

## Integration Between Voice and Silence in Human Resource Management (HRM) Perspective, A Literature Review

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### Abstract

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Many developments from studies on the concept of employee voice actualization in various theoretical disciplines - including Human Resource Management ( HRM ) , Organizational Behavior ( OB ) , Industrial Relations (IR) and Labor Process (LP) - are approaching phenomena from various ontological points. However, very few study the antithesis of employee voice, namely employee silence. This article aims to develop a conceptual framework of Voice and Silence employees based on interdisciplinary integration from the perspective of OB, IR, and LP. An integrated approach like this can offer a more reflective understanding of the social and psychological antecedents of employee Voice and Silence to academics, policymakers, and human resource management practitioners. This framework is critical to promote a pluralist view of the "silence" of employees which is illustrated by the concept of 'antagonism structured', which is rarely used in the study of HRM and OB. research continues suggested outlined to help integrate a more diverse approach to the vase of employees.

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## INTRODUCTION

Analysis of employee voice can be traced in Hirschman's research (1970: 30), where voice is seen as a vehicle for "changing unpleasant circumstances". However, the employee's "silence" is not part of the analysis, even though the employee's silence can be a manifestation of 'leaving' under the Hirschman framework. HRM tends to use OB insights to explain VaS (for example, Kwon, Farndale, & Park, 2016; Morrison, Wheeler-Smith, & Kamdar, 2011; Farndale et al., 2011; Park & Nawakitphaitoon, 2018; Rees, Alfes, & Gatenby, 2013; Wang, Wu, Liu, Hao, & Wu, 2016). In this article it is proposed that the HR audience can gain greater insight into the depth of integration approaches that are often exposed to each other, that is the perspective of organizational behavior (OB), industrial relations (IR) and the work process (LP). Wilkinson et al. (2014: 5) defines voice as "an opportunity for employees to have a voice and potentially influence organizational affairs related to issues that affect their work and the interests of managers and owners". Silence can reflect a situation in a company where employees do not have the opportunity to vote or do not use it for various reasons (Donaghey, Cullinane, Dundon, & Wilkinson, 2011).

This article provides a conceptual framework of multi-dimensional and multi-layers voice and silence, based on interdisciplinary integration from the perspective of OB, IR, and LP. This article contributes to advancing HR knowledge in four important ways. First, the integrated framework encourages HR academics to expand HRM beyond any paradigm by including forms of indirect, direct, informal and formal social dialogue. Approaches in a way that can capture how the vase reflects a relationship centered on strength; that is, relationships formed by unequal power exchanges. Second, a framework that integrates allow academics HR to connect the various levels, layers, and dimensions silence different employees to describe more fully why the employees do not speak. While OB provides more useful insights into understanding such as

collective reasoning, managerial behavior, individual traits, and psychological security, IR helps understand the institutional context for voice, and LP informs a deeper appreciation of the influence of agents connecting wider social structures of accumulation. with the political process of HR decision making at the company level. Third, this article builds on the HRM literature (Farndale et al., 2011; Morrison et al., 2011; Rees et al., 2013; Knoll and Redman, 2011; Avery, McKay, Wilson, Volpone, & Killham, 2011) for building critical pluralist perspectives on employees' "voice" and "silence" in various workplace settings (Godard, 2014; Ramsay, Scholarios, & Harley, 2000; Wright, 2000). Specifically, this article develops the critical pluralist concept of 'structured antagonism' (Edwards, 1986), which is ignored in most HRM studies (for example, Knoll and Redman, 2016; Morrison et al., 2011; Avery et al., 2011; Kwon et al., 2016; Farndale et al., 2011; Park & Nawakitphaitoon, 2018; Wang et al., 2016). 'Structured antagonism' explains how structural strength imbalances can damage employees' 'voice' and 'silence', depending on the formation and articulation of conflicting interests between employers and employees (eg cooperation vs. conflict and control vs. approval tension). Finally, the proposed integrative framework can support public, managerial and broader policy debates. For example, this article highlights the human hearing that silence - its employees may occur because of the mechanism of voice that effectively inaccessible; or employees whose silence alone may be a form of rejection and / or bad behavior. HR practices can then be critically evaluated using understanding from a variety of disciplinary perspectives to help move beyond narrow performance-driven metrics that have little meaning to employees.

This review literature compares the intersection of OB, IR, and LP analyze regarding employee voice and silence. Furthermore, a brief description of "voice" on the concept of HRM will be described, the contribution of OB in "voice" and "silence" of employees and then reviewed, and incorporated

from the viewpoint of HRM when necessary. After that, the relevance of structured antagonism to employees' "voice" and "silence" is considered and extended to section four to be developed into an integrated OB-IR-LP sensitivity framework.

## THEORETICAL REVIEW

### Voice and Silence in Human Resource Management perspective

The main focus of the literature HRM typically discusses how the opportunities for the mechanism of voice directly to help improve organizational processes (Fu et al., 2017; Huselid, 1995; Knoll & Redman, 2016). For example, Knoll and Redman (2016: 832) focus on voice upward sponsored by a company where employees "to express the idea that aims for process improvement and innovation". Rees et al., (2013: 2782) tested employee perceptions about the extent to which they were involved in voice behavior aimed at improving the functioning of their workgroups. Fu et al., (2017: 344) encouraged "HR practices that are easily implemented focusing on the process of creating opportunities for employees to get involved, as a medium to improve higher performance". Fu et al., (2017: 344) suggest making an internal bulletin, or social media, where employees can exchange knowledge, information, and ideas to improve existing practice.

HRM interpretation is often assumed that the mechanism of voice employees can align employee goals and organization through increased commitment and involvement (Farndale et al., 2011: 115). Holland, Pyman, Cooper, & Teicher, 2011 (2011: 97) a union "has been accompanied by direct voice diffusion, with priority placed on voice as a means of increasing employee productivity and commitment to the organization." Rees et al., 2013 (2013: 2780) claim a positive relationship between employee voice and engagement, where the engagement strategy is a way of "aligning employee interests more closely with organizational goals, which is predicted

assuming that employee voice will, in turn, improve organizational performance". Such narratives present a unified focus on a direct voice where employees share ideas to benefit from organizational goals. However, this can disregard the different (or conflicting) interests of managers and employees and the imbalance of structural forces between them (Cullinane & Dundon, 2014; Kaufman, 2015; Marchington, 2015).

Researchers previously found the scheme voice that is facilitated by the employer provides the voice of employees on management requirements, which may be very limited in communication at lower levels and has a shortage of inclusion for decision-making (Barry, Dundon, & Wilkinson, 2018). Examining 'depth' (ie, level of influence), 'scope' (ie, about what problems), 'level' (ie, department, team or company) and 'form' (ie, direct, formal, informal) voice mechanism very important for academics and HR practitioners (Wilkinson et al., 2014). Holland et al. (2011: 106-107) said that they measure the presence of the mechanism of voice, which is not too embedded depth and breadth settings voice which is in the level of early stage at the workplace". Rees et al., 2013 (2013: 2793) further cautions: "We have considered voice perception, not voice reality." Likewise, Farndale et al., (2011: 124) noted, "this study has used indirect voice measures, exploring how many employees believe that their managers provide opportunities for voice, not a real voice."

It can be said that HRM is very focused on generating employee voice perception, rather than providing insight into the depth of voice. For example, Farndale et al., (2011: 116) states: "Voice can lead to long-term positive attitudes because employees see the potential to influence decisions, regardless of whether the impact of employee voices on the outcome of decisions is realized". Also, they conclude that voice perceptions build trust relationships "regardless of whether the outcome of the decision is beneficial for employees or not". 'Voice perception' without a broad voice can "motivate employees to respond according to the wishes of

the organization" (Kwon et al., 2016: 3) and legitimate decisions with negative employee outcomes in the short term, but this is not sustainable.

So, overall, the danger is that HRM's view of voice is based on the erroneous idea of the voice mechanism as evidence of shared interests and shared goals. Furthermore, this becomes a pro-market orientation where voice is mainly based on values deemed to be in the interests of shareholders and organizations, rather than the right to expand or enhance democracy in the workplace (Boxall, Purcell, & Wright, 2008; Dundon & Rafferty, 2018). The HRM literature on voice and silence often evokes insight into OB (for example, Goldberg, Clark, & Henley, 2011; Kwon et al., 2016; Knoll and Redman, 2011; Avery et al., 2011; Farndale et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2016; Park & Nawakitphaitoon, 2018; Rees et al., 2015).

#### **Voice and Silence in the Perspective of Organizational Behavior (OB)**

Likewise, with HRM, OB research strongly emphasizes how 'opportunities to have voice are provided by direct voice mechanisms based on unitary, oriented-oriented assumptions (Ashford & Barton, 2007; Burris, Detert, & Chiaburu, 2008; Detert, Burris, Harrison, & Martin, 2013; Fast, Burris, & Bartel, 2014; Grant, 2013; Liu, Tangirala, & Ramanujam, 2013; Tangirala & Ramanujam, 2008). For example, constructing several definitions of the OB voice, Morrison (2011: 375.) conceptualizes it as "communicating ideas or suggestions about work-related problems to improve the functioning of an organization or unit". Likewise, Grant (2013: 1703) defines voice as "proactive behavior that involves talking with suggestions for improvement". Detert et al. (2013: 626) explains that the voice is a challenging organizational citizenship behavior, prosocial, and aimed a specific role in improving the performance of the organization by changing existing practices. They investigated three "different voice flow ideas or proposals to attract more business, increase customer satisfaction, and increase effectiveness" ( Detert et al. 2013:

659). The voice flow includes employee voice for 1) partners, 2) direct managers and 3) other managers. They aim to "see what and how differences exist in ways that are relevant to predictions that might be made about their impact on performance".

Reflecting unitary perspectives where conflict is seen as dysfunctional, employee complaints and complaints are usually not considered voice because employee complaints do not directly support organizational goals (Barry & Wilkinson, 2016; Mowbray, Wilkinson, & Tse, 2015). According to Detert et al. (2013: 641), the weakness of voice among coworkers is that it will be "coded by outside observers or internal leaders as" ventilation, "blowing steam, "or even" complaining "and that" while such communication can make the speaker feel better in the short term, it might just reduce the climate and unit performance over time ". Morrison (2014: 179-180) states that "the main intention of " voice " is to bring positive change, improvement, and not just to complain or get positive results for yourself." Tangirala & Ramanujam, 2008 by arguing that employees with autonomous, less expressing voice. But they see voice as "ideas and suggestions that are change-oriented" about work-related issues " rather than "personal complaints resulting from perceived injustice."

The OB voice mechanism is usually a direct channel that builds performance around the organizational climate and socially shared cognition between workers and leaders (LePine & Van Dyne, 1998; Morrison et al., 2011). Morrison (2011: 386) explains that recent OB research "has not yet considered the role of formal communication mechanisms much, perhaps because of the conceptualization of voice as extra-discretionary role behavior that occurs in face-to-face contexts. "Exceptions include Morrison and Milliken (2000), who encourage formal upward communication channels to promote voice, and Miceli, Near, and Dworkin (2008), which state that complaints are more likely to occur if internal reporting procedures exist.

Silence - its employees in the OB literature is "cutting ideas, questions, concerns, information or opinions deliberate by employees on issues related to the job and the organization they work" (Van Dyne, Ang, and Botero, 2003: 1389). Silence is described as things that are not desirable because the employees are not clicking to communicate their ideas so it may damage the interests of the organization. For example, silence has "significant implications for the team and organizational performance" because, "key decision-makers or teams may not have the information they need to make the right decision or to fix potentially serious problems" (Morrison, 2011: 374). Fast et. al., (2014: 1028) states that "holding back voices that are oriented to improvement can deny an organization's access to ideas that trigger growth, learning, and adaptation". Likewise, with HRM research that highlights employee involvement, Morrison (2014: 88) notes how employee silence can stimulate "high levels of stress, dissatisfaction, and loss or loss of potential employees, which can damage performance and retention".

Research in the field of OB addresses two important issues that shape whether or not employees speak up (Morrison, 2011, 2014). First, employees value 'voice efficacy', therefore, they can remain silent if they consider the conversation useless and/or no one will listen (Detert & Trevino, 2010; Milliken, Morrison, & Hewlin, 2003; Pinder & Harlos, 2001; Van Dyne et al., 2003). Second, voice is formed by 'psychological security', "people's perceptions about the consequences of taking interpersonal risks in certain contexts such as the workplace" (Edmondson & Lei, 2014). Silence in such contexts is labeled silence (Pinder & Harlos, 2001) and 'silence' (Van Dyne et al., 2003). Negative impacts might involve how others perceive their image, colleague relations, identity, social capital, termination of employment, restrictions on career development, and unattractive work assignments (Ashford & Barton, 2007; Bowen & Blackmon, 2003; Grant, 2013; Liang, Crystal, Farh, & Farh, 2012; Miceli et al., 2008; Milliken et al., 2003; Morrison & Milliken, 2003). These OB ideas are applied in

HR studies; for example, Goldberg et al. (2011) evoke psychological security and the efficacy of voice (see also Kwon et al., 2011; Farndale et al., 2011; Park & Nawakitphaitoon, 2018; Rees et al., 2013).

'Organizational identification' is a prominent idea in voice and silence in the OB perspective, developing ideas about commitment and involvement with unitary postures for common goals and shared interests. Organizational identification is "the extent to which employees feel unity or ownership with their organization and include organizational attributes in their self-definition" (Tangirala and Ramunjam, 2008: 1190). This reflects "the amount of interest felt by individuals and organizations" (Smidts, Pruyn, & Van Riel, 2001: 1051). Ashford and Barton (2007: 231) assert that organizational identification fosters voice by creating "motives to try and help and improve those organizations." Liu et al. (2013: 199) argue that "managers who want to encourage voice behavior need to build or strengthen employee identification." They found a positive relationship between transformational leaders and voice. Such leaders "emphasize the collective identity and values and vision of the whole organization (or group)" and make "organizational or group goals meaningful to employees" (p. 192). Organizational identification is also considered a positive byproduct of voice. Smidts et al. (2001) argue that when employees perceive voice opportunities, organizational identification is enhanced. Besides, as stated by Morrison and Milliken (2000), if employees evaluate the voice opportunities they feel valued, thereby increasing organizational commitment and identification.

What is interesting is the argument that organizational identification can also trigger silence, because attachment to the organization overrides employee dissatisfaction (Tangirala & Ramanujam, 2008). Related, Ashford and Barton (2007) argue that employees may not speak up because it can threaten their identity (and organization). Highly identified employees do not always recognize problems outside the organization's current framework of reference

and they tend not to conflict with applicable norms, so they remain silent. Research by Burriss et al. (2008: 914) do not support the hypothesis that the more employees are psychologically attached to the organization (ie, "identify with their organization's goals and values"), the more they are involved in voice-oriented improvement.

They argue this may be due to employees who are very bound like organizations. Similar arguments are made in the HRM literature. For example, Knoll and Redman (2011: 833) find that employees who feel "a sense of belonging to the organization" and show a "strong psychological relationship with their organization", tend to be involved in voice promotions. However, they conclude that the employee can also engage in silence - it is prosocial when they "hold the views that can disrupt the functioning of the workplace without hindrance" (Knoll and Redman, 2011: 832) and "hold opinions or concerns that if they thinking to express them will challenge relationships at work" (Knoll and Redman, 2011: 833).

From the perspective of HRM, perspective OB on the voice and silence research is strongly based on the views of unity of purpose and common interests, where employees speak to fulfill a common goal, and perhaps silence for the identification of a strong organization. Morrison & Milliken, 2000 acknowledged that reduces silence - its employees is very important to create a pluralist organization, which they define as "an organization that respects and reflects the difference between the employee and which allows the disclosure of a range of perspectives and opinions". However, as Fox (1979) notes, although pluralism is in principle attractive, it can also be aspirational and difficult in practice because of various external forces and because management has structural strength advantages. Furthermore, pluralist organizations that provide mechanisms for expressing alternative concerns are different from pluralist organizations that facilitate the distribution of power in decision making through these mechanisms. There seems to be more focus on

OB that observes the perception of voice than building democracy in the workplace. For example, Milliken et al. (2003: 5) note that when top management is "considered willing to listen", this motivates the voice, but this is not the same as assessing whether managers share power over the outcome of decision making when a voice is expressed.

OB insights indeed draw attention to how positional and hierarchical power relations shape voice and silence (Morrison & Milliken, 2000; Fast et al., 2013; Kish-Gephart, Detert, Trevino, & Edmondson, 2009; Detert & Trevino, 2010). Kish-Gephart et al. (2009: 174) argue that the emotion of 'fear' has a significant effect when employees consider facing an authoritative individual. In this context, "contemplating voice triggers fear of being ready to anger other people of higher status, which automatically triggers recognition of potential negative consequences." Likewise, Detert and Trevino (2010: 263) found that fear prevents employees from using voice to managers and that "this fear can originate from the idea of speaking to more senior authority figures". Furthermore, Morrison and Milliken (2000) and Fast et al. (2013) asserted that managerial perceptions of employee voices as threats and suspicions were largely shaped by the strength of positions and hierarchical relationships.

In short, OB and HRM perspectives are generally biased toward direct voice mechanisms, not overly recommending indirect forms of voice. While OB research focuses on informal voice behavior (Morrison, 2011), the HRM literature examines formal and informal practices (Mowbray et al., 2015). OB offers a range of employee motivations that are useful for speaking or maintaining silence, including the efficacy of voice, psychological security, leader-member exchange, identity, emotions and position and hierarchical resources (Detert & Edmondson, 2011; Detert & Trevino, 2010; Kish-Gephart et al., 2009; Morrison, 2014). This idea is presented in HRM research with different psychological differences (eg, Goldberg et al., 2011; Kwon et al., 2011; Knoll and Redman, 2011; Avery et al., 2011). However, OB

drawbacks include paying too much attention to individual-level factors and ignoring broader socio-economic, political and institutional forces (Godard, 2014; Barry et al., 2018),

Also, weaknesses in many OBs and HRM related research are the premise of unitary shared goals and aligning the interests of employees and organizations (for example, Ashford & Barton, 2007; Liu et al., 2013; Tangirala & Ramanujam, 2008; Farndale et al., 2011; Rees et al., 2013). This creates a bias towards voice 'oriented improvements' (Detert et al., 2013; Grant, 2013; Burris et al., 2008; Fast et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2013; Tangirala and Ramanujam, 2008; Ashford & Barton, 2007; Morrison, 2011; Knoll & Redman, 2016; Fu et al., 2017) and ignore how the interests of different employer-employees in power relationships that are structurally unbalanced shape the results of voice and silence. Finally, the focus in OB and HRM focuses on the presence and perception of behavior and voice mechanisms, rather than whether they provide democracy in the workplace or how deeply these arrangements are embedded (Holland et al., 2011; Farndale et al., 2011; Rees et al., 2013; Morrison & Milliken, 2000; Milliken et al., 2003).

#### **Similarities in the interpretation of IR and LP**

Following the definition of voice as 'an opportunity to have a voice', employees can use this opportunity to support organizational goals; but importantly, they can also challenge HR management and practices by attempting to influence alternative outcomes. Most importantly, 'opportunities to have a voice reflect' structured antagonism 'are permanently embedded in people management systems (Edwards, 1986; Kaufman, 2014).

While the different positions adopted in the flow IR / LP, including dialectical pluralist discourse, Marxist, post-modernist and critical framework for this support pluralist orientation critical in supporting the inclusion and integration (Dundon & Dobbins, 2015; Edwards, 1986). Powered by antagonism structured political and economic theory, the

framework seeks to map the phenomenon around silence its employees to capture better how and why workers remain silence, knowing the context and external processes and endogenous.

The HRM approach builds a critical pluralist view to recognize that aligning shared goals may be desirable but problematic. Although there is a degree of mutual dependence between employers and employees, inherent power imbalances usually favor employers. The power here is more rooted structurally and extends deeper than the 'position' and 'hierarchical' power relations presented in several OB / HR studies (Detert & Trevino, 2010; Fast et al., 2014; Kish-Gephart et al., 2009). Both parties have interests that are structurally conflicting because employers and employees will always seek control. There is a potential for tension, where employees can pursue the interests and beliefs of individuals who differ from management, which can trigger conflicts. However, both parties also seek to secure potential joint goals, for example, the survival of the company (Edwards, Bélanger, & Wright, 2006), generating opportunities for cooperation (Dobbins & Dundon, 2017; Edwards & Ram, 2009) and organizational efficiency (Johnstone & Wilkinson, 2016). Furthermore, employees not only actively seek to control workers efforts and work tasks but also try to support employee commitment and loyalty (Edwards, 1986; Fox, 1966, Johnstone & Wilkinson, 2016).

Employee costs and benefits including social and monetary rewards reflect the uncertainty in which employee exchange efforts are unbalanced, unpredictable, varied and can be felt differently by workers when comparing with other groups (Baldamus, 1961; Fox, 1966). Therefore, employers and employees engage in ongoing effort-reward bargains and their respective concerns can be unified or distorted day by day. But how managers can adopt or engage in voice relationships is a complex thing. Managers are under pressure to achieve company goals and are limited by the interests of owners and shareholders, especially under

financial capitalism (Thompson, 2003, 2013). This is proven in the HR literature, Ulrich (1998: 125-126) states: "Line managers have primary responsibility for the processes and outcomes of a company". However, as Jaros reminds (2005: 8), managers may have "a level of discretion that is independent of profit or mandatory value maximization", which can determine the nature and quality of voice or the level of structured antagonism. The manager is the employees themselves, but also the owner's agent, and thus can pursue their own goals that may conflict with interelict-cooperation and control-agreement tensions are important, as described in the following section.

Based on the view that employment instills 'structured antagonism', the IR / LP perspective can help explain the three main issues surrounding "voice" and "silence" that are ignored in the HRM / OB perspective discussed in the previous section. First, given the relationship of power imbalances and the potential interests of different employers-employees, the IR / LP perspective provides a thicker explanation of why employees do not always express a voice to benefit the organization, but rather to advance the interests of individuals and/or their collective, who can compete with organizational goals. What is important for the HR audience, providing employees with effective mechanisms to express potentially conflicting interests can be beneficial to the organization in the long run (Dundon & Rafferty, 2018; Mowbray et al., 2015). Second, employees can withhold potentially valuable information to reject managerial authority or improve degrading work. The idea has a long and established pedigree in the study of sociology and policy theory on employment relations and employment (eg Braverman, 1974; Burawoy, 1979; Thompson, 1989). It recognizes cooperative and conflictual debates about how human resource practices can change work practices that expose exploitative results or increase sustainability and protect workers and organizations from time and space. Third, recognizing the complex tensions that underlie people who manage, "silence" can manifest as

a form of cooperation and compromise, which can be manipulated or coerced by management actions (Burawoy, 2013). For example, MacMahon, O'Sullivan, Murphy, Ryan, and MacCurtain (2018) report incidents in which HR procedures to combat intimidation at work are sometimes in vain and management actions give rise to a culture of employee silence due to the perception of fear about possible retaliation against them.

Although the IR / LP perspective combines a more socio-political world view of workplace relations based on 'structured antagonism', their explanations of voice and silence differ in several key aspects, which are found in the sections to come.

### **Voice and Silence in the Perspective of Industrial Relations**

IR Analysis develops many disciplines such as history, economics, law, politics, sociology, and psychology, and focuses broadly on all labor actors, including management, labor, workers / employers' associations and government agents (Kaufman, 2014). Various levels of analysis are explored in IR, examining external influences on the behavior of 'actors', 'institutions' of the labor market, on IR 'processes' (eg bargaining, rewards, commitments, etc.) and 'outcomes' (such as voice and silence). IR research for decades has contributed to public policy, from the Wagner Act (1935) US New Deal and the UK Donovan Commission (1968), to the display of economic employee rights, or the implications of robot technology on work (Ackers, 2010; Berg, 2016; Kochan, 2015). While IR examining managerial behavior, the way he connects workplace relationships with macro-level factors, such as labor laws and institutional rules, helping inform a broader understanding of contextual diversity in contemporary HRM vis-à-vis the voice and silence "of his employees (Wilkinson, Gollan, Kalfa, & Xu, 2018). In contrast to HRM / OB, IRs build a unique agency-focus focus on employee voices that are oriented in direct and indirect forms, including unions, work councils, consultative committees and Civil Society

Organizations (CSOs) (Williams, Abbott, & Heery, 2011).

The results of institutional voices are learned in IR. For example, the workers' council has been proven to support two benefit claims. The first is the rent-producing effect: when workers have a collective voice through the work board, the rate of employee resignation is lower (Nienhüser, 2014). The effect is sharing information and supporting organizational efficiency. The second is rent-seeking outcomes, through compulsory collective dialogue, workers can organize the supply of labor and support a higher income than under the competitive labor market that was charity (Nienhüser, 2014: 247). Besides, institutional economists have shown that collective bargaining has proven the effects of positive income distribution, along with social and ethical values regarding greater justice support (Kaufman, 2007). The study also examined the relationship between the mechanism of employee voice and non-union (Willman, Bryson, & Gomez, 2009). For example, Dundon, Wilkinson, Marlington, and Ackers (2004) found the mechanism of union and non-union HRM voice in multi-factory organizations in the United Kingdom and Ireland to be complex, involving joint contestation of coexistence. The findings that are well cited in union settings are those reported by Black and Lynch (2004), which show a positive relationship between bargaining and labor productivity. Likewise, Dobbins and Gunnigle (2009) report, in making capital-intensive, that union-management negotiation systems can help reconcile different interests that support new and innovative HR arrangements.

Contrary to OB, IR analysis seeks to capture the 'depth' of the influence of voice, where employee problems can contribute, and at what level in the organization (Wilkinson et al., 2014). This is important because research shows that "silence" may be a byproduct of a shallow voice system, and managers force decisions unilaterally. According to Cullinane and Donaghey (2014: 402), 'accidental silence' can occur when 'there is no voice' in the organization. Subsequently, Dobbins, Dundon,

Cullinane, Hickland, and Donaghey (2017) examined the results of organizational-level voice mechanisms established under the Information and Consultation (ICE) Regulations (2004) in the United Kingdom and Ireland. They found that weak and minimalistic regulations gave employers high-level policies.

Contrary to OB, IR analysis seeks to capture the 'depth' of the influence of voice, where employee problems can contribute, and at what level in the organization (Wilkinson et al., 2014). This is important because research shows that silence may be a by-product of shallow voice systems, and managers force decisions unilaterally. According to Cullinane and Donaghey (2014: 402), 'accidental silence' may arise when 'there is no voice' in the organization. Furthermore, Dobbins, Dundon, Cullinane, Hickland, and Donaghey (2017) examined the results of organizational-level voice mechanisms established under Information and Consultation Regulations (ICE) (2004) in the United Kingdom and Ireland. They find that weak and minimalistic regulations provide employers with a high level of discretion when responding to legal regulations for voice that result in shallow employee participation in small matters.

For this purpose, relevant contextual factors recognized in IR research are socio-economic and political characteristics in various labor regimes (see also Barry, Wilkinson, & Gollan, 2014). For example, voices are generally shallower in Liberal Market Economies (LME), such as the UK, US, Australia or Ireland, where voices and labor regulations do not have a legal support mandate (see also Gallie, 2011). Conversely, voice may be more expansive in Coordinated Market Economics (CME), such as Germany, when voice is supported by tougher institutional support for social dialogue (Dobbins et al., 2017). IR also recognizes that institutional structures can be very different. For example, Artus (2013) discusses the shallow voices found in the critical service sector in Germany. Important here is that the divergence of institutional labor regimes is important in

terms of labor practices and HR design (Holman & Rafferty, 2018).

Therefore, you could say, the contribution of IR has a lot to offer in troubleshooting voice and silence - its employees. Some OB studies analyze outside the organizational level (eg, Morrison & Milliken, 2000). IR research connects voice and silence in the workplace with institutional arrangements such as trade unions, labor laws and regulations, civil society organizations and employers' associations.

However, the exclusive IR approach can be seen partially for several reasons. First, despite shifting to direct forms and employee engagement (Ackers, 2010), IR studies generally focussed indirect employee voices by ignoring individual or hybrid voice systems that combine trade unions and non-union mechanisms (Barry & Wilkinson, 2016). Only a few studies highlight the increasing importance of informal voice (Marchington & Sutej, 2013; Townsend, Wilkinson, & Burgess, 2013). For example, non-union SME workers can use family and friendship relationships to modify work conditions (Edwards & Ram, 2009). Associated, IRs often prioritize the level of institutional analysis, especially employment regulation, collective bargaining and recent non-union representation (Wilkinson et al., 2014). This can cause IR to understate the influence of individual-level factors that OB conveys insight into; for example, employees may feel they are not treated with dignity, even if they are satisfied with other conditions (Hodson, 2001)

Similar to OB / HRM, pluralist IR strains do not always recognize structural contradictions that are rooted to the same extent with more radical perspectives (Dundon & Dobbins, 2015; Edwards, 1986, 2014). Voice widely regarded as a good thing for employees because it will be good for the union and managerial effectiveness (Goodman, Earnshaw, Marchington, & Harrison, 1998). However, this view may not fully appreciate that employees can remain silence even when the voice mechanism is very broad, perhaps as a form of pressure (eg suffering in silence ) or to correct the effects of inherent power imbalances (eg

changing current circumstances) as discussed in the following section (Burawoy, 1979; van den Broek & Dundon, 2012; Woodcock, 2017). Therefore, pluralist IRs underestimate silence as a benefit for employees or as rational and deliberate workers' actions. Furthermore, the recent neural "-pluralist" IR (Ackers, 2014) lacks coverage when describing situations where employee voices suppress the interests of workers; for example, employees who share knowledge about organizational improvement and processes with management can trigger exploitation through increased workload, reduced autonomy, or job insecurity (Adler, 1993).

In short, IR research may lack respect for individual-level social processes and psychological traits, informal voice and line management involvement that underlies HRM. That is indeed interesting insights about institutional structures, regulations and other macro-level context factors that can exploit or break patterns. LP voice and silent research offer additional explanatory utilities in these areas, discussed in the next section.

### **Voice and silence in the labor process perspective**

Antecedents of sociological LP can help with a more integrative approach by examining the contradictions and tensions in human resource management, by including community strengths and the implications that accompany them on the voice of workers at the organizational level.

LP emphasizes that because of labor uncertainty and the potential for conflicting interests, voice and silence can be evident in the form of resistance from individual and / or collective workers (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999: 31). Theory LP adding that the silence of his employees may manifest in various forms of resistance, bad behavior, or damage, to oppose HR practices is believed to damage the interests of their workers. Resistance may stem from concerns surrounding autonomy, skills, manager limits, reconfigured managers, organizational structure and job design. This may involve

employees who seek 'retaliation' in management for some previous decisions or conditions imposed by withholding information or ideas that can improve work or organizational results, or increase management's ability to control or intensify employee efforts. For example, Graham (1993) points out that Subaru-Isuzu employees deliberately refuse to share work improvement information with management. Here, silence effectively limits management's ability to accelerate production lines. Thompson (1989: 137) discusses silence by Chrysler workers, who follow management's instructions to fit the door on the vehicle, despite knowing that management is sending the vehicle on the telephone in the wrong order. That mistake means expensive correction. Van den Broek and Dundon (2012) found that workers at non-union call centers regulate the flow of information and feedback to customers and management as different actions from employee silence, to 'get back' to managers for tight supervision. Woodcock (2017) makes a similar observation. Importantly, these may or may not be the actions that employees want to take, but they are embedded in economic and social relationships that are centered on power.

In addition to trying to "get-by" in management, "silence" can help workers overcome and 'get-by' in reducing work capacity. For example, employees may feel 'alienated' because they have limited job autonomy and ownership of decisions that affect them and their work (Donovan, O'Sullivan, Doyle, & Garvey, 2016; Woodcock, 2017). While OB research discusses the influence of managerial beliefs with concern for organizational effectiveness, LP assumes that managerial beliefs can have overall ideological value, so that voice can be considered by managers as an "unwanted barrier of effective work processes" (Kaufman, 2014: 19). Thus, employers can actively limit the opportunity for employees to air noise as a way to actively consolidate the power of the employer and silence - its workers can gain control of managerial standpoint (MacMahon et al., 2018: 14). Reflecting some extent the OB "psychological safety", workers who recognize

negative managerial attitudes towards voice or trade unions can remain silent for 'fear' of retaliation should management view them as troublemakers (Artus, 2013).

However, unlike OB, LP places these ideas within a broader political economy framework that recognizes structured antagonism related to how people are managed in the workplace. For example, the perceived consequences of voicing to employers are influenced by workers' views of management style, job identity, gender, contract status and job security, legal rights together with the interests of employees at a certain point in time (Artus, 2013). For example, at Nippon CTV in the Delbridge factory study (1998: 132), workers believe management "does not want to hear questions" at meetings. Under LP, the uncertainty of labor uncertainty embedded in unbalanced work relationships means that conflict and cooperation coexist (Dundon & Dobbins, 2015; Edwards, 1986; Edwards et al., 2006; Wright, 2000). The cooperative relationship can motivate employees to suggest ideas to support organizational goals, which reflect OB's notion of a good quality leader-member exchange. However, recognizing structured antagonism also reveals other implications. Managers can create a more favorable environment for voicing in certain contexts, even if this is against the manager's interests, to get employee cooperation on other matters. For example, Dobbins (2010) describes how managers relax direct control in Anquish Alumina and give voice work teams a variety of things, ranging from small issues such as vacation scheduling to larger budgeting problems. However, enabling employee voice allows managers to introduce indirect control measures such as performance targets and technical controls.

Furthermore, silence can occur because employees 'get along' with their work experience through a compromise relationship and cooperation. In Dobbins' research (2010), giving a voice to the team (which also included union representatives) triggered fewer conflicts and reduced complaints from 150 per year to 3-4

years. Besides, staying silence about issues that compete with organizational goals can mean other future assistance from management relating to career development, work-life balance, work assignments or other facilities. In the MacMahon et al (2018: 13) study, employees did not speak out against acts of intimidation when they had previous negative experiences about HR procedures that failed to protect employees who voiced their complaints.

Nevertheless, employees who are 'active' with their work can show the making of a silence attitude: that is, employees do not need to view HR policies as damaging their interests or forming shallow participation. For example, in the study of plant Burawoy (1979, 2013), bargaining concession-union workers to give "the illusion" about the involvement of employees. The unit-wage system makes workers compete with coworkers, but also allows them to determine how they carry out their work duties (eg. How much effort is expanded using the piece rate system). However, this system divides workers, damages collective employee representation, and ultimately hides the fact that companies enjoy increased productivity while paying workers very little. Nyberg and Sewell (2014) also found evidence of an illusory compromise, in which a 'happy family' culture was built to persuade employees that union voice was not needed, which further legitimized managerial control over workers. Therefore, LP theory shows a deeper insight into power dynamics that are less visible and how they can be played through HR policies for voice.

An important point for OB / HR audiences is that manager-employee collaboration must be understood in the context of different structural strengths and employer-employee interests (Edwards et al., 2006; Belanger and Edwards, 2007). For example, silence as a form of 'cooperation' does not indicate that conflict has been eliminated, and when the interests of employers and employees are harmonized, the conflict persists. Likewise, if employees voice concerns cooperatively in supporting organizational goals, the underlying

conflict of interest can persist, which can trigger voice in other contexts that damage the organization's goals. Likewise, if managers provide deeper employee voices and participation to secure cooperation, structural strength imbalances can persist. As Dobbins and Gunnigle (2009: 23) note, giving more voice to workers "is a new way to manage contradictions in work relationships and negotiate workplace order. Management control is not displaced but re-uses new guises. "

LP further adds to the conceptualization of voice and silence by considering broader forces in the capital circuit, such as financialization and globalization. As stated in Thompson's (2003) *Disconnected Capitalism Thesis (DCT)*, due to volatile markets and economic uncertainties, management's emphasis shifts to financialization, which tends to intensify HR around performance metrics driven by narrow markets (Cushen & Thompson, 2016). As a result, managers often fail to give their side of the expected agreement (aka psychological contract violations), including denial or simply not being able to provide opportunities for employees to voice. This can trigger collective counter mobilization (eg, through trade unions), or produce a culture of silence either as a form of resistance or withdrawal of employees for fear of managerial retaliation. For example, in Artus (2013: 416) temporary workers have little access to union protection, and non-standard contract employees are more likely to remain silence because of insecurity and "permanent fear of opening their mouths". To some extent, silence can be seen as a way to correct erratic conditions and poor working conditions.

Ramsay's 'cycle of control' (1977: 481) argues that "participation did not evolve from the humanization of capitalism, but appeared cyclically based on tightening conditions in the labor market". Therefore, managers are more likely to implement employee voice initiatives to ensure labor compliance when employer authority can be challenged by organized labor, such as during periods of increased union membership. However, Ackers, Marchington,

Wilkinson, and Goodman (1992) questioned Ramsay's thesis (1977) because of macro-level social focus. They found that because the organizational level managerial approach was reconfigured from time to time by interactions between many micro and macro-level forces, employee voice initiatives appeared in fluid 'waves' rather than cycles. Therefore, when examining how employee voice and silence are shaped by a broader balance of social, political and economic power under capitalism, it is not the only approach and analysis of intra-organization that remains important, including individual values, management choices and institutional regulations.

Overall, LP analysis has a rich explanation of the contested nature of people management under contemporary capitalism, which adds to the utility of examining silence and voice. It interweaves and integrates with an IR perspective (especially a radical and critical pluralist frame), while also signifying discrete points of intellectual difference. LP helps explain how voice and silence can be an outcome and also the process that employees use to improve the exchange of reward-degrading efforts. Amelioration can include workers 'getting back in management by hiding information; they are willing to 'hang out' with their coworkers and/or employers because of compromise or 'artificial agreement', or they may find themselves 'hanging out' when facing a difficult job.

Some of the influential forces discussed in LP research relate to OB, for example, managerial attitudes/perceptions, voice impact, voice vanity, and manager-employee exchanges. But, LP adds a valuable analytical lens, based on dynamic contestation of micro and macro-level strength, in antagonistic and unbalanced social relations. One possible way to integrate this debate and problem into a multi-layered voice and silence sensitivity framework is considered next.

## DISCUSSION

### **Integrate IR, LP and OB perspectives: into a multi-layered voice and silence framework**

This article tries to give an overview of the position of OB, IR, and LP on the voice and silence of employees, showing their strengths and weaknesses. In advancing the research agenda in the future, we invite critical pluralist work that integrates OB, IR and LP perspectives to help develop HRM perspectives that are more heuristic than ease of voice and silence.

### **Expanding HRM Research on " Voice " and " Silence "**

Research shows that a weak voice system allows the influence of workers that are shallow and narrow, prevents organizations from reaping the full benefits of worker's voice, and can trigger 'silence' in the long term (Cullinane & Donaghey, 2014). Recognizing variations around the depth, scope, level, and shape of voice mechanisms can help the HR audience, including managers (Wilkinson et al., 2014).


Voice formal and informal often occur simultaneously within the organization (Marchington & Suter, 2013). HRM, IR and LP perspectives can give more attention to face-to-face informal voice, as is more captured in OB research (Morrison, 2011). Likewise, the OB literature can focus more on the behavior of actors in formal institutions that influence direct and representative forces, including trade unions, work councils, and civil society agents, as discussed in IR / LP. Besides, the HRM approach is generally biased towards the voice system initiated by management, but employees are more likely to secure a deeper voice by influencing voice initiation and requirements (Barry et al., 2018). Combining direct, formal, indirect and informal mechanisms can produce deeper conceptualizations of workers' voices, motives, and variable contested outcomes. Finally, the tradition of IR / LP does not need to be an impartial voice of non-union, classified the voice unions as effective and the voice of non-union is not effective, which has been deemed too simple (Cullinane & Dundon, 2014).

Although HRM discusses 'employee complaint procedures' and OB research considers alternative voice motives (Burriss,

2012; Klaas, Olson-Buchanan, & Ward, 2012), this focus is mainly based on the unitary assumptions about the improvement-based voice that support shared interests (Barry & Wilkinson, 2016). Several OB studies note 'organizational pluralism' that reflects the interests of different employer-employees (Morrison & Milliken, 2000), but too often the OB literature does not integrate cooperatives with conflict dynamics or combine internal and

external factors around 'structured antagonism' (Dundon & Dobbins, 2015; Edwards, 1986). Conversely, a more critical pluralist perspective emphasizes how employee voice and silence reflect long-lasting structural determinants, which are potentially at odds with employer-employee interests, relational power imbalances, and changes in institutional and legal contexts that affect HR policies and practices.

Figure 1 A "voice" and "silence" framework in the Human Resource Management perspective



A further consideration is needed in the HRM OB flow from these fundamental structural factors to better explain why employees express voice, regardless of what is deemed necessary to maintain organizational goals, and how employees can challenge management goals with resistance, damage or silence. Seeing voice and silence in this way can be considered by the HR audience as undermining management goals, but this depends on the context and, indeed, it can stimulate positive results for the long-term organization.

**Deepening HRM Theory About the Power That Forms "Voice" and "Silence"**

The proposed sensitivity framework is graphically depicted in Figs. 1, silence bil of Goodrich's (1920) 'frontier of control'. This builds and expands the "silence" which is debated by Donaghey et al. (2011: 61) through potentially integrative synergies in OB, HRM, IR, and LP, as discussed in the previous section so far. As noted in Fig. 1, some of these dimensions overlap between disciplinary boundaries, while others remain distinct and separate. Phase 1 describes the formation of interest 'and' antagonism structured 'as the basic principles that form the attitude of "silence"

and HR practices. OB's contributions include insights into pro-social behavior, informal voice, efficacy and safety, making common sense, emotions and the nature and behavior of individuals. Also, LP helps understand a variety of contextual influences including market and capitalism influences, management beliefs, depth and scope of voice, skills and gender identity (among others). Most important, LP theory links this with structured antagonism and the diverse interests of manager-employees. Contributions IR provides a canvas institutional smooth, unpack the dynamic interactions between contexts (eg markets, financialization), actor (eg, unions, management style, country, etc.), Process (for example, talks of trade unions, the depth and scope voice, etc.) and results (for example, financialization of work, temporary employment contracts, involvement or satisfaction). This idea encouraged a debate on HR that discussed how managers could balance internal and external forces that compete better under contemporary capitalism, to provide deeper employee voices and protect the sustainability of work practices.

Factors that influence stage 1 joint HR practices between organizations to form the formation of manager or employee interest, voice and silence. Most importantly, the effect of such mediation can coexist in the organization simultaneously, depending on the problem (for example, whether it is an employee's concern about wages, hours, etc. ; and suggestions that will make employee work more intense and repetitive), management or supervisory resources (including more latent powers) and the interests of employers or employees. What is important for HR viewers, depends on the unique configuration of Phase 1 (eg, management support or opposition to trade unions, market changes, employee supervision support, etc.), the type of HR practice that is applied can differ in various contexts.

The interaction between the forces of Phase 1 helps explain the voice of sense, the attitude of " silence " the intentional and unintentional, and workers 'return', 'hang out' and 'hang out', as illustrated in Phases 2 and 3.

Voice shallow or weak may cause 'intentional' and 'accidental' silence episodes or cultures. It is this can lead to an attitude of " silence " where workers are trying to 'get back' on their employer; for example by withholding information in various ways. Such silence can improve work experience that can be derived but can also reduce productivity and cooperation. Collaboration often occurs and coexists alongside dissatisfaction: if not, the relationship will stop over time (Johnstone & Wilkinson, 2016). Thus, employees can pro-actively 'get along' with their work through compromise relationships, without contributing ideas or expressing complaints and being compliant, but do not have to commit to organizational goals. Furthermore, workers can deliberately withhold information or be emotionally and psychologically attractive but remain compliant. Fear, the potential for retribution and / or vanity in speaking can lead to employee silence (MacMahon et al., 2018). To some extent, silence can function as a rational coping mechanism for employees to 'survive' in their work. Similarly, employees can engage in ' meaningful voice ' through union bargaining and / or non-union employee representative channels (Kaufman, 2014). However, the scope and level of such voices are not static or universal, but elastic and supported by structured antagonism.

HR hearings will benefit from a more critical pluralist and integrative approach to explain whether, and if so why, silence workers to 'get back', 'get back' and / or 'get with'. All three actions show that the various interests of workers are not fulfilled and tend to prevent organizations from fully fulfilling their goals either now, or in the future. The task for the policymakers, HR practitioners, and academics OB / IR / LP, is to explore how to meet the interests of a better worker, for example by giving a voice that was initiated by workers more effectively and make the job is not degrading and unsafe. To this end, the sensitivity framework has the potential for broader public policies and the implications of organizational practice.

The last column, Phase 4, describes the results of voice and silence formed by how manager/employee interests, structural antagonisms, and HR policy interventions subsequently mediate the interaction of social relations mentioned earlier in Stages 1, 2 and 3. Recognizing structural antagonisms can arguably add insight deeper understanding of HR. why employees can express "voice" to challenge management as a dynamic force, as well as to support organizational goals. This is not to judge whether the behavior of employees (or indeed HR managers) is good or bad in mobilizing resources for certain interests. Integrative contributions are based on the knowledge generation social science paradigm to develop a heuristic picture of why workers can speak or not by placing HR voice and silence in a multi-level political economy and institutional framework (Kaufman, 2014; Thompson, 2013; Wilkinson et al., 2018).

The last column, Phase 4, Review of voice and silence results compiled by the interests of managers or employees, structural antagonisms, and HR policy interventions then mediate the social relationships discussed earlier in Stages 1, 2 and 3. Recognize antagonisms that can be said to embellish HR dialogue the deeper. Why employees can support voice to challenge management, as well as to support organizational goals. This is not to judge whether employees (or indeed HR managers) are good or bad in mobilizing resources for certain purposes. Integrative contributions are based on the social science paradigm of knowledge generation to develop heuristic classifications of workers' speeches that can speak or not by using "voice" and "silence" on the perspective of HR in multi-level political economy and improving work safety (Kaufman, 2014; Thompson, 2013; Wilkinson et al., 2018).

## CONCLUSIONS

This article reviews the perspectives of OB, IR, and LP to develop a multi-layer and multi-level conceptual framework that can be used by HR academics and practitioners to

better understand employee voices, and more important is employee silence. "Voice" and "silence" research in the perspective of OB has used, but can be integrated with IR-LP fusion, which connects actors, processes, and institutions, while instilling micro-relationships in the workplace with contexts of change and socio-political continuity and meso-social politics. Our framework contributes to understanding "voice" and "silence" as a dynamic interface that combines formal and informal, direct or indirect and structures or institutions in the context of imbalance structural forces and diverse interests.

Designing a system of "voice" that is effective to provide benefits to workers and organizations in the future requires conceptualization more in what the "voice", and understand the impact the attitude of "silence" for a different purpose in its own right. This framework discusses voice and "silence" from the perspective of HRM by considering how it reflects 'structured antagonism' as an imbalance of deeply rooted forces that are formed in layers. Related, work talks also encourage HR hearings for critical voice criticism given to employees. This includes a discussion of their level, level, and discussion space, how indirect and informal voices can be approved in the form of direct HR and whether employees can state voice practices (Barry et al., 2018).

Second, the framework seeks to explain the situational factors internal and external multi-dimensional and social relationships that form the shape and pattern of silence employees in the context (ie., Silence deliberate silence unintentional, voice meaningful). These include OB ideas around pro-social motivation, psychological security, identity, images, group norms, position strength, perceptions, emotions, leadership and colleague relations (Morrison, 2011, 2014; Morrison & Milliken, 2000, 2003). Nonetheless, the IR / LP's insights on 'structured antagonism' embedded in the management process of people capture the broader external political-economic forces operating under capitalism (Thompson, 2013).

This framework also offers deeper meanings of silence, for example, perhaps reflecting the strategies of workers 'getting back', 'getting along' and 'getting-by'. Hopefully, this will trigger debate among HR hearings about how to better meet the problems of different workers, for the benefit of employees, organizations, and society.

This analysis calls for a future research agenda that examines, refutes and adjusts the source of the influence of the relationship about voice and silence as a resource that can be silence and more veiled. To gain a fuller and deeper insight, future research can be based on a critical pluralist approach that links the actions of micro individuals with the context of meso organization and broader macroeconomic political forces. Examining how workers, trade unions, local state managers, shareholders, consumers and civil society groups form "voices" and "silences" can further enrich the more reflective HR knowledge base. Such research can use qualitative and/or quantitative instruments designed to investigate why employees remain silence or 'how employees limit the voice of employees who socially regulate the form of silence attitudes generated or systematically. Ignoring the internal and external challenges facing HR managers about voice and silence also deserves attention to stimulate debate around how to better balance this tension without suppressing employee interests.

Although OB unitary posture that supports the goals of the organization has been criticized, it does not mean that well-established psychological research methodology has limited appeal. Indeed, capturing employee and management attitudes about silence is important and has a valuable contribution to make, but it can benefit from relationships with structured antagonism and macro-level political economy power. A challenge here is still about how to encourage rich interdisciplinary research using a disciplined approach that addresses related phenomena but speak in alternative dialects of meaning and understanding. To this end, future research may explore the "silence" of his

employees in connection with the issue and inter-disciplinary methodology that reflects the fragmentation of work, the pressures and demands precarious, flexible working arrangements, the determination of remuneration or wages and the extent to which employers enter, or exclude workers when designing voice settings. We hope this framework offers future research pathways for HR / OB / IR / LP scholars and practitioners to better explore empirical nuances about employee silence.

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