

AN ANALYSIS OF THE KANTIAN FOUNDATION OF HUSSERLIAN TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY

Prof. Chiedozie Okoro

Department of Philosophy

University of Lagos,

Akoka, Lagos, Nigeria,

cokoro@unilag.edu.ng

&

Sirajudeen Owosho, Ph.D.

Department of Philosophy

University of Lagos,

Akoka, Lagos, Nigeria.

Abstract

The quest of an ultimate and absolute foundation and justification of knowledge was a persistent occupation of Edmund Husserl. From his first beginnings in philosophy, Husserl turned to the realm of subjectivity for his foundation and justification. The problem is to account for the validity of knowledge and objectivity of the objects of knowledge in terms of acts of consciousness through which the objects are apprehended and knowledge is constituted, and this happens to be the goal of his phenomenology. With regards to transcendental phenomenology, this paper aims to analyse Kant and Husserl's similarities and differences, in terms of methodologies and interpretations, with a view to showing that Kant provided the epistemological manure for the fruitful germination of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. Husserl's recognition of phenomenology as ineluctably transcendental philosophy forced him to confront Kant whom he had been reading seriously. He agreed with Kant's general view that the profusion of different philosophical systems was testimony that philosophy had failed to live up to its aspiration to be a science. Furthermore, Husserl, like Kant, believed that philosophy could only become a genuine science after it had embarked on a radical critique of its claim to be able to be a science at all. This involved a critique of the instrument of knowledge. Husserl sees Kant as correctly understanding the need for a transcendental critique of the sciences, one which saw them as subjective cognitive accomplishments. It is therefore the position of this paper that Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason provided a strong basis for the emergence of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology.

Keywords: Consciousness, Knowledge, Phenomenology, Philosophy, Transcendental Phenomenology.

Introduction

Husserl's phenomenology could be said to have taken its beginnings in neo-Kantian soil, and went on to become an independent philosophical organism. This ambivalence of phenomenology's relationship to Kant, this dependence upon and yet reaction against Kantianism is reflected in Husserl's own attitude towards the philosopher of Kronisberg: at times he credits Kant with anticipating and even attaining phenomenological status, at other times, he severely criticizes his thought (Kern, 1965, 192). To determine exactly how Husserl is related to Kant thus becomes an extremely delicate matter, calling for the most sensitive historical and philosophical analysis. Husserl saw phenomenology as the final answer to the question of epistemology: How is knowledge possible? He sees Kant as representing a crucial stage on the way to the emergence of his own transcendental phenomenology, and provides interesting criticisms of Kant from that standpoint.

Kant as Precursor of Transcendental Phenomenology

Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is the culmination of the turn to the subject that takes place in Descartes, but how does it relate to Kant? In Husserl's view, Kant's significance lies in the fact that he succeeds in converting Descartes' subjectivism into philosophy, which is genuinely transcendental. Descartes subject remains an item in the world (Hussel, 1982, 10). Kant's subject is transcendental in the sense that it is a subject in which the world as object is constituted. In the view of Gerner, such philosophy is the only one able to answer the epistemological question: How is knowledge possible? and it does this by showing how the world is "constituted" in transcendental subjectivity (2006, 503). An inevitable consequence of Husserl's conception of transcendental phenomenology is transcendental idealism, and Husserl not only accepts this but enthusiastically proclaims it. He sees his own transcendental idealism as Kant's idealism rendered consistent. Given the acknowledgement of Kantian influence by Husserl, this shall further be examined by comparing the two philosophers on some phenomenological themes such as transcendental subjectivity, views on psychologism, Things in Themselves, Life-World and its constitution, and transcendental philosophy.

Transcendental Subjectivity

Kant's view of subjectivity implies a two-fold consideration of the idea of subject. On the one hand, there is the empirical self, and on the other hand, there stands the transcendental subject as the principle of the unity of experience, and therefore, as the principle of the existence of the empirical self. Kant's idea of transcendental subjectivity is a response to Hume's empirical

formulation that reduces the idea of the self to a “bundle of perceptions”. Kant claims that there should be a unifying principle prior to empirical experiences of a particular person so that the idea of the self can emerge. One major problem with Kant’s view of transcendental subjectivity is that, it does not supply sufficient argumentation to support his claim about the existence of such a subject. That is, it fails to explain how the empirical self is related to the transcendental subject. He does not arrive at the idea of transcendental subjectivity but simply asserts it (Azeri, 2010, 281).

Edmund Husserl does not argue that transcendental consciousness must have such and such structures if knowledge is to be possible. Phenomenology is essentially a form of seeing. The constitution of objects in transcendental subjectivity is something which can become the object of what Husserl calls transcendental experience. Access to the kinds of active and passive synthesis in which objects and ultimately the world are constituted requires the carrying out of transcendental reduction. Husserl concludes that Kant’s account of the constitution of the world by the transcendental subject lacks a proper conception of the phenomenological method, and operates with mythical constructions (Husserl, 1970, 30).

Husserl thinks that because Kant never really appreciated the need for a transcendental reduction, he was always in danger of falling back into psychologism (Husserl, 1974, 9-15). In the very early stages of his encounter with Kant, Husserl thought that Kant was guilty of psychologism, trying to explain the necessity and universality of a priori truths by tracing them back to our psychological constitution which makes assent to them inevitable. By the time of *Logical Investigations*, he had come to see that this view of Kant is false even though traces of psychologism remained (Husserl, 2020, 30). According to Gorner, Kant explains the possibility of a priori knowledge in terms of the faculties of sensibility, imagination and understanding, and these are human psychological faculties. But as items in the world, human beings cannot fulfill a transcendental role (Gorner, 2006, 107). From the philosophical standpoint of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, human beings are entities in the world constituted in transcendental subjectivity, which is not an entity in the world.

The transcendental subjectivity Husserl speaks about is no other than human transcendence, which is the human ability to project from the physical world of experience into the supersensible world or non-physical world, which is made possible by the productive and reproductive imagination. It is the ability of the mind to form connectedness or synthesis. Transcendence shows how the sensible faculty of the mind interconnects with the non-sensible faculties of mind. The sensible part of the mind is referred to as immanent, while the non-sensible parts of the mind are referred to as transcendent. By the act of interconnectedness or synthesis, the mind projects from the experienced world into the non-experienced world and vice versa, making possible mental visioning or mental imaging of the world (Kant, 2003, 307). This very act of visualizing or imagining the world, is an act of synthesis, which Kant refers to as the synthetic *a priori* knowledge, which is made possible by the power of the imagination to form heterogeneity into homogeneity.

Synthesis in general, as we shall hereafter see, is the mere result of the power of imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious. To bring this synthesis “to concepts” is a function which belongs to the understanding, and it is through this function of the understanding that we first obtain knowledge properly so called. (Kant, 1970, 112)

There is an ambivalence involved in the above statement of Kant concerning the power of the imagination to form synthesis. In one fell swoop, he acknowledges that synthesis is the act and process of imagination, yet he refers to the imagination as – a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious.

There were a number of problems that confronted Kant concerning the matter of transcendental subjectivity. First, he began his intellectual quest as an anthropologist and later matured into the stage of critical ontology or transcendental philosophy. Second, even at the matured stage of transcendental philosophy, his thinking was still dominated and directed by his initial stage of anthropological analysis of human nature. Third, he was limited to the traditional rivalry between idealism and materialism in metaphysics, and rationalism and empiricism in epistemology such that synthesis for him became a reconciliation of the opposing parties. It is in this sense that he saw the *synthetic a priori* as a fusion of rationalism and empiricism in classical epistemology as well as an amalgamation of induction and deduction in traditional logic. It is in this sense that he understood the transcendental aesthetic as the analysis of the inductive process which follows the empiricist procedure of abstracting totality from particular experiences of sense knowledge (i.e. sensibility as a process and source of *a posteriori knowledge*). The transcendental dialectic on the other hand, deals with the deductive procedure, which portrays the rationalist process of applying general rules to particular experiences (i.e. reason as a transcendent faculty of ideas that legislates the pre-experiential condition which forms the spectacle for organizing experience). Hence, the whole essence of his transcendental logic concerns how to achieve synthesis of these two traditional processes of logic, which, for him, represent logical procedures or functions of the mind.

Fourth, at his earlier stage of anthropology, Kant had developed a metaphysical theory of human nature based on racism by which he pegged the human power of transcendence on skin colour. At his matured stage of critical ontology, his research into the inner depths of human ontology led him to the realization that the imagination (not reason) is the faculty responsible for synthesis by which process human transcendence is achieved. Since the acknowledgement of this new discovery would amount to a nullification of his earlier stand in his anthropology, Kant detoured from ontology back into anthropology. Fifth, the recoil from the analysis of human ontology, means making anthropology the foundation of his critical ontology. This anomaly, led him to introduce a process known as *subsumption* into his theory of human ontology. By this act, the powers and functions of the imagination were subsumed or incorporated under the faculty of the understanding, which now functions as the faculty responsible for the production and synthesis of both rational and empirical concepts through

the process of schematism (Heidegger, 1962, xix). Consequently, Kant labelled the imagination: “The Transcendental Object X, a Nothing and an unknown root” (112).

A sixth fundamental anomaly in Immanuel Kant’s transcendental ontology is that the twelve (12) categories of the understanding actually belong under the faculty of imagination. This is because concepts deal with rules of direction, not synthesis. This wise, the twelve categories rightly belong under the imagination which is the faculty of image formation. Image as a symbol, is a fusion of both rational and empirical knowledge. Hence, by ceding the functions of the imagination to the understanding, Kant derailed from the project of showing how the human mind comes about the act and process of synthesis. It is on this basis that Edmund Husserl accuses Kant of not being able to squarely deal with the problem of psychologism. This accusation stems from the ground that Kant is not able to comprehensively discuss the problem of human subjectivity and how human subjectivity gives rise to objectivity.

The Conception of Noumena

Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason* distinguished between two types of reality: Phenomena and Noumena. That is the knowable and the unknowable. Whereas the phenomena is the world of experience, that is, things as they are perceived, the noumena is the world of intelligence that is “thing in itself”. Appearances, so far as they are thought as objects according to the unity of the categories are called *phenomena*. But if I postulate things which are mere objects of understanding, and which, nevertheless, can be given as such to an intuition, although not to one that is sensible...such things would be entitled *noumena* (Kant, 2003, 123). As far as Kant is concerned, we can only know things as they are given to consciousness, through our sense perception, but we cannot know thing in itself, that is, we can never say anything at all about things as, they are in themselves because they are not given to consciousness.

In actual fact, the bifurcation of reality into phenomena and noumena by Kant, is a further manifestation of his detour into anthropology. In the first place, it is contradictory for Kant to say that what the mind is capable of knowing are appearances (phenomena), not things-in-themselves (i.e. noumena) and at the same time state about the source of metaphysics thus:

As it concerns the source of metaphysical cognition, its very concept implies that they cannot be empirical. Its principles (i.e. propositions and concepts) must never be derived from experience. It must not be physical but metaphysical, that is, knowledge lying beyond experience. It can therefore have for its basis neither external experience, which is the source of physics proper, nor internal, which is the basis of empirical psychology. It is therefore a priori cognition, coming from pure understanding and pure reason. (Kant, 1983, 107)

If the source of metaphysics is neither empirical nor physical, but always metaphysical, does it not imply that as beings endowed with the power of transcendence, humans have the transcendental ability to peruse noumena? However, since Kant’s had the double agenda of

making metaphysics scientific and at the same time laying a metaphysical foundation for science, he conjectured that a genuine metaphysics should exclude the religious/spiritual world (i.e. which for him belonged in the realm of noumena) and focus on the investigation of the phenomenal world with a view to enabling the scientific transformation of the society. This accounts for a main reason why he recoiled from making a delineation of the powers and functions of the imagination and chose to concentrate on the architectonics of pure reason and pure understanding. This preceding point is well articulated by Martin Heidegger thus:

This fundamental constitution of the essence of, “rooted” in the transcendental imagination, is the “unknown” of which Kant must have had an intimation when he spoke of “the root unknown to us”; for the unknown is not that which we know absolutely nothing but that of which the knowledge makes us uneasy. However, Kant did not carry out the primordial interpretation of the transcendental imagination; indeed, he did not even make attempt, despite the clear indications he gave us concerning such an analytic. (167)

Reason as the faculty of ideas functions by way of legislation and dissection, which involves the dispassionate distancing of the object of investigation. Understanding as the faculty of concept formation, can only avail us schemas, models or rules (both empirical and rational) of direction for structuring things into pattern. It is imagination as the faculty of image formation that is capable of perusing into the hiddenness of things. Hence, by failing to forage into the nature and structure of the imagination, Kant limited his entire philosophy to the mere perusal of appearances.

For Husserl, a genuinely transcendental philosophy cannot countenance things-in-themselves, which cannot themselves be presented or given to consciousness. This explains why Husserl dismisses the noumena theory of Kant by focusing his phenomenology on the egological perusal of the phenomenal world. Thus, the realism in Husserl’s phenomenology is that the phenomenal world is not populated by appearances but real objects which the ego can peruse. The marvel in Husserl’s phenomenology is that *epoche* as the process of *eidetic bracketing*, which happens by way of intentional correlation of the subject and object of knowledge, is the very process of imaginative visualization which results into the perusal of the essences of objects of knowledge.

At the core of Husserl’s phenomenology is the strict correlation between being (*Sein*) and consciousness (Husserl, 1982, 43). Given this correlation, the idea of an unknowable “thing in itself” makes no sense to Husserl. Although, it is possible to interpret Kantian “things in themselves” in a way compatible with Husserl transcendental philosophy, there is still the strong suggestion that they have a causal role in Kant’s epistemology, which Husserl thinks is obscured. This explains why Husserl’s transcendental idealism is more radical than that of Kant.

The World and its Constitution

Ordinarily, one would have thought that this conventional or classical rendition of phenomena would have been corrected by Immanuel Kant, since he had as his cardinal objective, the rehabilitation or deconstruction of metaphysics. But to our utter dismay, in Kant, phenomena remain the appearing of the non-appearing and the comprehension of the incomprehensible. In the third chapter of “The Transcendental Analytic” (which forms the first part of “Transcendental Logic” under “The Transcendental Doctrine of Elements”) entitled; “The Transcendental Doctrine of Judgment”, Kant speaks of “the ground of the distinction of all objects in general into phenomena and noumena.” (Kant, 2003, 257). But what exactly does Kant mean by the categorization of all objects of experience into phenomena and noumena. Let Kant speak for himself.

If the assertion, that the understanding can employ its various principles and its various concepts solely in an empirical and never in a transcendental manner, is a proposition which can be known with certainty, it will yield important consequences. The transcendental employment of a concept in any principle is its application to things **in general and in themselves**; the empirical is its application **merely to appearances**; that is, to objects of a possible experience. That the latter application of concepts is alone feasible is evident from the following considerations. (259)

For Kant, the structure or categories of thought or consciousness is such that we are never able to perceive things-in-themselves or noumena. What we are capable of perceiving are appearances or phenomena, and this is so because by the rule of empiricity or experience, we can never get beyond the empirical or physical knowledge of things. Once more, we let Kant speak for himself:

Now the object cannot be given to a concept otherwise than in intuition; for though a pure intuition can indeed precede the object **a priori**, even this intuition can acquire its objects, and therefore objective validity, only through the empirical intuition of which it is the mere form. Therefore, all concepts, and with them all principles, even such as are possible **a priori**, relate to empirical intuitions, that is, to the data for a possible experience. Apart from this relation they have no objective validity, and in respect of representations are a mere play of imagination or of understanding. (259)

Kant’s assertion that the understanding or apperception, is *a priori* or ‘pre-experiential’ by nature, but is however, never able to get beyond the realm of experience or the intuited, is in agreement with his doctrine of epistemology. This position, no doubt, contradicts his doctrine of ontology and limits the imagination to the realm of experience alone.

But why is the understanding never able to get beyond the bounds of experience? Kant replies as follows:

This domain (the understanding) is an island, enclosed by nature itself within unalterable limits. It is the land of truth-enchanted name! – surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the native home of illusion, where many a fog bank and many a swiftly melting iceberg give the deceptive appearance of farther shores, deluding the adventurous seafarer ever anew with empty hopes, and engaging him in enterprises which he can never abandon and yet is unable to carry to completion (258).

Although the rules of the understanding are not only true *a priori*, they are the source of all truth, but only as they contain in themselves the ground for the possibility of experience viewed as the sum of all knowledge where in objects can be given to us. For whether as constituted *a priori* (i.e. as with the principles of mathematics), or as merely regulative (i.e. dynamical), the understanding is but a pure schema of possible experience. A power or function of the mind fortified by the synthetic unity of the imagination, a faculty of the mind which according to Kant, is under the guide of the understanding whose function is to harmonize appearances, that is to say, experiences as data readily stand *a priori* in relation to, and in agreement with, that synthetic unity (258).

Kant's bifurcation of reality into noumena (things-in-themselves) and phenomena (things as appearances) left his successors in disarray. This pandemonium sparked off by Kant led to the emergence of two antagonistic schools of thought; idealism, symbolized in Hegel and materialism, championed by Karl Marx. Both Hegel and Marx made evaluations of phenomena and tried to show that nothing like an unknowable realm exists.

In the opinion of Husserl, Kant starts too high a level since he ignores the life-world and the constitution of the life-world (Husserl, 1970, 103-123). The synthetic *a priori* principle whose possibility Kant seeks to explain is supposed to be the fundamental principles of natural science. But in Husserl, the concepts employed in the formulation of such knowledge refer back to experience of the life-world. So what is needed is first an account of the constitution of the life-world and its structures.

Transcendental Philosophy

In *The Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant carefully distinguishes four senses of metaphysics. The whole of the metaphysical system he says, "consists of four main parts: (1) ontology; (2) rational physiology; (3) rational cosmology; (4) and rational theology" (Kant, 1970, 662). But how did Kant arrive at these four categories of metaphysics? His categorization of metaphysics into four stems from his initial distinction between transcendental metaphysics (as ontology) and physiological metaphysics (as anthropology). Kant's view on this is very emphatic. He says,

Metaphysics, in the narrower meaning of the term, consists of **transcendental philosophy** and **physiology** of pure reason. The former treats only of the

understanding and of reason, in a system of concepts and principles which relate to objects that **may be given (ontologia)**; the latter treats of nature, that is, of the sum of **given** objects (whether given to the senses, or, if we will, to some kind of intuition) and is therefore **physiology**– although only **rationalis**. (662)

The distinction between **understanding** and **rationalis** marks the difference between metaphysics as ontology (or transcendental philosophy) and metaphysics as anthropology (or physiology). In Kant's view, transcendental philosophy or ontology concerns itself with the study of the structure of human consciousness which makes it possible for man to ontologize or metaphysicize. Anthropology or physiology so to speak, deals with the study of nature and the so many essences that constitute nature.

But how come that metaphysics could be anthropological or physiological? Kant replies that even that which has been designated metaphysical anthropology is in a way transcendental. It is at this realm or level of metaphysics that distinction is made between physics as the study of nature and metaphysics as the study of that which goes beyond the physical. Kant's view about this is clear;

The employment of reason in this rational study of nature is either physical or hyperphysical, or, in more adequate terms, is either **immanent** or **transcendent**. The former is concerned with such knowledge of nature as can be applied in experience (**in concreto**), the latter with the connection of objects of experience which transcends all experience. (662)

That which is immanent, deals with experience in general and consists of **physics or rational physics** (the metaphysics of corporeal nature) and both come under **rational physiology** which in turn consists of **physicarationalis** (i.e. mathematics, as distinct from the metaphysics of nature as **physicgeneralis**) and **psychologiarationalis**. On the other hand, **transcendent** physiology has as its objects either an "inner" connection or an "outer" connection, both, however, transcending possible experience. As dealing with an inner connection it is the physiology of nature as a whole, that is, the **transcendental knowledge of the world** (rational cosmology); and as dealing with an outer connection, it is the physiology of the relation of nature as a whole to a being above nature, that is to say, it is the **transcendental knowledge of God** otherwise known as rational theology (Kant, 1970, 662-663).

But whether as dealing with things immanent or things physiologically transcendent, metaphysical anthropology is basically a priori. Without the a priori categories of the understanding physical knowledge (a posteriority) of the world would be impossible. This being so, Kant concluded that the technical implication of the "architectonics of pure reason" is that ontological transcendental knowledge or transcendental metaphysics is the foundation of all forms of knowledge, be they physiological, cosmological or theological.

Husserl accuses Kant of not subjecting his transcendental philosophy to transcendental self-criticisms. According to him, we do not expect a natural scientist to be able to give an account of how natural-scientific knowledge is possible. If he or she should do so, it is not qua scientist

but qua philosopher. But we are right to expect a philosopher to be able to give an account of how philosophical knowledge is possible. That is simply because philosophy is essentially self-reflective. It does not raise, let alone answer, the prior question of how transcendental philosophy is possible (Husserl, 1999, 63).

It is important to note that, in spite of these criticisms; Husserl still regards himself as the heir to Kant's transcendental philosophy. If this assertion by Husserl is anything to go by, then there are two fundamental respects in which this can be questioned. Firstly, there is something essentially *Cartesian* about Husserl's conception of transcendental philosophy. Phenomenological reflection is a kind of purified introspection. It is purified in being carried out on the basis of phenomenological reduction, whereas "ordinary introspection takes place within the natural attitude and on the basis of the general thesis. This is something quite alien to Kant's conception of philosophy (Gorner, 504).

Secondly, Husserl's conception of the a priori is really quite different from that of Kant. Kant's synthetic a priori judgements are characterized by necessity and strict universality. The synthetic a priori transcendental principles have those characteristics by virtue of being conditions of the possibility of experience. Husserl also uses the notion of synthetic a priori judgements but his conception of such judgements involves something which is entirely alien to Kant namely the intuition of essences (Husserl, 1982, 43-44).

For Husserl, it is not only individuals but also universals which can be intuited. Every contingent something has an essence or "eidos". An individual object is not simply a "this, here", but also has an essential "what". Every specific sound, for example, has a universal essence "sound as such". Likewise, every material thing has its essence. At a higher level of generality there is the essence "material thing as such" and included in this, "temporal determination as such", "duration as such" and "materiality as such". Everything which belongs to the essence of an individual can also belong to another individual, and essences of the highest levels of generality demarcate "regions" or "categories" of individuals (Gorner, 505).

Edmund Husserl maintains that, every "what" of an individual can be separated from that individual and apprehended as an idea. Empirical or individual intuition can thus be converted into essential intuition, and what is then intuited is the pure essence or *eidōs*. The essence is a new kind of object, just as what is given in an individual or empirical intuition is an individual object, so what is given in essential intuition, is a pure essence. Husserl insists that the talk of intuition is genuinely intuition and the eidetic object is genuinely an object. Essential intuition is a mode of consciousness of something in which the object, the essence is itself given. The *eidōs*, the pure essence, can be intuitively exemplified in what is given in experience, in perception or memory, but it can equally well be exemplified in imagination. In order to apprehend an essence itself, we can start out from either corresponding experiential intuitions or non-experiential intuitions in which existence is not apprehended, that is to say from

intuitions in which something is merely imagined. For example, essences of spatial forms, melodies, social processes, acts of experience, pleasure, displeasure, or willing can be intuited on the basis of purely imagined instances of such things. The positing and intuitive apprehension of essences does not imply the slightest positing of any individual existence. Pure essential truths do not contain the least assertion about facts. Consequently, not even the most trivial factual truth can be inferred from them.

References

- Aderi, S. (2010). "Transcendental subject vs. empirical self: on Kant's account of subjectivity." *Filozofia*, 65 (3), 2-18.
- Gorner, P. (2006). "Phenomenological interpretations of Kant in Husserl and Heidegger." In G. Bird (Ed.), *A companion to Kant*. Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
- Heidegger, M. (1997). *Kant and the problem of Metaphysics*, Fifth Edition. Translated by Richard Taft. Indiana University Press.
- Husserl, E. (1970). *Crisis of European sciences and transcendental Phenomenology: an introduction to Phenomenology*. Translated by D. Carr. Northwestern University Press.
- Husserl, E. (1974). "Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy." *The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy*, 5 (3), 9-56.
- Husserl, E. (1982). *Ideas for a pure Phenomenology and phenomenological Philosophy*. Translated by W. Bernd. Martinus Nijhoff.
- Husserl, E. (1999). *Cartesian meditations: an introduction to Phenomenology*. Translated by D. Cairns. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Husserl, E. (2020). *First philosophy*. Edited by R. Boetin. Martinus Nijhoff.
- Kant, I. (2003). *Critique of pure reason*. Translated by J. Meiklejohn. Dover Publications Inc.
- Kant, I. (1983). *Prolegomena to any future Metaphysics that will be able to come forward as Science*. Translated by P. Carus, extensively revised by J. W. Ellington. Hackett Publishing Company.
- Kant, I. (1970). *Critique of pure reason*. Translated by K. Smith. Macmillan.
- Kern I. (1965). "Husserl and Kant." In R. Sokolowski (ed.), *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 26 (1), 1-32.