Walter Williams and Elizabeth his Wife late Wife and Executrix of William Reed, deceased. Appellants.   

Richard Reed the Younger, Defendant.  
Sir William Gregory, Defendant.  
and Richard Wytherstone, Defendant.    
The CASE of the Appellants, upon the Order of the Lords in Parliament, Dated the 3d. of January, 1690. Whereby the said Appeal was referred to the Barons of the Exchequer, to be Heard, and Determined.  
JOhn Reed of Mitton, Esquire, deceased, having mortgage the two Meadows in Question,( worth 100 l. per Annum) to his Sister Katherine Reed, for 99 Years, from the 1st. of April, 1612. for securing the Payment of 500 l. and Interest at the Rate of 10 l. per Cent. as Interest then was, the said John Reed for 500 l. more, by dead dated the 22d. of May, 16 Jac. 1. 1618 made the said term of 99 Years in the Meadows absolute to Katherine, the residue of which Term, by the Will of the said Katherine; and by several mean Assignments in pursuance of that Will, and a constant Possession pursuant thereunto, and by the Consent and Approbation of the Defendant, Richard Reed the younger, and long after his Pretences( which if true, amount but to a Trus●) came to be vested in the Defendants, Gregory and Wytherstone on the 30th. of November, 1674. in Trust for the said William Reed, as to all the Profits of the said Meadows, except 20 l. per An. which 20 l. per An. was given to the Poor of Breedon, by the said Katherine Reed, during the said Term.  
In September, 1675. the said William Reed( being in Possession of the Meadow,) made his last Will and Testament in Writing, and thereby gave all his Goods and Chattels, after his Debts and Legacies paid, to the Appellant Elizabeth his then Wife, and in February following D●ed, whereby the said Elizabeth was entitled to all the Profits of the Meadows, except 20 l. per. An. for the residue of the 99 Years, and depending thereupon, paid 200 l. more than all William's other personal Estate, before she heard of any pretence of the Defendants.  
But the said Gregory and Wytherstone without any direction from the said William Reed for so doing, in breach of the Trust reposed in them, made a dead of Declaration, that they stood possessed of the Meadows for the residue of the 99 Years from the 1st. of November, 1679. in Trust for the Defendant Reed.  
And the Defendant Reed having exhibited a Bill in Chancery against the said Elizabeth, to compel her to Assign all her Interest in the Meadows in Question, to him, and she having exhibited a Bill against him, and the other Defendants, Gregory and Wytherstone, to compel them to Assign to her; it was Decreed the 26th of June, 1680. That the said Elizabeth being then in Possession of the Meadows, should Assign all their Interest to the now Defendant Reed, and her Bill against him, and the other Defendants, Gregory and Wytherstone, to compel them to Assign to her, was dismiss d, and the Appellant, Walter Williams, and she inter-marrying before she had assigned, they were both committed to the Prison of the Fleet, and there forced to Assign all their Interest in the Meadows to the Defendant Reed for nothing.  
From this Decree in 1680. the said Walter Williams, and Elizabeth appealed to your Lordships, and from another Decree made in 1639. which though it was Erroneous, and could never be put in Execution, yet was partly made a Colour for the Decree in 1680. and the Cause upon the said Appeal was appointed to be heard before your Lordships the 14th. of November, 1685. but upon the Defendant Reed's pretending he could not be ready, the Appellant consented, that the Cause should be put off to the 24th. of the said Month, before which Day, the Parliament was adjourned, or Prorogued, and afterwards dissolved, since which time, the Appellants could not procure the said Appeal to be brought to Hearing until the 26th. of March, 1689.  
But the Appellant, Walter Williams, having Notice some time before that Day, that the said Sir William Gregory was choose a Member of the House of Commons, he applied himself to the House of Commons, for their Leave to proceed against the said Sir William Gregory upon the said Appeal, but the House of Commons would not give leave, though, as the Appellant was informed, the House would have given Leave, if the said Sir William Gregory would have asked it himself, but that he would not do, though the Appellant informed both him and the other Defendant Reed several days before the Hearing, that he durst not proceed without the Leave of the House of Commons, and the Appellant on the said 26th. of March, 1689, by his Council, prayed your Lordships, that the Cause upon the Appeal might be adjourned for a Fortnight, to see, if in the mean time, he might get the Leave of the House of Commons, or else, that the Matter might rest until such time as Sir William were not a Member of the House of Commons, but the Defendant's Council pressed your Lordships to dismiss the said Appeal, if the Appellants would not then proceed, and to induce your Lordships thereunto, they affirmed, that Sir William Gregory had released to the Defendant Reed, and that therefore there was no necessity for the Appellants to proceed against Sir William Gregory, though in Truth, Sir William had not then released, as himself afterwards confessed, though he had made a Declaration contrary to the Trust reposed in him, and if he had released, that did not b●r the Appellant's from their Appeal against him, but h●d been a further aggravation against him, as being a further breach of Trust; yet nevertheless they prevailed with your Lordships to dismiss the said Appeal, because the Appellants durst not then adventure to proceed without the leave of the Commons.  
Afterwards, upon the Appellants representing to your Lordships what great differences formerly happened between both Houses in the Case of shirley and fag; for Sherley's proceeding in an Appeal against fag, then a Member, without the leave of the Commons; and that it might have been made use of to have raised the like differences again, in case the Appellants had proceeded against Sir William Gregory, without the leave of the Commons, which might have been very prejudicial to the Government at that time, therefore your Lordships retained the said Appeal; and because it was then so near the end of the Session, as the Defendants could not have timely notice if your Lordship● had appointed a short day for hearing: and in regard the Appellants had been so long delayed, your Lordships, by O●der of the 3d of January, 1690. referred the said Appeal to the Barons of the Exchequer, to be heard and determined.  
Whereupon the Appellants, on the 23d. of January moved the Barons of the Exchequer to appoint a day for hearing the said Appeal; at which time Baron Lechmore opposed it, and declared he thought your Lordships could not delegate any Authority to hear that Appeal: But the other three Barons being then of the contrary opinion, they appointed the Appeal to be heard the day of hearing Causes next after Hillary-Term last. But afterwards, upon the Defendant Reed's Affidavit of his being an old Man, and living 100 mile from London, the Barons so far indulged him, as upon his request to put off the Cause several times, and to agree to his own time for hearing thereof. And on the 26th of May council on both sides were heard before the Barons, upon the said Appeal: But the Lord Chief-Baron being that day obliged to attend in the House of Lords, he could not stay to hear the Proofs red, and therefore the Cause was adjourned for a further hearing until the 15th of June, 1691. on which day council for both sides appearing, the council for the Defendant insisted upon it, That your Lordships had not power to delegate, and that your Lordships Order of Reference was obtained by surprise: and Mr. Baron Lechmore repeating his former opinion, That your Lordships had not power to delegate, and protesting against hearing the Cause, Mr. Baron Turton, though with great difficulty, declared himself of the same opinion: So the Barons being equally divided, Two for hearing, and Two against it, the Cause was no further heard, nor any judgement given.  
The Appellants conceive your Lordships may delegate any Cause before you, except Causes upon Writs of Error to any of the Judges, for these Reasons:  
1. For that the Appellants conceive, That the King is always either virtually or personally present in the House of Lords in Parliament assembled, and that there he is in his highest Judicial Capacity, and therefore the Orders of the House of Lords are in the eye of the Law the Orders of the King and Lo●ds, and the King may delegate in all Temporal Causes by the Common-Law. Bract. 108.412.  
2. For that what hath been the Common Usage of the Kingdom, is the Law of the Kingdom; and that Causes have been referred by Order of the House of Lords, time out of mind, sometimes to the Chancellor and some of the Judges, and sometimes to some of the Judges only; and that as frequently to determine the matter, as to report to the House, as appears by the Parliament-Rolls and Jou●nals hereafter mentioned; viz. 3 H. 5. n. 18. Ibidem, n. 49. 8 H. 6. n. 45. Lords Journals 28 29 of May, 1624. 17 No. 1666. 29 No. 1664. 24 Octob. 1667. 25 March, 1669, &c. And the reason thereof may be grounded upon what is cited in Cooke's Institutes, fo. 11. out of the ancient Treatise, De modo tenendi Parliamenti. viz. The Parliament ought not to be ended while any Petition remaineth undiscuss'd, or at least to which a determinate Answer is not given; and therefore such Causes as cannot be determined in the House of Lords sitting the Parliament, ought rather to be referred to competent Judges, than that Justice should be delayed until the next meeting of the Parliament.  
If it be objected, That the Lords having once dismissed the Appeal, it ought not to be retained, because if the Lords alter their Orders, there will be no end of business:  
In answer thereto, It is hoped the Lords will not alter the Law; and that the Law is, That Errors in Parliament ought to be rectified in another Session, or in another Parliament, see 21 E. 3. 46. Broo. Tit. Error 66, 68. Crompt. Jurisdiction, fo. 12. Lord Hollis's Case stated, fo. 65. which last was as great a Champion for the Jurisdiction of the Lords, as any whatsoever.  
If it should pass for a standing Rule, That all Orders of the Lords House should be perpetually binding, and not alterable, tho grounded upon false P●oofs or Informations, there will be those that will not fail to invent, affirm, and sweir such false suggestions, as will require time to disprove; and if it should not be admitted to disprove them, I doubt we may soon bid farewell to all Justice.  
And as to the Objection that was made, That if the Barons had heard the Cause in hand, and made a Decree therein, they could not have put it in execution: It is conceived, That if they could not, yet those that then should have the Custody of the Great Seal ought to have put their Decree in execution; for there are many Presidents in many Reigns, That the King out of Parliament hath referred Chancery-Decrees to some of the Judges and the Chancery hath always pursued the Opinion and judgement of those Judges, à fortiore. Therefore if the King in Parliament refers any Appeal from Chancery-Decrees, the Chancery ought to pursue the Opinion and judgement of those Referees; the Reference of the House of Lords being the King's Reference in his Supreme Judicial Capacity, as is afore-shew'd.  
It is said, That the Prorogation happening before the Cause was shipmoney heard, determined the Power given the Barons, in case they had any by your Lordships Order. As to which, much may be said against that opinion in all Cases of this nature: but there's a particular reason in this Case, that the Barons Power should not be determined; and that is this:  
This Cause was appointed to be heard, and should have been heard the sitting after Hillary-Term; and the Defendants by their council, on the 10th of February, prayed it might be put off until Easter-Term, and agreed to hear it then; and upon that offer and request, the Cause was put off until the first Monday in Easter-Term: And afterwards, on the first of May, the Defendant Reed pretending extraordinary business, that he could not come to London by the first Monday in Easter-Term, the Defendants by their council prayed, That the hearing of the Cause might be put off for a fortnight longer, and again undertook they would peremptorily hear it then: So that their own Agreement gives the Barons a Jurisdiction, in case the Jurisdiction they had by your Lordships Order did determine by Prorogation.  
Of all which your Lordships Consideration is humbly prayed▪