

RETHINKING THE METAPHYSICS OF ACT AND POTENCY IN BEING

Anthony Ifechukwude AKALUE

*Department of Philosophy, Seminary of All Saints,
Uhiele-Ekpoma
ifechukwuderev@yahoo.com*

Abstract

This paper centers on the basic principle of being. Every being is seen to be in potency before it becomes an act. The paper argues that the notion of act and potency is both intrinsic and extrinsic judging from the principles of causality and motion. This is because every being that is said to exist, has a cause and this cause, produces its corresponding effect. Thanks to the efficient cause that determines the final cause of a being. The same is true of the notion of change and motion in being. This paper further argues that what is understood as potency is the gathering together of different acts while what is understood as an act, is the combination of different actualities. This necessitated the introduction of two operational terms 'Loosed' and the 'Strict' act. The method to be adopted in this work is analytic, speculative, and prescriptive.

Keywords: Act, Being, Change, Causality, Loosed Act, Motion, Potency, Strict Act.

Introduction: Background to the Nature of Being in the Universe

The notion of 'Being' has led to different arguments about the status of the universe. This is the contention between radical monism and radical pluralism. Where the monists, on the one

hand, claim that all beings are one, pluralists, on the other hand, argue for a multiplicity of Being. Dun Scotus, a monist, made a defense of this in his ‘univocity of Being’. For him, there is a single unified notion of being that applies to substance and accident as well as to the supreme being and creatures which serves to ground metaphysics as a science of being”.¹

However, radical pluralist holds that no being can be said to be of the same nature as another being since they are completely different from one another. This prompted William James, the American pragmatist philosopher to advocate for a change of the term *universe* (considering everything as one substance) to *pluriverse*² (understanding reality from its different aspects).

Other philosophers held that there is nothing in existence. They are known as voidists. Voidism holds that consciousness in existence is an illusion and that there are no gods, no morality, and as such nothing exists. The term nihilism already implies this sense of ‘nothingness’ but philosophers try to look for a deeper one that connotes ‘emptiness’ thus they use the phrase ‘null’ and ‘void’ to form a theory called voidism³. Hegel fell into this error when he advocated for a kind of nothingness in existence. For him, ‘Being is nothing’⁴ So why some scholars argue for plurality and unity, some others argue for a sense of nothingness and emptiness in existence. However, a defence of the notion of being in the universe is acclaimed by numerous philosophers. The term ‘being’ is applied to everything that is or can be, even to possibilities, for whatever is *nothing*, is being. (if we can’t say ‘being’, we can only say ‘nothing’). Being, then, is something that belongs to all things. Yet one being is not another being, nor one way of being another way of being. This means that whatever is seen in reality is a being and since it is being, it is *nothing*. For that which is *nothing*, is a being. However, in the notion of being, there is the idea of *sameness* and *difference*. This is because the way a stone is a being is different from the way God is a being. The way man is a being is different from the way a chair is a being. But one common thing is that they are all being yet in different degrees judging from the reality of act and potency.

The question of being is the *loci* and *foci* of metaphysical discourse. This is evident in the different conceptual analysis that is inherent in the said discipline. Since these conceptual analyses

are tailored to the perennial problem of philosophy, efforts to resolve them have burdened philosophers right from the pre-Socratic era to this era. Of notable conceptual analysis of being are act and potency. This is so because every being that exists is caused to exist; this cause of existence is enveloped with some processes; that is, from stage to stage. The process takes for a thing to be what it is intended to be is known as potency; while its final shape is known as act.

Be that as it may, one must know that it is possible for that which is already in act, to be the potency of another thing. In other words, the actuality of one being can be the potentiality of another being. Just like the effect of a cause can be the cause of another effect. With this in mind, the need to rethink the act and potency theory becomes necessary. This will see to the introduction of two operational terms as the work progresses. These operational terms are *loose actuality* and *strict actuality*. This is because it is observed that what we call potency is the putting together of beings already in actuality to attain an actuality that will in turn be a potency of another being. Given that this current philosophical trend might cause disagreement among scholars, the questions to be asked are: what then is act and potency? Is it possible that the actuality of a particular being becomes a potentiality of another being? Is it possible that an actuality in being is a combination of other actualities? If this were so, are we ruling out the idea of potency in being? If we say, actuality is a combination of actuality, does it mean that the Necessary Being (that is an uncaused cause) is a combination of actualities? Questions like these loom large but their answers are inevitable.

This work will take a tripod perspective. The tripod approach will take the following sequence: 1) The meaning of Act and Potency and its origin. This will help in bringing out the idea of how beings came to be (2) The Act and potency theory from its intrinsic and extrinsic nature. This will spell out the notion of change and causality in the act and potency theory. (3) Theorizing of *the strict* and *loosed* actuality; this will form the evaluation of the work thereafter, a conclusion.

Act and Potency: Meaning and Origin

The notion of act and potency are concepts (like every other metaphysical concept) used in relation to the study of ‘being’. They both describe the way and manner in which a being came ‘to be’. Etymologically speaking, ‘Act’ is what Aristotle describes as “*energia*” (from *en ergon*) meaning *work*; or better still as it relates to its metaphysical relation “*entelecheia* (from *en telos echein*) which means *to achieve the end*”⁵. This simply means that *act* has to do with the *result of being*. In other words, it means something in its complete state which can further be referred to as a being in its perfect state. A close look at the nature of being shows the reality of it being formed in stages. Why the different stages of growth are known as potency, the completion of the end of the work is called, *act*.

However, it must be noted that it is almost impossible to talk about act in isolation without reference to potency. This means that in talking about the act of a being, one must lay claim to potency whether directly or indirectly. This explains why in telling the meaning of Act, Aristotle laid claim to potency. He says thus “act is that which makes a thing be, but not in the same way as it is when it is in potency”⁶ this, therefore, means that a discussion on the nature of act must be in its relationship to potency. Here, Aristotle made it clear that a being in act is different from when it is in potency. This further confirms that act is always discussed in relation to potency and vice versa.

One truth about the act principle is the constant attachment to the reality of motion. This is because act is seen as the realization of a motion. In other words, for a being to get to the stage of perfection (act), it must have undergone several processes. This is where Aristotle’s “*enteleccheia*” comes to play as the perfection or fulfillment of a being that was once in potency to an actuality state.

Sylvester Enomah holds that act can be seen from two perspectives. Firstly, it can be seen as an *operation*, and secondly, it can be seen as a *form*⁷. This means that act is first and foremost attributed to action and secondly attributed to form because the form is the principle of action; form is the active principle of being.

Since there cannot be a talk of an act without reference to potency, the question now is, what is potency? R. Philips says the

word *potency* is derived from the verb *pose* which means “power to be or to become”⁸. Potency evokes a being that has the power to become something although it has not yet attained its end. This is because among beings we can conceive of some that can exist, although they do not do so at the moment. This is where potency can be seen as the aptitude for something, as R. Philips went on to say “in general, potency is understood to mean the principle of, or aptitude for, receiving or doing anything, or more precisely, the principle of action or passion”⁹. Celestine Brittle captures this ‘aptitudinal’ tendency of potency when he writes:

{potency} is the capacity or aptitude for something. It is correlative to act. Potency is always the capacity or aptitude in reference to something which a being is not or has not, but which it can be or can receive. Any being, in so far as it has not yet received a certain act or perfection, but is capable of receiving it, is said to be in potency for this act.”¹⁰

Celestine Brittle also furthers the argument that just as you cannot talk of act without potency, so also, you cannot talk of potency without reference to act. Potency, as Brittle puts it is geared towards an end (act) this is because being is act; this is so because any being that is yet to attain certain perfection but is said to be capable of receiving it, is in the potency of becoming an act.

Paul Gerrald Harrington, R. Philips, Timon Cline, and a host of others hold that potency is divided into two. *Active potency* and *passive potency*. While active potency, on the one hand, has to do with the capacity to communicate perfection, passive potency, on the other hand, is the capacity to receive perfection. R. Philips captures it thus “real potency may be either active or passive according to its capacity for action,(active) or for receiving action (passive).”¹¹ This distinction of potency is without prejudice to other types of potency as espoused by other philosophers.

The doctrine of act and potency is said to have its origin in the works of Aristotle which were sternly upheld by Thomas Aquinas. Polskie Akwinu calls them the “theoreticians of act and potency”¹². It was said that Aristotle developed the theory in his dialogues with Plato and his precursors. Aristotle’s idea of act and potency is seen to be a breakthrough in the understanding of the workings

and formulations of reality. This is because his precursors like Thales, Anaximenes, Anaximander, and other mythologists of the ancient era focused on a one-sided notion of reality in which they attached material elements (material monism) as the basic substratum of reality. In other words, the earliest philosophers in wanting to know about the origin of reality focused on the material elements which can be said to be either subject to change or not. This was the contention of Heraclitus and Parmenides.

Parmenides and other Eleatic philosophers hold that the idea of change is impossible in that the idea of change would depict that being emanated from non-being and as it were, non-being is nothing and something cannot come out of from nothing, so change is impossible.¹³ This Parmenidean view was seen as an extreme position which Heraclitus tries to correct with the prevailing circumstance of being. For him, (Heraclitus), permanence cannot be attained in reality. This is because being is constantly becoming and as a result, has no form of stability but is in flux¹⁴. This Heraclitian view is also seen as another extreme. Aristotle saw both views as an affront to the despicable nature of being and as a result, he brought into a formidable synthesis the views of Heraclitus and Parmenides in the theory of *accidental* and *substantial change*. Aristotle argues that “whilst being certainly cannot arise from nothing, change was not beings springing out of non-being (substantial change), but rather one sort of being arising out of another sort of being (accidental change).”¹⁵ This means that the fact that a being change does not mean that it will amount to nothing but that being has only transcended one being to another form of being and as such, it is possible to have some sense of stability and permanence in being when such a being is in act as against its potential state.

Thomas Aquinas who is known as one of the greatest philosophers in the scholastic period adopted this view of his master, Aristotle. There is no doubt that other scholars in the scholastic era like Dun Scotus and F. Suarez tried to adopt this Aristotelian teaching but ended up adulterating it. Thomas Aquinas, an unrepentant Aristotelian used the principle of act and potency to explain the notion of essence and existence in being thereby preserving Aristotle’s theory in its purest form. Dun Scotus on his part expanded this structure by introducing a

midway theory between act and potency which he called ‘virtual act’. Here, he meant to use it to challenge the distinction between the moved and the mover¹⁶ While F. Suarez on his part conceives potency as an *actus imperfectus* (imperfect act)¹⁷. This is what he used to describe beings that are yet to assume their perfect state.

This doctrine does not feature more in the modern and the contemporary era with the emergence of idealism and empiricism as philosophical trends. This is where philosophers focused more on the existence and the essence of being rather than its potentiality or actuality. It is the era where the *quiddity* and the *ousiology* of Aristotle were further explicated. The likes of Jean Paul Sartre, Martin Heidegger, Soren Kierkegaard, Edmund Husserl, Franz Brentano are proponents of this philosophical tradition.

Conclusively, what is meant by act and potency relates to states of being. As Cline notes that “there is being-in-act, that is, the way a thing is, and there is being-in-potency, that is, the way a thing could potentially be”. However, as the work progresses, the term act may be used interchangeably with *actuality* and the term *potency* may be used interchangeably with *potentiality* depending on the context in which they will be used.

It is important to note at this juncture that the notion of act and potency in being has both extrinsic and intrinsic nature. This is where the notion of causality and change becomes paramount in this discussion on the act and potency. While the extrinsic has to do with the notion of causality, the intrinsic nature has to do with the notion of change and motion as the case may be.

Act and Potency in the Context of Causality: The Extrinsic Nature of Being

The nature of being as discussed by the earliest philosophers is anything that exists. Hence it is said that ‘being is’. This being is said to be transcendental or conceptual, necessary and contingent. Now the fact that every being is, means that it is caused. The fact of causality holds a premium in the conceptual analysis of being. Thus the Latin expression: *Omnis effectus causam habet* (Every effect has a cause). Every being that is caused has its corresponding effect. Philosophical speculation in the classical era lays credence to this where Thales for instance, sees water as the cause of all beings; Anaximenes holds that air is the cause of everything in reality.¹⁸

Anaximander unlike Thales and Anaximenes took a step further when he brought about his principle of *aperion* as the one who is the chief cause to other inferior causes like water and fish and men. Dario Composta captures this argument thus:

(Anaximander) admitted that from the mire come fish and from the fish come, men, through evolution. In this fashion he seemed to state that the inferior principle (water) produces partial effects ... therefore, a supreme principle is necessary, one distinct from inferior causes and effects. But what is this supreme principle called to 'aperion'? Anaximander (says) it is primordial, divine ... an absolute justice which attributes a just recompense to inferior causes and effects.¹⁹

The point to be noted is that the idea of causality dates as far back as the presocratic era with the distinction between inferior cause and a superior cause. Although philosophers in that era fail to agree on which is more superior, one underlining truth is that for a being to exist, it must be caused except those which constitute the *basic substractum* of reality.

Aristotle was one philosopher who brought this principle of causality to the limelight in his physic and first philosophy. This is evident in his theory of motion where compartmentalization of the four causes was made. They are the material, formal, efficient, and final causes²⁰ the *material cause*; this is the stuff from which a thing is made; the *formal cause*, this has to do with the shape or the form which a being takes; the *efficient cause* is the agent that is responsible for bringing a being into existence; and the *final cause*, which has to do with the purpose for which a thing is made. The account of the four causes is general in the sense that it applies to every being that requires an explanation.

An important truth about the notion of causality is that an effect of a cause can be the cause of another thing that will produce an effect. This continues until it gets to the Necessary Being that most philosophers have called the 'Uncaused caused'. This is because it is a being that caused every other being to be, yet it is uncaused. This is the foundation from which the task of this work was taken. This will be well explicated when the call for a

rethinking of the act and potency theory will be examined vis-à-vis the principle of change and causality.

Now, the extrinsic notion of the act and potency theory is centered on viewing being from the outside. This is where the principle of causality holds its strength. Now of the four causes of Aristotle, two (2) will help in buttressing this extrinsic notion of the act and potency theory. They are the *efficient cause* and the *final cause*. This is so because there is a being from outside who is responsible for bringing into being from the state of potency to actuality. This is because a particular being cannot realize its potency to actuality without the aid of something outside of it; that is, the efficient cause. Now, the shape which the being takes becomes a final cause. This also has an outsider's perspective becomes it is viewed from the outside of the being itself. Daniel Sullivan captures this extrinsic notion of act and potency in the efficient and final cause when he argues:

... therefore we have to look outside the thing for further explanations of change. This is found in the efficient and final causes, which are called the extrinsic principles of change. The efficient cause is the action from a being outside (that is), the first cause in the order of existence which communicates to the thing acted on the perfection which was there in potency only. The final cause is the reason why an action is initiated (that is) the first cause in the order of intention.²¹

Looking at how the efficient cause has held supreme in the extrinsic perspective of act and potency, some might ask why the material and formal cause are not taken into consideration here. The answer is not far-fetched. It is the efficient cause that determines the form the material cause will take. The efficient cause is held premium here because it is the first cause in the order of existence. This is true on the ground that the beginning and origins of existence and all it contains show the activity of an agent (efficient cause) that made everything possible to exist. Dario Composta captures this primacy of the efficient cause when he states “the efficient cause transmits its act to what is passive (hence the famous expression, ‘man generates man’) ... However, in general, the efficient cause which produces the form also

determines the end”.²² Evident here-in is that the efficient cause is responsible in bring being from potency to actuality.

The final cause on the other hand seems to gain ground here because it is seen as the first cause in the other of intention. The reason is that before ever an agent will cause a particular being to exist, it must first intentionally conceive what it wants to achieve. In other words, before one engages in the task of bringing a thing into being, such a being would have conceived the end of the product he or she wants to do. This final cause becomes the act whose potential the efficient cause worked on for full realization.

This indeed is the extrinsic notion of the act and potency theory as it relates to being. However, care must be taken not to forget that the being that has an extrinsic nature, also has its intrinsic nature. This intrinsic nature is centered on the somewhat changes that occur in the intrinsic nature of the being in question as against the external cause of the extrinsic nature. This will form the basis for the discussion on the nature of change in the act and potency theory.

Change and Motion in the Act and Potency Theory: The Intrinsic Nature of Being

The notion of change or motion as the case may be in the act and potency theory shows the intrinsic notion of being, because it has to do with the being in itself. The fact of change in being is evident in the work of Heraclitus and Parmenides. Their views are contention between *radical mobilism* and *radical immobilism*. While Heraclitus saw reality as in constant motion (radical mobilism), Parmenides saw reality as permanent and not subject to change (radical immobilism). Aristotle reconciled these variant positions with the idea of substantial and accidental change as explained above.

Bringing this down to the act and potency theory, there is no doubt that there is motion or movement from potency to act of a being and vice versa. However, this motion is not a change from being to non-being, but a change of status while retaining its essence. While many scholars hold that there are different conditions required for change, I will adopt just two conditions for change to take place. The choice of these two will help in no small measures in buttressing the task at hand. These two conditions

required for change are *A starting point (terminus a quo- term from which)*; this means that the thing that is changing must have a starting point. Second, *ending-point (terminus ad quem-term towards which)*. This means that the changing thing should have a definite point to end up. This means that the being in act which is the *terminus ad quem* must have taken different stages from a *terminus a quo*. This is why Daniel Sullivan defines change as “the state of being in between being-in-act and being-in-potency”²³. He illustrated this definition of change with boiling water. Hear him:

Water that is only potentially hot is not yet in a state of change. Water that has become hot is no longer changing to hot; it is hot. But if water is only partly heated, lukewarm, let us say, then it is being changed to hot. Change in our body of water, in other words, refer to the progressive stages from being cold through increasing stages of warmth until we can say it is actually hot. At this point, there is no longer any process of change. The change is finished with the realization of the new way of being which was the goal of change.²⁴

The point here is that the reality of change or motion is evident in being. It is viewed from its stages of evolution between that which is in potency to actuality like in the case of the water. When it was cold, change has not occurred; when it was hot, following the intention at heart, then it has stopped changing. This is so because the intention is to make cold water, hot; and at a point in time, the water becomes lukewarm and thereafter hot. At the lukewarm state of the water, we can say change is taking place; thus D. Sullivan says “the imperfect stage of being lukewarm is called the state of change concerning the future of being hot too which it is ordered”.²⁵ And when it (water) becomes hot, it is in actuality. Notice that the transition from cold to hot did not in any way turn the water from something to nothing rather, just a change in temperature why remaining water.

Bringing this to the notion of being. The fact that a being changes does not mean a change from being to non-being but just a stage of being to another stage yet remains a being. This means that reality is a conglomerate of mobilism and immobilism.

Rethinking the Act and Potency Theory vis-a-vis Causality and Change: An Evaluation

Having stated that the notion of act and potency is almost a twin characteristics of being, there will be a need to state how what is termed potency is actually the putting together of different actualities. This invariable means that what we call actuality is a result of different actualities. All of these will be in reference to change and causality because as stated above, the extrinsic notion of being in the act and potency theory centers on that which is outside the thing being formed (causality). While on the other hand, the intrinsic notion of being in the act and potency theory centers on the very nature of the being itself (change/motion).

By our assessment thus far, there is the need to introduce two terms that will help buttress this rethinking notion of the act and potency story. These terms are *Loosed Actuality* and *Strict Actuality*. That which is called potency is the gathering of different loosed actuality to form a strict actuality. It is called loosed actuality because that which we call a potency of something was in a state of actuality (strict) before. It becomes *loosed actuality* when it is used as potency to achieve another strict actuality. While *Strict Actuality* is when a being is *in a state of momentary act*. The term *momentary* as used here, as it relates to being, means that a being that once has the status of a strict actuality, can later be referred to as loosed actuality when it is used to realize another strict actuality.

A useful analogy here will be necessary to bring this point down to the limelight using the example of a builder that intends to build a house. In getting the house to a complete state, he uses different materials to achieve that set goal. This means that getting the house to its complete state is the act; while the process of gathering materials together to build the house, can be said to be that the house is in its potential state. Care must be taken to notice that in building or constructing a house, one will need blocks, wood/planks, cement, water, zink, paint, and so on. Now, the putting together of all of these is suggestive of a house in potency. Here, a philosophical look at this will show that most of the things/materials that are put together to form the house are already in the state of act. For instance, in making a single block, cement is applied to sand and then water with a box to measure its size. Here we say the block is in potency. Now, when the block is formed, it

is considered a block in its complete state. Meaning it is already in act (actuality). But mind you, the block is not the house (even the cement used is in act because it is a combination of different materials that made it so). This block that is already in act is placed on something to make the house to be in potency. This simply means that as at the time the block was made, it was in strict act (as in actuality). However, this block loses the personality of strict act when it was placed on something to get the house to its complete and perfect state. By so doing, it becomes a loosed act. The same is true of the making of a car, and other contingent beings. Little wonder Isaac Ukpokolo during his presentation on the second international conference held at the Seminary of All Saints said 'Being is act'. This is because everything that 'is' in existence is in a state act.

The question now is: Does this apply to the status of the necessary being as well? Let us remember that the scholastic philosophers made a distinction of being into Necessary being and Contingent being. The *Necessary being* is a being who necessarily exists, a being who cannot but exist. It owes its existence to no other being other than itself. A *Contingent being*, on the other hand, is a being that is not responsible for its existence. It owes its existence to the Necessary being. This distinction of being further came up in the works of Martin Heidegger and Jean Paul Sartre. Where Heidegger distinguished between '*Being itself and Individual Being*'²⁶ and Sartre on the other hand distinguished between '*Being-for-Itself (pour sois) and Being-in-itself (en-sois)*'²⁷. Given that these distinctions of the above existentialist philosophers might have some dissimilarities with the notion of the scholastics, philosophers are of the view that the notion of the scholastics influenced the existentialists' distinction of being.

Bringing this down to loosed and strict act theory, our assessment of the act and potency theory in relation to loosed and strict act, the necessary being is always in strict act; but its strict act is not momentary neither is it caused by any loosed act; but it is uncaused. Thus, I will refer to the necessary being as '*uncaused strict act*'. This is because it cannot be used in potency to any other being and is not caused by another thing or being. At best it can be an efficient cause to other contingent beings.

This necessary being necessarily exists despite our knowledge of it. It is called the uncaused caused and the unmoved mover. It is a being that has always been in its actual form. Timon Cline has this to say “since the necessary being is pure act, it means that it lacks potency and cannot receive further actuality of being (i.e change) in any respect”²⁸. This position of Cline is a sentiment of most scholastic philosophers in the history of philosophy. The necessary being is pure act that was never in potency. So one cannot say the actuality of the necessary being is born out of loosed actualities because it was never in potency. It is a being that has been in actuality from the beginning of existence. Anaximander noticed the state of this being when he calls it the *aperion*.

Going back to the issue of active and passive potency, one can say that the Necessary being lacks passive potency because the idea of change and motion does not occur in its nature as Timon puts it “(The Necessary Being) lacks passive potency; and his active potency does not induce change in himself, though he can bring about change in other (contingent) beings. Pure or (uncreated) active potency such as this is simply implied in references to pure actuality”²⁹.

Daniel Sullivan shared a similar view about the loosed and strict actuality with his analogy of the water. However, he used the notion of *imperfect actuality* (a term I guess he got from F. Suarez) as distinct from perfect actuality. He argues thus:

The imperfect stage of being lukewarm is called the state of change with reference to the future state of being hot to which it is ordered. If the relationship to the future state of being hot were ended- if we stopped heating the water, for example--- then the change would be at an end. Our water then will be lukewarm; simply **lukewarm in act**, we would say, and not changing into hot. In other words, the imperfect act of being hot--- which is the state of being lukewarm, is imperfect only with respect to being hot. If we no longer consider that relationship, then the state of being lukewarm is being in act only.³⁰

The doctrine of the act and potency theory is truly hinged on the reality of stages. The stage of imperfect being along the path to

the realization of the new way of being can also be called act in so far as they are a new realization of being in relation to the potency with which we started. These stages are, however, ‘imperfect act’ in relation to the final goal of change because they fall short of that ultimate perfection.

The point of divergence between the view of Sullivan and the one being proposed here is that what Sullivan calls *imperfect act*, is *strict act* for me. It only becomes *loosed act* when it is used to actualize another strict act.

Another point of divergence is on the notion of the necessary being. He refers to the necessary being as *an unlimited act*. The term he used to distinguish from the contingent beings who have *limited act*. But the status of the necessary being for me is the ‘uncaused strict act’ as explained above. However, it is important to note that the idea of loosed actuality and strict actuality as it applies to contingent beings does not mean one is superior to the other. What we can see at best in both actualities, is the reality of complementarity. None can claim to be more important than the other. Taking a cue from our already established analogy of the house, a particular block cannot stand on its own; one would not just raise a pillar and say he has built a house. The erection of a house needs all actualities whether loosed or strict. In other words, there is a form of interdependence between the loosed act and the strict act.

Conclusion

In this work, we have been able to give a background to the notion of being in the universe while stating that every contingent being is a product of act and potency. This necessitated an explication of the notion of act and potency while tracing its origin from the pre-Socratic time to this present era. This was followed up with the bifurcation of the act and potency theory into the intrinsic and the extrinsic notion of being. This was followed by theorizing the strict and loose act which was used to deepen a sense of interdependence and a sense of fulfillment in being.

Endnotes

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- ¹⁸ Fredrick Copleston: *A History of Philosophy: Greece and Rome:* (London Bloomsbury 2013), 22-26.
- ¹⁹ Dario Composta. *History of Ancient Philosophy;* (Bangalore: Pontifical Urban University Press 2013), 19.
- ²⁰ Aristotle. *Metaphysics* 1048 b 11.
- ²¹ Aristotle. *Metaphysics* , 241.
- ²² Composta, *History of Ancient Philosophy*, 266.
- ²³ Daniel Sullivan. *An Introduction to Philosophy: Perennial Principles of the Classical Realist Tradition.* (North Carlifonia: St. Benedict Press2012), 239.
- ²⁴ Sullivan, *An Introduction to Philosophy*, 239.
- ²⁵ Sullivan, *An Introduction to Philosophy*, 239.
- ²⁶ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973), 51-54.
- ²⁷ Jean Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), 78-79.
- ²⁸ Timon Cline, "Necessary and Contingency," part 3 Act and Potency Conciliar Post. <https://conciliarpost.com/dialogues/the-necessity-of-contingency-part-3-act-and-potency/>.
- ²⁹ *ibid*
- ³⁰ Sullivan, *An Introduction to Philosophy*, 239.