The Atheist's Objections, Against the IMMATERIAL NATURE of GOD, AND INCORPOREAL SUBSTANCES, Refuted.  
In Two SERMONS preached at the CATHEDRAL-CHURCH of St. Paul, April 4th. and May 2d. 1698.  
BEING THE Fourth and Fifth of the LECTURE for that Year, Founded by the Honourable Robert boil, Esq;  
By JOHN HARRIS, M. A. and Fellow of the ROYAL-SOCIETY.  
LONDON, Printed by J. L. for Richard Wilkin, at the King's-Head in St. Paul's Church-Yard, 1698.   
JOHN iv. 24. 
God is a Spirit—  
THE Occasion of these words was this: Our Blessed Lord, in his way into Galilee, passed through Sychar, a City of Samaria, near to which was the famous Well of the Patriarch Jacob. To this Well our Saviour went to refresh himself on his Journey; and as he always made it his business to be doing Good, took occasion from a Woman's coming to draw Water, to discourse with her about the Business of his Mission. By way of Introduction to which, He first gives her some Proofs of his being endowed with a Super-natural Knowledge From whence she justly concluding Him to be a Prophet, or a Person enriched with Divine and Extraordinary Gifts and Qualifications; she asked Him concerning one great Point that had been long in dispute between the Samaritans and the Jews,( i.e.) about the true Place for Religious Worship. The Jews rightly asserted Jerusalem to be the Place where Men ought to Worship. The Samaritans contended, that it ought to be with them, at Shiloh, in Mount Ephraim, where the Ark and Tabernacle were placed long before the building of the Temple at Jerusalem, and where also the patriarches, before the Law, did use to sacrifice to, and worship God. They pretended also to be the true Successors of Jacob, and of the Ancient patriarches, and consequently, that their Place of Worship had the greatest Support from Antiquity. This Pretence was an Umbrage to that Temple that they set up in Mount Gerizim( in the time of Darius) in opposition to that at Jerusalem, 
Joseph. Antiquit. l. 11. c. 8.  and which they supposed to give an Holiness to that Mountain, even after the Temple was destroyed. And the Samaritan Version of the Pentateuch hath plainly falsified the Text of Moses, in Deut. xxvii. 4. by substituting Mount Gerizim instead of Mount Ebal, in order to gain some Honour to this Celebrated Place. But notwithstanding all these mighty Pretensions, the Samaritans were perfectly in the wrong. The Ancient Pedigree that they boasted so much of, was wholly false and precarious. For they were, in reality, only the Successors of some Assyrians, who were planted in the Cities of Samaria by Salmaneser, when he carried the Tribe of Ephraim Captive into Assyria; as you may red at large, 2 King. xxvi. 24.  
This therefore being the true State of the Case between the Jews and the Samaritans; our Saviour's Answer to the Woman was, That the Jews were in the right, because they worshipped the True God, and that too in such a manner as was agreeable to that Revelation God had given them of his Will: We know what we worship— But the Samaritans were doubly mistaken, both as to the Object, and as to the Place of their Worship. They, He tells her, worshipped they knew not what. In which, it seems probable, that he may allude to what is said of their Ancestors the Assyrians in the Place before mentioned, 2 King. xvii. 26. ( viz.) That they worshipped the God of the Land. That is, They blindly paid their Devotion to the God of their New Country, without having any true and real Knowledge of him: But along with him, they worshipped their own Assyrian Deities too; such as Succoth-Benoth, Ashima-Nergal, and the like. Our Saviour tells this Woman also, That a Time of Reformation was now at hand, when the Worship of God should not be confined either to Jerusalem, or Mount Gerizim; and that a more pure and Spiritual manner of Worship should be established; one that was not embarrass'd with so vast a number of External Rites and Ceremonies, but one more suitable to the Nature of God, and to the Improved Sentiments of Mankind: for God, saith he, is a Spirit; and they that worship him, must worship him in Spirit and in Truth. This seems to be the Occasion and Connexion of these words: which having briefly shewed you, I proceed now to speak to the words themselves, God is a Spirit.  
By which Terms, God and Spirit, thus connected together, we understand an Infinite Being, most Wise and Powerful, containing in Himself all possible Perfection, without being subject to any of those Defects and Limitations which we plainly discover in Material Beings. And after this manner the Holy Scriptures do describe God Almighty to us; they attribute such Perfections and Qualifications to Him, as we can have no possible Idea of, as belonging to Matter.  
Body or Matter is a Sluggish, Insensible, Passive and Unintelligent Thing, not possibly able to move of itself, or to act or perform any thing by its own Power; but all the Motion and Activity that it hath, comes to it by Communication from something that is without it, or distinct from it. But all Power, both in Heaven and Earth, is the Lords: In his Hands are Power and Might: with Him is Wisdom and Strength, he hath Counsel and Understanding. He made all Things; He stretcheth forth the Heavens alone, and spreadeth abroad the Earth by himself. There is none like to Him, who created and maintaineth all things, and in whom all Things Live, and Move, and have their Being 
1 Chron. 29.11, 12. Job 12.9, &c. Isa. 44.24, &c. Acts 17.24, 25, &c. .  
The Form and Fashion of all Material Things, we see, is continually flitting and changing, and there is nothing among them of any constant and lasting duration. But God is Immutable and Eternal, the same Testerday, to Day, and for ever; He was, and is, and is to come, and with him is no variableness, neither shadow of Turning 
Rev. 4.8. Jam. 1.17. Deut. 33.27. .  
Material Beings are all limited and imperfect as to their Extent. The Place they are in confines and circumscribes them; Nothing else can be there with them, nor they themselves any where else. But the Heaven of Heavens cannot contain God, which yet he more than fills with his Presence: which Presence no one can flee or hid himself from: He is the searcher even of our hearts, and knoweth the most secret thoughts of Men. There is no Creature that is not manifest in his sight, but all things are Naked and open before him 
2 Chron. 6.18. Jer. 23.24. Jer. 17.10.& 20.12. . This and such like is the Account that the Sacred Scripture gives of God, which is plainly Inconsistent with his being Material or Corporeal: and therefore it calls him in the words of my Text a Spirit, a Divine, most Excellent and Perfect Being, that discovers himself to our Reason and Understanding, but cannot possibly do so to our Senses; for him no Eye hath seen nor can see; he is Invisible, he is a Spirit.  
But here the Atheist thinks he hath a sufficient Ground for insuperable Objections; Here his Philosophy is called in to his Assistance; and by the Strength of that, he will undertake to maintain, that there is not, nor cannot be any such thing as a Spirit,( i.e.) Any Incorporeal or Immaterial Being or Substance. And therefore since the Sacred Scripture and Divines do describe the Deity after this absurd and impossible manner, 'tis a good Argument( say they) that there is no such Being at all: For when Men pretend to Describe God after such a manner as is Nonsensical, Unintelligible and Impossible,( and yet say, that theirs is the only right way of Speaking of him): When Men attribute such a manner of Existence to him, as we know is contradictory to the Nature of Things; we have then just Ground to disbelieve all that they advance, in defence of so ridiculous and absurd a Notion, and consequently to conclude that there is no God at all. And hence we see these Men raise another Great Objection against the Being of a God, viz. That his Nature is so Described as to be Unintelligible and Nonsense. Which I shall now therefore endeavour to Refute.  
And in Order to show the groundlessness and Invalidity of this Objection, I shall in pursuance of my former Method: 

I. Give you the sense of the Modern and Ancient Atheists on this Point. And then,  
II. Endeavour to Refute what they Advance, and show how Unreasonable it is to build Atheism and Infidelity on so weak and invalid a Foundation. And,    
1. I shall give you the Modern and Ancient Atheists Sense on this Point.  
Mr. Hobbs, that lofty Pretender to Philosophy, declares that to say there is any Immaterial Substance, is not so much an Error, as it is Nonsense; 'tis using an Insignificant word, whereby we conceive nothing but the Sound 
Leviath. p. 19. . And in his Kingdom of Darkness, where he undertakes to correct the University Learning, he is very Angry with Aristotle's metaphysics, because it brought in, as he saith( tho' falsely, as I shall prove hereafter) the Doctrine or Notion of Separated Essences, and also of Immateriality and Incorporeity; for what is not Corporeal, he saith, is Nothing, and consequently no where. And this he undertakes to prove from a Passage which he seems to have borrowed from Ocellus Lucanus, tho' without naming him; and which, tho' it be a poor Sophism, and much worse than those he is condemning; yet he boldly lays it down as a Demonstration. The Universe, saith he, is Corporeal, that is to say Body, and hath the Dimensions of Magnitude, namely, length, breadth, and depth; also every Part of Body is Body; and consequently every Part of the Universe is Body, and that which is not Body is no Part of the Universe. And because the Universe is all, that which is no Part of the Universe is Nothing, and consequently no where 
Leviath. p. 371. 207. . In another place he saith, That no Man can conceive any thing but he must conceive it in some place, of some Determinate Magnitude, and as that which may be divided into Parts 
Leviath. p. 11. . And again, p. 17. and 207. he tells us, That an Incorporeal Substance is a Contradictory and Inconsistent Name; 'tis all one as if a Man should say, an Incorporeal Body; which words when they are joined together, do destroy one another; and therefore Body and Substance are all one 
Leviath. p. 17. 207. . Elsewhere he tells us, That the proper Signification of the word Spirit in common speech, is either a subtle, fluid and invisible Body, or else a Ghost or other Idle Phantasm of our Imagination 
Leviath. p. 208. , and a little after he asserts, that to Men that understand the meaning of the words Substance and Incorporeal, they imply a Contradiction; and that to say an Angel or Spirit is an Incorporeal Substance, is to say in effect there is no Angel nor Spirit 
Leviath. p. 214. . And this Notion he defends in his Answer to Bishop Bramhall's Book written against his Leviathan; and perseveres in asserting that God himself is a Most Pure simplo and corporeal Spirit; and he defines a Spirit in General to be a thin, fluid, transparent and invisible Body 
Answer to Bishop Bramhall, p. 31, 36. . Thus also Spinoza, in his Opera Posthuma, p. 13. determines Extended Substance( that is Body) to be one of the Infinite Attributes of the Deity, and this he undertakes to demonstrate from hence; that there is not( as he saith) any Other Substance but God; and who consequently is a Corporeal, as well as a Cogitative Being. Deus est res extensa 
Ethices Pars 2. Prop. 2. p. 42. . This, you perceive, is the plain sense of these Writers, That there is no other Substance but Body; and consequently to talk of a Spirit or an Incorporeal Substance, is to them perfect Nonsense and Contradiction. But tho' this be their Opinion and Assertion, yet they did not Invent it, nor first find it out: they are as far from being Originals in this, as in other things; for herein they do but Copy the Sentiments of the Ancient Atheists, and tread exactly in their Steps. That there was nothing but Body in the World, was long ago the Assertion of such unthinking Men as our Modern Atheists are. Plato tells us, That there were some in his Time, who asserted nothing to be Substance but what they could feel, and which would resist their Touch: and these Men affirmed Body and Substance to be the same thing; and what they were not able to lay hold of, and to grasp with their Hands, they said was really nothing at all. And if any one happened to talk with them about any thing that was not Body, they would ridicule and despise him, and not hear a word more that he should say 
{αβγδ}.— {αβγδ}.— {αβγδ}. Sophist. p. 172. Ficin. .  
Aristotle acquaints us, That just such were the Atheistical Principles of his Contemporaries. They affirm( saith he) Matter or Body to be the only Substance, and that all other things are only Passions and Affections of it. And in another place, he saith, that these Men asserted all things to be one; That there is but one Nature only, which is the Matter of all Things, and this is Corporeal, and hath magnitude 
{αβγδ}.— {αβγδ}. Metaph. l. 1. c. 7. . And this was long before the Opinion also of Leucippus and Democritus.  
Epicurus argues against Plato, that there can be no Incorporeal Deity; not only because no Man can frame a conception of an Incorporeal Substance, but also because whatever is Incorporeal, must needs want Sense, and Prudence and Pleasure; all which things are included in the Notion of God: And therefore an Incorporeal Deity, saith he, is a Contradiction 
Dr. Cudw. Intel. Syst. p. 20. . And his Followers, as appears by Lucretius, continued in the same Opinion, that there is no other Substance in Nature but Body 
Praeterea nihil est quod possis dicere ab omni Corpore sejunctum, &c. Lib. 1. v. 431. ; and they had no Notion of any Incorporeal thing, but their Vacuum or Empty space, which was really nothing at all.  
Sextus Empiricus tells us, that all the Epicureans, and some of the stoics, as Basileides in particular, maintained {αβγδ}, that there was nothing Incorporeal or Immaterial 
Adv. Math. p. 267. . By these Testimonies we see plainly, that the Modern Atheists transcribe the Ancient Opinions exactly, and have been able to add very little to them. And the Notion that Mr. Hobbs seems so fond of, and which he would fain set up as his own Discovery, That a Spirit is nothing but a Thin fluid and transparent Body: seems to me to be plainly taken from the {αβγδ}, which Aristotle tells us, was the Definition that some then gave of a Spirit, or the Soul of Man.  
And thus having truly stated the Case, and shewed you what the Sentiments of the Ancient and Modern Atheists were and are, as to the Matter before us. I shall now proceed to Examine by what Reasons and Arguments they endeavour to support their Assertion, That there is no such thing as any Incorporeal Substance, but that whatever really is, is Body. And here I find their main and chief Argument to be This; that an Immaterial Substance is an Unconceivable Thing: 'tis what no Man can possibly have any notion or conception of; 'tis a perfect contradiction in Terms, and consequently Nonsense and Impossible. This is every where almost the Language of Mr. Hobbs, as I have before observed. He also pretends to discover the {αβγδ}, the true Cause of this Fiction about Immaterial Substances. The Notion, he tells us, took its rise from the Abuse of abstracted Words, and such-like Metaphysical and Scholastical Terms, which some have fancied as real Entities separated and distinct from the Subject, or Matter, of which they are Attributes or Qualities only. Thus for Instance, because we can consider Thinking or a Reasoning Power alone by itself, and distinct from Body; therefore some have been so foolish as to conclude that it is not the Action or Accident of that Body in which it is, but a real Substance by itself. And 'tis upon this Account, that 
Leviath. p. 373.  when a Man is dead and butted, they will say, his Soul( that is, his Life) can walk separated from the Body, and is seen by Night among the Graves, whereas Life is only a Name of Nothing, 
p. 372.  and the Soul or Mind of Man is in reality Nothing else but the result of Motion in the Organical Parts of his Body 
Leviath. p. 190.& De Cive C 15.§. 14. And in another place, he saith, Mens nihil aliud est praeterquam motus in quibusdam partibus corporis Organici. . 'tis like the forms and qualities of Other things, depending purely on the Mechanism, Modification, and Motion of the Parts of Matter, according as it happens to be variously disposed, figured and agitated; and consequently it can be nothing at all distinct from that Body whose Form or Quality it is. And this Soul or Mind, or any other Faculty or Quality in Man, coming once to be conceived as a thing distinct from the Body, and being Invisible and Insensible, hath been called by such Names as we use to give to fine subtle and aereal Bodies. Such as {αβγδ}, Spiritus, and the like: which do properly signify the Wind, or, which is near akin to it, the Breath of Man 
Leviath. p. 207, 208. . And so Mr. Hobbs tells us, that in order to express our greater honour of God, the name of Spirit hath been given to him likewise, as better expressing to vulgar Apprehensions his fine aereal and subtle Nature, than the grosser word of Body. But however, Philosophers and Men of sense must take care, and not be imposed upon by insignificant words, so far as to imagine there can in reality be any such thing as an Incorporeal Substance: for that is, when thoroughly considered, an absolute Contradiction and Nonsense. 'tis nothing but an empty Name, with which some poor Wretches are frighted, as the Birds are from the Corn by an empty Doublet, a Hat and a Crooked Stick 
Leviath. p. 373. ; as he is pleased to express himself. And this is the sum of what this mighty Philosopher advances against Immaterial Substances. Spinoza is the only Man besides, which I have met with, that aims at disproving the Existence of Incorporeal Beings: Which in his Opera posthuma he pretends demonstratively to do. But his chief and indeed only Argument is this( as I hinted before) that there is but one only Substance in the World, and That is God. Matter or Body he asserts to be one of the Attributes of this Substance, or the Mode by which God is considered as Res extensa; from whence he concludes, that there can be no Substance but what is corporeal, because Body is an Essential Property of his one only Substance, the Divine Nature. The Precariousness of which Obscure and Metaphysical way of Arguing, I shall plainly show below.  
And, Thus having given you the sum, of what these Writers advance against the Doctrine of Incorporeal Substances, I shall next proceed to Refute it, and to show you how weak and inconclusive their Arguments and Objections are. In order to which, I say, In the First place,  
1. That 'tis a very precarious and groundless way of arguing, to deny the Existence of any thing only from our particular Apprehensions and Conceptions not being able to master it. For it will not in the least follow, that there can be no such thing as an Incorporeal Substance or a Spirit, because some few Men pretend that they cannot conceive how any such thing can possibly be. And I have already shewed, 
See my Second Sermon.  that we have very just reason to allow the truth of, and to be satisfied of the Existence of many things, whose Nature neither we, nor perhaps any one else, can fully Understand and Comprehend. These Gentlemen pretend that they cannot conceive or have any Idea of an Incorporeal Substance. But yet they think, I suppose, that they have a clear idea and Conception of Body. Tho' should you put them to describe it, they would be very much at a loss. For as one hath well observed,( Mr. Lock in his Essay of human Understanding, Book 2. c. 23.) if we carefully examine our Idea of Substance, we shall find that it is a kind of complex one, consisting as it were of several ideas coexisting together: which because we are apt to conceive as one thing, we give it the General Name of Substance: as imagining that word to express something, tho' in reality we know not what, which is the support of these Accidents or Qualities which occasion the ideas we have in our Minds of it. Let us therefore take any corporeal Substance, as suppose Gold; and inquire in our Mind what is that Support, Substratum or Substance, in which the Accidents of Yellowness, great specific Weight, and strange Ductility under the Hammer do inhere; all which concur to give us that complex Idea which we have of Gold; Shall we not find our selves put to it how to conceive, or to have a clear Idea of this? If we should say that the subject of these Properties are the solid extended Parts; we shall not be much the nearer Satisfaction: for our Mind will be inquisitive again what is the Support or Subject of that Extension and Impenetrability. We may say, indeed, that 'tis the Substance itself: which is a word that we use, and implies something or other that is the Support of these Properties, but what that is, we have, I think, no clear and certain Idea. When yet we have clear and distinct Conceptions enough of these Properties which we find in this Body, and from whence we pronounce it to be Gold. So if on the other hand we take any Incorporeal Substance, as suppose the Mind or Soul of Man; and inquire what is the true Support of that Self-moving Power, that Reasoning and Cogitative Faculty, and that Liberty or Freedom of Action which we plainly perceive to be inherent in it: we shall indeed be at a loss, but yet no more than we were before in reference to Gold. For as from considering the Properties peculiar to that Body, we were satisfied that they must be inherent in something, tho' how or in what, we have no clear Idea; so when we consider Life, Cogitation and Spontaneous Motion in our Soul, we know very well that those more real Properties must have something also for their Support, or some Substance to inhere in: tho' what that is, and the peculiar manner of this we are wholly ignorant of. But then we have as just reason to believe that this Substance is real, as that the Substance of Gold is so. For Cogitation, Life, and Spontaneous Action, are Properties undoubtedly of as real a Nature as great Intensive Weight, Yellowness and Ductility can possibly be. And as we cannot but conclude both these to be real Substances, so we cannot also but conceive them as Natures absolutely distinct and different from each other, and which can have no necessary dependence upon and relation to each other: for we can never imagine that Gold can be ever brought to think, reason or move itself spontaneously, any more than we can conceive a Soul or Mind to be yellow, heavy or ductile. That is, we have quiter different ideas of each of them, and which nothing but wilful or long habituated Ignorance can ever make us confounded together. And thus it appears to me that we may have as clear an Idea of Incorporeal Substance, as we have of Body; and that the former is no more unconceivable than the latter. And therefore 'tis as absurd to argue against the Existence of a Spirit, only from our not having any clear Idea of the Substance of a Spirit; as it would be to say there is no such thing as Body, because we don't know exactly what the Substance of Body is: which I dare say no Man can affirm that he doth. 'tis very possible that Men may be so blinded and prejudiced by false Principles, so stupefied by Ignorance, Idleness or 'vice, and so engaged and enslaved to a peculiar set of Notions, which advance and support that way of acting and proceeding which they take delight in, that a great many things may appear Unconceivable and Impossible to them, which shall be far from being so to others, whose Minds are free, and more enured to thinking. Should you tell a Man, who is a Stranger to Geometry and Astronomy, of the many admirable and surprising Truths that can certainly be demonstrated from the Principles of those Noble Sciences, he would boldly pronounce them Impossible; and all your Discourse and Proof( should you attempt any such thing) would to such a Person be Nonsense, and your words mere empty and insignificant Sounds. And there are many Persons in the World, on whom the clearest and strongest Method of Reasoning that ever was, will make no manner of impression at all, because their Minds are not at all enured to a close way of Arguing and Thinking. And truly the Atheistical Writers do discover so poor a Knowledge in Philosophy, and so very little acquaintance with true Reasoning and Science; that 'tis no wonder at all that they should not be able to conceive and comprehend a great many things which others are very well satisfied with. I know very well, saith the Ingenious Person before cited, 
Essay of Human Understanding, p. 143.  that People whose Thoughts are immersed in Matter, and who have so subjected their Minds to their Senses, that they seldom reflect on any thing beyond them, are apt to say they cannot comprehend a thinking thing; which perhaps is true, &c. And therefore such a Philosopher as Mr. Hobbs, that defines Knowledge to be Sense; and saith, that the Mind of Man is nothing but Motion in the Organical Parts of his Body, may easily be infatuated so far as to assert that there is no other Substance but Body, and that a Spirit or Incorporeal Being, is a Nonsensical, Contradictory and Impossible Notion. While Others, who can raise their Minds a little higher, and who can penetrate farther into things, will be fully satisfied that such Philosophy is Nonsense and Impossbility. As indeed some Persons, in all Ages of the World, of which we have any Account, have ever been. For,  
2. Which is another very good Ground, from whence to refute this absurd Opinion that there is no such thing as an Incorporeal Being: I say, there have been always many Persons in the World, that have firmly believed and embraced the Doctrine of Immaterial Substances, and who have also asserted the Deity to be of that Nature. And this will Undeniably refute the two great Points of Mr. Hobbs his Opinion. For, if it be proved plainly that there hath been all along a received Belief and Opinion that there are Immaterial Substances, and that God himself is such an One: it is then most clear and certain, that the Notion is neither inconceivable, contradictory, nor nonsense: and also that it did not take its Rise and Original only from the Abuse of the Philosophy of Aristotle. Not the former; for what is in its own Nature unconceivable, nonsensical and absurd, could never sure gain an Admittance into the Belief of so many great Men, as we shall see presently this Opinion did. Not the latter; for what was commonly received in the World before the time of Aristotle, could never be derived only from his and the Schoolmen's Philosophy, as Mr. Hobbs is pleased to say this Belief of Immaterial Substances was. And that there was always in the World, a Notion and Belief of another more noble Substance than Body, and that the Deity was of an Incorporeal or Spiritual Nature, we have the united Suffrages of all the Ancient Writers that are preserved down to our time.  
Cicero tells us, That the Heathen Philosophers generally defined God to be Mens pura& sincera, soluta& libera ab omni concretione mortali 
Lib. de Nat. Deorum,& Tuscul. Quaest. lib. 1. ; and speaking of Thales Milesius in particular, he saith of him, Aquam dixit esse Initium Rerum, Deum autem eum Mentem quae ex aquâ cuncta fingeret. Now this Mind they all distinguished plainly from Matter, and looked upon it as a much more Noble Principle than 'twas possible to conceive Matter to be. Lactantius acquaints of Pythagoras 
De Irâ Dei, c. 11. p. 742. Oxon. . Quòd unum deum confitetur, dicens Incorporalem esse mentem, quae per omnem Naturam diffusa& intenta, vitalem sensum cunctis Animalibus tribuat. And Plutarch gives us much the same Account of him in his Books, De Placitis Philosophorum, viz. That he made two Principles; 
Lib. 1. c. 3.  one Active, which was Mind or God: The other Passive, or the Matter of the World. And those Verses of Empedocles, are very remarkable; wherein speaking of the Deity, he asserts Him not to be of human shape; And also that, 
{αβγδ}  
{αβγδ}— ( i.e.) That he is no way perceivable by any of our Senses; which is as much as to say, he is Incorporeal. And in the next Lines he doth expressly tell us what he is: 
{αβγδ},  
{αβγδ}.  A sacred and ineffable Mind, which by swift Thoughts moves and actuates the whole World. Anaxagoras also asserted, That 
Plutarch de Placitis Philosoph. Lib. 1. c. 3. p. 876.  an ordering and regulating Mind was the first Principle of all things; and this Mind he made, as Aristotle saith of him, {αβγδ}. The only, pure, simplo, and unmixed thing in the World: thereby plainly distinguishing it from Matter, the Parts of which, he, who was as Sextus Empericus calls him {αβγδ} knew very well to be promiscuously blended and mixed togethere very where. Sextus also tells us, That That Mind which Anaxagoras asserted to be God; was {αβγδ}, an Active Principle; in opposition to Matter, which is a Passive one, 
sixth. Empir. adv. Mathem. p. 309.  and this is agreeable to what the Poets say of Spiritus intus alit; mens agitat molem, &c. We are  told likewise by Sextus, That Xenophanes held {αβγδ}, That there is but One God, and he Incorporeal. And Plutarch describing the Deity, hath these remarkable words, God is Mind, a separated Form perfectly unmixed with Matter, and without any thing that is passable, {αβγδ}. And in another place he asserts, {αβγδ}. That 'tis impossible Matter alone can be the sole Principle of all things 
De Placit. Philos. l. 1. c. 3. .  
Plato every where distinguisheth between corporeal, and incorporeal Substances, calling the former by the Names of {αβγδ} Sensible, and the latter always either {αβγδ} or {αβγδ}, immaterial or intelligible; and he saith, That certain intelligible and incorporeal Forms, are the true and first Substance; and that incorporeal Things which are the greatest and most excellent of all others, are discoverable by reason only, and nothing else 
{αβγδ}. In Polit. p. 547. Ficin. .  
And in another place, he saith, That they were instructed by their forefathers, that Mind and a certain wonderful Wisdom, did at first frame, and doth now govern all things. His words are {αβγδ}. In Phileb. p. 28. Which sufficiently shows the Antiquity of the Notion of an Incorporeal Deity, and the way also how they came by it. Of the same Opinion also was Socrates, as we are  told by Plutarch, and others. Lib. de Placit. Philos. 1. c. 3. Zeno and the stoics defined the Deity to be {αβγδ}, an Intellectual and Rational Nature; or as Plutarch recites their Opinion, {αβγδ}, an Intelligent Spirit devoid of all Bodily shape. Ibid. And Sextus Empericus tells us of Aristotle, that he constantly asserted God to be Incorporeal, and the Utmost Bounds of the Universe 
Adv. Math. p. 155. . And Aristotle concludes his Book of physics with affirming 
{αβγδ}. Nat. Auscult. l. 8. c. 15.  that 'tis impossible the first Mover( or God) can have any Magnitude; but he must needs be devoid of Parts, and Indivisible. And Plutarch gives us this as the received and common Opinion of the stoics, that God was {αβγδ}, a Spirit that was extended, or did penetrate throughout the whole World. De Placitis Philosoph. lib. 1. c. 3. p. 882.  
Now by these Passages, and many others that might easily be produced, it appears very plain that the most Ancient Writers had a good clear Notion of God, and that they speak of him as of a Mind perfectly distinct from Matter, or as an immaterial or incorporeal Being. Many of them also deliver themselves very expressly as to the Soul of Man; which, as Plutarch tells us 
{αβγδ} c. 2. p. 898. , they generally asserted to be Incorporeal; and that it was naturally a Self-moving and Intelligible Substance. But of this, more in another place. And that the Ancients did believe God to be a Spirit, or a most Powerful, Intelligent, and Perfect Immaterial Substance will yet farther appear, if we consider what Notion they had of, and how they defined Matter or Body. Plato describes it by the words {αβγδ}, that which thrusts against other Bodies, and resists their Touch or Impulse. Others call it {αβγδ}, that which so fills up a place, as, at that time, to exclude from it any other Body. Sometimes they called it the {αβγδ}, in contradistinction to the {αβγδ}, or the {αβγδ}. That is, they distinguished it to be of a pure passive Nature, and which was acted and determined only by Impulse from without it, or distinct from it; they knew very well that there was also besides it, some Active Thing, something that was the Cause of Motion and Action in the Universe. For, as Plutarch well observes, {αβγδ}. 
De Placitis Philos. Lib. 1. c. 3.  'tis impossible Matter alone can produce any thing, unless there be besides it some Active Cause. Sextus Empiricus also gives this Definition of Matter or Body 
{αβγδ}. Adv. Math. p. 32. . That it is that which resists other things which are brought against it; for Resistance, saith he, or Impenetrability, is the true Property of Body. By these Accounts that they have given us of Matter or Body, 'tis very easy to understand their Notion or Idea of it; which, indeed, was the Just and True one. They thought Matter or Body to be a purely Passive Thing, incapable of moving or acting by itself; but wholly determined either by some Internal and Self-moving Mind, or by the Motions and Impulses of other Bodies without it: That it was {αβγδ}, that is, as we now adays speak, Impenetrably extended, and did so fill up space or place, as to exclude any other Body from being in the same Place with it at the same Time: If to this you add what Aristotle, and some others, said of it, that it was also capable of all Forms, Figures and Modifications, you have then the whole that ever they thought Matter could do or be. Now from hence 'tis exceeding clear that they could not, as indeed we find actually they did not, think Matter or Body the only Substance in the World; and that the Deity was Material or Corporeal. For they always described the Divine Nature by Attributes and Properties that were the very Reverses of what they appropriated to Matter or Body. God, they have  told us, is an Intelligent Mind, pervading and encompassing all things; an Active Energetical Principle; the Cause of all Motion and Operation whatever; Intangible, indivisible, invisible, and no ways the Object of our Bodily Senses; But yet whose Essence is plainly discoverable by our reasoning and Understanding Faculty. This was, as we have seen, the Notion or Idea that many of the Ancient Philosophers had of the Deity; and this plainly shows us, that they looked upon him to be what St. John here defines him, an Incorporeal Being, or a Spirit. There were indeed some even then, as I have before shewed, who being wholly immersed in Matter themselves, did assert that there was nothing else but Body in the World. Such were Leucippus and Democritus; and afterwards Epicurus and his Sect, who perverted the Ancient Atomical and true Philosophy to an Atheistical Sense, and made use of it for the banishing the Notion and Belief of a God out of their own and others Minds: as, indeed, some others long before them had attempted to do 
{αβγδ}. Arist. Metaph. l. 1. c. 3. p. 842. Paris. . But in this, 'tis very plain( as 
Dr. Cudw. in his Intellectual Syst. of the Universe.  an Excellent Person of our Nation hath observed) that these Men did not understand the Philosophy they pretended to: For it doth most clearly follow from the Principles of the True Atomical or Corpuscular Philosophy, that there must be some other Substance, distinct from, and more Noble than Matter; and which is of an Immaterial, Incorporeal or Spiritual Nature. And this, I hope, it will not be judged impertinent briefly to prove at this Time; because some, who seem not so thoroughly to understand it, have of late reckoned the Mechanical Philosophy among the Causes of the growth of Atheism and Infidelity. It is very much to the Purpose, that the Ancient Atomists before Democritus and Leucippus, did plainly assert and maintain the Doctrine of Incorporeal Substances, and that the Deity was also of that Nature himself, as I think I have sufficiently proved in this Discourse; and therefore those confident Modern Writers, who say that the Ancients never had any Notion of an Immaterial Being, betray equally their Ignorance with their Assurance: for the Doctrine of Immaterial Substances was as well the Concomitant, as indeed it is the Necessary result of this kind of Philosophy. The Embracers of it, found plainly that they had a clear and distinct Idea of two Things, viz. Passive Matter, and Active Power; and these they found were perfectly distinct from each other, and no way dependant at all upon each other. To the former of these, they only attributed extension and impenetrability, and a Power of being variously figured, modified, disposed and moved. To the latter, they ascribed Cogitation, Life, Sensation, and the Power of Motion, which they plainly saw did belong to this, and could not do so to the other. And these Two, they made the Two Great Principles or General Heads of Being in the Universe, and called them by two vastly different Names, as I have before shewed, viz. the {αβγδ}, and the {αβγδ}. The one Passive Matter or Bulk, and the other Self-Activity, or Life. In the former of these, viz. Passive Matter; they found that there was nothing Real, besides its Bulk, or impenetrably extended Parts: and that consequently all Forms and Qualities in Bodies were no real Entities distinct from the Body in which they inhered, but only the Parts of the Body differently modified, disposed and agitated, and therefore they held, that when any Body received a new Form or Quality differing from what it had before, there was no new Entity produced, any more than an old one destroyed; for that they look't upon to be perfectly Impossible: And this was the true Ground of that Fundamental Axiom of theirs, That Nothing could be made or produced out of Nothing; which they did not( as the Modern Atheists do) advance at all in Opposition to a Creative and Almighty Power's producing all things at first from Nothing; but purely against the producibleness of real Entities out of Nothing, in an Usual and Natural way: which those that assert Forms and Qualities to be Substantial and Real Beings, must needs grant to be daily done. But it was this, and this only, that that Axiom was leveled against. And hence it was that they asserted the Deity and the Souls of Men to be real Entities distinct from Matter, and not to be producible out of the Power of Matter; as all Qualities which are nothing but Modes of it, they maintained, were: and this made them perhaps have recourse to the {αβγδ} and {αβγδ}, the Prae-existence and Transmigration of Souls; for they could never believe their Souls were, as one expresses it, younger than their Bodies, and that they perished, when the Bodies died. And therefore nothing can be plainer, than that the very Principles of this Philosophy did led Men to the acknowledgement of Incorporeal Substances, and forced them to believe Life, Motion, and Cogitation to be things that could not be Modifications of Matter, nor perishable and producible, as the common Qualities and Forms of Body or extended Bulk are. And thus when it is rightly considered and thoroughly understood, the Atomical or Mechanical Philosophy is so far from being any way instrumental to the leading Men into Atheism, that there is none other that doth so truly distinguish between Matter and Incorporeal Beings; none that renders the Operations and Qualities of Bodies so Intelligible, and none that prepares so clear, natural, and easy a way for the Demonstration of Immaterial Substances, as this kind of Philosophy doth. Indeed, as almost all things are, so This is capable of, and hath been made use of to ill Purposes by its Atheistical Votaries; who did anciently, as they do now, assert that Cogitation, Life, Sensation, and Active Power, were all producible out of bare Matter without a Deity. But as this was what the True Atomists never could think possible; so it is really involved with the most monstrous Absurdities that ever any Opinion was: and which therefore ought not to be charged on the Philosophy itself, but only on that Dark, Unintelligible and Inconsistent System of it, which the Ignorant Atheists have Compiled; and that only to render it subservient to their wicked Designs of excluding the ideas of God and of Incorporeal Substances out of the World. Tho'( God be thanked) they do in this Point so far fail of Success, that nothing can be clearer than that 'tis utterly impossible to account for any first Cause of things, for Cogitation, lice, Sensation, or Motion, according to their Principle, that there is no other Substance but Body: And this necessary leads me to another very good Argument, for the Necessity of allowing Incorporeal Substances, and to prove that God himself is of that Nature, or a Spirit, viz. The strange Absurdities of the contrary Opinion.  
But these being very many, and it being of great moment truly to clear up this Point, in an Age wherein Men are so fond of Corporealism. I shall defer this till my next Discourse: wherein I shall finish this and my remaining Arguments to Prove God to be a Spirit, and that there are Beings of an Immaterial and Incorporeal Nature.  
The End of the Fourth Sermon.   

THE Fifth Sermon.  JOHN iv. 24. 
God is a Spirit.—  
I Have already shown the Meaning and Import of these Words, and what we understand by God's being a Spirit. I have shown you also the Atheist's Objections against the Immaterial Nature of God, and the Existence of Incorporeal Substances; and have endeavoured to Refute them, from Two Arguments. I have proved,  
1. That 'tis a precarious and unfair way of Arguing against the Existence of any thing, only because our particular Apprehensions and Conceptions cannot master it: And that it will not follow, That there is no such thing as an Incorporeal Substance, on the Account only of some Mens declaring that they cannot conceive how any such thing can be. Where likewise I shewed, That the Notion of a Spirit, or an Immaterial Substance, is as Intelligible as that of Body; and that we have as much reason to believe the Existence of the former, as of the latter.  
2. I have plainly proved, That the Notion of Incorporeal Substances hath all along been believed and received by many Knowing and Judicious Men amongst the most Ancient Writers and Philosophers; and consequently that it can neither be nonsense and Impossible, nor of so late an Originial as the perverted Philosophy of Aristotle: both which the Atheists are pleased to assert.  
3. I proceed now to speak to a Third Argument, To prove the Deity to be of a Spiritual or Immaterial Nature, and that there are Incorporeal Substances: And this I shall draw from the many and strange Absurdities of the contrary Opinion, That there is nothing but Matter in the World. And if these can fully be made to appear, I hope the Doctrine involved with them will also appear false and precarious; and that the contrary Opinion, of the Real Existence of Incorporeal Beings, will find an easy admittance into our Faith. But here I must premise, as taken for granted, That we are all agreed on the Definition of, or know what we mean by Matter or Body, viz. That it is Substance Impenetrably extended; whereby we distinguish it from Spirit, which is a Thinking Substance without Corporeal Extension, or without having Partes extra Partes. For if this be not the Notion which our Adversaries have of it, as well as we; 'tis in vain to dispute about it at all. If therefore they have any other Idea of it that is different from this, let them produce it, and make it as clear and Intelligible as this is; for without doing so, they do nothing to the purpose. And if they have not a clear and distinct Idea of Matter or Body, how come they so boldly to say that Matter and Substance are all one? how can they distinguish the ideas of Body and Spirit so plainly, as to be sure there can be no such thing as an Incorporeal Substance, but that it implies a Contradiction? Unless they fully know what Matter or Body is, there may be Millions of Varieties and Degrees of Immaterial Substances; or there may be no such thing as Body at all, for any thing they can prove to the contrary. The Atheist must then do one of these two things; he must either establish a new Notion of Matter, that shall be so intelligible and plain, that all Mankind shall as readily acquiesce in it, as they do in the old and common one, or else he must resolve to keep to That. The former of these he hath not yet done, nor I believe is very ready to do; but when he doth it, 'twill be time enough to consider it. In the mean while, I will readily join Issue with him, on the common and received Notion of Body: And from thence undertake to maintain, That nothing is more absurd and unaccountable than their Assertion, That there is no other Substance but Matter or Body in the World. For,  
First, Had there been nothing else but Matter in the World from Eternity( and if there be nothing else now, there never was any thing else) I cannot possibly see how these Gentlemen can account for Motion, 
{αβγδ}, saith Anaxagoras. Vid. Diog. Laert.  or show us how Matter came first to be moved. And Matter without Motion sure could never be God, never be the Cause of any thing, nor could it ever produce, act, or do any thing whatever. Before Motion began, Matter could have been nothing but an heavy, lifeless Lump of vast extended Bulk; which must have lain also for ever in the same dead and unactive Position, if nothing had been superinduced to put it into Motion and Action. And no one sure can be so stupid as to call this a Deity! This is as Mr. blunt rudely and irreverently expresseth himself, worse than to suppose 
Oracles of Reason, p. 126, 127.  a Hum-Drum-Deity, chewing of his own Nature; a Droning God, that sits hoarding up of his Providence from his Creatures. And this even he can't but aclowledge, is an Atheism no less Irrational, than to deny the very Essence of a Divine Being. I hope therefore they will grant, that Matter without Motion cannot be supposed to be a Deity. And if so, then the Divine Nature( whatever it be) must be something distinct from, and more Noble than Matter, and more akin to Motion, than to Matter or Body in general, or to it quatenus Matter, as the Schools speak. And indeed, Motion taken in this sense, not for a translation of Body from one place to another, but for the Active Cause of Motion, may be very well said to be Incorporeal, or the Deity itself. But how came this Motion into Matter at first? and which way did Matter attain this Divine Activity, or God-like Energy? Here they must assert one of these three things, either, 1. That Motion came into Matter from something without it, and distinct from it. Or, 2. That Motion is Essential to Matter, and Co-eternal with it. Or, 3. That it came into it afterwards by Chance, or without any Cause at all. The First of these they will not say, I doubt, because it's Truth: but however, if they do, our controversy is at an end; for we believe that 'twas a Divine and powerful Mind, perfectly distinct from, and more Noble than Matter, who first made it, and moved it, and doth still continue to modify and dispose it according to his Infinite Wisdom and Providence.  
And one would think no Man can be so senseless as to maintain the last, viz. That Motion came into Matter without any Cause at all, and that it was Chance only that first produced it; for Chance here signifies nothing in reality: And truly, Men that will be so ridiculously absurd as to assert, that a Body, or Particle of Matter, that is once at rest, may move by Chance only, or may Chance to move of itself, though there be nothing to cause its Motion, deserve no serious Refutation, but ought to be treated only as we do Fools and Madmen, with silent Pity and Compassion. And yet so very fond are some Persons of any thing that opposes Truth, that they will run into the greatest Absurdities to maintain it. For a late Corporealist is pleased to say, 
observe. on Dr. Bentley's Serm. p. 6, 7.  That Matter can move of itself: and to show his deep Skill in Philosophy, he tells us, that Wind, Fire, and very fine-sifted small Dust, are Matter, and yet Self movers. And of Wind and Fire, he profoundly asserts, That they cannot lose their Motion, or cease Moving, so long as they continue to be Wind and Fire. That is, As long as Wind and Fire are in Motion, they cannot cease to move. This, indeed, is a very deep and important Discovery! But yet 'tis what hardly any Man would have published in Print, but one that concludes a Body must needs move of itself, only because he can't see with his Eyes the Cause or Origin of its Motion. And yet even this he may often see in the case of Fire, if he will but vouchsafe to observe how 'tis usually kindled. A little Consideration would have satisfied him also, that Winds may be produced in the Atmosphere, by the Air's being moved some way, by Heat, Compression, or some other Accidental Cause, as well as in an Eolipile, or a Pair of Bellows. And as for his fine Dust's rising up in a Cloud of itself; had he understood that the Agitation of any Fluid will keep the small Particles of any heavier Matter mixed with it from descending to the bottom of it, nay, and raise them up from thence too; and had he not forgotten that this was the case here,( the Air being so agitated by the Motion of Sifting) he would not, sure, have been so silly as to have brought these as Instances of Spontaneous Motion in Matter. But however, he is not the first that hath been guilty of this Absurdity. For Aristotle upbraids some, in his time, 
Metaph. l. 1. c. 3.  with introducing Motion into Matter, without any Cause, or without supposing any Principle whence it should proceed.  
The Second Point therefore, is, I suppose, that which our Corporealist will adhere to, viz. That Motion is Essential to, and Co-eternal with Matter; and that either all Matter and Motion taken together, or else some Fine and subtle Parts of it are the Deity. But this, if it be thoroughly considered, will appear almost as absurd and unaccountable as that Matter should be moved without any Cause at all. For, in the first place, 'tis plain, That Motion is not Essentially included in the Idea of Matter. I can conceive Matter to the full as well, if not better, when it is at rest, as when it is in Motion. When I look on any Body, or consider any determinate quantity of Matter, I can conceive that 'tis a Substance that is impenetrably extended, divisible, and movable; that it fills up such a space, and that it excludes any Body from being there with it at the same time, without conceiving it to be in Motion at all; much less being forced to aclowledge that it must be, and was always in Motion. Whereas certainly, if Motion were as Essential to Matter, as Impenetrability and Extension, 'twere as impossible for me to conceive it at rest, as it is to conceive it without those Qualifications or Properties: But no doubt I have as true an Idea of a ston or a Bullet, or of any other Body or Part of Matter, when it lies still on the Ground, as I have of it when 'tis projected from a Sling or a Gun. Now if Motion be not Essentially included in the Idea or Notion that we have of Matter, how can any one suppose it as Essential to, and Co-eternal with it? This is a Conclusion beyond the power of our Reason to make; no one can come to it naturally, and in the ordinary way of Apprehending and Reasoning; and 'tis much more Unintelligible and Mysterious than a great many other things which they pretend they cannot believe purely on this account.  
But supposing that Motion be Essential to Matter; it must then be so to every Particle of it, and that Uniformly alike, or in the same Proportion. And if so, then every Atom of Matter must always retain its Original Degree of Motion or Velocity, and can never possibly be deprived of it: For no Accidental Cause can any way either increase or diminish, promote or hinder the Essential Properties of a Being. Thus, for Instance, take a Particle of Matter, or any Body whatever, and move it as fast or as slow as you please, place it where or how you please, separate it from other Particles or Bodies, or combine it with them; still 'twill retain its Essential Properties of Extension and Impenetrability, and they will receive no intention and Remission all this while. But now 'tis quiter otherwise in the case of Motion; we find the same Body may be brought to move sometimes faster, sometimes slower, and sometimes( to all appearance) be reduced to absolute rest; which could never be, if Motion were Essential to each Particle of Matter, in such a Determinate Degree of Velocity, and there were( as is now supposed) Nothing else without or distinct from Matter to put it into Motion. For then nothing could ever accelerate or retard its Motion: no one Body could ever move faster or slower than another. But a Snail or the Pigritia would keep place with the seemingly Instantaneous irradiations of Light.  
And thus we may see plainly, that without supposing some Principle of Motion distinct from Matter, Motion could never have come into it, nor have been co-eternal with it.  
But allowing them that Motion should get into Matter neither they nor we know how, or that it is Eternal and Essential to it: If there be nothing else but Matter and Motion in the Universe, which way will they account for the Deity? they dare not say Matter alone without Motion can be God; and I think there can be nothing more clear, than that Bare Motion in Matter can never make a Deity. For if Motion came into Matter any time after its Existence, the Deity must then be produced, and consequently receive a Beginning; and so the First Cause of all things must be caused himself after all things, which is contradictory to the Notion of a Deity.  
If they say that Motion is Co-eternal with, and Essential to Matter, and the Deity be Matter thus Eternally moved; then either every Particle of Matter must be essentially God, or else he must be the result of the whole, or of some Parts of Matter combined together. If the former be asserted, there must of necessity be as many Gods as there are Atoms or Physical Monads: for each of them are Individually distinct from each other, and have their separate and peculiar Properties of Impenetrability, Extension and Motion; which in this fine Hypothesis, are the only Perfections of the Divine Nature. But no doubt they will say, that 'tis not any one Particle of Matter that is a God alone, and therefore they cannot be all Deities singly; But 'tis all of them, or at least a good convenient Number of these luckily combined together, out of whom the Deity is composed. Though which of these to stick to, our Corporealists are very much at a loss; Spinoza asserting the former, and Mr. Hobbs the latter. But I think 'tis no great matter which they adhere to; for both are alike unaccountable and absurd: For if there be not a Divine Nature, and its Perfections, in each single Atom of Matter; will barely combining some, or all of them, together make a Deity of them? Can it ever enter into the Heart of Man to conceive that barely collecting together a parcel of roving Particles of Matter, such as agitated Dust, or Motes moving up and down in the Sun, will ever unite them into a God? give the Combination Almighty Power, Wisdom, and Goodness? when there was nothing like this before in any of the Atoms themselves? Certainly, Men that can assert such monstrous Opinions as these, do not think as other People do; or, indeed, rather do not think at all. These certainly labour under the Disease mentioned by Epictetus, of {αβγδ}, 
Arrian. Lib. 1. c. 5.  a stony Insensibility or Deadness of Understanding, by which they are besotted and stupefied in their Intellectuals; so that they can believe and assert any thing, if it be subservient to their designs, tho' never so contradictory to the clearest light of Reason and Truth.  
But to go on: Granting to the Corporealists that Matter either hath been always in Motion, or for what time they please; allowing its Particles to be small or great, to move swiftly or slowly, and to be combined together, or disjoined from each other as they think fit. I inquire what all this will signify towards producing of Cogitation, Wisdom, and Understanding? or to the production of Life, Self Activity, or Spontaneous Power? And yet These are the most Great and Noble Things in the World; these are the highest Perfections of the Divine Nature, and in these we place the Essence of the Deity.  
Now here Matter and Motion is more than ever at a loss; and I think it demonstratively certain that it cannot account for these things. Aristotle did very truly find fault with the Corporealists of his Time, that they did not, as ours cannot now, assign {αβγδ}, 
Lib. 1. Metaph. c. 3.  any Cause of well and fit; any Origin of, or Reason for that Wisdom and Regularity, that harmonious Relation and Aptitude of one part of the Creation to another, which is so very conspicuous in all things; supposing that there is nothing in Nature but Matter and Motion. And it is most certainly true, that the Idea which we have of Body doth not necessary include Cogitation in it, nor our Notion of Cogitation include Body: but they are two as distinct ideas as any we have. So far are they from being the same thing, that we cannot possibly conceive Cogitation with Extension. No Man ever conceived a Thought to be so many Inches or Yards long; to be deep, thick or broad, to be divisible into two or more Parts, or to have any Kind of Figure or determinate Position or Extension; whereas if whatsoever be unextended, or not Body, be absolutely Nothing, as these Gentlemen assert: Cogitation, Wisdom, Understanding, and Spontaneous Power must be nothing: or else they must be figurate Bodies; than which nothing can be more absurd. And if we farther examine our own Mind, and consult our own Reason, we shall find that we cannot possibly conceive how thinking, Wisdom, Consciousness, and Spontaneous Power can possibly be the result of Bare Motion of the Parts of Matter. Was there ever any one that seriously believed a Particle of Matter was any Wiser or had any more Understanding for being moved than it was before when it lay still? for let it be never so briskly agitated, is it not still Body? there is no other Idea ariseth from hence, but only that it changeth its place, and is united successively to several parts of space, that it will move such other Particles of Matter as 'tis capable of, and be retarded in its Motion by hitting or striking against them; these, and such like, are all the Ideas that we can have of a Body in Motion; but what is this to Thought and Consciousness? Did ever any one but a stupid Corporealist imagine that a Particle of Matter by being moved, was made Intelligent? and that its traveling from place to place, made it understand all things in its way? and did any one ever think that the Knowledge of such a rambling Atom increased in Proportion to the velocity of its Motion? Yes, doubtless! and thus a Bullet discharged from the Mouth of a Cannon, ought to be looked upon as one of the most Ingenious Beings in Nature. And hence it will follow, that the more hast any one makes to tumble over Books, or to ramble over Countries; and the more precipitantly he makes a judgement of Notions or Opinions, the Better Account he can give of Authors and Places; and the more solid and substantial will be his Learning. This, indeed, is the best Account that can be given of the fineness and quickness of Thought, that some Men so much pretend to; for this way they may come by a vast share of Penetration, and be volatilized far above the dull studious and considerate Vulgar: and the Event shows that they frequently make use of the Experiment.  
But again; As we cannot possibly conceive that the Motion of one Particle of Matter alone, can give it Knowledge and Understanding; so neither can we suppose that a Body composed of many of them, can acquire any such thing barely on the Account of the Motion or Agitation of its Parts, for Motion only will do no more to the whole, than it did to each one singly; and 'tis not conceivable that Three, or Three Millions of Bullets will be any wiser for being discharged together, than if they were all shot singly in pursuit of Understanding. Nor can any happy Combination or Constitution of Parts avail any thing in this Case, any more than Motion; nor can that be essectual to super-induce Wisdom and Understanding into Matter. The {αβγδ} will be no more a God, than Jupiter's Log was among the Frogs, nor than the most dense and gross body in Nature. For after all the various Positions, Configurations, and Combinations of Matter, is it not Matter still? will rarefying or subtilizing of Matter change its Nature and Essential Properties? A Rare Body is nothing but a contexture of fine and subtle Particles, which being separated farther asunder than is usual, are also perhaps more briskly agitated and moved. And pray what is here new? what will this do towards Divinity? will bare Figure and Position of Parts change the Nature of those Parts, and give them Cogitation and Knowledge when they had no such thing singly and before? will adding, subtracting, multiplying or dividing of Numbers, make them any thing else more Noble than what they were before? will not the sums, Remainders, Products, or Quotients be still Figures and Numbers like the first Digits, out of which these do by Combination or various Positions arise? and is it not just so with Matter? will a Particle of it be made any more Wise and Intelligent, for being rendered smaller than it was before? and hath a little Particle more Sense than a larger? will Three or Four, or Four Millions of these be more ingenious than a Body or Lump that is as big as them all? and will moving a few Atoms a good distance from each other, Separate them into Knowledge, and Disjoin them into an Understanding Power which none of them had before? If Men can swallow such things as these, and think at this Extravagant and Unaccountable Rate; I fear all good Arguments and sound Reason will be lost upon them, and they ought to be neglected as downright Stupid or Distracted. And yet these, and such like Absurdities, must be the Natural Consequences of supposing Matter and Motion alone capable of thinking, that Matter can be rarefied into a Deity, and that Divine and Almighty Wisdom, Knowledge, Goodness and Power, are the result of Body luckily disposed and moved; which yet was the Opinion of Hobbs, and is still of many of his Admirers and Followers. For notwithstanding those Excellent Demonstrations that many Learned Men 
Dr. Cudworth, Dr. Bentley, and others.  amongst us have established, that Matter and Motion cannot possibly produce Cogitation, Consciousness, Understanding and Liberty of Will: There is lately an Ignorant Corporealist who asserts, 
Observations on Dr. Bentley's Sermon, p. 10.  That the Inflamed and glowing Particles of the Blood, called Spirits, tho' they are not in themselves Sentient and Intelligent, are yet the active Principle of Life and Motion, of Sense and Understanding in Man and Beast; and do act the Understanding or Brain to apprehended, judge and remember. Now by this 'tis plain that he supposes Cogitation, Understanding, Consciousness and Liberty, and all the Faculties of the Soul of Man to be nothing but the result of some peculiar Motions in a Fitly organized Body. The Animal Spirits he thinks are like the Elastick Particles in the Spring of a Watch, tho' they cannot tell what a Clock it is themselves, yet they can by means of the Spring which they actuate, do that and many other things that the Movement shall be fitted for: Or to make use of a Comparison of his own; The Animal Spirits may do as the Wind doth in the Chest of an Organ, tho' it can make no music of itself, yet by being communicated so as to inspire the several Pipes, it may actuate them into a very fine Harmony.  
It is not my Business nor Design to discourse here of the Soul of Man: but yet I would fain beg these Corporealists clearly to explain, how Self-Consciousness, Reflection, and Liberty of Action can possibly be accounted for by this Hypothesis. For this necessary makes Men mere Machines at long run. An Engine is never the more free and conscious to its self of its own Operations for being fine and curiously contrived: And the wonderful Clock at Strasburgh knows no more what it doth, nor is it any more the Spontaneous Cause of its so many and curious Motions, than the Ancient Clepsydra, or a modern Hour-glass knoweth what it is about, when it rudely measureth the Duration of any Part of Time. For whatever is performed by mere Matter and Motion must needs be necessary in every step and degree of its course, be the way of acting in the Engine never so curious, and never so remote from the cognisance of our Senses. They know well enough, as I shall show below, that there is no possible room for freedom of Action, Consciousness of any Operation, nor for a Cogitative and Reasoning Power, according to this way of explicating the Operations of the human Soul. For in the Animal Spirits they grant there is no such thing; they are only a fiery and briskly agitated Fluid, which serves to actuate any Part. of the Rational Machine pro re natâ: And these several Parts or Organs of the Machine can no more produce any such thing without the Animal Spirits, than the Hand or Dial-Plate of a Watch can, or any other Part of a curious Instrument. If therefore you inquire of them, wherein they place this Cogitation, Self-Consciousness and Liberty; they will tell you 'tis in the Man, 'tis in the whole; 'tis neither his Soul alone, nor his Body alone; 'tis no Spiritual Substance distinct from Matter, but 'tis the whole Man that thinks, reasons, and acts freely by the form of the whole: But this is very unaccountable, and is what neither they nor any one else, I believe, can ever apprehended or conceive; that Liberty should be the result of necessary moved Matter; that Cogitation should arise from Senseless and Unthinking Atoms, and that Knowledge and Consciousness of its own Operations should come into any Engine by its being finely and curiously contrived, and be nothing but the necessary result of bare local Motion, and rightly Organized Matter.  
These Absurdities some other Corporealists clearly perceiving, and being fully convinced that 'tis impossible to account for Cogitation, Consciousness, and the like, from bare Matter and Motion; and to educe the Perfections of the Deity out of the Power of Matter only. These, I say, had recourse to another way of maintaining their beloved Assertion, that there is no other Substance but Body. They assert, that Cogitation is Essential to Matter: or, as Spinoza words it, All Substance is essentially Cogitative and Extended; so that as there is no Substance but what is Material, so there is none but what is Cogitative too. Indeed, as I shewed you before, he asserts that there is but One only Substance, which is God, or in other words, Universal Matter; and Cogitation and Extension( he saith) are the two Infinite Attributes, or else the Affections of the Attributes of the Deity 
Op. Posthum. p. 12.& 14. . And this, with a great deal of Assurance( as the way of these Writers is) he pretends to demonstrate Mathematically, by a Pompous, tho' a very Obscure, Apparatus of Definitions, Axioms, Postulates and Propositions. But it is not calling a thing a Demonstration, that will make it to be so; nor concluding with Quod erat Demonstrandum, that will make every body acquiesce in a Proposition, when it is either perfectly unintelligible or false. And yet such are those that Spinoza brings to prove and support this strange Opinion. The Monstrous Absurdities of which, I shall now consider.  
And First, 'tis plain, That if Cogitation be as Essential to Matter as Extension; Then all and every Particle of it must needs be a Thinking Substance or Body by itself, Distinct from all Other Particles of Matter in the World. There is no one doubts but 'tis so, in reference to the proper and allowed Affections of Body, Impenetrability and Extension. Every least Particle or Atom of Matter hath these Properties as complete within itself, as they are in the whole Bulk of the Universe, or in any larger Body whatsoever: These are also individually distinct in each Particle; so that its Properties, though of the same kind, are not the very same with those of other Parts of Matter. Now if to each such Particle of Matter Cogitation be also added; then every Atom in the Universe will be a Thinking, Intelligent and Reasoning Being, distinct from all the rest, and have its own proper and peculiar Faculties and Operations; 'twill be a different Person from all Others; and every Individual Particle of Matter will be so from it, and from every one else in the World. Every Atom also will be equal to any of the rest, in respect of this Cogitative Power; will have it in the very same Proportion, and not be wiser or more foolish, duller or more ingenious than its neighbours. And if this be so( as it must necessary be, if all Matter be Essentially Cogitative) then there must either be no God at all, or else every Particle of Matter must be a distinct God by itself; and so the most ridiculous Polytheism that ever was imagined, must be introduced and allowed of. For if there be any such things as Perfect Knowledge, Power, Wisdom and Goodness, every one of these Particles must have it: For 'tis impossible Infinite or Perfect Power, Wisdom, Knowledge and Goodness, can be produced out of finite; the lesser can never produce the greater, nor any thing make or give that which it hath not within itself: And therefore it plainly follows, that either there is no Deity at all, or else that every Particle of Matter must be a God by itself, according to this Hypothesis. For finite or imperfect Cogitation can no more be the Cause of Infinite, than Cogitation can arise from incogitative Matter. And this Spinoza saw very well; and therefore he asserts all Cogitation, as well as all Substance, to be Infinite 
Op. Post. p. 21. 6.4, 5. . Indeed, to avoid this abominable Absurdity of each Particle of Matter's being God by itself; he saith, that there is but one only Substance in Nature, and that this is God 
Ib. p. 12.  But this will not help him out, nor do him much service in defending him from the horrid Absurdities of this Notion. For if by Substance, he mean only Substance in general, or the Idea that we have of some Substratum, Support or Subject of Inhesion in which we conceive the Properties and Accidents of Real Beings to inhere; as by his Definition of Substance he seems to imply; 'tis plain, this is only a Metaphysical Notion, only a general Word or Term that serves to denote our conception of something in a Being that doth not depend upon the Properties of it, nor inhere in them, but they upon and in it. But we can have no Notion of Substance existing without any Properties, any more than of Properties without it. If therefore he mean that God is such a Substance as this, that God is the Term or Idea of Substance in general, he makes the Deity nothing at all but a mere Name, a mere Ens Rationis, or Creature of the Brain only; than which nothing can be more ridiculous and foolish. For 'tis the Attributes or Properties of the Deity that we chiefly contend for, and which we are chiefly obliged to aclowledge and Reverence; and 'tis These that we assert must be inherent in an Infinite and Immaterial Substance, or Spirit. But if by there being but one only Substance, which he saith is God, Spinoza means, that the Deity is the whole Mass of Beings or of Matter in the Universe, as by what he delivers in many places, I do really believe that he did; for he asserts, that all Corporeal Substance is Infinite and One 
Ib. p. 14. ; and that Extension and Cogitation are the Attributes, or the Affections of the Attributes of God, as I hinted before. I say, if this be his Opinion, there cannot possibly be a more unaccountable, absurd and impossible Notion of God advanced. And 'tis also absolutely inconsistent and contradictions with what he doth at other times assert. For if Substance, Matter, and God, signify all the same thing, and all Matter be Essentially Cogitative, as such; Then 'tis plain, as I have shewed already, that God cannot be the whole Matter of the Universe, but each Particle of Matter will be a God by itself. For if there be any such thing as Infinite Perfection, it must be Essentially in every Particle of Matter; otherwise Infinite Perfection may arise out of what is only Finite, which is impossible. And if every Particle of Matter have this Infinite Perfection, the whole Mass of these, Collectively considered, will be by no means One God, or One Being, Infinitely Perfect, but a Swarm of Innumerable Deities, every one of which will be Personally distinct from each other, and yet contain all possible Perfection in itself. But allowing him all the Collective Mass of Beings, or the Universe to be God; What a strange kind of a Deity would this make? The Divine Nature must then necessary be Divisible, part of it here, and part there; part of it in Motion, and part of it at Rest; part of it Hot, and part could; part Fire, and part Water; and, in a word, subject to all manner of Imperfections, Vicissitudes, Changes, Contrarieties and Alterations that can be imagined. But this the common Sense of all Mankind will abhor and detest to be spoken of the Deity: and besides, 'tis contrary to what Spinoza asserts in other places, where he saith Substance is Indivisible 
Ib. p. 11. . But how there can be but One Only Substance, and that the Matter of the Universe; and how this Substance can be Indivisible, when yet each Particle of Matter must be a distinct Substance by itself, and is divisible, and divided from all others, as our Reason and our Senses do every day inform us, is a flight of metaphysics above my Understanding, and can, I believe, never be conceived by any one that understands the meaning of the Words or Terms such an Opinion shall be delivered in. But he indeed that doth not, and that will admire lofty and insignificant Sounds, without Sense, or he that hath some wicked and base Design to cover under such Cant, may conceive any thing, or at least say that he doth so.  
The Operations and Actions also of a Corporeal Deity( were it possible there should be such an one) must be all absolutely Necessary, and determined by pure Physical and Mechanical Fatality. For he would be really and truly Natura Naturata, only the bare Result of Motion in Matter, as 'tis variously formed, figured, moved and disposed so as to produce any Natural Effect. And this, I doubt not but some of these Corporealists very well understand; and that is the reason that makes them so very fond of the Notion of a Corporeal Deity, and of asserting, That there is nothing in the World but Body: For then they know very well, that there can be nothing but {αβγδ} in Nature, such a Physical Necessity as will perfectly exclude all Freedom and Liberty of Will amongst Men, and consequently destroy all Notions of, and Distinctions between Good and Evil. They don't care to say plainly there is no God, that looks a little too bare-faced: for Atheism is a Name they don't love to take. But they will readily and studiously endeavour to advance such an Account and Notion of a Deity as shall do as well; such an one as they know is in effect the same as to say there is no God at all. And this the representing him as Corporeal, will effectually do; for this subjects Him to a Physical Necessity, makes Him nothing at all but Nature, and deprives both Him and us of the Noble Principle of Freedom of Will: and then they know that there can be no such things as Rewards and Punishments proportionate to Mens Actions; but that all things are alike, without any distinction of Good and Evil, and consequently that they may do any thing that they have a mind to. And this appears to be the Issue that they would willingly bring all things to; For if this were not the case, what Reason can be given why Men should be such zealous Sticklers for a Corporeal Deity? Why should they still, in spite of Sense, Reason and Philosophy, maintain, That there can be no such thing as an Incorporeal or Immaterial Substance? Is it purely out of a devout and holy Desire to understand the Divine Nature more clearly, in order to speak of him more properly, to adore him more religiously, and obey him more hearty? I fear, not: For if Matter and Motion can Think, and( as they say) the Properties or Attributes of God can be accountable that way, and there be really and truly a Wise, Powerful, Just and Good God, though Corporeal; why should not these Gentlemen look upon themselves obliged to obey such a God, as well as a Spiritual one? Why do they quarrel with, and cast off his Holy Word, and reject and despise his Revealed Will? Is not a Corporeal Deity( according to their Notion) truly a Being endowed with all possible Perfections. Is not He the First Cause, Maker and Preserver of all Things? and consequently is not He as fit and worthy to be worshipped as well as a Spiritual One? and cannot such a Deity acquaint his Creatures how he will be worshipped and served? cannot He Reward them for so doing, and Punish them for offending against Him, equally as if He were Incorporeal? If he cannot, indeed, then there is something more than bare Speculation in the case, and there must be some substantial Reason why Deists and Antiscripturists are always Corporealists. And this is the truth of the Matter; the God of the Corporealists is not the True Deity, whatever they may pretend, but a blind, stupid, senseless Idol, that hath nothing but the Name of God wickedly applied to it. 'tis only Nature or a plastic Power in Nature, the whole mass of, or some fine, subtle and active Parts of Matter in rapid Motion, without any Understanding, 
Quando attribuimus Deo sensus, Scientiam& Intellectum, quae in nobis nihil aliud sunt quàm suscitatus à rebus externis organa prementibus animi Tumultus, non est putandum aliquid tale accidere Deo. Hobbs de Civ. c. xv.§. 14. p. 271. The same thing he saith also, Leviath. c. 31. p. 190.  Wisdom, or Design, without liberty of Will or freedom of Action; but Physically and Mechanically Necessary in all its Operations. Their God is {αβγδ}, and {αβγδ}, as Herodotus speaks, he is the Servant of Necessity, and cannot possibly himself avoid the destined fate. And to be sure, if God be not a free Agent, Nothing else can: for all things flowing from him by an inevitable Necessity 
Omnia Inevitabili necessitate ex Dei Naturâ sequi statuo. Op. Post. p. 453. Vid. etiam, p. 24.18.26, &c. , or being Parts of Him, as Spinoza asserts, they must be under the same Necessity with the Deity, and he saith plainly, That every thing that is determined to Operate, is so determined necessary by God, and could not act at all if God did not thus necessary determine it 
Op. Post. p. 24. . That the Will of Man cannot be called free, but is only a necessary Cause 
P. 28. . And in another place 
P. 36.  he tells us plainly, that there are no such things as final Causes in Nature, they being only the Ignorant Figments of Mankind; but that all things are Governed by Absolute Necessity. A while after this, 
P. 37.  he asserts Man to be a mere Machine, and saith, that 'tis only those who are Ignorant of Causes that say he was thus finely formed by any Art or Design; or who attribute his Composition to any Supernatural Wisdom. And then at last he comes to the great Point on which all this Philosophy turns; which is, That Good and Evil are not by Nature; but that the Notions of them came only from Mens mistaken Opinion, that all things were made for them; and who therefore call that Good which is agreeable to their Fancy, and that Evil which is contrary to it. By which short Connexion of their Opinions, 'tis clear enough why Spinoza was a Corporealist, as also why Mr. Hobbs advanced the same Notions. And I doubt those that Espouse the same Opinions now adays, know too well the Consequences of them.  
But of the Precariousness of these Notions, I must say no more now; designing particularly to confute them hereafter, as they are made Objections against the Truth, and Obligation of Religion in general.  
FINIS.   

ADVERTISEMENT.  
REmarks on some late Papers relating to the Universal Deluge, and to the Natural History of the Earth; By John Harris, M. A. and Fellow of the Royal-Society. In Octavo.  
Discourses on several Practical Subjects; By the late Reverend William pain, D. D. with a Preface giving some Account of his Life, Writings, and Death.  
Both Printed for Richard Wilkin.