A Letter to a Friend Concerning the Partition Treaty.  
SIR,  
I Return you many thanks for the trouble you have given yourself, in letting me know so regularly the Progress of affairs during this Session of Parliament, which( God be thanked for it,) is now come to an end; this was indeed much longed for. I did not increase your trouble by putting you then to explain some things; which, at this distance were not well understood by us; but now that you are more at leisure, and that I know you have opportunitys of hearing matters as freely talked of, almost as they were at St. Stephen's chapel: I desire to know what indifferent Men and good Judges say of the Partition-Treaty. We in the country do generally agree with our Representatives in condemning it. It seems strange to us, that our King, who was raised and advanced by his perpetual Opposition to the Court of France, who was provoked not only to persist in it by all possible Indignities to his Person, and by their setting on so many Conspiracies against his Life, but by all the strongest Considerations both of Interest and Religion, could be prevailed on to treat with them, to trust them, and to procure them such an Addition of Empire as the Pertition Treaty gave them. It seems to us, that this perhaps may have driven the Spaniards to those desperate Coruses they have taken while they hoped, by their late King's Will, to have kept their Monarchy entire, tho' instead of saving the whole they have delivered it all over into the hands of the French, without a possibility of redemption, unless others take more care of them, then they have done of themselves. If I Judge of this matter wrong, I desire you will set me right. I am so much inclined not only to wish well, but to think well of the King that it raises in me a great uneasiness to see a Cloud on any of his Actions and councils which gives them an ill appearance. I expect your answer to this, and without more Ceremony,  
I am Yours, &c.   

SIR,  
NOW the scene of affairs is shifted and that I have nothing more to tell you from the two Houses, I refer you to the prints for the public news, and so hoped I might be respited for some time. But I see I am not yet quiter at Liberty, you are putting me now on the hardest task in the World, to writ of politics. It is an easy thing to tell you what this or t'other man said, even I— H— us Speeches cost me only the Trouble of writing out what I remembered of them: Tho' the abusive strains in them came to thick that one driven out another: Only they were so oft repeated that what was lost at one time was recovered at another. But I am called on by you to treat of matters that I do not perfectly understand, nor can I arrive at a full information about them. You begin right at the Partition Treaty, which is said to have been the occasion of all the Miseries that we feel or fear. And since you will have me tell you my thoughts of it, I will do it very freely. You know I am not apt to flatter or to think well of things because they are done by men of a high Character: My bias lies another way: There is so much occasion given for Censure, that common Observation make a man fall very naturally into a Disposition of thinking the worst, both of men and things.  
I have no excuse to make for our Courts trusting the French, or for their entering cordially into their Concerns. If I thought the King was capable either of loving or Trusting them, I could not maintain in my heart that affection and confidence which I ow'e him: It is impossible for me to believe it, he knows them too well, and has had too much practise in affairs to be guilty of such an error. As far as I understand the matter, this was the case. We and the Dutch had got thro' a great War at a vast Charge, and with infinite danger: We saw the weakness of Spain in the Buisness of Barcelona: There was no reckoning on them as capable of making a stand if the King of France were freed from a War, since when that pressed him on all lands, yet with a small army he could at his Leisure take that important place: Had Spain any intrinsic strength to resist, there was time enough given them to have brought it all together. If I say France then with so small a body made such a conquest, what could be expected from Spain when the French King should sand his whole strength against them? A Fleet before Cadiz and two small Armies marching in thro Catalonia and Navarre might have found it hard to Subsist, but not to Conquer Spain. The Emperour abandoning all other Thoughts, had during the last War pursued his advantages against the Turks, and thereby had both exhausted his own strength, and disgusted his Allies. And on the Conclusion of the Peace of Reswick he had shew'd so great an Inclination to ruin Heresy at any Rate, and so little regard of the Honour of a Prince, to whom he owed so much, that this with some other things( that I love not to remember, because I hope that Court will grow Wiser) had given so just a Discontent, that few seemed willing to engage in a New War for him and his Family. And his councils were so dilatory and uncertain, that instead of pressing the Renewal of a General Alliance upon the Conclusion of the Peace, he seemed not to regard it, when pressed thereto. We here were so weary of Taxes, and so jealous of a standing Army, that we brought down our Land Force, first to Twelve Thousand, and then to Seven. Our Fleet kept proportion to our Army. The Dutch did not disarm so fast, yet they had no force to spare, and to be sure, they would unwillingly engage in the Quarrel deeper than we did. While the debates concerning the Army were on foot, the ill Health of the K. of Spain was not forgot to be mentioned, and the Danger of the Progress that the French might make, if we were ruduc'd to such an Incapacity of protecting the Spainards, was often represented; but was often rejected with Indignation, as an Artifice of the Court to get an Army kept up. Things being in such a state, might not the King think that what was left for him to do, was to make the best Bargain he could. How bad soever the Partition may be, it seemed still more desirable to yield up some parts of the spanish Monarchy, than to let France conquer it, or rather take it all. Spain itself, the West-Indies and Flanders were the Branches of that Monarchy, in which we were chiefly concerned, and while these were kept entire, in the same hands, our interests weary pretty safe. It is known, that what advantage soever the Spanish Grandees may make of the Dominions in and about Italy, Spain itself is not the stronger or richer for them, but much to the contrary. It is true, their interests at Rome are fortified by them, but we are little concerned in those. It was not to be imagined, That France that had so much Noise with their pretensions to that Succession, and( how slight soever they may be) had involved all Europe in Wars upon yet slighter ones; and that saw how sure they were of Conquering so feeble an Enemy, and so weak a Rival, would let all this go for nothing. They did not fear a new Alliance against them, they knew well the Temper both of the English and Dutch. They therefore pretended to the Italian Dominions. If the King had been in Condition to have talked roundly to them, certainly that had been both the wisest and the best method. But those who seem now the most inflamed against the Partition Treaty, know in their Consciences, that they themselves would never have engaged in a new War, if the Dominions in Italy, much less if the duchy of Milan had been the only Point in debate. I leave it to you to judge what a Parliament would have said, if they had been called, and had found the French King in possession of perhaps all the Spanish Monarchy( as no doubt by what we have seen, he would soon have been, upon the Death of the K. of Spain) if they had discovered, That Offers had been made to have compounded for that whole succession, by yielding up the Dominions in Italy, but that the King and his Ministers had rejected the Proposition: I doubt not, but then we should have had Impeachments upon Impeachments and the suspicions of selling and betraying the World into the hands of the French, would then have carryd such Characters of Probability, that we would, in reverse of S— B— S— 's subtle Discovery, have concluded who they were that were the Instruments of France, and supposed them to have been as well paid for it, as perhaps some have been for later Services. I confess the Dominions in Italy are very valuable, yet no Naval Power belonging to them, they are not now so considerable as they were some Years ago. Nor is it certain, that notwithstanding the Partition Treaty, they would have been a sure Accession to the Crown of France, perhaps France would have found as much Opposition to it, as she is like to do now to her taking possession of the whole. The Pope would have struggled hard; It must have alarmed the Court of Rome, and indeed all Popery mightily, to see the Pope surrounded with French Armies, and so much in their Power. The Popes pretensions on the Kingdom of Naples are of an old standing, and are not disputed. If the Pope should have refused to change his Vassal, and have upon that made use of the Arms of the Church, and invited the Germans to his Assistance, and the Venetians to open Passages to them both by Sea and Land, this must have brought on a new War, and made Italy the seat of it. It would have made an irreconcilable Breach between France and Rome. It is easy to see, what this might have ended in. It is true, we by the Treaty were to have assisted the French, but in the Progress of the War, we might have found just Reasons of getting out of the Quarrel, and of becoming the Umpires in it. Would it be a Reflection on the King's Honour, if it were suggested, That perhaps he would have stood to this Treaty as most Princes do, when they see where the advantage lies, and as the French King has always done, and most signally in Relation to this very Treaty: I can't think so meanly of the King's Wisdom and Experience, as to believe that he built much on the Faith and Honour of his most Christian Majesty, but he might imagine that age had qualified that unquiet spirit, which has given the the World so much Disturbance. He might think that a bigoted Prince would above all other things desire to have the Papacy under his protection, that is to say at his Mercy. He would perhaps choose rather to have the Dominions that were yielded to him by the Treaty, which he might expect without the Trouble and Charge of a War, than to embroil all his Affairs, and engage in the Decline of his Life in a War, of which it is not easy to see the End. A Lady that has great Credit with him, might be known to be fond of this Accession of Empire, both as laying a great Obligation on the Succession; and as securing the quiet and Life of one in whom she has so particular an Interest. A Ministry composed of such young Persons as might hope to out-live their Monarch, for all his Immortality, would probably conclude that it would be more meritorious in another Reign to have extended the Empire of France, than to have raised a younger Son of France, so as perhaps he might be able one day to Dispute matters with his Elder Brother. Upon one or more of those Reasons, or perhaps upon much better, the King might have reckoned that the Treaty would have been better stood to by the French, without relying so entirely upon a Faith that had been so often given, and so seldom kept. He had likewise other things to depend on▪ It was reasonable to hope, that the Emperour would have come into it, tho' it had been only with this Design, that by his sons being in possession of the best parts of the Spanish Monarchy, he might thereby be the better enabled to lay Claim and struggle for the rest. Was it reasonable, to think that a Prince who had no Naval Force would have maintained a Dispute in opposition to all the Naval Power of the World united against him. And could a Prince of such an exhausted Revenue hope to succeed in Competition against a Court so dexterous in all the methods of it, and so well furnished with all that was necessary for making it most effectual. The Emperour's Conduct in this matter had been so unaccountable in being so unactive to prevent it, that there was no Reason to suspect his not submitting to the Partition Treaty, when he saw it could not be helped. The King might likewise trust somewhat to the virtues and to the Vices of the Spaniards. They have had an antipathy to the French of above 200 Years standing. The Spaniards have never before this time been guilty of betraying their Country, a Fidelitry without example has long supported a sinking Monarchy, and so it might have been still depended on, and their coming so tamely under a French Yoke, is a thing that was so little looked for, that till all saw it, none could believe it. Upon all these Accounts it might seem reasonable enough for the King to imagine that the Treaty would have been stuck to without an Absolute Confidence in the Virtues of the most Christian King. And after all, as the K. of Spain had lived beyond all mens Expectations, so the King might have hoped that he might languish out yet a few years more, and then the Revenue of the Crown of England would have been cleared of all Anticipations, and in the mean while the French King would have been obliged to keep such Measures as would have secured us from all attempts, and have sunk the hopes of a Treacherous Party among ourselves, who had set up their Rest upon the greatness of France, and begin now to revive their dead hopes, which seemed quiter withered by the Peace of Reswick, and by the seeming Friendship between our Court and that of Versailes. And now, if you will lay all this together, you will retract a little of the forwardness, and of the Severity of the Censures with which you may be apt to load that Treaty. Every Partition-Treaty is not to be condemned. The Triple Alliance was the Glory of K. Charles's Reign, and would have been its strength, if he had stuck to it. And that was a Partition of the Spanish Nea●herlands, of which the Council of Madrid complained so much, that they would abandon all Flanders, rather than submit to it; and yet they were wiser when they saw they could not help themselves. When Spain could not be defended but by our Arms, and by our Treasure, it might be both reasonable and just for us to consider what Interest we had in preserving any of their Dominions, and to take Care of those, wherein we were concerned most nearly, and particularly, and best able to defend, but leave the rest to take their Fate. I am,  
Sir, Yours, &c.  
FINIS.   

A Second Letter to a Friend, concerning the Partition Treaty, with his Answer.  
I Am convinced, by your Letter, that it is not safe to rely on common famed, or to yield too far to the impressions, which the first appearances of things, and some general prejudices are apt to make. I consider the Partition Treaty after another manner than I did. I see, the King might have too good Reasons to harken to a Proposal of that Nature, from the French King, without the least disposition to trust him, or to enter into close Measures with him; which in my Opinion must always prove fatal to himself, to his Kingdoms, and indeed to all the rest of Europe. But tho' you have gone a great way towards justifying the King, upon many personal accounts, for engaging in this Treaty; I do not find, you are yourself reconciled to it. You rather make an Excuse for the King, than a Defence of the League. Therefore, for my own Satisfaction, and that of our Friends, I must become a little further troublesone to you. I can't but think it a lessening of the King's Character, if only in order to keep himself quiet at home, and to sink the Hopes of a Treacherors Party among ourselves( as you express it,) he could be induced to enter into a Treaty unjust in itself and ruinous to Christendom. It is so Represented to us. One is said to have openly called it a Felonious Treaty. And we are  told that a great man, in another public Assembly, said it was ridiculous and dishonourable in the Project, and Mischievous in the Consequences. And yet after all, this Treaty was made by the King, let who will be concerned in the Advice: And the Dutch are Parties to this Treaty, who are not used to be so grossly mistaken. We have been  told, the King has a clear and more Universal knowledge of the Affairs of Europe than any Man, and therbfore we are amazed to see him enter into an Affair so very liable to censure. Tho you are no Friend to this Treaty, yet you hear the Talk of those who do not so much mislike it, and you will do me a very good Office, to make a report of what is said in favour of it, that I may know how they Vindicate the Kings Honour, which is very dear to me; and may not rest under the Suspicion that the King would engage in unwise and unjustifyable Measures, upon the bare Consideration of Personal Safety and Present Quiet.  
I am, &c.   

Sir,  
YOUR inquiries are made with so honest a meaning, that a good Subject can hardly refuse what you desire. And yet methinks, you make but an odd Choice of one, whom you admit to be no Favourer of the Treaty of Partition, to represent to you what is said in its Justification. But I will obey you, as well as my memory will serve me, and what is omitted now may be supplied in another Letter. It is not Flattery to say, the King is perfectly instructed in the Affairs of Europe. He has been at the head of Business for Thirty Years, and has encountered as great Difficulties as most Men ever did. This great experience, joined with his thoughtful Temper and discerning judgement, gives him advantages above most Princes, if not most men. This is truly my Opinion, and I should think myself happy, if I could contribute to confirm others in the same thoughts. My own Dread of the Power of France, and my Detestation of her politics, may possibly have formed in me too unreasonable Prejudices against a Treaty, which seemed to add so much to her Dominions, and may have occasioned me not to give all the attention I ought, to the Arguments I have heard in defence of it; but I will fairly relate to you as much as I can call to mind of what I have heard on this Subject.  
The Objections to the Treaty of Partition go both to the Justice and to the Wisdom of it. It is said to be unjust in itself, as being a disposition of the Dominions of a Third Person then alive, made by a Codfederacy of two strangers, with one of the Pretenders to the Succession, without the Consent of the other. It is said also to be unjust, as being inconsistent with the separate Article of the Grand Alliance made 1689, whereby the States-General stipulate with the Emperor, to assist him in taking the Succession of the Spanish Monarchy, in case of the then King of Spain's Death without Issue.  
It will not be amiss, for the better conceiving the Force of the Objections and the Answers, in a very few Words to state the several Pretensions to this great Succession. Philip the Third had Issue, besides his Son Philip the Fourth, Three Daughters; Anna, the Eldest, married to Lewis the Thirteenth, whose Son is the present French King; Margarita, the Second, married to the Emperour Ferdinand the Third, Father of the present Emperour; and Catharina married to Savoy: Philip the Fourth had Issue, besides the last King of Spain, dead without Issue, two Daughters; the Eldest Maria Theresa married to Lewis the Fourteenth who had Issue, the Dauphin; the other, Margarita, married to the present Emperour, and by him she had Issue, only Maria Antoinetta, first Wife to the Elector of Bavaria, and they had one Child, the late Electoral Prince, born in 1691, and who died the Sixth of Februrary 1698.  
Upon the several Marriages of the Two Infantas with Lewis the Thirteenth and Lewis the Fourteenth, solemn Renounciations were made of all Claims to the Succession of the Spanish Dominions, by them or their descendants.  
Those Renounciations the House of Austria insists upon as valid, and so their Claim takes place. The French pretend to object to their Validity, and Claim the Succession, as if nothing had passed to bar them  
This being the Case, it appears, the first Treaty is not liable to the Objection of want of proper Parties, for as the French King and the Dauphin entred into it; so the Elector of Bavaria, in behalf of his Son, in whom, at that time, the whole Right of the House of Austria was indisputably lodged, was not only consenting, but promoted it.  
I should observe to you, that the Treaty of Partition is looked upon as an abusive Name, by those who think well of that Treaty. They say, it ought to be called, as it is, both in the Powers for making, and in the Treaty itself, a Treaty for the Preservation of the Peace of Europe. I should also observe to you, that this first Treaty had a very good Consequence, for as soon as the Transaction took Air, it not only occasioned the King of Spain to make a Will, by which he declared the Electoral Prince, his universal Heir, but it made the Emperor to acquiesce in it, who till that time was vigorously soliciting, by his Minister at Madrid, for a Will in Favour of the Arch Duke.  
As to the second Treaty, it appears, by the Powers, which are in Print, That it began in Holland, by a Joynt-Negotiation of the Emperor's Plenipotentiary, with those of England, France, and the States-General; but the Emperour not thinking it fit to appear a Party in such a Negotiation, for Reasons which were obvious enough, the Treaty was afterwards concluded without him.  
To say it was unjust for that Reason, is at the same time to say, the separate Article of the Grand Alliance was unjust; for that was disposing of the Dominions of a King then living, by an agreement of two Strangers with one only of the Pretenders. As the Emperor was no Party to this last Treaty, so France was no Party to the first. If it was consistent with Justice, for the King of England and the States to agree, that one of the Pretenders should have the whole, without any Privity or Consent of the other, or of Spain: How could it be unjust( as to the Nature of the Contract) to enter into an Agreement with one only of the Pretenders, for distributing the Succession among all that claimed.  
When Controversies arise between Sovereign Princes, there is no Judicature to determine of the Right. And they are at Liberty to refuse to submit to a Mediation, which is often hard to bring about, because both Parties must agree in the Mediators. Controversies of this sort would never have an End, but in the ruin of one of the Parties, and perhaps of neighbouring Nations in the Consequence, unless other Princes and States may by a proper interposition in such a manner as they think most agreeable to the Justice and to the Good of their own Subjects, oblige all the pretenders to recede from Extremities, and in Case of Obstinacy on any side, to assist those who are willing to yield, for the sake of Peace. This has been the approved practise of all Ages. It is not necessary to mention Instances to prove what cannot be denied;— otherwise, what was done in the Case of the late Difference between Denmark and Holstein, is a fresh Example, much less is it necessary to go about to make a more particular application of this Rule to what was then the Case.  
A well-founded Apprehension of an unreasonable increase of Power in a Neighbouring Prince, has been always held to be a just Ground of making War; it may be better defended, to be a just Reason to prevent it by a Treaty.  
An Accession of the entire Spanish Dominions, either to the Emperor( whose Claim was for himself, and his lineal Descendants) or to France, must unquestionably have formed a Power extremely terrible to the rest of Europe. It was thereforefore necessary, to think of dividing the Succession, or turning it out of the direct Line, for the common Security of Christendom.  
Princes are bound to provide for the safety of their Subjects by all reasonable ways. If the most eligible can't be arrived at, they must pursue such Methods as are practicable. It was visible the French King was resolved not to acquiesce in the Renunciations, his Flatterers had absolutely hardened him in the Opinion, that all those Solemn Acts were insignificant; and to make good these Sentiments, he had not only employed his Lawyers, but his Arms, in the dispute, for many Yeaas. This the Emperor well knew, nay it is expressly declared in the separate Article of the Grand Alliance. So that when the Accident happened, the War was inevitable, and the Accident was expected every day. No Care had been taken to form the necessary Alliances, on the conclusion of the Treaty of Reswick. Nothing was determined as to the spanish Succession. No Provision for securing any thing Stipulated by the Grand Alliance. On the contrary, some things had passed at that time, which necessary made a strangeness between the Emperor and the Protestant Princes. No Arguments were omitted to draw him into New Measures, in order to make the Separate Article of the Grand alliance significant and effectual. And it was highly reasonable to insist upon Terms, when it was so fresh in memory, where the burden of the last War lay. But by reason of the very slow Measures of the Court of Vienna, and the particular interests which the Emperor thought himself under a necessity of managing with the Court at Madrid, nothing had been done or was likely to be done on that side, and at the same time the Subjects of England and Holland seemed neither willing nor well able to enter into a new War. France did not only continue armed, as during the War, but was at a vast expense, in buying Horses for remounting their Cavalry, and for listing the ablest Men, as fast as they were disbanded by the Confederates. Without a Treaty a War was inevitable; or rather, France was Master of all without a War. This was the unhappy Necessity under which the King and the States found themselves, And in such Circumstances, where was the Injustice to accept of the Contract of the French King and the Dauphin, to content themselves with a part only of that vast Succession, and such a part as would not only be least inconvenient to the Parties contracting, but to the General Liberty and security of Europe, rather than to leave him in Circumstances to seize the whole, or at least to take immediate Possession of those Parts, which would necessary and suddenly endanger the Trade and Safety of the English and Dutch.  
Upon the foot of this treaty, the King and the States acquired an explicit and direct Right to compel the French King to acquiesce in the share allotted to him, which perhaps was wanting before. For tho' Spain, in respect of the several Renunciations and solemn Acts, had an express Right to oppose the future Pretences of France to any Part of that Succession, yet it was not plain, that by renewing his Claim, he violated any League with England or Holland, which would be the Case, after his entering into this Treaty.  
There is another very considerable thing to justify this Treaty, if it be true,( as it has been affirmed,) that during the Transaction in Holland, in the summer 1699, the Emperor's Minister's, tho' they declared they could never make themselves Parties to an Agreement for dismembering of the Spanish Monarchy, which would wholly ruin their affairs at Madrid, yet they did not express any great aversion to be seemingly forced to some Reasonable Terms. It has not often been known, that a deliberate Act of three Sovereign Powers, made upon very weighty Grounds, has been so frankly called unjust. The Emperour has not found cause to give it that hard Name. Nay, the French themselves who have violated this Treaty, in the most open and shameless Manner, and want to the highest Degree an Excuse for Breach of Faith, and had a good one, if the Treaty was unjust, yet they have never called it by that Name, but have contented themselves to take up the wretched Pretence, that by breaking the League, they have pursued the Spirit and meaning of it.  
This is all I shall say to you, at present, with respect to the Justice of this Treaty, that which you desire further, is to hear how it is defended from being impolitic to such a Degree as to be Ridiculous, as you say it has been styled. I have already stated to you, how the Circumstances of Affairs abroad stood, and in my Answer to your former Letter, I have observed to you what Disposition, as to War, had appeared in England, and I will repeat nothing. It was evident, the French King was in a Condition to take possession of what Parts he pleased, of the Spanish Dominions, if not of all, without opposition: And that if some thing was hot done previously to the King of Spains Death, it would be too late then to talk of forming Alliances.  
This Reasoning has been too unhappily justified by what we have seen since. France has taken Possession of all the Dominions of Spain, without the least Obstructions, and before any Measures could be entred upon to prevent it. The Friends to the Partition-Treaty say, the World will Judge which was the wisest Course, to provide before hand against so great an Evil, or to he put to play the difficult After-Game of recovering things out of the hands of France.  
In so critical a Juncture, the King and the States-General judgd it reasonable, to harken to the Proposal of a Negotiation, as the only means left to prevent the impending Destruction of Europe. They were not insensible, how little the French Faith was to be depended on, but they were not put in a worse Condition by the Treaty. On the contrary, if the French King should not stand to it, the English and Dutch had an indisputable Ground to resent the Perfidiousness, and would be justified by all Christendom, in directly joining to assist the House of Austria. And till that Breach happened, the Empeaor might see how far he might depend upon their actual Assistance, and what care they had taken of the House of Austria.  
To think of Treating with the French King upon such a Subject, and to yield nothing to him, was indeed Ridiculous. All then that remained, was to make the best Terms possible; in the doing whereof, as the Interest of the House of Austria was to be sincerely and hearty espoused, and a solicitous Care used that the Balance of Europe should not be entirely broken, so it concerned England and Holland, who were the Parties contracting, not to neglect themselves but to make such a Distribution, as might be least prejudicial to their Interests.  
The Three Things which they were principally obliged to take care of, was their security, their Trade, and the common interest of the Protestant Religion. In order to this, they were first to take care of the Barrier in Flanders, for making good whereof so much Money had been spent, and so much Blood had been spilled. It being demonstrably plain, that if France was possessed of the Spanish netherlands, it was not possible for the Dutch to bear long the expense of supporting themselves; and when they fell a Prey to France,( notwithstanding the vain discourses, we heard not long before, of what we were able to do,) England was not likely to be free any great while.  
The Second thing which concerned both Nations highly, was the preserving the Trade of Spain, and the use of her Ports. This need not be enlarged upon, the present Apprehension of the Danger of losing this Advantage, has made it very sensibly understood by every body.  
The Third Thing which concerned England infinitely, and The Dutch not a little, was to keep The West-Indies, and the Trade thither, in the Condition they then stood. For it will not be denied, if ever France can appropriate to itself the Trade of Spain, and The Management of the Spanish West-Indies, she will soon be Mistress of the World.  
These were the great Things to be first looked after, and for these the Treaty did fully provide. It is not to be denied but that the turkey Trade was of great consequence to both Nations, and the Trade of Italy not inconsiderable, especially to Holland; and it were to have been wished that every thing could have been entirely gained, but when that was impossible, the most weight was to be laid on what was of the greatest Consequence. It is said in a certain Letter, which is charged by some, as favouring the Partition-Treaty; and by others as written against it, That if Sicily were in the French hands, they would be entirely Masters of the Levant Trade. They who declare themselves for that Treaty, quarrel at that Expression as too forcible. No Question, in Case of a rapture, if the French had Sicily, they might at least for a time, give a great Interruption to the turkey Trade, but if the Ports of Spain and its Dominions were open to the Dutch and English Fleets, that Inconvenience would be in a great Measure avoided. Whereas, as the Case now stands, for want of the Effect of such a Treaty, the Spanish Ports are like to be entirely shut up; and consequently all Trade into the Mediterranean, if ever a War should break out, must become entitely impracticable.  
The Treaty of Partition, if it had been stood to, had placed Spain, the West-Indies, the Netherlands and Milan, in such hands, as France could expect no sincere Assistance from. What real Addition of Power Naples and Sicily would have brought to her, is not so plain, France is a compact united Strength. Whether she would have been stronger by the Possession of two remote Countries, whose Natives have the utmost hatred to the French, Experience only would have shown. Italy would have been alarmed to the last degree, to find the French taking Possession of so large a Part of it, which it could not be possible to prevent, considering the Power and Preparations of France. But this would not have been the first time that the French had got to be Masters of Naples and Sicily, and yet were not able to hold them. Certain it is the Court of Rome would have found itself obliged to set all its Engines on work to prevent the establishing of that Slavery, which was inevitably coming upon them. They would be discerning enough to see, that from the hour the French King became peaceably settled in the Possession of Naples and Sicily, the Pope must sink in his Character, and would be no more than a French Bishop. The rest of the catholic World would hardly consider him as a Common Father, who could be made and unmade at the Pleasure of France. Without pretending to prophesy, one may say literally, That Heaven and Earth would have been moved upon this Occasion: The Church would have drawn out all her Forces Spiritual and Temporal, and besides the Influence she would always have upon the Italian Princes and States, which is avowedly not little, They themselves are quick-sighted enough to see what different Figures the Princes of France make in this Age from what they made heretofore, and to learn Caution from so significant Examples. Besides, the Pope's Remonstrances would have had the more Authority as well as vigour from the scandalous Appearance it would have had to the whole Papal World, that France in Conjunction with two heretic Powers should dispose of the Fiefs of the Church. The Emperour would undoubtedly have been solicited by all sorts of Arguments to assist the Church, and assert the Liberty of Italy, and how far he might have been able to resist, might not be difficult to guess. All the catholic Princes of Germany were at liberty to act as the Conjuncture invited them. The Italians would not have apprehended any thing from Spain, they would have understood easily which way the archdukes Wishes would go. The Duke of Lorrain's affection to the House of Austria is so well known, that it is certain the French could have depended on nothing from Milan, in his hands. And tho' the late Chancellor in his Letter, said, that if the Treaty should take place, and Milan could not be relieved by Sea, it would be of little signification in the hand of any Prince: We see he was mistaken, and that very powerful Reliefs might be sent by Land to Milan, and the Emperour and Empire might always have an open way into Italy, thro' that country. The King of France would have been cautious to have left his Frontier naked towards Flanders, when in Possession of a Prince of the House of Austria, or to have left the Rhine unguarded, when the Pope would be sure to have a prevailing Power with the Ecclesiastical Electors, and the other catholic Princes of the Empire.  
This would have been the highest Security to the Protestant Interest, for which certainly we were above all other things concerned. Italy would have been the Scene of the War, where upon all Accounts we ought to wish it, and not only as being the most remote from us. The Apprehension of a catholic League, which is no Chimaera, and which it is to be too justly feared may be the immediate Consequence of a settled Peace among the Popish Powers, when the Zeal of the Emperour, as well as of the French King is consider d, would have been far removed. In such a State of Things, we could apprehended nothing as to our Trade, not even in the Mediterranean. All Parties would have found it reasonable to be courting the Great Naval Powers of the World. We might be Neuter if we thought fit, or might have made our own Terms. We were not bound to take any other Share in the War than we pleased, for tho' we stood oblige d to see the Treaty executed, yet in the utmost Strictness that was all. We were not bound to maintain the respective Parties in Possession. We might have enjoyed the Advantages of Peace, or we might have otherwise found our Advantages in return for our Assistance, in case we choose to give it to either side.  
But they who have a mind to extol the Wisdom of the King and the States, for entering into the Treaty of Partition, found themselves most on the ill Consequences which have appeared upon the laying it aside. They pretend to think it wonderful, that Men should be quarreling with so much heat at a Transaction, whereby such large Territories of the King of Spain's Dominions were to be delivered up to the French King; and at the same time, with so much Patience and Temper see him take Possession of the WHOLE, and show so little Concern to redeem that Time which was lost, by their late Coming Together. They say it will cost many Lives and much Treasure, before Europe can see Things upon so good a Foot, as that Treaty put them.  
They go further, and say, That the same Men, who promoted the Clamour at this Partition-Treaty, are labouring at this very time to make one much worse for England and Holland, for the Liberty of Europe, and for the Protestant Interest. For already they stick not, in their Discourses, to make it a Fault, to talk of asserting the Pretence of the House of Austria to the whole Spanish Succession, and this is not to be wondered at by any who observed their early Zeal for the Duke of Anjou's being owned as King of Spain, and their Question ready formed for the Purpose.  
I have set down what occurred to my Memory, according to your desire. You must look on me as not responsible for the Solidity of any of these Arguments, on the one side; or pretending to have said all that is to be said in Defence of the Treaty, on the other. I am so sen●●●le of this latter, that I find myself under an Obligation of telling you, That upon your in●●●ating to me, what parts of the Account I have given you, appear to you to be most weak and imperfect, I will let you know, whether the Defect proceeded only from my want of Memory.  
I am, &c.  
FINIS.