

AN APPRAISAL OF KWASI WIREDU'S CONCEPTUAL DECOLONIZATION

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Abstract

Kwasi Wiredu in his work Cultural Pluralism and Particulars advocates for conceptual decolonization. There are twin essential concepts in Wiredu's conceptual decolonization: negative and positive programmes. These, to him are two complementary ideas. In the negative sense, Wiredu's conceptual decolonization is the process that seeks to avoid and reverse "through a critical self-awareness the unexamined assimilation" in the thoughts of contemporary African philosophers those conceptual frameworks that are found in western or other philosophical cultures that have influenced African habits and thoughts. On the positive sense, it involves the exploitation of the enormous "resources" of African conceptual frameworks in philosophical exercises or reflections on all the fundamental and important issues of contemporary philosophy. Using the combined methods of exposition, thematic content analysis (TCA) and evaluation, this study aims to appraise Wiredu's conceptual decolonization. The study establishes that the negative programme of Wiredu's conceptual decolonization which enjoins African scholars to think effectively using African languages as proposed by him is almost impossible to apply. This is because, we are so globalized in such a way that our languages are heavily influenced by other cultures and languages that we cannot think in them effectively and so many ideas which are presumably thought to have African origins could have been adopted and adapted from other cultures but are termed Africans. The work proposes the application of Wiredu's positive programme through the critical assessment for reappropriation and incorporation of experiences, practices, beliefs, values, and ways of life of sub-Saharan Africans into African universities curriculum in general and philosophy in particular.

Keywords: Conceptual Decolonization, Negative Programme, Positive Programme, and universities Curriculum.

Introduction

According to Kwasi Wiredu, conceptual decolonization can be achieved through negative and positive programmes. Negative Programme of Conceptual Decolonization has to do with the act of either avoiding or reversing via “a critical conceptual self-awareness the unexamined assimilation in our thought (that is, in the thought of contemporary African philosophers) of the conceptual frameworks embedded in the foreign philosophical traditions that have had an impact on African life and thought”(Kwasi Wiredu, 33). On the Positive Programme of Conceptual Decolonization Wiredu subscribes to “exploring as much as judicious, the resources of our indigenous conceptual schemes in our philosophical meditations on even the most technical problems of contemporary philosophy”(Wiredu, 22). It is from the above views that the problems which this study seeks to address arose.

Wiredu asserts that there are three principle avenues through which the European categories of thought were superimposed on African thought systems – consequently has twisted our worldview; these avenues are as follows: language, politics and religion. According to him, they can be dislodged through what he refers to as conceptual decolonization of the African thought system. The problem which this study investigates is whether Wiredu’s conceptual decolonization can solve the problem of epistemic colonization in Africa. In order to determine this, the work explores the concept of conceptual decolonization, the three foreign categories of thoughts superimposed on African thoughts systems, and rethinking Wiredu’s conceptual decolonization and the need for a change in universities curriculum in Africa. Hence, let us take a look at what Wiredu means by conceptual decolonization.

Kwasi Wiredu on Conceptual Decolonization

For Wiredu, conceptual decolonization involves two vital but interconnected ideas: negative and positive programmes. Negative Programme of Conceptual Decolonization has to do with the act of either avoiding or reversing via “a critical conceptual self-awareness the unexamined assimilation in our thought (that is, in the thought of contemporary African philosophers) of the conceptual frameworks embedded in the foreign philosophical traditions that have had an impact on African life and thought”(Kwasi Wiredu, 136). On the positive programme of conceptual decolonization, Wiredu subscribes to “exploring as much as judicious, the resources of our indigenous conceptual schemes in our philosophical meditations on even the most technical problems of contemporary philosophy”(Wiredu, 136).

For Wiredu, the negative programme is only but a reverse of the positive. He chose to address the negative aspect before the positive side because the need for decolonization was brought about in Africa “in the first place by the historical superimposition of foreign categories of thought on African thought systems through colonialism”(Wiredu, 136). Furthermore, the negative programme demonstrates clearly the predicament which African philosophers and African philosophy are experiencing. This predicament in which Africans are experiencing has led

to the twist of the African worldview. The serious question is, how did the African thought system get distorted?

The Three Foreign Categories of Thought Superimposed on African Thoughts Systems

Wiredu holds that there are three principle avenues that the European categories of thoughts were superimposed on African thought systems which include the following: language, politics and religion. As regards language, he holds that our education in philosophy has been done in foreign languages of our colonizers. This for him is the basic “subtle, pervasive, and intractable circumstance of mental colonization”(Wiredu, 136). The two other ways in which the colonizers superimpose their categories of thoughts is through religion and politics. It is “through these have been passed to us legacies of long-standing religious evangelization, in the one case, and political tutelage in the other. These fundamentally left in Africa, certain historical legacies that tend in diverse ways, diminish the cultural values of Africa before the emergence of colonialism. Owing to the truth that when the language, religion and culture of a people are destroyed or taken away from them, such people are left without any value of self-worth or esteem. It is the impacts of these three historical issues that Wiredu makes efforts to address through his view on conceptual decolonization.

Wiredu on the Linguistic Situations

Wiredu further stressed on how language is a means of mental colonization by holding that the essential concepts ‘of philosophy are the most vital categories of human thought’ (Wiredu, 137). However the main forms of thoughts that brought about these concepts may demonstrate the particular traits “of the culture, environment, and even the accidental idiosyncrasies of the people concerned”(Wiredu, 137). In other words, Wiredu asserts that the specific patterns of thought that generate these concepts reveal the peculiarities of the culture, environment and also the accidental behaviours of the people that are involved. Thus, “conceptual idiosyncrasy, although an imponderable complication in human affair...”(Wiredu, 137), may in diverse ways be the core reason for the differences and disparities that are contained and inherent in various “philosophical traditions, especially the ones in which individual technical philosophers are deeply implicated”(Wiredu, 137). Wiredu suggests to the contemporary African philosophers to reflect then on the “possible enormity of the avoidable philosophical deadwood we might be carrying through our historically enforced acquisition of philosophical training in the medium of foreign languages”(Wiredu, 137). By implication, this weight of “philosophical deadwood”(Wiredu, 137) would have been avoidable if only contemporary philosophers were trained through the medium of their own native languages. One is forced to ask the following questions: is this situation common to only Africa? How is this possible in a multi-lingual African society? Can Africa pay for the retraining exercise that could help in conceptual decolonization? To Wiredu, the response to these questions is in the negative. This assertion

can be seen in his argument that the “historical inheritance” of every society or culture influences their philosophical thought. He further states that evidence of this “historical inheritance” can be seen even in contemporary western philosophy. However, to him, the situation appears worst in Africa as can be seen in “our situation of cultural otherness, for even ordinary common sense would depreciate needlessly carrying other people garbage”(Wiredu, 137). The following concepts are what Wiredu points out:

Reality, Being, Existence, Thing, Object, Entity, Substance, Prosperity, Quality, Truth, Fact, Opinion, Belief, Knowledge, Faith, Doubt, Certainty, Statement, Proposition, Sentence, Idea, Mind, Soul, Spirit, Thought, Sensation, Matter, Ego, Self, Person, Individuality, Community, Subjectivity, Objectivity, Cause, Chance, Reason, Explanation, Meaning, Freedom, Responsibility, Punishment, Democracy, Justice, God, World, Universe, Nature, Supernature, Space, Time, Nothingness, Creation, Life, Death, Afterlife, Morality, Religion. (Wiredu, 137)

With regard to these aforementioned concepts, the easy way for decolonization to take place for the African is to “try to think them through in your own African language and, on the basis of the results, review the intelligibility of the associated problems or the plausibility of the apparent solutions that have tempted you when you have pondered them in some metropolitan language. The propositions in question may be about the internalities of an African thought system” (Wiredu, 137). For Wiredu, Africans can only establish modern African philosophy that depicts African worldview, by undertaking conceptual decolonization.

The issue of language as presented by Wiredu in his project of Conceptual Decolonization tends to establish the fact that everyone thinks in the language of his/her education. The implication of this is that for contemporary African philosophers to think in English or French which is their language(s) of education there could have been a great difference if this was done with indigenous African language. However, to Wiredu, recourse to “African vernacular” will not lead to “instantaneous philosophic revelation”(Wiredu, 138).

Furthermore, Wiredu asserts that Africans should take into serious consideration wealth of knowledge found in our culture and belief system and utilize these resources in doing philosophy in order to bring out the genuine interpretation of the African conceptual system(Wiredu, 137). Reacting to Wiredu’s view of conceptual decolonization Balogun noted:

The two conceptions of conceptual decolonisation given above are interrelated and complementary of each other. They involve the “comparative utilisation of different languages in philosophical thinking” (WIREDU 1991, 81) intending to guarding against and freeing philosophical thinking in Africa from the entanglements imposed on it by the uncritical assimilation by African scholars of alien conceptual Scheme. (Oladele Balogun A., 277)

From the excerpt above, it is obvious that Wiredu's focus is that African philosophers should bring Western categories to systematic and critical examination. That is, African scholars should decolonize concepts such as morality, evil, spirit, person, mind, and Gods knowledge. Oladipo expresses it thus: "the African must direct his thought of all modes of conceptualization emanating from the colonial past that cannot stand the task of due reflection"(Olusegun T. Oladipo, 16).

Legacies of Religious Evangelism and Political Tutelage

It is clear that Africa has experienced serious anguish and suffering from the political legacies of colonialism. Sadly, Africa continues to suffer directly or indirectly, from the political teaching of the West. There are several causes to this, which according to Wiredu is not always of African making. Among the causes is the obvious suspension of belief in African political traditions on the part of many contemporary African leaders of opinion. He avers that, after several years of being subjected to the one party dictatorship in Africa, there is now visible happiness among many African intellectuals and politicians for multi-party democracy. Furthermore, there is little sign in African intellectual circles, of a critical examination of the particular doctrine of democracy involved in the multi-party approach to government. For Wiredu, this approach or political doctrine appears to be clearly against the philosophy of government that is foundational to traditional statecraft (Wiredu, 143).

According to Wiredu, the lesson that is learnable from the traditional philosophy of government that might be of importance to the modern quest for democracy is that, there is a certain unity of approach among huge number of Africans based on archeological evidence. The unity has to do with the insistence on consensus as the standard of political decision-making. For Wiredu, this decision-making is different "from that which makes the will of majority, by and large, decisive. Since majorities are easier to come by than consensus, it must be assumed that decided preference for consensus was a deliberate transcending of majoritarianism"(Wiredu, 143). He stresses that

It was not an unreflecting preference; it can be shown to have been based on reflection on first principles. The most fundamental of these principles may be stated as follows: in any council of representatives-traditional councils usually consisted of representatives elected by kinship units-the representative status of a member is rendered vacuous in any decision in which s/he does not have an impact or an right of the representative, and through him, of his consistency to be represented in the making of a decision that affects their interests (broadly construed). (Wiredu, 143)

Furthermore, there are issues of the legacies of religious evangelism and political tutelage of the West. These legacies to Wiredu have brought to Africa enormous sufferings and historical distortions so, there is the need for conceptual decolonization. But the questions here are; what are the problems of religion and politics? Are these problems created by the West? Wiredu did

not tell us in concrete terms the sufferings and the nature of religion and politics that generate these sufferings and how conceptual decolonization could help in salvaging the situation especially within the context of globalization which is a reality of the contemporary world and Africa. “Majoritarian democracy” based on Wiredu’s conceptual decolonization is a problem because it tends to render the view of the minority ineffectual (Wiredu, 143). But the pertinent questions here could be; does democracy have any value? What is the place of democracy in a globalized world in which Africa is included? A search for a reflective and validly satisfactory answer will certainly reveal that Wiredu’s conceptual decolonization is a disjointed philosophical discourse that is grossly deficient in logic and validity. It is an idea that needs a thorough systematic rethink for logic and epistemic direction especially within the existential necessity of globalization.

Rethinking Wiredu’s Conceptual Decolonization and the Need for a Change in Universities Curriculum in Africa

Wiredu’s conceptual decolonization has two programmes: the negative and positive programmes. The negative programme is the process that seeks to avoid and reverse “through a critical self-awareness the unexamined assimilation” in the thoughts of African philosophers those conceptual frameworks that are found in western or other philosophical cultures that have influenced African habits, and thought system. His positive programme has to do with the judicious exploitation of the enormous “resources” of African conceptual frameworks in philosophical exercises or reflections. These programmes show that Wiredu’s conceptual decolonization is based on historical impacts of colonialism on African systems and Africans themselves – ranging from education, politics, religion, science, technology, language, and ways of thinking. For him, the two programmes which he put out will help to conceptually decolonize the minds of African scholars if properly applied. Hence, we will evaluate the veracity and applicability of his claim below.

Positive Aspects of Wiredu’s Conceptual Decolonization

Conceptual decolonization promotes the growth and sustenance of local languages. It promotes intercultural studies and research. It enhances epistemic freedom. It helps for the growth and use of indigenous ideas that are capable of bringing about growth and development in every area of the Africans. According to Balogun, Wiredu’s need for conceptual decolonization is because of the following benefits: Conceptual decolonization is essential as it has the benefit of advancing cross-cultural understanding in African philosophical studies. It is promoting the search for African intellectual identities as if able to advance various cultural foundations of philosophical ideas and thoughts. Decolonization research can intimate how African beliefs can help in dealing with some basic contemporary challenges in our triple-heritage culture (Oladele Balogun A., 278).

As regards the issue of language situation, Wiredu holds that “by definition, the fundamental concepts of philosophy are the most fundamental categories of human thought. But the particular modes of thought that yield these concepts may reflect the specifics of the culture, environment and even the accidental idiosyncrasies of the people concerned”(Wiredu, 136). This puts us in weak situation to carry other peoples’ baggage as far as we are imprisoned to the concepts their linguistic and other cultural conventions promote. The advice of Wiredu at this juncture is very important. According to Olufemi Taiwo, “One cannot overemphasize the importance of heeding Wiredu’s wisdom in this respect. For example, many have argued that the reason for the repeated failure of liberal representative democracy to take root in Africa is, in part, the alienness of its package of ideas, institutions, practices, and processes”(Olufemi Taiwo, 135–159).

Inherent Limitations in Wiredu’s Conceptual Decolonization

Let us look at Wiredu’s claim that “the simple recipe for decolonization for the African is: Try to think them [concepts like reality, being, meaning, freedom, etc.] through in your own African language and, on the basis of the results, review the intelligibility of the associated problems or the plausibility of the apparent solutions that have tempted you when you have pondered them in some metropolitan language” (Wiredu, 137).

Wiredu’s simple injunction — think through in your own African language—is teeming with assumptions that are not always, or for the most part, plausible. Let us explore this passage. Wiredu assumes that his audience is bilingual, minimally speaking—possessed of an African language and a colonially-imposed one, say, English. But given how the scenario is designed, the colonial language is the primary language, the one that triggers thought and in which thought is originally formulated. This is where the problem begins. The thinker here is supposed to “think through in her own language” the relevant concepts (Olufemi Taiwo, 135–159). “Why wait to be prompted in the colonial language? Why not proceed to think through the concepts in your primary African language in exactly the way, I believe, that a Chinese or Portuguese thinker will do in similar situations?” (Taiwo, 135–159). According to Taiwo, the answer to this question for Wiredu would be that we have divided ourselves from “belief in our languages” and welcomed instead the colonial ones (Taiwo, 135–159). He further stresses that:

If this is true, then it is problematic to assume that those who have been thus separated from their languages could summon, without more, the requisite facility and grounding in those languages of the recondite thinking that we associate with philosophy and other advanced modes of intellection. If what I say is plausible, then Wiredu’s facile recommendation is neither easy to indulge nor likely to be productive of exactly the kinds of insights that theoretical explorations are designed to elicit(Taiwo, 135–159).

This is where we must begin to acknowledge the sad fact that where unclear intellectual activity is concerned, many African scholars are not bilingual in the important sense. Our languages are already afflicted with a severe case of fossilization that continues to escape our attention. Few of us can think in “our own African languages” deep thought respecting many of those concepts in Wiredu’s list. No whit of this affliction is removed by our repeated declamations to decolonize our intellectual production. Yes, we deploy our languages for colloquial, quotidian purposes. This misleadingly makes us think that our facility at this level and versatility in everyday exchanges amount to an easy shifting of gears from here to theoretical or philosophical discourse. It takes only a little bit of attention to realize that this is a mistaken assumption. The upshot is that there is little, if any, indigenous little known intellection in many of our original languages, especially where research and knowledge production presented by our tertiary institutions are concerned (Taiwo, 26).

According to Olufemi Taiwo, “what we have mostly is equivalence-ism where many labour to find equivalents in our original languages for the concepts that we encounter in the metalanguages furnished by the colonial languages. To limit myself to the Yorùbá that I know intimately, the original work being done at a higher level takes place in Sociology, Art History, Language and Literature, and Linguistics” (Taiwo, 135–159). It may not be what Wiredu intended but it is what dominates much writing in academic and professional African philosophy. Words are routinely pulled out of their semantic and hermeneutic contexts and made to stand as equivalents for concepts taken from elsewhere. There hardly is any effort at sustained analyses wholly or even mostly in our original language. To the extent that this is the case, the promise of decolonization in the sphere of language may have been oversold (Taiwo, 26).

Clearly, the African historical colonial heritage is a major factor limiting the implementation of Wiredu’s conceptual decolonization in African philosophy. Also, the cultural contact of Africa with colonialism and other foreign influences through globalization led to a forced acculturation that has rendered the rich cultural heritage of Africa comatose, and left it in a precarious situation of existential eclipse or extinction. This is made more effectual by the globalized and foreign educational system that produced contemporary African philosophers including even Wiredu. In the twenty-first century, where the world is so fused together through technological innovativeness that promotes integration, interdependence, inter-culturalism through globalization, Wiredu’s conceptual decolonization that merely seeks to isolate Africa and Africans cannot afford the cost of being localized and seen to be championing racialization of her thought processes when the world is coming together as a “global village” for the existential benefits and social ethics of mankind. Since doing philosophy in our local languages seems not possible let us rethink Wiredu’s conceptual decolonization as a way for effective decolonization.

Rethinking Conceptual Decolonization: The Need for Decolonization of University Curriculum in Africa

In Wiredu's positive programme of conceptual decolonization he encourages African scholars to make judicious exploitation of the enormous "resources" of African conceptual frameworks in philosophical exercises or reflections. This work holds that it will be effectively achieved through decolonizing universities curriculum in Africa. According to Edwin Etieyibo, decolonizing universities curriculum in Africa entails transforming the curriculum through "the appropriation, adoption and incorporation into the curriculum the experiences, practices, beliefs, values, and ways of life of sub-Saharan Africans" (Edwin Etieyibo, 405). However, the appropriation and adoption of African experiences, values and ways of life without proper and critical reexamination of such experiences and values of life of Africans will be tantamount to revival of the traditional knowledge. I think what is best for the decolonization of the universities curriculum is the critical assessment for reappropriation and incorporation of experiences, practices, beliefs, values, and ways of life of sub-Saharan Africans into African universities curriculum in general and philosophy in particular. It is this that will engender knowledge diversity and guarantee intellectual freedom from the colonizer. By implication, it will address "cognitive justice and it is all about the right to think, theorize, interpret the world, develop own methodologies and write from where one is located and unencumbered by Eurocentrism" (Ndlov-Gatsheni, 3). This is what will create a veritable platform for the realization of Wiredu's positive programme which involves the judicious exploitation of the enormous "resources" of African conceptual frameworks in philosophical exercises or reflections.

Grounds for Decolonizing Philosophy Curriculum in African Universities

There are four basic rationales for the decolonization of the universities curriculum and these rationales are as follows: epistemic ground holds that through colonialism African knowledge production system was silenced. This oppression of other epistemic perspectives as no-knowledge can be restored through the transformation of universities curriculum in Africa in order to create room for diversity of knowledge production. Based on ontological ground, Africans have been categorized and classified as sub-humans who are incapable of thinking and that was an agenda orchestrated by the Europeans in order to dominate Africans through colonialism, neocolonialism and imperialism. Hence, for there to be change to this narrative, healing and restoration of the African identity, creating room for the reappropriation of African values, experiences, beliefs and knowledge systems in universities curriculum in Africa is a sure way to go. As regards conceptual ground, Wiredu argues that colonialism suppressed African ways of thinking by making Africans to learn, speak and think through foreign languages thereby abandoning the philosophical suggestiveness that lie hidden in African languages. On this note, it is conceptually imperative to decolonize conceptually the African universities curriculum using the positive programme of Wiredu. His positive programme involves exploiting as much as possible the resources of our own indigenous conceptual

schemes (Wiredu, 136) and the best way to do that is through the redesign of African universities curriculum. Finally, on moral ground, Africans have suffered in all aspects of their lives: economically, epistemically, and ontologically as a result of coloniality, hence, it is morally imperative for a redress. And this redress can best be achieved through the epistemic transformation of universities curriculum in Africa in order to help create an autonomous space for Africans to think and theorize freely. At this juncture, let us look at the usefulness of Fricker's epistemic injustice to the decolonization of African universities curriculum. What is Fricker's epistemic injustice?

Miranda Fricker on Epistemic Injustice

In *Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing*, Fricker discusses the connection that exist between ethics and epistemology by identifying the ethical facet of our epistemic activities. With this she was able to move our attention to injustice instead of justice. It is based on this comes the idea of epistemic injustice. The nitty-gritty of her argument is that there exist epistemic kinds of injustice whereby a person can be wronged in virtue of their status as a knower or knowing subject. Fricker presents in her book two kinds of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. For Fricker, apart from social or political injustices suffered by women and other minority groups in the society, these persons also go through testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. These two forms of injustice demonstrate some kind of prejudices which according to Fricker (whose overarching interest is to propose a virtue epistemological account of knowledge, particularly testimony), the best way of addressing these prejudices is by taking up some ethical-intellectual virtues.

With regard to testimonial injustice, the prejudices demonstrated have to do with a case where a person gives "a deflated level of credibility to a speaker's word" (Miranda Fricker, 1). Fricker gives an instance of a woman at a business meeting who was not believed or was taken less believable due to the fact that she is a female gender or woman. The reason this constitutes a form of injustice is that it is motivated by a gender based prejudice. Notwithstanding the fact that she may make a good argument at the meeting, her listeners do not take her to be sincere and her arguments to be believable. Hence, there may be an injustice resulting from that in the sense that, as the speaker or testifier, she could be missing out on a reward or promotion at work. This form of injustice is basically the type theories of social justice focus on. However, she also suffers testimonial injustice, that is, she is "wronged specifically in her capacity as a knower"(Fricker, 1).

As regards hermeneutical injustice, this kind of injustice is one faced by individuals and minority groups who do not have the common linguistic tools to make sense of their specific experiences. Apart from the fact these individuals are excluded from the sphere of meaning-making, they might be less inspired to believe their own testimony in the same way other people are less predisposed to believe in their testimony. Fricker's instance above was to emphasize the kind of injustice in the late 1960s of a woman who went to a meeting and the aim of the

meeting was to have a discussion on post-partum depression. It is obviously that as at this period there was no linguistic tool that can be used to share or understand the experience of post-partum depression. Put differently, due to the non-availability of the common linguistic tool that people who suffer from post-partum depression can utilize to express their very own experiences in ways that will be meaningful to others; their testimony about their experiences is not accepted or believed. Sometimes they can be referred to as liars or “mentally disturbed”. For Fricker, this is a form of injustice, though not the form of injustice that theories of social justice focus on; instead it is an epistemic type of injustice.

Hermeneutical injustice and the need to decolonize Philosophy Curriculum in African Universities

Previously, we depicted hermeneutical injustice as a situation whereby an individual is undermined in his or her effort to make sense of the world owing to power relations and structural prejudice. In the same vein, if we take a broad view of this form of injustice in the case of the obligation to decolonize the philosophy curriculum, a non-decolonized philosophy curriculum undermines the autonomy and capacity of Africans to make meaning of the world owing to some power relations and structural prejudice as regards knowledge production and its exclusion from the philosophy curriculum. Taking into consideration the fact that to undermine the capacity of Africans to make meaning of the world owing to power relations and structural prejudice weakens their autonomy, it will be essential that we decolonize the philosophy curriculum. Thus, a decolonized philosophy curriculum in universities in Africa would be one that will promote the natural right of an individual as an independent being. In other words, it gives Africans the resources with which they can make and contribute to meaning-making in the world.

Testimonial Injustice and Knowledge Diversity as Rationale for Decolonizing Philosophy Curriculum in African Universities

Let us reiterate the point that testimonial injustice is that that has to do with the prejudice that makes a listener to give less relevance to a speaker's testimony. Put differently, it is a situation whereby a listener it gives a deflated level of credibility to a speaker's word. In the same vein, if we take a broad view of this form of injustice in the case of non-decolonized philosophy curriculum on the ground of certain prejudice is one that consequently comes about when a deflated level of credibility is attached to the perspectives of Africans. This discourages diversity and plurality of knowledge and perspectives. If this is valid, thus, our duty to decolonize the philosophy curriculum comes from the fact that inability to achieve that commits testimonial injustice against Africans. It is ethically wrong because it does support or promote diversity of knowledge. By depriving, undermining and excluding Africans from contributing their own perspectives and understanding of the world to enrich the wealth of knowledge in the world in turn deprives Africa and the world certain relevant knowledge that could help to drive development both within Africa and outside Africa. In fact, we deprive, exclude and undermine these perspectives when we do not decolonize philosophy curriculum.

Conclusion

We have argued here that Wiredu's positive programme of conceptual decolonization where he encourages African scholars to make judicious exploitation of the enormous "resources" of African conceptual frameworks in philosophical exercises or reflections can be effectively achieved through decolonizing universities curriculum in general and philosophy curriculum in particular in Africa. It is when this is done that African scholars can leverage on it to come up with novel research questions, teach undergraduates based on the new curriculum, engage in constant and free debates among themselves and achieve good researches that will not only help the development of Africa politically, economically and epistemically but the world at large.

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