

## EXPLORING THE FORMATION OF COALITIONS BETWEEN ISLAMIST AND SECULAR PARTIES IN INDONESIA LOCAL ELECTIONS: FIGURE, PATRONAGE AND COMMON ENEMY

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**Abstract:** The issue of difficulties in building coalitions between PKS and PDIP has been widely discussed by the scholars. This paper presents the reasons for the formation of coalition between secular and Islamic parties in supporting the election of leaders where coalitions are formed at the local level. The study suggests that the track record of candidate, patronage system, and the involvement of elites either from inside or outside of the party, determine the treatise of a coalition. In addition, an effort to make the dominant political power as the common enemy is another strategy in the local political contest. The study also found that the coalition of inter ideologies can lead to the creation of temporary coalitions where political interests align.

**Keywords:** Coalition, Local politics, Patronage, Figure and common enemy

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### 1. Introduction

Changing political dynamics frequently create many surprises for both national and local elections during the reformation era in Indonesia (1998-now). The reformation era not only has seen the creation of several new political parties with different ideologies but also seen differences between the formation of political coalitions at national and local levels. In some cases, some different parties cooperated at the national level, but at local levels will support candidates at local levels from parties they are not aligned with nationally. For Example, both PDIP (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) and PKS (Prosperous Justice Party) never cooperated in a national context. This can be seen when PKS were in power (2005-2010 and 2010-2014), PDIP at the same time were in opposition. Subsequently, once PDIP won the election and took over government (2014-2019 and 2019-2024), PKS became the opposition ([Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014](#); [Bourchier, 2019](#)). In contrast, at local political levels, both parties cooperated to support the same candidate in three different provinces and thirty- three regencies in 2018 ([detik.com, 2018](#)). If PDIP acts as the main supporter of one candidate, PKS will often be an additional supporter and vice versa. This study examined this phenomenon in South Sulawesi and East Java the parties aligned at the provincial level. PDIP and PKS have a different ideological and supporters background. PDIP is considered to be a nationalist party, and some researchers call it a secular-exclusive party ([Baswedan, 2004](#); [Evans, 2003](#); [Feith & Castle, 1970](#)).<sup>1</sup> This notion is based on the observation that the party frequently contrasts the relationship between Islam and the state. Besides, the main base

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of PDIP supporters are a Marhaen group ([Gerald, 2019](#); [Nashir & Jinan, 2018](#)),<sup>2</sup> Sukarno followers who come from grass root level (abangan) and non-Moslem ([Kaligis, 2014](#)). They are scattered in many regions of Indonesia. Meanwhile, the foundation of PKS is Islam. They identified themselves as the Islamic Party, which are struggling to maintain Islamic values in the country's life ([Fealy, 2001](#)). The Party followers are mostly dominated by Middle Eastern university alumni, *salafi* groups (early generation of Islam), and missionary networking-based universities that scatter in many popular universities ([Nurdin, 2011](#)). Thus, the vast majority of this party's supporters are educated people, professionals, and middle-class society.

PKS however is a new party that emerged in the reformation era 1998 ([Hilmy, 2007](#)) that previously called as the PK (The justice Party). This change might be caused by the insufficient of the percentage of PK voters which must be two percent of national voters. Scholars such as [Baswedan \(2004\)](#), [Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani \(2012\)](#), identifies PKS as Islamist party and exclusive Islam.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, PKS is grouped with transnational Islamic parties, because the ideas, founders and main figures of the party are mostly Middle Eastern alumni and have an incision with Middle Eastern model religious and political practices ([Rahmat, 2006](#)). Moreover, PKS is a solid and disciplined cadre party ([Fealy, 2001](#)), and is often identified with the practice of politicizing religion through symbols and rituals. This can be seen in the process of fans recruitment which take a long and tight procedure ([Hasan, 2011](#)). Furthermore, The PKS fans is the educated middle class, public and professional colleges ([Minardi, 2018](#)).

Local elections are crucial for political parties to build political power in a region. As contended by Ben [Hilman \(2012\)](#), the competition of local political contest may attract more attention in local area rather than a national political contest. Different types of power, such as economic, track record of the candidates, and networking can determine the victory of the election ([Lay, 2012](#)). These elements become the foundation for parties' cooperation in the local election. A number of strategies came up to win the local political contest such as building ideology cross coalition. This article seeks to understand the reasons behind the coalition and also try to figure out the political ideologies for each parties in building cooperation.

## 2. Literature Review

One of the main characteristics regarding the Indonesia political system is sharing power. Consequently, there is no single party even the President who has capabilities to fully controlled the political authority either in the parliament or government ([Mietzner, 2013](#)). This political system is mainly caused by the fragmentation of Muslim community in Indonesia which further influenced the political party fragmentation.

Generally the vast majority of Indonesia political parties encounter same barriers where the party and its member mainly concerned on the track of candidate not the party as the institution ([Mietzner, 2013](#)). In other words, the party frequently pick up the candidate who is potentially to get more voters without considering their capabilities and experiences although these candidates are not the party followers ([Mietzner, 2016](#)). To put it simply, the popularity

of figure is mainly considered to get more voters ([Mietzner, 2013](#)). This is supported by the Indonesia political system who allow non-cadre of party to join the local political contest as long as they meet the condition.

On the other hand, the Reformation era has created a movement that divides the power of the presidency and the legislative (DPR) as well as the delegation of authority between the center and the regions. As an illustration, according to World Bank records there was an increase in the distribution of authority from 17 percent in 2000 to 40 percent after 2009 ([Mietzner, 2013](#)). The birth of Law no. 32 of 2004 concerning regional government, one of which regulates direct regional head elections, giving birth to the spread of the political axis from the center to the regions. Local politics has served as a bellwether of state of democracy in the country ([Fossati, 2016](#)). Prior to the enactment of this law, political and economic frenzy was concentrated in Jakarta. This condition makes political parties run fast to win positions at the regional level because it will have an impact on the popularity and acceptability of parties in the election.

In various previous studies, the main issues in local elections are related to candidates and patronage. The candidate is related to the party's efforts to win the regional election (Pilkada) to recruit candidates who have high voting appeal. The aspects of personality, popularity and wealth became general considerations even though they came from outside the party ([Lay, 2012](#)). It cannot be denied that the process of recruiting candidates has resulted in buying and selling tickets as candidates. As explained by [Buehler and Tan \(2005\)](#) in a case study in Gowa, about the process of recruiting candidate through buying and selling tickets for regional head candidates ([Buehler & Tan, 2007](#); [Buehler, 2010](#)). Citing a statement by political party leaders that the ticket that had to be paid by candidates from outside the party cost \$ 200,000, while from the cadre itself was \$ 60,000 ([Buehler, 2007](#)). The party provides the opportunity for the public to get a ticket for nomination by paying the required amount. The longer this kind of candidate model is still strong especially at the local level ([Fossati, 2019a](#)). One of the reasons is that the selection of candidates is carried out openly and everyone can access it if they meet the requirements set by the party.

The case in Gowa illustrates the general phenomenon of political parties in Indonesia. The role of the Chair in deciding whether or not to qualify as a candidate is very decisive ([Lele, 2012](#)). The pattern of each party is almost the same ([Budi, 2020](#)). Regional leaders submit candidates to the central head of party, and from this process the central leadership will determine the final decision. One of the phenomena of buying and selling candidate tickets is the strong personalization of the party or party chairman as if it were the owner ([Budiarti, 2018](#)). Some of these trends can be seen in PDIP, PKB, Gerindra, Democrat, Nasdem ([Chambers & Ufen, 2020](#)). One side of the unclear definition of the position of chairman of the party is also visible in the strong personal influence in changing internal party rules and in determining the party management under him ([Chambers & Ufen, 2020](#)). In addition, several political parties are still strong in maintaining figures who are the power of party strengthening in the electoral, as happened to PAN and Amien Rais, Megawati in PDIP and PKB with (late) Kyai Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur).

Regardless from the issue of recruiting candidates, patronage is also a major issue in local elections. [Aspinall and Sukmajati \(2016\)](#) stated patronage as a shareable benefit that is

exchanged for political support. Some of the most notable forms of patronage are vote buying, gift giving, project promises, cooperation and social assistance. Patronage can occur before and after contestation. The promise or gift is submitted before the election is regarded as the 'door opener' and continues after being elected a larger number. Aspinall said patronage was practiced openly and semi-legally and part of the neoliberal model ([Aspinall, 2013](#)). Money politics (vote buying) ([Sumampouw, 2018](#); [Lewis, 2020](#)) which occurred during the General Election and regional election which is well known to many people, and this phenomenon seem to have been ignored by law enforcers. The practice of patronage occurred in many rural communities and poor families, although it cannot be denied that it occurs in the urban middle class ([Tomsa, 2014](#)). The candidate-client relationship is largely temporary depending on how long he has been in power ([Aspinall & Hicken, 2020](#)). Patronage practices target all political parties, including Islamic parties ([Hamayotsu, 2011](#)). The case described by Buchler and Tan in Gowa actually happened to PPP, which in fact was an Islamic party ([Buehler & Tan, 2007](#)). To put it simply, there are no differences in the patterns and strategies to get votes between the Islamic and nationalist parties, including the matter of patronage ([Hamayotsu, 2011](#)).

In the regional elections where the parties are very close and face to face with constituents, the use of various new strategies is strongly required. Competition for regional heads encourages parties to seek new approaches, one of which is to form an extreme coalition. This can be viewed in the case of the PDIP-PKS coalition that has never happened at the national level, but it was actually practiced in a regional coalition.

Election Law No. 7 of 2017 requires that the nomination of regional heads must meet 20% of the total votes. In practice, not all political parties meet these requirements, including PDIP and PKS. Consequently, a cross-party coalition becomes an unavoidable option. Coalitions refer to joint efforts integrating interests to achieve common purposes ([Leftwich & Wheeler, 2011](#)). It is a collection of government parties ([Grzymala-Busse, 2001](#)), as well as a joint movement who share benefits by adhering to stipulated coalition agreement ([Tattersall, 2006](#)). The party coalition occurs for two reasons; firstly, to win office or a position in government (office seeking), or secondly to fight for the policies and ideals of the party that benefits the public interest (policy seeking) ([Strom, 1990](#)). Additionally, [Strom \(1990\)](#) suggests that coalitions may be formed simply as a means of vote-seeking. Each of these approaches has advantages and disadvantages. Meanwhile, [Nyhuis and Pleiscia \(2017\)](#) explain the possibility of another coalition consideration due to satisfying voters by putting aside all differences including ideological differences. There is a strong effort of voters to encourage political parties to form coalitions with other parties.

The PDIP-PKS coalition in the election for the governors of South Sulawesi and East Java in 2018 was more driven by non-ideological considerations. Apart from figure and patronage factors, it is also due to a strong effort to break the hegemonic strength of the Golkar party by making it a 'common enemy'. These three factors occur simultaneously. Figures, patronage and common enemy become new models in winning regional heads. Here in lies the advantage of this article compared to previous research.

### 3. Method

The research used the qualitative approach. It employs interviews, participatory observation, and documents collection either from journals or websites. The research focused the two big provinces, South Sulawesi and East Java and representativeness of west and east Indonesia. Data analysis used the interactive analysis [Miles and Huberman \(1994\)](#). It starts from data gathering, display, reduction and conclusion.

### 4. Findings and Discussion

#### 4.1 Figure, patronage and common enemy in local election

The strength and popularity of the figure of a regional leader candidate is crucial for electability. The higher the profile of the figure, the greater the electability. The strength of the figure might be sourced from experience as a political leader, record experiences in government, a role in various social activities, and because of family descent who have respectable social status ([Aspinall & Sukmajati, 2016](#)). Two candidates supported by PDI-P and PKS in East Java (East Java) and South Sulawesi (South Sulawesi) in the local elections in 2018 are very popular figures in their area. Nurdin Abdullah (NA) as a governor candidate in South Sulawesi and Syaifullah Yusuf (SI) represented East Java. Both candidates are the popular figure at that time.

NA, candidate for governor in South Sulawesi, has the ability and figure that is quite prominent compared to other figures. NA is the Regent of Bantaeng for two periods. At the provincial level, Bantaeng is one of the prominent districts; it has recently become notable in the archipelago for the free health services provided by its Disaster Preparedness Brigade (BSB) team. Other achievements in Bantaeng are the construction of flood control reservoirs, construction of hospitals, industrial estates, Toyota mechanical schools, community academies and Vocational Training Centers (BLK). In addition, due to their ability to manage a clean and visionary government, NA is aligned with high-achieving regional leaders such as Risma and Azwar Anas in East Java and Ridwan Kamil while still leading the city of Bandung. Compared to other regions in South Sulawesi, the gate to Eastern Indonesia has not changed much except in terms of population and vehicle growth. PDIP ([Rudi, 2019](#)) and PKS ([Ustadz, 2019](#)) view the success of NA in Bantaeng can be duplicated at the provincial level. NA has a clean reputation, because he is not willing to engage in corrupt activities. One example of this uncompromising stance was when the idea of impeachment emerged in early in his period of being governor. DPRD's Questionnaire Rights towards him were related to various policies and the assumption of leadership dualism with the vice governor, which can have implications for impeachment. However, NA responded to the questionnaire with an open and calm attitude-without being influenced by the possibility of lobbying outside parliament that results in transactions with political parties ([Sri, 2019](#)). NA clearly answered the questions of legislative members that he and his deputy have same vision and still work together ([tempo.com, 2019](#)). This attitude emphasizes that he is on the track in taking strategic policy and without being influenced by anyone.

Figure factors also occur in East Java. The political choice of the PDI-P and PKS on Syaifullah Yusuf (also known as Gus Ipul, abbreviated GI) was based on his ten years of standing when accompanying Soekarwo as vice governor. The figure factor is directly proportional to the support of the clerics both in the formal structure of NU and personal support as done by Kyai Kholil Situbondo, Kyai from Sidogiri, Kyai from Madura ([Irwan, 2019](#)). This support is the basis and consideration of PKS leaders at all levels to support it.

Gus Ipul's figures in the social and political fields are widely known. He was a central executive of PPP, PDIP, PKB, members of the DPR, and ministers in the era of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. After the minister, then being vice governor of East Java for two periods (2008-2013 and 2013-2018). His extensive communication skills and strong relations make him an example of successful vice governor. Outside the government, Gus Ipul has been the chairperson of Ansor Youth Organization for two periods, Deputy Chairman of 1 East Java PWNU (Regional Leadership of Nahdlatul Ulama) and chair of 1 Ulama Awakening Leaders (PBNU). Political networks and communication are very broad, especially with leaders of political parties.

Generally speaking, a person's figure is crucial in managing an organization. Based on dictionary definitions, 'figure' or 'personal appeal' relate to things that originate from the soul, namely inner strength, determination and firmness ([Aspinall & Sukmajati, 2016](#)). In its context of effective leadership, the figure is related to exemplary, credibility, and trust in one's abilities. Talking about figures is related to the power they have. In the theory of the source of power, there are times when it comes from procedural matters obtained through formal mechanisms, and some are substantive, inherent in a person, and are informal ([Agustino, 2007](#)). Power can be obtained through various means. First, position, which is an important position in society, government, and organization. Second, through wealth. Third, belief or religion, where power can be obtained through religious media, especially figures who have a large number of worshipers or followers. Fourth, intelligence and skill. Fifth, kinship or closeness to policymakers.

In each election, consideration of electability is rejected in local elections ([Hanafi, 2014](#)), besides the availability of sufficient funds to mobilize voters. However, the strength of cost availability can still be defeated by the strength of the figures ([Hanafi, 2014](#)). Concerning the figure, the simulations emerge that even though they don't have enough money, but there is an extraordinary appeal, the greater the chance of choice ([Nyhuis & Plescia, 2017](#)). The question of the strength of figures does not only occur in men but also women. In many cases in Indonesia, the appearance of women as regional leaders is due to the strength of their profile or figure ([Aspinall & Sukmajati, 2016](#)). Although in practice many face challenges.

In addition, local elections cannot be separated from the intervention of hegemonic forces both from within and outside the party. Intervention from the party in the form of direct appointments from the central and regional leadership of the nominee. Influence from outside the party can come from the government, military, businessmen, and other prominent figures. The level of intervention from within and outside the party depends on the selling value of an area. Regions that have natural resources and large sources of income have implications for the possibility of stronger interventions compared to regions with low selling value. The same thing will happen in regions that have a large population that can contribute to the vote in the

election. South Sulawesi and East Java are two provinces that have high economic and political selling points that are very dynamic.

Intervention and patronage in a political event are reflected in Andi Sudirman Sulaiman's (ASS) nomination as a South Sulawesi Vice Governor Candidate. His name appeared last minute when registration at the Election Commission. The name ASS is not widely known in public. Moreover, he has a little experience in political activities and he mainly concerned on business activities in Kalimantan. He crossed the globe as a professional worker in various companies such as Deputy Project Manager (2013-2017) in PHE ONWJ DP2 DSV Saturation Diving Campaign (2013-2017) and Conoco Phillips DP2 DSV Saturation Diving Campaign (2014). Beside as Senior Project Controls Engineer (2008-2009) in BanpuIndominco-Bontang Coal; EPC Terminal Project Upgrade and CibaliungSumberDaya (CSD)- Cibaliung Phase 2 Gold Project (Wikipedia, 2020). His presence was always connected by his brother, Amran Sulaiman, Minister of Agriculture at that time, and was known as a close person of President Jokowi and Vice President Jusuf Kalla. In addition, the rising of personal networks in Sulawesi after Jusuf Kalla elected as vice president giving impact to local election ([Buehler, 2009](#)). Similarly, the name Puti is not widely known by the East Java public. His name appeared last minute when the previous candidate, Azwar Anas, resigned as a candidate for Deputy Governor of East Java who would accompany GI ([Nugroho, 2019](#)). The name Puti Guntur SoekarnoPuteri (Puti) is always associated with the name Megawati (Irwan Setiawan, 2019), the chairperson of the PDIP and at the same time his father's younger sibling.

The appearance of the candidate's name at the last minute and his name completely unknown to the public is related to the term 'prospective order' the name in the process of regional head candidacy. The term 'prospected order' relates to part of the preparation for a change of leadership in the future, as well as being regarded as a political cost for economic interests. Both parties share interests and benefit from the support process ([Scott, 1972](#)). In patronage, the supported parties are interpreted as weak parties, and conversely, those who carry are considered strong parties. The relationship is very close and special ([Sandbrook, 1972](#)) which is based on kinship, friendship to form mutual trust in each other. Patronage relationships are very personal - often people around the stakeholders do not know the relationship ([Scott, 1972](#)). In some cases, the relationship is very close though not formally written. As happened in several places-patronage always creates problems that lead to internal party conflicts ([Chambers & Ufen, 2020](#)). High interests between elites can result in organizational solidity. However, in the PDIP and PKS coalition conflicts are very well managed and differences of interest can be sidelined.

Interestingly, local elections are also colored by the emergence of a strategy by creating a common enemy against the running political parties. The PDIP-PKS Coalition in South Sulawesi cannot be separated from the shared motivation to break the hegemony of the power of Golkar by making it a common enemy. One of the motives is competing to be a governor. Golkar is the dominant party in South Sulawesi. In the 2004 elections, it won 33 votes at the provincial level and was the leading of all political parties when Jusuf Kalla became the General Chairperson of Golkar. The success of Golkar in South Sulawesi cannot be separated from the two important figures who became the Golkar icon, namely BJ Habibie and Jusuf

Kalla. Habibie is a coach, senior, and person who has been in Golkar for a long time since the New Order. The highest position as Vice President and President in 1997-1999 because of his strength and closeness to Golkar. Until he died, Habibie's name, which came from South Sulawesi's Pare-Pare, was still attached as a Golkar figure and senior.

In addition, Jusuf Kalla is also considered as the key person in Golkar. His name is strongly identified with Golkar because he was the Chairman of Golkar from 2004-2009. His political engagement was very broad, having been the Vice President of 2004-2009 and 2014-2019 alongside SBY and Jokowi. In 2009-2014 he once ran as a Candidate in pair with Wiranto. The name JK is a name that is very popular in South Sulawesi even in Indonesia because he is also known as a successful businessman. JK has a Bosowa holding company that manages various types of business holdings in cement, shipping, and universities.

The emergence of new political competitors influenced the power of Golkar as the dominant party across the country. The inception of more one new party with a nationalist style as the 2004 Democrats, Gerindra 2009 and Nasdem 2014, decreased Golkar's power - including in South Sulawesi. However, leadership at the executive level dominates Golkar. The Governor of South Sulawesi for two periods, SyahrulYasinLimpo (2008-2013 and 2013-2018) is the chairperson and key figure in Golkar at the present — even though it is nearing the end of time as the Governor moves to the Nasdem Party. Previously, Amin Syam (2003-2008) was also a Golkar figure. At the end of the New Order until the beginning of the South Sulawesi Reform, it was led by the military, Zainal BasriPalaguna (1998-2003) who was also affiliated with Golkar. This illustrates before and after the 1999-2019 Reform, the strength of Golkar at the legislative and executive levels is unmatched in South Sulawesi. Even though a new party has emerged and several local figures have migrated to a new nationalist party, for example Syahrul Yasin Limpo from Golkar to National-Democratic (Nasdem), this has not diminished the political flow of Golkar, which is still dominant in South Sulawesi. The factor of figures is one of the keys to long-standing political politics in the hearts of the people. Nasdem's rise in votes from 7 seats (2014) to 12 (2019) was due to the factor of Shahrul Yasin Limpo who changed direction. Some of the political cars that had been helping Golkar were taken to Nasdem so that in an instant the sound rose dramatically.

Golkar's strength is almost evenly distributed in all regions ([Buehler, 2007](#)). However, there are some areas where its traditional bases are- especially those inhabited by the Bugis tribe and scattered with national figures from the area, obtaining 50 percent of voters population in some decades. These areas include Soppeng, Bone, Wajo and Bulukumba. In addition, the city of Makassar and its surroundings also became the stronghold of the Golkar Party. National figures such as Jusuf Kalla, AmranSulaiman, Nurdin Halid are the sons of Bugis who came from Bone. Others come from Makassar and its surroundings.

PDIP and PKS formed a coalition in 2018 Governor election in South Sulawesi in order to break the Golkar hegemony ([Rudi, 2019](#)). The position of the PDI-P and PKS, which became a small-middle party, was always undermined by the power of the dominant Golkar political currents. The PKS base is in the Takalar, Makasar, and Bantaeng areas, where for two periods Nurdin Abdullah was the regent upon the PKS proposal. PDIP has traditional bases like Toraja which predominantly non-Muslim and Makassar City which is an urban-plural area. The two regions became the initial capital of the two parties to carry the NA-ASS pair

as a new icon for the Governor-Vice pair in addition to utilizing the votes from PAN who are also both supporters.

The basis of Golkar's votes in traditional areas is not directly proportional to the electability of the candidate he carries, Nurdin Halid. The eastern region of South Sulawesi, called Bosowa, and which has been the main force of Golkar, has experienced a drastic decline, and some of it has a NA-ASS lead over its opponents. On the other hand, the regions which became the basis of the PDIP, PKS, and PAN NA-ASS votes experienced significant increase led the other three contesting pairs. One of the strategies used by this coalition was describing that Golkar party as a bad party and a failed party in running government (Abdur Rahman, 2019). This strategy seemed to work effectively when NA got more voters in NH bases.

Theoretically, it is frequently happened in the realm of society, a small group of community aligned to fight a majority of group of people. This is relevant with the theory of C Wright Mills when he stated that a small group tend to counter a big group which is hegemonic to other group due to the ignorance of sharing power to the others (Mills, 1990). Mills theory is inspired with daily activities among the urban societies in United States of America. A small group of people, as Mills continues, who has a strong networking in military, politics and economics, strongly influences the government policies (Mills, 1990). In contrast, a rest of people who has no power either in politics and economics depend their life to the small group of people.

In addition, as contended by Coser, this counter is mostly caused by inequality of power sharing (Coser, 1967), and more importantly, a strong competition to be elected leader is another factor of this counter (Coser, 1967). Learning from local election in a number of regions, the negative campaign frequently colored the political contest, especially in Indonesia which followed the system of multi parties (Walter & Brug, 2013). The object of this negative campaign usually target the running authority or the dominant political party. Consequently, the high competition to attract the voters demands the party to hardly work (Walter, 2012). In contrast, the big coalition parties normally do not perform a negative campaign because of having power or authority to control the government (Walter, 2012).

Moreover, the emergence of populist candidate surely strengthens the existence of opposition political parties. The populist candidate is a new phenomenon in Indonesia political contest. A number of characteristics of populist candidate may be illustrated, such as the simple communication style, no bureaucracy in building communication with the grass roots (Balsa-Barreiro & Rossi, 2019). In the context of South Sulawesi, PDIP and PKS successfully presented the populist candidate and showed the weaknesses of parties which supported the previous regime.

Figures, patronage, and common enemies appear simultaneously, encouraging parties with different ideologies to form coalitions. The pattern of recruitment of candidates in political parties that use open and closed patterns allows anyone with certain qualifications to put themselves forward as candidates or be nominated. The superiority of figure strength can usually enter through open channels, while many patronages enter through closed recruitment patterns. While the 'common enemy' factor arises when competitors have power and network resources that are difficult to breakthrough. Small parties do not have other strategies and

sufficient resources to openly compete. Extreme ideological differences, in this case, are secular nationalist parties and Islamic parties, not a barrier to building political cooperation

#### ***4.2 Testing the Consistency of Ideology in Local Coalition***

Where is the ideological position that seeks the characteristics of the secular nationalist party and the Islamic party in the coalition? Indeed, the ideology embedded in the platform still exists in each party. The party remains solid in upholding ideological principles that are practiced in daily life and cadre activities. This solidity is in line with the ideals of the parties, PDIP and PKS referred to nationally. In this framework, there are two patterns of the application of ideology namely intern and external. The application of ideology is still strictly implemented for cadres as the hallmark of the party. But outside the cadre and the formal cadre process, the application is not strictly enforced, is flexible, and adapts to the mass segment.

Meanwhile, in the context of party relations in the coalition is personal and unstructured. Party relations only occur at the elite level, both at the central and regional levels. Such communication is only in the interests of the coalition in order not to integrate platforms that have an impact on the possibility of obstructing ideology. Each party runs a tight relationship to avoid collisions. In some cases, for example, the coalition party never met at the party's office but in a neutral place based on the agreement of the two parties, and there was no written agreement containing the rights and obligations that are legally binding between the two parties. Also in practice, the campaigns are not carried out together but continue to focus on their respective bases. In the 2018 local elections which coincided with the Presidential and Legislative Elections, the practices and rules of the coalition party campaign were carried out strictly to avoid sharp clashes between cadres.

With such a practice pattern, does the coalition only stop on the grounds of the strength of figures, patronage, and common enemies, or are there other factors and motivations? Returning to Riker's perspective, forming a coalition is driven by two reasons ([Riker, 1962](#)) namely for the benefit of positions in government and to fight for a policy. Returning to Strom's perspective ([Strom, 1990](#)), that he adds to the term vote-seeking, namely to raise the party's vote in the next election. It is possible because these two motivations can occur simultaneously, both office seeking and policy seeking ([Sened, 1996](#)).

Thus, the reasons for figure, patronage, and common enemy ultimately lead to office seeking and to seek votes. The party will make the most of the leadership of the regional leader that is carried for the benefit of the party and the actors (party elites and supporters) at the party, especially to build and enlarge the networking for the upcoming election. Parties will seek and get collective incentives, while actors will get selective incentives ([Bettcher, 2005](#)). In the end, according to Bettcher's view, all coalition motivations were focused on efforts to take advantage of both material and non-material.




Figure 1: Description

The coalition of secular and Islamic nationalist parties in local elections is not an ideological coalition but a pragmatic coalition. A Cross-ideology coalition becomes a tool to get power through different patterns, while ideology remains attached to the party and each cadre as a value to be fought for. Such coalitions are temporary, which can change at any time based on the number of incentives obtained. In the case of local ideology issues are not as strong as at the national level, especially after several national political parties have developed more religious platforms (Bourchier, 2020). Secular parties and Islamic parties are able to play this role to be more open so that they can build a coalition each other for electoral interests.

## 5. Conclusion

The emergence of coalitions between secular and Islamic parties in local elections were caused by three factors: the strength of figures, the existence of patronage, and efforts to break the hegemonic power by creating a 'common enemy'. A strong, populist, and popular figure who can ensure high electability is a fundamental consideration for party support. In addition to the figure factor, the strong interference from the elite inside and outside the party contribute in the coalition. Candidates for regional deputy leaders emerge suddenly at the end of the process of nomination and a new name is born by creating a 'common enemy' against the ruling party by building a negative image of various policies made both at the legislative level and in the public sphere. These three factors occurred simultaneously which moved the two parties to form a coalition.

The coalition of two parties with extreme ideological differences generates an ambiguous and absurd pattern of relations. Party communication only occurs at the elite-party leadership level at the central and regional levels by building narratives as decisions taken for granted and must be carried out by each cadre. While in the space of mobility that requires communication to the grass root has never happened so that each political machine runs on its own according to their respective political bases. Due to restrictions on relations that are only at the elite level, there is no sharp clash between cadres during mass mobilization.

The pattern of a coalition of secular and Islamic nationalist parties at the level emphasizes the main character of political parties who are both fighting for the interests of 'power'.

Differences in ideology, platforms, and mass bases can be dealt with by building communication between the two parties so that they do not topple each other. This pattern will be a model in cross-ideological coalitions in local politics, maybe even at the national level. More research from other regions would be needed to confirm the finding here it. It is hoped that this study encourage further work along this lines.

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## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> The election of secular-nationalist parties and Islamic parties cannot be separated from the grouping of Muslim schools in Indonesia. They can be divided into two big clusters; secular Islam, conservative-traditional, and Java versus non-Java. In addition, some contemporary Indonesian stated that populist-elite and Islam versus the secular west, and Secular-Muslim and Liberal-Socialist.

<sup>2</sup> This grouping is strongly associated with the long history of Indonesia, especially before the emergence of Islam in thirteenth century. At that time, Java tradition combined with Hindu religion and Buddhism colored societies' life. Once the imperialist came to this archipelago, the encounter between Islam, Hindu, Budha and the West culture carried by the Dutch cannot be avoided. This also influences the structure of social and political among the societ

<sup>3</sup> The same category aimed at PPP and PBB are also conservative. This sorting is based on the application of ideology and the desire of the party to apply Islamic teachings in state life. Meanwhile PKB and PAN are categorized as 'Islamic parties' because they are more open and moderate.