A Peaceable Resolution OF CONSCIENCE Touching our present Impositions.  
WHEREIN LOYALTY& OBEDIENCE ARE PROPOSED, And settled upon their true Foundation in SCRIPTURE, REASON, and the Constitution of this KINGDOM, against all Resistance of the present Powers: And for compliance with the Laws, so far as may be in order to Union.  
With a draft, or Specimen of a BILL for ACCOMMODATION.  Ipse autem Rex non debet esse sub homine, said sub Deo,& Lege, quia Lex facit Regem. Attribuat igitur Rex Legi, quod Lex attribuit ei, videlicet dominationem& potestatem. Non enim est Rex ubi dominatur voluntas, non Lex. Bract. l. 1. c. 8. 
LONDON, Printed for Robert Clavel at the Peacock in St. Pauls Church Yard, Thomas Simmons at the Princes Arms, and Jacob samson next the Wonder Tavern in Ludgate-street, 1680.   

THE Epistle to the READER  
READER,  
THat those who soberly fear God throughout the Nation may know their present interest in England, whatsoever hath been the effects of some unadvised minds but lately among the Scots, I take this for a fit season to sand abroad these Sheets, while most people seem to me to become more feverish in their Allegiance to the Higher Powers, then is allowed to them in the thirteenth to the Romans, and this Dissertation upon it. They were in the substance( excepting the Conclusion) prepared many years ago, and seen by many, such as Bishop Wilkins, Judge Hales, and other the like judicious persons; and there has been several Papers since these lay by, published and presented to the late long Parliament for removal of these injunctions, unto which( seeing such attempts as yet have prevailed nothing,) this Discourse comes out with the best assistance it is able, for submission. That is, so far it must be supposed only, as every man can with a safe Conscience. Those kind of Papers therefore, and this Book are indeed no enemies. The Imposition of these Laws is one thing, and the Submission to them is another. He that writes against them, and he that writes for them upon these two accounts, does but carry on the same Work. The one may propose our Difficulties as a reason for a Relaxation: the other may bring the Solution when that cannot be obtained. If any Parliament be got to release the Burden, or the Concerned be satisfied in Conscience to bear it, it comes to one. I need not say which I think best, or desire most, but the design is ●eace and Moderation in both. The Candid will see this, some others will not see it, but accuse the Design of Contradiction. To this purpose I would have it observed, that in a few Sheets entitled, The Peaceable Design, set out by some Ministers of London, in the year 1675, when they come to offer their Arguments against the Oxford Oath, they have these Words. Which we desire may be taken with Candour in respect only to our design, that is, as Argumentative for the removal of these injunctions, not as peremptorily Definitive of our own judgments, and much less of others above our Sphere, in the cases concerned in them. These are Words put in de industria to anticipate such an accusation.  
Nor is it the fruit of a generous Christian mind, to regard a mans self only, what I can do, how far I can go, or what is fit for me( or one party) without consideration of others. There are many young men in whose hearts God I hope hath sown his Grace, that are training up at the University, and in other places, whose Parents expect they should enter the public Vineyard, and while their Consciences are limber and not grown stiff as ours are, they have need of such a Book as this is, and such a confessor to them as I am. I have writ other Papers for my self: I have writ this Book for them. That such may have the more Faith in what they act, and we the more Charity in our thoughts of them, if they do otherwise then we do. For my part, I am a debtor to those that fear God, and comform not: and I am a debtor to those that fear God, and do comform. Besides, if by this means I can come but to open our sore to the public cure, or get that case to be pondered, which I cannot by other means, I think my greatest purpose is not lost; I will conclude therefore with these two texts. One is, Do I persuade( that is give way to, or obey) Men or God? Or do I seek to please Man? For if I yet pleased Man, I should not be the Servant of Christ. The other is, I please all men in all things, not seeking my own profit, but the profit of many, that they may be saved. When these Texts fall out, then shall these Things Contradict one another.   

ERRATA.  
Pag. 2. l. 21. for quas tenus, red quatenùs. p. 11. l. 3. for itself r. itself. p. 13. l. 21. for fo, r. for p. 28. l. 4. for defined, r. defined. p. 29. l. 1. for I, r. If. l. 10. r. from the highest. p. 37. l. 8. for Supremacy, r. Supreme. p. 73: l. 15. for eus, r. eos. p. 77. l. 9. r. in the Power. p. 79. l. 29. for to, r. too. p. 112. l. 17. for he, r. the. p. 115. l. ult. r. says yet a greater Author. p. 127. l. 20. r. to the Orthodox. p. 136. l. 18. r. that Liberty which. p. 140. l. 18. for eay, r. lay. p. 128. l. 17. for me then, r. them. Note; that from p. 160. to p. 169. are false numbered, and p. 168. as it should be, l. 4. for finito, r. finito.  
P. 125. l. 22. Haec Verba Desiderantur.  
This is the Rule, and the Explication, which I humbly lay down for us to go by, in our obedience to human Impositions.   

A Peaceable Resolution OF CONSCIENCE Touching our Present Impositions, &c.  

CHAP. I. The Original of Civil Power, and our Subjection to it, in this Nation, established.  
IT is the usual infirmity of men of the greatest parts, in their undertaking the satisfaction of Conscience in any matter of practise, which is of moment, to offer so many Reasons and Considerations upon the Subject, that their strength being divided into many things, there are few of their Intelligent Readers but see the insufficiency of what they urge, and thereby judging of the rest, they do not know where to find the bottom which they are to set their Foot upon, and so are left unresolved in the case.  
There is one Famous Text therefore, I shall lay down, for the resolution of the judgement and Conscience, in that grand matter which in this discourse is undertaken. {αβγδ}. Let every Soul be subject to the higher Powers, for there is no Power but of God. The powers that be, are ordained of God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the Power, resisteth the Ordinance of God, and they that resist shall receive to themselves Damnation.  
From this piece of holy Writ, I will lay down my ston, and Build upon it, That the Powers that are, that is the present Powers as they are( I suppose them {αβγδ}, Rightful Powers) whatsoever they be, quas tenus they be, must be submitted unto, upon this ground, that they are the Ordinance of God, who disposes of all Powers that are, to be as they are.  
We must distinguish here upon necessity. There is the Power itself, and the Constitution, form, or the Qualification( as Dr. fern expresses it) of that Power as it is specificated in the kind, individuated in the Persons, and clothed with Customs and Laws in any Community or Nation. Again there is {αβγδ}, the ordinance or ordination of Gods Precept, instituting or commanding such or such a thing in the law of Nature, or his Sacred Word: and the ordination of his Providence, which Ruleth, Ordereth, and Disposeth the Affairs of this World, and more especially the Kingdoms and Dominions thereof according to his Council and Pleasure.  
This thing Power itself; that there should be an Authority in some person or persons, to Rule and Govern for the ends of Society and the common Good( without which, neither Family, nor City, nor Kingdom, nor the World itself( as Cicero, de legibus, has it) could subsist) and consequently that others should be in Subjection to that Power, is the ordination of Gods Precept, the institution of God in the Law of Nature, and so of Moral and Everlasting obligation, the very ground and reason itself of the fifth Commandment. The Constitution or Form of Government, as this power is qualified by the Laws or Customs, that are established in any place or people, according to their interests and concernments, we must know as being that which cannot be gain-said, is, and must be of human device altogether, arising I say from mans invention, consultation, institution; and so is called a human creature by St. Peter, {αβγδ} {αβγδ}, the Ordinance of man, which is doubtless the only impartial Interpretation of that expression. Let a Government be Monarchical, Aristocratical, Democratical, there is not any( the Commonwealth of the Jews only excepted) of God in this sense, but are left by him indifferent to the Nations.  
As for that dispute in the way which of thcse is best, it does not conccrn us who are to be subject to that which is. Where the public interest does become each mans single Interest, and all preferment lies in accommodating himself unto that, there methinks the end of Society is Originally like most to be attained. I will not speak falsely for favour. There is now and then a line about the Venetian State in Bocaline, does touch me more to the quick, than the arguments for his Pope in Bellarmine. Nevertheless in regard that differences will arise among men; and from differences dissension and division among equals; and from division tumults, wars and ruin: for a blessed mouth hath said it, that A Nation divided cannot stand, it is very likely in my judgement, that Monarchy came into the World as Episcopacy into the Church, according to St. Hierom, that is Remedij loco, as the best expedient against this inconvenience, and upon that reason is preferred.  
Now the great question will be, how the Powers that are, which comprehend the constitution of Government, with the person or persons who are Governours, as well as the power itself under the same, are to be said the Ordinance of God, which is made the ground of the precept, Be Subject.  
I will take here some line in speaking to this. Potestas est jus imperandi, says Arnisaeus. Take the word imperandi at large. A Right to Order, Dispose or Govern, say other politics. There is Potestas I count, that goes to the making a Commonwealth, as to the Ruling it. A right now, in or to a thing, a man cannot have, but by the grant of him that hath the propriety. The great and chief proprietor of all things is God, by creation. Upon this his Dominion is Founded. Mans Dominion arises from Gods. Dominion is either private, which is a right to have or use a thing: or public which is to rule. public Dominion then or Government, which is a right to order or rule a Society of men( the principal of Gods earthly Creatures) must be derived from a grant of his, in the Original of it. This grant is an Act of his will, passed in the Law of Nature, or his Word; and this Act we call the Institution. The institution of Magistracy then, is Gods general Rule or Command, Grant, or Charter; which does require and authorize all Communities in the World to agree and come together into Government, leaving them to their liberty for the framing their own constitution( consisting of the kind of Government and individuation of it in the persons) as it shall conduce most to the common Good. The providence of God now comes in wholly, and disposes, orders, and determines of the minds and resolutions of the Community herein, unto this and that person as it pleases him, who is the Alpha and Omega of all his creatures, and all their actions.  
By this we see how Gods institution, and Gods providence do go both to the Powers that be Ordained of God: Yet must this ordination of his, in reference to the objects intended, have its distinct explication to resolve what is proposed. The Powers that are do necessary comprehend these two things, the Power itself which denominates the Recipient, Subject, or Subjects wherein it resides to be Powers: and the Persons or subjects themselves that are denominated Powers, which includes the sort of Government with the same. The words, of God, ordained of God, do likewise contain two things according to their common sense in other Scriptures, to wit, Gods Decree, Counsel, or Providence, and his Law, Word, or Precept. Let us but adjust these matters now as we ought. The abstract, thing, Power itself, which in the Nature of it is nothing but a right( a right to Govern, as was even now said) must proceed necessary from that will of God which is grantive or institutive, that is, from his Law, Word or Preceptive ordination. The persons, denominated Powers, together with the kind of Government included in the same, being not determined by Gods Word or Law, but left to the liberty and choice of men themselves, are of God by his decree, dispose, or Providential ordination. The Powers then that are in the Text, that is, the Powers concretively taken, are of God by his Providence, and are of God by his Institution. The concrete contains the abstract in it. They are of God by his institution in regard of the abstract, because the abstract thing is wholly from thence: and they are of God by his providence in regard of the kind of Government, and the Person. And thus far may the arguments of Mr. Gee in his elaborate discourse of The divine Original of the Magistrate( c. 5.§. 3). take place. The thing Power itself wheresoever it resides, derives itself from Gods grant, and the Concrete hath divine warrant on that account. That will answer what he brings, which though he seems to strain higher then so, until I shall hear some Minister in stead of Charles by the Grace and Appointment of God, to say, Charles by the Law or Word of God, of England King, I shall be pretty sure, where his cast must be pitched. And when I have said already that the Constitution of the Government and persons governing( simply considered in themselves) are not of God imaginably by way of institution( but for the sake of the abstract thing, Power itself), they must be the ordination of his Providence. They are what God hath appointed, ordered, determined to be where they are, and that is the respect, I judge, wherein these human creatures or Ordinance of man in St. Peter, are the {αβγδ} the ordination of God in St. Paul, upon which we see our Subjection is Founded.  
It is certain that the abstract thing, Authority itself, is that alone which is of Divine necessity. Now shall a man hereupon pled thus? As for our Rulers and Laws, they are all nought, we like not any thing of the very constitution, and if we combine to endeavour the extirpation of the whole, we will not meddle with what is Sacred. That which he hath appointed is, that there should be Authority and Subiection which we intend in Rulers and Laws that shall be better, but as for the form of Government, the persons Governing, and laws Established, these are human every jot, and not at all the Ordinance of God, which we resist not. God forbid that any should presume to argue thus, for it is not only the Power itself, but the Powers that are, whether the King as Supreme, and those sent by him, the Power and the Qualification of it, which are to be submitted to by this Text, and that upon this ground, that they are the Ordinance of God.  
There is no Christian goes to his prayers, but he is to pray that the will of God be done. How far this will may be extended, Christ hath taught us in that passage in his Agony, when Flesh and blood would willingly have had that Cup to pass, he adds, not my Will, but thy Will be done. What will was that? Not his Preceptive will; the Jews were not bound sure to put to death the Lord of Glory and  shed innocent blood: but his Decretive Will, what Gods hand had determined before permissively to be done. Let the will of Gods good providence be what it will, when man does not know it he may submit to it; and when he knows it, must not he do it? The Powers that are, as they are, are the ordinance of his decretive Will, and the Institution presupposed, that is the ground we are not to resist them( the ground of the command not to resist) upon pain of Damnation. I mean not as if the Will of God in the rightful constitution of Kingdoms were but permissive only, for so there is no agreement of Thieves and Robbers to steal and kill, that is not by the Will of God, not hindering what they act, which yet he doth forbid and punish: but I understand it as that which doth both concur effectually to the doing as in all acts that are good, and by his command of our Subjection approves and conserves the same being done. Si ordinationis voice res intelligeretur quam Deus tantum non vult impedire quo modo se Deus habet circa vitiosos actus nulla sequeretur ind honoris obligatio, nec tantopere hanc potestatem predicaret; Sequitur ergo ut ordinata haec potestas voluntate Dei approbant intelligatur. Nor will I be understood after this to exclude the universal Law of Magistracy, or institution of the Office, from Gods Ordination, for that indeed is to be presupposed to the Apostles precept. He could not bid us Be subject, if that command had not its rise and Foundation in Nature, and so is to be fore-conceived I account, or presumed to the same.  
In sum, the powers that be then, are of God, by his providence, by his approbation, by his law. By his providence as I have already shown. By his approbation, as all wholesome Laws which men do make, ut humana et humano modo, are approved of him. By his law, as there is an universal ordinance for government, from whence, a Commonwealth being framed and the Person or Persons designed, the Power does immediately come, and in regard of the abstract thing, Power is self being immediately from God, the Powers in the concrete are said thus to be ordained of him. Well, to go on where I left( not excluding the second and third in the first) God does think fit the powers should be as they are, thou art discontent and wouldest endeavour to alter them; who art thou O man, that wouldst intrude inro Gods Seat? Dost thou know when thou comest to the bottom of this, what it is thou comest to? Thou wouldest be wiser than God, thou wouldest Usurp his providence, and have things otherwise. Thou wouldest indeed be God in his place.  
But are we here at the Root? And is this firm? There is nothing comes to pass, but it is the Will of God, and must I submit to every thing, that is, so as not to desire and endeavour it be otherwise? May I not desire and strive to remove those evils that oppress me, because Gods Will is they should fall on me? I say, no doubt of it, It is Gods Will, the Will of his purpose, that you should have these afflictions, and suffer as you do: and it is Gods Will, the Will of his precept, that you should use the means to free yourself if you can, and upon this account you act and endeavour warrantably. But if God bring on you any evil, and command you to bear it with that virtue as becomes that condition, and not go about to change it, for it is his will, then is the case otherwise. When the people of Judah had their City and Land ransacked by nabuchadnezzar, and they were afraid of tarrying in the Land, and so thought of going to Egypt, this was doing no more then the Law of self-preservation might warrant; but when God had brought on them that calamity, and commands them to stay in the Land, under these Governours that were there, and obey them, then could they not go about to fly, but they resist the Will of God, and must expect a punishment suitable to their disobedience. Such is the case here, the governments that are, are appointed of God: There is the institution of the Office, by the universal Law of Nature always standing; there are these actual disposals of providence, making over the power to the individual persons; and such as they are therefore being once established, that ordination of God, is the ground upon which the Apostle builds this precept, Be subject to them; and the precept once taking place, makes our endeavour of alteration to be evil without any more ado. Thou shouldst apply thyself to faith, and patience, and prayers, and thou thinkest of defence, and arms, and change of thy state.  
When the Nation of the Jews had been under a Theocracy( God raising up Judges under him for their deliverance on all occasions) and they would needs have a King as other people, whereby they cast off God and so sinned( or else we might be tempted easily to think it no sin at all to cast off any man) Samuel tells them the Manner of their King, thus and thus he should do unto them, which was all grievous God knows: but let him do what he will, this in fine becomes their duty, they must submit to him, and nothing else can be done. Not that the doing thus and thus there mentioned, was lawful in a Moral sense, the King was to be accountable for the use of his power; nor that it is meant only, thus and thus he would do against Right: but thus and thus he might do in a Political sense, so that if he did, according to the jus Regis of that State, they might not rise against him for it. There was no weight otherwise in his diswasive from a King; fo they might say, if the King will do as you threaten, we will turn him off presently and choose another, or change our Government again at pleasure. No, they might have recourse to God, and cry unto him( as the text says) but help themselves they could not, Where the word of a King is, there is Power, and who can say unto him, what dost thou?  
Not but that we are to distinguish between Subjection and Obedience, if I may use Dr. Fields words, and the sense of all Divines whatsoever. We are not to do always whatsoever the Magistrate commands; for he may command what is evil, and when God forbids what man requires, the greater Authority must take place of the less, according to the known decision of the Apostle in that case. Nevertheless we are to be in Subjection still, not disowning his Authority, but being ready to suffer his will( understanding that readiness aright) when we are not able to do it. Tum in sacris tum in profanis rebus neque iubentia neque vetantia precepta obligant ad agendum omittendumve aliquid contra legem Dei, sieve naturalem sieve positivam, said duntaxat ad patiendum, idque tum demum ubi paena evitari nisi vi opposita non potest, Grotius de imperio summarum potestatum circa Sacra, p. 98.  
It follows not then neither, that any man from hence may set the Text of St. Paul at variance with himself, and with St. Peter, and acknowledging that so long as the Magistrate is Gods Minister indeed, a terror to those that do Evil, and a praise to those that do Well, he is to be obeied, but when he shall do contrary, and be an encourager to 'vice and a terror to the good, he is then not Gods Minister for our weal, and to be submitted to no longer then till we can get power to deliver ourselves out of his hands. God forbid! The title of the Epistle and the time when the Apostle wrote, will be a good refutation of this conceit. The Epistle is to the Romans, and the Emperour of Rome was then one of the vilest Monsters upon Earth. There is the Magistrate, and there is his Acts, and Laws, and Courses he takes. The Acts and Commands of a Magistrate, as his courses, may be such, as are not for the common good: and the Laws of a superior which are not just and good, do not oblige the Conscience, Dr. tailor tells us case. l. 3. c. 1. r. 3. Quod necessariam non habet conjunctionem cum fine publici commodi( according to Suarez) non potest praecipi lege humana. See him de legibus l. 1. c. 7. The Magistrate nevertheless, and his Government, and other Laws which he conserves, are for the common good, and not to be resisted, but upheld. If Nero be Gods Minister for their good, and those governours sent by him were for the punishment of evil doers and praise of them that do well: If nabuchadnezzar be Gods Servant, and to be submitted to on that account, then may not the wickedness of a Ruler, or the abuse of his power, privilege us from our duty. If he does not his, yet must we do ours, and rely upon God. It appears then( as is suggested) there is a difference between the Magistrate and his Command, as to the Authority they bear. Wheresoever there is the thing Power or Authority, it must, I will account, be obeied, for Power is a ray of divine Majesty: But there is no man, the very truth of all lies there, can indeed have any power in things that are unlawful. For power being a right to command, which derives from the grant or will of the Supreme Majesty, as hath been said: and there being no will of God, or any grant of his, that any person should command that which he has forbidden, it follows directly that such a command which does so, is devoid of power, and that, that is the reason at the bottom of our Non-obedience thereunto, when subjection to the person and his Authority, is due still, by the precept of the text.  
I will yet distinguish, There is the end of the power, and the ends of those that are in power, Isa. 10.7. Whatsoever the ends of those who are in power be to the fulfilling their own wills, the end of the power is for the common good; and so long as that power, with the ends of it, are committed to such a person, we are concluded; insomuch that when we have the courage not to obey him in evil( if he errs de fine) for wrath sake, we must have the patience to suffer in well doing for Conscience sake, and be in subjection still to the ordination of God. Distinguendum est inter Imperij actum qui subditum ad agendum movet,& vim quae patiendi aliquid necessitatem illi imponit. Cum Imperii actus effectu suo, hoc est, obligatione caret, vis tamen eo nomine illata effectum quendam habet, non tantum Physicum said& moralem, non ex parte agentis, said ex parte patientis, hunc scilicet, ut eam vim vi repellere non liceat.  
He is the Minister of God for our wealth( says the Apostle) therefore he must judge what conduces to our wealth. I know in mixed States, as ours, the whole people, at least in their Representatives, do judge of their own weal, and so choose and prefer their Laws: yet seeing the King has a negative vote, there must be a judgement which is absolute in some kind( as is agreeable to the nature of the State) committed to him de fine& mediis what is for his peoples safety, and what is for their destruction. Which yet is to be understood in reference to the Universality, not destroying that judgement of private discretion, which every particular man must have, as to the lawfulness and expedience of his own actions. I will shut up this with a saying of Tacitus, much made of I find, by Writers, on this Subject. I took it up last from Dr. Hakewel in his Scutum Regium. Bonos principes voto expetere debemus, qualescunque pati,& quomodo sterilitatem, aut nimios imbres,& caetera naturae mala, sic luxum& avaritiam dominantium tolerare.  
You may say if here indeed be the ground of our subjection, then must many good people in the World be in a sad condition; for let their Government and Governours belike, be as evil as they will, they must bear it, and have no remedy. God hath ordained them as they are, and if they submit not thereunto, what is it, but they will not have Gods Will to be done? They resist his Ordinance, and shall incur his judgement. I answer, let this seem as hard a condition to the subject● 〈…〉 can, it is to be received as the tru●●●nd the Religion that is Christian; as th● very intent of the Apostle in the place. If Christ command thee to turn thy Cheek to the Smiter, and receive one blow after another, rather then to revenge thyself and strike again, Resist not evil, is there any towards whom this is to be exercised like unto our Rulers? Here is one part of a disciples denying himself, and taking up his across; of that Meekness, Humility, Faith, and Patience, with the like Christian Graces he is to actuate all his life. The Lord his God knows what is best for him, and such a submission, though unto death, is better for him in the everlasting Issue, then to be freed from it; or else his Father would never have appointed him to it, as he did all his fellow Servants, during the first Persecutions, which made so many to suffer, and lay down their lives, when their Towns and Cities were so full of Christians, when particularly a whole Legion of 6666( if that Story be true) could yield to a decimation twice over, upon an injunction to Sacrifice to Idols, while the Sword was in their hands, rather then resist, and incur the danger of this Text, by a defence so just, that you perhaps are tempted to have liked them better, if they had done it. But the Weapons of their Spiritual Warfare, were more mighty then their Carnal, which made them lay down these, and fly only to their Prayers and Tears, to their believing and suffering, and the Will of God be done.  
Nevertheless, as for our State, God be blessed our condition is not so hard in this Nation under the Powers that are, but if there be any thing that is grievous to the people, it may be altered in a way agreeable to the same. that is, by the way of Parliament, with consent of the King: So that to endeavour any alteration that way, is no resisting the ordinance of God; for Gods Ordination with us is such, as allows such an endeavour when it is needful, in the ground-work of the Land. To this purpose I observe, in the Act for preservation of his Majesty, where it is made a praemunire to affirm, there lies an obligation on any from the Covenant, to endeavour a change of Government in Church or State, and highly criminal to speak against the same as now established; there is a Provided, that the Act deprive not the Houses of Parliament their privilege, of debating any matter touching the repeal or alteration of any old, or preparing any new Laws, or the redressing any public grievance: Now we must take consideration therefore, of persons in a public, or in a private capacity. Let a man who is in a public capacity, as a Clerk of the Convocation, or Member in Parliament offer any thing of alteration( I speak as to the Administration, not Constitution of the State, which they are not to alter or dissolve) that is commodious to the Church or State, and prosecute it with vigour according to his Conscience, this is to be looked upon, as a part of Subjection, which the Powers that are do require of him in his place, not any resistance of it. But let a man who is only in a private capacity go about to make any alteration, that is, in a way not allowed by the Powers that are( whereas if it be in a way appointed, he may be reckoned to act in a capacity political, though a private person) this mans endeavour is a resisting Gods Ordinance in the most intimate sense that the thing does import. For what is resistance here? It is not the refusing Obedience to what the power commands, seeing that may be done in case of sin, without blame: but it is refusing Subjection, and not yielding to the Power that is, when a man cannot bear with it, but will have the ordinance of God to be otherwise then it is, and so goes about, whether by Arms or other means not appointed, to undo what by his providence is established; that is, endeavours it be not, so much as in him lies, and what is resisting more directly then this is? Take heed, will you dispossess God of his dispose of things according to 〈◇〉 ●wn Will, as if he did not know what w●●●●ter for the World and for yourself then y 〈…〉 If you go the way before, you follow Prov●●●nce, if you go any other, you resist it. And he that resists, receives to himself damnation.  
Having purposed here the end of this chapter, a rub stays me, There are some very likely, may be apt to think, that those persons who have a title to the Government in any Land according to the constitution thereof, have more then providence to pled for their being the Powers ordained of God in the Text of the Apostle, and so may find fault with something here that is passed. I answer, If any Ruler have indeed more to pled for his being of God then providence, then hath he providence to pled for it, and what I have sa d on that score, will do him no hurt: Nevertheless the constitution itself, and so the title any have according to that constitution, and the persons to whom the Government belongs according to that title, are of God, we are to know really, no otherwise, then by his providence, which hath ordered and disposed the hearts of men to agree so, that according to such a constitution, such a person, should have such a title, and so being designed for the Government there is nothing else but the institution of the Office with it, that goes to the making him the power ordained of him.  
That there should be some to bear the Sword for the punishment of 'vice, and encouragement of Virtue; or that some should be the Ministers of God for the common good, which is that I call the power in the abstract( that is abstracted from the Qualification put on it by the constitution) is the Precept of God expressed in the Apostle, and in the light of Nature, and so of divine institution: But what the person or persons shall be who bear the Sword, what the form of Government, what the constitution, what that which shall give title according to it, what the terms upon which the Government must be held, and the several particular customs and laws which are convenient to be observed, according to the diversity of place and Nation, These are all( if they may be called all, which come in effect into one, to wit, the Qualification of the Power, as I call it otherwhere) left to the liberty of man: and to go about the thinking out any other Ordination of God, then this of his Wisdom and Providence in these things, will quit no cost, because it cannot put any bar to the Usurper, nor bring any more advantage to the rightful governor then this does. For how shall that man who usurps the Government pled any title from providence, when it is the Ordination of Gods Providence in the Nation, which is directly contrary to his claim? The Act of providence, productive of Civil power, is that, which disposeth of the right and title, and not of the mere possession, says Mr. Gee herein very well, p. 129. And which security is greater to the Prince, to make a resisting of him to be a resisting of Gods Precept only, or to be a resisting Gods Providence also, a {αβγδ}, and entering Gods Throne? Nevertheless, in regard that there are few or no Dominions Hereditary, but there will now and then step up one out of his rank, and it is very dangerous to make the people judges of their Princes titles; and in regard that the command of God and Nature for Government it self, or the necessity thereof in general, is so far to be preferred before the singular interest of any person or persons therein concerned, there is a determination to be attributed to Providence over-ruling the Title in some case; which, if I may deliver my opinion, in short will come to this, that though no person, as to himself, does become the Power ordained in the Text merely for his possession, yet does he become so to us upon his reception, and good Administration.  
I distinguish here, between the part of the Usurper, and the Subject; Between the Usurpation, and Gods Providence ordering and disposing the wills and consent of the people to his admission. The occupant, I judge, cannot hold what he has got, with a good conscience toward God and his Neighbour whom he hath wronged, but he is bound to restore it to him that hath the right Title: yet I think( I say) when Providence hath precluded him from any possibility of returning to enjoy it, and hath inclined the hearts of the generality to a dedition, the particular Subject for his part is concluded in point of Subjection. And this I suppose our Law does favour, which will own the wholesome Statutes of a Richard the 3d. or Henry the 4th. as of an Henry the 2d. and Richard the 1st. And if it were not so, then might the thirteenth to the Romans for several if not the most part of our Kings, from the conqueror to Henry the Seventh, be laid by, and signify nothing, and we to reckon no higher Powers during their Reigns, ordained of God in our Nation.   

CHAP. II. The Ground upon which all Lawfulness for any People to endeavour the change of Government when it proves grievous to them is Founded, rendered insufficient and dissolute to our State.  
NOt that we live without Intelligence from daily History of the lubricity and common mutations of this World, both as to persons and States or Kingdoms; Nor can it be hide from the considerate how deep a root and footing there is in politics for the same; which do receive a divers Measure and judgement according to the condition of Time, Place, Person and Constitution, where they are made. There is no Authority( it is pleaded) one man could have over another, who by Nature are equal, but he must Cedere de jure suo, and let him have it by consent: so that all Power Originally was given to their Rulers by the people, and to the common good, and if they use it therefore to their hurt, they may take it away again.  
For demolishing those strong Towers of Liberty and Insurrection, which have been, or may be built on this Foundation, I am not Ignorant of the more ancient device, promoted afresh by a late great name, that would do it effectually, if the difficulty of that way were not so apparent and inextricable as a man cannot abide by it, and that is, by deriving all Government from Paternity or Genarchy. But besides that, a man can hardly be content to have that made the Basis and proper Title to Magistracy, as will leave us never a Magistrate of the right Stamp in the Universal World, since Noah and his Sons deceased: It is manifest, as Authors do distinguish their economics and politics, so is the Power of a Father and the Magistrate really different, in the kind, and foundation of the Relation; the one being of Choice, the other of Nature. Quasi vero nihil intersit inter magnam domum,& parvam civitatem, says Aristotle in his Pol. l. 1. at the beginning. Over a Multitude( says Hooker Ec. Pol. l. 1.§. 10.) consisting of many Families having no dependency on one, as the Family or the Father, impossible it is that any should have complete lawful Power but by consent, of men, or immediate appointment of God. These words( though but a few of many) are directions enough in this point. I am persuaded( says a sober Writer for Monarchy, in the late distractions) it will appear an uncontrollable truth in Policy, that the consent of the people, either by themselves or Ancestors, is the only mean in ordinary Providence, by which Sovereignty is conferred on a person or family. It is not for me therefore, to go here against the Stream of so much light. I must acknowledge that a Community of men are not a Herd, to be driven into Government; but as subjection is a Moral act, and they free agents, they do come into the same by agreement, and that through a kind of Potestative act, as I am apt to conceive of it, unto which, as they are commanded, they must be authorised by the Will of God.  
We must know therefore, where there is a Company of Persons and Families in a Vicinity fitted for receiving a form of Government not yet introduced, this is called a Community; who though they have a propriety of what they possess, and liberty of person, and consequently an equality in respect of one another, yet is there, according to Nature, a Superiority in the Universal over each Singular person; that the giving place of all distributively, to the good of all collectively, is not free in sorrow interiori, in regard of Conscience, when it is free from any, in foro exteriori, in regard of Compulsion. It is a question whether a Community( as just now defined) be obliged to enter Society for the common end of Government, or no? That is, whether Sponte adducti, or Dei praecepto they do coire into a Commonwealth? I see what has passed from Grotius, but if it be not a duty from the light of Nature( which is Gods precept) then is not a Commonwealth from Nature( which the Bees teach us) and Government from divine institution, when yet the Text tells us, it is the Ordinance of God. If it be, then must the same Law of Nature, that requires men to enter Societies, require that some should follow, and some led in the doing. Those that led are the prevalent part, whether by Wisdom, Riches, Valour, Goodness, or bare Majority. The providence of God that designs the persons in all Governments, designs these to the leading the rest unto Government. These act as they represent the Universal, and in that name they have right. Now a right to led from God is Potestas. There may be Potestas( as potestas ordinis) which is not coercive. This power in the Community is not to all purposes, but to this purpose. It is their Office to consider and determine what Government is best for them, and so to frame their constitution and appoint their governor. If they have not Authority from God to do this, how comes the constitution to be binding to Posterity, and have the pre-eminence over all the Laws that succeed? If no Law can be made but by Authority, can a Constitution be made without any? A right to frame the Constitution, and to bind others, must be Power. If the least Law be from a higher Power, the greatest must be the highest; and Maxima potestas is Sovereignty. What then can be more ingenuous upon this, when in a Community, as a Community, there are no persons yet chosen in whom the Power shall reside, to distinguish with Bisoldus and other politics in this manner. There is Majestas duplex, realis and personalis. Real Sovereignty is in the Community for the Constituting a Commonwealth, Personal in the Magistrate to administer it.  
Suppose a company of Families together under no mans jurisdiction. Frame we our politics. What are these people here to do? The Natural answer I think is, they are to do what is best for them. There are some of them think it best for them to remain Independent, but if it be not best for the generality to enter Society, Society shall not be of Nature, for therefore it is of God and Nature because it is best. Here the first thing that appears in Policy, is this, that there is a Good arising from their being or living together, unto which they all of them have right. If Society be not best to some of them, as they think, in regard of their particular interest, there does appear next a right in the Universal that must take place of that right in the Singulars, as to the aforesaid good. This good however lies in the mutual help and assistance which by God they are bound, and able, to yield one another, if they do their Duty. To fetch this good out it is necessary they agree to an order of Superiority and Inferiority( which is a Commonwealth) wherein some may be appointed to see that men do this duty by compelling the refractory, and encouraging the willing, that the good be obtained, which they as a Community, while the Families are equal, are not capable to do. And these are Gods Ministers( says the Apostle) attending continually upon this very thing. Here then appears these two Powers, the real and the personal; a Power to constitute a governor, and a Power to Govern. The right unto the good, which is the end of the Government and governor, belongs not to any one, but to every one, not to the governor, but Community, and to him as one of them only. The Sovereignty then radically is in the Community, but the life and activity of it cannot be exerted but by a personal Sovereign, whose power begins where theirs stops, to the attaimment of the same very thing in their behalf for them. There is power therefore in the Community to its proper purpose, and there is power in the governor. The power of the Community is not Governing as the Magistrates is, and the Governours power is not to make the Constitution, as is that of the Community. These powers mingle not, nor hurt one another.  
The jura Regalia or prerogatives indicate a Sovereign; The prime Regalia are making Laws, and constituting Officers: the Community makes the constitution& constitutes the governor. Is not that real Sovereignty? The Universality is the end of the commonwealth, the finis cvi for whose good it is framed, and the efficient under God that frames it, and in this respect it is {αβγδ} a human creature; what title then can be attributed less hereunto then Sovereignty on that account? Suppose me in a Community where I have propriety of Goods and Liberty of Person, Does not the law of Nature bind me to consent to my own loss in particular for the benefit of the many? Charity I know barely, requires me not to mind my own things onely, but the things of others, but doth Charity bind me to prefer other mens? Charity begins at home, and requires me to love my Neighbour as myself, not above myself, and how then could this really be, unless the Universi did virtually & eminenter praeesse singulis, and the singuli a Deo& Natura universis subderentur? In the collective body( says Hooker) that hath not derived as yet the principality of power into some one, or few, the whole of necessity must be head over each part, otherwise it could not have power possibly to make any one certain head; inasmuch as the power of making a head, belongeth unto head-ship. If there be not potestas in the Community, then is the constitution of a Nation no Law, the grand Law, the very Law of the Land no Law, which methinks is ill. If it be not Law before, but made so by the Princes subsequent act, then may he by a Sovereign act reverse it again, which will be worse. If it be no Law, then it is a Covenant, or Contract, but how shall that be a Contract which is made by one party, to wit, the Community about a Sovereign, while yet they have none? Nay what if the constitution be to have their Sovereign by Vote or Lot, how shall that be a contract between the Sovereign and Subject, when the Sovereign is not yet choose? A contract, I think farther, binds not a successor, but by virtue of its being Law. And that which is yet worst to the main business, if one party breaks a mere Covenant, the other is disobliged.  
After this unto the great Plea in hand, I shall put in my doubt, and answer.  
I doubt here, that those golden days which Writers of politics have Fancied in all Nations, supposing them to have modeled their own Government( as a body at first without a form) and choose their Governours according to it, may deceive us: seeing the first Lords and Rulers of the Earth( as Nimrod) got their Dominions by violence, and the people we may conceive after obtained such exemptions and liberties they could from them, in their Successions. Let us distinguish therefore between these two questions, what is de jure in politics, and what hath been, or is de facto? We discourse ordinarily on this Subject, and I think ought to do, as we conceive of things de jure, when if we inquire thereof strictly de facto, we shall find some little matter that is near or like to what our Politicians do writ, and that is virtually to go for the same. The more solemn though, a Government is in forming, and the nearer to such principles it comes, the more desirable is it by man, and the more approved by God. In that Government therefore wherein God hath been himself an Author to us in politics( who knows the best Rules to go by) when the people would have a King, and set up another Government, he directs this course. Samuel is to tell them first the Manner of their King, or Kingdom( so it is expressed in two places) that is, the Constitution of their Government, unto which they consent, and then is their King introduced, and this constitution wrote in a Book, and laid up before the Lord. There is but a resemblance of this happily in the constitution of most Kingdoms in the World, yet is the agreement of the people mediate or immediate, tacite or express, so necessary, that a people who are Conquered cannot be Governed as men by the Victor, without their consent; and his Victory tends only to give him a right by inducing them to a dedition, which being done upon saving their lives, his grace and protection, there remains some shadow yet of a Constitution.  
I answer then, if the supposition were true, that the power of the Ruler was given by the people, as well as their consent is required to it, and it came indeed Originally from them, then were the consequence perhaps not irrational. But our Text tells us otherwise, The Powers that be, are ordained of God. Let me understand my own answer. If when a Community set up Government and made them a Ruler, they were at their own liberty, and might choose whether they would or no, so that the Will alone of the people was the Original of the Rulers Power, and that be a Foundation to bear it, then would this double consequence I take it be good. The one, that They who were willing before to have such a one for their governor, to the end of Government, that is, for the common good, and he abuses his Authority to their hurt, must needs be willing no longer; for, the End which was the reason of their Will failing, their Will must cease also. The other is, that they ceasing to be willing, and their Will being the prime cause and fountain of the Power, the Cause ceasing, the Power, which is the Effect, must cease with it. But the matter is not indeed so, There are no people I apprehended are at their own liberty, but under the command of God to enter Society, and yield to government for his glory; so that it is not the Will of the people but the Sovereign Will of Almighty God that is the Original of Power, and can be alone a Basis sufficient for it. For Dominion being founded in propriety, and God alone being the proper Lord of his creatures( as hath been expressed in the former chapter) there is no mortal can have right to use, or rule over, any of them, but by a grant of his. This grant, I have said farther, does lye in an Act of his Will, which is passed in his Word, and the light of Nature. I add now, this Note. Government in the Ruler may be looked upon as his Office and Duty, and so this Act of Gods Will may be called his Precept; or as a Right and Dignity, and so it is to be styled a Grant or Commission: But whether you call it one or the other name, this Will of God is the thing from whence all Power in the World is derived and owed. It follows not therefore that when a governor abuses his Power, and the people cease their consent, that his Authority ceases: because the Authority which is not received without their consent, does not depend upon that consent as the cause and root of it, but on the standing Will of God.  
I will borrow a Simile from a late Writer, whereby he would show how the Ministerial power does not flow from man in Orders, but immediately from Christ. It is applicable as well here. In Cities or Corporate Towns they have a Charter, which does allow them to choose such or such a person, to swear him, and perform such ceremonies; but when these things are done as appointed, the Power or Authority he hath to be Mayor for that year, flows immediately from the Charter, or grant of the King. Thus it is with the Supreme Power, in reference to its Original. There is an institution or Charter from God, writ in the Law of Nature and the Word, that there shall be Authority in some, and Subjection in others, which allows men liberty to form what Government is best for them: but when the Constitution is made, and the designation of the person or persons to govern according to that constitution, the power of the Supremacy flows immediately not from that Constitution, Election, Coronation( though by the Constitution it is qualified 'tis true,) but from that Charter which is Divine. And that this is indeed so, it may appear from those titles God takes of King of Kings, and Lord of Lords. By me Kings reign, and the like. That is, a Universal Sovereignty is attributed to him, of whom the whole Family in Earth and Heaven is name; so that as there is no Subject can have any Rule in a Land( as in the instance before mentioned) but he must derive it from the King or the Supreme there: so is there no King or Potentate in the Earth can hold his Supreme Authority over any one single Nation, but he must hold it both from and under him who is the Sovereign of the World. And hence it is that Gods representation they bear, I have said, ye are Gods, and it is recorded, They worshipped God, and their King.  
You may say what does this infer, The Power of the Magistrate which is Temporary, or Pactionary, is from God and immediately, as much as that of any Hereditary absolute Prince, Does it follow therefore that his Power cannot be taken away again? I answer, it follows that it cannot be taken away but on the terms it was received. If a Government be Pactionary, and the Magistrate breaks with the people, it is true that he must forfeit notwithstanding his Power is immediately from God: But if it be not so, the deriving the Power from God immediately, does render it inviolable from that consent that was yet at first required to its possession. The reason of both being, because the Power passes from God with the Qualification it hath put on it by man in the Constitution, if that hath rendered it conditional, so God will have it to pass: if there be no such Qualification put on it thereby at the passing, it once being passed, cannot be revoked by man to be qualified otherwise, because it is not from him that it comes.  
Unto Government there goes something of Divine and something of human institution. That which is Divine flows from God immediately that which is human mediately. To flow immediately from God is to flow so from him as that nothing comes as a cause between his Will and the Effect. To flow from him mediately is when there are second causes concur to the same. The Quailfication of all Government is from God mediately, because he hath referred that to mans liberty for good reasons regarding human Nature and consent, and the will of man comes between God and it, so that, that is immediately according to Mans will, and mediately according to Gods. But the Power itself is from God immediateiy, because there is nothing comes between the grant or warrant, and the right, as any cause of it else; there is only a disposition of the Subject, which being put, the form flows as into the matter immediately from that Will. From whomsoever the form of any Government and the qualification of the Power according to that form does arise, the Power itself comes from above. Aliud est imperium( says Grotius) aliud habendi modus. Power in the Community is Native, or belongs to the universal over the singulars without Concession. Power personal in Commonwealths orderly framed is Conventional, upon consent, but that consent comes between only as Conditio, that is, Causa sine qua non( the Constitution must first be framed) but it concurs not per modum causae efficaciter operantis, to confer or give the same. It is Gods Will, not Mans does that. They are Gods Ministers says the Text. You could have no Power unless it were given you of God.  
You may say if there be a real Sovereignty in the people, and they may choose what Commonwealth they please, and have what Supreme governor they please; and he shall have no more Power, nor no otherwise then they allow and appoint, nay and he shall keep his Power no longer, and be liable to be turned out of Power for mal-administration, if they at first so agree( all which is certain in their liberty only to frame their own Constitution): how shall we deny but the people give the Power, or how shall we say he derives the same from God? I answer, In the first place, when I call that right in the Community to frame their Constitution real Sovereignty, this expression makes nor mars any thing as to the main business, only in regard the Constitution is the highest Law, and Legislation is the chief Right of Majesty, and the Community have that right from God to make their Constitution, here is that thing I count certainly which Sovereignty is, and to give it that name hereupon that others have done, will, I hope, offend no body: But as for the substance of the Objection, it is forelaid and prevented already. There is the Power itself, and the Qualification of it. The qualification, ordering, or disposition of the Power in what form of Government or Governours, as it may conduce best to the end appointed of God, that is, the Common good, is left to the liberty of man, and so is immediately from him, or as he appoints, but the Power itself, I say, is immediately from God. I have likewise presented you my understanding hereof. There is one and the same Charter or Institution of God in Nature, whereby he commands or wills a double Power, in a double Subject, and as two distinct rights in those two Subjects, the one is a right or Power to constitute a Commonwealth, the other is to Govern it. The Constitution is one thing, the Administration another. To argue that the Power of the Community is not such a Power as the personal Sovereign's is, which is coercive, therefore there is no Potestas in a Community, is all one as to say, there is no Power in the Prince to make the Constitution, and that being the highest point of Law-making, and Legislation makes a Sovereign, Ergo, he has not Maximam Potestatem, which is Sovereignty, These are two rights then distinct, yet as they agree sub eodem genere and are both Power, they equally flow from the same institution of God. God wills that a Community should frame their constitution, this gives them right to do it; A right of making any law or laws to bind others( even the governor and governed) is not Power only, I take it, but Sovereign Power. It is Gods will also, that according to the Constitution made, a Commonwealth should be Defended from enemies, by making Warand Peace: and Governed in making Lawsand Officers for the administration, and doing Justice to the Subjects, in rewards and punishments. This gives the governor his right, and from thence he will derive it. It is true also that the Constitution puts an extension or limits upon these rights of the governor according to the consent of the Community, because it is Gods Will also it should be so, that no man may lift up himself above his Bretheren but for their good: Yet is the Power in the abstract( when the Qualification thereof, I say still, is from man) only and immediately from God. I will renew the Simile before. Suppose a Prince should grant a Charter to any City not only to choose them a Magistrate which he hath appointed, but to appoint what Magistrate they please for themselves, to prescribe Laws and Rules for him to Act by, and that they may choose him absolutely for his time, or conditionally, and upon his Misdemeanour actually depose him, and then being in statu quo, constitute another kind of governor, and other rules which they judge better, holding still under the King, who is there will not say this is Authority? and yet if they do not put him down, or choose him conditionally, the jus or right from the Charter( seeing they might if they would) is the same thing. If they shall choose him absolutely, and he break their Rules and his own Engagements, they may repent they choose him not conditionally at first, and they may complain to the King, they may cry to him, and he may punish him or remove him, but they themselves cannot, the remedy now is out of their hands. The reason is( what has been given) because that neither the Power by which they acted in constituting of him was their own, nor that Power he received upon that constitution, theirs, but both of them derived to them from that Charter of the King. I need make no application, only I would here show that there is Potestas in a Community, and that this Potestas, when a Government is absolute, can do the governor no hurt. In Marriage the consent of the Man and the Woman makes the Husband and Wife, but their consent will not dissolve the Marriage again, because the authority the Husband has over the Wife, flows not from that consent, but from the Law and Institution of God. So may there be in some Commonwealths a consent of the people peculiar to them, that is, necessary to their making the Supreme Magistrate, but the authority flowing from God and not them, it is not in their power to reverse what they have done. Provided though, it be not fore-agreed to the contrary in the fundamental coagulation of any State, for when the imperium ipsum is aliunde, the modus habendi must follow that agreement. Indeed if a Marriage-contract be broken, and a Woman become an Adulteress, the Man may withdraw his consent and put her away: when if the Prince who is absolute break his promise, the people cannot depose him for all that. The reason I would assign is, because that Marriage is in the nature of a Contract only, and so one party breaking it, the other is loosed: but the constitution of a Land which makes the Prince and Subject, is a Law, and if one person neglect to perform his duty which a Law requires of him, that does not privilege another under the same to do so also.  
Whither this drives then, you may begin now to conjecture. You are ready to say perhaps, But is not this notion of Real Sovereignty in the Community, that, that should be Law which they at first agree and conclude upon, something dangerous to Anointed Majesty? And why do you not fall in with those that oppose it, rather then with Hooker and the Stream that runs ordinarily in the sense or purport of it? I answer, you may judge by the sequel as to the one, and I will offer you a reason why, as to the other. I do apprehended by some opposition which is made against this notion( wherein there is little fear of what was done so many hundred or thousand years ago) that those who leave the light and benefit of this, must receive other notions, which if they be not more dangerous to Government, they are more irrefragably destructive to the Doctrine here undertaken. The Constitution is that which makes the King, Lex facit Regem say the Lawyers. What Law? not that Law which he makes, for that cannot make him, that was made by him, but the fundamental Law, or Laws of the Constitution, and the Law in our Books, as declarative of that. Now if the Constitution of a Nation do not proceed from Power in the Community, that is, from such an authority from God, given at first to them for this purpose, as shall be obligatory as a Law, then must it have the virtue of a Contract only, which must be supposed originally to be made between the people not yet Subjects, but free, and the Sovereign; And then whatsoever rights are found to be exempted in the fundamental Laws of this Contract from the Princes power, they must be kept inviolable to the people, or else the Constitution is dissolved, and they shall be free from their Allegiance. Thus shall the Cause in the late Wars, and those of the Barons be full Stated. Thus can there no right orderly framed Government in the Earth, be an absolute Government. Thus must there be no fundamental liberties of the people of this Land, or of one, above others, but the King must be Pactionary, and the Prince no absolute Prince. Thus the Parliament representing the people as Trustees to secure their liberties upon the violation of any of them, shall be justified if they raise a new war to our endless confusion. But if we make the Constitution of a Land an Act of the highest Sovereignty( which we call real, as virtually being such) that being authorised by God, does therefore become the standing Law to Posterity,( as the ancient Land-marks set by the Elders,) never to be removed, then must the Power which is absolutely derived on any person and his Successors, continue inviolable against this assault, which is the strongest I suppose that can be made at any time for Rebellion. For seeing it pleased Almighty God at first to leave the Real Sovereign( who goes down I will account when the Personal ariscs, leaving us but one Sun in our State at once) at perfect liberty to its proper Power( to wit the Qualification of the Government) so that the Community might make what Laws for the Constitution they pleased, and put a condition on them if they would, to wit that if the Prince broken them, or any of them, he should forfeit and loose his Dignity, but they thought best that their Prince should be absolute and his Oath only taken, leaving him, if he break it, to the Almighty: this Constitution being made, and the Power flowing to him from God immediately with no other qualifications then is put on it by the Costitution, it must remain irrevokeable, against all future contradiction. I am therefore very little offended with the Politica of Mr. Lawson, that dexterous person in this sort of Learning, whose book considering the time it came out, both for its Light into Civil Government, and his peculiar notion of Ecclesiastical, as Nationally Independent, whereby in his capacity he strewed the way at that season, for return of King and Bishop, is not to be envied its due praise, and cautious use to be made of it.  
There is a question or two, you may yet ask me. The Power of a Commonwealth lies in its Sovereign; The Commonwealth virtually is in the Community, The Power consequently must virtually be there also; Yet is not the Power of the Sovereign the same with the Communities, yea, nor conferred by it, but given of God. How will you make these agree? How is it then? Ans. Why thus. All Power is from above, That which is from above, is Gods Will, a grant, passed in the divine Law concerning Man. The grant is not to the Sovereign but to the Community: The Charter in the Simile before, is the Cities Charter not the Mayors. If there be something granted then to the Community that the Sovereign has not, and to the Sovereign, that which the Community is not capable of, then is there distinct Powers; And the Powers being so, it appears that, although what is done by the Community in order to the Power of the personal Sovereign be acts of a preceding Power in them, that power of theirs does not make them Donours or intermediate causes of the personal Power, because his and theirs doth both flow, as hath been said, from the same grant. Indeed they are causes of the qualification( as is inculcated) which comprizes the Manner of their Kingdom with the particular person or persons Reigning, and upon that account are the people said truly to make their King, but as for the Power itself( the qualification being put) nothing is able to come between it and God. De Regum authoritate, quod ex jure Divino non sit, quod immediate a Deo non descendat— said mediant corpore collectivo— Tortus probat; Asseri enim Scriptorum sententia communi— De regno etiam in Rempublicam interdum mutato apponit— Acutus Homo non distinguit inter f●rmam, atque Authoritatem Regiminis. Forma de hominibus esse potest, de Caelo semper Authoritas. Bishop Andrews. Ad M. Torti librum Responsio. p. 384, 385.  
One thing more and that is the last. But what if a man cannot distinguish between the Concrete and the Abstract, the Qualification and the Power, and so holds only in gross that God is the prime Cause, and Men the second Causes or Instruments( which is a Cause) of the Power of the Magistrate. Suppose their conceptions thus. Pilate's Power( says Christ) was given him of God, yet did he hold it by Commission from Caesar. Gods Will is, that Caesar should be Emperour, Caesar's Will is, that Pilate should be governor of the Jews; Thus Pilate hath his Power from God. Real Sovereignty in a Community is Native and Immediate from God; The personal Sovereign is constituted by the Community; Under Officers by the Prince; Thus all Power is of God. It may be asked then, What prejudice is it, would come to our Cause in hand by this? I answer, I think the Nail is driven closer by more blows, but if it have no more. I suppose it will, hold so long only as we resolve Civil Power into the Will Institutive of God, and not into the Will of Man. Indeed we cannot( I think) do that clearly but by this distinction, something being left to Mans Will in it, and something not; but if any list to confounded them, and hold the same thing more confusedly, or to disprove this, and be contentious, I am no Dogmatical Opinatour in my conceptions. There is this benefit( I will add rather) may arise upon their supposition, that the Original of Magistracy will lye more easy for the common understanding then it does. Civil Power hereby shall be Potestas a naturali Orta, though not Naturalis; Neither shall there need be for any in the deriving the Power of a Prince from God to Sweat so much as to make him a pedigree from Noah, that holds only the Community have Potestatem in what they do. God empowers the Community to make the Constitution; The Constitution empowers( they may say, designs I say) the Magistrate; Thus the Power is of God. Deus Author, Populus instrumentum says Barclay. Dicitur etiam constituere Regem Deus cum a populo fieri praecipit, quod potentiam dominationis instituto regi delatam ita confirmat, ut infringi a populo, aut infirmari amplius, nulla ratione posset. l. 2. c. 2. As there is no more certain argument that Lands are held under any as Lords, then if we see that such Lands in defect of Heirs fall unto them by ●●scheat: In like manner it doth follow rightly, that seeing Dominion when there is none to inherit returneth to the Body; therefore they which before were Inheritors thereof did hold it with dependency on the Body, so that by comparing the Body with the Head as touching Power, it seemeth always to reside in both; Fundamentally and Radically in the one, in the other Derivatively; in the one the Habit, in the other the act of Power, says Mr. Hooker, aptly well I take it according to other Political Writers, but not perfectly well I think, according as it ought.  
It is certain( to sum up all this) that this great person and others that writ on politics and Laws as well as he, do seem ●o give too much to the people when they make the Power which the Magistrate hath, to flow from them, and revert to them. Dicendum est Potestatem leges condendi ex sola rei natura in nullo singulari homine existere, said in hominum collectione. Conclusio est communis& certa. Suarez. De Legibus. l. 3. c. 2. Again, c. 24. Cum immediate sit in Communitate per illam derivata est ad Reges. But we must be allowed here to distinguish in their behalf. And that first( as I have done) between the Power itself, and the Manner of the Government. Licet haec potestas absolute sit de jure naturae, determinatio ejus ad certum modum potestatis& regiminis est ex arbitrio humano, says the same Author. For the Manner of the Government they are in the right then, That is, from the people undoubtedly. For the Power itself, Distinguish next, between the Cause of it: and the Means through which, or Condition upon which, it flows. That the peoples consent or agreement is the Condition which must be first put before the Power is given, or that there is no ordinary Means else, whereby Power is conveyed to a person who has no right before, I do hold also for undeniable: but that the peoples Will is therefore the Cause efficient or Author of the Magistrates Authority we deny. By me Kings reign. The Powers that be, are of God. When the Power does then flow immediately from Gods Institution upon the consent of the people being put as the condition, Distinguish we again of this consent or agreement, which we may suppose to be made by way of Contract with the Prince: or between themselves by way of Constitution. I do apprehended it no less dangerous in politics to suppose the Power of the Prince derived to him by way of Contract, than to make the people the Original of it. For if Power concredited to these and these individuals be the Ordinance of men upon such conditions, then the Prince breaking those conditions loses his Power, or the Obligation of our Subjection must cease. Pacta conventa legibus Dei& naturae nituntur, a quibus nemo sanus unquam reges exemit says Serravia himself, l. 4. c. 9. The only thing therefore which is safe and agreeable, is, to suppose this consent among themselves, and to be, that the Government shall be Absolute. And so distinguish we lastly between a Power Constitutive, and Governing; a Power of making Laws for the Administration, or the Constitution. The people have no Power which is Governing Power, they can make no Laws to Govern, or for the Administration of the Government, in rewards and punishments: but they have Power and Liberty to choose their Government, and governor, and their agreement herein is the Constitution. If they agree that the governor shall not be accountable to any for his actions, the Authority coming immediately from God according to their Constitution, it must be inviolable, and who can have a word to say for Resistance, Non-Subjection, or Rebellion?   

CHAP. III. The grand, and more difficult Cases in point of Subjection as to this Land, discussed freely, and resolved.  
IT must be known, if it be not already, that the person, or persons, in whom the Supreme authority does reside( let it be where it will) has an Absolute and Universal power supposed to them by the Word of God, which if it receive any restraint or limitation, it is from the Constitution, Laws, or original Agreement only of the Nation where they are. This must be understood rightly, not in materiâ Indefinitâ( for Kings by Conquest that make their own Charter( or own Terms) are set in the line of the Law of God and Nature, says Hooker) but in materia Politica. And indeed that is so necessary ●n the nature of the thing, that we cannot conceive a Power Supreme unto whom no man can say What dost thou? that is, which is unaccountable to any other, but it must be free and unlimited. Not but the Office is limited( to use Dr. Taylor's words), the Prince hath his duty set him as well as we, and the Laws of God oblige him equally, and that from the penalty( he being alike obnoxious to it) as the meanest person; but the Power is unlimited( says he) that is any otherwise then by his duty, and the Laws which are Civil cannot oblige him from( or through) the penalty, but upon the account of Ingenuity and Equity. Licet non teneatur ipsius legis vi coactiva, tenetur vi tamen quadam directiva; Ratio siquidem naturalis dictat Principem legem istam servare quam is tulerit, says Coveruvias. To this agrees Suarez De Legibus l. 3 c. ult. And, Quae ex jure naturae dependant iis princeps etiam tenetur, quia licet sit Dominus aliorum, subditus tamen est Naturae& civis Mundanus, is solidly spoken by Arnisaeus De Jur. Ma. l. 1. c. 3.  
The Power is unlimited, I say, as to the word of God( Take it in its Proper matter, and that Negatively, not positively, for Christianity in things of this nature does not, de novo ponere, but rather supponere), but it receives limits from the Constitution. How far the Power of Kings may extend says Mr. Hooker( not altogether to my thoughts) the Articles of Compact between them and the people is to show, not only those at the beginning, which for the most part are worn out of knowledge, but whatsoever hath been after in a voluntary manner condescended to, by positive Laws, or custom reaching beyond the Memory of Man. I know to this purpose, there is more then one sort of Government; and that of Monarchy, is either Despotical( or Arbitrary) according to Will: Or Regal according to Law. In the one there is no propriety of the Subject, therefore called Imperium herile. But the other is of free Subjects, who have propriety in their Estates and Goods. Such is ours, when this alloy is so eminent, that neither the Purse nor the Laws, is in the Power of the King but by the Parliament, and that freely chosen by the people. Upon this account, there are some great Laws in a Nation such as Magna Charta, and Petition of right ( Augustissima illa libertatum Anglicarum diplomata& Sacrae anchorae) in this Land, which do oblige the King more particularly, and ought to be preserved inviolable. Now what if a Prince entrench upon these Laws, Put the Case at the highest, what if he should violate them? May the Subject take Arms, or rise against him for that? I answer, if I may distinguish here between the Kings own person and government, and those that act under him or are his Instruments, it were more easy for me to know what to say: But if I must speak indiscriminately, I will speak as a fool, I think not; seeing such Laws themselves are with us, not Conditio regnandi, but Sponsiones prineipis, and who hath right to ask him What dost thou, or call him to account for it? Regum timendorum in proprios greges, Reges in ipsos imperium est Jovis. Pacta conventa no doubt( says Seravia) by the Laws of God and Nature are to be kept. l. 4. c. 9. Quae vero si violari contingat ab eo cvi summum Deus commisit imperium, nullum esse supra supremum judicem alium hic in terris, qui eum judicet cogatque in ordinem. l. 4. c. 11. De Imperandi authoritate,& Christiana obedientia.  
It is true there are certain things the King swears to in his Coronation Oath, but if these be Conditions of his Reign or Crown, how comes he to be King, and to Reign before he be crwoned? If the Coronation itself be no condition( that is causa sine qua non), how shall any thing done at his Coronation? Coronation gives not the King his kingdom, which he hath jure haereditario before. Unctio Regem factum significat, non ad Regnum jus addit, says the Author Deus& Rex. If there be conditions of Reigning, then may he make a forfeiture, and be called to account, and how then shall the great prerogative of the King( as Lawyers speak) be, that he can do no wrong? The meaning whereof is, that his Officers and those whom he employs, must see they act according to Law, or they must answer for it, but the King himself is accountable to none but God. Who doubts but a Master may promise some things to his Family, and they have a right thereby to his dealing with them accordingly, whose Authority over his house cannot be Conditional, out of question? By the way I gather, there can be a right which may not be defended( I mean by force, if one could do it). The Persian King was most absolute, {αβγδ}, and yet that he took an Oath with his Diadem, so that he might not change their Laws, we may not only have Xenophon and Diodorus, but the Scripture in part to assure us. And that the Kings of Epyre were wont to take an Oath {αβγδ}, to Govern by law, as ours do, Plutarch may be consulted in the life of Pyrrhus.  
But suppose Conditions, and they be broken, unto whom does he make forfeiture, or who shall take it? There are in some States Powers which are Coordinate, and there the Less may join and bring the Greater to question; and what some Divines have said on the 13th. to the Romans will be current in those States. But is there any such with us, that derive not from one that is Supreme? Who then is it shall do this? Not the Parliament, because they are called by the Kings Writ, and when the Authority by which they sit is from him, they cannot be empowered by that in any act that is over him. Nay, will they derive the Power from the Constitution with himself, though he calls them? if he forfeits yet, and ceases to be King, they must cease also, and be no Parliament with him. The Parliament then cannot do this as a Parliament. Nor can any Magistrate or Officer, as so, for the same reason. Nor yet any subject, as Subjects, for that is contrary to all Order and Duty, and a destruction of the fifth Commandment. What then can be said? Why this only, that the forfeiture is made to the Community( which is properly the Matter of a Commonwealth before they have ●orm) not under any other relation, but as a Community, and they must take it. If this be said, then cannot any part, or party, take Arms against the King, it must be confessed, not only because that he is mayor singulis will be granted, but because that is not the Community. And if it must be the whole, as he is held Minor Universis, then can I conceive of what is said very easily, in the notion; but really it is a thing indeed never to be done. For if there must be at least the mayor vote or consent of the Community, how shall this consent be given? who shall gather them together, or take their votes? If any undertake it, they must be men in Power, others cannot: But the present Power that any have in their hands is derived from him, and they cannot use it against him. Nay they cannot act by it, but they justify it. It is unjust to act by his Authority, if it be forfeit. How! Act by it, to the denial of it? They cannot act then by any Authority they have to rise against him, the Cause of it, and they have no other to act by; and consequently they cannot act at all. Again, whosoever they be rise first they are but single persons, a part, a party, or at most a multitude, and as a part or single multitude they cannot do it, will be granted. The Sword does signify defensionem Regni& patriae, says Bracton, and no man as a private person bears that. As the whole, they cannot rise together, as a part they may not; and so is the thing never to be done. I will add, if there be any thing yet, you may conceive kept in; That, there are the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy have passed over the Nation; the tenor of these Oaths runs absolute, which will hold those that have taken them under the State and Capacity of Subjects: and consequently neither can the Sovereign make a forfeit, nor the inferior judge the superior according to the light of Nature.  
What then may the King act Arbitrarily? God forbid? I say first, Let him take heed, he is therefore Sworn to the Laws, that being not liable to man, he should stand bound toward God. I can say next, that no Subject but may choose if he command contrary to Law to obey him, as he must not rise against him And that is perhaps bridle enough to Sacred Majesty that if any do serve his Arbitrary Will, he shall suffer for it as against the Kings Royal Crown and Dignity, though it be by personal command. The Case of Empson and Dudley is known in the Law and our Chronicles. It is the Kings Legal, not Personal command in point of inconsistency, binds the Subject. But what if any regard not that, and he persist in his Will? We must wait for a Parliament, and there we are provided of redress against such men. But what if he shall not harken to his Parliament? Then may they with-hold the Subjects Purse in supply of his wants. And thus far hath the Constitution of our State put the reins into the Subjects hands toward the bridling personal Majesty to his Laws. But what if he shall thereupon dissolve the Parliament, and take by Force what he cannot have by Law?  
I will premise here, that some( and not the unlearned) who have handled this question, and maintain that the people are not upon any cause to take Arms against their lawful Sovereign, do come in the stating the matter to distinguish between a King and a Tyrant; a Tyrant in Title and Act; and Tyranusin exercitio they will account does exuere personam Regis, and excidere de jure, etsi haereditario.  
Legitimae potestati propter Deum& conscientias obligamur, in tryanno vero nihil ordinatum a Deo, said omnia Deo adversa& reipublicae detrimentosa, says Heningus Arnisaeus. Regimen tyrannicum( says Aquinas) non est justum quia non ordinatum ad bonum Commune,& ideo perturbatio huj●s non habet rationem seditionis, nisi sic inordinate fiat quod majus detrimentum sequatur. 22ae q. 42. Art. 2. De isto tryanno qui justum habet titulum, said exercitio apparet tyrannus incidit in legem Juliam de vi publica. Bartolus Consil. lib. trac. 6. Quod scribis( says Barclay to Boucher) rempublicam posse eum occidere qui in ipsam hostiliter agit( si intelligatur de illo qui hostili animo, sieve animo perdendi rempublicam agit) verissimum est; said non ea ratione quia populus principe superior sit, publicaque penes populum potestas resideat: said ea solum ratione, quod quia perdendae reipublicae animum gerit, is semet dominatu& principatu omni exuit, atque ipso jure, sieve ipso facto, Rex esse desinit. In that noted Book Adversus Monarchomacos. Num igitur obstrinxit se scelere( says Cicero) si quis tyrannum occidit? Populo quidem Romano non videtur, qui ex omnibus praeclaris factis illud pulcherimum factum existimat. In that classic Book of his De Officiis. Enim vero maximas injurias inferunt homines propter cupiditates im moderatas,& non propter res necessarias: Verbi gratia tyrannidem occupant, populumque impio dominatu opprimunt, non ut ne algeant, said ut suas libidines impune expleant. Idcircò magna praemia praeposita sunt, non ei qui furem, said ei qui Tyrannum occideret,( says Aristotle in his politics) l. 2. c. 5. He is the Minister of God for thy good saith St. Paul, otherwise he is not Gods Minister, and hath to other purposes none of Gods Power. Dr. tailor case. l. 3. p. 35. As for them( says Hooker accordingly) that exercise Power altogether against order( or more then ever they did receive) although the kind of Power which they have may be of God, yet is their exercise thereof against God, and therefore not of God, otherwise then by permission, as all injustice is: and cannot in Conscience( at the end of the same page.) bind any man to Obedience. I will not here city the famous Bilson, I shall have occasion to do it after, nor Bishop Jewel, which two are noted by the late King in his papers to Henderson: But I will return to that learned French man at first name, who besides two other books of politics, hath written one on purpose. De authoritate principum in populum semper inviolabili, and yet does thus determine. Traditur Respublica principi in eum finem ut illi praesit in salutem omnium, a quo si prorsus desciverit, etiam de potestate cadit, quam non alio sine sibi commissam habebat.  
I speak this, and produce these Testimonies thus liberally, for the sake of some peaceable Spirits( and it may be over-strict Consciences) who are, or have been haply, looked upon as refractory persons, in forbearing compliance to certain late Impositions, only because they having red more, could not Swallow some unlimited Words so easily as others did that considered less of them. But then, as for myself, I say first to the question, This is never to be supposed of our King; and next I have spoken before, that Majesty in our State I conceive such, as can make no forfeiture. It is not Potestas sub conditione, and if the Prince might excidere de jure, he cannot excidere de possessione, where there is none to take the forfeit, or call him to account for his doings. Omnes quidem sub eo,& ipse sub nullo( says Bracton) nisi tantum sub Deo. Si ab eo peccatur( so one reads it, not petatur), locus erit supplicationi quòd factum suum corrigat& emendet, quod quidem si non fecerit, satis erit ei ad paenam quod Dominum expectet Ultorem: Nemo enim de factis suis praesumat disquirere, multó minus contra factum suum venire. I will add in reference to the Drs, the Divines I have name, leaving the Heathen Orator and Philosopher to their higher sayings. As in Divinity they say of Natural Power which is properly {αβγδ} or potentia, that posse malum, non est posse( it is not the Power, which is Strength or Ability, but Impotence) So may we affirm as rightly of Civil Power, which is {αβγδ} or Potestas, The Powers that be, are ordained for our good: That Power which is not for our good,( that is the exercise of it, for the Powers themselves are of God and cannot be otherwise) is not Power but Violence; It is not the Power which is jus Imperandi, or which God grants. It is unlawful, injustum and not jus, and so in foro interiori truly unobligatory. But when I say and yield this, I apprehended here some distinction. It is unlawful, to wit, Morally, as null, and accountable to God: but not Politically, as to be resisted by the people.  
Bodin de Republica lib. 2. thus states this whole matter. There is the Usurper of Sovereignty, and the lawful Sovereign, whether by Succession, Election, Conquest, Lot, or especial Vocation. The lawful Sovereign is either Absolute or not. And there is the Stranger, or the Subject. For the Usurper he will have him slain, so that the prescription of a hundred years shall hardly save him. For the Lawful Sovereign, if he tyrannizes over his Subjects and is not absolute, he may be proceeded against by Justice, or Force, as the States of the Empire have done by the Emperour, and so Rome and Venice. If the Sovereign be absolute and perverts the Laws of God and Man, there is the Stranger, who is of Force, as some Neighbour Potentate, and he( he counts) may come Heroically to chastise such a person, by the example of Hercules, Dion, Timolen, Tamerlan, and the like. But for the Subject, where the Sovereign is absolute and a true Monarch, such as( he says) in Spain, France, and England, it is not lawful to attempt any thing against them, their Life and Dignity, be they never so Wicked.  
The conclusion comes to our purpose, yet will I put in some exceptions. 1. For the Usurper, This great Lawyer it seems had not learned to distinguish the Power itself which is of God, and his righteous dispose for the deserts and iniquities of men, from mans Usurpation. A Submission to the one under due Circumstances, is no approbation of the other. Probantur arma sumpta in tyrannos in titulo( says Arnisaeus) said non a subditis, verum ab extraneis, aut injustè oppressis. 2. For the Stranger I make a stand, what has he to do, who hath neither Interest nor Authority, to come and meddle with anothers Kingdom? {αβγδ} is forbidden. 3. This volumnious French man had taken up what he says of our Government from discourse only( as he tells himself) with one of our countrymen, and when he makes England an absolute Monarchy, he does yet lay down his marks or rights of Sovereignty so, as will make it not absolute. For the first and chief is, the making Laws, which he will not have enough, unless it be without consent of others, either greater, equal, or lesser then himself; when we all know, there passes no Laws with us, but they are Enacted by the King, with the consent of both Houses, and Authority of the same. 4. Though he treats of a Government Lordly and Regal, and puts the difference right as to the Subjects, that in the one they have their Natural liberty and propriety, and in the other not: Yet, as it seems to me, does he not touch the chief string; The Royal Monarch, he says, is one that yields Obedience to the Laws of God and Nature, as he expects his Subjects should to him: But so may the Despotical Monarch. The String that should be touched( if the Harp of their French Commonwealth were not set too high) is the Law of the Land, Will he have his Monarch to be subject to, or over that? We are not so shy perhaps as he. Omne Imperium sub Deo. Rex sub Deo& sub Lege. Princeps est ubi dominatur Lex, Dominus ubi voluntas. The Courts of Chancery or Law can avoid his Majesties Charters which are passed against Law; for the King is subject to the Law and sworn to maintain it, says judge Jenkins. In his works. p. 48. And yet though we hold the King is bound to Govern, as we to obey him, according to Law, that hinders him not from being an absolute Prince, because we make not that a condition of his being King, but a necessity of his Kingdom; that is the Manner of our Constitution will hold him to it, but takes no forfeit on him upon de failure.  
There is the Constitution itself of any State, and the Laws built upon it. As for the Constitution itself, there is no personal Sovereign whatsoever but he is sub Lege in that respect; The Constitution prescribes to him how he shall Govern. But as for the Laws hereupon for the administration which are nothing else indeed but the Will of the Supreme about the people so Governed, it must be acknowledged that when a Government is Despotical, or the State a pure State, the absolute Monarch in politics is over the Laws, because every Man is Lord of his own Will: When in a mixed State, as ours, where the Laws are not the Will of one solely, but All, in the consent of their Representatives, the Monarch here must be sub Lege, as to these Laws also, which is in itself clear. Neither does it follow because a Prince is not absolute with an absoluteness proper to Lordly Rule, or a pure State, which is hurtful both to Prince and People( when he may do what he please with the Laws,) that he is not absolute with an absoluteness proper to a mixed State, which is so equally attempered to the safety of the Prince and people, that he can neither violence them, while he is to Rule by the Laws which themselves have chosen: Nor can he be violenced by them, while his Officers are obnoxious( that they may not dare to act under him but according to Law only) but in himself left unaccountable to any but God for the transgression.  
I must not pass over this yet. The case put is about Arbitrariness of Power. We own Absoluteness, not Arbitrariness. This requires our care. Let our foreign Writers pled to us Tyranni& Regis parem esse licentiam, illud solum interest— To wit, that between a King and a Tyrant there is no difference but in their Title, and end of governing. Tyrannus erit qui negligit& subvertit bonum publicum habitâ tantum ratione sui commodi. Arnisaeus in his Doctrina politica c. 9. {αβγδ}, is Tyrannis in Arist. Pol. l. 4. c. 10. We shall grant them, this indeed is one thing, wherein they ordinarily differ, to wit in their ends. The one regardeth the Wealth of his Commons, the other the advancement of himself, his Faction and Kindred, as Sr. Thomas Smith speaks. But the formal reason of Tyranny as it differs from Royalty in a mixed State, I must place herein, that the one does govern by Law, so as therein he is Subject to it( which is Hooker's Doctrine as the Judges before) or under it: the other breaketh Laws already made, at his pleasure, and maketh other without advice and consent of his people, as the name Secretary to two of our Princes( and thereby fitted to suite his definition to our State) does express it; and accordingly does add, One may be a King in his entry of the Government, and a Tyrant in the administration. De Rep. Ang. l. 1. c. 7. Happier that people( are the words of Hooker from Archytas) whose Law is their King in the greatest things, then that, whose King is himself their Law. Out of the same Author he adds, where this order is not, a King groweth to be a Tyrant. Indeed there will be a ground laid by us, both of danger and error if we distinguish not of places. In a Government truly Regal, to become Arbitrary is Tyranny: In a Government that is Lordly, Tyranny it is certain, must be somewhat else. Let it be what Bodin or any of these mentioned will make it. We have this advantage in our Temperature, that when in a Lordly government the people may call any Prince of theirs Tyrant, whensoever they are in effect but disaffected, and have strength, they cannot do so in ours. It is easy surely for them to say their Prince regards only himself, his pleasure and profit, and neglects the common Good, and so expose him to the hate and consequences of that Name. But it will be hard for any ever to affirm of a Prince of ours, that the Habitual, Constant, Predominant, tenor of his Rule and Government here is not according to the Law of the Realm, by, and under regulation of it. In this definition then of Tyranny, I consult the safety of my Prince, Quod adprimè est utile, and ought to be well taken.  
I know moreover such Writers who are concerned especially in the French State do speak high, that there is no true absolute Monarch, who is not above his whole people and the Laws also; and they city Aristotle to this effect. Ubi Leges Dominantur negat, Aristoteles verum& absolutum Regem esse. But the learned in the Customs and Laws of our Nation will speak just contrary. Non est Rex ubi dominatur voluntas non Lex. The Sr. Thomas before mentioned and Buddeus( which is but the same book in Latin) do tell us of a double Government a {αβγδ}, and {αβγδ}, The last he Englishes a Royal Power regulated by Laws, which he mentions I apprehended as a Portraiture de industria of ours. If Aristotle then speaks as he is cited( which I have found not at once looking) I do suppose he means it of the former of these Governments a {αβγδ}, and so I will take the words of Austin, Imperatorem non esse subjectum legibus qui habet in po●estate alias leges far, cited by Barclay when he is contending that a King cannot be subject to the Laws, meaning so as to be compelled by them. But as for a {αβγδ}, where the Leges far does not lye in Potestate of one solely( as it does not with us) I must by this Counsellour's leave, take the boldness upon me to distinguish between sub Lege esse, and cogi posse; Legibus astringi, and a populo judicari. As there is a difference between a pure and a mixed State: So is there( as is before intimated) in the absoluteness of the Monarch, according to one, and the other. A mixed( mollis gentle) absoluteness will think it enough to be Soluta( free) from the one, when a pure( rigid) absoluteness will be Soluta from both of them. Let Bodin and Henningus who are French, and the learned Scot mentioned, being a Consilijs to that King, advance their Monarch to a Power so absolute that he may say what our Richard the Second was accused of his Nobles for saying, that the Law was on his head, it shall be the glory of our Nation, that we live not under such a torrid, but more temporate Zone of Absoluteness, while our Monarch is contented to yield himself to an astringi legibus, and sub lege esse, so long as he is yielded by us to be Solutus from a Cogi posse, and a populo indicari. Et quod sub Lege esse debeat, cum sit Dei vicarius, enidcnter apparet, ad similitudinem Jesu, qui cum ad reparandum humanum genus in effabiliter ei multa suppeterent, hanc potissimùm elegit viam, quasi ad destruendum opus Diaboli, non virtute uteretur potentiae said justitiae ratione;& sic Voluit esse sub lege( Here stretch not the Simile beyond the Staple ( ut eus qui sub lege erant redimerit. Noluit enim uti viribus said ratione& judicio. Bracton.  
If any then will still press me with the French politics, and what I have noted in my third exception to Bodin, who holds that no Prince is absolute but he who hath the sole Power of Legislation, and yet that our Prince is an absolute Prince, I will make an end with him at once. An absolute Monarch accipiatur dupliciter. Either we may understand by it, One in whom the Sovereignty is solely and fully, wholly and altogether placed: or One whose Dominion is not held upon Condition. In the first sense there is no Prince in a mixed Government can be an absolute Monarch, for the constitution of a mixed State does place the Supreme Power or rights of Majesty in him with others. The most high and absolute Power of the Realm of England consisteth in the Parliament, says Smith, l. 2. c. 2. But that our Princes of England are absolute in the second sense, to wit, that no Mortal can take Arms against them upon pretence of non-performance of the conditions of their reigning, it is that we stand upon, as what pro virili, tam Mercurio, quam mart, is to be maintained.  
To proceed. But what think we of the great case between the King and Parliament in the late War? Is it not lawful to take Arms in such a case? For the scanning hereof indifferently, The ground of this Case hath been placed I suppose by most of the Sober, in their apprehension of a Co-ordination of Powers, not well understood. They have supposed the Government to be a mixed Government in regard of division of Power; As if the trees ordines hujus Regni, were trees Potestates, as the several States united in the Netherlands: Or at least as if one part thereof lay in the King, another in the Peers, another in the Commons, and each party were to defend his own. Now when in some foreign States there are petty Powers who depend not on those that are greater, but are distinct, and so have jus gladij( if they dare use it) in case of wrong against the greater: Many have been apt to judge likewise, that the Lords, or Commons, or inferior Magistrates may do the like here, when they concluded the people, of themselves ( bearing not the Sword) might not. Upon such a conception perhaps as this, the Wars were not the first of that Nature which have been in this Nation. But there is an handsomer conception of our Government, as a mixed Government then this.  
The three usual sorts of Government being found to degenerate ordinarily from pure into their extrams, a mixed Government hath been invented as better then any one of the other, called a Free-State. A Government is mixed in regard of placing the Supreme Power. There are three Estates in our Land. Suppose these as some would have it, the King, Lords and Commons Let these three then, as thus conceived( though without any stress at all on the word Estates) be looked on as one person, and the Supreme Power to reside in them jointly as one. The King is a chief part( says Lawson) and may not any more be divided from his Parliament than from himself. The Supreme Power according to this is but one and indivisible, and the jura Majestatis shows where it lies. Legislation, the Dominium eminens as to the Subjects purse we know lies not in the King alone. Where the last Appeal too lies we know; and if the Militia were lain with its fellows, it would do the King not a jot of hurt in this notion, wherein he and his two Houses make but one, and when they are dissolved it rests in him altogether for Execution. Now if the Supreme Power be in these three identified not several,( that is, not in King, Lords, and Commons apart, but in the Corporation together) then cannot they be coordinate Powers, and the Parliament consequently can do nothing without him, which resolves the case. A Parliament( says judge Jenkins, is a Body composed of a King their Head, the Lords and Commons the Members; all three together make one Body, and that is the Parliament, and no other. p. 80. There is such an incorporation as cannot be dissolved without the destruction of both, saith Mr. Pym in his charge. This agrees with our Laws, and the Law of the Land. p. 168. Again. The two Houses can make no Court without the King. Before the Norman Conquest and since to this day the King is Principium, Caput,& Finis Parliamenti. It appears by the treatise de modo tenendi Parliamenta in the Confessors days; By the Writ of Summons, whereby the Treaty or parlour in Parliament is to be had with the King only; By the Oath of Supremacy taken at every Parliament, It doth appear manifestly that without the King there can be no colour of a Parliament. p. 148. It is objected by Mr. Prin, The Parliament can enlarge the Kings Prerogative, and therefore it is above him. The judge answers, If the King assent, otherwise not. p. 48, This I apprehended short. Yea, it must not be the Power of the Parliament quâ Parliament, that is, of King and both Houses together, either to shorten or enlarge Sovereignty, because the rights of the personal Sovereign, or Qualification of the Power, does derive from the Constitution of a Nation, which is the only standing, grand, original Act of the Community: And the Constitution must be above the Parliament, being that, by virtue whereof, we must suppose them to act, and to be. Indeed the King in Parliament is in some sense above himself, and above the Laws made by them, but not above the Constitution, which is the predominant Law( a thing at least that is still to be supposed as though it were extant) and must control all. Upon this account, or bottom, is there a Solidity in the Lawyers advancing ancient Usage to that pitch they do, when otherwise, Dies diem docet, and latter reasons, have the more years. The Opponent and Defendant therefore, both of them in earnest, are out here in their Law, if they think a Parliament though with consent of the King can do so. By this answer, or by nothing, is Majesty rendered fixed, permanent, and indeed inviolable; beyond the reach of yesterday, and not obnoxious to any Mortal or Mortals, but to the Will and Power of God only.  
You may say A Parliament with the King may do any thing, they can do this therefore, and if they please set up a new Government. I answer, I deny it. You, may persist, The whole people may set up what Government they please, and consequently cast off any. But the Parliament are Representatives of the whole People: I reply, the people may be considered as a Community, or as a Commonwealth. The People in the capacity of a Community may indeed at first agree upon what form of Government they will, but in the capacity of a Commonwealth they can do no such matter. The reason is, because as a Community they are supposed to be in a State of liberty: but when they are brought under an order of Superiority and Inferiority, that is to be a Commonwealth, they are supposed to have contracted one with another, and must stand to their agreement. The Parliament now are Representatives of the people as a Commonwealth, not as a Community. The people are here Pars subdita, and cannot meddle with Government: Their Representarives( who with the King are Pars imperans) are chosen for Commonwealth purposes, and when they can make Laws, for the Administration, they can make none( as Waters can never arise higher then the Spring from whence they come) but in subordination to the Constitution. If the whole Nation therefore with the King would change the Government. He with his two Houses must give up the Supreme Authority, and when they have declared a Dissolution of the State, the people are turned into a Community, and may come to a new Agreement. The King then and the Forty Counties, indeed might do this, but not the King and Parliament.  
Thus much from that judge occasionally, to this purpose, though not on this account. But if our Government be a mixed Government( which is the thing we are upon) not really in the Constitution, but nominally, in regard of some Acts of Administration, it is another matter. I know there may be a dispute held about the three Estates in Parliament, whether the King is to be reckoned as one of those Estates or no? That he is, there is a Royal precedent, and the transactions of the late times, as is known, in the late Kings answer to the Parliaments 19 Propositions. There is perhaps to the reason of the thing itself; The three Estates assembled in Parliament may possibly be nothing else but the three States of Government there assembled, or comprised in that assembly. The three States of Government are Monarchy, Aristocracy, Democracy: How shall the first of these three be represented but in his Majesty? And how shall our Government be mixed of the three, if he be not one of them? The Laws of this Kingdom are made by a King, a House of Peers, and a House of Commons. These three Estates making one incorporate Body are they in whom the Sovereignty and Supreme Power is placed, says the King, in those papers mentioned. Besides, who hath the hardiness to say, if the Spiritual Lords were absent from the House, there could no Act of Parliament pass, or that when they were removed of late from thence by an Act, the three Estates were then dissolved, and our Constitution Parliamentary at an end? Nevertheless Dr. Heylin I remember, in his Quodlibetical paper does prove out of the words of a Statute in one of the Richards, and another of Queen Elizabeth, and out of my Lord cook, unto whom judge Jenkins refers, that the three Estates of the Realm are the Lords Spiritual, Temporal, and Commons. Let me turn to my Lord cook myself. The high Court of Parliament consisteth of the Kings Majesty, and the three Estates— These three Estates, and the King, are the great Corporation or Body politic of the Nation, and do sit in two Houses— But in ancient times both Houses together. Part 4. c. 1. Sr. Thomas Smith after he hath distinguished the King( as it seemeth) from the people, he hath these words: The people( says he) I call those that the word Populus doth signify( viz.) the whole Body and three Estates of the Commonwealth, B. 1. c. 7 Again, The Barons for the higher, the Knights, Esquires, Gentlemen and Commons for the lower part of the Commonwealth, the Bishops for the Clergy be present to show what is good B. 2. c. 2. I have passages by me out of Rawleigh's prerogatives of Parliament, and others( I think) asserting this, which are needless to transcribe, seeing there are two passages express in the Thanksgiving for the fift of November inserted for the nonce in our Book of Common Prayer. However this be, If the Community of England when they set up this mixed form of Government we have( let it be mixed in what regard it will) were indeed so Wise and Reserved as to agree that no Laws shall pass, Money be raised, or War undertaken, without their consent given by their Representatives, called first to advice about the same, I admire they should leave the King at perfect liberty as to his negative Voice, and dissolving their Representative at his pleasure. The consideration of the last of these alone makes me suspect that these jura Majestatis supposedly reserved by them, owe their derivation to the grants of Princes, gotten from them by Contests, rather then to that original agreement. And if Parliaments as they are called by the Writ of the King do sit and Act by that Authority alone which having called can dissolve them at Will, and by no higher( preserved for them by the Constitution) from the Community, then cannot the Parliament take Arms against the King, any more then the Subjects, as hath been spoken. Parliamentum est solemn colloquium omnium ordinum Regni authoritate Regis, ad consulendum sttatuendumque de negotijs Regni indictum, says Spelman. Neither may any argue here as against me, If the Parliament hath its Power from the King, then the Purse and Legislation also is in his Power. He hath himself all that he can give. The argument is from that topic, Causa causae est causa causati, which must be understood de causis necessarijs, not de contingentibus: The King indeed may call a Parliament at his Will, but he cannot command their consent when he hath called them. Nevertheless I determine not but this Power which lies in the Parliament jointly with the King, does flow to them immediately from the Constitution of the Land when called, rather then from that writ that called them to consult upon such an end. To go on then where I was last. The Powers that are, are only the Supreme or Subordinate. If the Supreme Power be in the Parliament, it must be in them as one with the King, and as one with him, they cannot take Arms against him: If their Power be Subordinate, they cannot rise up against the causc of their being, out of question. The sum of all is: I suppose the summum imperium of England, is regal, not Despoticum; but regal absolutum, not pactionatum. Absolutum, that is, solutum legibus. Not so, but the King is to govern according to the Laws( while I say it is regal,) but he is not Judged by them.   

CHAP. IIII. One peculiar case farther arising out of several late Acts[ wherein that Position of taking Arms by the Kings Authority against his Person, or any Commissionated by him, is required to be renounced and abjured as traitorous and to be abhorred] taken into consideration, in regard of the Consciences of so many that are concerned.  
HAving ventured thus far, I proceed to what follows. The Laws of this Realm, it is to be acknowledged according to what hath been spoken, are made by mutual consent, by the King and Parliament, and the Authority of both; and hence it is, that the King singly is sub lege, when some other absolute Monarchs in a pure State, and Despotical Government, are Lords over their Laws, as over their own Wills. Upon this Foundation it follows, that if the Law, and the Kings grants or Commissions clash, the Law must take place, because the one is but his single Will, but the other is his Will jointly, with his whole people in their Representatives the Parliament. Put then this case: The Sheriff in execution of the Law, hath Power to raise the County against any that resist him; The King in some concernment, upon some cause forbids the execution, yet he proceeds; The King Commissionates some Officers to withstand his proceedings; he raises the County upon them, and for all that executes his charge. The question will be, whether he be justifiable herein or no? How deep this draws, I leave to the Considerate and Wise. If he be justifiable, then is there a taking Arms according to Law, that is in the Kings name, or by his Authority, against those that are Commissionated by him: and how then shall such an Oath be sworn, or Subscription be subscribed, which yet is imposed upon the lieutenants and their Deputies of the Counties in one Act; on the Aldermen or Burgesses of Corporations in another: on all Deans, Canons, Prebendaries, Ministers, School-masters, or others, that have any Ecclesiastical promotion, in the Act of Uniformity; and on the Non-Conformists that live within 5 miles of a Corporate Town, in the Act of Oxford?  
It is not for me, here to be peremptory and definitive, in a positive determining the Sheriff justifiable or not: but upon supposing of either( to wit, that it may be he is not, it may be he is,) I shall be more sure and safe in the resolution of the matter.  
The reasons to justify the Sheriff do lye in the foundation mentioned: But there appears against him the Militia Acts. An Act declaring the sole right of the Militia to be in the King. An Act for ordering the Forces in the several County of this Kingdom. For as much as the sole command and disposition of the Militia, is, and by the Laws of England, ever was, the undoubted right of his Majesty, and that both, or either of the Houses of Parliament, cannot, nor ought to pretend to the same, nor can, nor lawfully may raise, or levy any War offensive or defensive against him, and yet the contrary hath of late been practised, Be it declared and Enacted. In these Acts, and another as I remember, the sole Power, Command and Disposition of the Arms of the Nation is placed in his Majesty; and the word Sole as well as Supreme is used purposely for exclusion of the Parliament, that it lies solely in him, and not in the Parliament, or any deriving from them. It seems then, that the Law, which is the Act, or Acts of Parliaments, is not the Fountain of Power in the business of the Militia. It seems then( I say by way of reasoning, it seems) that a man who acts herein, is not to be Governed by the Law, but he must be justified by the Kings command. It seems then, that the Power which the Sheriff has in raising Forces for execution of the Law, must be under the check and control of the King, seeing in his hands the sole command and disposition of those Forces, as all else in the Realm do lye. It seems then, that the Personal Will of the King, which must indeed( according to the Foundation mentioned) give place to his Legal Will in other things, in the matter of Arms must have the predominance, ot rather it must be held, to be all one with his Law, and absolutely to be obeied. This I shall suppose first.  
It may be Objected, There are some Statute, or Statutes, which in the late times were pleaded for resisting evil Cousellours, and Commissioned Officers, and the bringing Delinquents to punishment, notwithstanding any Letters under the Great Seal or Little Seal, in the like or the same words. I Answer, I dare not take upon me so much skill in these Statute books, as I desire caution, and refer such Statutes to the more Learned in the Law, and what was said to them, by the eminent of the Kings party. It suffices me to produce these Militia Acts, wherein the sole right of Arms is declared to be in the King, and consequently the latter Statutes taking place of all former( whereof yet they are made but the interpreters) the Conscience is I take it in point of Law to rest satisfied therein; for whatsoever might be pretended or supposed to be Law before, this is declared to be Law now, and what, ought ever( as the Acts account) to have been held so to be. It is a maxim in the Law of Parliament( says my Lord cook) quod leges posteriores, priores contrarias abrogant.  
I will not conceal where indeed does lye the most grievous difficulty. I A. B. do swear, or subscribe, it is not lawful to take Arms against the King; and I abhor the Position of taking Arms by the Kings Authority against his Person, or any Commissionated by him. It is absolutely unlawful I apprehended to take Arms against the King himself, or against any Commissionated by him for the execution of the Laws, or his Legal Will: but if he should Commissionate any to execute his pleasure or Private Will against the Law, here will be the question that is sore. Put the cases over I pray, as to them, put before as to the King, What if any Commissionated Officers should come to destroy Magna Charta, or the peoples Liberty, to kill the Country and take their goods, might neither Courts, Justices, Sheriffs, or People, resist defensively, yea and bring those Subjects to punishment? I will not give a positive answer to this question, there is no need always to do so. Nevertheless I will offer so much readily to it, as may give the conscience satisfaction in reference to the words premised, which here alone is that I make my task. I will suppose then, that it is not lawful on any pretence whatsoever to take Arms against the Kings own Person, his Government, or Laws: so that the first part of the words may be admitted on the account of what hath been said. And as for those Commissionated by him, it is in a second part, or clause, where the position to be renounced, is the taking Arms by the Kings Authority against such. Now I will suppose likewise, when the command and disposition of the Militia is declared to lye solely in the King, that it is not justifiable by Law to take Arms against those that bring his command in their Commissions, because according to the express words, as they appear, it is a flat contradiction thereunto. If it were lawful then for the whole people, when not for a part, to rise defensively, when not invasively, against any Subject or Subjects, when upon no terms against the King himself, in case of extremity for necessary preservation: this was not to be done by the Kings Authority, as justifiable by the Law of the Land( when the Militia Acts have declared the Law to be otherwise,) but if it were warrantable to be done, it must be by the Law of Nature, upon which they were to stand. I say not the point so stated is justifiable by the light of Nature, I meddle not with it, I need not: But I say if it were, I should the rather discard the unsound pretence of taking Arms by the Kings Authority, or by his Laws, which would not hold against such, when there was the Authority of God in the Law of Nature, to justify the same.  
You may say to all this, It is not in the Power of the Parliament to give away the Militia to the King, but it must remain where it is placed by the Constitution of the Nation. I answer, If the Constitution of the Land be such that it places the Militia in the Parliament, and not in the King alone, there are few I think red in politics, will affirm that any Act of Parliament can rise higher then the Constitution. Nay, if any Law or Laws be made by a Personal Sovereign which do overthrow the Constitution, by virtue whereof, or rather according to which, he holds the Power he hath from God, such a Law, or Laws are destitute of Authority, and ipso facto null and voided. The whole business therefore lies in this, whether the Constitution of our Land hath placed the right of the Militia in the King alone, or not? And here I know I am on the safer side. I confess according to the principles of Policy, it is a thing very agreeable, that where the Power of Legislation is lodged, there should be the Power of the Militia, that the Laws may be rendered of force; and where the Militia is placed, there should be the Power of the Purse, because the one can command the other, This is therefore the handsomer notion I have said before, yet if it hath so pleased any Community in their framing their Constitution, for reasons to themselves, to place these matters otherwise, who can say to these Potters, why have you framed your day thus? And what if the Founders of our State have seen it good that they would not have their Laws made, nor Estates touched, without their own consent in their Representatives, and yet in the business of making Peace and War( where present Counsels and Expedition is necessary often times, that it cannot wait such a preparation as that) they thought it best to dispose the Power thereof altogether in the Prince, who can say any thing to contradict the same? I confess it is not in the Power of the King and Parliament to make our Constitution, no nor to alter it; they are the peoples Representative to Parliament-purposes, not to that purpose, but it is in their Power to declare it; this is not only in their Power, but this I take it, is their Office. And though there be no declaration can be valid in apparent falsehood, because truth is greatest, and must overcome all things: Yet when its impossible to evince the contrary, the declaration of our superiors that are in Authority over us, must be obligatory, both because of the fifth Commandment, and also because otherwise we must be at an endless loss in the case. There be some to this purpose will tell us that the division of the Regaliae in our State, to wit, the placing the Militia in the King, the Purse in the Parliament, and Legislation in them both, is agreeable to the Lawyers. I undertake not that, but I may be apt to believe, then disprove them; and when I suppose as readily as any, that in the Constitution of a State, it is very suitable to politics to lay these jura Majestatis or prerogatives together, and make them inseparable, and consequently that those persons who have placed the Sovereignty of our State in King and Parliament jointly on that account, have spoken tightly according to the rules and reason of those who writ of such things: Yet when we come to the point of fact, whether it be so in the Constitution of our State indeed, or no, this is certainly another matter; and I may not argue, this or that seems most agreeable to my reason to have been done, seeing the question is only what is done? Wherein we must at last either have recourse to some records which are authentic to the contrary, or else sit down in that which is next of credit hereunto, the declaration of Parliament about the same.  
I will add, if it could be proved that this was part of the Constitution of the Realm, that the people might defend their rights against any that invaded them, saving harmless the Kings person, yet must this Position( in the words expressed) be discarded still. I make it good. The Constitution of a Nation we are to know once for all( whatsoever the Civil or Common Lawyer may call Constitution) is in politics nothing else but this, to wit the Original agreement of the people, how, and in what manner, they would be Governed, when at first they framed their Commonwealth: and if it could be proved then, that the Community of England agreed or consented not to be Governed by King, or by a King and Parliament, but on these terms, that they would defend their rights against either, if they were invaded by them, then must not their taking Arms in that case be by the Kings Authority or Parliaments either, or by virtue of any Law proceeding from them, but by the Authority of the Community who framed the Constitution, and by virtue of that Mother-law, upon which, as above theirs, the personal Sovereignty of King and Parliament both depends. But now in regard this is not a thing possible to be proved, seeing we have not a copy of that original agreement, so as what is essential and naturally consequential to Parliaments we may suppose to belong thereunto, but otherwise we have nothing but the footsteps of the Laws which have successively passed in our Parliaments to insist upon, and they having now declared the right of the Militia, not barely to be, but ever to have been in the Prince alone, we are to conceive of this Grand Charter, which is Magna mayor,( and time hath eaten the words out) to have been accordingly; and not to have been contrary without Testimony or probation.  
If we look over our Nation, the first time we hear of it with any truth is under the Romans. Then came the Saxons and divided it into an Heptarchy; then one of those Kings prevails over the rest and reduces it into one Kingdom; afterwards came the Danes for a lesser season; and then William the conqueror, and so we continue. Now where I pray, or in whose time shall we lay the Constitution of our Nation, I mean, when was it, or at what time, that we are to account that it was formed? Shall we lay it in William? I think not, because though he was called the conqueror, he pretended a good title, and altered not the Foundation of our State, but only added some Laws, which any Prince in an orderly way may do. For Canutus, or the Danes, they did less as to any alteration of the Constitution then the Norman. As for Egbert, who I think it was that reduced the Heptarchy, he did I account but restore the ancient Monarchy, and though he changed the name into England, the Government in the kind none can suppose but the same. For the Romans they left us in a Monarchy, and found Princes here, and if we look beyond them, we must come up to those persons who at first in our iceland resolved upon Government, and that they would have a King. The Government of this Kingdom by a royal Sovereign hath been as ancient as History is, That usage so practised( says Jenkins) makes a fundamental Law. And here indeed does the prime constitution take his root: but who will say this is ours, or that ours is this? Who can tell us this first British agreement; and declare us the Instrument of it? If you will have it laid by Egbert, we are as much in ignorance also, what the Nation consented to when they came in entirely to him. If we had that perfect body of Law Edward the Confessor drew up, it might happily tell us something. But if then you desceud below the time of the conqueror to find our Constitution out, where shall it be placed? Will you have it lye in Magna Charta? That must not be, because Magna Charta, and charta de foreste or the like, were the grants of our Kings, and the Constitution is that supposed Law of Laws and greater charter from whence the Prince himself holds his rights as the people their liberties, and must be therefore another matter. Shall we go then to the Statutes of the Realm? Nay, these are all Acts of the personal Sovereign, which suppose the Sovereign before, and consequently they do not give the royal Power, or make the State, but they declare that Power. The Lex that made him is long ago out of books, the Lex that declares him supposedly according to that Lex that made him, does as it seems, in two or three Acts( which are the latest, and therefore must stand, till contraried or reversed) declare so much to be and ever to have been the right of the King( I mean the Militia acts cited) as no person can take Arms upon any pretence whatsoever against him, or on pretence of his Authority against such as are Commissionated by him, without contradiction( I suppose) to that declaration, and consequently the Constitution, as it stands now declared, is for the premises, and preys to have costs.  
It is time for me after this to come to the supposition on the contrary in the case proposed. Suppose the Lawyers should determine that the Sheriff were to be justified notwithstanding the Militia Acts. There is an harmony, or reason of Law in general, to wit of all the Laws together which concern the Government in its administration, which have a mutual habitude and relation as they consist with one another, that may be very near a definition of the Constitution in some mens apprehensions. The Sheriff in our Land according to his office hath the Authority for executing the Law in his County, and so may in the name of the King raise the force of it to that end. If the Militia now does so lye in the King, that he may command off those Forces and dispose them at his pleasure, then is his Authority frustrate, and insufficient to its end. Consequently that harmony, which I take it, they mean, by reason of Law, is broken, and the Law is made inconsistent with itself, because the office of the Sheriff, and the sole command of the Militia in the King, cannot both stand together( as it seems) in this point. I must confess moreover I am very tender in this matter. Here is a Position of taking Arms by the Kings Authority against his Person, and against those that are Commissionated by him, is to be abjured. It is not( I know) for serious persons to wallow any words in so solemn a thing as an Oath without chewing, and much less to be willingly ignorant of what the considerate have against it, who in pondering the matter will I suppose see quickly, that by the Kings Authority, is all one as, by the Law: and when they are content perhaps to subscribe that they abhor taking Arms in the name of the King, or upon pretence of the Law, against his Person, because the Law is conceived to preserve still his Sacred person inviolable, yet they may not be able to say so as to those Commissionated by him, because they conceive their Commission maybe illegal and that the Kings Authority issued out according to Law is to be preferred before that which is issued out only by Commission. For my part I believe it could not be the intent of the Parliament as to the mayor part, in these Oaths or Subscriptions, to advance the personal command or Commission of the King, above Law, I mean in genere to do so, which were to change the Government, from Royal or Regal, into Lordly or despotical. I shall offer it therefore as a matter of special verdict at the Bar of the most skilful in reason and Law, whether there be any case possible of taking Arms by the Kings Authority in his Commissions( Note, I speak only in the matter of Arms) can be put so, as that the Authority of the Law, may be said thereby to be opposed? If it may, the Case in conscience remains to be answered. But I question it, because the Will alone of the King in the whole business of the Militia( the sole Power thereof being in him by these Acts) as it seems, must be Law, or equivalent with Law, when in all other cases, not of the Militia, the Law is certainly above, and more then his single Will, and consequently hath place of his Commissions. Power is a right to command; That right in any Subject, does lye only in the Will of the Supreme. Well, if the sole Power of Arms lies in the King, then must the Sheriff's Power to raise Arms in such and such cases he is authorised to, be nothing else but the Kings Will that he should do it. The Sheriff now raises Arms in his name, one comes and forbids him in his name, and shows his Commission. Here, is not the Sheriff gon, seeing the King is Master of his own Will, and can reverse it? If you say it is not his Will alone, but the Law that gives him his Power to act in the case, I ask, how then does the sole Power of the Arms lye in the King, when it seems that it is the Law he pleads for his taking Arms, which is not the Kings Will alone( or his sole Will, which he opposes,) but the Will and Act of his Parliament with him? I will come to a conclusion therefore, and leave the question. It is enough for me in the issue, if the Conscience be resolved as to a lawful submitting to the injunction, though the question be unresolved. I say thus then, either the Sheriff is to be justified, or he is not. Let these determine that will and can. If he be not, then is all objection vanished at the Militia Acts, the doubt and scruple is over, and we have done. If he be to be justified, then do I say that the Militia Acts must on necessity receive such a construction as that we are to conceive that the King and Parliament who passed them intended not to include any consequences of such a Nature as the disabling the Sheriff from executing the Law in the case supposed would come to, when they thought only of preventing illegal practices in all Insurrection and Rebellion. That is as much as to say, they intended to prevent any future War between King and Parliament, by declaring the sole Power of the Militiato be in the King, but they never intended it should be destructive in the least( in any case supposed or to be supposed) to the good and wholesome Laws of the land, which do empower any Officers for the execution of law and justice, or preservation of the liberties of the Kingdom. And if this be their meaning( which removes all that is grievous) and we may so interpret them, then must they in the imposing these Oaths and Subscriptions mentioned be construed also in the same, and no other meaning, and according to their meaning are they to be taken. I draw this up, either it was then their meaning by the repeated declaration of their Acts to exempt all cases of the Militia, even that of the Sheriff insisted on( supposing it put) from the dispose of any but the Kings personal Will: or it was not their meaning. If it was their meaning, then is that to be held for Law, and the Conscience hath nothing left to object in these Oaths or Subscriptions mentioned: If it be not their meaning, these Oaths and subscriptions must be taken( that is sworn, and subscribed) only according to their meaning, and so the difficulty is resolved.  
I pass with this advertizement. There is a strict, scrupuled sense ( N. B.) of the impositions of our superiors, wherein if a man be extreme to mark every word or thing that can be thought or said according to the rigour of it, there is no flesh living able to abide any of them: or there is a larger, customary, allowed sense of such words or things, when not only those that comform to them do take them in the same, but those that are scrupuled at them do suppose and verily believe that the meaning of the Imposers was no more then they can currently together with others yield unto. And in this construction I profess( where there is any such) both that the Conscience ought to lay down her scruples, and all impositions that were, are, or shall be, must be taken. Talis interpretatio in ambiguis eligenda est, ut evitetur inconveniens& absurdum. And Excessivum omne( says Sr. Edward cook) in jure, reprobatur.   

CHAP. V. The Solution of an Objection, That Majestas imperij and Salus populi may not be rendered inconsistent with one another.  
FOr the impugning the Doctrine of indefinite Subjection there are several things I know alleged, which might swell my Book more then is needful. Some instances( as of David and the Macchabees) are brought out of the Old Testament; and many things in reference to Religion have been said in the late times. But forasmuch as we have so much Scripture against Resistance as there is in the New, and so many precepts there, of Patience, of Suffering, of Faith, of the across: I shall commend these Texts ensuing, Mat. 5.39. Luk. 6.29. Ro. 12.17. Mat. 5.10, 11, 12. 2 Cor. 4.17. Ja. 5.10, Heb. 10.32, 33, 34. Heb. 11.35, 36, 37. Mat. 16.24. Mark 8.34, 35. Heb. 3.1, 2, 3. Phil. 2.6.8. 1 Pet. 2.18, 19, 20, 21, to the Consciences of every sober Christian, as in the sight of God, and content myself with that of Grotius for this place. Illa questio gravior, an quantum Davidi, an quantum Machabaeis licuit, liceat& Christianis, quorum Magister crucem subire toties jubens, exactiorem patientiam videtur requirere. Certe ubi Superiores ob religionem mortem inteutant Christianis, Christus fugam concedit, ultra fugam nihil.  
And unto this Dr. Hammond in his papers between him and Mr. Marshal gives his suffrage. But there is an Objection of an higher moment, wherein I see not that they come off so easily; An objection of another topic then from Example, which indeed enters the very Nature and End of Government itself, and cannot be waved with faithfulness to this cause. It is this. If there be such a Power attributed to Princes, then may they not only oppress any of their particular Subjects according to their unbrideled Wills, but they may take such courses as are destructive to the whole, and if we may not then take Arms against them, there shall be more care had for the Means, that is the Governours, then for the End( unto which they are Ministers,) the common good and safety of the people.  
I must acknowledge, I am encouraged to venture on this Objection by the learned Primate Usher in his Book of the Power of Princes, or else I should be startled, when I find those two great Champions for the same Power, Barclay and Grotius at a stand here. Barclaius ait amitti Regnum si Rex verè hostili animo in totius populi exitium feratur. Quod concedo, consistere enim simul non possunt voluntas imperandi,& voluntas perdendi. Grotius De jur. Bel l. 1. c. 4. What then does he say if he yield this? Why in Rege mentis compote, vix videtur id accidere posse. To frame such a case then, under this double circum●●ance, that it must be animo perdendi, and in exitium totius is not to be conceived a thing in the World ever likely to be, and so not to come into the thought, to stumble any on that account. Quid ergo? Nulline casus incidere possunt( says Barclay) quibus populo in Regem arma capere jure suo liceat? Nulli certe quamdiu Rex manet. Duos autem casus invenio quibus Rex ex rege non Regem se facit. Adversus Mon. l. 3. c. 16. In such a case as this then( and he instances in Nero and Caligula) a King ceases to be King with him. Nevertheless I shall not so leave the Objection, nor yet trust too much to the notion of the prince being Unking'd in this case, seeing if he willingly prosecute those ways which will ruin the Commonwealth, whatsoever his mind, purpose or intention be in it, as we cannot tell, so it were little odds as to the main. I answer therefore in the first place from Scripture, the Apostle hath set down our duty which is Subjection indefinitely, and we are not to break Gods command for earthly advantage, but we must do our duty, that is perform his command, and leave the issue to him, who can turn all things to the best. We must not do evil that good may come of it. And must we not do good, though evil succeeds? We are to be subject not only for Wrath but Conscience sake; If we resist, we resist the ordinance of God, that is, we do not only break his precept, but as I must inculcate, we would not in effect have him to be the Orderer of things, we would dethrone him of his providence, and be ourselves in his room. Now when there is such evil as this at the root, how can we think that the possibility of the evil of misery, can warrant us the evil of sin? In the next place, as to the reason of the thing, I shall offer this consideration. To wit, As there is no mischief can befall a private person, that can stand in competition with the safety of the Commonwealth, or the whole Government itself, that for the prevention thereof, this should be endangered: So is there no mischief or ruin on one whole Government but it must give place to the safety of all. I pray weigh it, Upon the truth of this proposition, Quod nulla ex causa( in Arnisaeus's words) subditis fas sit contra legitimum principem arma sumere, does the safety of not one, but all the Governments upon Earth depend: and there is no mischief from the ill courses of any Prince, but is to be held better then such an inconvenience as the infrindgment of the verity of this Doctrine is, which were a Womb of far greater and ampler evils. If there be any case wherein a Subject may take Arms( says Dr. tailor) there may be some other like it, and who shall be judge hereof? If we ourselves be judges, Lo what a gap is opened to Disorder, wars, ruin, ruin of all, ruin with out end. It is true our doctrine does provide for the security of Governers, even when the common good is accidentally left open to oppression: yet in regard it is the concern not of one Government but all, and many Governours are good, the most but indifferently bad, and none at the worst so bad, but it is better, or more conducive to the common good, that we should have such as they are, rather then none at all, the security at root is not greater for the Means then the End.  
And now I pray let this I have spoken so royally, have its due grains of understanding. When I pled for subjection to Governours, I pled for them as {αβγδ}, as the Powers that are, which comprehends the Constitution whereby they Govern with their Persons; {αβγδ} I say chiefly, and {αβγδ} as from {αβγδ} distinguished. The Constitution of Nations hath provided for the good of the Community, or the Community, hath provided for the good of themselves( that is the public) in their Constitution; {αβγδ}. What is not profitable to the Bee-hive, is not profitable to the Bee, says Antoninus. Potest, quod inutile Republicae sit, id cuiquam civi utile esse? says Cicero accordingly in his Book De Officijs often. If Rulers rule not according to their Constitution, they are not the Powers that be( not {αβγδ},) for the Powers that be, are the the Powers so constituted. Those persons who get into Rule without the title which is required to the Ruler in the Constitution, may not be held the Powers that be, upon the same account. Indeed the Ordinance or Will of God is a complex thing, which contains more then one matter in it; It contains in it that there shall be a Government and Subjection, and that those that rule should be rightful and right Governours, to wit, that they should have a due title, and act duly, according to the Constitution. But if any shall not have a right title, I dare not say that this Will is( as to us) there should then be no subjection For this Will of God objectively taken being an aggregate thing, some of the things it contains in it must be greater and some less, and God Almighty we are to know( and then suppose) does Majus& Minus velle, according to the condition of the things he would have, or wills. It is a greater matter now( or a matter of far greater concern) that there be Government, then that the governor have a right title, and the greater matter then in the case I judge must take place of the less. The resolution of this will draw in its fellow. If a Prince hath a right title, but acts in some things contrary to the Constitution, those acts of his are to be esteemed indeed with out Power, and if the Subject does not obey him in them he resists not the Power, which Hooker may tell us clearly, if he tell us no more: But when the Subject may forbear to act, he may not resist; As the word in the original is opposed to Subjection, undoubtedly he may not. The Subject is here to be restive( if I may so speak,) not resistive, I mean it as the people in the case of Jonathan was, they would not act, which was the right course they were to take, when they were never the less under due Subjection unto Saul for that. The reason for this is the same here as before. The right the Prince hath to the Government is a greater thing then the right ●o such or such a particular act. When I do then not obey him in such an act or thing unto which he has no right, upon the ground( which he perhaps may pled for my doing, to wit) of being subject to the Power that is, I may not take Arms and rise against him for that act( or for the imposing of that, or any such act,) because the right( I say) he hath to the ruling Power in general being a greater thing then this, I must give way in the less for Gods Ordinance sake. I return to what I was saying. The command of God does bind us to the Powers that be. The Powers thus and thus constituted are the Powers that be. We must make no more, nor no less of it then the Apostle. Whatsoever be the Powers then, whether limited or unlimited, arbitrary or regal, conditional or absolute, the inconveniencies that may arise upon the Subject thereby, will not dissolve their Allegiance, so long as they are the Powers that be, according to the Constitution. Thus much I must declare and acknowledge once for all, that the Word of God meddles not with the bounds and limits of the Sovereign Power in any States or Kingdoms, but taking them as it finds them, it requires Subjection to the Power that is. Chemnitius from Luther hath turned this into an Axiom. Evangelium non obolet Politias.  
Not but indeed there are diversities of Powers( or States) which must be considered according to their several conditions. The Magdeburgenses who were men of great learning and pains are noted for this opinion. Imperatores& Reges esse primarios vassallos imperij& Regni,& proinde si feloniam contra imperium aut Regnum committant feudo privari, perinde ut alios vassallos. The ground hereof I take it is laid in the nature of other States which are divers from ours; and we may see, the Empire being the chiefest State of any perhaps with these persons, how they judge of other States thereby, when the German Empire is not an absolute Monarchy, it is proved out of Bodin at large, and granted by others. When Luther agreeably had taught that the Magistrate should not be resisted, and some Lawyers proved to him that the Laws of the Empire permitted resistance, he then held they might make a League to defend themselves. Sleidan. Lib. 8. The reason of this satisfaction, was, because the Gospel( said he before Chemnitius) abolishes not the Laws of any Commonwealth. Under this fit construction, what Paraeus hath wrote upon the Romans may find its favourable allowance: whose careful Son excuses his pious Father, that what he had said of a pactionary State or Government, ought not to have been drawn unto an absolute. And to this effect it will not be hard I suppose, to find Divines of the german States speaking as Zwinglius( quoted to me by him who shall next be name,) When Kings rule unfaithfully they may be deposed. Which we need not wonder at, when that eminent Prelate Bilson in his Book of the true difference between Christian Subjection and Unchristian Rebellion, wherein he does so stoutly defend the Authority of the Prince against the Pope, and all private Rebellion, he does yet( as it seems out of conviction) express himself with care, yet very plainly. There may fall extremities( says he, speaking of chilperic deposed for insipiency) wherein Princes are not able to guide themselves, and much less their Realms, p. 420. Again, defending the Protestants in their stirs in Germany, Flauders, France, and Scotland, I will not( says he) pronounce all that resist Rebels. Cases may fall out even in Christian Kingdoms where the people may pled their right against the Prince and not be charged with Rebellion. I pray let us hear those cases. If a Prince should go about to subject his Kingdom to a foreign Realm, or change the form of a Commonwealth from empery to tyranny, or neglect the Laws established by common consent of Prince and People to execute his own pleasure: In these and other cases that might be name, If the Nobles and Commons join together to defend the ancient and accustomend Liberty, Regiment, and Laws, they may not be accounted Rebells, p. 520. In short, the Pope may not meddle, but the whole Realm may defend their rights by Arms against Princes. Let us have his Foundation. I denied that Bishops had Authority to prescribe conditions to Kings when they crwoned them, but I never denied that the people might preserve the Foundation freedom, and Form of their Commonwealth, which they fore-prized when they first consented to have a King, p. 521. Here I will join issue with him, according to what we have had before. While a people are yet in forming their Government, singular persons( as well the Eminenter as Formaliter Cives) must be subject to he universal; In the universal then( when States arise thus, at least while they are rising) does lye a real Sovereignty, whose rights are to agree upon what form of Government the Community thinks best, and to appoint the Manner( to borrow that comprehensive phrase of Samuel) of their personal Sovereign, as hath been before. If they be so cautious now as not to consent( which consent is causa sine qua non, or necessary condition, not efficient of Power) to be governed but upon terms, and their Governours shall be accountable upon Mal-administration, ordering some Officer ( deriving from them) to that purpose, who can gainsay, but the case is all one as when Princeps and subditi are obliged ex contractu? Arnisaeus will hold Rex pactionatus ubi pactum non servat deponi potest. De jur. Ma. l. 1 c. 6. Upon this account what Luther, Zuinglius, and the Magdcburgenses say, is as good as what is said by Bilson. But here then does lye the question, whether there were indeed any such terms fore-prized( to use that most Reverends own words) in the constituting our Commonwealth of England, that the Prince should be called to account by the Sword in any case whatsoever? That the people have their rights is out of question, why else is the King Sworn when he is crwoned? The sum of which comes to this, that they shall be Governed only according to Law. But whether this be one of their rights that they may take Arms against the Prince if wronged, is, id quod restat probandum, I red indeed in our Chronicles in King John's time and Henry the third's, what a stir the Barons kept for their rights in those wars, but though I think the Subject is beholden to them for the Effect, I do not know how to justify them in their Cause. If any shall say Bilson does hold indeed that the whole people may defend their liberti●s when a Prince goes about to destroy them, and so take Arms, but he says not they may take Arms against the King, his Person, Authority, Government, or Laws: Let him that will so distinguish, make me that difference clear and sound, I shall honour Bilson, and thank him, and come to this end with both. That it is possible for some Doctrine to be good( at least well-accepted) under Queen Elizabeth, which was hardly approved by King James, became dangerous under King Charles and is now razed by Acts of the late Parliament under his Son.  
There is indeed one question lies at the heart of all, and that is, whether the whole people, or their Sovereign be greater? Which question if it may not be baulked, I dispatch thus. Distinguish we of the people as a Community, or as a Commonwealth; and of the greater, quoad finem, and quoad authoritatem. That the whole people, as a Commonwealth, are greater then the Magistrate, quoad finem, I think manifest, because he is appointed for their Weal. But that the people, as a Commonwealth, are greater quoad authoritatem, I suppose it so far from truth that the people as they are under a Commonwealth have indeed no Power at all. The whole Power of the Commonwealth( quâ Commonwealth) lies in the Sovereign, who is the pars imperans, and the people pars subdita only. Nevertheless take the people as a Community it must be acknowledged that the original Grant or Charter from God is conveyed immediately to them, and the Power of their Magistrate comes from that Charter. Consequently, if there happens any such case as that by the act of God or Man, the Commonwealth comes to a dissolution, so that the Prince and Subject( to make something of Barclay) does indeed cease, then may the Universality challenge( if they will) the greatest authority, and take Arms for their defence against any that shall go to oppress them: But while the Legal Constitution, and Order of Prince and People abides, this Doctrine of Subjection( and that indefinite) must hold good even against the whole Body. Quando agitur de principe supremo non habente Superiorem, non potest ullo modo occidi a subditis, etiam si tyrannice vixerit. Tholosanus de Rep. l. 26. c. 6. Quamdiu Rex est( says Barclay) Superior semper populo est, alioqui Rex non esset,& superiorem ab inferiore judicari posse, contra rationem est, contraque naturam. Against him there is no rising up, says a greater Authority.   

CHAP. VI. The general Case or Cases of Conformity, which respect the Church as well as civil Obedience, proposed and weighed with candour and indifferency, that the rigid of those that comform not may not censure others that have Conformed, and those that are willing to comform, and are able, may have peace in it.  
THere are two parts of this Discourse intended in the Title, The one of Loyalty against Resistance, which is dispatched: The other of Obedience for Conformity or Compliance with the present Establishment, so far I could wish really as may possibly be without offending their Consciences, to all whatsoever. There is a State-Conforming, and a Church-conforming; The Act of Uniformity, and the Oxford Act, with other Acts. A Conformist to the State may be a Non-conformist. The Non-conformist is not all one with the Refractory. A Christian must comform to God, and to his Ordinance, the Powers that are, when he cannot comform( in every thing at least) to the Church, and will not to the World.  
As for Ecclesiastical Conformity, all are not alike easy. There was a time the Nation had the overture of a Concord between the sober of two parties, and lo, in stead of that composition( which must still be implored as equal) a streight injunction of assent and consent to all things New and Old, or one of them must put up and be gone. How can those here whose judgments are perhaps, and have been for Moderation in times before, as now, come over thus to one party altogether on such terms? This hath moved some to no good Will. Again, It is God rules mens inclinations; They whose conversations show them most faithful, whose Zeal to the life and power of Holiness is most serious, whose faces are toward Zion, have ordinarily no heart here, they go another way. This enters into many a mans Soul. Moreover, There are strange things in the Revelations, the rise of two Beasts, whereof the one seems to be the Power Ecclesiastical; and there is a Babylon spoken of, out of which we are to come. I would to God we were sure what this Babylon and Beast are, that we could know where to be safe. I am sure our Protestant Divines have spoken so seriously of these things that they have frighted our people of this Nation so far from Popery, that we have run almost out of our Wits, and can't tell yet when we are far enough, least we be still in Babylon, and the Beast have us. Such a Constitution of things, as, whether by Romish Idolatry, or other way of external Worship or form of Religion, undermines and persecutes the Life, Power, and Spirituality of it, is the Beast, Babylon, and Antichrist for ought some know. And consequently there may be a great difference to such, between joining with the Bishops, Cranmer, Ridly, Latimer, Hooper, in those things they imposed then, when they were coming out of Babylon, and comforming to them now when their faces seem to be towards it. What? Toward Popery? No, perhaps they believe no such matter, but to such a way of Discipline and Worship, as carrying a countenance of either, but being rather only a kind of Idols thereof, by the show pomp and formality of these things they indeed contain not in them, the Life, Power, and Efficacy of both, is undermined and lost. This where it lights sinks in deepest. Nevertheless in regard our dwellings in flesh are dark; and Pride and Superstition are two close sins; we cannot tell but Separation may be the Child of one of those two Mothers. For as there is a placing Religion in those things wherein there is none, that is Superstition on one hand: So is there a placing Evil and danger in those things wherein there is none, that is Superstition on the other: more weak, and perhaps more pernicious, as more against the goodness of God, and the conversation of Mankind one with another. I am you see impartial, God knows the truth on both sides. But were it not for these secret, deep impressions upon the hearts of good Men, that we can't tell what they be( unless aliquid {αβγδ},) more then the objections only in their mouths and pens, the business of Conformity and Grace might come to farther parley.  
To carry on this task then, there are three things that require our distinction and due consideration. The matter of Conformity, or the matters themselves imposed. The forms of Words, Composure, or manner wherein those matters are drawn up into such and such impositions. The scandal from without, unto which the tender Christian is to have such regard that what is lawful in its self, may not yet be done by him with sin to another.  
For the middlemost of these( to begin there as most commodious to the rest) I must needs enter this pre-admonition, that I cannot but think it a reasonable thing that those who prepare such doses as are enjoined in late Acts, for others, should consult with the Stomach of the Patients, to wrap them up in such expressions, as would go down best with them. There are the Compilers therefore of these Pills, and the Takers. I distinguish the parts of these in the point of their justification. For the Compilers I say nothing, For the Taker, I apprehended, he is to look to the sense and import of what is prescribed, and if he be satisfied in that, he is to impute the form and words to the Compiler, and not charge their oversights to the guilt of his Soul.  
It is true, the interpretation of an Oath( say Casuists) is stricti juris; and we are to think no otherwise of every solemn Declaration imposed in our Acts: Nevertheless, as there are certain restrictions allowed to the obligation of an Oath itself, such as Quantum possibile, Quoad licet, Rebus sic stantibus, when taken: So in the taking, and consequently in all these injunctions, there are some conditions that are common to all Words and Speeches, necessary to be understood and granted, or else there is nothing can be spoken, promised, or sworn by any man, that he can assent unto, but what is spoken, promised or sworn to, in his own Words. Such a common condition now, I suppose this, that whatsoever is declared promised or sworn in these matters, as in all things in the World besides, the words must have an Equal interpretation. There is the very letter, and there is the meaning of Laws, and so of these impositions. The meaning is the mind of the Lawgiver or the imposer. His Will is t●● Law, and his Meaning is his Will. In the general then we must take up here, That whatsoever the form of words be, wherein any matter is enjoined, those that submit to that matter, must take it in the supposed sense of the King and Parliament who passed the same according to their declared words, receiving and bearing an equal interpretation.  
Indeed the sense of a Parliament being not single, yet the declared words not varying, there is a latitude must go to an Equal meaning; Neither is it material what two or three or more of the harder-grained aimed at in passing an injunction, for so long as a man is to take it only in that sense which he verily believes was intended by the mayor part, there is nothing but what is candid, or at least nothing that is unreasonable is to be attributed to it. If you say the mayor part do differ in their meaning, and so we cannot go by the meaning of the mayor part, you may cavil as well, the Parliament have no meaning at all to go by, because they have not all one meaning. I answer that that meaning wherein more do agree then in any other, is to be judged the mayor parts meaning, and that, that is liable to no more difficulty to go by, then if the Lawgiver( who is not actually to be consulted) was but one person.  
This interpretation yet farther which is equal must be left in its decision to the Conscience of every single person, as it is in the case of Scripture. Not to put what sense on the injunction he will, or can, as if a man might use his Wit here, as his Weapon, to defend his living: but to judge what was indeed the Imposers meaning; Neither wronging them in straining their words to any harsh or injurious Construction, nor giving himself liberty to serve his turn of the most reasonable, which he believes not they intended. Every man is to judge what is the Holy ghosts meaning in this or that text, and from that he may not recede, without sin, in his actions. Upon this account are the Scriptures not of private interpretation( N. B.) when yet we are still bound in the practise of them to a judgement of private discretion. We must hold the same of all Laws, and these Impositions.  
As for the Mediums, whereby we gather the mind of the Imposers, they are various, some taking the common sense of the Many, some the sense of the Impartial and Wise, some the judgement of the Law, some the declaration only of themselves to be the sense of the words imposed. But let the Mediums be what they will, whereby a man comes to the resolution of his belief of the Imposers meaning, when he is once brought to a settled persuasion and conviction, that this or that and no other was their meaning, if he can submit to the words in the full latitude of that meaning as he is fully persuaded in his Conscience is all they intended in such or such an injunction then is he free to his own determination.  
There is a strict, or allowed sense of words therefore, I said in one Chapter before; I will say it over here more fully. There is a sense which a man is persuaded in his Conscience if he should ask the Imposers they would allow, as what in these things was their meaning: and there is a sense they would not allow him. A Christian, I apprehended, is to take the injunctions of his superiors in the sense he believes they allow him. If he makes such scruples and yields himself to them, which his Conscience tells him the sense which they allow him does satisfy, he wrongs them and trespasses on the fifth Commandment. If he on the other side receives their injunctions without any regard at all of their sense, or in such or such a sense which his Conscience tells him is larger then they allow him, he is profane in his Conscienae, and sins in the matter against God. There is a Court then is setup for every one in his own Breast, Let him go to his Conscience and ask what think I really, as in the presence of God, if I could ask the Imposers of these things whether it is their Will that he should be of another mind in these particulars that across his assent, or leave his station? If his Conscience tells him it is verily persuaded it was their intention in the injunction, he is to honour God in his patient suffering their pleasure. But if he is persuaded in his Soul that this is utterly against their wills( and was) and that the things he scruples at, or as he scruples them, never came into their minds unless to admit them, only they passed them in the gross, never intending that they should put a bar in Conscience unto any, and if he could ask them, he believes they would certainly allow him in them, Here he is( I suppose) to put such a sense or meaning then upon the injunction, as may be favourable to his scruples, and yield it his submission. Leges satis habent id quod plerunque accidit respicere( said Theophrastus,) quae autem rarius contingunt, communibus tamen regulis constringenda sunt, quia etsi ratio legis in isto speciali facto specialiter locum non habeat, maneat tamen ratio in sua generalitate, cvi specialia subjici fas est. They that please may red Suarez de Legibus l. 6. c. 1. For my part though I could use more words, I see no cause to alter any thing for my reading of him.  
For the Matter itself of Conformity, the chief stumbling Stones may be reduced to these heads. The renunciation of the Covenant. Approbation of the Liturgy. Episcopal Orders.  
The last is the threshold to comforming, and there is a first and second discourse abroad about Re-ordination, which as the Authors of the Grand Case and Peace Offering referred their Readers to, for satisfaction: So the deceased Bishop Worth once  told me he had actually himself satisfied all he met with in Ireland but three Scots with the arguments of the first of those Books. For my own part, I despair really of proving any uncommon thing ever by Scripture if re-ordaining as to the work of a new charge is not exemplified in the instances that are pressed in those Papers: and I must yet say freely, I am satisfied that the repetition of Orders upon the said account is lawful, when I cannot methinks be satisfied with it upon any account else for my life, for this slippery Ice after trial no where else will bear. Let a man produce St. Paul, the eleven Disciples and Barnabas receiving commission more then once, they will say this is still {αβγδ}. Be that exception then provided against, and forasmuch as this is the general case( for it is to a new charge if any now be ordained) let a man declare himself freely to the Bishop and others( those especially that have to do with him in it) that there is this account he has( whatsoever satisfaction he hath besides) upon which he can do it, and there is no scruple that I know otherwise, but he may find his ease for it( if he take heed) in that second, of those Discourses. In short, There is Re-ordination ad Officium, or ad Exercitium particular. Though the one of these be condemned by Divines generally, Ancient and Modern, School-men, councils, and Fathers: the other is justifiable and justified( as I remember) by Mason and as good Divines as any we have. And this expedient I will commend from the practise of the Primitive times. Justin Martyr in his questions and responses( if his) the Orthodox( Quest. 14) asking why the Church did not Baptize, and ordain the heretics again, whose Baptism or Orders before was faulty, thus answers. {αβγδ}. That is, The error of the heretic who becomes Orthodox is thus amended. The error of his Opinion by the change of his mind; the error of his Baptism by the anointing of the Holy Chrism; the error of his Ordination by the Imposition of hands.  
The next thing is the Renunciation of the Covenant; And here it is not for any to deceive themselves and think that less then this was intended in the Subscription of the Act of Uniformity, the Oath of the Oxford Act, and the like Declarations. They that took the Covenant swore they would in their place endeavour the extirpation of Prelacy, that is the change of Church-government, when in these late Acts they are required to declare, subscribe, and swear the direct contrary, that they will not endeavour any alteration of Government in Church or State, and that there lies no obligation on me then from the Covenant so to do. This is a manifest renouncing of it, and to be justified too only upon the account that this particular matter covenanted( at least according as it was covenanted) was unlawful, and so is it likewise expressed in the Subscription. In an Oath then( that every one may see before him what he does) there are two things to be distinguished, the Actus jurandi, and the Res jurata; The act of Swearing, and the thing Sworn; The Covenanting, and the matter Covenanted. It is not enough that the actus jurandi, the act of Swearing or Covenanting was unlawful, to make an Oath to be said unlawful in itself, so as upon that account to be renounced, unless the Res jurata, the thing Sworn, or matter Covenanted, be found so too. This matter Covenanted, what it was, we see: And the alteration of Episcopacy as now established which is that matter, may be considered then, either Simply and Precisely, without regard to the Covenant itself or them that Covenanted, and so we are not to suppose this matter in se to be unlawful( in favour to the concerned) but that it lies at the pleasure of the Power which is Supreme, directed by the word of God: or else this matter Covenanted may be considered Relatively and Complexly, as incarnated in the Covenant, and with regard to the persons that took the same, in their capacity of acting, and way of prosecution, and this Res jurata as to them who were in no capacity political, and acting not in order to the Will of the Supreme, but by force, and against his Will, must be unlawful and as against the Ordinance of God may be renounced.  
To pursue this a little as clearly and honestly as I can. Whatsoever Government( to keep on my ground at first laid) it pleases God that men upon reasons seeming best to them do set up in any Nation and comes to be established, it is to be looked on as set up by the providence of God, and so his Ordinance according to our Apostle, upon which the command of Subjection falling in immediately it is not for any single man, or party, to endeavour the disannulling of it. There is a Resistance of the Governours that are, which we understand easily, and there is a resistance of the Government that is, and that I take to be in the highest degree an endeavour it be not, and in the lower, an endeavour it be otherwise then it is; which consequently being unlawful, we must distinguish of the Constitution of a Government, and the Administration. Alterations in the administration of Government, are made we know ordinarily in repealing Old, and making New Statutes: But the fundamental Constitution whereby and according to which they are made, remains standing as the settled Ordinance of Gods Providence in the Nation. Now the way of any alteration according to the Constitution of our Government, is not forgotten, in the first Chapter to be premised; It must be by the King and Parliament, which being chosen by the people, the people thereby in their Representatives do concur to these alterations. A thing we are to know so true that there are no Laws that pass, but in this sense are said to be Quas vulgas Elegerit. All the Commons in the Realm are represented in Parliament by the Knights and Burgesses says Sr. Edward cook Inst. part 4. p. 158. And are called tout le commonalty de la terre illonque Summones in the preface of Westminster the first. Every English man is intended to be there present either in person or by procuration, and the consent of the Parliament is taken to be every mans consent, says Sr. Thomas Smith, l. 2. c. 2. Nay while the King consilio& assensu Baronum leges olim imposuit universo Regno consentire inferior quisque visus est in persona Domini sui capitalis, prout hody per procuratores comitatus says Sr. Henry Spelman. There is a Uniform kind of Endeavour therefore after the common good, wherein every man that hath a vote in choosing Burgesses, may be looked on, though private persons, in a sense, to act in a capacity that is political or public, so long as it is in order only to a Parliamentary proceeding in subordination to the highest Authority: when if he shall act out of that way, not in order thereunto, such an acting cannot come under the score of a capacity political, but private, being against the Constitution, which is the public( or the thing wherein the Res publica or populi does mainly lye,) and consequently against the Ordination of God.  
There are two suppositions upon this that are contrary, yet have both some truth in them, and must be set at rights. The one is, that it is the duty of every one to endeavour the reformation of the Church as highly pleasing unto God; which when some words of caution and tenderness were put in for the avoiding Sedition and breach of Peace, such as in their place and calling be, it is no wonder if the hearts of a great many of the most serious in the Land were won by so good an End and tender Words, so as to enter into a Covenant for the extirpatien of Prelacy in order to it. The other is, that the business of Reformation which includes an altering of the present Government, does belong to the Power which is Supreme, and for any to go about it in a way that was, or is not in order to the consent of the King, in and together with his Parliament, is so far from being his duty, that it is a thing contrary to subjection, that opposes Gods Ordination, that will not be content that Gods Will should stand, but would have the Powers that are to be otherwise then they are, and so entering into Gods Seat, as if a man could order things better then God does, as hath been spoken.  
To the former supposition then I answer, there was two things put together that could not stand together, taking the Covenant truly as it ought, in its complex consideration. To wit, An endeavour to alter the Government, and according to every man's place and calling. It is indeed according to the place and calling of the Supreme Magistrate, of the King and Parliament to endeavour reformation of the Church and State as there is need. And it is according to the place and calling of private persons to desire and seek the same to be done by them. They may choose their Burgesses, Petition them, advice with them, and Pray to God for them to that End: But to desire or seek it, and much more to swear to endeavour a change in the Administration of the Church( even so far as the extirpation of the persons therein governing) in a way that was not to proceed politically, by the act of the Supreme( for whether the Supreme Power lies in the King, or in the King and his two Houses jointly as one, nothing could pass while he was divided from them) is not according to our place nor calling. So that the saying I will endeavour it, but according to my place and calling, was an inconsistency in the Lenitive, with the matter undertaken.  
To the latter supposition I distinguish. There is an Endeavour of Reformation( or of altering what is convenient in the Government) that is consistent with the Constitution, to wit by the way of Parliament with consent of the King, which appears to be lawful before God and man, and that must therefore be maintained and held: when there is an Endeavour, Not in this way, and so not consisting with the Constitution, which( let it be in what way else it will) is pleaded to be Resistance, forbidden of God and men, and consequently liable to be quitted or renounced. In our late Acts when a man is put to profess, subscribe, or swear that he will not endeavour any alteration of Government, he is not to conceive that it is intended he should bind himself to lay down his subjection to the Laws, and much less to the Constitution itself of our Nation, which provides for the former Endeavour, so that if a Parliament be called, he is to act in their Choice, and consequently Endeavour in his place( for there he has place) the promoting the common good according to the constant practise of the Realm: But he is to conceive that he renounces the latter Endeavour, that is that endeavour which was carried on in the late times( unto which no doubt but these Acts have their respect) in a way not allowed by the Constitution, and consequently against Gods Ordination, where the unlawfulness of the War and Covenant by me is placed. To wit, the Constitution of our Land is such, that whatsoever alterations of Government there be( which as to the Administration may, and are fit sometimes to be,) they must be made only by the King and Parliament; and Here was an endeavour of alteration by the Parliament without the King, and against him; An endeavour by Arms to force the King to consent, in stead of that free joint and mutual content in Parliament, the endeavour whereof alone it is, that our Constitution allows. And if the other be not allowed, we see how the late Parliament-cause may be relinquished, when yet all lawful endeavour for the public good either of Church or State is upheld. There was the End of that cause let me say, and the Means. The Means were covenanting without the King, and War against him. The End was Reformation. The Means I apprehended appears liable to renunciation, when the End is still by other means( that is according to the way our Constitution provides) to be sought. To conclude, The Impositions that are, must be taken in the sense of the Imposers I have said before. In these late Acts, when the Parliament do require that a man should renounce all obligation from the Covenant of Endeavouring any alteration in Church or State, their sense is plainly he should not do as they did formerly; that is, their meaning lies certainly in opposition to former proceedings, to what of late hath been practised, to use their own words before cited in the Militia Acts. He is to renounce all Endeavour which is Resistance, forbidden by the Apostle: but he renounces not not any Endeavour which is Subjection to the ordination of God i● the Nation.  
I will ●onfirm this, with one only clear reason. The grea● thing intended by the renunciation of the Covenant in our late Acts, is the preservation of the Government in the present Constitution against all alteration. But the Constitution of our Government being such in the fonndation that whatsoever is needful or convenient to be altered, may be proposed to that End in Parliament: to take away that which is universally radicated in the whole Nation in order thereunto, were a piece of the greatest alteration that could be, and consequently never to be understood as intended by the Parliament.  
After this, it may be said haply, This determination were well, if it were authorised: but how shall we turn universals into particulars without Authority? I answer, He that ploweth plows in hope, and I am not one out of hope but that these injunctions may yet come in due time under some revisory Explanation; and then may what I writ( I mean the Contents) become serviceable. In the interim, There is a concent of Reason to be understood in the Laws one with another, and of all with the Constitution, and Reason of Law is my Authority. It is a general rule allowed by all Laws( says my Lord cook) in the construction of Statutes. Quamvis Lex generaliter loquitur, restringenda tamen est, ut cessant ratione,& ipsa cesset; Cum enim ratio sit anima vigorque ipsius Legis, non videtur Legislator id sensisse quod ratione careat, etiansi generalitas prima fancy aliter posset suadere Inst. part 4. c. 74.  
The third thing in the matter of Conformity is an agreement to the Liturgy. And here may be included the old difference about our Rites and Ceremonies: and the new Declaration in the Act of Uniformity.  
For our old Rites. That the Church hath a Power to appoint Ceremonies I do not question, but how far this Power doth extend, is not perhaps so easy of decision. There is the Worship of God, and the Circumstances of it. The Worship of God itself cannot be instituted by Man, but God only, because there is none can know what will please him unless he reveal it. Besides, Will-worship is forbidden by the Apostle; To add or diminish by Moses; And this is the substance of the second commandment. Circumstances of Worship are its appendages or accidents which when they go not into the essence of that honour, which we give unto God according to his excellence( the School-definition of Worship) do appertain as necessary to the person in the performance. Those Ceremonies consequently which are not necessary to the person who acts in a thing which God hath commanded for his immediate honour thereby, are more then circumstances of the same( I will speak surer, are in my account or according to this adjustment I make, more then circumstances, or more then belongs to man to prescribe in Gods Worship,) and let them that impose them, or use them, look to it My reasons are, because this is a peculiar branch of Christian liberty to be freed from the Ordinances of men. Also ●argue, That which is unlawful and forbidden the Church hath no Power in, for our Doctors say her Power lies in indifferent things that are neither commanded nor forbidden. But it is forbidden by the Apostle to enjoin any thing that is not to Edification. Ergo, In things that are unnecessary and unprofitable I apprehended the Church hath no Power( that is, hath no right from the Will of Christ) to put Impositions upon us as to Gods Worship, and consequently there can be no subjection due in Conscience to such things. Things now that are necessary to him that acts in the Worship of God are so either in genere, or in specie. In things that are necessary any way I am willing the Churches Authority be owned, and I think one ought to submit his private judgement very much to hers in judging a thing edifying or not. When things in genere are necessary and not determined by God in specie, these are matters we suppose, wherein our Church or Rulers Power doth lye; And here we must distinguish of the Imposition, and the peoples Submission. As for our Submission, I apprehended that whensoever our Rulers do act in their own Sphere, and the things they command be lawful, we are concluded under obedience by the fift Commandment. For the Imposition there is need of a double distinction. The one is concerning those things which are necessary in genere and not determined by God in specie, and they are either such as are needful to be so determined; or not needful so to be. For instance, Time and Place are cirumstances of Worship ●ecessarie in genere, for there must be some time and place, and this in specie is needful to be determined, for else cannot the Worship of God be performed. On the other hand, there is the Habit and Gesture, which are in genere also necessary: No Minister can come to Church but some habit he must have on, and he must use some gesture: but the determination whether it be of this or that Colour, in the Pulpit Black, in the Pew White, or the like, this is not needful to be determined, because the Service may be performed though that be not appointed. Now it is a question to me whether it be lawful for our superiors to determine of things that concern Gods Worship which in specie are not necessary to be determined. For two reasons. The one from the analogy of that text, It seemeth good to the Holy Ghost and us, to lay upon you no greater burden then those necessary things. The other from those I Rules unto which the Church is tied in her injunctions, to wit, that she do nothing to eay a stumbling-block before the weak brother, nothing but what is fit and decent and to edification. But it is impossible according to the condition of our Nation, to determine such things in Gods Worship as need not be determined, but it will scandalise many, and so cannot be to edification, when it is to their destruction. Nevertheless the other distinction is here also to take his room, to wit, between the Matter imposed and the Act of imposing. Though the Act of imposing were unlawful ( which yet I peremptorily say not, yet is the matter imposed, so long as it is about that which in genere is necessary, no other then what does belong to the Sphere of our superiors, and consequently obliges the outward man in point of Submission. The outward man I say de industria, for whatsoever the commands of our superiors in indifferent things be, rather then resist, we must do them: though those commands in Ecclesiasticals must be for our Edification, and in Civils for the Common good, when they carry the Authority of God to bind the Conscience. See Suarez De Legibus. l. 1. c. 7 and Dr. Field on the Church. B. 4. c. 34. Nor am I ignorant here of the quarrel most have at these Ceremonies, merely for their being Significative( which must be confessed in the stated account of them,) when if they were not indeed so, the Compilers of the Common Prayer would have accounted them unprofitable and relinquished them. It is one thing therefore( I account) to make a Rite to be Exhibitive of Grace, and another to make it Significative of Duty. A Sacrament I know in the catechism after Austine, is defined an outward and visible Sign of an inward and invisible Grace, and some of our Rites you may say are made to be such. But this is not all the definition, we must not cut off there. A Sacrament is an outward sign of invisible Grace( such as remission of sins) given to us, &c. Note that. Now if any Rite of the Church be made a sign of invisible grace given, or to be given to us upon the use thereof, I shall see good reason for a mans dissent from her Liturgy till that be removed. For let me offer a little light here. To say the Church in such and such Rites makes a kind of new Sacraments, Take the word Sacrament in a common usage among the Ancients, and this is nothing if you understand not where the evil of so doing would lye. And where is that? Why a Sacrament being a sign of Grace given to us( that is of the grace of Gods part which he gives) thereby, there is none can be the ordainer of such a thing but God only, because it is he alone that can promise that Grace and give the same by it. If any mortal then should bring in such a Rite into the Church, and make it an exhibitive sign, that is a sign of the Grace of God given by the same, it were a most strange presumption in imposing upon the Almighty, manifestly, as if he should be tied to exhibit his Grace according to the Will of Man, or upon an institution of his, the evil and horror whereof must appear in the mention of it. But to make any circumstance of Worship, any piece of Decency, Ceremony or Rite to be significative only in putting us in mind of that Grace which is our duty( not as what on Gods part is given hereby, but what is) incumbent on us to exercise and stir up ourselves unto, at all times, whether we use this Rite or no, and whereof it is good to be still put in mind, I apprehended not myself the harm therein, at least not such as that this signification should make such Rites to be Sacraments any more then the Fringes were made so on the Jews Garments for keeping them in mind of Gods commandments. In ritubus, si materia sit ductilis, nihil tutius quam ea restituere quae primis post Apostolos saeculis observata apparent. In hoc autem rerum genere quip per legem divinam indefinito, recte fecerit summa potestas, si imperia sua subditorum affectubus attemperaverit. Grotius De imp. sum. pot. c. 6.§. 11.  
For the new Delaration of unfeigned assent and consent to all and every thing contained in, and prescribed by, the Book of Common Prayer, and Orders, I must confess it is to me, too much methinks of all Conscience to be imposed under that straight prescription of those Words and no other. The design of the Act seems only to intend a compliance to the use of the Liturgy, and what need such a precise form of Words as this, or that of the Canon, in the old Subscription? What if a man would use the Common Prayer and consent to it in other Words? Why might not that serve? It is a hard thing to be forced to bear ones Testimony to the Book of Common Prayer in those terms as a man cannot declare to the Bible itself, or any Book in the World. If we turn to the Books of the Chronicles, and the Kings, we shall find it is said of the same man in one Book he was two and twenty years old when he began to Reign, and in the other he was two and forty. That these places are reconcilable, and reconciled in the Hebrew, we will suppose: But if I were put upon an attestation to the English translation, which is our present Bible, in these Words and no other, that I assent to every particular thing and passage contained in it, I must refuse, or pause at least, till I have made my interpretation. We must therefore have our recourse here to what was said before as to the forms and composure of late injunctions, and in regard the intendment of the Lawgiver or the Imposers is to be attended in all Laws, we may consider in the first place whether any man can seriously imagine for himself, that the Majority of Parliament could ever intend that he should give such an approbation to the Book of the Liturgy as is more then he can give to the Book of the Scriptures? Or rather whether he is not assured that if he give such a testimony to the one as he can to the other, he does come up to the utmost of their meaning, and performs as much as possibly they can be thought in reason to desire of him? We may consider then in the next place, there being some Mitigation proving here to be necessary, that when this man cannot declare to the Bible in those precise terms of assent to every particular thing in it, yet can he consent to the use of the whole, or to the reading of all and every thing therein without scruple. For instance, I cannot assent to the Words in both the Translation of the Bible and Psalter of that one verse of the Psalm where it is red in the one, they were not disobedient, or they rebelled and in the other, they rebelled not against his Word, seeing they are contrary: but I can consent to have both translations red in the Church, so long as a good construction may be( as Hooker shows) made of Either. So in the Liturgy, I assent not to that passage of Athansius's Creed that whosoever holds not that Faith entire is undoubtedly damned, for I doubt not but many of the Greek Church may be saved that dissent in one Article of it: Yet who would not readily consent to have that Excellent Creed used as the judgement of the ancient Church, for the kerbing loose Wits from the danger of swerving about such Mysteries? To proceed upon this, Thus much I hold to be good, that whosoever could make this Declaration, if the word Use were put in, I A. B. do declare my assent and consent to the use of all and every thing in the Book, he may make it no less now though it be left out. For though it may seem a hard Chapter to give ones consent thus to the use, in such a form of Words as declares to the things, and not at all to the use, that word being left out: Yet in regard the preceding words of the Act which enjoins this Declaration on on the persons there concerned, are express, He shall declare his assent and consent to the use of the things in the said Book in these Words and no other, this Declaration in these Words( though they be in no other) must be understood to be to the use. We can have no greater evidence of what is the Imposers meaning then their own interpreting themselves, which they have also confirmed in the preamble of the Oxford Act. Neither may their Words be taken but according to their Meaning. Indeed I apprehended it not myself, proper to say Assent to the use, nor do I believe it easy for every one to give his Consent( which word is proper) to the use of every particular prescribed in the rubric and Orders, so that, as I do not know what advantage, or how much, may be made hereof, I must needs say moreover, that it cannot be thought by any that are considerate but that in an imposition which contains so many things in it as this, thereis and may be several exceptions picked up and pressed so to the quick, that no body shall be able to say any thing to the purpose, but that here is a tacit general allowance to be given to all these draughts of Men, and human things, as subject to oversight, diversity, and imperfection: and that as we have a refuge from the rigour of the Words of any Law, to the Meaning of the Lawgiver, so are we to pass a righteous judgement on their Meaning, that we burden it not with any thing that is intolerable, or not comporting with our Equal, and Believed interpretation. We must consider therefore in the third place more nearly. There is a Consent, Let us understand, that is External, if I may use the Words of Bishop Bramhal, and I be not mistaken; and there is a subscribing to the Doctrines of a Church as Articles of our Faith, or as matters of Concord, in the Words of Bishop Usher. When a man is required in the old Subscription, and this new Declaration to assent and consent to all and every thing in the Liturgy, it is sufficient I apprehended that there be this Consent which is External, and such an Assent which is proportionable to things required only for Agreement, and not such as is requisite to points of our Creed: So that if a man will submit to the practise of these things established, and will not oppose any of them, this in short is as much( he is to account) as is expected of him in these Impositions.  
This is certain that no Laws which are human, can meddle with the internal Acts of Man, and consequently that his assent and consent can be no otherwise, or no farther concerned herein, then is necessary to the resolution of the outward man and external Obedience. It is true also, There is a diversity of Faith, at least as to the Majus and Minus of it, to be allowed to the matters even of Scripture, and much more to the Contents of any other Book whatsoever. I will add, that I dare not deny but that it may be consistent with the Integrity of a Christian, in relation to many particulars, to speak and act sometimes with the Many, yet reserve ones inward thoughts in their native Ingenuity and Liberty with the Wise and fewer number.  
What may be gathered from hence farther I leave: But there are few or no Churches that have not their Rites, and Confessions, and the like, unto which they require the signified approbation of their Ministers, especially when they first enter that Office, that they may stick the faster to them for the time to come; and it is not possible that all, if any who are men of Free and Searching judgments, should inwardly, and with conviction, perfectly accord in every point, words and all, with the same. There is a submission therefore of ones private judgement and belief( especially I say while a man is yet green) in some point to our superiors, to the Church, or Common judgement, as Learners yield to their Teachers, and the Client to his Consellour, which is an External kind of Assent( as I spoken now of a Consent to what they prescribe in like manner) serving to Concord, when there is no less than an internal experimental knowledge and faith in necessary points will serve unto Salvation.  
I must confess it were a happy thing I judge when the most of our serious Fathers and Brethren are not unwilling to take a latitude themselves in their sense of the things they Impose, or are Imposed on them, that they would come once to make the business of Conformity to lye no longer in any forms of Words, but in agreement to the general design only of those Acts which prescribe such or such Impositions: Nevertheless while those ordinarily who are in Power are so apt t● look upon it as a piece of wisdom, that they may not bring any guilt upon their cause, or the Church appear inconstant, or for the like reasons, to keep up still unto that which hath been, there is a necessity that men must be ready to bend a little and find out something to satisfy their Consciences, wherein they act, or else retire and give off for this World. I remember there was a time when Cato himself by the contrivance of his enemies was brought to such a streight that either he must swear to a Law, and give his consent against his judgement, or else from the example of old Metellus, be like to be Banished; and he was persuaded by Cicero from his stiffness for the service of the Commonwealth, to temporize for once, rather then be rendered useless for ever after by his refusal. I cannot say that any man who is a Christian, may do so in a case of Confession, when he cannot save his Conscience: but if he can save it in this business of Conformity, I shall not blame him after Cato, for a little condesention. And I think I may apply here the Wise Man's saying. Be not Righteous overmuch, Why shouldst thou destroy thyself?  
For the matter of Scandal. That now remains, and does deeply concern this Argument. There are two Cases of it momentous in Scripture. The one is, when a man is satisfied himself of the lawfulness of a thing, but by his doing the same he shall induce some others to it, that are either not under the same Circumstances, or not satisfied in Conscience about the doing, and to them it is sin, which when a man shall reffect on afterwards, he knows not what a Wound it may be to him. If you sin against the weak brethren and wound their Consciences, you sin against Christ. The other is, when a man shall use that liberty he hath himself in a thing which is so abhorrent to some of his brethren, that they be ready thereupon to fall away from the true Religion, and so perish inevitably. This made the matter of meats( I apprehended) to be of so much danger in reference to the Jews. For meat destroy not him for whom Christ dyed. It must be acknowledged therefore by me here, that when a man is indeed in such a case as that he shall certainly give either of these two scandals to others, he hath need to look to himself. It is not enough( I fear) to say, The matter of scandal does lye in indifferent things, but when Authority hath commanded them, they cease to be indifferent, and then cessant materia, the scandal ceases. For besides that if it were not for this command and danger of the penalty, a man should not at all be scandalised herein, having no temptation otherwise to do the thing which is against his Conscience, and whatsoever is so, we know is not to be done for all that command: Besides this I say, such a solution as this, is so easy a way of dispatch, that Christianity I am persuaded, requires more care, and carries in it more difficulty then that comes to. A man( as my mind does give me) must yield an account unto God for that opinion that will loosen his awe toward him, and tenderness toward his brethren, more then he does allow. God commands, Thou shalt not do that thing which will stumble thy brother so as to wound his Conscience, or destroy his Soul. Man commands, Thou shalt do this or that thing which will wound his Soul and destroy him. Who must be obeied, God or Man? If I say to this, God does not command, Thou shalt not do that thing that will wound thy brother, but thou shalt not do that indifferent thing that will wound him, and when it is commanded by the Magistrate it is necessary, and a duty, this answer will not serve. For besides that this limitation is Mans gloss and not in the text, the bottom I think lies here, Where there is a former Obligation, as there is from that command, Thou shalt not kill, on the Conscience before, it cannot be taken away by a later as that of the Magistrates must needs be which yesterday was not. Moreover, That the Magistrate be obeied is a duty of an affirmative precept which binds not ad semper: But that thou shalt not kill, or that thou shalt not scandalise thy brother in these senses which is in earnest the murdering of his Soul, is the duty of a Negative precept, which binds semper and ad semper, and so must take place of the other.  
There is another way of satisfaction then, that a man must find here in his practise, when he cannot be helped by his Brain. It is this. The objection from scandal against any thing in the point of obedience, does not nullify the Duty which is commanded by the Magistrate, but it puts a bar to the Action, so that a man must first remove the scandal, and then do his duty. Whosoever thou art that readest these lines, take this with thee, remember it for thy occasion, and bless God. Now then as to the first Case. Are there any likely in anothers comforming unto this or that matter enjoined, to be induced by him to the same, who are not under his circumstances for it, or not yet satisfied in Conscience about it, and so shall be wounded by his fact? Then let him go to such persons, If he satisfy them with his reasons, they are edified not scandalized by him: If they are not, he may charge them not to do as he does, by his example. For the second case likewise, Let a man set him down impartially, and neither overweeningly of himself, nor unconcernedly toward others, consider whether his doing this or that thing is like indeed to have such an effect upon any, as that they shall be ready to think all Religion hereupon to be nothing, and so cast off all care of their Souls for the future, or at least depart from that holy way of profession wherein they have entred, insomuch that he verily believes it may be an occasion to their everlasting perdition, then let him in the name of God forbear the thing. I dare not judge otherwise then so. It is beter that a Mill-stone were about his Neck, and he thrown into the Sea, then that he should thus offend any: and there is nothing so bad I hope as that, like to befall him in the forbearing. But if the matter comes only to this, that folks will be displeased, some grieved, some angry, some triumph, so that he shall lose his credit haply with a great many, some will count him a Knave, and others a could man, and many will revile all the Sect for his sake: I do not think any thing of this, nor all this can stand in competition with Obedience to Authority. That the name of God and good Men are reviled, is a thing 'tis true, not to be made light of: but it is a mans doing evil, in the causing it, makes him culpable, Ro. 2.24. Mat. 15.12. In fine, Do thou thy Duty with an upright heart, and God will take care of the issue.  
The business of this Chapter thus being dispatched, there comes into my mind for the close a certain prank of a Minister in Somersetshire a very laborious pious Servant of Christ that wrote for the Morality of the Sabbath, and was very Zealous in that point, who when the Book of Liberty came out, took this course. He red the Book in the Pew( as his theme) in Obedience to the injunction, and then went into the Pulpit immediately, and preached up the observation of the Sabbath with all his vehemency, so satisfying his Conscience about it. I do believe many good men who left their Ministry rather then they would red that Book being against their Consciences( though in the judgement of the point I meddle not) did glorify God at that time, witnessing a good confession: and I dare not say but this eminently godly man( it was Mr. Bernard of Batcomb) did bear his testimony as well to the honour of God, and kept his Ministry. I say not neither assuredly that his action was laudable, but I say the best of the dead. The one might glorify God in an act of prudence and faithfulness to his Flock, as the other in self-denial and abrenunciation. I let this instance pass on purpose in regard this difficult case may happen. A Minister is put to red a thing that in his Conscience is unlawful; He must obey the Magistrate, and he must be true to his Conscience. If he cannot obey man, but he must offend God, he must choose to suffer. But if he can obey, and be true also to God, if he see the way clear to do both, that methinks were to be chosen. When an act is evil in it self, it must be avoided, but if it be evil only in the Consequences of it( as reading in this case seems to be,) let those consequences be prevented, and the act is free. Where a testimony for God does preponderate the service of man, much methinks may be done. After I had wrote this, I light on Dr. tailor in his Cases l. 3. p. 243. with 176. Mauritius commands Gregory to hand an Edict to the Churches, that no soldier should turn Monk without his leave; This in his Conscience is wicked; Hereupon he admonishes the Emperour of it, preys, Preaches, declaims against it, yet withal upon the command publishes the Edict, giving this account of it. Utrobique quae debui exolvi, qui imperatori obedientiam praebui,& pro Deo quod sensi, minime tacui. The Dr. hereupon resolves the case very boldly. The unlawful Proclamations or Edicts of a true Prince may be published by the Clergy in their several Charges, yet they must not conceal from the people any part of their duty, nor from the Prince, if they can declare it. My thoughts here you may see are something parallel, but more fearful in coming on to the main entendment. There are many at this day of those they call Non-conformists have left their Livings and Station in the public Ministry upon the Act of Uniformity. I suppose the most have done it very honestly and to God's glory, though some of them the Lord knows not without human frailty. I know not whether the same persons might again find out some way of doubling the service of his name, in resuming their Ministry, with the preservation of their Consciences, which( how much or little so ever this Mite of mine may conduce unto) are not perhaps incompatible to those that will use search and entreaty in the matter. They have born their Testimony for Reformation against present Impositions, now they may bear their Testimony also for Peace against Schism, obstinacy, and faction. They have exercised self-denial, let them exercise Humility, Charity, toleration. St. Paul who withstood Peter against the Ceremonies, did upon occasion after comform himself to them. A good Christian may have more ways then one to glorify God in his generation.  
I will acknowledge there are twenty things and more, which, if they be severely pressed on tender and reflective minds, are enough to stumble them; and I am not the man who am like to go about the answering all particulars of that kind: Nevertheless, if there be any persons fearing God shall receive that enlargement of heart by the Rule I have laid them down, or any consideration else which I offer them in the general only, so as they can retain their Ministry, and submit to these Impositions which otherwise they could not, or others cannot, I shall have no cause I hope but that I may bless God for it, who does ordinarily according to his manifold Wisdom and Goodness toward his Church, in such turns of his Providence as these, provide some persons to be his Confessors, and to lay down all they have rather then offend their Consciences: and some to carry on the public work without deserting their Station, and yet maintaining their integrity in what they do. Neither may that Author be less studious of charity toward his brethren, and of the honour of God thereby, who does industriously endeavour to heal the scruples of those that out of Conscience do comform, then another who offers his Apology for such who out of conscience also, dare not. I confess if a man can by no means save his Conscience I have done, or if his heart cannot bear it. If he may enter again into the Vineyard without clogs, and his Soul be in frame for it, it is what he should desire of God. But if he cannot, why should he become a burden to himself? God will have Mercy I hope, and not Sacrifice in this case.  
After all, I have yet one thing methinks which I must also offer. Suppose a man who hath been a Non-conformist hitherto, should come to this resolution; To wit, to be ready to comform, in declaring, subscribing, and yielding to whatsoever is imposed, so far, or to so much as ever he can according to his Conscience, and if that will not serve his turn, to be fixed, not to go a jot farther, for any thing, or any body: but if it will serve him, and they wink at the rest, to be contented to do so, and to try. Suppose farther, that such a one should publish this, so that it being known as far, how he does it, as what he does, he shall not thereby become guilty of active scandal unto any, seeing if others do as he does, and but so, they will do no more then according to their Consciences, as he resolves as to his, and so shall they not be wounded by the example: If they be troubled only, that another does( if he could, or if he can) what they can't or won't, That I count must give place to edification. I ask, what may be said unto this? Let the Prudent give judgement. It may be possible some may scruple, or object, that the fear of God which requires our obedience to Superiors will not stand at any time with such a prefunctory or unfaithful performance of their commandments. I answer, As the commands which are divine reach but to a mans Natural Can, that if he does what he is able, God accepts of the Will, for that which he Cannot: So the commands which are human, reach only to our Moral Can, that when a man hath done so much of them as his Conscience will let him without sin, or is able to render a sufficient reason why he does no more, this is to be accepted of him, as perfect in its kind. Leges humanae( says Grotius) vim obligandi tum demùm habent, si latae sint ad humanum modum, non si onus injungant, quod a ratione& natura plané abhorreat. human Laws( says Dr. tailor) bind the Conscience of the Subjects, but yet give place to just and charitable causes; which are competent and sufficient, is not expressly and minutely declared, but it is to be defined by the moderation and prudence of a good man. Too rigorous it were( says Mr. Hookeo) that the breach of every Law should be held a deadly sin: A mean there is between these extremities if so be we could find it out. His last Book, and his last Words.   

CHAP. VII. The Conclusion for Peace.  
HAving asserted the inviolable authority of the present Powers over us, and our Subjection to them as the Ordinance of God, against all principles, inclinations, and pretences of future disturbance in this Nation, and offered some endeavours for a universal compliance( so far as may be, and as I can) of the conscientious with their injunctions: I do think it but seasonable that regard be had now to the reciprocal duty and pious affection which the Magistrate ought to bear toward his subjects, that seeing their fidelity to him, and so his security does hang so much as it does on Religion and Conscience, he may be exceeding tender of their Consciences in the matters of Religion: wherein, as he is to take heed he doth not exceed, we are not to desire he should neglect the Commission he hath from God about it.  
If any expect some Determination on this point, it must suffice the judicious, if I offer him here only this contraction.  
There is a difference to be held in the first place, between the Magistrates taking care of Religion: and his compelling people to it. No body can force another to believe any thing which he does not, and consequently not to practise any thing which is not to be done but upon that Faith. There is a difference again next, between the compelling men to their duty even in Religion, which is according to their Consciences: and the compelling them to any thing against their Consciences whatsoever it be in the World, especially in matters of supernatural Revelation. To act against a mans Conscience is sin. But the Magistrate cannot command a man to sin. There is a difference lastly between the not forcing any to a thing against their Consciences, which the Magistrate must take heed to do: and the restraining men from doing things according to their Consciences, when they are erroneous, and when if he let them alone, they may bring themselves the Church, or State to ruin. There is no Toleration to be desired of the Non-conformist that is sober, but one Stated, and so far agreed to in the general, that the Articles of Religion, a good Life, and the Government of the Nation be secured.  
We know it hath pleased his Majesty to express his gracious inclinations to Moderation on several opportunities: and divers Papers have been published for the advancement of so blessed a design. It would be no good News to hear that the hopes of something of that nature should have put any at a farther distance then they were in before to Unity. Upon which account it seems to me but an honest thing to let these Sheets go abroad for Obedience, among others that have been sent out for condescension and Indulgence. I would fain indeed do what I could equally on both sides, that one party should come up as far as ever they can, and the other in what they really cannot, might yield to them. I would not be partial to my own intentions, which being displayed thus indifferently, I shall hope for Candour from the concerned, and that the Integrity of my Endeavour shall compound for the Meaneness of the Performance.  
There are Objections or Arguments against Conformity in some Papers, particularly in regard to the Oxford-Oath and the Subscription, which cannot( as I believe) receive solution by any but one way only, intimated in the fourth and sixth Chapters preceding, that is by a Mitigated Construction of such Impositions. And forasmuch as they who were concerned hitherto to answer them, either would not, or could not tell how to do it, when yet there are no Ministers that are Conformists but do Subscibe, and several of the eminent Non-conforrmists have took that Oath: it is no little nor unnecessary piece of Charity and Righteousness to both these sorts of persons, that I have proposed such a Rule to walk by under the injunctions of our superiors, as that they who comform to them, and those that cannot, may see reason to retain a fair opinion of one another, and to believe that neither have departed from a good Conscience in what they do.  
I will instance in that Oath for Example. Let us in the first Clause of it, understand by taking Arms the raising an Army, or a war( which is truly the proper meaning,) and by the King, the King's own sacred Person, and I see nothing but one may subscribe these Words I A. B. Do swear that( I hold, or believe, which is to be understood) it is not lawful to take Arms against the King upon any pretence whatsoever. In the second Clause let us understand by those Commissionated by him such as have a due Authority from him, and exercise it only according to Law( which is likewise the true meaning) and I see no more difficulty in this Clause neither. And I do abhor( that is disown, or disclaim) that traitorous Position of taking Arms by his Authority against his Person, or against any Commissionated by him, in the pursuit of any such Commissions, that is Legally Commissionated by him, and in the Legal pursuit of such Commissions. In the third Clause let us distinguish an Endeavour to Change or Reform any thing in the Church or State which we think conducive to the good of the Nation in a Parliamentary way only as is allowed by the fundamental Law and Course of the Realm, from an Endeavour( as before) in any other way that is not so warranted, to wit, in a seditious way, or in such a manner as they did in the late t●mes, when they endeavoured the extirpation of Prelacy by force, against, and without the Kings Consent in Parliament, and let us take this to be the sense( as I think it was) of the Majority of those that passed the Act, and then is the offence over in the last part of the Oath also. And that I will not endeavour any alteration of Government, either in Church or State, To wit, in any manner not warranted by the Constitution of the Land, or any otherwise then by Act of Parliament.  
Not but I am highly sensible of one evil and inconvenience in our late Impositions more then heretofore, which is, that they make matters of Government to become Cases of Conscience, and so engage the poor Divine upon the work of the States-man and the Lawyer. If there be no other benefit then comes by this Book there shall be this however, that the Wise will see of what nature and difficulty Conformity indeed is, while such points as you find here are brought into dispute, and so into doubt and danger by the occasion: and consequently what reason there is for the withdrawing such Acts which( to say no more then so) do put so slender a person as I, upon the Argument of these Papers. It is not for a man to be led to an Oath, as a Bruit to a Stake, before he hath considered what he Swears or Subscribes. And it is in vain to talk of considering any thing, if we dare not look into it to the bottom. Thou shalt Swear says the Scripture, so say I, Thou shalt Declare, thou shalt Subscribe, thou shalt comform( if thou dost at all) in judgement, in Truth, and in Righteousness.  
It hath been always a grievous thing to me, I must profess, to see any troubled for their Consciences, who am solicitous for them lest that trouble should hurry them to the doing some things they are unsatisfied to do, and wound their Souls. If they are wounded, I methinks am wounded, afflicted, and suffer with them. My heart longs for some accommodation, and stated rest for the Land: for accommodation with the Sober, and Moderation towards all men. Yet am I wary also least in seeking moderation, we should forget to be moderate, and by falling into that fault my Lord Bacon accounts incident to men who find things better in their Books then in the practise be apt to contend too far to bring things to perfection, and loose the beginnings that otherwise might be made. There is this one thing alone I am apt to think might do much. If all Declarations that are required to be Made, Subscribed, or Sworn, were Imposed only as to the Matter and End, leaving those who submit to them free to the use of their own Expressions.  
I have now done, after I have given warning that no man presume to take occasion from this Discourse to act any farther in the case of Conformity then he is fully persuaded in his own mind about it. If he does so, I must protest he hath not me for his Example. I have purposed from my heart for my part, by God's grace, not to stir a step farther then I find my judgement to go along with me, who though I writ liberally in regard to others, and believe that many honest and discreet men may take up with it, yet must I be sparing in what I do myself. I cannot, I dare not, but act methinks by the penny, when it is by Talents that I speak. And for my own practise, if any desire to know that, I refer the Reader to a few Sheets, entitled, The Healing Paper, which came out some little time before the end of the Methuselah-Parliament. Recordare mei Deus mi, nec sinito deleri benignitates meas seu potius desideria& conatus debiliores, quos exercui erga domum dei mei,& erga observationes ejus. said deal mihi peccata omnia mea,& dolores per sanguinem Filii tui. Et fac, ut ex omni carnis vitioso affectu,& Conscientiae insidiante laqueo, mentisque atra boil superfaetantis gravedine ereptus, tibi inserviendo, toto cord,& fideli& alacri, quae superest vitae partem impendam: Recordare mei Deus mi in bonum.   
THE END.   

A BILL FOR ACCOMMODATION.  
WHereas there are many Jealousies risen about Popery, which makes it even necessary to the Peace of the Nation, that the Protestant Interest be united and strengthened by all good and lawful Means: And to this end, there being this one proper Expedient, to wit, the removing the Occasion of Divisions, which several Persons do find to themselves in those late Injunctions, which yet were intended to the same purpose of Concord in the Nation: Be it Enacted,— That an Explanation of these Impositions, and such Alleviations, be allowed to the tenderly Considerate, and peaccably Scrupulous, as follow.  
In the Act of Uniformity, By the Declaration of Assent and Consent to all things, and every Thing contained in, and prescribed by the Two Books of Common Prayer, and of Ordering Priests and Deacons, we understand not, 
These Materials were provided, during the sitting of that Parliament which passed the Act of Uniformity, and other the like Rigorous Acts; and are therefore drawn up in the form of an Explanatory Bill, because it was supposed, they were not like to Repeal their own Acts, though they might be got to Interpret them. But now we have a New Parliament, and that after another also Dissolved, we may expect quicker Work: Yet will the Proposing these Things still to view, have their use, both for suppressing such as have said, The Nonconformists know not what they would have; and setting some Measure to our own Desires, and the Parliaments condescensions about the same.  that these Books are in every Minute particular, infallible, or free from that Defect, which is incident to all human Composure: but that they are in the main Contents, to be sincerely approved and used. And we do therefore allow this Declaration to be sufficient, if it be made to the use of the Book, in the Ordinary Constant Lords Day Service, notwithstanding any Exceptions some may have against some Things in the By-Offices, and Occasional Service, the rubric, and otherwise. And for the Ceremonies which are made, and have been always, and on all hands, held to be only indifferent Things, we think fit that they be left to the Consciences and Prudence of Ministers, and People, every where( excepting the Cathedrals) to use them, or forbear them, as they judge it most meet for their own and others Edification. Provided, that if any Person will have his Child baptized with the Sign of the across, or stands upon any thing else, hitherto required by the Service-Book, if the Minister himself scruple the Performance, he shall permit another to do it.  
In the same Act, By those Words in the Subscription, that It is not lawful to take Arms against the King, upon any Pretence whatsoever; we intend no new or strange Thing, but the rightful Maintenance only of the Kings Authority against Rebellion, 
That we have our Reason for these Interpretations, any one may see that please in those Arguments against the Oxford Oath, and this Subscription which are offered in a little Book entitled The Peaceable Design, so that we can by no means submit thereto, without them. There is moreover this Clause[ And I will comform to the Liturgy of the Church, as it is by Law Established] we desire may be spared, because upon our Declaration before of Assent and Consent,( which must be the Bounds of our Sense thereof) it is needless altogether, and can serve but for a Snare only to Mens Consciences.  according to the common Determination of Learned Writers, in the Case of Subjection to Princes. By the Words, I abhor the Position of taking Arms by the Authority of the King, against any Commissionated by him, we never thought of Advancing the Arbitrary Commissions of the King, above Law; but by those Commissionated by him, we understand such as are Legally Commissionated, and in the Legal Pursuit of such Commissions. By the Clause which follows, that requires a Renunciation of all Endeavour of any Alteration of Government in the Church or State, we never meant to deny any Free-Born Subject his Right, of choosing Parliament Men or Acting in his Place for the Common Good any way, according to Law; but that he shall Renounce all such Endeavour, as is Seditious, or not warranted by the Constitution of the Nation; and particularly, such an Endeavour as was Assumed in the late Times, without, and against the Consent of the King: And for the rest of the Subscription, which is enjoined but to the Year 1682. Be it enacted, that it cease presently, and be no longer enjoined.  
And forasmuch as there is an Oath prescribed and required of all Non-conformist Preachers, that Reside in any Corporate-Town, by a certain Act of the former Parliament, made at Oxford in the 17th. Year of His now Majesties Reign, entitled, An Act for restraining Non-conformists, from inhabiting Corporations: We do further declare, 
This Oath is of the same Contents with the Subscription before; and to Impose both, is nothing else but the multiplying Wrath, and laying Load on the already Laden.  That it shall suffice any Man; for the Enjoyment of his Free born Liberty, of Inhabiting where he thinks best; and serve him also instead of the fore-mentioned Subscripton; to take that Oath in this Form of Words following. I A.B. do swear, That I hold it unlawful upon any Pretence, to take Arms against the King, his Government, or Laws: And that I disclaim that dangerous Position, of taking Arms by his Authority, against his Person, or any Legally Commissionated by him, in the Legal Pursuit of such Commissions: And that I will not endeavour any Alteration of Government in the Church or State, in any way or manner, not warranted by the Constitution of the Kingdom, or any otherwise than by Act of Parliament. And as soon as any Man hath taken the Oath thus, he shall be discharged of all Penalty for his Omission before.  
We do declare moreover, That whereas it is required also in the Act of Uniformity, that every Minister who enjoys any Living, or Ecclesiastical Preferment, shall be Ordained by a Bishop; and there are several persons of late, who in case of Necessity, for want of Bishops took Presbyterian-Orders: Our Meaning is not in any wise to disgust the Reformed Churches beyond the Seas, and make it necessary for such to be Re-ordained to the Office; but that they receive this Second Imposition of Hands to the Exercise of their Office in the new Charge, unto which they are, or shall be called; 
There is Reordinatio ad Officium, which( we say) is generally decried by Divines: or Re-ordinatio ad Exercitium particular, which may be irrefragably proved from Acts 13, 2, 3. with Acts 14.26. and consequently allowed to serve this Occasion.  and that the Bishop shall frame his Words accordingly.  
And whereas there is a Subscripon also in the Canons, and the Canonical-Oath of Obedience, imposed on most Ministers by the Bishops, that have given some of the greatest Occasion to Non-conformity heretofore; which yet never passed into Law by any Act of Parliament: 
If the Oath of Supremacy and Allegiance be taken, and the Articles of the Church subscribed, and the Declaration before to the Common-Prayer, made; we see no need of boiling over these three Things again for us, in the Canons, unless it be for a Crambe Repetita, on purpose to Kill us. Neither do we think the putting any Honest Men who fear God, out of the Vineyard, to be so good a Thing for her, that our Wise Church of England should use so much Care and Industry as She takes, that She may not miss to do it.  We do further declare, That nothing more of that kind shall be required of Minihers hence-forward, then was made and held necessary, by the Act of the Thirteenth of Elizabeth.  
And in regard there hath been great Offence taken by Conscientious Ministers, at the Bishops,( or their Courts) commanding them to red the Sentence of Excommunication against some or other of their Parish, for such Faults as they think not at all worthy of so great a Censure: We declare it but a just Thing, 
As we think, there is no Elder in the New Testament, who is not a Pastor, and that there is no Lay Pastor; so do we account, that there is no Pastor or Presbyter, but such as have the Power both to Rule and Teach, committed to them by Christ: Yet do we for all that, apprehended it not only Lawful, but Expedient, for the ordinary Ministers of our Parochial Congregations,( when the Church is National) to commit part of their Charge,( to wit, that of Ruling) in Actu Secundo, to some few among them, who are more Eminently fitted for the Work,( that is, the {αβγδ}) and consequently to the Bishop: So that, if this Fundamental Right of Governing their own Flocks, be but acknowledged to Reside in every Presbyter, by granting so much to us as this( and what hath preceded) comes to, we shall be unwilling to fall off from Episcopacy, upon the Points of Ordination and Jurisdiction.  that every Minister be first satisfied in the Cause, or else be exempted from the Execution of that Charge; and that the Bishop( or his Court) provide some other person, that is satisfied about it, to do it.  
And to the intent, that a free Search after Truth may not be discouraged in the Pursuit of Concord, and many other Scruples avoided upon that Account: We declare, That though an authentic Interpretation be required, 
The authentic Interpretation of an Article, is the Meaning of the mayor Part of the Convocation: A Doctrinal Interpretation, is the Meaning of any one of the Doctors there present,( and consequently, of any other Learned Expositor) who are supposed to have the Liberty to abound in their own Sense, so long as they can agree in the Words of the Article Established. And this Clause therefore we put in upon Mature Consideration, in regard more especially to the Conscientious Latitudinarians,( which is a Name abused) who being some Arminian, and some Calvinian, cannot otherwise Subscribe the Doctrine of the same Theses; as the Reader may see more in such a sort of Book as this, called The Healing Paper, out of which this Bill for Union is Collected.  as to the Substance of all Laws, yet in the Articles of the Church,( which are Theses for Agreement, and not Laws) and the Homilies, a Doctrinal Interpretation shall be held sufficient for an Assent or Subscription to them.  
And because the very Superintendency of Bishops, and that Subjection to them which is required by the Constitution of the Realm, is or may be an hindrance to many sober Ministers, and other Protestants, of coming into the Church, who are ready to consent to the Doctrine, but not to the Discipline or Government of it: We do declare, That so long as any Person or Party do aclowledge the King's Supremacy, as Head of the Church in this Nation, and obey their Ordinary, 
That is, Although there be some that cannot aclowledge our Diocesan Prelates to be Christs Officers, distinct from the Elders in Scripture, Yet so long as they can live Peaceable lives in Obedience to them, as Ecclesiastical Magistrates under His Majesty, for the keeping the several Congregations, in their Precincts, to that Gospel Order, which themselves allow, and for super-vising their Constitutions in Things indifferent, that nothing be done, but in Subordination to the Peace of the Kingdom,( which is a Notion wherein the Judicious of every Party may acquiesce, and expressed by us in these very Words in a Book forenamed) it is suffecient unto National Church Union.  or the Bishops, in Licitis& Honestis, upon the Account of his Authority( committed to them for the Exercise of that External Regiment Circa Sacra which is granted by all our Divines, to the Higher Powers in every Nation,) it is enough for the owning Episcopal Jurisdiction( so far as they do own it, in the Declaration of Assent and Consent, or in any other Part of Conformity,) and shall serve them to all Intents and Purposes in Law, no less than a professed Belief and Acknowledgement of the immediate Divine Right of it.  
Be it therefore Enacted by this Present Parliament, That if any Person be willing to comform to the Present Establishment of the Church of England, and her Service appointed according to these Explanations, Alleviations, Declarations, Lenitives, or Cautions, he shall be admitted to any Ecclesiastical Preferment, and enjoy the use of his Ministry without any Molestation: All Statutes, Canons, or Laws to the contrary notwithstanding.  
And for the making this Act of better Signification to the Concerned, and the Prevention of that Scandal which is raised on the Clergy, through the Covetousness of some, in heaping up to themselves all the Preferments they can get, when others have scarce subsistence for their Families, and the Souls of many People are thereby neglected: Be it farther Enacted, That no Clergy-Man for the Three next Years ensuing, be suffered to Enjoy any more than one Living or Cure of Souls, 
We propose these Things, we confess, as if we were in Republica Platonis, but we should be glad to see any Fruits of this kind, as those who are in Faece Romuli may expect. What is Right and Just, and ought to be done, is one thing, and to be sought; though what is like to be done, or will be done is another.  and one Dignity,( or other Ecclesiastical Preferment) at one Time; and that every Man( without Exception) that hath more than One of Either, shall immediately give up the Rest to be distributed among those who shall be brought off from their Non-conformity, upon the Terms of this Act into the Established Order. Which that they may also be obtained, and possessed with a clean Conscience, and that grievous Corruption of Simony may be extirpate out of the Land: Be it Enacted moreover, That every Patron that shall henceforward present his Clerk to any Living, shall have the Oath called The Simonical Oath, imposed on himself, no less than on the Incumbent: And if he Refuses to take it, that then the Bishop shall have immediate Power( taking only the same Oath) of Presentation in his Room.  
And forasmuch, as there are some Ministers of a good Life, that cannot( according to their Judgments) allow of our Parochial Churches, nor a Book of Liturgy: but do choose to Worship God, and Jesus Christ, in the way of their Gathered or Separate Congregations; and crave the Protection and Clemency of the King, upon their Allegiance, 
There are two Parts of this Bill; One for Concord or Coalition with all such as can join in Parochial Communion, in the Clauses before: The other for Forbearance of those that cannot, in this last Clause. For, what shall we do with such? We must not Knock them on the Head: They must therefore have Time. If the Parliament will begin with the last first, that is, a Suspension of the Penal Statutes, and then let us treat for a Composition after, we consent with all our Hearts, and like the Method best. Then Abner called unto Joab, and said, Shall the Sword devour for ever! Knowest thou not, that it will be Bitterness in the end! How long shall it be, eat thou bid the People return from following of their Brethren.  as other Subjects: Be it finally Enacted, for the Happiness and quiet of the Realm, and the Reduction of these Men by other means than those which have hitherto proved unsuccessful, That every Christian Subject throughout the Land that profess the Reformed Religion, and be not Convict of Popery, be pardonned all Faults and Penalties, incurred upon the Account of any Fore-passed Non-conformity; and that they shall not, 
Until by a further Act of Parliament, or a Convocation, those that are fit to be Tolerated, and the Intolerable be distinguished.  during these Seven Years next ensuing, be prosecuted upon any Penal Law for their Consciences, in the Matter of Religion; They carrying themselves Innocently and Peaceably, with Submission to the Civil, and without Disturbance to the Ecclesiastical Government, now settled in the Nation: All Statutes to the contrary notwithstanding.   

In Short.  
A Repeal of all our Laws about Conformity unto the 13th. of Elizabeth, Or, A New Act of Uniformity, Or, The Kings Declaration concerning Ecclesiastical Affairs at His first Coming in, turned into a Law, were Comprehension.  
His latter Declaration to all his Loving Subjects( some few Things in Both yet a little considered) made so, were Indulgence.  
A Bill for Comprehension with Indulgence, both together, will do our Business. An Addition, or Clause in it, against Pluralities, will do it with Supererogation.  
Deo Gloria.   

Postscript.  
BEcause some will be offended at the Book, and others at this Bill at the end of it, the Printer shall( having this spare leaf) tell them this Story. A Minister of the Church of England, an Ingenious and Considerable person, who lived lately in a Town of good note in the Country, was in the Company of some Gentlemen of that place who were Papists, and he Discoursing occasionally about the Non-Conformists, they fell inveighing readily against them, as a Generation not to be suffered to live; and that they wondered that the Episcopal party did not use their Interest to root them out of the Kingdom. These expressions seeming bitter to him, as well as unusual( for the Papists ordinarily are more reserved) he could not choose but reflect upon it, and thought in his mind immediately that it would be worth his inquiry to know what the same persons did use to say to the Fanaticks of the Churchmen, that spake of the Dissenters thus to him, and going therefore to some of the more eminent of the Town of that persuasion, he desired them to tell him truly what such Gentlemen( naming them by name) were wont to say of the Episcopal party when they were in their Company. They  told him they said ordinarily they were men of a Persecuting Spirit, that made not Conscience of their Religion, as the Fanaticks did, and consequently deserved to be looked on and dealt with accordingly, or words yet harsher to that effect. Upon this the Minister tells them what those persons said of the Non-Conformists party in such Company to himself the other day. The good men were astonished at it, in regard of their frequent conversation with them; and the result was, that both they and the Minister concluded streight of what a dangerous importance the dissension of the Protestants is amongst us; That the Design and Strength of the Papists lies there; And what need we have therefore to use all the means, and speed we can, to endeavour a composure and concord one with another.