

INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY AND THE POLITICS OF MANAGING RWANDAN CRISIS: LESSON FOR DEVELOPING STATES

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Abstract

The Rwandan crisis of 1994, still fresh in the mind of many over the loss of about 1,250,000 people – mostly Tutsis and Modulate Hutus in one hundred days of ethnic genocide that was planned and executed by the Hutu government, with no help from anywhere in the world to rescue the victims turned out to be an international embarrassment of abandonment. Diplomatic inaction being the climate of the time however cast doubt on the notion that diplomacy is the peaceful conduct of relations. The study, therefore, in adopting primary and secondary data utilizes descriptive, in-depth interview method of key informants drawn from the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Military Observers (MILOB) and the academe as an analytical concept to arriving at its goal as it is situated on national interest model of the power theory framework. The study notes that diplomacy and diplomatic intrigues pervaded the whole situation unchecked; that this abandonment though might have being deep rooted in the poverty of no oil, no diamond, no gold, and no timber among others, encouraged the degree of ethnicization; that the theoretical context of diplomacy is quite different from the practical context as actors' behaviour are modulated by their avowed interest, which allowed the disparity in the treatment of small state like Rwanda by the international system in the period under investigation. These absurdities, these maltreatments and misplaced priorities that seek numerous answers however, informed the revisit of the Rwandan crisis.

Key Word: *Diplomacy, National Interest, Disparities, Genocide, Ethnicization*

INTRODUCTION

With the end of cold war in 1989, the focus of International politics thus shifted to re-alignment and the formation of new alliances, especially among states of Eastern Europe while Africa was turned a dumping ground to the dangerous weapons used in the cold war threat era. At the same time, Africa was also designated as only good for charity recipient (Okigbo, 1992). A factor that its scramble and struggle coupled with bad political leadership

helped to plunging the continent into unabated conflict. In the preceding decade, conflicts and wars in Africa was fought primarily within states by rebels and national armies, with the victims being predominantly civilians and the vulnerable groups in the society.

These rebels, militia groups, and state armies use conspicuous terror such as rape, looting, and massacre as part of their war and military strategies. It is a situation characterised by mass killings,

ethnic cleansing which the actors regarded as the inevitable consequences of war, rebellion and conflict (Rupesinghe, 1998). By 1990, the Burundi and Liberia wars took between 100,000 and 500,000 lives each (Gott, 1998). From 1995 onwards, there were ongoing wars in Angola, Liberia, Sierra-Leone, Somalia, Sudan, among others. Several other countries that were prone to severe crises or civil cum political instability, at one time or the other were Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria, Togo and Congo DR (then Zaire). In some other countries, however, low-level ethnic and political conflicts remained contained, but unresolved in such countries as Chad, Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda. According to Stedman (2004:237), as at 1996, an estimated 19 major internal conflicts were fought worldwide. Added to this are a further 42 lower intensity wars and 74 lethal violent political conflicts experienced within this period. A close review of the period under study clearly shows that Africa, with 13 conflicts at home, is ranked amongst the highest in the number of distribution of the world's conflicts and crises. Berridge (1997) observed that these crises were escalated by foreign friends or foes alike, who, in the midst of such crisis, usually concealed their real intentions and hid under the canopy of providing assistance in terms of funds and advice, to pursue their national or selfish interests.

Arguably, no nation has been able to solve all of its problems as such can only

be reduced to barest minimum or otherwise. Thus, Massimirano (2010) noted that the challenges of a nationhood or nation-state are complex and mostly demanding. With Rwanda inclusive in this category, even after the events of 1994 that was caused by the colonial German/Belgium – indirect rule system's favouritism and designation, beginning from 1849 to 1959 with the seed of discord sown amongst the Hutus, Tutsis and Twas respectively, which did not only help to torn the country apart, but had allowed outside influence that capitalized on their impoverished status to explore the land to the detriment of the general society (Nyankanzi,1998), thereby explaining the high profile and depth of the country's political quagmire.

This outside influence – diplomacy, which had explored a great deal on the people, though, may not be said to have allowed the people to experience total stability or social civility at any particular point in time, but instead were said to be the root cause of the problem in Rwanda, as it encouraged and supported bad ethnic political leadership of the Hutu Government. Rwanda, then, was seen faced with a great element of disunity with persisting misgivings in the polity with inept diplomatic hypocrisy.

Thus, in this study, diplomacy, both preventive, small state, and or coercive diplomacy amongst others, which seemed to have dominated the event of 1994 in Rwanda were put on trial toward



attending to the Rwandan crisis. Also disparities in the treatment of small state in the international political system were also examined among some selected states toward arriving at the desired goal of the study.

THEORETICAL ARGUMENT

This study adopts the National Interest Model” of the Power Theory Framework. National interest is the totality of state’s values. It is an instrument of action, which evaluates the sources of nation’s diplomatic foreign policy. It serves as a means of justifying, denouncing, or proposing policies. The notion of National interest tends to confine the intended meaning of what is best for a nation in foreign affairs. National interest in a simpler term rests on the notion that a state cannot engage in anything without having interest attached to it. Hence, it is as old as mankind itself. With theorists like Joseph Frankel, Hans Morgenthau, and Hugo Grant amongst others, the model had argued that state’s interest is always in anything that will be of benefit to it. Hence, to the state, it is inevitable, as she selfishly devices means of actualizing her goals in any particular situation.

Frankel (1993), agreeing to this view, postulated that people maintain social order in a bid to satisfying their selfish national interest. He contended that national interest is a fundamental notion that defies definition by reference to other terms, because it is analytically convenient although often empirically

impossible to determine whether the value found in the formulation of a specific interest had been internalized by the decision-makers or introduced only in response to environmental pressures, generally domestic but sometimes also international.

Morgenthau (1960) sees National interest in terms of power. To him, National interest is the perennial standard by which political action must be judged and directed, hence the objective of a foreign policy must be defined in terms of National interest.

He went further to posit that the interest of the state is that peace should be maintained, but whereby such fails against an aggressor, that the state should alternate her interest for war. Hugo (1969), one of the protagonists of the school aptly noted that states behave the way they do because it is in their interest to do so.

Construing from the above contentions, and in relation to the subject under study – international diplomacy and the politics of managing the Rwandan crisis: lesson for developing states, certain questions that needs to be asked to further this investigation are: namely, why are African states known for continual crisis and high incident of political instability? Why were the problems of Rwanda and her politics of succession a major issue to African and the world, particularly in the period under study? Why was it that in the post-cold war-Africa, certain forms of

government, especially the type that encouraged the Rwandan conflict was recognized unlike in the present time? Why was the west divided and ready at the same time to make mockery of their fellow state that had failed in their area of sphere of influence in the course realignment? Why did the kind of contours that enveloped diplomacy in the Rwandan crisis allowed for the annihilation of such a great number of citizens? Why was African diplomacy dwarfed of any kind of remedy against the abandonment of the people of Rwanda? Why, in comparison was the kind of treatment meted to Rwanda exceptional in relation to the way other small states that had passed through the same situation of crises different?

While the above questions may sound rhetoric or answered in thoughts, the major reasons for such intuition are the place and roles of National interest in state qua state and government qua government relations. It suffices to notes that these characters are always found in a conflictual paradigm of their separately avowed National interest that needs to be satisfied. A fact to which might have contributed in creating the situation leading to the escalation of conflict in Rwanda.

Thus, while we further observe the role of national interest, it will suffice to highlight with reason that the French interest in Rwanda are vacillated between the desires to preserve her traditional sphere of influence in the region where her economic interest in

tea and cash crop prospecting is at stake owing to other states' interest. Just as Vassilier (1997), notes that Africa lies in the sphere of the United States and Europe global interest, which might have led to abandonment of Rwanda in the crisis days to French failure. This could be an outward demonstration, rather than a sign of real national interest of states' mentioned above.

The high incidences of political intrigues sequel to power successions problems in Rwanda and Africa in general informed the reasons for this revisit to the Rwandan war/genocide of 1994. The role of diplomacy and power struggle in African states and the ominous reasons why the spatial problems had remained and left many African states in a state of perpetual sympathy with Rwanda inclusive before the rest of the world explains the awful decadence of leadership problems amongst the people.

The salient features that had been masking the cyclical leadership problems in Africa, leading to the abysmal diplomacy role as occurred in the Rwandan crisis, however, also lay its contradictions as experienced and seen in the Rwandan conflict since all actors were directly or indirectly modulated by its national interest model.

THE VALUE CONCEPTS OF DIPLOMACY

Diplomacy has been defined in different ways by different people. Hamilton (1996:1-2) defines diplomacy as the peaceful conduct of relations amongst



political entities, their principals and, or accredited agents. It is a process that is sometimes regarded as a necessary evil but; regrettably, at other times with a deep respect. Accepting this observation, Lund (1996) reiterated that diplomacy had played a more significant role in human affairs in the present than ever. Although as old as mankind, diplomacy, according to Richard and Hamilton (1996) had made the necessity for organized dialogue in an era when the relative certainties of a bipolar states system have so recently given way to a disorderly, confused multipolarity, as witnessed in the frenetic pace of contemporary diplomatic activities.

In another dimension, diplomacy, according to Wolton (1954:12) is an honest man (an ambassador) sent to lie abroad for the good of his country. To McJohnson (1976), diplomacy is concerned with the management of international relations. This is because diplomacy deals with tact, skill, and cunning to achieve a set of goals Thus, its application in the old was seen as a necessary evil, because then, it was agreed that it was better to hear the message than to kill the messenger. This acceptance in the classical Greek philosophical doctrine, however, gave rise to the first tenet of diplomacy, which is the principle of diplomatic immunity.

According to Alken (2005:3) the political scheming and intrigues are well sustained in the political disagreement and agreement when the level of diplomacy employed becomes

successful, meaning that diplomacy helps to bring systematic skill to apply on the negotiations or dialoguing of issues in most political spheres. Stranger cited in Hamilton (1996: 3) observed that in a world where war is everybody's tragedy and everybody's nightmare, diplomacy is everybody's business. Consequent upon the collapse of long – established hegemonies and the re-emergence of long neglected enmities, the art of diplomacy has placed a high premium on the work of those skilled mediators, negotiators and representatives.

Therefore, in collating the views of the scholars above, particularly in the assertion of Wolton, in terms of practice of diplomacy as observed in the Ancient Byzantine empire, Hamilton (1996:15-17) revealed:

that in the late tenth Century, during the visit of envoys of Prince Vladimir of Russia to Byzantine, they seemed to behold amid wreaths of incense and the radiance of candle young men, wonderfully arrayed, floating in the air above the heads of the priests and singing in triumph, "Holy, Holy, Holy is the eternal.

In explaining the motion on the air to the envoy: "the Emperor noted that if you were not ignorant of the Christian mysteries, you would know that the Angels of God themselves come down from heaven to celebrate the office with our priest".

It is comparatively easy to understand what an irresistible effect this would likely have, and did have, on the visiting dignitaries and those who might have had the intention of attacking or engaging the empire in war and how it was achieved because of this diplomacy at work. In another instance, the Byzantine Emperor, in carrying out her state functions, especially on the issue of foreign relations, had in her Code 515, stated that there was a law in the Code which empowered and ordered the Emperor to lie and to violate his oath if it was necessary to do so for the well-being of the empire, implying that in diplomacy, if it means to tell a lie to save the state, one should not hesitate to do so (Hamilton, 1996).

Agreeing with the above contention, Stinnett (2005:26) reiterated that diplomacy has a chequered history. It is the practice of verbal discussion with the intent to influence, transmit a position or negotiate on a given issue or situation for a mutually acceptable outcome. Diplomacy is an art because it requires a unique mixture of empathy, persuasion, bluster, cajoling, amongst other things (Goldberg, 2005:6). Shultz and Moltang (2005) also noted that in modern diplomacy, roles and intrigues in intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations has helped the workings of globalization of communication and transportation to opening up new avenues for the conduct of diplomacy

Emanating from the various definitions of diplomacy given above, several types of diplomacy, which according to Woldspring (2009), include economic diplomacy, multi-tracks diplomacy, preventive diplomacy, coercive diplomacy, panda diplomacy, ping pong diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, small state diplomacy, shuttle diplomacy, gunboat diplomacy, citizen diplomacy, appeasement diplomacy amongst others. However, away from the several types of diplomacy, there are also processes through which diplomacy works. These, according to Zartman (2007), include negotiation, mediation, reconciliation, reporting and representation, which help to quicken the workings of diplomacy. Meanwhile, against the conditions of the events that informed the topic under study, beginning from 1990 to 1994, that is, from the period of the build-up of the crisis to the period of conflict escalation in Rwanda, scholars had argued in respect of the application of any of the three – preventive diplomacy, small state diplomacy and or coercive diplomacy, among others as they affect the Rwandan crisis on either success or failure of the practice. Premised on this, the study in consideration of the Rwandan crisis, will seek permission to briefly examine the above-mentioned.

a. PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY AND RWANDAN CRISIS

In this sub-section scholars were critical of what preventive diplomacy is, what constitutes it, how it is applied and where, if possible, had it been successfully utilized or otherwise. Thus,



Calhill (2000:37) observed that the essence of preventive diplomacy is not only to employ tact in dialoguing among the conflicting parties, but the act of employing persuasion to stop conflicts or wars before they start or escalate. This, according to him, is because lives are more saved and protected than when the battle or conflict escalates to destroy more than imagined. To Zartman (2007) preventive diplomacy focuses on negotiation as practiced in different issue areas. Agreeing with the scholar's assertions as above, Lund (1996:11) argued that preventive diplomacy is the international movement toward responding to early warnings of conflict and attempting preventive measures before it escalates to severely violent levels. To him, this includes knowing the root cause of the conflict, and dialoguing out the differences towards ending any escalation. Accepting the emphasises, Touval (1996) queried reasons for the failure of diplomatic attempts to prevent war and maintain a unified Yugoslavia instead of allowing its disintegration. He critically blamed the idea of preventive diplomacy as lacking clarity and credibility owing to the lapses in the former. Disagreeing with Touval, Cohen (1997:23-39) argued that cross-cultural differences have significant effects on preventing crisis and diplomatic negotiations. Yugoslavia was an example of failed diplomacy because there was failure to understand and appreciate these differences. Meaning that, for preventive diplomacy not to lack clarity and purpose, then the content, process

and style of negotiation must go hand in hand with the cultural differences.

However, being specific on international conflicts like the Rwandan crisis, Lund (1996) observed that one of the major reasons why preventive diplomacy was somehow ignored in the 1990s was due to the complexity of the problems and the multiplicity of conflicts going on at the same time, just as the Rwandan crisis caught everybody napping. Could the contentions above be a cogent reason for the failure of preventive diplomacy in Rwanda? Against the backdrop of the above notion, and with the event catching everybody unawares, Dallaire (2003) disagreed and argued that preventive diplomacy was the best method needed to avert the Rwandan holocaust, but it was not there. To him, the failure could be located in the lack of the major characteristics of preventive diplomacy, such as adhering to early warning that the risk of conflict exists, the causes and the nature of the potential conflict being identified and the consent of the parties within the jurisdiction to which preventive action is to be taken. Supporting Dallaire's analogy, Nye (2008) posited that the element of timing is also crucial. The potential conflict should be ripe for the proposed preventive action. This was absent in Rwanda. This assumption, in both conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy, shows that intractable conflicts are easier to avoid before they happen rather than being fixed once they have occurred. There is a great deal of

truth in this assumption, although some conflicts are likely to be unavoidable.

In view of the reasoning that preventive diplomacy is usually used in the international arena and that it refers to efforts of outside nations or groups of nations to prevent the escalation of conflicts between or within other nations, Perry (2001) further argued that conflict prevention is the best approach to managing conflicts but it was not there in Rwanda. These preventive measures include early warning, fact – finding, early deployment to demilitarized zones and confidence-building measures. Accepting the assertions above, Ghali (2002) noted that preventive diplomacy has had a long and instrumental role in international relations.

Meanwhile, Reye (2000) in total disagreement with the issue of absence of preventive diplomacy in Rwanda noted that track one of the preventive diplomacy was duly applied at Arusha because in the field of preventive diplomacy, track one, which is the formal negotiation between official representatives of the parties involved was carried out until the breakdown of peace in April 1994.

However, Nye (2008), reasoning from the Reychler standpoint, argued that if track one of preventive diplomacy was applied in Rwanda and it failed, then, should one accept the fact that the lapses may be located on small states diplomacy incapacitation?

b. SMALL STATE DIPLOMACY AND RWANDAN CRISIS

According to Shultz and Moltang (2005:43), the issue of small state diplomacy could be viewed from two angles: one, the small states are always at the receiving end of every event in the international system, whether positively or negatively motivated. Two, small states lack developments that are determined beyond their borders such as climate change, water, security and shifts in global economy; hence, it is through diplomacy that they can address their desires to attain expected goals, as it is obvious that with the absence of these factors the small states have strong incentives to support international co-operations.

Corgan (2008), however, argued that when a small state takes up a task that is above its strength, even if that small state were to devote its entire diplomatic service to the project, only half the required task could be completed. This is the sort of problem that any small state faces in dealing with global politics. Given the right circumstance, they could prevail against far larger powers and could even have palpable influence on the world stage. Meaning that, in modern times, some small states, notably Switzerland, Iceland, Norway and Finland, amongst others had shown how a focused and well – informed diplomacy could produce remarkable results, especially when vital economies or security are involved in the interactions.



In addition, Sperling (1999:17) argued that when a small state is in trouble, the urge to help such a state is quickened when it is realized that such a state belongs to the same alliance with the great powers. The hope of rescue depends on how cooperative the small state is to global issues. Citing a recent instance, Corgan (2002) noted that the general response to the Kuwait invasion in 1991 was successful because of Kuwait's general interest in the global happenings, even when the invasion was a clear violation of international norms. Furtherance to this, Henrikson (2006) noted that small states are viable and active partners within the international community: a common characteristic of small states is the thrust and nature of their diplomacy that goes with persuasion and consensus building. In the view of Payne (2004:63) small states are highly dependent on development beyond their own borders. For example, in the environmental field, small states are highly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of natural disasters. On security, small states are quickly and deeply affected by regional and global conflicts and instabilities. In this regard, Otiengo (2000) aptly stated that one of the problems of Rwanda in the dark days of her trouble was the limited resources at her disposal. This was among the reasons why Rwanda could not conduct effective diplomacy that posed a great challenge to her in the days leading to the genocide, a factor, which made her fall an easy prey to the several kinds of diplomacy that were dictated from outside. Accepting this assertion,

Dallaire (2003) still went ahead to query the great powers; saying, should we agree that the previous cooperative nature of small states diplomacy has been eroded by the heated competition in an increasingly globalised world, thereby making vulnerable states like Rwanda to be abandoned and betrayed in the days of the war/genocide in her domain or should we accept the exacerbated differences amongst small states as a reason for not attending to the Rwandan crisis?

Against the backdrop of the fact that Rwanda was among the small states left behind in her days of trouble due to incapacitation and inability to fend for itself, could it be agreed that this abandonment might have compelled her, owing to different interests, to yield to some element of coercive diplomacy as observed amongst quarreling parties to the Rwandan crisis? And, how could a small state like Rwanda employ diplomacy to help build stability which is vital for her own existence when there were several interests attached to the political conflict?

c. COERCIVE DIPLOMACY AND RWANDAN CRISIS

Going by the manner through which preventive diplomacy and small states diplomacy were examined in the preceding sub-sections, it is imperative also if the act of coercive diplomacy is probably considered as having something to do with the issue or approach which had been employed in the process leading to the Rwandan

war/genocide. In the course of this review, scholars, apart from offering definitions, also seem to be divided, even as they went ahead to explain to what extent such could be employed in conflict situations. Thus, emphasis is also placed on the conflict between the Rwandan government and the opposition towards achieving or failing to achieve their aspirations.

According to Woldspring (2000), coercive diplomacy is the attempt put forward towards achieving aspiration or a target by a state, a group within a state or non-state actor – to change its objectionable behavior through either the threat to use force or the actual use of limited force. Coercive diplomacy presupposes the use of threat or military force to achieve political objectives. Thus, Otienna (2000:99), in agreeing with the above-held view noted that coercive diplomacy is essentially a diplomatic strategy, one that relies on the threat of force rather than the use of force. If force must be used to strengthen diplomatic efforts at persuasion, as adopted by Rwandan Patriotic Force (RPF) against the Rwandan government in the 1990s, it is employed in an exemplary manner, in the form of quite limited military action, to demonstrate a resolution and willingness to escalate to high levels of military action, if necessary.

In support of the above contention, Byman (2008) asserted that coercive diplomacy is a political diplomatic strategy that aims to influence an

adversary's incentive structure. It is a strategy that combines threats of force, and if necessary, the limited and selective use of force in discreet and controlled increments, in a bargaining strategy that includes positive inducements. The aim is to induce an adversary to comply with one's demands, or to negotiate the most favourable compromise possible, while simultaneously managing the crisis to prevent unwanted military escalation.

The aforementioned assertions, however, may not have been ruled out in the Rwandan crisis. Thus, in support of the use of coercive diplomacy by states to achieve their goal, Art and Kristol (2003) observed that in the 1990 - 1991 Gulf war, the USA applied it but it failed to persuade Saddam Hussein to exit Kuwait and the result was the use of total force on the former. Another instance of coercive diplomacy was the Cuban missile crisis between the USA and the former USSR in 1962 in which Kennedy used coercive diplomacy to blockade the USSR Naval passage until the withdrawal of the missile by the USSR, which was achieved instead of using total force against the USSR.

In this regard Otienna (2000), states that there is, indeed, the confirmation that the RPF used coercive diplomacy from its military base at Uganda/Rwanda border to compel Habyarimana to accept negotiation as a way out of the Rwandan quagmire. In the same vein Anyidoho (1998:2-3) argued that a guerrilla force of the RPF using limited force invaded



Rwanda in 1990 to persuading the government of Habyarimana to change policies on the treatment of citizens, a failure which led to invasion. It is possible therefore, that RPF used coercive diplomacy to checkmate the Rwandan government of General Habyarimana.

DISPARITY AND TREATMENT OF STATE: RWANDA RE-EXAMINED

The main trust of this study is: *“that the disparity in the treatment of small states in the international diplomacy might have provided the contour that led to the abandonment of Rwanda in the 1994 war/genocide”*. This is examined based on the situations of things at Rwanda in 1994, to which different intrigues were brought to play in the process of suspicion and the actual conflict period. All the situations were meant to meet the demand of the actors who in turn makes the people to feel deprived and neglected against their suffering. Rwandan crisis and its interrelationship with the outside world within the context of the international system was a huge challenge, to the international community, the United Nations, and Africa in particular. These adduced reasons and questions are tackled referencing the raised main trust. Such questions are: what could be considered as the negative treatment of small states in the international politics, Rwanda inclusive? In relation to the Rwanda situation in 1994, could she have been considered less importance in the international politics vis-à-vis the

kind of treatment meted out to her in the period of war/genocide? Comparatively, under small states diplomacy, can Rwanda, Israel and Kuwait be equated in any positions in the context of international politics or is there any difference? Could there be an element of international conspiracy to the Rwandan crisis? And presently, with the assistance of foreign aids, direct foreign investments, trade liberalization, neo-democracy and opening up among other; could this be part of the western world ploy to appease Rwandans for long years of neglect and abandonment leading to the 1994 war/genocide?

However, going by the raised questions and the guiding main trust in this section as stated above, the study, which had earlier adopted national Interest model in all of its analysis, may resolve to utilizes some tenet of “power framework” and, “conflict theory” in furthering its explanations. This is specifically, in addressing the negating value and the interplay of national Interest model within the context of the Rwandan crisis. It is evidence that the complexity, challenging and prolonged phases of the conflict was aided by the role of the outside powers, the weaknesses in OAU and the structures of the indigenous Rwandan.

Power framework, which is the ability to make one do whatever the other wants, even when there are dislikes or likes, accepted or not accepted, might be considered as one of the tool in the treatment of small states in the

international system, since power is an important variable in all political equations. Thus, Machiavelli (1532) and Hobbs (1662) conceived politics in terms of power. Dahl (1953), also, argued that power is the capacity to change the probability of outcomes, while Deutsch (1964) asserts that power is the ability to make things happen that would not have happened otherwise.

The implication is that the interplay of power and its ability was not ruled out in the Rwandan crisis. There was a strong indication of the existence of power intrigues. The intrigues and functions of power as displayed by the actors made the conflict unique in the annals of African history.

Conflict, on the other hand according to Boulding (1962:1) is an activity that is found almost everywhere in the world of man. Amongst all the categories of conflicts, political conflict seems to be most devastating and destructive, both in idea and actions. Laue (1990:17-18), further postulated that conflict is a natural and inevitable part of all human social relationship. It is the escalated, natural competition between two or more parties about scarce resources, power and prestige. Banks (1996:439), also, argued that conflict is both inevitable and necessary. It is inevitable, because both people and groups have basic needs, expressed in society through competing values, clashing in order to provide the catalyst for development.

Beside, on the consideration of the issue of small states' diplomacy, it is important to state some of the elemental make-up of small states vis-à-vis their place in the international system. According to Dokubo (2011) small states emerged during the Westphalia treaty of 1648. At that period they projected some degree of collective voice or vote to balance the dominance of the then super powers, even to this day. Their diplomatic activities on the UN were for one vote per sovereign state. The essence being according to Henrikson (2006:8), for the greatest chance of safety and survival of small states, which lies in law, in institutions and, especially in diplomacy.

However, in determining the strength and capability of small states in the present world order, opinions are divided on what constitute a small state coupled with the hiccups of small states diplomacy. Thus in respect of Rwanda, Power (2003) asserted that the UN did not shot its door to the situation there, but was doing little as less priority and less concerned of a small state diplomacy as Rwanda. An allegation that was never debunked by the UN. These allegations of negligence to the crisis in Rwanda were not hidden as the UN fell more negligent in the later incident in Rwanda, amongst which, were the failure of the Belgium and France to implement the delegated function on the Rwanda crisis by the UN. Against the adamancy of the UN when the Arusha peace talks resumed on 16 March 1993, the body resolved not to



participate fully as a negotiator, which too many critics and analyst like (Melvern, 2000) and Power (1997) noted as a betrayal of trust for the body held to protect and save lives, in lieu to the charter principle. Henrikson (2006) in this respect, while sympathising with Rwanda, argued that a small state is one that cannot protect itself by its own efforts. Small states require allies or to be ally.

In the same vein, Richard (1999:10) asserts that small states diplomacy is particularly affected by developments which are determined beyond their border against the fact that diplomacy is the main vehicle by which small states are able to ensure that their goals are addressed in the global arena. But analyst being critical of the UN lip service in the Rwandan crisis as noted by Melvern (2004:16), that there was more of UN interest in Liberia, Somalia, Former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Mozambique and Georgia amongst other than Rwanda, a small state with nothing to offer, to which even ally had abandoned. Supporting the contention, Dallaire (2003:10) notes that the UN had a low priority over the mission in Rwanda. To the same effect, Buggingo (2005) aptly stated that Rwanda was never of any importance to the UN less worried about of whatever happens to it.

To Williams (1970:23), small states are pawns. They are not the knights, the bishops or the rooks in the international chess – but merely the pawns, counting for only one each in points. On the

positional advantages, Richard (1999) reiterated that small states under the right circumstances can prevail against far larger powers and can even have palpable influence on the world stage. A case in point was the role of Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, Switzerland, and Vatican in international politics. Small States can only manage and manoeuvre to promote their interests within a framework established by and for larger powers. This Means that Rwanda, though being an impoverished small state, possess such opportunity.

It is also evidence that the small state status greatly affected Rwanda in all ramifications, especially, at the period of its crisis. This singular act made the peace talk to look more unrealistic and unreliable, as Power (1997) aptly opined that the UN participated in the peace deal as an observer, which indicates how unserious the body had been with the Rwandan crisis from the onset. The analyst blamed the UN's non-chalant attitude and kind of diplomacy even under the Security Council resolution 812 (1993) is unbecoming of the behavior of an International body meant to maintain peace. Also, under the Security Council resolution 846 (1993) (Melvern 2000:24-28) and Destexche (1995:34) blamed the UN's role as trying to pave way for unhealthy competition in Rwandan conflict.

The level of diplomatic interplay between the UN, SRSR and the people of Rwanda according to Anyidoho (1998:11) created a great gap that was

exploited by the warring factions leading to war/genocide, which probably made people to accused the UN of bias. Added to this, Keane (1996:37) argued that while the UN and Security Council in New York were polarized and nursed sympathy to one group or the other the UN and UNAMIR in Rwanda was seen to have been considerably compromised.

Premised on these analogies above about small states, especially on the positional advantages (strategic importance) in the international system in relationship with big actors; the manner of fate suffered by Rwanda in the period of her crisis and her influence in the global politics, speaks nothing than an abandoned small state left to fend for itself. In the same continuum, the research will hereby, takes our minds back to the drawn questions above and the raised main trust while examining the issues of the position and importance of Rwanda to the international system, and, the comparism of Rwanda and the rest (Israel and Kuwait) preferably in the context of international system with regard to differences.

i. THE POSITION AND OR IMPORTANCE OF RWANDA IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Agreeing with Schultz and Moltang (2005) and Rana (1999), that small states are viable and active partners within the context of international community; that for a small state to succeed well in diplomacy, it must completely be a sovereign entity, not merely in the sense of having legal independence and

international recognition, but in the full sense of national self-possession. On whether to this effect that Rwanda has self-possession. Rwanda, since 1962 is a sovereign and independence state, and a non-veto member of UN Security Council in 1994, has the status of small state. Then, if that be the issue, the question that readily strikes one is: why is the treatment of small states like Rwanda in 1994 done with such disparity and impunity, given its status? According to Dokubo (2011) in international politics, with respect to Rwanda, the big states swallows' small states and the small states in turn eat worms. This is because the small states cannot work miracles in the globalized world that is still dominated by great powers unless they follow their fellow Lilliputians. Furthermore, international constraints, domestic politics and foreign policy create uneasy change in small states (Fredrick, 2010:13). Shultz et al (2005:43) had argued that small states are always at the receiving end of every event in the international system, whether positively or negatively motivated, and that small states lack developments that are determined beyond their borders. Rwanda, in 1994, was found wanting in this regard. Upholding this view, Nani (2011), Agwu (2011) and Agbu (2011) argued that Rwanda was less important, insignificance and extremely poor. Nani (2011), further states that the less position of Rwanda in the international politics might have encouraged the international community and the United Nations to probably allow the event that



took place to happen. Agwu (2011), also, notes that Rwanda, from all sense of purpose, is not viable in the international system. The less importance of Rwanda, as in lacking any strategic importance and cooperation in international politics and governance, also weakened any attempt at helping. Thus, the UN failure and abandoned the people of Rwanda as confirmed in what Dallaire (2003) posited as the devil incarnated in form of human being, came down from hell to feast on innocent blood was never false.

Arguing from the angle of international diplomacy, Adeleke (2011) noted that it is true that diplomacy is the main vehicle through which small states like Rwanda can voice its predicament in the global arena, but Rwanda's lack of the necessary natural supporters for international cooperation had helped to put it in a disadvantaged position. He agreed with Nani (2011) that there was international conspiracy among the UN, USA, Belgium, France and the rest of the international community over the issues in Rwanda. This is because even when their (UN peacekeepers) strength was reduced from 2700 troops to 250 men and moved to Kenya, UN trucks, vehicles, equipment and communication gadgets were left behind only for the invading RPF to use same to overrun the country against the Rwandan Armed forces and the Hutus government. Implying that the international community wanted what took place to actually happen.

It could be summarised that there is disparity in the treatment of small states like Rwanda in the international system, especially in the period of its crisis in 1994. It was noted that some of the negating factors which provided the contour to that kind of treatment were due to lack of relevancy in the power configuration of states that are less important and who contribute minimally to the advancement of the international system. Coupled with the fact also that national interest is the totality of states' values, just as power is the means to national end (Morgenthau, 1964). It is absurd for any state to invest where its interest is not protected. Hence, going by the preceding analogy, the research adduced main trust above, however, could be said to have merit.

ii. **COMPARISON OF RWANDA AND THE REST (ISRAEL AND KUWAIT) IN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM**

Comparatively, in looking at Rwandan crisis and other small states like Israel and Kuwait amongst many others, vis-à-vis the kind of negative attention given to it in the days of crisis in 1994, and the kinds meted out to others like Israel in the middle East conflict and Kuwait in the days of its invasion in 1991, this study which tends to state the difference, also link the events to the staggering evidences on the disparity in the treatment of small states in the international system.

a) **ISRAEL**

According to Agbu (2011), in the treatment of small states like Israel, Rwanda and Kuwait based on their position, importance and influence in the global politics, the state of Israel, is overwhelm above all others. Israel, though a small state, has power and influence over many states. The Jewish lobby which is a strong force of the Israel descent in New York had made the country to see itself as Most Favoured Nations (MFN) in the world. Nani (2011) asserts that in the international politics, it is not the size of a state that matters, but the state's capability and strength, which speaks of its strategic importance, military might and technology, and to which Israel is strategically placed and at advantage. In the same continuum, Dokubo (2011) explained that apart from Israel being the western world strategic interest in the Middle East, it has a developed educational system with a profound link to the World, highly skilled diplomats that are technically advanced and sound. To Adeleke (2011) Israel possesses the quality that makes it to be taken seriously in every actions and situations. As a small state, Israel is able to prevail on superior powers outside its domain and cannot be commonly treated in the international system as Rwanda was treated in 1994.

b) **KUWAIT**

Kuwait is a small state and could be likened to what Corgan (2008:18-19) argued as has been given occasional successes against the agendas of larger

states owing to its wealth and resources in most critical arena that enhanced its influence. Agwu (2011) who agrees with the notion above argued that Kuwait, which is located at the international strategic importance of the U. S's policy in the Middle East, is a small state whose oil and wealth has provided a viable link to world economy and politics, thus, agreeing with Williams (1970) that small states have limited range, and can rarely enter into large, complicated and strategic international power play. Thus, Kuwait was rallied round against Iraq invasion because of its economic importance to the international community.

Collaborating this view, Agbu (2011) argued that it was because Kuwait was a strong ally to the western world; hence, ignoring it at that period was like giving a strong economic bloc away to a new comer. He submitted that Kuwait, located in the geopolitical configuration of America in the Middle East, cannot be abandoned. Kuwait oil and wealth explains the manner in which it was treated in the international system, which differ greatly from the treatment meted out to Rwanda and mostly same to many Africa states in crises.

RWANDA

According to Schultz (2001) a small state that is highly dependent on development beyond its border hardly survive in a period of crisis. This is because such a small state is highly vulnerable to the adverse impact of climate change and natural disasters and



other internal problems, be it political or otherwise. Adding to this observation, Fredrick (2010:16) noted that the foreign policy of such a small state like Rwanda, is seen as a response to the constraints and politics of international system that at times may abandon it as was in the case of Rwanda in 1994.

Although the contention seemed to be disputed upon, owing to the fact that the importance of such a state domestic politics is expected to determine its foreign policy, he quickly added that Rwanda's domestic policy is a make-up of what was imported from outside its domain with implications. Agbu (2011) argued that Rwanda, unlike Israel and Kuwait, has nobody to speak for it. Furthermore, being a natural forest country of trees, wide life and interlocked – hilly state, which the possibility of help was ruled out such might have informed the event of 1994. Agwu (2011) in furthering assertion, add that it is because Rwanda is not strategic to any power configuration, it is a small country with no oil well, no diamond and of no importance in the international system compared to Israel or Kuwait, thereby prompting its abandonment in 1994.

Inference to the contentions above and in the re-examinations of the tool of analysis mentioned above to explaining the political dynamism that led to the war/genocide in 1994 at Rwanda and the interpretations or consideration of the element of power relations it is evidence

that Rwanda was negatively treated by the international community. Rwanda, a small state that was inexperienced, was left to experience the momentum of international power struggle in the emerging new international system. The power play of the international community, especially between America and France left much to be questioned on their role in the abandonment and failed diplomacy. As the factors in the lapses also left the Hutu government to annihilate both Tutsis and modulate Hutus alike in the peak of the crisis. In the context of position and relevance in the international system, Rwanda was found wanting and missing.

CONCLUSION

In view of the foregoing, it is evidence that the role of actors in international conflict, internal state political crisis, and regional conflicts alike had been modulated by national interest backed by element of politics and power, to which most crises had leaned on as a supporting beam in either escalating the propensity of the of conflicts or the longevity of its duration with diplomacy being the end point of either the execution or stayed-execution in the world context.

Imperatively too, there are huge politics in the treatment of state in the international system. More especially, small states who may not be able to make any impact in the affairs of international system beyond their capacity. At times they are neglected or

seldomly ignored in case of any internal upheavals as was in the situation of Rwanda. Rwandan people being close in interaction and relationship to outside world against such treatment might have seen that they are the architect of their own misfortune. This is sequel to the fact that its abysmal relationship to the outside world actually played on the kind of diplomacy that was used to addressing its political crisis in the period between 1988 to 1994.

This means to say that the relationship a state puts up towards a neighbour, either inside or outside its domain or the world in general at times modulates the kind of treatment apportioned to it in time of trouble or conflict. Moreover, it is evidence that even before then, and thereafter, that diplomacy in Rwanda from the period of build - up to the time of conflict escalation in 1994 was already a complete failure. If the role of individual states to the Rwandan crisis had portrayed a negating adventure from the onset, it then means that it is these hiccups that created the several contours that in turn led to the conflicts and the consequent abandonment and wilful neglect of the people in the period.

The superior base of power struggle between United States and France also, perhaps, displayed the intrigues, denial and delay to act and the consequence lapses in the diplomatic practices of the states to the crisis in Rwanda that enhanced and encouraged the kind of diplomacy witnessed in Rwanda in 1994 war/genocide.

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