Roberts's CASE against Mellish, upon dismission of his Appeal, without entering upon the Merits of the Cause, To be Humbly Presented to the Lords in Parliament.  
IT being Decreed that Roger Williams, deceased, should pay one Mellish 282 l. 14 s. 5 d. and 149 l. Costs of svit; whereas instead thereof, Mellish ought to have been Decreed to pay Williams, 481 l. Upon Hearing of Roberts's Appeal from that Decree, Mellish's Counsel alleged the Decree appealed from, was a Decree by Consent, and Consented to by Mr. Williams, Brother and Council for the said Roger Williams: whereupon the Appeal was dismissed without Hearing the Merits of the Cause. Afterwards, finding that Mellish by his Answer to the Appeal, had not insisted upon any such Consent. Roberts's Counsel thought it not practicable, to admit any thing at the Hearing of an Appeal, in bar to the Appeal that was not insisted on by the pleading Precedent to the Hearing, and therefore inter alia, Roberts prayed a Re-hearing upon the single point of Consent, or not Consent, which was ordered accordingly; yet notwithstanding what was then offered by Williams's Counsel, the Petition for the Re-hearing was dismissed, without entering into the merits of the Cause; and Roberts ordered to pay 〈◇〉 Cost, which he hath since paid. Since which Rehearing, the proceedings upon and 〈…〉 r the Decree, have been found, which is hoped may make it evident there 〈◇〉 no Consent to the Decree but an offer to Perform long after the Decree was 〈◇〉, to prevent going to Gaol, which Proceedings are as followeth;  
On the 17th of January, 1681, the Decree appealed from was pronounced, at which time, and before the Hearing, the Court was made acquainted, that Sir Robert Sawyer, then Att●rney-General, and the said Roger Williams's Principal Council was absent; and therefore it was prayed, that the Cause might be put off but for one day, which was denied.  
In few days after, a Petition Signed by Council, for a Re-hearing, was presented to the Lord Chancellor, but Rejected, as by Affidavit soon after Fil'd in Chancery, appears.  
Afterwards, the 282 l. 14 s. 5 d. Decreed, was demanded of Roger Williams, and he refused to pay it, and therefore was taken upon an Attachment, and after that he had appeared upon the Attachment, it was referred to a Master in Chancery to examine, if the said Roger Williams were in Contempt; and on the 13th of July 1682, the Master reported him in Contempt.  
After which, Williams took exceptions to that Report of the Contempt, for that amongst other irregularities, there were not 15 Days between the Teste and Return of the Attachment upon which Williams was taken; which Exceptions came to Hearing the 17th of October 1682. Yet the Court over-ruled the Exceptions, so that according to the course of the Chancery, the next Remove for Williams was to goal, or Comply with the Court: Whereupon Williams's Council prayed some time for payment of the Money Decreed, and offered to pay it within a Month after the Costs should be taxed. And on the same day, a Cause upon a Bill of the said Roger Williams against Mellish, praying a new Trial in a Cause wherein Mellish, obtained judgement against Williams for 230 l. upon a Verdict against all the Evidence in the Cause, came to be heard: and the Court being of Opinion it could grant no new Trial, dismissed the Bill, and Mellish's Council pressing for Costs, upon that dismission, and urging, by way of aggravation, that Williams had stood in Contempt to the Decree: The Court Declared, That in regard the said Williams's Connsel had offered to pay the Money decreed, as aforesaid, he should pay no Costs upon the Dismission, if the Money were paid according to the offer; and the Money was paid within a short time after the time it was promised to be paid, and Leave given that day it was paid, to bring in a Bill of Review; So that the said R●ger Williams was brought under a necessity of going to Geol, or complying with the Court, before the offer of paying the Money Decreed, was made:  
Upon all which, the said Roberts Humbly preys your Lordships f●th●r Consideration, whether such an Offer at such a time, ought to be a bar to an Appeal.