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Nexus between India and Bangladesh in the Liberation War of Bangladesh: Consequences of International Agreement

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ABSTRACT

The support of India and the Soviet Union was very important in the liberation war in Bangladesh. Why did they support and why did on August 9, 1971, the Foreign Ministers of India and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) signed a treaty of “Peace, Friendship and Cooperation” on the eve of the liberation war in Bangladesh? The present study will investigate these research questions through secondary methods. The study is descriptive, and the study is part of history. For this reason, a historical approach and secondary sources were used. The historical review method has been followed because the study is of contemporary international relations. The historic Indo-Soviet Treaty had an immediate impact on the decisive battle between India and Pakistan in the eastern war theater. This essay deals with the explanation for establishing a treaty that was signed on August 9, 1971, between the Soviet Union and India. A focus has been made on the reasons for India's brightest role in the liberation war in Bangladesh. This paper also highlights that the friendship treaty between these two countries was not signed to help and aid East Pakistan, but its background prevailed in the 1955 Bandung conference and the USSR's involvement in the liberation war of Bangladesh in the context of Soviet-American rivalry during the Cold War. But it was spread out in 1969, and on August 9, 1971, the Foreign Minister of India and the Soviet Union signed the treaty “Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation” at a special moment during the war of 1971.

Keywords: Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty, Soviet Union, U.S.A, Pakistan, India, East Pakistan, Bangladesh, Liberation War, Struggle for Independence, Diplomatic initiatives

INTRODUCTION

West Pakistan led by President Yahya Khan launched operation searchlight in Dhaka on 25 March, 1971 that marked by oppression, gang rapes, genocide. Following nine months brutal struggle on 16 December, 1971, Pakistani troops surrendered before Indian soldiers and Bangladesh's forces. The 1971 Indo-Pakistan war changed the map of south Asia resulted in the secession of East Pakistan, putting an end to 24 years of Pakistan rule. The year 1971 witnessed a brutal struggle for independence waged by East Pakistan, soon to be Bangladesh. This was not just a war against West Pakistan's oppressive rule but a triangle web of international alliances and strategic moves shaped international power politics. At the center of this web, India and Bangladesh are intertwined, bound by shared history, culture, geopolitics and a secret international agreement. Amidst the war of Independence on 9 August 1971, historical ‘Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation Treaty’ was signed between the two powerful states (U.S.S.R. and India), India's previous non-alignment stance was changed in the Cold War era pushing the region closer to the Bangladesh war as China and America battled for influence in lieu of stand beside Pakistan. This study delves into this complex relationship, unraveling the existence, nature, and impact of such an agreement on the war's outcome and the lasting mark it left on both nations.

The India-Bangladesh tie does carry strong historical and cultural overtones, but both sides also realize the immense benefits of a strong relationship. India and Bangladesh share 4096.7 km of border, which is the largest land border that India shares with any of its neighboring countries, out of which 1116.2 km is riverine (Andrio, 2016). Geopolitics and history and international politics played a vital role in creating a nexus between India and Bangladesh during liberation war of Bangladesh. It is well known that India helped Bangladesh in 1971, but contemporaneously, it would not be possible for India if the USSR, which is

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now Russia, could not spread its hand of cooperation. Not only Indira Gandhi's government helped the Bangladeshi masses, but also the Indian people, Armed Forces helped and supported Bangladesh. However, it is very urgent to show an elucidate background on why and how India was active and its attitude was positive in the liberation war of Bangladesh.

Objectives of the Study

This study aims to unveil and analyze why India and the Soviet Union concluded the “Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation” treaty on August 9, 1971? Furthermore, it will evaluate the immediate impact of such an agreement on the Indo-Bangladeshi relationship.

METHODOLOGY

This present study is qualitative in nature and employs content analysis to glean insights from diverse secondary sources. Leveraging pre-existing data aligns with Kothari's (2004) observation that secondary sources have already been collected and analyzed by someone and are readily available for use. This approach, noted by Abdullah (2017), proves cost-effective and expeditious compared to primary data collection. The present study is a part of history; for this reason, a historical approach has been used because the study pertains to contemporary international relations. A substantial amount of literature exists on this issue, so various secondary sources of data have been extracted through a thorough review of several books, journal articles published in both reputed national and international journals, newspaper articles, and web documents that helped the author to gain in-depth understanding.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Scholars like Srinath Raghavan (1992) and Sumit Ganguly (2001) delve into the complex motivations behind the treaty. They highlight India's concerns regarding China's growing influence, Pakistan's military build-up, and the perceived need to counterbalance the US in the region. Conversely, scholars like Rajesh Rajagopalan (2001) emphasize the Soviet desire to gain strategic leverage in South Asia against China and the US. Nandan Unnikrishnan (2021) makes it quite evident in *Hindustan Times* that many people think the crisis that resulted in the creation of Bangladesh at the end of 1971 and the ensuing conflict over East Pakistan is what ultimately convinced India to sign the treaty. Echoing the same, Saleem Samad (2021) in *Dhaka Tribune* reported on how an Indo-Soviet treaty expedited the Bangladesh war of independence 50 years ago and how the agreement restrained Pakistan and its allies from embarking on a course of “military adventurism” in the subcontinent. This treaty not only epitomized the special relationship between India and the Soviet Union but also acted as a guarantor of regional peace. The Indo-Soviet treaty was later adopted as the India-Bangladesh Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1972.

According to a number of academics, such as Barbara Ramm (2005) and P.R. Rao (2007) ingrained that the treaty gave India the confidence to intervene in the Bangladesh Liberation War since it guaranteed Soviet backing in the event that tensions with China and the US escalated. Others, such as Christophe Jaffrelot (2010), challenge this viewpoint by pointing out India's prior commitment to aiding the independence movement in Bengal. The treaty's immediate as well as long-term consequences are widely debated. Some literatures like Bhabani Sengupta (2012) emphasizes the economic and military benefits that India received from the USSR. Others, like David Washbrook (2001) critique the treaty's potential for compromising India's non-aligned foreign policy and fostering dependence on the Soviet Union. Recent published research by Rajesh Rajagopalan (2022) and Srinath Raghavan (2021) examines the treaty's continued significance in light of India's evolving relations with China and Russia. They draw attention to the treaty's enduring historical significance and its impact on contemporary regional dynamics. Many authors (Drong Andrio, David Scott, Jackson, Rounaq Jahan, Van scandal, Aurobindo Mahapatra, Guhathakurta Meghna) aptly discussed that the USSR helped Bangladesh in 1971 through India considering the ethical and political grounds. I argue that the USSR's involvement in Bangladesh's liberation war was to counterbalance the capitalist hegemony of U.S.A in this region and a big country like India can act as a strategic partner of Soviet Union against U.S.A. and China.

Theoretical Framework

Decision-Making Theory

Decision-Making Approach studies politics as a process of decision making that explores the attributes of decision makers as well as the type of influences on the decision makers. Richard Snyder's Decision-Making theory is considered as theoretical

framework to understand the consequences and dynamics of the 'Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation Treaty', 1971 and the supportive role of U.S.S.R. in the liberation war of Bangladesh through convincing India. When U.S.S.R. and India perceive that the international order is threatened, the leaders and actors of both countries took the hard decision to help East Pakistan against the triangle web of America, China and Pakistan considering internal setting (national interest) and external setting (actions and reactions of other states) of decision-making process. Internal setting interacts with the decision makers, i.e. the decision makers gather information and opinions from the internal environment and inform the environment. Likewise, there is an interaction between the decision makers and the external setting. The decision or action that the decision makers take to spread to the internal and external setting and through the feedback about the response of the environment, it goes to the decision makers. Thus, decisions are made through feedback in various settings. So, decision making approach involves study of complex and interrelated social, political, psychological processes.

Assumptions of Snyder's Approach

a. All political action is undertaken by concrete human beings, and b. if we want to properly understand the nature of their action, we should view the world not from our point of view but from the perspective of persons responsible for taking decisions.

Game Theory

Kaplan, Schelling and Riker believe that the theory of games is a very important tool for analysis of international politics. The situation prevailed in the present study can be fruitfully explained in terms of games theory because every nation, especially the superpowers was busy in finding out strategy to cope with the move adopted by the rival powers. During the Cold War period (Bi-polar) the rivalry between the two superpowers was excessively animated by the strategy of games. The strategy taken by one power was swiftly followed by another power and this process heavily shaped international politics for more than two decades. By applying game theory in international politics, it gives us an insight on how alliances or agreements control international politics and try to maximize national interest.

In the game theory, Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) is based on the theory of deterrence which explains that the threat of using strong weapons against rivals prevents the enemy's use of those weapons. If the Soviet Union, choose don't attack, the game ends, and results in a stalemate where no nuclear weapons are used. However, if the Soviet Union choose to attack, the USA must then decide its move; whether to retaliate, or don't retaliate.

During the cold war era in 1954 military pact SEATO and CENTO was signed between America and Pakistan. This military treaty made USSR and India (socialist nations) closer ever before. In 1962's Sino-India and 1965's Indo-Pak war turned the domestic politics into international conflicting situation. However, in aforesaid events number of participants (Game theory) were two and according to Karl Deutsch purpose of games based on Zero-sum games. In Bi-polar system what is beneficial to the United States is detrimental to the Soviet Union or vice versa. In such game, there is permanent antagonism between the two parties. Even though both sides are guided by rationality adopting a plan to defeat the opponent. Consequently, concerning the issue of Bangladesh liberation war number of participants (Game theory) were more than two making alliances and agreement where purpose of games based on Mixed-motive games. In the context of international politics, nuclear power countries have developed their own nuclear power by competing with each other (Games of Competition). Making treaty or alliances with friend countries (Games of Cooperation), the two superpowers action or decision in a game involves a reward or a penalty.

Number of Players/participants: (N-person games)

When more than two persons/players compete in any conflicting situation, then we can see the intrusion of making alliances or treaty that make the situation more complex. Strategic move of triangle web is observed during the liberation war and players (N-person games) are: Pakistan (West Pakistan), U.S.A., China Vs Bangladesh (East Pakistan), India, USSR

Strategies/level of achievement of Games Theory

USA, China, Pakistan: Pakistan tried to take control over East Pakistan by the military crackdown on 25 March 1971. USA and China gave moral and military support in favor of Islamabad.

USSR., India, Bangladesh: India Supported Bangladesh's independence movement through military intervention with the help of USSR aiming to counter USA and China's influence in the region.

Payoffs/Goal: Each player seeks to maximize their own interests as outcome-

By examining these factors through the lens of game theory, we can see games of cooperation and games of competition that give us a deeper understanding of the complex dynamics and prevalences of the Bangladesh Liberation War. Lastly, it can be said that the triangle web of USSR., India, Bangladesh succeeded in international political game while counter triangle partners USA, China, Pakistan defeated in the game of liberation war of Bangladesh.

Results and Discussion

a) Background of the 'Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation Treaty', 1971

Pakistan	Maintaining control over East Pakistan as a dominant actor.
Bangladesh	Seeking Independence, freedom from West Pakistani oppression.
India	Weakening Pakistan (common enemy of India and Bangladesh) increasing regional influence.
USSR	Weakened the hegemony of USA and China, improved relations with India.
USA	To sabotage USSR's spread of communism in Asia
China	To emerge as more powerful country in this region spreading monopolistic hegemony.

Consequently, after the SEATO treaty the world witnessed the historical Bandung conference. The main objective of the Bandung conference (1955) was to foster economic and cultural cooperation among Afro-Asian countries aiming to counteract the influence of US and USSR colonization and new colonialism. Despite India being one of the main proponents of the conference's mission, its relations with the Soviet Union did not deteriorate. The USSR sought to capitalize on this opportunity through India, hence Soviet newspapers referred to Indian Prime Minister Nehru as a great leader of the non-aligned countries and Nehru's policy of non-alignment was appreciated by the Soviet Union. Consequently, an amicable working relationship developed between the two countries following the visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev to New Delhi in December 1955. Immediately after the Bandung conference, Nehru toured the Soviet Union and signed a joint declaration with Bulganin (Nikolai Bulganin, chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers from 1955 until 1958). In this context, Jahan (2005) opined, "Historically, the USSR under Stalin was suspicious of the genuineness of India's independence and non-alignment. However, Indo-Soviet relations began with Jawaharlal Nehru's visit to the USSR in June 1955 and the Nikita Khrushchev/ Nikolai Bulganin visit to India in December 1955. This was also when the Congress party in India was asserting its belief in state planning and a 'socialist pattern of society,' with Nehru playing a leading role in the Bandung conference (1955) of 29 Afro-Asian nations." This relationship continued to progress gradually.

Furthermore, in 1962, Sino-Indian war and in 1965's Indo-Pak war provided an opportunity for closer ties between the USSR and India. During this time, the USSR became active in the politics of the subcontinent as the mediator of the Indo-Pak war and extended cooperation towards India (Mahapatra, 2011). Following figure illustrates how an amiable relationship was developed between USSR and India:




Figure 1: how an amiable relationship was developed between USSR and India

The study argues that these historic events mysteriously worked in favor of

Bangladesh, resulting in the historic Indo-Soviet Treaty of 'Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation' was signed during the liberation war of Bangladesh. Few treaties have influenced world politics, history, and geography as much as this one. Many experts have compared the signing of the treaty as India's second liberation.

b) Consequences of the agreement

Andrio (2016) highlights that India decided to go to war against Pakistan when Indira Gandhi failed to gain American support. Finally, she made the hard decision to sign the treaty to curb the hegemony of U.S.A and China in this region. The treaty was appreciated from historical viewpoint because the struggle for the independence of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) gained momentum in 1971. After the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty, East European countries took a positive attitude towards the Bangladesh issue. Ultimately, through this treaty, both the USSR and India decided to support East Pakistan. Therefore, it is not straightforward to say that the agreement between India and the Soviet Union was solely aimed at liberating Bangladesh. On the other hand, the US sympathized with Pakistan for various reasons: firstly, Pakistan belonged to American-led military pacts, CENTO and SEATO, and secondly, the US believed that any Indian victory would be seen as an expansion of Soviet influence in the regions gained by India, as it was perceived to be a pro-Soviet nation, despite pursuing a policy of non-alignment.

The history of the liberation war begins with the elections held in December 1970, where the Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, won 160 out of 162 seats (39.2% of the vote), all from East Pakistan. This was more than double the Pakistan People's Party's 18.6% vote share. Bhutto ignored the fact that the Awami League had a comfortable majority. President Yahya Khan tried to suppress East Pakistan's legitimate demands. After the military crackdown (March 25, 1971) Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was arrested and taken to West Pakistan. The operation has been termed as genocide against the Bengalis of East Pakistan. The Hindu minority colonies were specially targeted for rape and murder. Not only logistical support but also for the release of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from the prison of Pakistan, the then Prime Minister of India (Indira Gandhi) traveled around the world to gather support for the cause and create world public opinion.

Opponent player of India and East Pakistan- Pakistani President Yahya Khan had stated that "If India made any attempt to seize any part of East Pakistan, he would declare war and Pakistan would not be alone." Pakistan with the tacit support of the United States was trying to involve the UN in East Pakistan which India regarded as "an unnecessary interference in the internal affairs" of another country. China gave unconditional support to her "all-weather" friend Pakistan against India as if New Delhi would not dare to interfere in the domestic affairs of Pakistan. During the July 1971 meeting between Henry Kissinger and Chou En-lai (the Chinese Prime Minister), Chou En-lai had clearly indicated to the then US Secretary of State that in case of an Indo-Pakistan war over East Bengal, Beijing would launch military intervention against India on behalf of Islamabad. India was desperate to deter Chinese intervention (Rahman, 1989). On April 2, 1971, Soviet President Podgorni wrote a letter to President Yahya Khan, giving him a red signal that urged Yahya to take 'the most urgent measures to stop the bloodshed and repression against the population in East Pakistan and for turning to methods of a peaceful political settlement.' This would be in the interest of Pakistan and in 'the interest of preserving peace in the area'.

When Pakistan's air force proactively attacked Indian forces on December 3, India responded by invading the new country, now Bangladesh. James Novak aptly portrayed a nexus between India and Bangladesh during the liberation war in such a way that, finally, in December 1971, the Indian army entered Bangladesh. After a few firefights, including one major battle at Jessore, the Indians quickly subdued the Pakistanis, who had become dissolute as they murdered scores of innocent people and raped local women. Indeed, the Pakistanis' behavior for ever will be an infamous example of an army that bullied, raped, and murdered, then broke, ran, and surrendered in the face of the first organized resistance it faced. Thus, Bangladesh was born (Novak, 1993). The contribution of the Indian government, citizens, and military was unprecedented during the liberation war of Bangladesh in 1971. After the crackdown on March 25, India intervened and sent the Indian army to fight against Pakistani soldiers and supported freedom fighters by providing training, food, shelter, and other assistance. On March 27, 1971, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi expressed full support from her government for the independence of Bangladesh. Under the leadership of Indira Gandhi, all-out support was given by India to the struggling people of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) during the liberation war. The Bangladesh-India border was opened to allow Bangladeshi refugees safe shelter in India. The governments of West Bengal, Bihar, Assam, Meghalaya, Uttar Pradesh, and Tripura established refugee camps along the border. Exiled Bangladeshi army officers and voluntary workers from India immediately started using these camps for the recruitment and training of Mukti Bahini guerrillas (Schendel, 2012).

Table 1: India’s contribution

India’s contribution	Number/ Amount
spent	7,000 crores of rupees
Sacrificed lives	3630 Indian army officers and soldiers
wounded	9856 Indian army officers and soldiers
Missed officers and soldiers	More than 213

Source: Drong Andrio, 2016, p.738.

Source: Drong Andrio, 2016, p.738.

The BSF, Army, Navy, and Air Force of India aided East Pakistan. They portrayed 69 Indian-sponsored insurgent training camps bordering East Pakistan, with an estimated total of 30–50 thousand rebels training. The BSF has established camps at which 10,000 Bengalis are reportedly receiving training in guerrilla and sabotage tactics. In the month of September, the Indian army gradually started to participate directly in the liberation war. India's Army, Navy, and Air Force were lauded for their role in ending a genocide and giving birth to a new nation (David, 2013).

In Delhi, a three-day international conference on the Bangladesh issue took place, in which 150 delegates representing 24 countries participated. On September 20, 1971, on behalf of the conference, an appeal was made to all the governments of the world to recognize Bangladesh as an independent nation and to stop helping West Pakistan with any kind of military aid (Ashfaq, 2012). Through this conference in India, Bangladesh got worldwide ethical and moral support.

World response to the genocide can be analyzed at dual levels- official and non-official. While the world watched in horror, India and its allies U.S.S.R. firmly stood beside Bangladesh, offering unwavering support. Pakistan, however, cloaked the atrocities in lies, garnering backing from some Islamic nations and China. Yet, the tide of truth couldn't be dammed forever. The official policy of the United States was to “tilt in favor of Pakistan” because Pakistan was used as an intermediary to open the door to China. **At the non- official level**, there was a great outpouring of sympathy for the Bangladesh cause worldwide because of the genocide. The Western media—particularly the U.S., British, French, and Australian, well-known Western artists and intellectuals came out in support of Bangladesh. George Harrison and Ravi Shankar held a Bangladesh concert. Andre Malraux, the noted French author, volunteered to go and fight with the Bengali freedom fighters. In the United States, citizen groups and individuals lobbied successfully with Congress to stop military aid to Pakistan. Despite the Nixon administration’s official support of the Pakistani government, influential senators and congressmen (such as Frank Church and Edward Kennedy) spoke out strongly against the genocide. Members of Parliament in the United Kingdom, Europe, and other Western countries were also highly critical of the Bangladesh genocide. The US President Richard Nixon called Indians aggressors and ordered to support Pakistan by the US troops deployed in Vietnam. And on the other hand, the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev assured that if the US or China attacked India, the Soviet Union would take severe counter measures.

Both officially and unofficially, India played a critical role in mobilizing support for Bangladesh. The genocide and the result of influx of ten million refugees in West Bengal and neighboring states created spontaneous, unofficial sympathy. The press, political parties, and voluntary organizations in India pushed Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to immediately intervene in Bangladesh when the Pakistani army cracked down in March 1971. The Indian government initially declined to intervene but gave moral and financial support to the Bangladesh government-in-exile as well as the freedom fighters. It also sponsored a systematic international campaign in favor of Bangladesh. And finally, in December 1971, when the ground was well prepared, Bangladesh was liberated as a result of direct Indian army intervention.

On December 6, 1971, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi said in the Lok Sabha, ‘Pakistan had declared war against India. There is no importance to a peaceful solution. Bangladeshi people are engaged in their struggle for existence, and India is fighting against aggression. They are, like us, fighting against a common enemy. I am pleased to inform the Houses that in the existing situation and due to repeated requests from the Bangladesh government, we have carefully decided to grant recognition to the People’s Republic of Bangladesh’ (Khan, 1976). India provided not only logistical and moral support during the liberation war but also recognized and motivated other countries to recognize Bangladesh. The Soviet Union, the first major power, recognized Bangladesh, which it did within 38 days (on January 26, 1972) of its de facto liberation from the Pakistani forces (Khan, 1967). For Bangladesh, it was a tough diplomatic effort to earn the nation’s recognition because Zulfikar Ali Bhutto clearly stated that if any nation recognized Bangladesh, then Pakistan would break all diplomatic relations with that nation. In recognizing Bangladesh, Pakistan really suspended diplomatic relations with a few countries. From the above discussions an abridge

overview is portrayed why the USSR and India took sides with Bangladesh and the causes of building a nexus between India and Bangladesh:

1. Signing the Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation Treaty with India on August 9, 1971, the USSR expressed its strong support for India's initiatives in favor of Bangladesh.
2. Sending the Soviet Navy from Vladivostok to prevent America's warships from entering the Indian Ocean.
3. Imposing Veto Power: The USSR vetoed 3 times against the cease-fire proposed by the US in the UN Security Council during the Security Council's Sessions 1606, 1607, and 1613 (in between December 4 and 13, 1971).
4. The aim of the treaty was to prevent the U.S. dominance over East and South Asia.
5. Attempts were made to spread communism in East and South Asia by convincing India.

During the penultimate days of the Indo-Pak war over Bangladesh, the Soviet veto in the UN Security Council against a US-backed proposal for a ceasefire paved the way for the Indo-Bangladesh allied forces to march into Dhaka and secure the defeat and surrender of 90 thousand Pakistani troops on December 16th December 1971. The Soviet Union's positive role thus contributed immensely to the historic triumph of Bangladesh. The response of the Soviet Union to the 1971 crisis in East Pakistan was conditioned by the general Soviet policy with regard to Asia in the 1960s. It was a policy of growing involvement, initially undertaken to contain America's influence in East and South Asia.

Concluding Remarks

'Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation Treaty' (Article IV) states that India respects U.S.S.R's Peace-loving policy and U.S.S.R. respects India's policy of non-alignment. The two countries stood beside Bangladesh showing the proper respect of the statement of the article. The events surrounding the treaty's signing unfolded during a period of immense historical significance. In this regard, Meghna Guhathakurta expressed her aspiration in the lines: "As throngs of people from East Pakistan fled across the border to India, especially to West Bengal, many volunteers from West Bengal and beyond came to give aid to the war refugees and help out in the mushrooming camps. K.K. Sinha, a humanist philosopher and political thinker, was among them. During one of his visits to the camps around October 1971, he and his wife were in a car accident. He succumbed to his injuries after taking his wife to the hospital. Like many, he felt the need to wake up civil society in West Pakistan to the atrocities of the Pakistani regime and to exhort them to help the victims. His wife, Sati Sinha, wrote in the preface to his posthumously published collected writings on Bangladesh, *Bangladesh Revolution for Liberation*: "The author's prayer and dream was to see Bangladesh liberated, which he could not witness due to his untimely and sad passing away. But his dream has come true. Bangladesh was liberated from the clutches and tyranny of West Pakistan and achieved full independence" (Guhathakurta & Schendel, 2013). According to Sachin Karmakar (a sub-sector commander and veteran of 1971), After World War II, the greatest triumph of Indo-Soviet friendship and cooperation in the Indian subcontinent was the emergence of Bangladesh. The Treaty of 'Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation' was a shock to America because they feared that the involvement of the Soviet Union could sabotage their plan to expand their influence in East and South Asia, under which Russia was bound to defend India in case of any external aggression. But all efforts by Pakistan, America, and China failed due to the persuading activities of India with the collaboration of the USSR. The birth of Bangladesh came into reality with India's support and sympathy under the supervision of the USSR.

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