unto us. A word or two shall not therefore be unnecessary concerning the corruptions & errors that even communities themselves are often subject to.  
That Communities are less subject to private ends and affections then particular men are, is true: but it is also true, that they are not absolutely free from them, and when they fall into them, they are more fatally violent and dangerous. And though one would think it repugnant, that an universality (which contains the whole public) should have private ends; or that that should any way be counted private, which they that contain the public do pursue: yet seeing it is not the number of agents, but the capacity in which they act, the quality of their acting, and the coherence or incoherence of what they pursue, with the publiques end and weal; that makes the actions of men public or private: it must needs follow, that if without authority, or out of the way of the public ordinance, men pursue any thing (though the whole community concur in the pursuit) yet is all of the nature of a private action, done to a corrupt and private end, for though the thing intended be to the present good of the public, yet being beside the ordinance and way, it is in consequence against the good and weal of the public, & so against the very ends of the public. And as in the body natural a very few members (that is none but the eyes) have the sense of seeing, but all the members have the sense of feeling. so in Communities all have the sense of enjoying good, or suffering evil: but very few the faculty of discerning the cause and means of either. Yet the major part of the Community (more carried by sense then true discerning) oft makes the judgement of the whole Community, and brings it to act that, that agreeth not with the intended weal of the Comity. By this means (at the best) the whole universality of the Israelites (contrary to their own final good and prosperity) forced their Priest to set them up golden Calves. By this means the universality of them again revolted from David (their King by God's immediate Ordination) to Absolom an usurper. By this means the universality of the ten Tribes, for redress of their grievances, rebelled against David's Grandchild, and set up Jeroboam, who reviving their own affected false religion, authorised that sin which pursued them in their extirpation. It is therefore an untruth, to say that Communities can have no private ends, and a belying of the Law and Truth to say (as fol. 22.) that ever there was such a Maxim.  
But it will be said, that though in Communities the body at large (in which the vulgar is the greatest part) may be subject to corrupt affections and ends; yet the body representative, which is the Choice of the Community, is to be presumed free from corrupt ends and affections, and therefore most wise, faithful, and assured.  
Truly we pray, that since in this knot lie many scruples that wring the consciences of thousands in our Israel, we may with modest freedom, reason the things that tend to clearing the honour and observance due to representatives. To whom we acknowledge the highest honour and observance that can be given to the body represented. But the honour and authority of the representative will always depend upon two things, that is, the quality and condition of the body represented, and the quality of the representation itself: for as that is more or less proper and lively, so will it derive more or less authority and reputation. If therefore the body at large be an absolute free sovereign (as is the Community of a right Republic) the true representative of that body is then to be observed with all sovereign honour and due subjection: but if the body at large be itself a Subject, the honour and authority of the representative cannot exceed the honour and authority of a Subject: for none can make their image more than they themselves are. Next then, (besides that all representations how plenarily soever authorized, must ever be subject to the condition of the body represented) The repute and authority of representatives, will also follow the soundness or weakness, exactness or imperfection of the representation itself. For if throughout an whole Community the representers be equally and proportionably ordained according to the true relative interest, that each part which sendeth them hath to the whole public (as in the united Provinces they are) there will be all full acknowledgement of authority to the representative, that possibly can be to the body at large: and there will also be some presumption that the representers are authorized, to determine sovereignly of those things that concern the public. But if (on the other side) there be no equality, in making representers, observed: but that some parts send as many as others that are an hundred times greater and more considerable, both in power and support of burden in the Commonwealth and if for some of the parts none are admitted to choose the representers, but substantial legal Freeholders, and for other parts all are admitted of what condition soever. And if the number of those that are unproportionably and promiscuously chosen, do three or four fold, exceed the number of them that are strictly chosen for the most principal part of the Community. And lastly, if it lie in the power of some other authority to give to some particular Towns the power of sending representers, equal in number to the greatest Provinces of the Community. These circumstances will not only detract from the repute and authority that a more exact representative of the Community might have, but vehemently demonstrate that the institution and end of such a representative is rather to minister information of the state and condition of every of those particular places and advice, and assistance to some other sovereign, and to consent with him, then to determine sovereignly itself.  
To come then to the Objection of the assuredness of Representatives in their judgement and fidelity. If in Kingdoms, we by the representative body of the Community mean a perfect representation of the whole body Politic, so as that the head as well as the other parts do freely cooperate and concur (as in our Acts of Parliament it ever doth) then can we presume no other Counsel more assuredly wise, faithful, or safe for the public, then is the counsel of the universal representative in that sense. But if by the representative, we mean the representation of the gross of the body without the head, (that is, the representative of the body of the Subject only) then is the assertion false, for the Law presumes not in the representative of the Subject, so assured judgement and fidelity for government, as it doth in the sovereign head alone, for than it would not have placed the sovereignty in the head, but in the representative of the gross of the body. But the Law knowing both Communities themselves, subject to dangerous inclinations from private incitements, and their representatives likewise subject to misleadings, factions and ambitions of private men, hath (as in the most assured place, placed the sovereignty in the head, and the head so having the ordinance, both for judgement and for government, where the ordinance is, there is the blessing and there the best assurance.  
We need not seek examples how representative bodies of Subjects moving without consent of their head have been misled: there is not one imitable example to be found that ever the representative of the Subject, moved to act sovereignly without the consent of the head. But we have examples of sovereign representatives, in Republics themselves, notoriously misled by private men; was there ever a more reverend representative than the Roman Senate, yet did not Appius and his Faction, under the Colour of a Decemvirate (or Committee of reformation) so blind that Senate, as to work them to confer all the power of the Commonwealth into his, and his Factious hands, to the subversion of the common liberty? so as that if by accident he had not been taken away, he had made himself Prince? And was not that sovereign representative, another time wholly swayed and carried by Marius and Sulpitius? Sure as nothing is more wholesome for the public, then that the Sovereign of a Kingdom should often have the advice of the body representative of the Community, so is it most dangerous for the public to have the advice of the Community enforced on the Sovereign. Lest so that that should be for Our good, be unto us an occasion of falling.  
But the Observour insists not so much, that the representative body is the great Council of the King and Kingdom: as that it is the supreme judge and the most sovereign power. If the Prince (saith he) be seduced, some Court must judge of the seducement, and some power enforce that judgement, and that must be the Parliament (meaning the two houses of Parliament.)  
We have already shown the absurdity of a superior power to enforce the Sovereign: but farther to dissolve all difficulties in this false assertion, we must know that in Parliament there are divers kinds of judgements. And that the mere representative body, that is, the house of Commons solely, hath not any judicatory power by itself, unless it be in particular cases concerning their own house and members. But they are as the great Inquest of the Kingdom to inquire, discover, impeach, etc. The house of Peers hath generally in all things judgement preparatory in order to judgement of Parliament, as to give Oath, to take recognizance, to fine, to imprison etc. In matters that come before them bywrit of Error, it hath judgement decisive to determine and adjudge Law. But this judgement it hath not as it is part of the representative body: for the representative body hath not therein any part with it. But the house of Peers alone hath this superior judgement, as great Court of the King's Barons of the Kingdom, which being assisted with the judges of all the Benches, is by formal Ordinance of Law in all matters so coming before it, the proper and immediate superior judge of Law. But it is not absolute supreme judge of Law in all things: and therefore it cannot revoke the judgement which itself hath given. Neither can the House of Commons, nor the two houses together revoke, or annul any judgement given in the House of Peers, or elsewhere; therefore also the two Houses are not supreme judges or declarers of Law. The Observer (fol. 44.) tells you the reason, To be supreme judge or declarer of Law is all one as to be supreme maker of Law, and that you know the two Houses are not. But in the whole three Estates of Parliament, that is, in the King, the Peers and Commons, there and there only are all powers ingredient, for they upon Bill are not only judges of the last resort, to reverse the judgement of the House of Peers and of inferior Courts, but they can repeal and restore, and repeal again in infinitum their own judgements and Acts. And they can not only declare the Law but they can make the law, and none but they. They alone are they that cannot be bound by precedents or Acts of Parliament, they alone are they that have the Legislative Power: and therefore they, and only they that have the absolute Supreme judgement of the Law.  
But (saith the Observer) The King deserts His Parliament, implying that then the two houses must be Supreme judges; though otherwise they were not. As well may he imply, that if the King come not to Parliament then are the two Houses no more Subjects, but Sovereign's, yea Sovereign's in the highest exaltation. Let us see what this deserting is, that shall so easily create Sovereignty in Subjects. We know that by the law, the King's personal presence is of no absolute necessity to the proceed of Parliament, and that by the law (declared and confirmed 33. Hen: 8.21.) the King's presence is not necessary at His giving consents to Acts passed, but He may give consent in His absence by His great Seal. If then the Law count His personal absence no deserting: and as to deserting for want of just and reasonable consent to their demands, His Majesty be so little faulty toward this Parliament, as that he hath given His Consent beyond the example of His Predecessors. Where then shall a sincere Conscience in any deserting the King hath made, find warrant enough to desert this Sovereign, and acknowledge another Superior? but to return.  
Diversity of Powers and authorities exercised in the several parts of Parliament, necessarily causes a diversity of respect and observance to be rendered to them. And though the judgement of the representative of the Subject (that is of the Peers and Commons) in those things wherein it is properly exercised, aught to have esteem and credit before any other judgement of the Subject. Yet is it not to be opposed to the judgement of the Sovereign, in those things which the law hath entrusted to the judgement of the Sovereign for the law trusteth none but whom it judgeth to have judgement, fidelity, & provision of all necessary incidents sufficient for that trust and then it prefers both the Acts and judgement, of the party trusted, before any other judgement whatsoever. Not is the judgement of the whole Kingdom any whit slighted thereby, no more than if in particular Sciences (as Divinity, Philosophy, Physic, Mathematique, etc.) the judgement of the professors of those Sciences should be preferred before the judgement of the whole body representative, for Vnicuique in sua arte credendum: Matters of State and secrets of government are not only unfit and dangerous to be publicly managed, by so numerous a body as our representative is, but the greater part are so little experienced or able to manage them as that in Edw. the thirds time, the House of Commons themselves (as the Observour (fol. 6. tell us) desired they might be spared from giving advice in those matters, the queuxals nont pas cognizance, of which they had not the Cognisans. The judgement of the body representative itself, did not at that time believe, but that aswell the judgement, as the care of the Ardua Regni, did chiefly belong to the King. To whom alone, the Law having committed the Sovereign Government, ordained him withal, a body of sworn privy Council to advise with therein, and a sworn Counsel at Law to advise Him of the Rights and Privileges, that belong unto Him as supreme Governor, and first of the three States of Parliament.  
If any of these sworn Counsellors shall Counsel the King against the known Law, or any by their counsel, act any thing against it: after legal proceeding and conviction, it will soon be out of question what shall become of them. But if without legal proof of particulars, such Counsellors shall by general vote of the Subject, be censured private whisperers and seducers of the King, and to be wholly removed from Him: then shall the King at once be dangerously deprived of the constant means which the Law hath especially ordained Him, for support of His Right against the other two opposed powers, and for the good discharge of His Kingly office. Besides if men shall so be condemned and made guilty, more by Sovereignty and uncontroulablenes of judgement ascribed to the condemners, then by clearness of evidence and legal proof of any fact than is the birthright of the Subject, in the highest concernment of Life and fortunes taken from Him, and He muststand and fall by the vote of the people, that (like a judgement infallible) shall supply the office of both witness, Peers, and judge.  
While I pursue the examination of those things which the Observour would have received for reason, I may not let slip the observing of his sly unfaithfulness and deceit, to pass over that point which most of all concerns the souls and bodies, lives and fortunes of the whole Kingdom, and all because his want of proof in that point, does (if noted) overthrow all that he contends for. For though he argues the lawfulness of Subjects taking up Arms and resisting the Authority and Commands of the King, under the warrant of a general rule to this effect, That in extreme peril and failance of ordinary means, any extraordinary means may be taken for the safety of the People: yet finding an impossibility of proving the State in such extreme danger (for indeed such a danger must be so visible to all men as not to need any proving) and finding it also not possible to prove a necessity of the Subjects arming himself for want of other means, when His Majesty, (in whom the natural ordinary means of protection is placed) readily offered, and yet offers, to perform that regal office of protecting; The Observour passes over the matter without proving either danger or want of other means, and presses only the lawfulness of self-defence in extreme danger, as if (if that were granted) all men might take up Arms whether there were danger or no, and whether there were other ordinary means of defence or no, and so securely do we pursue this error, as that we with it swallow any thing, and because that in ordinary providing for danger before it threaten; the ordinary courses of putting the Kingdom in a posture of defence by Commissions of Lieutenancy and of Array, are voted illegal; therefore we not only admit them to be so, but we admit also that the King (to whom it properly belongs to take order for the safety of the Kingdom) may not in extremity of danger, by any means that he can use, raise Arms, and put the Kingdom in a posture of defence, but the Subject (to whom it is Treason (by the Law) to raise Forces without authority from the King) he may (against the ordinary rule of Law) raise Arms in the very same form that is unlawful for the King to do, and all because of the extreme necessity and danger. Yet the very same necessity and danger shall not make it lawful to the Right and proper Authority of the King to do the very same thing. Oh, what shall we say, when at once, extreme necessity is pretended, all wont forms of defence (without showing a lawful form) are declared unlawful, and the course which Law abhors, and the Conscience of every Law-sworne Christian trembles at, is set on foot, without the warrant of the lawful Sovereign, when yet he is ready to supply that office in the Just and lawful way?  
I cannot also but note, that though levying of Arms and putting the Kingdom in a posture of defence is a right so clearly belonging to the King, as that we know His Majesty, & all His Predecessors have ever been possessed of it as a right and authority inseparably annexed to the Crown, which near any have lawfully exercised, but they. And though the representative body of the Kingdom, and (in them) every one of the body represented have, according to the positive law, sworn allegiance to the King and sworn to assist and defend etc. all Privileges, preeminences, and authorities belonging to his highness, His heirs and successors, or annexed to the Imperial Crown of the Realm etc. Yet is not the observer afraid to say that the Oath of Supremacy is not endangered by such taking of Arms. Nor is he afraid to say that next to renouncing of God, nothing under Heaven can be more perfidious than people's withdrawing themselves from their representations. As if Subjects, by giving authority to some of their fellows to represent them, & to advise, & consent for them, gave them a power so much above the condition of Subjects, yea so much above the condition of their Sovereign, as that neither breach of faith, nor Oath, nor any other duty unto him, were comparable to their withdrawing from the vote or act of their own representers: as if the right of the King, the Crown, & Kingdom; & the concurrence of the three Estates in Parliament, did not so concern the Commons of the Land but that, (against all) they stood solely bound in allegiance to their representers as to the only Sovereigns of their obedience. Of that it may please the two honourable Houses to take into a serious consideration; how repugnant these positions are to the loyalty of a true Christian: how hard it is for a pious conscience to persuade is self, that they that broach such Doctrines intent nothing but the defence of the King, of the laws of the Land, and of the true Protestant Religion: how much the name and Majesty of God himself is blasphemed, when in a Christian Kingdom that boasts itself of the knowledge and true profession of his word; such Doctrines so derogatory to Christianity should so audatiously be maintained: And lastly, how much it must needs reflect upon their own honour, in point of jealousy and distrust (as if some illaffected factious persons had too great an influence and power over their votes) when such impious assertions, so desperately misleading the souls and consciences of men, are so licentiously divulged without any condemnation check, or discountenances, from them though earnestly desired by His Majesty at their hands.  
I suppose there remains not in the observations any thing material, that is not already answered. As for the design of changing Religion into Popery, which the observer perhaps glances at in speaking of Popish Prelatical and Military Courtiers. If a Christian can in his conscience find any other ground for such belief then only the opinion of a judgement, that would be believed rather for authorities sake, then for any thing proved or discovered, he then may well listen to it. But if instead of presumptions that way, he finds presumptions of intended change to the contrary Corruption of Religion, a good Conscience will not be so Popishly affected, as for the infallibility of any judgement, to believe contrary to what his heart telleth him the most apparent presumption must incline him. For besides that it is easier to bring in a corruption in extremity contrary to an old exploded corruption, then to recover that, that hath been once exploded, (as Popery hath been and is.) We have His Majesties often solemn attestation of God, imprecating the prosperity of Him and His, if he do not maintain the true Protestant Religion established in the Church of England against all Popery. We have not the like on the other part, against Schismatical innovations. Yet our Schismatics are thrice as many as our Papists; and whereas our Papists are (God be thanked) disarmed, awed, and in fear, our Schismatics are bold, armed, and in authority, and therefore licentious, and tumulting in every place.  
God will require an account of our Oaths, and Protestations for defence of the true Protestant Religion, aswell against Schismatical corruptions, as against Popish. And an account of our solemn Oaths of Supremacy, and of observance of the Law, as well against popular insolences, and invasions of Sovereign power, as against regal Tyranny. Let us take heed, that when because of Oaths the Land already mourns; we through an universal breach of Oaths make it not for perjury mourn more greivously. Lest when with our solemn Oaths, we have brought the animadversion of our observance of Law, of right, and of Religion, before the presence of God, as judge and Revenger of it; and with out own hands kindled a fire for the trial of it: we ourselves be found guilty of a breach, or of halting in it. Let us weigh well the cause, the ground, the way, and the end of our taking Arms, that the horror of unjust and causeless bloodshedding may not lie upon us; let us see what it is that we would have, which we may not already have without it.  
May we not after some provision made for forbearance of such Ceremonies, as by the judgement of the Church shall be thought fit to be spared, have the authorized service of the Church established? And after purgation and regulation of some enormities in Church government, have the discipline of the Church of England in a good condition settled, with severe penal provision against connivers and Innovators in the one or in the other? Hath not His Majesty declared himself ready and willing to consent thereto? Again, to make sure the abolishing of all grievances already suppressed, and to regulate Arms, and some other extravagances in government not yet provided for, may we not have fit provisionary laws, with severe and penal damning of all practices to the contrary? Doth not His Majesty to that also freely offer His consent? what can be wanting to the settling of as sound and well a governed Church and State, as any Nation under Heaven hath ever lived in? For if by a severe Law the persons of them that shall attempt any thing prejudicial to the settled practice of Religion or to the declared liberty of the Subject be exposed to exemplary punishment, no fear of Innovation to the prejudice of either can remain. Nor can we fear His Majesty's tolerating of offenders when besides his imprecating in that case himself and His, he has (in case he so violates the Law) with His own mouth dispensed with His Subject's obedience. As for Our Parliaments, it can no way be in the power of the King to take away the least Right, much less the being of Parliaments; for whatsoever a King can do to the prejudice of Parliaments, and how soever averse He may be from them, yet always the necessity of State will at last enforce the calling of a Parliament, and when it is called, it is presently repossessed, and re-invested of all the Rights and Privileges that do belong unto it. For nothing but a Parliament itself, or so much of a Parliament, as in the people's opinion shall have the authority of a whole Parliament, can any way destroy the being of Parliaments, or deprive them of the least right or privilege belonging to them.  
To conclude therefore, if they that devised and broached the new State principles & doctrines published in the Book of Observations, have in them dealt truly and faithfully with the Subject. Then let the Author of those Doctrines rejoice in them that receive and maintain them; and let the maintainers of them rejoice in them that were the authors. But if they have dealt unfaithfully and deceitfully with the souls of the Subject to cause the blind (that cannot judge) to err, thereby to bring to pass their own designed innovations. Then let it please the just, and allseeing Supreme judge of judges in mercy to so many thousand souls in this our Jsraell, who in the darkness of these difficulties know not the right hand from the left, to send (as once he did at Jothams' instance) Iud 9.16. a fire from the malicious authors of them, to bring to confusion and shame the malignant maintainers and defenders of them; and a fire from them to bring to confusion the malicious authors. And let the Throne of our Sovereign Lord the King, (with us the only supreme Vicegerent of the great and Supreme judge) be in righteousness, in judgement, to true Religion, and in Peace for ever established over us.   

The Printer, to the Reader.  
THis Summary Answer (good Reader) having it seems lain long upon the way to Oxford, happened to come to the Press before Christmas last, where by reason of our full employment ever since, Is could not be dispatched till now.  
FINIS.