TERRORISM AND NIGERIA'S SECURITY CHALLENGE: THE CASE OF BOKO HARAM

Chuka Enuka
Department of History and International Studies
Nnamdi Azikiwe University
Awka, Nigeria
&
Ojukwu, Emmanuel Ph.D
Department of Political Science
Nnamdi Azikiwe University,
Awka, Nigeria

Abstract

The paper surveys the Boko Haram sect and its activities in Nigeria. It posits that the origin, spread and continued manifestation of the Boko Haram group reflect the dysfunctional character of the Nigerian state. The paper inter alia, establishes that the myriad and milliard attacks and manifestations of the Boko Haram sect pose enormous and complex security threat to Nigeria. Besides its multifaceted negative implications on human security and economic development, Boko Haram also portends harmful ramifications for the corporeality existence of the Nigerian state. The paper posits that two bare options present themselves to Nigeria: To defeat Boko Haram, or become deformed by Boko Haram. In view of this imperative, the paper concludes with a number of suggestions as panacea to the menace of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria.

Keywords: Terrorism, Boko Haram, Nigeria, Security.

Introduction

The incidences of Boko Haram terrorism have become not just obvious in Nigeria, but have remained a threat to the country's national security. The unrestrained milliard attacks on individuals and institutions of government by the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria demonstrate that there is a palpable deterioration in the security situation of the country. Across the country, mostly in the northern part of Nigeria, both Nigerian citizens and foreigners residing in the country are faced with constant fear for their lives and property following the seemingly unending campaign of killing and maiming by the Boko Haram terrorist sect. For some long years, bomb blasts have become virtually a daily occurrence in Maiduguri and other parts of Borno state, resulting in deaths of scores of people (Anyanwu 2012). The massacres by the Boko Haram terrorist group, using improvised explosives and gun attacks, prove that Boko Haram has become a virulent thorn in the flesh of

Nigeria. The country has watched helplessly as hundreds of innocent people are being killed, important national monuments and facilities being destroyed and foreigners including present and potential investors being scared away from Nigeria by the activities of the deadly Boko Haram group. Positing that the Boko Haram is a terrorist group in Nigeria which origin, spread and continued manifestation reflects the dysfunctional character of the Nigerian state, this paper establishes that the sect poses an enormous and complex threat to Nigeria's national security. Besides its multifaceted negative implications on human security and economic development, it also portends harmful ramifications for the corporate existence of Nigeria.

Towards a Conceptual Explanation of Terrorism

Terrorism is a fluid concept that has remained hotly debated and sharply contested. Like many other subjects and concepts in the social sciences, terrorism has defied a single definition. As Seteolu (2011) argues, the conceptualization of terrorism is subjective, transient and problematic. Perceptions on how to define the phenomenon differ among scholars, who attempt to define terrorism in different contexts and perspectives. This is exemplified in the oft over quoted saying that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. Terrorism in a sense is linked to the struggle for self determination (Seteolu 2011), and in another sense, governments' description and construction of opponents who use violence against them (Calvert 2010). Political philosophers and democratic theorists have in certain circumstances, justified rebellion against a tyrant. The opening statements of some country's constitutions have it that when a government becomes destructive to the very purpose that established it, the people have right, and indeed the right to overthrow it. One wonders if revolutionary pressures by disgruntled and abused citizenry on tyrannical governments qualify for the description, 'terrorism'. In the United States, the former American president, George Washington, is revered as a revolutionary and freedom fighter for contesting the authority of the English state. equally,Gerry Adams, the leader of Sinn Fein is viewed as a terrorist for similar actions (Seteolu 2011). The fluidity of the concept of terrorism is further evidenced in the perception and construction of late Yasser Arafat, ex-leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Especially to the western capitalist, Arafat was a terrorist in the light of his struggle to actualize the state of Palestine, the declaration of a parliament in exile, the non recognition of the state of Israel and the threat of declaring a Palestinian state. But on his death, Arafat was described as a freedom fighter and canvasser of peace (Seteolu 2011). Similarly, the terror actions of the Irish Republican Army, IRA, Chechens and the Polisario Front in Western Sahara are described as self determination struggles, and moralized to justify the terror.

However, while accepting that the confusion shrouding the definition of terrorism is growingly indubitable, we are not exempted from attempting a working definition of the concept of terrorism. Etymologically considered, the word terrorism is derived from a Latin word "Terrere". This means terror which is intended to attain specific objectives by creating fear in obstacles that prevent the attainment of such goals (Oche and Dokubo 2005). Terrorism can be seen as a concept that is defined and understood relative to the legitimacy of state governance, as an illegal and illegitimate act (Franks 2006). This assumption, which is disputed, forms the basis of Seteolu's conceptualization of terrorism as an unauthorized act. Though Seteolu defines terrorism as "…the resort to violence or terror for political ends by unauthorized **non-governmental groups** in pursuit of specific political goals", but there can be state-directed terrorism, state-sponsored terrorism, added to non-governmental terrorism (Oche and Dokubo 2005). Seen from its non-state/governmental perspective, terrorism is a form of political violence that challenges the illegitimacy and ill-governance of the state. Terrorism shares undeniable and inextricable linkage with premeditated act of violence or threat of violence which are designed to spread shockwaves of fear and anxiety, to send message to government officials, military leaders, or some segment of the public (Levin 2006). However, clear demarcation should be recognized between civil strife that is an expression of will of the people and criminal groups which may be dreadful, violent and chaotic.

Having journeyed thus far on the difficult path of conceptually clarifying terrorism, we make haste to posit that conceptualizing terrorism as the acts of non-governmental groups is reductionist and lacks a conceptual balance. Our working definition of the concept sees terrorism as the use of, or threatened use of violence by government, group or individual to intimidate or coerce people or government in furtherance of political, social or religious, selfish or rational objectives.

Making Sense of Security

Security as a concept has been a subject of broad and rich debate due to its multi-dimensional nature, for as Imohe will say, "Security is a word that does not enjoy an agreed definition" (Imohe 2010:240). By and large security is a sharply contested concept. Wolfers described it as an ambiguous abstract symbol (Wolfers 2010). Yet it has remained as Imobighe will put it, a great concern to all human societies and impinges on the survival of every human person or society (Imobighe 2003). However, despite the absence of an agreed general definition, majority of the scholars in the field of security studies have noted that security has always been associated with the safety and survival of the state and its citizens from harm or destruction and dangerous threats

(Zabadi 2003, Ocheche 2005, Golwa 2010). This understanding of security focuses on the state as the unit to be secured and on issues relating to use and management of force and coercion in world politics.

For some other scholars, security means the absence of threats to acquired values so that a nation is secure in the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice its core values if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war. This perspective further asserts that the state is the only institution on which primary responsibility for safety of its territory and its people reposes.

Following the challenges of nation building in Africa and other Third World countries in the 1990s, scholars began to extend the concept of security to encapsulate wider issues beyond its political and military meaning. From this period, the understanding of security stretches itself to capture items such as satisfaction of basic needs, the right to sustainable environment, protection of cultural and religious identity etc (Ocheche 2005). However, for the purposes of this study, we are constrained to adopt the definition of security that encompasses its environmental dimension, but focusing more on the political and military angle. This is not in the least to undermine the importance of the dimensions of the package of security.

Origins of Boko Haram Terrorist Group in Nigeria

The history of origin of the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria is shrouded with obscurity. The confusion not only reflects in the narratives about the exact date, but also who the actual founder was (Alozieuwa 2012). While Adibe (2012) maintained that the sect was founded in 2002, Madike (2011) traces the date to as far back 1995 under the name Jama'at Ahl us-Sunnah li'd-Da'wah wa'l-Jihad (The Group of the People of Sunnah for Preaching and Struggle) (Murtada 2013). Madike's account had it that one Lawan Abubakar was the actual founder of the Boko Haram sect. Other accounts credit the origin of Boko Haram to Shehu Sani, a civil right activist in northern Nigeria (Alozieuwa 2012). On the other hand, Gusau's version of the account of Boko Haram origin, traces the sect to an evangelical group formed by Muslim students at the University of Maiduguri, Bornu state, who reportedly felt dissatisfied with Western education (Uzodike and Maiangwa 2012). The popular belief however, is that the Boko Haram sect was founded in 2002 (Alozieuwa 2012). Mohammed Yusuf, to whom the formation is now generally ascribed, only assumed leadership after Abubakar's departure to Medina in Saudi Arabia for further studies.

Boko Haram is a compound name that comprise of Hausa and Arabic. The word Boko is applied to Western and non-Islamic forms of education. Haram

figuratively means 'sin', and literally 'forbidden' (Nwogu 2012, Murtada 2013). Joined together, the two words Boko Haram, means to forbid westernization (Both western education, western culture and modern sciences). The conviction of the Boko Haram sect is that what has been constructed as evil in the society is a consequence of western civilization. Therefore, the aim and pursuit to entrench an Islamic society becomes, in their thinking, an assurance for an evil-free society. To have this achieved, modern state formation must be replaced with the traditional Islamic state. Boko Haram associates itself with the Sunni Salafi tradition (Nworgu 2012). Mohammed Yusuf, the late Boko Haram leader was heavily influenced by the teachings of 14th Century Islamic legal scholar, Ibn Taymiyyah, who himself is associated with the Salafi strain and whose work influenced the ideologies of many radical Muslim groups. Salafists adhere to an austere Islamic tradition practiced by the first Islamic converts. Salafi Jihadists aspire to implement the traditional form of Islam by rejecting any innovations or modern influence on Islam.

There is a correlation between systemic frustration and violence such that the Boko Haram sect inflicts and which threatens the security of a society. Following from this understanding, it has been argued that the wanton destructions, bombings and other acts of violence linked to the Boko Haram group are necessitates of the particular way the Nigerian society is structured and organized. As Faleti (2006) would argue, problems like political exclusion, economic deprivations, injustice, poverty, exploitation and inequity are sure reasons for violence and aggressive behaviours. When as a result of the dysfunctional character of a state, expectations no longer meet attainments, the tendency is for people to confront those they hold responsible for frustrating their ambitions. This is central to Holsti's Weak State thesis. Weak states display a low or absence of vertical legitimacy in that substantial portions of the society fail to display any loyalty to the rulers. The Boko Haram phenomena constitutes essentially the fallout of frustration with corruption and the attendant social malaise of poverty and unemployment among the teeming population. The majority of Nigerians, especially the growing youths, see how the nation's resources are being squandered by a small group of self-serving elite. This unquestionably breeds anger and frustration which ultimately is demonstrated in violent outbursts which continuation has challenged the monopoly of use of force by the Nigerian state, resulting to scores of deaths of innocent and defenseless Nigerian citizens. It is against this background of failed and dysfunctional state character of Nigeria and that of notorious corruption among the political elite and increasing poverty of the citizens over the past years in Nigeria, that a growing disenchantment with the Western system of governance grew,

particularly among the jobless young men (Nwogu 2011). Students of tertiary institutions, lecturers and highly placed individuals are believed to be members of the Boko Haram sect, fighting the cause of Allah to save Islam from the clutches of Western influences and domination (Abolurin 2011).

Incidences of Boko Haram in Nigeria

Since the inception of Boko Haram, and indeed since its radicalization in 2009, following the killing of its leader, Yusuf, who was shot dead while in the police custody, the group is believed to have carried out numerous campaigns that have resulted in the deaths of many and destruction of property worth billions of naira. Below are selected cases of Boko Haram attack incidences:

Selected cases of Boko Haram attacks from 2009 to 2015

Date	Incidents	Effects
July 26-29, 2009	2009 Boko Haram Uprising marking the Beginning of the insurgency in northern Nigeria.	Nearly 1,000 people were killed in clashes between Boko Haram Militant and Nigerian Soldier.
July 30, 2009	Execution of Muhammed Yusuf, Spiritual Leader of Boko Haram by Nigerian Soldiers following the recent uprising.	Abukakar Shekau takes control of the group
September 7, 2010	Bauchi prison break.	5 people were killed and 721 inmates freed from Bauchi prison.
October 11, 2010	Bomb Attack on Maiduguri police station	The police station was destroyed and three person injured.
December 31, 2010	Attack at Mammy Market at Army Mogadishu Barracks, Abuja.	11 people died.
May 29, 2011	Bomb explosion in Abuja and Bauchi (during Goodluck Jonathan's swearing in as new president).	15 people killed.
June 16, 2011	Failed Abuja police Headquarters bombing (Nigeria's first instance of suicide Bombing).	2 people died (the suicide Bomber and a traffic policemen)

August 4, 2011	Damaturu Attacks	Between 100 to 150 people were killed.
December 22- 23, 2011	Book Haram and Nigerian Army clashes in Maiduguri and Damaturu.	68 people, of whom are 50 militants, at least 7 soldiers and 4 civilians were killed.
December 25, 2011	Bombing of St. Theresa's Catholic Church, Madalla.	46 people killed.
January 21, 2012	Kano multiple bombs blast.	185 people feared dead.
April 29, 2012	Attack Bayero University, Kano.	13 Christian worshippers, 1 non-teaching staff and 2 professors were killed.
June 17, 2012	Kaduna Church Bombings	19 people were killed.
August 7, 2012	Deeper Life Church shooting.	19 church members killed.
December 25, 2012	Maiduguri and Potiskum Church shootings.	27 Christians were killed.
January 1, 2013	Nigerian Army Raid on Boko Haram.	13 militants were killed.
March 18, 2013	Kano Bus bombing.	Between 22 and 65 people were killed.
April 16, 2013	Baga Massacre (Borno State)	187 people were killed.
July 6, 2013	Yobe State school shooting.	Over 42 persons were killed.
August 12, 2013	Attacks on Maiduguri Mosque	56 people killed.
September 12, 2013	Ambush by Boko Haram	40 soldiers died.
September 12-18, 2013	Nigeria Army offensive against Boko Haram sect.	150 militants and 16 soldiers died.
September 19, 2013	Benisheik Attacks by Boko Haram.	16 people were killed.
September 29, 2013	Guiba College Massacre (Yobe State).	Over 50 students were killed
October 2013	Government force raid on rebel.	101 Boko Haram fighters were killed.
October 29, 2013	Raids on Damaturu.	At least 128 people were killed (95 militants, 24 soldiers, 8 policemen and 2 civilians).
January 26, 2014	Northern Nigeria Attacks by Boko Haram	138 killed in total.
February 14, 2014	Borno Massacre in Konduga	121 Christian villagers were killed.
February 15, 2014	Izghe attack by Boko Haram.	106 persons killed.
February 25, 2015	Federal government college	59 students were killed some through

	attack by Boko Haram in Yobe State.	throat slitting by militants.
March 14, 2014	Attack on Giwa Military Barracks in Maiduguri.	Book Haram Detainees were freed from a detention facility and recaptured detainees were executed by the military.
April 14, 2014	Abuja twin bombing attack	Over 88 people were killed.
April 15, 2014	Chibok school girls kidnapping (Borno State).	276 female students were kidnapped by Boko Haram.
May 1, 2014	Abuja Car bombing	19 people killed.
May 5, 2014	Gamboru Ngala Attack (Borno State).	At least 300 people were killed.
May 20, 2014	Jos car bombings.	At least 18 villagers were killed.
May 27, 2014	Buni Yadi attack (Yobe State)	49 security personnel and 9 civilians were killed.
June 1, 2014	Mubi bombing (Adamawa State).	40 people were killed.
June 2, 2014	Gwoza massacre.	At least 200, mostly Christians were killed in several villages in Borno State.
June 20-23, 2014	Borno State attacks.	70 people were killed and 91 women and children kidnapped by militants.
June 23-25, 2014	Central Nigeria (Middle Belt) attack.	About 171 people were killed in series of attacks in the middle belt of Nigeria.
July 26, 2014	Nigerian Military Raid on Boko Haram camps.	Over 100 militant were killed
November 28, 2014	Kano bombing and Gun Attacks.	At least 120 Muslim followers of the Emir of Kano, Muhammed Sanusi II were killed during a suicide bombing and gun attact by Boko Haram. The four gunmen were subsequently killed by an angry mob.
December 13, 2014	Gumsuri Kidnappings (Borno State).	About 35 persons were killed, while about 185 persons were kidnapped.
December 28-29, 2014	Failed Boko Haram offensive into Cameroon's far North region.	85 civilians, 94 militants and 2 Cameroonian soldiers were killed.
January 3-7, 2015	Baga massacre and Raze.	Militants razed the entire town of Baga in North-East? Nigeria. At least 2,000 were killed. Boko Haram controlled 70% of Borno State. The worst affected by the insurgency.
January 9, 2015	Refugees flight from Baga,	7,300 Refugees flee to neighbouring

	Borno State.	Chad, while over 1,000 were trapped in the land of Kangala in lake Chad (following the Boko Haram Massacre in Baga).
January 12, 2015	Failed Kolofata Raid in Cameroon.	The Cameroonian military claimed the army lost one officer, while the Boko Haram group lost between 143 – 300 rebels.
January 18, 2015	Attacks on villages in North Cameroon by Boko Haram	80 people kidnapped and 3 others killed by Boko Haram.
January 25, 2015.	Offensive against Nigerian Forces in Maiduguri.	8 civilians, about 53 militants and unknown numbers of soldiers died Rebels captured the nearby strategic town of Monguno.
January 29, 2015	Recapture of Border town of Michika by Nigerian Military in Collaboration with Chadian Soldiers.	Michika recaptured from the Rebels.
January 31st, 2015	African union pledged to send 7,500 International Soldiers to Nigerian and fighting in North of Cameroon.	Chadian Forces claimed to have killed 120 Boko Haram fighters while they lost 3 soldier.
February 6, 2015	Niger Raid by Boko Haram on Bosso and Diffa towns.	It marked the first time the Boko Haram attacked the country. The Chadian Military assisted the Nigerian Armed Forces to repel the attack. 5 Nigerien were killed while the government claimed to kill 109 militants.
February 12, 2015	Invasion of Sambisa Forest, Borno State (Boko Haram Stronghold) by West African Allied Forces of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger	Undisclosed number of scores of insurgents were killed.
February 13, 2015	Ngouboua, Chad Attack (after 30 insurgents crossed lake Chad in 4 Motor Boats).	The first attack on Chad by Boko Haram.
February 21, 2015	Recapture of Baga by	Baga which had fallen to Boko Haram on

	Nigerian Army.	January 3rd was recaptured by Nigerien Army.
February 24, 2015	Chadian Boko Haram rebels clash near Garambu	Over 200 Boko Haram fighters were killed, one Chadian soldier lost and nine others wounded.
March 9 and 18, 2015	Recapture of Malam Fatouri and Damasak (North East Nigeria) by Chadian and Nigerien forces.	Insurgents dislodged from Fatouri and Damasak while Chadian and Nigerien forces retook the towns.
April 24, 2015	Sambisa Forest last area controlled in Nigeria by Boko Haram Forces.	Intensive efforts are still mounted to dislodge the militants and take over the area.
June 16, 2015	Twin Suicide Bomb attacks in Chad Capital Targeted at Police Headquarters and Police Academy.	24 people killed and more than 100 wounded in N'Djamena blamed on Boko Haram Jihadists.
June 22, 2015	Maiduguri Mosque Bombing by 2 female suicide bombers.	30 killed at crowded mosque as Boko Haram marked the start of Ramadan by targeting a mosque that they saw as falling short in following 'the Prophet'.
July 1-2, 2015	Multiple Mosque Massacres	48 persons killed on the 1st at one mosque in Kakawa and 17 wounded in the attacks. 97 others mostly men were killed in numerous mosques on the 2nd July 2015 with a number of women and young girls killed in their homes, while unknown numbers were wounded.
July 6, 2015	Jos Bomb attack	At least 44 persons were killed.

Source: Akinobi (2015)

Security Implications of Boko Haram in Nigeria

There is no doubt that Boko Haram insurgencies and violence has been a major threat to national security in Nigeria since the year 2009 when the group declared its onslaught on some government institutions in the heartland of northern Nigeria. The continued insurgency of the Boko Haram shows that Nigeria is a tinderbox, an unstably equilibrated country sitting at the edge of a precipice. The use of lethal weapons and explosives by the Boko Haram group that engage in violent activities have been responsible for the death of many individuals and destruction of property, including places worship. The implication of this is serious insecurity problem in Nigeria. This

is to the extent that safety to the lives and property of people is no longer guaranteed as people can be killed at the slightest provocation. Substantial number of Nigerian soldiers had been lost to Boko Haram killers. This is a great minus to Nigeria's resources invested in training these fallen officers, and also a reduction to the expectation of national protection to which end the military in the first place was designed and created.

In addition to the security implication of loss of lives, the perpetration of violence by different Boko Haram members and groups has been generating mutual hatred and suspicion in the minds of people in Nigeria. The recent attacks on places of religious worship by suicide bombers have been misinterpreted as attacks by Muslims in the north against the Christians in the south and vice versa. As such, the level of trust between the adherents of the two religions has been affected. This has been increasingly causing attacks and reprisal attacks in the country. The resort to violent attacks has made the task of nation building more difficult in Nigeria. Instead of advancing towards achieving common national identity, people now attach themselves with primordial symbols.

Boko Haram since its inception has created a cover under which crime and violence are perpetuated by other gangs. Armed robbers have found an alibi to loot banks, and politically hired assasins employ the Boko Haram cover to execute their jobs (Omotosho 2010). It should be emphasized that the activities of the Boko Haram militias in Maiduguri and its environs has a negative implication on Nigeria's nascent democracy. Apart from facilitating election rigging, the Boko Haram activities have scuttled and obstructed smooth conduct of general elections in Nigeria.

Following the insurgence of terrorism in Nigeria, the country's sources of revenue have equally been affected. Several business cities, especially in the northern part of the country which were formerly economically active are fast becoming shadows of their old self, thereby reducing economic growth rate in Nigeria. Boko Haram activities have placed Nigeria on the global map of terrorism. The United States for example has branded Nigeria a breeding ground for international terrorism (Dukor 2010). Arising from this is that Nigeria's business environment has been described as unsafe. Since the business environment in Nigeria has been rated risky as a result of Boko Haram insurgencies, potential foreign investors are running away from Nigeria. It is evident that cities and states like Kano, which had remained for many years, the commercial and economic epicenter of northern Nigeria, and indeed that of other neighbouring countries, have now been ripped of this economic glory. The indiscriminate attacks of the Boko Haram bombers have generated fears that have affected traders from Mali, Chad and Niger

Republic who usually flood the (Kano) market (Nwokike and Oche 2014). An atmosphere of fear occasioned by insecurity, no doubt, inhibits economic development. In line with this, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Nigeria has been badly affected. UNTAD report has it that FDI flows to Nigeria fell to 6.1 billion US Dollars in 2010. This is a decline of about 29 per cent from 8.65 billion US Dollars realized in 2009 fiscal year (Nwokike and Oche 2014). Also, statistics from the 2010 annual report of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), showed that the capital inflow into the Nigerian economy in 2010 dropped by 78.1% from what it was the previous year. Implicit in this is that Boko Haram terrorism has negative implication on the Nigerian economy, and the economic security of Nigerians.

Another security implication of the violent attacks by Boko Haram sect in Nigeria is that it leads to the displacement of citizens from their homes or places of settlements, leading to a deluge of refugees. Such rising number of refugees is considered a security threat especially to the host communities (Nnoli 2006). Since the 1980s and accelerating rapidly with the end of the cold war, the content of national security concerns has expanded significantly from the traditional focus on military threats to borders and governments in power to encompass non-military sources of insecurity. The expanded notions of what constitutes threats to national security have important implications for the issue of forced migrations, especially refugees and internally displaced persons arising during the course of internal wars and other forms of violence. The United Nations Security Council's Summit Declaration acknowledged that threats to peace and security can come from non-military sources. This has brought refugee activities to the forefront of security concerns. With the infliction of terror by Boko Haram through killing by shooting, arson, beheading, maiming and bombing, many have been compelled to flee their homes and residents in Nigeria. Those who flee the scenes of conflict eventually become refugees in other places. In places like Maiduguri, Biu etc, where great destruction had occurred, huge displacements of persons internally had occurred. This has serious impacts on socio-economic activities of the people concerned.

Refugees and forced migrations necessitated by the Boko Haram terrorist activities disrupt production and distribution in the affected Nigerian communities. Often it is the actively productive members of the population who flee. Besides, the flight of highly skilled persons from the society reduces the capacity of the economy to grow. In addition, the timing of the flight of refugees does not necessarily coincide with planting and harvesting seasons in the case of farmers, or factory work schedules in the case of manufacturers. Thus farms are abandoned either during the planting or harvest seasons to the

loss of important food and cash crops. Similarly, the pattern of expectation of manufactured products is not realized.

Influx of refugees in a state or community generates divisive socio-economic competition between the refugees and the host population. The perception by large numbers of the host population of refugees receiving economic support from the government, at a time when the local population is experiencing unemployment and economic hardship, often contributes to a rise in negative attitudes towards the refugees, and indeed physical violence towards them.

There are ecological consequences of refugee emigration. Refugee flows are often much denser and more concentrated than labour migration movements. They are therefore more likely to have an impact on the environment, often leading to overgrazing, deforestation and destructive agricultural practices. Refugees make demands on the resources of the host community, such as water, food and land. Often, domestic resentment arising from that has translated into political action, and indeed conflict.

Conclusion

There is no gainsaying that the operations of Boko Haram as a terrorist group add danger in real and serious terms to the already shaky security situation of Nigeria. The uphill task for the Nigerian state is to defeat Boko Haram or be deformed by it. To end this menace will require, to some appreciable extent, recognizing what in the first place, brought it about, and conscientiously working on them. The Nigerian state should in some serious ways be blamed for its improper handling of the sect which resulted in their radicalization, leading us to where we are today. Boko Haram began in 2002 but as a peaceful Islamic splinter. It was not until 2009 that Boko Haram turned violent, after its leader, Muhammad Yusuf, was killed while in police custody. Seeking revenge, Boko Haram resorted to violence, targeting the police, the military and local politicians. Besides having a rethink on her rather harsh and hard approach to some national issues, the Nigerian state and leadership should, as a matter of urgency, address the lingering and deep-seated socio-economic poverty and deprivation, manage the economy in the interest of the citizens, and construct the much needed platforms of inclusion, tolerance and participation. Some discipline should be ensured within the ranks of Nigerian elites and politicians, some of whom, allegedly, give insidious support to the Boko Haram sect for their self political ends. Amnesty and retraining and rehabilitation programme by the federal government of Nigeria, for members of the Boko Haram sect, and the youths in general in the hot spot areas of the country, will not be a bad option. If this applied in the Niger Delta, it can work in the case of the Boko Haram members. The example of the Chibok

girls' release, holds hope for Nigeria at the instance of the Boko Haram terrorist menace. The release of the girls took a long period of steady and sustained negotiation between the federal government and the sect. This suggests that these boys are amenable to negotiation and peace talk. The government should explore this opening, and meaningfully engage Boko Haram in negotiation that will lead to laying to rest, the lasting terrorist activities in the country.

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