

Apollonius Rhodius and the Stoic Doctrine of the Emotions

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ONE OF THE MOST SALIENT FEATURES of the *Argonautica* of Apollonius Rhodius is the unprecedented access the reader has to the mental lives of its characters. Medea's monologues constitute the clearest example, but characters such as the Lemnian women or Telamon also contribute to this impression. Other figures, especially Jason, remain opaque, so that applying common-sense ideas of character to them has proven difficult. Nearly contemporaneously with the composition of the *Argonautica*, the Stoics were developing systematic arguments about the soul and emotions, that the soul was thoroughly rational and emotions were nothing more than erroneous judgments, breaking with philosophical models that attributed emotions to irrational parts of the soul. While earlier discussions relating Apollonius to the Hellenistic schools focus on ethics, and recent work explores his engagement with their teachings on fate, the poet's reception of contemporary doctrines of the soul and emotions has not been explored. This study uses a model of engagement: Apollonius does not replicate philosophical doctrines, but selects, adapts, or probes them in constructing the mental lives of his characters, juxtaposing them with traditional epic representations. Three themes emerge: Apollonius' characters often fall into emotional states through erroneous judgments, analogous to the Stoic model, and in contrast to earlier models that separate emotions from thought. Influenced by strong emotions, his characters are unable to articulate their impressions, corresponding to Apollonius' well-known use of

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ἀμηχανίη (being at a loss), likely referencing Skeptical approaches. Medea's hesitations allude to the difficulty the Stoics encounter in explaining psychic conflict. Apollonius updates inherited epic representations of the emotions, enriching them with ideas and images from the contemporary philosophical schools and the controversies surrounding them.

1. *Backgrounds*

1.1. *Apollonius and philosophy*

Following upon earlier approaches detailing the Alexandrian poets' engagement with Aristotle,¹ it is becoming clear that Apollonius engaged a range of philosophers and doctrines. His references to Empedocles' cosmogony in Orpheus' song in Book 1² and Circe's beasts in Book 4³ are now familiar, though their precise function is debated.⁴ Apollonius' engagement with Democritus is also clear: Medea's enchantment of Talos reflects the

¹ E.g. appropriating Aristotelian scholarly techniques, as in Callimachus' *Pinakes*, but rejecting his poetic teachings: R. Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship: From the Beginnings to the End of the Hellenistic Age* (Oxford 1968) 134–138, 143.

² T. Phillips, *Untimely Epic: Apollonius Rhodius' Argonautica* (Oxford 2020) 161–167, developing earlier comparisons in P. Kyriakou, "Empedoclean Echoes in Apollonius Rhodius' 'Argonautica'," *Hermes* 122 (1994) 309–319, at 309–313, and M. Asper, "Apollonius on Poetry," in T. Papanghelis et al. (eds.), *Brill's Companion to Apollonius Rhodius*² (Leiden 2008) 167–197, at 178; cf. D. P. Nelis, "Demodocus and the Song of Orpheus (Ap. Rhod. *Arg.* I, 496–511)," *MusHelv* 49 (1992) 152–170; L. A. Marshall, *Uncharted Territory: Receptions of Philosophy in Apollonius Rhodius' Argonautica* (diss. Ohio State Univ. 2017).

³ Phillips, *Untimely Epic* 158–161, developing earlier comparisons in Kyriakou, *Hermes* 122 (1994) 317–318; R. Hunter, *The Argonautica of Apollonius: Literary Studies* (Cambridge 1993) 165, and *Apollonius of Rhodes: Argonautica IV* (Cambridge 2015) 175–178; cf. Marshall, *Uncharted Territory*.

⁴ Phillips, *Untimely Epic* 158–167, argues that the references create temporal tension: Circe's creatures recall an age prior to the Argonauts, but from Empedocles' viewpoint, posterior to the Argonauts, analogous to the *Argonautica* being both 'before' and 'after' Homer; see J. Clauss, "Cosmos without Imperium: The Argonautic Journey through Time," in M. A. Harder et al. (eds.), *Apollonius Rhodius* (Leuven 2000) 11–32, at 23–25.

philosopher's understanding of the evil eye,⁵ alluding, Powers argues, to the contemporary debate among the Epicureans.⁶ Marshall identifies Parmenides as an important philosophical source for Apollonius.⁷

Apollonius' reception of Hellenistic philosophers is more contentious. Early approaches focused on imagery, demonstrating that Apollonius knew the texts, but concluding that he adopted their figures, not their doctrines. Fränkel sees that the bee simile at 2.130–136 alludes to an early Stoic writing also reflected in Epictetus.⁸ Likewise, he notes that the simile of light glancing off water at 3.755–760 recurs in Epictetus, concluding that both drew on early Stoic sources, but rejecting the possibility that Apollonius adopted the relevant doctrine.⁹ Fränkel develops the idea that Apollonius' Heracles alludes to his appropriation by the Stoics as a model for the sage:¹⁰ Heracles' refusal of his election, his abstinence from the sojourn on Lemnos, his perplexity over his broken oar, and his justification for killing Theiodamas point to a serious, intellectual Heracles that is deflated by his emotional response to Hylas' disappearance. Scherer notes that

⁵ 4.1638–1688 with Hunter, *Argonautica IV* 302–303 ad loc.; M. Dickie, “Talos Bewitched: Magic, Atomic Theory, and Paradoxography in Apollonius' *Argonautica* 4.1638–88,” *PLLS* 6 (1990) 267–297, at 272–275. Text: F. Vian and É. Delage, *Apollonios de Rhodes: Argonautiques*² I–III (Paris 1976–1996); translations are by the author.

⁶ N. Powers, “Magic, Wonder, and Scientific Explanation in Apollonius, *Argonautica* 4.1638–93,” *PCPS* 48 (2002) 87–101, at 87–97.

⁷ Marshall, *Uncharted Territory* 149–192.

⁸ H. Fränkel, “Apollonius Rhodius as a Narrator in *Argonautica* 2.1–140,” *TAPA* 83 (1952) 144–155, at 151.

⁹ Noted in H. Fränkel, “Problems of Text and Interpretation in Apollonius' *Argonautica*,” *AJP* 71 (1950) 113–133, at 127 n.29, and “Das Argonautenepos des Apollonios,” *MusHelv* 14 (1957) 1–19, at 17–18; developed in *Noten zu den Argonautika des Apollonios* (Munich 1968) 376–379; see discussion below.

¹⁰ Noted in Fränkel, *AJP* 71 (1950) 127 n.29; developed in *Noten* 115 on 1.855–856, 143 on 1.1187–1189, and 147 on 1.1245.

Phineus' prophecy is suggestive of Stoic fatalism.¹¹

These observations focused on individual motifs, and scholars did not entertain the suggestion that Apollonius engaged the doctrines. Later studies argued for engagement, rehabilitating Jason from his reception as an anti-hero,¹² arguing that he exemplified the ethical stance of one of the schools. Klein suggests that Jason's ἀμηχανίη stands for Skeptical ἀπορία.¹³ Clayman argues that Pyrrho's methods were available to Apollonius and his style of weighing alternatives is reflected in Medea's monologues and Jason's dilemmas.¹⁴ Williams contends that Jason embodies Stoic ethics, reading his ἀμηχανίη as hesitation for reflection, and his leadership as Stoic οἰκείωσις ("appropriation").¹⁵ Similarly, Mori detects an Aristotelean background to Telamon's anger over the loss of Heracles, discerning when anger is appropriate, and touching on the physiology of anger.¹⁶ While these approaches have not produced scholarly consensus, they contribute to understanding Apollonius' reception of the Hellenistic

¹¹ B. Scherer, *Mythos, Katalog und Prophezeiung: Studien zu den Argonautika des Apollonios Rhodios* (Stuttgart 2006) 157, following C. Beye, *Epic and Romance in the Argonautica of Apollonius* (Carbondale 1982) 118–119; cf. L. Nyberg, *Unity and Coherence: Studies in Apollonius Rhodius' Argonautica and the Alexandrian Epic Tradition* (Lund 1992) 85–86; Hunter, *Literary Studies* 93.

¹² For Jason as anti-hero see G. Lawall, "Apollonius' *Argonautica*: Jason as Anti-Hero," *YCS* 19 (1966) 121–169; C. Beye, "Jason as Love-Hero in Apollonius' *Argonautika*," *GRBS* 10 (1969) 31–55; S. Jackson, "Apollonius' Jason: Human Being in an Epic Scenario," *G&R* 39 (1992) 155–162; R. Hunter, "Short on Heroics: Jason in the *Argonautica*," *CQ* 38 (1988) 436–453.

¹³ T. Klein, "Apollonius' Jason: Hero and Scoundrel," *QUCC* 13 (1983) 115–126, at 125–126.

¹⁴ D. Clayman, "The Skepticism of Apollonius' *Argonautica*," in Harder, *Apollonius Rhodius* 33–53, updated in D. Clayman, *Timon of Phlius: Pyrrhonism into Poetry* (Berlin 2009) 188–208.

¹⁵ M. Williams, "Stoicism and the Character of Jason in Apollonius' *Argonautica*," *Scholía* n.s. 5 (1996) 17–41.

¹⁶ A. Mori, *The Politics of Apollonius Rhodius' Argonautica* (Cambridge 2008) 82–90.

philosophies, establishing that the Alexandrian poet had access to their writings and engaged with their doctrines.¹⁷

1.2. *The emotions in Hellenistic philosophy*

Thus, there is an emerging consensus that Apollonius engages the philosophical tradition, from early exponents to contemporary controversies. Given the focus on the schools' ethical teachings, we can identify a gap in our understanding, namely how Apollonius receives the doctrines that modern philosophers identify as 'philosophy of mind': explanations of the soul, perception, decision-making, and emotions.¹⁸ Annas outlines the topics in the Hellenistic schools, identifying the soul, perception and thinking, and emotions as central foci.¹⁹ These occasioned controversies in the middle of the third century, when Apollonius was writing.²⁰ The development of the Stoic doctrine is complex; the central teachings: the soul's physicality, impressions and assent, impulse, and the passions were introduced by Zeno (331/0–262/1),²¹ though their canonical expressions were

¹⁷ On Klein as "suggestive" see Hunter, *CQ* 38 (1988) 436 n.6; on Williams, R. Gleis, "Outlines of Apollonian Scholarship, 1955–1999," in *Brill's Companion to Apollonius* 1–28, at 12.

¹⁸ The schools did not identify 'philosophy of mind', but J. Annas, *Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind* (Berkeley 1992) 9–10, argues that these topics cohere in the Hellenistic philosophies and finds 'philosophy of mind' a useful heuristic.

¹⁹ *Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind*; recent surveys—V. de Harven, "Rational Impressions and the Stoic Philosophy of Mind," in J. E. Sisko (ed.), *Philosophy of Mind in Antiquity* (London 2019) 214–235, and F. Masi and F. Verde, "Mind in an Atomistic World: Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition," 236–257—focus on the soul, perception, and thinking for the Stoics, and the soul and mental states for the Epicureans.

²⁰ Apollonius' dates are problematic; see R. Hunter, *Apollonius of Rhodes: Argonautica III* (Cambridge 1989) 1–9, for the evidence and tentative conclusion for the publication of the *Argonautica* in the 240's, and J. Murray, "Anchored in Time: The Date in Apollonius' *Argonautica*," in M. A. Harder et al. (eds.), *Hellenistic Poetry in Context* (Leuven 2014) 247–284, at 258–267, for the argument that Apollonius' descriptions of the night sky reflect the year 238, suggesting revision through that date.

²¹ For Zeno's dates see T. Dorandi, "Chronology," in K. Algra et al. (eds.),

often formulated by Chrysippus (281/277–208/204, scholarch 230/229–208/204),²² for example, that the passions do not arise from irrational elements in the soul, but are the result of false value judgments within a unitary, rational soul (Galen *SVF* III 463). These teachings broke with the approaches of Plato and Aristotle, and were immediately controversial.²³

1.3. *Traditional epic models of the emotions*

Apollonius' reception of philosophical approaches to the emotions necessarily appears in the context of his pervasive engagement with Homer. Scholarship on emotions in Homer has a long history, and became particularly controversial in the middle of the twentieth century, responding to Snell's argument that Homer lacked a unified sense of the psyche.²⁴ Recent scholarship has focused on other topics such as agency and cog-

The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (Cambridge 1999) 31–54, at 38; on the physicality of the soul, Cic. *Acad.Pr.* 1.39 = *SVF* I 90; on impressions and assent, Sext. *Emp. Math.* 7.228–231 = *SVF* II 56; our sources do not associate impulse with Zeno, but the controversy between Cleanthes and Chrysippus on the nature of walking (Sen. *Ep.* 113.23 = *SVF* II 836; cf. B. Inwood, *Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism* [Oxford 1985] 50–53) suggests that the doctrine was established early and refined over the third century; on the passions, Gal. *De Hipp. et Pl. decr.* 4.2.1–6 = *SVF* III 463, and 4.3.2–5.

²² Dorandi, in *Cambridge History* 38–40.

²³ Arrius in Stob. *Ecl.* 2.88.8–89.3 = *SVF* III 378; cf. Annas, *Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind* 108–110. A debt is owed to M. Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions* (Cambridge 2001), who promotes the relevance of Stoic teachings on the emotions to modern cognitive approaches; I do not engage her broader arguments since my focus is literary-historical, but she constitutes important background. For the break with Plato and Aristotle and attendant controversy see M. Frede, “The Stoic Doctrine of the Affections of the Soul,” in M. Schofield et al. (eds.), *The Norms of Nature* (Cambridge 1986) 93–110.

²⁴ B. Snell, *The Discovery of the Mind* (Boston 1953) 8–17; recent scholarship rejects this view, but acknowledges Homer's preference for specific organs over ‘mind’ or ‘body’: S. Lye, “Homeric Body and Mind,” in C. Pache (ed.), *The Cambridge Guide to Homer* (Cambridge 2020) 142–144, at 143.

dition.²⁵ I do not review this scholarship in detail, but identify themes that enjoy consensus and illustrate Apollonius' developments.

First, Homer tends to deploy physical affect to communicate emotional states: facial expression, tears, and the like tend to represent inner states directly, and internal audiences tend to interpret them accurately. When Achilles nurses his resentment after the heralds take Briseis, his tears reflect his affliction and Thetis interprets them correctly.²⁶ When Odysseus listens to Demodocus, he weeps; despite his concealing it, Alcinous sees and understands (*Od.* 8.83–95). Complexity in emotions is not at issue; Odysseus' tears communicate a nuanced response: sorrow for the transience of his glory, grief for his lost comrades, regret that his former actions do not fit his current values, and so forth.²⁷ Rather, Homer uses affect to communicate the emotion, rather than emphasizing a tension between inner and outer selves, or suggesting the incommensurability of individual emotions.²⁸

Second, emotions (and sometimes cognition) are dramatized as externals: gods, parts of the psyche, or forces. When the heroes gather their courage, the narrator represents this as a god putting valor into their hearts.²⁹ When the suitors break before

²⁵ J. Christensen, *The Many-minded Man: The Odyssey, Psychology, and the Therapy of Epic* (Ithaca 2020) 23–28.

²⁶ Achilles' affect: *Il.* 1.348–351, 357, 361, 364; Thetis' interpretation (outer tears represent inner πένθος): 1.362–363. On the appropriateness of Achilles' tears: S. Schein, *Homer: Iliad Book I* (Cambridge 2022) 160 on 1.349.

²⁷ Similarly, I. de Jong, *A Narratological Commentary on the Odyssey* (Cambridge 2001) 198–199, on *Od.* 8.83–92.

²⁸ With caveats: Auerbach's (E. Auerbach, *Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature* [Princeton 1953]) denial of inner depths overreaches (especially for the *Odyssey*, where dissimulation and delayed revelation are thematic: de Jong, *Narratological Commentary* 326 on *Od.* 13.253–286, 386 on *Od.* 16.4–219).

²⁹ E.g. *Il.* 5.1–2, with G. Kirk, *The Iliad: A Commentary II* (Cambridge 1990) 53, on 5.2–3.

Odysseus' attack, Athena shakes the Aegis and panic seizes them.³⁰

Last, making decisions on the basis of emotion (or cognition) tends to be represented dialogically: another hero, a god, or a separate part of the psyche serves as an interlocutor. When Achilles becomes angry with Agamemnon, his impulse is to violence, but Athena convinces him to withdraw instead (*Il.* 1.188–222); Athena dramatizes Achilles' second thoughts or prudence overcoming his anger.³¹ When Odysseus sees the suitors taking the maidservants to bed, he addresses his *κράδιη*, convincing it not to act but remain in disguise until the right moment (*Od.* 20.6–24).³² Yet Athena is physically present, she touches Achilles and acts as Hera's agent to save Agamemnon; Homer uses her to reveal Achilles' decision-making process.³³ Apollonius adopts these techniques at times, typically with characters from an earlier generation, such as Idas, Aeetes, or Heracles.

1.4. *A model of engagement*

The model employed here, examining Apollonius' reception of teachings on emotions in the Hellenistic schools, follows Acosta-Hughes and Stephens on Callimachus' response to Plato, and Ojennus on Apollonius' engagement with philosophical debates about fate.³⁴ Acosta-Hughes and Stephens trace Callimachus' engagement with Plato, arguing that the poet avoids the specific challenges the philosopher poses, since that would

³⁰ *Od.* 22.297–298; since A. Lesky, *Göttliche und menschliche Motivation im homerischen Epos* (Heidelberg 1961), described as “double determination”: human decision and divine intervention are parallel, reinforcing explanations, not competing ones.

³¹ G. Kirk, *The Iliad: A Commentary I* (Cambridge 1985) 73, on 1.193–194.

³² J. Russo, M. Fernandez-Galiano, and A. Heubeck, *A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey III* (Oxford 1992) 109, on 20.18–24.

³³ Schein, *Homer: Iliad Book I* 22–23.

³⁴ B. Acosta-Hughes and S. Stephens, *Callimachus in Context: From Plato to the Augustan Poets* (Cambridge 2011) 23–83; P. Ojennus, “Apollonius of Rhodes, Hellenistic Philosophy, and Fate,” *AJP* 139 (2018) 215–248.

concede that philosophy existed outside of language where it could reasonably judge literature, but frames Plato's philosophy as a species of literature, so that the philologist (Callimachus) may competently judge it. Callimachus' self-depiction in *Aetia* fr. 1, writing poetry in obedience to Apollo, rewrites Plato's portrayal of Socrates in prison, reinterpreting Apollo's command to make music by writing poetry, not practicing philosophy.³⁵ This reference to Socrates understanding philosophy as a sort of literature (μουσική Pl. *Phd.* 59C) indicates the contradiction with his practice in the *Ion* and *Republic* of judging literature from the standpoint of philosophy, as if philosophy were outside of literature. This strategy positions Callimachus as critic parallel to Socrates so that he can judge Plato's writing, now understood as a literary genre.

Similarly, Ojennus frames Apollonius' reception of the debates about fate in Hellenistic philosophy, so that the poet claims epic poetry as the privileged position for adjudicating those debates. Idmon's choice to join the expedition, despite foreknowing his fate to die in its course, recalls the Stoic doctrine that divination relies on fate being pervasive and ineluctable: it is only possible to predict events that are foreordained. But it also recalls criticisms by Epicurus and others that this view of fate is incompatible with ethics: it is nonsensical to praise or blame someone for what they did necessarily. Ojennus identifies this as generic rivalry also: rather than side with the Stoics or their critics, Apollonius leaves the question of compatibility open, and assigns to the epic poet (himself) authority over praise and blame. When Idmon dies and the Boeotians and Nisaeans honor his tomb as that of Agamestor, Apollonius corrects the error and returns praise to Idmon.³⁶ Applying this approach to Apollonius' treatment of emotions, I will argue that he contrasts Stoic teachings with traditional epic models and other current approaches; he does not replicate the philosophical teachings, but

³⁵ Acosta-Hughes and Stephens, *Callimachus in Context* 33–35.

³⁶ Ojennus, *AJP* 139 (2018) 227–229.

uses them to update his epic model and allow the debates to energize his presentation of character.

2. *Posing the problem: Jason and Idas at Pagasae*

After preparations for the expedition are complete and the Argonauts extend their dinner with conversation, Apollonius shows Jason afflicted with ἀμηχανία (1.460–461):

ἔνθ' αὐτ' Αἰσονίδης μὲν ἀμήχανος εἰν ἐοῖ αὐτῶ
πορφύρεσκεν ἕκαστα, κατηφιόωντι ἐοικώς

There, in turn, Aesonides, at a loss within himself,
was brooding over the details, like one depressed

Jason's emotional response to assuming leadership is complex, and the narrator withholds direct access to that response, in contrast to the Homeric model where affect helps communicate emotional states.³⁷ Idas challenges Jason to express himself in a more Homeric manner,³⁸ setting up competing models of understanding emotions in the *Argonautica*.

2.1. *Jason's emotions and Idas' critique*

Earlier, when Idmon prophesies the Argonauts' ultimate success but his own death, Apollonius signals his use of complex emotional responses, recalling his Homeric model: νόστω μὲν γήθησαν, ἄχος δ' ἔλεν Ἰδμονος αἴση (“they were glad over their return, but anxiety seized them over the fate of Idmon” 1.449).³⁹ Thus Jason, with the others, is affected by gladness and anxiety. Turning to Jason, he adds further complexity: Jason is ἀμήχανος “at a loss,”⁴⁰ κατηφιόωντι ἐοικώς “like one depressed,” πορφύρε-

³⁷ Hunter, *Literary Studies* 19.

³⁸ Cf. *Il.* 18.426, Hephaestus prompts Thetis to reveal the purpose of her visit: αὐδα ὅ τι φρονέεις ≈ 1.463–464 μετὰ φρεσὶν ... αὐδα. Thetis responds at length.

³⁹ Hom. *Od.* 9.62–63 = 565–566 = 10.133–134 ἐνθεν δὲ προτέρω πλέομεν ἀκαχήμενοι ἦτορ / ἄσμενοι ἐκ θανάτοιο, φίλους ὀλέσαντες ἐταίρους (“from there we sail onwards, grieved at heart / gladdened to be safe from death, having lost our dear comrades”), but juxtaposing γήθησαν and ἄχος.

⁴⁰ The translations “without resource” and “helpless” seem overly intel-

σκεν “brooding.”⁴¹ Forfending the objection that there is no ‘real’ mental state behind his affect,⁴² Apollonius indicates that Jason has conflicting emotions about his leadership elsewhere: he is glad for Heracles’ backing (γηθόσυνος “glad”), but diffident over the Argonauts’ support (εἰ μὲν δὴ μοι κῦδος ἐπιτρῶπατε μέλεσθαι, “if you *in fact* entrust to me the honor to take care of the expedition” 1.350–352), he is encouraged by oracles and the help of the heroes (ἐπεὶ μάλα δεξιὰ Φοῖβος / ἔχρη, ἀτὰρ μετέπειτά γ’ ἀριστήων ἐπαρωγῆ, “since Phoebus prophesied very / favorably, and additionally with the help of the princes” 1.301–302, cf. 1.448–449, 2.641, 3.1134–1135), but burdened by responsibility for the safety of the Argonauts (2.635–637,⁴³ cf. 1.416–418, 1.449), and concerned about their inexperience (2.417–418); he regrets leaving his parents defenseless (1.904–909, cf. perhaps 1.534–535).⁴⁴ When Apollonius presents Jason’s emo-

lectual; Apollonius primarily uses ἀμηχανίη to represent emotion rather than cognition: Jason does not lack understanding, but feels overwhelmed, “at a loss”; see further below. Similarly, E. Sanders, “Love, Grief, Fear, and Shame: Medea’s Interconnecting Emotions in Book 3 of Apollonius’ *Argonautica*,” *G&R* 68 (2021) 45–60, sees Medea’s ἀμηχανίη as conflict between emotions, suggesting “without means” or “at a loss.”

⁴¹ LSJ⁹ s.v. posits the figurative senses: “be troubled, brood, ponder”; F. Montanari, *The Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek* (Leiden 2015) s.v., more narrowly “meditate, ponder” for Apollonian usage, but the Homeric senses “be troubled, brood” are available for Apollonius. Some instances have this nuance: 2.546, the exile, *in his agitation* (note ὀξέα), grasps images; 3.23, Athena *weighs* the options; 3.397, Aeetes’ spirit *weighs* two plans; 3.456, as Medea *considers* Jason, she thinks no one is like him; 3.1161, Medea *broods over* what an evil deed she has shared in; 3.1406, Aeetes *weighs* what path to take.

⁴² The documentary fallacy, as Hunter, *Literary Studies* 19–20.

⁴³ With caution, since the narrator later calls this a “test” (2.638).

⁴⁴ Compare the narrator’s generalization at the wedding of Jason and Medea (4.1165–1167):

ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ ποτε φύλα δηπαθέων ἀνθρώπων
 τερπωλῆς ἐπέβημεν ὄλω ποδί· σὺν δέ τις αἰεὶ
 πικρὴ παρμέμβλωκεν εὐφροσύνησιν ἀνίη.
 For, however, never do we tribes of suffering humans

tional response at Pagasae as complex, that is congruent with emotional responses developed further elsewhere.

In contrast, Idas' apprehension of Jason's emotional state appears naïve (1.463–465):

Αἰσονίδη, τίνα τήνδε μετὰ φρεσὶ μῆτιν ἐλίσσεις;
 αὔδα ἐνὶ μέσσοισι τεὸν νόον. ἦέ σε δαμνᾶ
 τάρβος ἐπιπλόμενον, τό τ' ἀνάλκιδας ἀνδρας ἀτύζει;

Aesonides, what is this stratagem you are turning over in your mind?
 Speak your intention in our midst. Or does fear come upon you
 and overcome you, which terrifies cowardly men?

Idas performs his familiar function in the *Argonautica*, an archaic foil to the modern Jason.⁴⁵ Scholars have not previously described Idas' riposte as challenging Jason to express his emotions like a Homeric hero, but Jason's emotional isolation replays Achilles' seclusion on the shore after Agamemnon's heralds take Briseis, so Idas' challenge may be understood as alluding to the Homeric model.⁴⁶ Apollonius develops this model: the expectation that Idas' question will prompt Jason to explain his feelings remains unfulfilled. Moreover, Idas casts Jason's ruminations in intellectual terms: Jason is working out a "stratagem" (μῆτιν) in

tread with full foot on pleasure; but always some
 bitter affliction has come alongside our joys.

⁴⁵ H. Fränkel, "Ein Don Quijote unter den Argonauten des Apollonios," *MusHelv* 17 (1960) 1–20. J. Clauss, *The Best of the Argonauts: The Redefinition of the Epic Hero in Book One of Apollonius' Argonautica* (Berkeley 1993) 79–83, compares Homeric oppositions of strength and intelligence: Odysseus and Achilles *Od.* 8.73–82, Idomeneus and Ajax *Il.* 23.488–491.

⁴⁶ For Jason's emotional isolation note the contrast of Jason as κατηφιόντι ἐοικώς (1.461) with the Argonauts as τερπνῶς ἐπιόωνται (1.459); the recollection in 1.455–457 of *Od.* 9.8–10, contrasting the Phaeacians' feast with Odysseus' sorrow, reinforces the sense of emotional separation. For Achilles see above; for Apollonius' reference to *Il.* 1 (or Telemachus on the shore in *Od.* 2, or Odysseus on the shore in *Od.* 6) see J. Carspecken, "Apollonius Rhodius and the Homeric Epic," *YCS* 13 (1952) 35–143, at 102; for Apollonius' characters 'replaying' scenes from Homer see Hunter, *Literary Studies* 18–19.

his “brain” (φρεσί);⁴⁷ he has an “intention” (νόον) which Idas assumes he can articulate (αὔδα).⁴⁸ The cognitive cast of Idas’ questioning is particularly stark in view of the broader Homeric allusion, since Achilles is associated with “anger” (μῆνιν) rather than “stratagem” (μῆτιν); the paronomasia with *Il.* 1.1 would be typical of Apollonius. When Idas considers that Jason may be overcome with fear, he attempts to assuage that fear by removing its cognitive basis (1.466–471):

ἴστω νῦν δόρυ θούρον, ὅτῳ περιώσιον ἄλλων
 κῦδος ἐνὶ ποτολέμοισιν αἰέρομαι, οὐδέ μ’ ὀφέλλει
 Ζεὺς τόσον ὀσσάτιόν περ ἐμὸν δόρυ, μή νύ τι πῆμα
 λοίγιον ἔσσεσθαι μηδ’ ἀκράαντον ἀεθλον
 Ἴδεω ἐσπομένοιο, ...

Be witness now my impetuous spear with which I obtain greater glory in the wars than others, nor does Zeus prosper me so much as my spear, that, then, there will be no destructive adversity nor unfulfilled endeavor since Idas accompanies you, ...

Idas’ assurance contrasts with Jason’s diffidence, but the suggestion that Jason has fallen into this torpor because of a mistaken judgment departs from the Homeric model, alluding to a Hellenistic understanding of emotion.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ See n.38 above for comparison with Homer. A taxonomy of Apollonius’ intellectual and emotional vocabulary remains a desideratum. C. Pietsch, *Die Argonautika des Apollonios von Rhodos: Untersuchungen zum Problem der einheitlichen Konzeption des Inhalts* (Stuttgart 1999) 246–257, focuses on Book 3, and his Platonic framework seems overly schematic; Sanders, *G&R* 68 (2021) 48–50, focuses on Medea in Book 3, also using a Platonic approach (48 n.16). In Apollonius, μῆτις means “stratagem, plan,” e.g. 1.677, 1.1291, 2.225, 2.383, etc.; φρένες are the organ of cognition, e.g. 1.508, 2.534, 2.950, 3.18, etc.; the φρένες can be disturbed by emotion, disrupting thought, e.g. 1.1232, 3.382, etc.

⁴⁸ In Apollonius, νόος typically means “thought, intention, plan”: 1.242, 1.439, 2.182, 2.226, 2.325, etc.; Pietsch, *Die Argonautika* 246–247, 256–257, and Sanders, *G&R* (2021) 45–60, too readily identify it with a Platonic intellectual organ (“mind”); it occasionally has this sense: 2.212, 2.306, etc.

⁴⁹ Achilles is not sullen because he misunderstands Agamemnon; Aga-

2.2. *Idas' model of thoughts and emotions and early Stoicism*

The exchange at Pagasae is programmatic, presenting models of thought and emotion that Apollonius contrasts throughout the epic. The episode recalls Homer where characters' emotions arise naturally from the action, and their interlocutors' questions prompt articulation of their emotions. For Jason, thought and emotion are interwoven in complex ways that are not easy to articulate. For Idas, thoughts can be articulated, as in Homer, but emotions are erroneous judgments that can be cured by correcting their cognitive basis. This fits our understanding of Apollonius' Idas as an overdrawn archaic hero whose behavior contrasts Jason's Hellenistic sensibilities.⁵⁰ Apollonius' use of Homer is well understood, and Jason's ἀμηχανίη is well recognized, likely representing a response to Skeptical approaches to thought and emotion, but the rationalizing turn that Idas represents, corresponding to the Stoic approach, has not been explored.

To clarify, Apollonius does not represent Idas as a Stoic, or his advice as Stoic doctrine, but his (implicit) model of what emotions are engages the Stoic doctrine. We can approach this engagement in several ways. First, thoughts are readily articulable in language: Idas asks Jason to utter his thoughts. This corresponds to the Stoic teaching on judgments: judgment is assent to the linguistic content corresponding to an impression. Thoughts originate from a sense perception or "impression" (φαντασία); in adult humans the mind gives "assent" (συνκατάθεσις), assigning truth value to the linguistic representation or "sayable" (λεκτόν) corresponding to the content of the impres-

memnon in fact dishonored him. Telemachus is not depressed because he misunderstands the assembly; the assembly in fact demonstrated his lack of support.

⁵⁰ Fränkel, *MusHelv* (1960) 1–20, which some see as unbalanced (e.g. Gleis, in *Brill's Companion to Apollonius* 6), others as apt (e.g. Clauss, *The Best of the Argonauts* 81–83).

sion; this assignment is a “thought” (νόησις).⁵¹ Second, emotions are incorrect judgments; when Idas thinks Jason may be afraid, he understands a cognitive error on Jason’s part: Jason underestimates his, Idas’, help.⁵² This doctrine was always controversial, but the controversy was exacerbated in the middle of the third century by Chrysippus’ emphasis on the identity of judgments and emotions,⁵³ and continued throughout the Hellenistic period.⁵⁴ Third, since emotions are identified with incorrect judgments, they may be remedied by correcting their cognitive basis, as Idas encourages Jason by explaining why he need not be afraid. This doctrine was controversial within the Stoa itself, Cleanthes advocating that the judgment of what constitutes a good or evil should be corrected, and Chrysippus that a secondary judgment, e.g. “it is appropriate for me to be distressed at the presence of this evil,” should be corrected first.⁵⁵ Idas’ failure

⁵¹ On impressions see Aetius 4.12.1–5 = Long/Sedley 39b = *SVF* II 54 (part); on assent and λεκτό, Cic. *Acad.Pr.* 1.40–41 = Long/Sedley 40B = *SVF* I 55, 61, 60 (part); on thought, Diog. Laert. 7.51 = *SVF* II 61. Cf. Annas, *Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind* 75–78.

⁵² Stoic emotions are *functionally* rational, i.e. reasoned judgments based on perceptions and beliefs, but contrary to *normative* reason, judging things other than virtue to have the highest value; see Annas, *Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind* 105–106, 114.

⁵³ Chrysippus’ emphasis likely lies behind Galen’s construal that Chrysippus “contradicted” Zeno about the emotions; see Annas, *Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind* 109.

⁵⁴ E.g. Zeno admits that when an emotion is removed, a “scar” remains (Sen. *Ira* 1.16.7 = *SVF* I 215, cf. M. Graver, *Stoicism and Emotion* [Chicago 2007] 91); the doctrine of the *propathēia* developed to account for emotion-like responses not involving assent, see Graver 102–108. Posidonius adduces further examples, e.g. emotional responses to instrumental music, that imply emotional responses without assent (fr.168 E.-K. = Gal. *De Hipp. et Pl. decr.* 5.6.20–22; cf. Graver 78).

⁵⁵ For the two judgments constituting emotions see Cic. *Tusc.* 3.61, 74; for the mistaken ascription of value as necessary, Gal. *De Hipp. et Pl. decr.* 4.5.21–25 = *SVF* III 480 (part) = Long/Sedley 65L; for the mistaken ascription of appropriateness as necessary, Stob. *Ecl.* 2.7.10b, Cic. *Tusc.* 3.61. Cf. Annas,

to encourage Jason then refers to his employing Cleanthes' prescription, which is superseded by Chrysippus' advice, so that Idmon's reproof, ἄλλοι μῦθοι ἔασι παρήγοροι ("there are other encouraging words" 1.479), alludes to the controversy.

3. *Emotions as judgments in the Argonautica*

Although Idas' cognitive model of the emotions acts as a foil to Jason's more problematic psyche, understanding emotions as incorrect judgments that can be assuaged by correcting intellectual beliefs remains one of several important models.

3.1. *Telamon and Jason*

When the Argonauts discover they have abandoned Heracles, Telamon reacts emotionally, accusing Jason (1.1289–1292):

Τελαμῶνα δ' ἔλεν χόλος, ὃδέ τ' ἔειπεν·
ἦσ' αὐτως εὐκηλος, ἐπεὶ νύ τοι ἄρμενον ἦεν
Ἡρακλῆα λιπεῖν· σέο δ' ἔκτοθι μῆτις ὄρωρεν,
ὄφρα τὸ κείνου κῦδος ἀν' Ἑλλάδα μὴ σε καλύψη, ...

But wrath seized Telamon, and he spoke thus:
Sit there at your ease, since it was planned by you, after all,
to leave Heracles; and the stratagem arose from you,
that his renown might not overshadow you throughout Greece, ...

Telamon speaks his mind like a Homeric hero, but, as with Idas and in contrast to Homer, his emotion is based on a mistake: Telamon's anger is nothing other than his (factually) incorrect judgment that Jason planned to abandon Heracles and (normatively) incorrect judgment that it is appropriate to become angry.⁵⁶ This recalls the Stoic model of anger, namely the

Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind 108–115, and Graver, *Stoicism* 41–46. For the controversy between Cleanthes and Chrysippus, Cic. *Tusc.* 3.76–77, cf. Graver 196–197 and *Cicero on the Emotions: Tusculan Disputations 3 and 4* (Chicago 2002) 121–123.

⁵⁶ Telamon does not articulate the second judgment, but it is implied in Jason's pardon (1.1340–1342):

ἐπεὶ οὐ περὶ πάεσι μῆλων
οὐδὲ περὶ κτεάτεσσι χαλεψάμενος μενέηνας,
ἀλλ' ἐτάρου περὶ φωτός.
since not over flocks of sheep
nor over possessions did you become difficult and angry,

judgments that someone has inflicted an evil on oneself and that it is therefore appropriate to be angry.⁵⁷ Moreover, Telamon's anger dissipates when Glaucus corrects his judgments: it was not Jason's plan, but Zeus': Τίπτε παρὲκ μέγαλοιο Διὸς μενεαίνετε βουλὴν / Αἰήτεω πολίεθρον ἄγειν θρασὺν Ἡρακλῆα; ("Why beyond the plan of great Zeus do you intend / to bring bold Heracles to the city of Aetes?") 1.1315–1316); it is not appropriate to desire to recover Heracles: τῶ μὴ τι ποθὴ κείνοιο πελέσθω ("Therefore let there not be any desire for him" 1.1320). Glaucus' correction of the cognitive basis of Telamon's anger causes it to dissipate and prompts reconciliation: Αἰσονίδη, μὴ μοί τι χολώσεται, ἀφραδίησι / εἴ τί περ ἀσάμην ("Aesonides, do not become wroth with me at all since by thoughtlessness / I was bewildered" 1.1332–1333). Framing Telamon's cure in terms of Stoic therapy highlights the irony and intertextual play that we expect from Apollonius:⁵⁸ the irascible Telamon evokes Sophocles' Ajax, who would rather die than abandon his anger,⁵⁹ but then is updated in terms of a Hellenistic understanding of the emotions.⁶⁰ The ease with which Telamon abandons his anger occasions some irony: Ajax' in-

but over a man who was your companion.

Jason understands that Telamon's anger includes a judgment about appropriateness; unlike the Stoics, he approves. Mori, *The Politics* 86–87, reads Telamon's anger (1.1332–1335) as an Aristotelean mix of cognition and emotion; ἀφραδίησι and ἀμπλακίην certainly suggest cognition. As the appropriateness of anger was controverted by the Stoics and Peripatetics (Cic. *Tusc.* 4.43; Graver, *Cicero on the Emotions* 163–165), an allusion to that controversy fits the model of engagement adopted here.

⁵⁷ See n.55 for references.

⁵⁸ Cf. Hunter, *Literary Studies* 18–19, on intertextuality and irony in the election episode.

⁵⁹ Scholars compare Telamon to Achilles in the *Iliad* (e.g. Clauss, *The Best of the Argonauts* 205–208; Mori, *Politics* 86–87), but a reference to Sophocles' *Ajax* is also likely, given the representation of the Argonauts as the fathers of the heroes who fought at Troy, cf. Clauss, in *Apollonius Rhodius* 23.

⁶⁰ See above for complex references as typical of the Alexandrian poets' engagement with controversies in the tradition, as in Acosta-Hughes and Stephens, *Callimachus in Context*, and Ojennus, *AJP* 139 (2018) 215–248.

transigent temper secures his heroic stature,⁶¹ so when Telamon is placated his stature is reduced. The epic's central value of *ὁμοιοῦν* ("likeness of mind") is secured,⁶² but the tension between Hellenistic approaches to emotion and its role in traditional depictions of heroism remains. Again, Jason's emotions contrast with the Stoic and Homeric models (1.1286–1289):

ὁ δ' ἀμηχανήσιν ἀτυχθεὶς
οὐδέ τι τοῖον μετεφώνεεν οὐδέ τι τοῖον
Αἰσονίδης, ἀλλ' ἦστο βαρεῖη νειόθεν ἄτη
θυμὸν ἔδων.

But struck with being-at-a-loss,
Aesonides uttered neither such a word as this
nor as that, but sat deep in heavy infatuation,
gnawing at his heart.

Jason's silence contrasts with Telamon's rash words, and Apollonius emphasizes his inability to formulate the alternatives in language. Jason does not address his heart like a Homeric hero, dramatizing his dilemma, nor does he form a false judgment, which Glaucus might correct and so remove his emotion; Jason's affect must be accounted for otherwise.⁶³

3.2. *Aeetes and Jason*

Similarly, in Jason's interview with Aeetes, Aeetes' initial reaction suggests the Stoic model of the emotions, but appears alongside reactions that evoke other approaches. Aeetes' response to Argos is similar to Telemon's accusation (3.367–370):

ἄναξ δ' ἐπεχώσατο μύθοις
εἰσαίων, ὑψοῦ δὲ χόλω φρένες ἠερέθοντο.
φῆ δ' ἐπαλαστήσας — μενέαινε δὲ παισὶ μάλιστα
Χαλκιόπης, τῶν γάρ σφε μετελθέμεν οὐνεκ' ἐώλπει —,
ἐκ δὲ οἱ ὄμματ' ἔλαμψεν ὑπ' ὀφρύσιν ἰεμένοιο·

⁶¹ B. Knox, *The Heroic Temper: Studies in Sophoclean Tragedy* (Berkeley 1964) 13.

⁶² For *ὁμοιοῦν* as a central value see Vian and Delage, *Apollonios* I 16–17; Mori, *The Politics* 52–90. For the *Argonautica* as contesting traditional ideas of heroism, Hunter, *Literary Studies* 15–25.

⁶³ Jason's *ἀμηχανή* likely engages the Skeptic pursuit of *ἀταραξία*; see Clayman, *Timon* 193–194, discussed below.

But the lord became wroth at his words
as he listened, and his wits flew aloft with choler.

He was indignant and spoke—but he was especially angered at the sons
of Chalcioppe, for he expected that they had come on their account—,
and his eyes flashed under his brows in his eagerness:

Aeetes' anger is based on, or is nothing other than, rational judgments that are false. Like Telamon, Aeetes articulates his judgments: the Phrixids have come for his throne (3.375–376, also his misinterpretation of Helius' oracle 3.594–605) and have enlisted the Argonauts to help them (3.595–596). With the normatively false belief that it is appropriate for him to be angry over the plot,⁶⁴ Aeetes' anger evokes the Stoic model: some irrational part of the soul does not overcome his judgments, but his judgments themselves, being mistaken, constitute his anger. Jason, like Glaucus, attempts to soothe Aeetes' anger by correcting its cognitive basis: οὐ τι γὰρ αὐτως / ἄστου τεὸν καὶ δῶμαθ' ἰκάνομεν, ὡς που ἔολπας (“For not at all for this / did we arrive at your city and home, as you expect, I suppose” 3.386–387). Lacking Glaucus' divine authority, Jason fails to mollify Aeetes, and his anger does not subside.

Next, in Aeetes' reaction to Jason, Apollonius employs a Homeric model (3.396–400):

τοῖο δὲ θυμὸς
διχθαδίην πόρφυρεν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι μενοινήν,
ἢ σφραγς ὀρμηθεὶς αὐτοσχεδὸν ἐξεναρίζοι,
ἦ ὅ γε πειρήσαιτο βίης· τό οἱ εἶσατ' ἄρειον
φραζομένῳ, ...

But his heart
in his chest brooded over a two-fold desire,
whether he should set out and slay them in haste,
or make trial of their strength; this seemed better to him
as he considered it, ...

⁶⁴ Strictly, the Stoics did not consider that factually mistaken judgments, “the Phrixids seek my crown,” occasioned emotions, only normatively mistaken judgments, “an evil is in prospect, namely the loss of my kingship” (being deposed is not an evil); see Stob. *Ecl.* 2.89.4 = Long/Sedley 65A (part) = *SVF* III 389. Apollonius' thematization of factually mistaken judgments apparently represents normatively mistaken judgments.

As Rosenmeyer observes, this imitates Homeric decision-making: the hero ponders two options, then selects the second. Where others (Ancaeus, Hera, and Alcinous) complicate the pattern, verging towards the Hellenistic model of Jason and Medea, Aeetes reproduces the Homeric form precisely: the first option is not a real possibility, but dramatizes the inevitability of the second.⁶⁵ This characterizes Aeetes as a relic of the Homeric past, whose behavior provides a contrast with the modern Jason, like that of Idas earlier.⁶⁶

When Aeetes imposes the trial, Jason is overcome with ἀμηχανίη, as at Pagasae and Chios (3.422–425):

ὁ δὲ σίγα ποδῶν πάρος ὄμματα πῆξας
 ἦστ' αὐτῶς ἀφθογγος, ἀμηχανέων κακότητι.
 βουλὴν δ' ἀμφὶ πολὺν στρώφα χρόνον, οὐδέ πη εἶχε
 θαρσαλέως ὑποδέχθαι, ἐπεὶ μέγα φαίνετο ἔργον.

But [Jason], silently fixing his eyes at his feet, stood in place without speaking, at a loss in the evil situation.

For a long time he turned over the proposal,⁶⁷ but was not in any way able to undertake it in good courage, since it seemed a great task.

As after Heracles' abandonment, Jason is unable to select one of two options: to reject the proposal as impossible (μέγα ... ἔργον 3.425, cf. ἀεθλον ὑπερφίαλον 3.438) or to accept it as necessary (ἀνάγκης 3.430). He nominally accepts Aeetes' terms, but actually puts off a decision until consulting the Argonauts, as is clear later: ὁ δὴ νύ οἱ—οὐ τι γὰρ ἄλλο / βέλτερον ἦν φράσσασθαι—ἀπηλεγέως ὑποέστην ("This very thing, then—for there was not anything else / better to say—I undertook without further consideration" 3.500–501).⁶⁸ As before, he is "at a loss" (ἀμηχα-

⁶⁵ T. Rosenmeyer, "Apollonius Lyricus," *StIt* 10 (1992) 177–197, at 181–183.

⁶⁶ M. Williams, "The Character of Aeëtes in the 'Argonautica' of Apollonius Rhodius," *Hermes* 124 (1996) 463–479, at 477.

⁶⁷ Taking βουλὴν as Aeetes' proposal, not Jason's own plan, excluded by ἀμηχανέων; similarly, in Stoic language, μέγα ἔργον is the propositional content of the impression (φαντασία ≈ φαίνετο) that Jason does not assent to.

⁶⁸ Similarly Rosenmeyer, *StIt* 10 (1992) 183.

νέων 3.423, cf. ἀμηχανίη 3.432), expressed with speechlessness (ἄφθογος 3.423). Apollonius presents different models of the emotions: a Stoic-like emotion based on incorrect judgment, a Homeric deliberation, and a Hellenistic phenomenon of being overcome with ἀμηχανίη.

3.3. *Heracles' anger and emotion in Chrysippus*

Thus, among others, Apollonius employs a model of emotion as essentially cognitive, but the soul, once it makes an incorrect judgment, is disturbed and acts irrationally. Heracles' anger over the loss of Hylas allows us to refine our understanding of his engagement with Stoic thought specifically. An important difficulty for the Stoics is that those experiencing an emotion often resist having their mistaken judgments corrected; they may recognize their error but continue under the sway of the emotion.⁶⁹ Galen quotes Chrysippus defending the Stoic position:⁷⁰

οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ πορεύεσθαι καθ' ὄρμην οὐ πλεονάζει ἡ τῶν σκελῶν κίνησις, ἀλλὰ συναπαρτίζει τι τῇ ὄρμῃ ὥστε καὶ στήναι, ὅταν ἐθέλῃ, καὶ μεταβάλλειν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν τρεχόντων καθ' ὄρμην οὐκέτι τοιοῦτον γίνεται, ἀλλὰ πλεονάζει παρὰ τὴν ὄρμην ἡ τῶν σκελῶν κίνησις ὥστε ἐκφέρεσθαι καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλειν εὐπειθῶς οὕτως εὐθὺς ἐναρξαμένων.

Such as when someone walks according to impulse the movement of his legs is not excessive, but corresponds to the impulse so as to stop and change whenever he wishes. But when someone runs according to impulse this sort of thing no longer happens, but the movement of the legs is excessive beyond his impulse so as to be carried away and not change obediently as soon as he has started to do so.

Chrysippus defends the doctrine that emotions are rational judgments, corresponding to the decision to start running, but cannot be governed by reason once entered upon, corresponding to the runner's difficulty stopping or changing directions. Apollonius makes this analogy literal in several passages. Hera-

⁶⁹ Cf. the controversy between Cleanthes and Chrysippus, n.55 above; also, Posidonius' criticism of Chrysippus, Gal. *De Hipp. et Pl. decr.* 5.6.22–26 = Long/Sedley 65Q.

⁷⁰ *De Hipp. et Pl. decr.* 4.2.15–16 = *SVF* III 462 (part) = Long/Sedley 65J (part).

cles reacts emotionally to Hylas' disappearance: τῷ δ' αἰόντι κατὰ κροτάφων ἄλις ἰδρῶς / κήκιεν, ἐν δὲ κελαινὸν ὑπὸ σπλάγχνοις ζέεν αἶμα ("but when he heard, over his temples plenty of sweat / dripped, and, within, his dark blood seethed in his guts below" 1.1261–1262),⁷¹ and he runs where his feet carry him: ἐς δὲ κέλευθον / τὴν θέεν ἧ πόδες αὐτοῖ ὑπέκφερον αἰσσοῦντα ("and he ran onto that path on which his feet themselves carried him as he hastened" 1.1263–1264). As with Chrysippus, Heracles' entering an emotional state is figured as beginning to run; once he has become angry,⁷² his reason cannot restrain his anger, so he commits 'irrational' acts, such as killing the Boreads (1.1302–1306), just as he does not direct his running, but goes where his feet carry him.⁷³

The symbolism of running for being overcome with emotion recurs more elliptically, cross-referencing the fuller treatment of Heracles. When Medea is elated at Jason's promise of marriage, her feet carry her on their own: ψυχὴ γὰρ νεφέεσσι μεταχρονίη πεπότητο. / αὐτομάτοις δὲ πόδεσσι θεῆς ἐπεβήσατ' ἀπήνης ("for her soul had flown aloft with the clouds. / But she boarded the swift wagon by her feet on their own" 3.1152–1153). When she leaves to join the Argonauts, the same connection appears: τρομερῶ δ' ὑπὸ δαίματι πάλλετο θυμὸς [...] τὴν δ' αἶψα πόδες φέρον ἐγκο-

⁷¹ Mori, *The Politics* 84, sees an allusion to Aristotle in the boiling blood, confirming the sense of philosophical engagement.

⁷² Note χωόμενος (1.1263), with a subtext of passion for Hylas (Beye, *GRBS* 39 [1969] 46–47; Hunter, *Literary Studies* 38, with further bibliography in n. 114).

⁷³ The image may be traditional; cf. Theocritus 13.70: ὃ δ' ἄ πόδες ἄγον ἐχώρει ("but he went where his feet led"), understanding Theocritean priority with A. Köhnken, "Hellenistic Chronology: Theocritus, Callimachus, and Apollonius Rhodius," in *Brill's Companion to Apollonius* 73–91. Yet, Apollonius associates Heracles' feet carrying him away with his emotional state, while in Theocritus his disturbance (ταρασσόμενος περὶ παιδί 13.55) is separated from the image (but also: μαινόμενος· χαλεπὸς γὰρ ἔσω θεὸς ἦπαρ ἄμυσσεν, "raving; for a difficult god within was piercing his liver" 13.71). Theocritus has the generic χωρέω "proceed"; Apollonius uses θέω "run," more precisely representing Chrysippus' image.

νέουσαν (“and her spirit shook with trembling fear ... and her feet quickly carried her as she hastened” 4.52, 66). Likewise Jason when he is seized by fear returning from his sacrifice to Hecate (3.1221–1222), and Medea when shame and desire drive her in different directions, whether or not to approach Chalcioppe (3.651–653). In each case the subject experiences a powerful emotion, dramatized by their feet acting on their own, clearly running in the cases of Heracles and Medea in Book 4.⁷⁴ Apollonius’ thematization of characters being overcome with emotion so that their feet run away with them, then, refers to Chrysippus’ discussion of how emotions, themselves functionally rational judgments, can overcome reason. This reference encourages us to read other emotional responses as engaging the Stoic model.

4. *Apollonian ἀμηχανία*

Apollonius sometimes recalls his Homeric models to mark them as antiquated, as with Aetes’ wrath, and, when he evokes the Stoic model, there can be a sense of irony, as when Telamon quickly abandons his anger. These models are contrasted with Jason’s ἀμηχανία; I now examine Apollonian ἀμηχανία as alternative model for the emotions in the *Argonautica*.

4.1. *The Lemnian women*

Examining how fear overcomes the Lemnian women when they spy the Argo illuminates the relationship between the cognitive model of the emotions and ἀμηχανία in Apollonius, since they progress from one to the other. Before the Argo approaches, the narrator describes the emotions of the women, what pleases them and what they fear (1.627–632):

τῆσι δὲ βουκόλιαί τε βοῶν χάλκειά τε δύνειν
 τεύχεα πυροφόρους τε διατμήξασθαι ἀρούρας
 ῥήτερον πάσησιν Ἀθηναίης πέλεν ἔργων
 οἷς αἰεὶ τὸ πάροιθεν ὀμίλειον. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἔμπης
 ἦ θαμὰ δὴ πάπταινον ἐπὶ πλατὺν ὄμμασι πόντον

⁷⁴ Vian and Delage, *Apollonios* 73 n.2 on 4.66, note that the image recurs at 4.1121 without the sense that the feet are acting independently.

δείματι λευγαλέω, ὅποτε Θρήικες ἴασι.

But for them cattle-herding of cattle and donning bronze armor and cleaving wheat-bearing fields was easier for them all than the works of Athena with which they always spent their time before. But still, after all, very often indeed they gazed with their eyes over the broad sea in grievous fear as to when the Thracians would come.

The preferences and fears of the women are expressed as judgments: herding is easier than spinning, the coming of the Thracians is fearful. The cognitive depiction of their emotions wavers when they see the Argo: φὰν γὰρ που ἰκάνειν / Θρήικας. [...] ἀμηχανίη δ' ἐχέοντο / ἄφθογοι, τοῖόν σφιν ἐπὶ δέος ἠωρεῖτο (“For they thought, surely, that the Thracians had arrived ... and by being-at-a-loss they were kept speechless, such fear hung over them” 1.636–639). With the characteristically Apollonian που⁷⁵ the narrator signals that their thoughts become less transparent, and they enter a state of being-at-a-loss (ἀμηχανίη), causing their speechlessness. This demonstrates how Apollonius relates emotions and ἀμηχανίη: emotions are often compatible with the Stoic cognitive model, where their bases are expressed as judgments, but sudden or intense impressions produce emotional turmoil, preventing the articulation of judgments that might be handled rationally, dramatized by speechlessness. Clayman aptly compares this ἀμηχανίη to Pyrrho’s ἐποχή (“suspension of judgment”),⁷⁶ but that comparison may be refined: Clayman focuses on the cognitive aspect of ἀμηχανίη, especially the use the dilemma to achieve it,⁷⁷ but Apollonius also regularly indicates an emotional component, as with the Lemnian women’s fear. Thus, Apollonius does not adopt Skeptic ἐποχή exactly, but adapts and deploys it for poetic ends, where it appears as one mental model among several.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ Clayman, *Timon* 206.

⁷⁶ Clayman, *Timon* 191, 194, on the Lemnian women.

⁷⁷ Clayman, *Timon* 192–193.

⁷⁸ Clayman adumbrates these possibilities (194 on emotion, 208 on the *Argonautica* exposing flaws in Skepticism), but her focus is cognition.

4.2. *ἀμηχανία as an emotional state*

Apollonius' use of *ἀμηχανία* to indicate emotional turmoil is thematic. As noted above, when Aeetes sets the challenge for Jason, the hero is characterized as *ἄφθογγος* and *ἀμηχανέων* (3.423, quoted above). The Argonauts react similarly when Jason relates the encounter (*δὴν δ' ἄνεφ καὶ ἄναυδοὶ ἐς ἀλλήλους ὀρόωντο, / ἄτη ἀμηχανία τε κατηφέες*, "but for a long time they looked at each other in silence and speechless, / downcast because of their infatuation and being-at-a-loss" 3.503–504). When Phineus prophesies the trials awaiting the Argonauts, they are overcome with fear and fall silent (*τοὺς δ' εἶθαρ ἔλεν δέος εἰσαίοντας. / δὴν δ' ἔσαν ἀμφασίη βεβολημένοι*, "but immediately fear seized them as they listened. / And for a long time they were struck with speechlessness" 2.408–409). At Apollo's appearance on Thynias wonder overtakes them (*τοὺς δ' ἔλε θάμβος ἰδόντας ἀμήχανον*, "but irresistible amazement seized them when they saw him" 2.681); only at length (*ὄψέ* 2.684) can Orpheus articulate their experience.⁷⁹ Grief overcomes the Argonauts at the death of Tiphys (*ἄτλητου δ' ὀλοῶ ἐπὶ πῆματι κῆδος ἔλοντο· / δὴ γάρ, ἐπεὶ καὶ τόνδε παρασχεδὸν ἐκτερέϊξαν, / αὐτοῦ ἀμηχανίησιν ἀλὸς προπάρριθε πεσόντες*, "but they reaped unendurable grief over the destructive disaster; / for, indeed, when they buried him forthwith, / they fell there before the sea at a loss" 2.858–860). When Eros shoots Medea, she is speechless (*τὴν δ' ἀμφασίη λάβε θυμόν*, "and speechlessness seized her spirit" 3.284), and she spends much of Book 3 trying to articulate her feelings. Speechlessness overtakes Aeetes at Jason's performance in the trial (*τὸν δ' ἔλεν ἀμφασίη ῥιπῆ στιβαροῖο σόλοιο / Αἰήτην*, "but speechlessness seized Aeetes at the cast of the stout lump" 3.1372–1373). The repetition of key terms (*ἀμηχανία/ἀμήχανος, ἀμφασίη*) establishes the theme of emotional turmoil that drives characters to an impasse, cross-referencing the fuller descriptions of the phe-

⁷⁹ Here *ἀμήχανον* has its Homeric sense "irresistible," but also evokes the theme of emotional turmoil producing speechlessness. Orpheus also represents Apollonius: emotional turmoil exceeds the powers of philosophy to describe, but may be handled by an epic poet.

nomenon. While fear is common, wonder, grief, and desire also trigger the state. Thus, for Apollonius, ἀμηχανία is not only a cognitive state, but also, even predominantly, an emotional one, engaging the Skeptic pursuit of ἀταραξία, but also suggesting that suspension of judgment is indistinguishable from emotional turmoil.⁸⁰

4.3. ἀμηχανία and psychic conflict

Apollonius' construction of ἀμηχανία, expressed by ἀμφασία, and its tendency to arise when characters are unable to articulate their thoughts, provides a counterexample to the cognitive model of emotions. The Argonauts fall into ἀμηχανία not by assenting to linguistic content corresponding to an impression, but because they cannot formulate that content at all.⁸¹ The Stoics' cognitive model of the emotions was always controversial, so when Apollonius juxtaposes that approach with his characters' ἀμηχανία, he is likely alluding to the controversy. This context enables a better appreciation of Apollonius' use of Stoic imagery in describing Medea's impasse at the end of her great monologue. An important objection to the Stoic model was its difficulty in accounting for psychic conflict: weakness of the will, indecision, regret, remorse, and the like.⁸² It broke from the models of Plato and Aristotle, where emotions resided in irrational parts of the soul;⁸³ indeed, the need to explain such

⁸⁰ Clayman, *Timon* 194, distinguishes “two kinds of *amechania*,” but it is unclear that Apollonius ever presents a purely cognitive, ‘positive’ one.

⁸¹ This question is not unanswerable; the Stoics probably did not claim that individuals *consciously* formulated all judgments or could always articulate them (Graver, *Stoicism* 45), but it emphasizes the counterintuitive nature of the model.

⁸² On indecision see Annas, *Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind* 116–117; on weakness of the will, Inwood, *Ethics* 132–139; on regret and remorse, Graver, *Stoicism* 193–196.

⁸³ The Stoics sometimes adduced parts of the soul, corresponding to the senses, but these were subordinate to the ἡγεμονικόν, which alone made judgments; for the parts of the soul see Aët. 4.21.1–4 = Long/Sedley 53H =

phenomena was an important motivation for the division of the soul.⁸⁴ Chrysippus defends the Stoic model, arguing that apparent instances of psychic conflict are vacillations in the judgments of a unitary soul; Plutarch reports:⁸⁵

ἔνιοι δὲ φασιν οὐχ ἕτερον εἶναι τοῦ λόγου τὸ πάθος οὐδὲ δυοῖν διαφορὰν καὶ στάσιν, ἀλλὰ ἑνὸς λόγου τροπὴν ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρας, λανθάνουσαν ἡμᾶς ὀξύτητι καὶ τάχει μεταβολῆς· οὐ συννοῶντας ὅτι ταῦτόν ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧ πέφυκεν ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ μετανοεῖν, ὀργίζεσθαι καὶ δεδιέναι, φέρεσθαι πρὸς τὸ αἰσχρὸν ὑφ' ἡδονῆς καὶ φερομένη πάλιν αὐτῆς ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι·

But some say that that emotion is not something other than reason, nor that there is a difference and civil war between the two, but that it is the turning of a single reason to both, escaping our notice by the suddenness and speed of the change; not seeing that it is the same part of the soul by which it is our nature to desire and repent, to become angry and to fear, to be borne toward the shameful by pleasure and, being borne back again, to hold onto itself.

Apollonius engages the controversy: Medea does not manifest conflict between reason and emotion like her Euripidean self (καὶ μανθάνω μὲν οἶα δρᾶν μέλλω κακά, / θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων, “And I learn what evils I am about to do, / but my anger is stronger than my deliberations” *Med.* 1078–1079),⁸⁶ but deliberates over the competing demands of her family, social

SVF II 836 (part); for the ἡγεμονικόν, Chalcidius 220 = Long/Sedley 53G = *SVF* II 879 (part); cf. Annas, *Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind* 61–64. For the controversy note Panaetius’ attempt to reconcile the Stoic and Platonic models: Annas 118, citing Cicero’s attempt in *Tusc.* 4 to ‘rescue’ the Stoic position as evidence of how counterintuitive it could appear.

⁸⁴ *Pl. Resp.* 439E–440B; for psychic conflict as a central justification for the tripartite soul see S. Knuuttila and J. Sihvola, in J. Sihvola et al. (eds.), *The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy* (Dodrecht 1998) 1–19, at 2.

⁸⁵ *Virt.mor.* 446F = *SVF* III 459 (part).

⁸⁶ Authenticity and sense debated; see D. Mastronarde, *Euripides: Medea* (Cambridge 2002) 388–397, but clearly in Apollonius’ text of Euripides, indicating a conflict between an emotional θυμὸς and a rational subject of μανθάνω (and probably βουλευματα); elsewhere Chrysippus adduced the passage as a test case for the Stoic model (*Gal. De Hipp. et Pl. decr.* 3.3.13–22 = *SVF* II 906).

expectations, pity for Jason, and so forth, but comes to an impasse.⁸⁷ Likewise, Jason, when he decides to ambush Apsyrtus, does not acknowledge that it is dishonorable, but, being overcome by fear, does it anyway, but describes his plan in cognitive terms.⁸⁸ With Medea, Apollonius probes the cognitive model: why, if her soul is rational, can it not reach a decision? His engagement with the Stoic model seems certain, given the allusion to a Stoic treatment of the topic at the end of Medea's monologue (3.756–760):

Ἡελίου ὡς τίς τε δόμοις ἐνιπάλλεται αἴγλη,
 ὕδατος ἐξανιούσα τὸ δὴ νέον ἢ ἐ λέβητι
 ἢ ἐ που ἐν γαυλῶ κέχυται, ἢ δ' ἐνθα καὶ ἐνθα
 ὠκείη στροφάλιγγι τινάσσεται αἰσσοῦσα·
 ὡς δὲ καὶ ἐν στήθεσσι κέαρ ἐλελίζετο κούρης.

As a ray of the sun quivers in a house,
 reflecting on water which indeed was just poured
 either in a bowl or perhaps a pail, and here and there
 darting it is made to tremble with the swift eddy:
 even so also the girl's heart trembled in her chest.

As Fränkel notes, since Epictetus (*Disc.* 3.3.20–22) uses this image, both authors must be drawing on an early Stoic text; recognizing that Apollonius does not present Medea as a committed Stoic, Fränkel concludes that the poet borrows the image for its vividness, not its doctrine.⁸⁹ Reframing Apollonius' engagement, that he does not represent his characters as Stoics, but juxtaposes Stoic doctrines with other models, we recognize that the allusion engages the debate over psychic conflict. Accepting

⁸⁷ Clayman, *Timon* 193–194, clarifies the cognitive nature of Medea's deliberations, arguing that her ἀμηχανίη corresponds to Skeptic ἐποχή.

⁸⁸ E.g. διζήμεθα (“investigate” 4.396), δόλον (“trick” 4.404). The narrator obfuscates the relationship between Jason's speech and his actual intentions, indicating that he spoke out of fear of Medea's anger (ὑποδδείσας 4.394) and that he was fawning on her (ὑποσσαιῶν 4.410). Contrast Menelaus' deliberation *Il.* 17.91–101.

⁸⁹ Fränkel, *MusHelv* 14 (1957) 17–8, and *Noten* 378.

that Epictetus represents the original comparison,⁹⁰ we can understand that it represents the denial of true dilemmas. Epictetus explains: καὶ ὅταν τοίνυν σκοτωθῆ τις, οὐχ αἱ τέχναι καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ συγχέονται, ἀλλὰ τὸ πνεῦμα, ἐφ' οὗ εἰσιν· καταστάντος δὲ καθίσταται κάκεινα (“and whenever someone suffers from vertigo, his skills and virtues are not confounded, but his *pneuma* is, on which they lie; but when it is calmed, they are also calmed” 3.3.22). The ray of light represents virtue (correct judgment); when the soul is undisturbed, it decides (“reflects”) correctly and consistently, but disturbed by emotion, incorrectly and inconsistently.⁹¹ Apollonius, then, engages the Stoic model creatively here, referring to their denial of true dilemmas, but testing its verisimilitude. Readers may find it more or less convincing that, if only Medea’s psyche were cleansed of its emotions, she would decide virtuously. As often, Apollonius suggests that the reality is more complex: Medea’s concerns (μελεδήματα 3.752) are judgments that occasion emotions (δειδυῖαν 3.753), which have an impetus of their own (cf. above, discussion of Heracles running); disentangling cognition and emotion may not be as straightforward as the Stoic account suggests.⁹² Yet, rereading Medea’s monologue in view of the simile and its Stoic contexts, we can also see that Apollonius’ style evokes the “suddenness and speed of change” that Chrysippus attributes to the soul laboring under emotion, in the passage from Plutarch quoted above. Her short sentences, often coinciding with verse end, and particularly the

⁹⁰ So Fränkel, *Noten* 378, on 3.755–760, 766–769, tentatively suggesting Aristo as the source.

⁹¹ Epictetus (and the Stoics generally) correlates consistency with correctness; for consistency in Epictetus see *Disc.* 2.26.3, 3.23.34; in the early Stoa, Plut. *Virt.mor.* 440E–441D = Long/Sedley 61B.

⁹² This may be further reflected in Apollonius’ locating this process in Medea’s “heart” (κραδίη 3.755, κέαρ 3.760), rather than in her “mind” (e.g. νόος), though the Stoics also placed the (unitary, rational) soul in or around the heart (see e.g. Chalcidius 200 = *SVF* II 879 = Long/Sedley 53G); the current understanding of Apollonius’ intellectual vocabulary prevents confidence; see n.47 above.

rapid questions in 3.779–782, evoke the troubled waters of the simile. Her “here or there of evils” (ἔνθα κακῶν ἢ ἔνθα 3.771) reiterates the “here and there” of the sunbeam. Since this aptly describes Medea’s deliberations, it seems compelling that Apollonius uses the reference to the early Stoic text to enrich our appreciation of Medea’s apparent psychic conflict, and to mark how he has updated his character to reflect the latest discussions about the phenomenon.

5. *Conclusions*

Examining how Apollonius’ characters suffer emotions, how they encourage and persuade one another, how they work through their emotions, and how they become overwhelmed reveals several themes corresponding to controversies over the nature of the emotions proposed by the Stoics contemporaneously with the composition of the *Argonautica*. Naturally, Homer continues to provide an important model, but we may expand our appreciation, since the Stoic model, where the soul is unitary and rational and emotions are incorrect judgments, appears to lie behind various interactions, as when Idas tries to encourage Jason by reminding him of his help, when Telamon abandons his anger once Glaucus corrects his assumptions, or when the Lemnian women panic on seeing the Argo, thinking it is a Thracian ship. Apollonius’ characters repeatedly fall into emotional states through mistaken judgments. This model is contrasted with Apollonius’ well-known thematization of ἀμηχανία, where characters cannot formulate judgments at all. This theme engages Skeptic ἐποχή, if ironically, blurring cognitive suspension of judgment with emotional upheaval. Heracles’ response to Hylas’ abduction engages another controversy: how the rational soul can set itself into an irrational state. The hero’s feet running away with him recalls Chrysippus’ defense of the Stoic position. Finally, Medea’s great monologue and its aftermath engage the controversy of how the Stoic model might account for psychic conflict, where Medea considers her options in a functionally rational way, but because her soul is disturbed by emotion, she cannot commit to a course of action, capped by

the image of the sunbeam reflected on water, referencing a Stoic discussion of that very phenomenon.

Recognition of engagement with Stoic teachings on emotions enriches our appreciation of Apollonius' poetry: As expected, Apollonius plays the *doctus poeta*, updating his characters to reflect the latest thinking on emotions, the soul, and psychic conflict, while allowing room to identify gaps and current controversies. Apollonius' references to the doctrines are often ironic and witty: he makes reference to Stoic teaching about functionally rational emotions, which can overcome reason, even as he deflates Heracles' role as the proto-philosopher; Idas, the model for hyperbolic archaic heroism, attempts to analyze and cure Jason's emotions; the irascible Telamon quickly gives up his anger when its rational basis is corrected. Again, Apollonius uses the references to underline the realism and pathos of Medea's plight: her heart flutters and she constantly changes her plans because that is what the soul does when it is disturbed by emotion; we all might suffer the same.

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