A DISCOURSE Concerning GOD'S Foreknowledge, AND Man's Free Agency: WHEREIN Their seeming Opposition is reconciled, and real Consistency Demonstrated from the Holy Scriptures, and Arguments thence deduced.  
Acts 4.28. For to do whatsoever thy hand and thy Counsel determined before to be done.  
Phil. 2.12, 13.— Work out your own Salvation with fear and trembling. For it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure.  
Deut. 30.19. I have set before you Life and Death, Blessing and Cursing; therefore choose Life, &c.  
LONDON, Printed in the Year 1697.   

The PREFACE.  
IF in the Perusal of this small Tract, the Reader finds but small Satisfaction, I hope he will not much wonder at it, when he remembers, that Larger Volumes, and even Learned Ones too, in Matters especially of this Nature, do not always answer Expectation. I pretend to no great share of Learning, nor any large measure of Acute judgement; only I am naturally disposed to Thinking and Consideration, and upon the Occasion mentioned at the Entrance of the Ensuing Discourse, which is no fictitious Pretence, but a thing that did really happen about two years ago, I took a Fancy to set down my thoughts upon this abstruse Subject. Some few that have seen it in Manuscript, have thought it to be tolerable Sense, and might perhaps be a further Occasion to some Man of better Parts to speak more clearly to the Point, for which cause I am not unwilling to permit it's Publication; for I believe the Subject has not been hitherto exhausted; and I desire nothing more than to be out-done, or even confuted, by any one that can make things more coherent, and better vindicate the Divine Attributes.  
In the mean time, 
By a Fellow of the R. S.  I have met with a Curious Discourse concerning things above Reason, amongst which the Subject here treated of, is mentioned as one; by which I perceive, that this Essay of mine is not impertinent, tho' perhaps it may be ineffectual, and come far short of the Design. For how can an Unlearned Head( by never so much thinking) think to bring that under Reason, which so great a Wit hath ranked among things above it? So that the importance of the Attempt will not( I fear) account for the ill management of it: Yet its Innocency will( I hope) defend it from any heavy Censure. If I have not wholly subdued my Province unto Reason, yet I have given it a kind of Negative Voice; that is, tho' Reason cannot absolutely command the Affirmative, it shall nevertheless so far rule the Opposer, as to prevent his Negative. Some things must be granted, tho' perhaps not without difficulty, because they cannot be denied without far greater Inconvenience.  
If it be said, We cannot understand how any thing can be certain, and yet contingent; or how a voluntary Action can be foreseen, which depends upon Free-choice, and that at any time until it be effected, may be either done or let alone. Let such Persons try how they can clear the Inconveniencies of an Ignorant and Imperfect Deity, which will lie hard upon them if they grant not Divine Prescience. On the other side, let them see with what success they can take away distributive Justice, and root out the Notion and Existence of Good and Evil; which task is of Necessity incumbent on them that deny Man to be a Free Agent. If things to come be not foreseen, what will become of Divine Providence? If there be not in Man a free Election, where is sin? for where there is no choice, how can any one choose amiss? To chastise my Child for Disobedience, would be all one as to whip my Clock for going amiss. Either God Almighty foresees things future, or he cannot be God: Either Man is a voluntary Agent, or he cannot be Man. If these things therefore will not stand together, Reason itself may seem impertinent, and it's natural Conclusions altogether useless: For, to what purpose is Discourse or Ratiocination, when either there can be no Transgression, or none to take Notice of it, and punish it?  
These are the inconveniencies which men run the hazard of in this matter: For rather than admit one apparent difficulty, which consists perhaps only in the narrowness of human understanding, they choose to fill the World with Contradiction and Absurdity. Some will venture to mix Heaven and Earth together, under a State of War and Rapine, without any sense of Divine Authority to Awe Rebellious Mankind; and others will attempt to turn God out of the World, because they cannot comprehend his Perfections and Operations. But surely it is not advisable to Cashier every thing that puts a stress upon our limited Faculties, nor run down all those things for false, which consist not well with what we apprehended to be true. To which purpose the Discourse above mentioned contains a parcel of the Noblest Instances, applied and managed with the greatest Clearness, and to the highest Ends and Advantage, of any Book I have hitherto met with. From thence I gladly learn, that there are certain privileged Things, which will by no means stoop to Common Reason, nor accommodate themselves to those Rules and Measures which are sufficient for other Matters. Not but that there is a peculiar sort of Reason in these also; for tho' they are above my Reason to apprehended them fully, yet I apprehended very good Reason why they should be so. For, either my Capacity is bounded, or it is not; if it be, 'tis sure to be over-powered in grasping an unlimited thing; if not, it must then be infinite: And since I know many Capacities about the same Level with mine own, and not a few incomparably greater, it must follow, that, not only a multitude of infinites are consistent, but a Number also of Capacities, each of which is more than infinite; which Conclusion I think is more than sufficiently absurd. Besides, since God cannot do what is inconsistent, or involves a Contradiction, be could not create a Power or Faculty, comprehensive of his own Perfections; for that could be no less than infinite. he cannot parcel out his peculiar Attributes unto his Creatures; for that would imply a contradiction. Wherefore the most shallow Reason may conclude, there must of necessity be those things, which the most refined Wit cannot adequately comprehend.  
And this is so, not only in reference to the Divine Perfections, but in things also of a lower Nature, of which it may not be improper to insert one instance in this place, whereby an undeniable Truth will appear to be attended with unaccountable difficulty. For the Ensuing Discourse pretends not to answer all the Cavils that may be made against a Meridian Truth,( which yet like the Sun it self) hath some Obscurities; much less doth it undertake to make men see, who are either blind or shut their Eyes. But the design of it is, to assert from the Scriptures, the Truth of Divine Prescience, and of voluntary Election; to evince the necessity of admitting them both; to accommodate the seeming Opposition, and to point out some of those unconcluding Arguments, that misled Men to apprehended an inconsistence where there is none. But in case I have not performed this with sufficient Strength and Clearness of Expression, it will not be foreign to the matter in hand, to show by an instance, that somethings may not only be true, but are almost universally acknowledged, which yet how they can be so, is insuperably hard to be conceived.  
And this shall be an instance which doth frequently occur to every one that is conversant about Decimal Numbers: Scarce any good accountant but understands, no learned man but will aclowledge the force of it. For you may have a small fraction, suppose of a farthing, or of a barley corn, not worth demanding, which yet cannot be denied to be infinitely Divisible; insomuch, that going about to find some determinate part of such a fraction, as l⅓, ⅕, or the like, you may indeed divide it according to Decimal arithmetic, and you shall presently come near the truth, and the further you continue your Division, you shall still come the nearer: But though you Divide it everlastingly, you shall never be able to get out entirely the part you aim at, but the Quotient will still be defective, and something will for ever remain of the Dividend.  
To make out this the more evidently, I put the following Case for an Example: Seven Workmen are to receive for some piece of Work 20 s. to be equally divided amongst them; and supposing myself to be one of the seven, I demand my share; but first I am to compute what it comes to. To do this, I make use of Decimals, which in many Questions are very expeditious, and much in use at this day. It is no more but only to divide 20 by 7: But since there is a remainder, I add ciphers 
20( 2.8.5.7 14 60 56 54 35 50 49 1  to the Dividend, and so continuing the Division to four places. I find in the Quotient this mixed Number, 2. 8. 5. 7. which comes to 2 s. 10 d. 1 q. and something more, which is a solution exact enough for common practise.  
But this is not all; for there remains one of the Dividend, that is to say, one thousandth part of a Shilling, and of this I demand 1/ 7, to make up my full proportion of the 20 s. I there still proceed to Divide, in order to get out my seventh part exactly, but I shall never be able to do it; no, though the Division were to be continued from Age to Age for one thousand years, and after that for another, yet still the Quotient would be too little, and the Dividend inexhaustible.  
In this plain and familiar Question, resolved by Decimals, three things are evident. 1. That in a few minutes time an answer may be given, tho' not exact, yet sufficiently true for common use; that is to say, in half an hour at most, I may safely aver it, that so much is my full share, within less than one Millioneth part of a farthing; and yet at the same time, I may be sworn, that the same is not my proportion exactly.  
2. Let me continue the Division as far, and as long as I please, I shall come nearer still and nearer to the truth, and every new figure in the Quotient, adds something to my share, which I had not before; it lessons the Dividend and approaches by various( or rather infinite) degrees nearer to 1/ 7, which is the proportion aimed at. But  
3. It can never be accomplished; myriad of Ages would not suffice to drain this Fountain. You may suppose( if you please) the Quotient to be extended in Decimal Fractions, as far as from the Artick to the antarctic Pole; all that would not reach a true seventh part, tho' every figure( as I said) advances something towards it.  
Let us now lay all this together, here is a Mark to be hit, as suppose it were a Jack lying in a Bowling-Alley, you may aim at it, and presently come within an hair's breadth, your Bowl may be still in motion, and every moment come nearer to the Mark, and yet shall never touch it.  
This Example in arithmetic seems to conclude no less than those two other Noted Curiosities in Geometry, concerning the Hyperbole and Diagonal, and has a respective Affinity to them both. For whereas the Hyperbole, may have such a Relation to a right line drawn near it, that both being prolonged, it shall come nearer and nearer to the said right Line; yet how far soever both lines be extended, they shall never meet; this is very nearly resembled in the case before us. And whereas it is impossible to assign any common Measure for the Side and Diagonal of a Square, which shall exactly measure them both, but there will remain a part of the one line, less than the said common measure, after you have made that as little as you please: So here, it is impossible to exhaust Decimal Numbers by sevens, because that 7. and 10.( or any number consisting of 1. with the Addition of ciphers) are so far incommensurable, that nothing above an Unit can be a common Measure to them both. To conclude, from this plain and familiar instance, may be inferred the endless Divisibility of matter, that the Parts of any thing exceed the whole, and that the whole Globe of Earth is no further divisible, nor cannot be said to contain a greater Number of Parts, than one small grain of Sand.  
Now if there be such a mysterious depth in Lines and Numbers, such a boundless Abyss in any small particle of Earth or day, that the Wit of Man cannot comprehend it, what shall we say of him that made all things in Number, Weight and Measure? How can we excuse the audacious folly of pretending to measure Eternity by the unequal standard of our judgement, or Circumscribe infinity within the narrow Circl● of human Capacity? Wherefore if the Reader shall dislike the following Discourse, and the Reasons therein made use of, let him for his own satisfaction( and for mine too, if he please) bethink himself of better, and therein he may do a piece of service, both useful and acceptable. But for any one to confine the ineffable perfections of the Supreme Being to his own faculties, is a piece of egregious vanity, and an undertaking altogether desperate.   

A DISCOURSE Concerning GOD's Foreknowledge, AND Man's Free Agency.  
I Happened a while ago, to be present at a Discourse between two Gentlemen, concerning the fatal Period of Man's Life, or the fixed certainty of Future Events: The one affirming it, from the consideration of God's Foreknowledge; the other denying it, from the evident certainty of Man's Free-will. The former urged; what God Foresees, cannot but come to pass; the latter pleaded, Man cannot choose, nor refuse, the doing of that, which is certain to be done. I thought there was truth in what they both grounded their Arguments upon, but certain inferences, pretended to be drawn from thence, which this Discourse produced, I could by no means approve of, I did therefore interpose a little for an accommodation, but with so ill success, that I have a mind to try, if I can do any better in this Paper. Not that I will presume to moderate betwixt two Persons, each of them better Learned, and of far greater Abilities than myself. But since their Discourse hath so fixed the Subject in my mind, that I cannot easily remove it, I will only attempt to clear the Notion a little to my own Apprehension, by setting my thoughts in some kind of order in reference to this matter. I shall therefore endeavour these three things.  
1. To assert from Scripture, that God foresees future Events; and that nevertheless, Man is a free and voluntary Agent.  
2. To show, how these two things agree together; and detect the fallacy of those Reasonings that represent them inconsistent.  
3. To answer some of those Objections, that are wont to occur in this Debate.  
I begin with the first, and easiest part of my Task, namely, to assert God's Foreknowledge, and Man's Free-will, out of the Scriptures. These are indeed two several subjects, and might challenge each of them a distinct Head of Discourse: yet I rather choose to manage them both in one, by linking Scriptures together in such sort, that of each couple, the one shall make out Divine Prescience, and the other human Freedom; and being considered together, shall evince, that both these have oft-times been conversant about the same particular event; that is, one Text shall prove God's Fore-knowledge of, and another shall evidence Mans Freedom in, doing or refusing the same individual Action.  
But first, that I may clear my way as much as I can, I must explain the Terms, or give some account, at least, how I understand them. Some indeed except against the word Prescience, and tell us, that God doth not properly fore-see any thing, since he beholdeth all things as present; but this I count is Criticism without Necessity; for the word is frequently used, as 'tis taken in this Discourse, and is proper enough with respect unto us, and to such things as are not yet in being. What shall be a thousand years hence, is indeed potentially in God, but not yet actually existent: So that his knowledge of such things, is not unfitly called Prescience, as also the respect and consideration of somewhat that is distant, is called Providence. Now as God's Omnipotence did virtually comprehend from Eternity, all the Creatures that were to be produced in Time; So his Omniscience gives him an entire View and Prospect of all their Actions. They cannot act but by a Power derived from him; how then should they do any thing unknown to him? He knows what himself will bring to pass in spite of all opposition; and he knows what Latitude he will allow his Creatures in their Actions. Since therefore God Almighty knows his own Will, and since Nothing can ever come to pass without his Will, either positive or permissive; it must follow, that he sees and knows all things and events, which are to come, and not yet actually existent, with equal certainty as if they were present. And this is what I mean by Divine Prescience.  
I must now fix my Notion of Free-will, and herein I shall carefully avoid all School Controversies about it, or about Common and Efficacious Grace: As also those Dominican Fancies about a thing they call 
Prov. Letters.  Next Power, which is next to none, and Sufficient Grace, which some think altogether insufficient. These and such like questions I leave to be beaten into Atoms between the jesuits and Jansenists.  
And whereas some contend, that it is in every Man's power to do what the Gospel enjoins: For should God require of any man what is impossible to be done by him, he must needs appear to be a hard Master.  
Others deny that any man can, or ever will effectually believe and repent without special Grace, which wherever it comes, makes a thorough work of Conversion in the heart, and therefore can never be lost, nor the person in whom it is finally miscarry.  
Others again say, there is a sufficiency of Grace, which with pious endeavours will bring a Man to happiness, yet under a possibility of apostatising, in which case God may and doth sometimes relinquish the Person to final Destruction.  
And others, to name no more, say, there is a Common Grace, or Universal Talent given to all Men, which tho' of itself, it is by no means sufficient, yet upon a conscientious improvement thereof, with earnest Prayer for further daily Supplies, it will please God to bestow such a Measure, as shall be sufficient to Salvation; whilst those who were entrusted with the same stock, having laid it up in a Napkin, are through their own Default, utterly ruined. Yet they add withal, that there are a certain Number, more peculiarly called the Elect, whom Efficacious Grace does seize upon, some in a high career of Wickedness, others at first even against their Will, tho' in the day of Gods Almighty Power, they become a willing People, to that degree, that they desire nothing more than to lay out their lives, to spend and be spent( as St. Paul said) for the advancement of that Grace and Truth whereby they are subdued and purified: But these( they say) are not the Rule and Measure of God's dealing with Mankind in general, but are to be look't upon, as certain high and noble Instances of the Freeness and Efficacy of Divine Grace, and of God's exercising an Almighty Prerogative in choosing a Raging Persecutor, or some Atheistical Debauchee, to be made a peculiar favourite and chosen Vessel to himself.  
Whereas( I say) there are these( and perhaps some other) Opinions, that are wont to fall under consideration, when the business of Free-will is in debate; I shall not trouble myself to determine which is best, nor is it material to my design: 'tis not impossible, but with a due Respect unto Persons, Times and Circumstances, there may be something of Truth in them all, and each of them perhaps may be good or bad, according as 'tis managed. Truth and error I look upon as Gold and Dross: The one is a pure and splendid thing, but may be adulterated or abused, and seldom is without alloy; the other, tho' base and ignoble, contains for the most part something of true mettal, if duly separated from the rest.  
This only( under submission) I shall adventure to say as my own present thoughts about this matter, and so proceed; namely, that most men, however under a state of Nature, may do much moral good, which shall not pass unrewarded, and something too( for ought they can know to the contrary) towards acceptance with God. That many men through the Divine Goodness shall be saved, that neither know punctually the time of their Conversion, nor certainly whether they be converted or not. That few there are who attain to that complete assurance, as to banish at all times, all manner of Dubitation. That it is all mens duty to seek that they may find, and to wait upon God in the use of those means appointed by him in his word; and we have his promise for success. And, that no man can truly say now, or shall be able to pled at the last day, that he hath used his utmost endeavours, and found them unsuccessful. These and the like considerations may be ground enough for men to be doing good at present, and for their reliance upon the Goodness of God for the future. But on the other hand, since there is a spiritual as well as a fleshly Wickedness, and Satan is transformed sometimes into an Angel of Light, and lest Man should be lifted up with an apprehension of certain fine things that he can do; let him remember, that 'tis God who worketh in him both to will and to do of his good pleasure; that of himself he can do nothing, and that all his righteousness is but filthy rags. And this will help to poise him at the Center between the two extremes of fainting and presuming, and will discover a necessity of an humble attendance at the Throne of Grace, that God would supply unto him those Divine Aids, and Spiritual Powers, by which he may be enabled to encounter opposition, and find acceptance in Christ Jesus.  
And herein perhaps may consist the narrowness of the way that leads to life. For one man, supposing he can do nothing acceptable to God, resolves to take his ease, until the Spirit, that Wind which bloweth where it list, breath upon him; another thinks he is able and willing, to do all that God requires; he admires his own good husbandry in the improvement of his Talent, and thanks God, he is not like other men. Now the way lying in the middle betwixt these Extremities, the least step towards a Carnal Liberty one the one hand, or a Pharisaical Righteousness on the other, must needs be a deviation from the right path, as this collateral Discourse is a digression from what I intend. But I now return, and do say, that let men establish what Doctrine they please concerning Grace, it will not import the matter in hand, since I shall confine my Notion of Free-Will to those things that are on all hands acknowledged to be within Man's power, supposing only the ordinary concurrence of God's providence thereunto.  
I consider then, that Man above other Creatures hath knowledge to judge and distinguish of things commodious or inconvenient, beneficial or noxious to him, in the concerns of his Life; and it would be a strange solecism in Nature, if he had not the Liberty of choosing the one, and refusing the other. What doth it advantage a Man, to know the difference between a Sheep and a Wolf, if he want the Power or the Will, to make a benefit of the one, and avoid the mischief of the other? Nay I do not see, but this might render Man of all Creatures most miserable, since his knowledge of Good could be no other to him than gull and Bitterness; whilst he finds himself fatally carried on to Evil. And suppose he had been always predetermined to Good, his knowledge of Evil then had been in vain, or rather indeed it had been impossible; since Man could not have come to the knowledge of Evil, but by doing it. And what could Man under a necessity of always doing good, signify, more than a good Watch? which tho' it moves regularly, yet is it altogether involuntary, cannot do otherwise, knows not that it moves at all; and consequently is incapable of Praise or Encouragement, Reward or Punishment. Thus if we take away from Man his Faculties of Judging and Choosing, we make the Lord of the Creation the most contemptible thing in Nature, and put him under the Feet of those Brutes he was made to rule over. So that without voluntary Agency, that is, without a Will and the proper Exercise thereof, Man becomes little better than a senseless Machine.  
But now on the contrary, we see plainly, that, by the good Providence and Disposal of Almighty God, men have power to do many things, as namely, to cultivate the Earth, to build Houses, to provide against Hunger and could, to educate their Children, to exercise several Arts and Trades, for the Benefit of human Life, and to manage all these according to certain Rules, Methods and Observations, arising partly from Experience, and partly from Mens consulting one another. I say, in all these, and a thousand more particulars, Men do consider and deliberate, and then pursue their several Designs, some with greater, others with a lesser share of Prudence, but each employing his Measure, and accordingly determining to choose this, and refuse the other.  
In short, I conceive, that God having endued Man with an Understanding to judge, and a Will to choose, and continually supplying him with power to act according to his Nature, he doth not ordinarily over-power, or impel his Faculties, but leaves him to the free Use and Exercise thereof in things within his proper Sphere. And this is what I mean by Free-will. Now I address to my Province, which is to assert this, together with God's Fore-knowledge of future Events from the Scriptures.  
The first pair of Scriptures that I employ for this Service, shall be out of Exodus, 
Chap. 3.18. Chap. 3.19.  where Moses is appointed of God to go unto Pharaoh, and say unto him, Let us go, we beseech thee, into the Wilderness, &c. It is not easily to be imagined, but that Pharaoh had power to have granted this Request at first, and the very Request itself doth strongly imply a Liberty of granting it. No good Master will require any thing of his meanest Servant, with intention to punish him severely for not doing it, and yet secretly contrive means to prevent and disable him, that he cannot do it. To say, that God should sand Moses to make a request unto Pharaoh, saying, Let us go, we pray thee, that he should destroy him at last for refusing, and in the mean time should bind up his heart by some irresistible influence, from all possibility of granting it: This would not only excuse Pharaoh from the guilt of sin, but make an odious representation of the Ever blessed God; as if his Wisdom were exercised in laying snares for the innocent, and his power in their destruction. Should a Writing-Master guide his Scholars hand, to make a blot, or some ill Character, and then beat him for it, whereas being left to himself he would have done better, what could be thought of such behaviour in a Master? and how just would be the Scholar's indignation against him?  
The sinfulness of an Action consists in this, that it is voluntary, and against the Command; the nature of a voluntary action is, that 'tis done out of choice and deliberation, when otherwise it might be forborn. Now, either Pharaoh sinned in detaining the People, or he did not; if not, wherefore was he destroyed? 
Gen. 18.2  Shall not the Judge of all the Earth do right? If he did, he acted out of Choice, and consequently he might have dismissed the Israelites sooner, if he had pleased. Hence it will also follow, that there could be no secret Influence, nor any predetermining Concourse from God, to bind his Faculties, or take away his Free-agency; only the Pride of his Heart, despising God's Message to him, and his domineering Ambition to keep the People in Slavery, did out-weigh( in his unjust balance) the other Motives he had to dispense with them.  
And herein consisteth the nature of Election, that of two things proposed, with Motives on either part, a man freely chooseth that which likes him best, in his present Apprehension, tho' at the same time( if he thought good) he might choose the other. Thus did Pharaoh choose to detain the People, there's his Choice; yet before ever the matter was propounded to him, God himself says, 
Exod. 3.19.  I am sure he will not let you go; here is Fore-knowlege: Therefore Divine Prescience and human Liberty are consistent, and have been conversant about the same individual Action.  
But here an Objection may arise from the seventh Chapter, and the third verse, where God says, 
Exod. 7.3.  He will harden Pharaoh's heart: From whence it might be supposed, that Pharaoh could not act voluntarily, nor be said to have any real Freedom of Will. To this I answer,  
1. I will not deny, but that in consideration of Pharaoh's former Wickedness, in dealing so barbarously with the People of Israel, God might forsake him, and give him over to hardness of Heart. But then,  
2. I deny that this hardness of heart, by whomsoever, or in what manner so ever it was wrought, could deprive him of the Liberty of doing a Civil Act within his power. He might for some self End, or with some ill design, have dismissed the Israelites, and yet still have retained his hard heart; it was but a word speaking, and the business had been done. And it is observable, that while the smart was upon him, he could say, 
Exod. 9.27, 28.  I and my People are wicked; and promised too, to let the Israelites go; but still, as he found respite,( thinking perhaps the storm was over) he retracted. On the one hand, there was the danger of perishing, or having at least) his Kingdom ruined by those Judgments God sent upon him: On the other hand, there was the lust of tyrannizing over an enslaved People, and the benefit of their Labours in making Brick. These two weights being opposed each to other in the Scales, sometimes the one, and then presently the other preponderates. And this purely is deliberation, the result whereof is choosing, and choosing is the undoubted property of a free Agent.  
3. Concerning the hardening of Pharaoh's heart, the Apprehensions of Learned Men are different; that which to me appears the most reasonable is to this effect, namely, that this induration is not to be understood as any positive Act, or immediate Efficiency from God, whereby Pharaoh's heart was made hard,( much less his Will Predetermin'd) directly and properly, no more than it is to be understood that our Saviours coming was directly and properly to fill the World with dissensions, because he himself saith expressly, that 
Luke 12.51, 52.  He came not to bring peace on the Earth, but rather division. The primary intention of the Gospel, no doubt, was Peace and Good Will towards men; but meeting with various tempers, and sundry degrees of Corruption in the hearts of men, it could not choose but occasion dissension and a sword upon the Earth. In like manner the primary intention of God's Judgments, is to reform the World, and bring men to Repentance, whilst in some Persons they have a quiter contrary effect. So that, as the Gospel of Peace was the accidental cause of War, so might God's dealing with Pharaoh tend to harden his Heart, and yet to soften a less rebellious one, as the same Sun beam melteth Wax and hardeneth day. And as fin by the commandment becomes exceeding sinful, 
Rom. 7.11, 13.  in so much that the Commandment itself, which was ordained unto life, is found to be unto death: So Pharaoh's stubborness, under the Divine Hand, becomes the more exceeding stubborn; and that Chastisement, which was ordained unto Reformation, did the more effectually promote his destruction. Hence it is highly probable, that, I will harden his heart, may import no more than this, I will bring such things to pass, and in such a manner, as shall through his own Corruptions, render him much more obdurate.  
That the natural and direct tendency of God's dealing with Pharaoh was to convince him, seems very apparent from these Considerations: 1. He orders Moses to try him with Innocent Miracles, afterwards with smarting ones, by such degrees, till it come at last to the death of his First-born. 2. While the Plagues lay heavy upon him, he gave some signs of a yielding and relenting temper, but ever in the Intervals he contracted a greater obdurateness. 3. The Judgments of God had their proper Effect upon the Egyptians, so far, that they would gladly have the Israelites dismissed sooner and at last, were not only urgent to have them gone in hast, but willing to part with their 
Exod. 12.33, 35.  Jewels into the bargain. These considerations( I say) seem very much to favour the forementioned sense of the Place, but whether that be the only true meaning of it, I shall not contend, so long as I can make it good, that Pharaoh was a Free Agent in that particular thing which was foretold by God Almighty.  
The next double Testimony shall be out of 
Ezek. 3.4.  Ezekiel, where the Prophet is sent to the Israelites, and words put into his Mouth, to warn and dehort them from their wicked ways, lest they should die. Hence I argue thus; either the House of Israel might have obeied God's message to them by the Prophet, or else not: If not, how shall we clear the sincerity of God's dealings with them? Or will his message to them appear any more than a compliment? Let us have a Care of entrenching upon Blasphemy. But, if they might have humbled themselves at the Prophet's voice, as Nineveh did in the like case, it will follow, that they were not by any previous necessity divested of their Liberum Arbitrium, as is also evident from these words so often repeated in the Prophet's Commission, Whether they will hear, or whether they will forbear? which is as much as to say, they have their free choice. And what follows? 
Ezek. 3.7.  But the House of Israel will not harken unto thee. God doth not only afford Liberty and Opportunity of Repentance, but he urges the same by strong pleadings and inducements; and yet at the same time, he foresees a contrary Event. And this is what I undertook to assert from the Scriptures.  
Again, in the 5th. of Hosea, 
Hos. 5.5.  God foretells, that Israel and Ephraim shall fall in their iniquity, Judah also shall fall with them; yet in the 6th. Chapter 
Hol. 6.1.  he exhorts to Repentance. This indeed might have its proper effect too, upon some small remnant that should escape 
Ezek. 6.8, 9.  and remember God among the Nations whither they were to be carried captives. But now there is the same means afforded to those that should fall in their Iniquity, as to the few that should escape; nor doth God's Fore-knowledge of the several Events impose a necessity upon either. He grants Liberty unto both, which he knows a Remnant will make good use of, whilst the greater Number will abuse it to their ruin. Thus it is evident, that Liberty and Prescience are consistent.  
It is moreover prophesied, that by 
Hosea 13.1.  reason of Idolatry, they shall be as Chaff driven with a whirlwind out of the Floor, and as smoke out of the Chimney; yet afterwards, we red in the same Chapter, O Israel thou hast destroyed thyself. We do not use to say, a man destroys himself, that is unwillingly run down by external force, or some inevitable necessity; nor can he that ruins himself charge the fault upon another. If Israel destroys himself, he is surely the Agent of his own destruction; and if so, he is either a Voluntary or an Involuntary Agent; if Involuntary, he cannot be said to destroy himself, no more than a House burns itself when fire is set to it by an Incendiary. An Involuntary Agent, as a Sword or a Hammer, can only act as 'tis managed by Hands, and those governed by the Will. It remains then, that Israel was the voluntary Agent of his own ruin; and since this is foretold of God by the Prophet, it must follow( if the Scriptures be true) that Divine Prescience doth not any way infringe the Liberty, or Free-agency of rational Creatures.  
God foresaw, that wicked Hands would be forward enough to deliver up the Divine Person unto Death, who was the 
Act. 2.23.  Lord of Life; nay, his determinate Counsel did concur with his Fore-knowledge, so far as to let it proceed to Execution, as the Learned Mr. Howe observes. And our Saviour 
Mat. 20.17.  himself, not only describes particularly the manner and circumstances of his own Death, when yet it was not near at hand, but is said also to 
Jo. 18.4.  know all things that should come upon him. Yet if the Actors of this wickedness had been rightly informed what they were about, they would have left their work for other hands. That's very strange( says one of our Disputants) here is an Event secured by the determinate counsel of God, here is the place where, the manner how, and the Persons by whom it should be brought to pass, described before hand by our Saviour; can any thing that is so infallibly certain admit of an If? Yes, in St. Paul's account it may, and he is a person that deserves some regard, And indeed, his Assertion will appear highly reasonable, when we consider the Princes of this World, so sadly misinformed as they were, and imposed upon by all the wicked Artifice imaginable, yet we do not find them very eager to be concerned in the Blood of that just person, when the principal Agent pretends 
Mat. 27.24.  to wash his hands of it, and professes 
Luke 23.22.  he found no cause of death in him. And had it not been for the impetuous Clamours of a wretched People, and the danger of a Tumult, 'tis probable that the malicious contrivance of the Priests, and their shame Evidence, would not have weighed against Pilate's Native Clemency. What must we then think had been done, in case of a right information? Why the Apostle tells us; 
1 Cor. 2.8.  Had they known it, they would not have crucified the Lord of Glory. This puts it out of all doubt, that they were under no other force than the Result of their own Deliberation. On the one hand, there was the meekness of the Prisoner, the clemency of the Judge, and the disagreement of the Witnesses: On the other hand, there was the influence of the Priests, the ignorance of the Court, and cries of the Multitude; which kept the business for a while in Equilibrio, but then the fear of a tumult superadded, cast the Scales. Nor were they under any further Necessity of crucifying our Saviour, by means of such a Divine Foresight, that he should be crucified, than they would have been under, in case it were to be supposed, that God had not so punctually foreseen, or foretold the same.  
There are many other places of Scripture, that do evidently prove there is in Man a free Election. Solomon is commended for asking Wisdom, 
1 Kings 3.1.  when he might have asked Riches, length of Days, or Revenge upon his Enemies; and Ananias 
Act. 4.5.  is the more condemned for falsity about the price of the Land, because that even after it was sold, it was in his own power.  

Num. 30.1.  If a Wife make a Vow, it is left to her Husbands choice, either to establish it, or to make it voided.  

Jos. 24.15.  Choose you this day whom you will serve.  

2 Sam. 24.12.  Go and say unto David, thus saith the Lord, I offer thee three things; choose thee one of them, that I may do it unto thee.  
These Scriptures are so clear, they need no Commentary, nor do they admit of any Objection. And I think there is no less Evidence for Divine Prescience, since all Prophecies and many other Places of Scripture, do either directly, or by just consequence put it beyond Dispute, with all that aclowledge the Authority of that sacred Book. I shall mention no more but this one, and therewith close up this first part of my Undertaking: It is so direct and full to the purpose, as if the Holy Ghost had designed it to remove all Scruple and Hesitation about that matter. 
Isa. 36.9.  I am God, and there is none like me, declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done.  
Had I leisure now, or Opportunity, to consult the Fathers or Schoolmen; I am inclinable to believe, I should have their general Suffrage in this matter; but truly those Gentlemen are none of my Familiars, and and I was loathe to trouble them. Yet meeting by accident with two of them, which are esteemed no less than Oracles, I made bold to ask them their Opinions in the case. I confess, I was not displeased to find them so very civil, and favourable to the Notions, I had already formed, and in part written down, concerning this Subject. One of these was the Learned Suarez, who first of all disputing copiously about Man's capacity of acting freely, he brings it last to this issue: 
Metaph. Tom. 1. p. 338, 339.  Experimur enim evidenter, situm esse in nostra potestate aliquid agere vel omittere,& ad hoc utimur ratione& discursu ac consultatione, ut in unam partem potius quàm in aliam inclinemur: Est ergo Electio positiva in nostro arbitrio, alioqui fuisset nobis data superfluè, haec deliberandi& consultandi vis. For we find by evident Experience, that it is in our power either to do a thing or leave it undone, therefore we reason, argue and deliberate, in order to choose one thing rather than another, 'tis therefore in our power to make a positive choice, or else we have this Capacity given us in vain. This comes close to that point. And then in the next place, he doth no less vigorously maintain God's Fore-knowledge of all Events and Actions, whether voluntary, or contingent, the Sum of which is thus.  

jom. 2. p. 92, 93.  God cannot( saith he) be ignorant of what he himself doth, or will do, because he knows his own Will and his power to effect what he wills. Nor can can he be ignorant of what his Creatures do now, or what they shall do hereafter, because whatever is positively good in their Actions, is by immediate influence from himself; and what there is of privation or defect, cannot be without his permission, and therefore he cannot be ignorant of mens sinful and wicked actions. He goes on to show, that unless God did fore-know from Eternity whatever was, or is to come to pass in time, he could neither be omnipotent nor immutable. Not omnipotent, because in reference to those things whereof he had no foresight, his Providence and Government of Affairs must needs be defective. Not Immutable, because something must daily occur to his knowledge which he knew not before.  
Atque hinc sequitur Deum habere hanc Scientiam Creaturarum quae fiunt in tempore ex aeternitate sua, ut totam illam simul habeat sine successione, quia non potest in se variationem admittere; item quia non posset Deus habere perfectam providentiam in rebus administrandis, nisi haberet omnium praescientiam. Thus far that Eminent Schoolman.  
The other is the Angelical Thomas Aquinas, as some are pleased to style him. He in his Sum of Theology dispatches me in a few words. For having first described Providence to be a respect to somewhat that is distant, according to which the occurrences now present are to be ordered, which doth therefore necessary include prescience: He saith afterwards, Providentia Dei est omnium singularium, nec tamen à rebus excludit contingentiam, nec casum, nec fortunam, nec liberum arbitrium: That the Providence of God extendeth to all particulars, not excluding Contingency, Chance, Fortune, or Free-will.  
Add hereunto, that it was allowed St. Augustine as a maxim, that God by his foreknowledge, doth not necessitate, or constrain, the coming to pass of the things foreknown by him. These Testimonies, as they are of unquestionable Authority, so are they clear, direct, and full to the purpose; and this is all I design for the first general Head.  
I am now in the second place to attempt certain reasons, or considerations, whereby to accommodate the difference, or at least to lessen the opposition, that seems to be between Prescience and Free-will. The Heads to be insisted on for that purpose are these three: Namely, The truth of the Holy Scriptures, The Harmony of the Divine Attributes, and the Non-causality of Divine Prescience.  
First then, I argue from the verity of the Scriptures; for I am not designing to confute an Atheist, writing only to such as do aclowledge the Truth and Authority of those Sacred Letters; but chiefly( as I said before) for my own satisfaction. Some young Divines indeed I have observed, who in their first setting out to preach the Word, affect to preach altogether without it, and seem to Triumph in dispelling the darkness of Atheism and Irreligion, by the Gloworm-light of corrupt Nature. Others there are, that prove their Doctrines out of Terence, Tully and Seneca; whether it is, because they have not red the Bible, or that they preser the Authority of Heathen Writers before it, or that they would be thought to be profoundly learned, I shall not dispute; but I find other more experienced Work-men, who do not trouble themselves to dig below the true foundation, but think the Rock of Ages safe enough for them to build upon. Now, as that Comical sort of Preaching, to vulgar Ears, doth rather Amuse than edify: So this Essay( which is not like to be regarded by the Learned) if it should happen to take the Country air, would look very thin without Scripture-Evidence. But if indeed the Scriptures do clearly speak the Substance of what is herein contained, this ought to have the force of a Reason, with all those that aclowledge the Authority of that Book. Nor will it be material to object, that this Argument doth not sufficiently make out the reasonableness of what is here pleaded for: For as there are several Ranks of privileged things, which will not condescend to Common Reason, so there are several degrees of Reason also, of which the lower ought to yield to the superior; and it is the highest reason sure, that God is true, tho' every Man should be found a liar.  
I am by no means against it yet, that Atheism should be encountered upon its own principles, if at least it can be said to have any principles at all; but every Stripling is not a fit Champion for an overgrown Philistine: And I had rather have that Province entirely left to such as can manage it, than have the Truth to suffer by weak Patronage As for those therefore, that expect better proof than from the Word of God, and those natural consequences arising thence, I shall leave them to the discipline of their own Consciences; for if they are not convinced by what Bp. Wilkins, Bp. Ward, Mr. boil, Dr. Cudworth, Sir Cha. Wolsely, and some others have already said against Atheism, I shall never hope to give them satisfaction.  
But as for those two Gentlemen, betwixt whom the controversy was started, upon which occasion I scribble down these hasty Notes, they are both of them( I hope) serious Christians, not doubting in the least the truth of the Scriptures, yet differing vastly in their apprehensions about this matter. One of them is firm in the belief of Divine Prescience, but somewhat Hesitant as to the business of Free-will: The other is so much a Free-willer, that he seems to cashier Divine Prescience; For( says he) if God offer me any good thing, and knows in the mean time I will not accept of it, I am nothing beholding to him for his kindness.—  
This manner of expression concerning God, is over-bold and fawcy; for we may not speak of him with such a Liberty, as is allowable in other matters. Besides, let us observe the consequence, and we shall find it to be this, that either God Almighty has no knowledge at all of future Events; or else, that all conditional Promises, throughout the whole Scripture, are no more than shadows; the former of which consequences strikes at the Perfection of the Divine Nature, and the latter blurrs the sincerity of the inspired Writings. To which it may be added, that such Doctrine is false, and injurious to the Goodness of God: For his Benefits offered to Mankind are not to be valued by his Fore-knowledge of Non-acceptance, but by their own intrinsic worth, and by Man's Capacity of enjoying them if he will. And tho' God doth assuredly know, who will not accept of his kindness, yet he knows at the same time, the fault is in themselves; nor is their refusal any further necessary from any such Divine Foresight, than otherwise it would have been. So that some Persons will indeed seem to have a great Veneration for the Scriptures, and yet own such Principles as render a great part of them insignificant: For, if God's Fore-knowledge necessitate all Events, so that nothing could have fallen out otherwise than it doth; then all Divine Precepts and Rules of Life, all Promises and threatenings upon certain conditions, are no more but Cheats and empty Formalities. But now, to those that sincerely aclowledge the Divine Authority and Truth of the Scriptures,( as all Christians ought to do) the Argument will lie thus: What ever is entirely true, is also harmonious and self-consistent. But the Scriptures are true. Ergo, &c.  
If it be urged, that the Scriptures, as proceeding from God, are indeed most perfectly and entirely true, yet passing through the hands of so many Men, in various Copies and Versions, from one Language into another, it cannot be, but something of human infirmity must stick to them. This indeed I freely grant; and if any such thing can be made evident in the case before us, it will be very fit to be considered. In the mean time, there can hardly any two things be name that are more clearly and vigorously asserted in Scripture, than are Divine Prescience and Free-will, as well in the places above-mentioned, as in divers others. From whence it will follow, that if those places of Scripture be genuine, and no way corrupted( which we must suppose, till the contrary be made out) God's Fore-knowledge and Man's Free-agency are not only true, but perfectly harmonious, and consistent each with other, altho' our limited sight and dazzled Eyes cannot fully enable us to behold their Agreement.  
Nor need we wonder at it, when we consider, that not only in the Scripture, but in Euclid's Elements, and many other Books approved in their kind, are found divers things, which a great number of Readers, tho' men of good Sense, cannot easily understand or reconcile; and some things of that difficulty, that the greatest Masters of Learning and Reason, have more than work enough to overcome; of which, if need required, one might give particular Instances. Who will believe that the least Diameter of a Needle's Point should be Divisible into a Million( or rather infinite) Parts, and yet that a circled, how large soever, can touch a right line but in 
That is, the right line being drawn as a tangent, but not through the circled.  one point only? And since a Globular Body set upon a plain, can reach the same but in one point, and a point is defined to be that, which hath no part, would it not be a strange Paradox to say, 
Eucl. def. 1 Lib. 3. prop. 36. Lib. 10. prop. 117.  A Globe can touch a Plain in no part at all? Yet all this leans upon Mathematical Demonstration.  
It is easy to observe, that when any difficulty, or seeming opposition doth occur in Scripture, which common Readers cannot( and even Learned ones not very easily) reconcile; two sorts of People, the profane and Superstitious, take hold of it to very ill purpose; the one apprehends it their Interest to have no Religion at all, looks upon the Scripture as a State-contrivance to keep the World in Order and Subjection, and hence they assume a lewd Liberty of turning it into Burlesque and Ridicule; the other sort, being for the most part over eagerly devoted to some Party, have a Religion made up of a few Fractions of Truth, neglecting in the mean time the Sum and Substance. These men pursue, to the best advantage of their Sect, that part of Scripture which hath the kindest Aspect upon their espoused Notions, and run it off from the main Body of Truth, to that extreme, that it becomes an error in Doctrine, and perhaps too a Rent in the Church. For the Body of Truth may not unfitly be resembled to the Body natural, which cannot live in pieces.  
That there are unchangeable Decrees of God, I do not doubt; but if that Doctrine be so managed as to evacuate Men's Endeavours, this surely is an unwarrantable extreme. Justification by Faith i● a great truth; but if it be imprudently carried to that height, as to exclude, or make men neglect a good Life, it will become a dangerous error. That Christ died for all, is a glorious Truth, as it is laid down in Scripture; but if some stretch that Doctrine to the actual Salvation of all Men, and others thereupon put the whole Business of Salvation within Man's power, these doubtless are vicious extremes, opening a wide passage for Pride or profaneness. The one makes Religion altogether vain, and the other makes the Grace of God not worth looking after. So that whilst Men run into such violent Extremities, they seem to tear off some particular Truths from their Unity with the whole, which from thence forward turn into Corruption, whilst the main Body of Truth is deserted by them, and becomes useless.  
And this is the case not only of the less considering Sectaries, but even of those who pretend highly to Philosophy, and aspire after the Reputation of Wits: One whereof( sufficiently known) hath improved three Syllables to that height, as to render a great part of the Scriptures ridiculous, and the noble Army of Martyrs no other than a Company of wilful and superstitious Fools, in needlessly exposing themselves to flames and tortures. 
2 Kings 5.19.  Go in peace, says the Prophet to Naaman; which single case he advances to a general Dispensation for any Man to quit his Religion, as oft as it shall be difficult, and dangerous for him to profess it. And this I take to be the Fountain Cause of all the Divisions that are, or have been among Christians; namely, that Men will not red the whole Scriptures, and give each part its just weight and measure, duly balancing and comparing one thing with another; but each Man according to his Complexion or Education, or perhaps some predominant Melancholy, lays hold of that part that suits him best, and makes up a Religion for himself, which is little more than the Result of his natural temper.  
Here I call to mind a passage of a Non-jurant, which I happened to be present at. The Man was reputed among his Neighbours an honest plain Man, but somewhat rash, and of no deep consideration, as may appear by the Story. The Discourse fell out to be about Swearing, and the Person could not forbear to Declaim bitterly against it, because it is said, 
Mat. 5.34.  Swear not at all. One of the Company urged that of the Hebrews, where the Author speaking of God's confirming 
Hebr. 6.13, 16, 17.  his Promise made to Abraham, seems to intimate strongly the necessity of swearing in some cases, not vainly, nor in common discourse, but in a solemn manner, for the avoiding of Contention, and for confirming of some weighty matter. And the Author doth not only allege it, without any manner of Reproof, as a practise amongst Men, who use to swear by the greater, and amongst whom an Oath for confirmation is an End of Strife; but he adds further, that God himself, the more abundantly to show the Immutability of his Counsel, doth condescend to that usage, confirming his promise by an Oath. To all which the Person suddenly replied, the Author was a liar in that thing: A decision somewhat surprising, and no less than blasphemy; yet had thus much of Ingenuity in it, as to yield the force of the Argument on no easier terms to be avoided.  
Thus If Men will needs imagine an Incongruity between Prescience and Free-will, and so reject the one, tho' both are equally asserted in Scripture, I cannot see how they can do it otherwise, than by the Non-jurants Argument. But surely Men of Reason and Sedate Temper, will rather argue thus, that since Prescience and Free-will agree in uno tertio, and that no less than the Word of God; they must not only be agreed betwixt themselves, but both true. And therefore if we cannot get them to fadge together in our Minds, the Reason must not be any mutual jarring of theirs, but want of room in our Understandings. If that Sacred Book were impartially red, and Religiously attended to, no violence put upon it, but all its parts understood,( as they ought to be) in Congruity with the main Bulk and Substance of the Doctrine therein contained, it would put an End to this and many other Debates. The Magistrates Sword, and the Peoples Conscience, the princes Prerogative, and Subjects Liberty; the Divine Attributes, and the Essential Properties of human Nature; would all enjoy their full Exercise and Latitude, without invading one another. And this leads to the next thing I am to consider, Namely,  
The Harmony of Divine Attributes. Where there are intestine jars and struggling Discord, there is no Unity, nor any thing like Perfection; but those Natural Notions we have of the Being of a God, do at the same time, and with equal Evidence, dictate to us his essential Perfection; therefore to talk of an imperfect Deity, is so great a piece of Non-sense, as cannot sufficiently be exposed; because there is nothing in the World to which it can be reduced, more absurd than itself. Down-right Atheism is indeed a monstrous thing, yet I think 'tis capabable of a better Colour, than having once acknowledged an adorable Supreme Being, at the same time conclude him lame, or deficient. He that looks about him into the World, and yet says in his heart, 
Psal. 14.1.  There is no God, is properly a Fool, and that cannot make a rational Inference, and from the things that are made, cannot so much as conclude there must be a 
Rom. 1.20.  Maker. And when both his Bible and his own Eyes may inform him, that every House is built by some Man, yet 
Heb. 3.4. ( as if the World must build itself) so foolish is he as not to consider, that he that built all things is God. But now, he that thinks God like unto himself 
Psal. 50. , that is, subject to Failing and Imperfections, is styled Improbus, 
16.21.  wicked or detestable, which seems to be the heavier charge of the two. And I have heard of some of the Ancients, Plutarch I think it was, speaking to this effect; I had rather Posterity should say, there never was such a Man, than that Plutarch was an injurious and vile Person.  
Now this Foundation, which is deep laid both in Scripture and Natural Reason, namely; that God is every way perfect, is enough to build my whole Design upon: He is perfect in Power, 
Chron. 20.6.  He doth what he will both in Heaven and in Earth; perfect in Justice, 
Gen. 18.25.  Shall not the Judge of all the Earth do right? perfect in Knowledge, 
Job 36.4.  Declaring the End from the Beginning. His 
Rom. 12.2.  Will is perfect, his 
Psal. 18.30.  Law is perfect, his 
2 Sam. 22.31.  Work is perfect, all his Ways are judgement. If the Streams be so clear, the Fountain must needs be pure. But if any Man now will raise a Dispute amongst the Divine Perfections( like that of the Disciples) which should be greatest; or should give so much to one, as to leave nothing for another; he would make strange work. Just as if some Man should be said to be a very prudent and just Person in himself, yet when he comes to deal with his Neighbour, his Prudence undermines his Honesty, and so he would become a Knave, or on the contrary, should his Honesty out-go his Discretion, that would( in some degree) render him a Fool. And this tho' a blunt Comparison, seems to be the very case in Debate. We must however be careful to speak with Reverence and Decorum, even in applying the most just Consequences of other 
Deut. 32.4.  Mens Doctrine unto the divine Majesty.  
The Attributes we are concerned with in this matter are chiefly two; but by consequence great many more; God's Wisdom, and his Goodness; the former implies Knowledge, and that includes Prescience; the latter comprehends Justice, in which Free-will is strongly implyed. In reference to the first, take but away from God his Fore-knowledge of future Events, and you may almost as well dethrone him; for besides that, it doth clearly infer Ignorance and Imperfection, whereby his Wisdon and Knowledge will come in Question; it carries with it a kind of Impotency, for he that knows not of an Event before it comes, may be surprised and defeated of his Expectation; and how should he have power to have prevented what he knew not of before? Suarez is positive in the place above-mentioned, That had not God a Fore-knowledge of all things, he were not fit to govern the World. And as for the latter, take away from Man his Free-agency, and you bring him under such a fatality, that he is in no sort Master of his own Actions; and then saith the Learned Dr. Cudworth, 
Intellectual World.  You take away the foundation of distributive Justice: For what Equity can there be in the Reward or Punishment of those things, wherein Man has no choice, and which could not possibly have fallen out otherwise? So that here is no denying of either, without rejecting one or more of the Divine Attributes, and so rendering the Blessed God a lame and imperfect Being; as if he could not be omniscient, but he must be Arbitrary; nor just, without being ignorant.  
Besides, how can God be said to search the Heart, 
Rom. 8.27.  and 
Jer. 11.20.  try the Reins, or to what purpose should he do it, unless he knows the bent and tendency of Men's Minds, and what they will do before they act it? And how can he svit his Providences to his blessed 
Rom. 8.28.  Ends and Purposes, for the good of his People, if he knows not the Exigencies that shall befall them? On the other hand, if there be no voluntary Agents in the World, what need any Providence at all? General Laws might serve the turn, 'tis but putting the several Parts and Wheels of the Creation together, and set them a moving like a Pendulum, and they will drive on one another; and so Epicurus his Doctrine comes in play, that God regards not particular things. What can we expect but confusion and disorder, whilst we invade the Divine Attributes, or labour to set them at odds one with another?  
But now, if we lay aside all Perverseness and Prepossession, the Harmony of the Divine Perfections will be a most pleasant object of our Consideration. God doth not impose a Necessity of sinning upon any Man, but he knows some Men will be ready enough to sin, out of choice. He doth not punish or reward in Men what he acteth himself, or what he causeth them to act without the Intervention of their Wills; but if some will be virtuous, and others vicious, when they might be otherwise, God is just in punishing and rewarding, tho' not ignorant in the mean time, who will deserve well or ill at his hands. In a word, God doth know, that Man is a Free-Agent, because he made him so, and doth daily preserve him in that Capacity; he also knows, that some Men will abuse their Freedom inspite of all Invitations and Inducements to the contrary, unless he interpose his Sovereign Power( as sometimes I conceive he doth) to move them irresistibly unto good.  
From what hath been said, the Argument will lie thus. God is perfect in all his Attributes, and harmonious in all his Actings,