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## IMPOSED IDENTITIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE FORMATION OF THE ANGLO-INDIAN AND COLOURED IDENTITIES

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In March 1991, amid sweeping reforms in South Africa's political structure, the National Party suddenly opened its membership to all races. Within two months of the announcement, five MPs from the Labour Party, the traditional "Coloured party", rose in the House of Representatives and crossed the floor to join the former party of Apartheid. Peter Marais, a Coloured member of the President's Council, proclaimed that, "the National Party without its apartheid policy is the natural home for the majority of the Coloured community."<sup>[1]</sup> By June 1993 the Labour Party had lost its majority position in the House of Representatives<sup>[2]</sup> as a result of continual defections by Labour MPs. Most joined the National Party. With only twenty-seven members left, the party officially dissolved itself in 1993. Meanwhile outside the realm of official, parliamentary politics, the radical Coloured political organization, the United Democratic Front, was similarly disintegrating. Many of its leaders and activists left for positions with the African National Congress. Others left politics altogether.<sup>[3]</sup> Thus by the end of the transition period to democracy, both of the organizations that fashioned and mediated Coloured politics in the 1980s disappeared, as members opted for whiter or blacker pastures.

In March 2000 a film premiere in Delhi drew a startling amount of collective backlash and indignation from one of India's tiniest and often unseen minority communities. Set in 1954, *Cotton Mary* tells the story of an Anglo-Indian nurse who is obsessed with the customs and culture of the British family she works for. Within a week of its opening, Anglo-Indians across the country organized a string of protests, calling for the film to be banned or censored because of its clichéd images of the community: aspiring to be white, lacking dignity and self-respect and attempting to ingratiate with Europeans.<sup>[4]</sup> Beatrix D'Souza, an Anglo-Indian MP

from the state of Tamil Nadu, vowed to raise the controversy in Parliament and insisted that, “We are a 500-year-old community which is dynamic and evolving and growing. They should realise we would not have lasted this long time, with a separate identity, if we did not possess certain basic values, such as having a strong family structure.”<sup>[5]</sup> Similarly, D.K. Francis, the president of the Anglo-Indian Association of South India affirmed that, “Cotton Mary is terrible in denigrating our entire Anglo-Indian community. Every one of us is furious.”<sup>[6]</sup> The film was later withdrawn from theatres in the states of Kerala and West Bengal due to local Anglo-Indian pressure.

Why would Coloured politicians quit “their own” party to join other white and black ones? How could Coloureds actually join the party of apartheid? Why would Anglo-Indians make such a fuss over a movie? Far from being merely amusing snippets, these episodes are telling. I argue that they are illustrative of the differing degrees of commitment and solidarity to their respective identities by group members. While Coloureds appear to resist identification with an exclusive Coloured-ness, Anglo-Indians seem enthusiastic to maintain distinctiveness. As the analysis will show, however, this pattern is not peculiar to democratic South Africa and independent India. The tendency for Coloureds to resist their identity and for Anglo-Indians to accept and come to embrace their identity is well linked to the colonial experience. The historical circumstances under which these mixed populations came into being as well as the evolving use of race in maintaining colonial order are key to understanding the extent of communal solidarity amongst group members in the colonial environments.

A product of every colonial project the world over has been a mixed-race population derived from sexual relations principally between colonial men and local, resident women. The Coloureds of South Africa and Anglo-Indians of India are two such examples. These colonially derived mixed-race populations represent unique case studies for studying the politics and process of identity formation, largely because of their condition as racial or ethnic groups “started from scratch.” Smith, interested in the formation of ethnic groups, argues that the origins of ethnic differentiation itself are often “shrouded in obscurity.”<sup>[7]</sup> Colonially derived mixed populations defy this generalization and offer a rare “clarity” in the origins and terms of group

differentiation.

In both India and South Africa, the mixed populations came to be socially interpreted by colonizers, and later the colonized, as a people apart. A distinct intermediary position in the colonial hierarchy was conveniently carved out for these “coloureds” and “half-castes” to float in between the white colonizer and resident colonized, to induce the willing (and in early colonial South Africa, unwilling) lend of labour and cooperation in the expansion and entrenchment of the colonial apparatus. However, as Muzondidya argues, the mere act of categorizing does not necessarily lead to the assumption of ethnic identities on the part of those categorized. While categorization from above undoubtedly sets the parameters within which the production and reproduction of a distinct mixed identity could occur, such identity is ultimately formed through self-identification by the people themselves, who give (or do not give) that identity its shape, meaning, and tenure.[8] He describes it as a process of definition and counter-definition, resulting from a combination of both structure and agency.

The purpose of this paper is thus to perform a historical comparative analysis of the formation of the Anglo-Indian and Coloured identities. Our starting point is the assertion that greater communal solidarity existed among Anglo-Indians than Coloureds during the colonial period. Put another way, while Anglo-Indians became a genuine ethnic community with feelings of historical and cultural individuality, as well as a sense of belonging and an active solidarity,[9] Coloureds did not. Accounting for this difference forms the task at hand. A point that will become obvious is that context matters. The ways in which group members reacted to their imposed, formal categorization was influenced heavily by the social contexts immediately preceding and following categorization. In the case of Coloureds this entails understanding of their inclusion in the operation and legacy of slavery, while for Anglo-Indians appreciation of their inclusion in the ruling group for the first century of British rule as well as their social interpretation by high-born Indians is necessary. Furthermore, as will be made clear, group responses to both Afrikaner and Indian nationalism was instrumental in buttressing or refraining communal solidarity.

The paper is divided into two main parts. The first and second deal with the

historical formation of the Anglo-Indian identity during colonialism and the Coloured identity during colonialism and apartheid, highlighting the role of structure and agency in both. The conclusion will return to the core argument that while the Anglo-Indian identity evolved into an ethnic *community*, the Coloured identity remained as an ethnic *category*. Concepts of ethnicity and ethnic community will inform the analysis.

#### PART ONE: FROM BRITISHER TO EURASIAN TO ANGLO-INDIAN

Anglo-Indians are the inheritors of a diversity of national, ethnic and caste backgrounds. In fact, the name *Anglo-Indian* is often a bit of a misnomer. Not all Anglo-Indians necessarily have British ancestry. In practice, this technicality is circumscribed by the official definition of an Anglo-Indian in both colonial usage and in the Constitution of India - as essentially, any Indian with European ancestry in the male line.<sup>[10]</sup> Why the term does not include persons of mixed descent with European heritage from the female line, and why the term suggests British background when this may not in fact be the case, will be addressed soon. For now, Anglo-Indians are persons born in India with mixed European and Indian heritage resulting from relations between colonial men and local women.

Furthermore, the term Anglo-Indian is of fairly recent origin. Adopted by the mixed-race community around the turn of the twentieth century, the popular designation for such persons throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was *Eurasian* - someone of European and Asian ancestry.<sup>[11]</sup> While the term Eurasian was coined by others to describe the mixed-race community, the term Anglo-Indian was later adopted by the community to describe itself. I will argue that the name change is significant in the group's evolution of self-consciousness and solidarity. Thus, *Anglo-Indian* will be reserved to describe the community only at that point in time of its adoption. *Eurasian* will be used more generally and to describe the community in its earlier phases.

The British were not the only, nor the first Europeans to venture into India. This is noteworthy because while the story of India's Eurasians is no doubt closely intertwined with the history of British colonialism, the fact that Eurasians of non-British origin existed before the British ever arrived, as will be shown, has certain

implications in terms of group boundaries for the subsequent development of an Anglo-Indian identity.

The largest pool of pre-British Eurasians derived from the first European traders to land at Calicut on the Malabar coast in the late fifteenth century, the Portuguese. Both the trading company and Christian missionaries actively encouraged inter-marriage between Portuguese soldiers and Indian women; missionaries gained Christian recruits, marriage provided more decent, "Christian" behaviour, and the company saw mixed offspring as a handy labour pool with which to consolidate Portuguese rule.[12] Once married to Christians, the women were generally unwanted by their own families, and the children - typically known as *Luso-Indians* - began to feel the stigma of their mixed parentage.[13] In time, a second name in addition to Luso-Indian came into use - *Indo-Portuguese*. The exact genesis of this separate name is not known, but the most reliable explanation is that while Luso-Indians were more associated with the maternal line and thus less able to trace their European ancestry, Indo-Portuguese were more affiliated with the paternal line and tended to inter-marry with Europeans or other Eurasians.[14]

With the decline of Portuguese rule, the position of Luso-Indians generally sank in the social scale and many absorbed an "Indian way of life." [15] While some Indo-Portuguese continued to marry other Indo-Portuguese and retain reasonable distinctness, others inter-married with newer Europeans arriving in India and their newer Eurasian mixtures, resulting in a process Mills describes as "ethnicfusion." [16] As Dutch, French, Danish, Prussian, and Flemish companies came to India, sometimes employing Austrian, Swiss, Italian, Greek, and Spanish mercenaries and labourers, most preferred unions with Eurasians. The tendency for Eurasians to marry other Europeans or Eurasians eventually led to the creation of a more or less generic Eurasian population, supplemented with cultural specificities here and there, but largely retaining and identifying with a certain European-ness. [17] With the arrival of the British East India Company in 1639 and its contribution to the process of "ethnicfusion," the character of Eurasians gradually tapered to British, [18] as they established themselves as the dominant power in India.

The British East India Company was not interested in permanent settlement in

India. Their economic interests, as a non-settler colony was conquest and trade, involving resource extraction and labour exploitation. Young men who came to work in the colony, on 'temporary assignment,' would eventually return home. The temporary character of the non-settler colony meant that few, if any, women were originally brought along to India.[19] Policy concerning the legitimate and illegitimate unions that began to take place between British men and local Indian and Eurasian women became a pressing subject. Similar to Portuguese logic, British officials saw the usefulness of a mixed race population in extending their tenure; mixed men would join the military, women would form a pool for marriage. Company policy soon deliberately encouraged inter-marriage, to the extent that all mothers (Indian or Eurasian) who married Britishers were paid on the day their child was christened.[20] Unlike the offspring of the original Portuguese-Indian relations however, the offspring of British-Indian/Eurasian relations were categorized as British, and socially absorbed into the ruling group.[21]

The fact that persons of mixed heritage were socially interpreted as equal Britishers from the beginning is significant in regards to the formation of their identities. Because they thought of themselves and were regarded by others as having a particularized identity, rather than belonging to a recognized group, there was no apparent contradiction to being biologically mixed yet wholly British.[22]

The particular socialization and attitudes toward the mixed children depended upon the status of the father. The children of high-ranking officers and officials were absorbed into the upper class and often sent to England for schooling, only to return to India and assume other high-ranked positions. Those of middle rank fathers remained in India for mission-schooling and found employment in the Company and military. Those whose fathers were soldiers, as well as any unrecognized children, tended to grow up either neglected or abandoned and were taken in by mission-run orphanages, eventually joining the military.[23] Thus while accepted overall as Britishers, the mixed children meshed accordingly into the stratified British society in India.

This pattern of inclusion remained for the first 150 years or so of British tenure in India, but by the mid 1780s, directors of the East India Company and upper ranked

military officers realized a number of social trends that potentially threatened their dominance. First, the new British citizen surpassed the imported British citizen in numerical superiority.[24] Second, news from Haiti was unsettling. There, members of the mixed population joined forces with blacks to rebel against their European masters in a 'revolution.'<sup>[25]</sup> Though the situation in India was not an exact parallel, belief that the 'Indian born' British - burgeoning demographically and employed in considerable numbers in both the Company and military - could ally with Hindus or Muslims at any time became widespread. Third, grumbles over the Company's patronage policy increasingly emanated from London. British at home were not pleased with the prospect of being passed over for top positions in India because of Indian-born mixed sons having first dibs due to rules of inheritance.<sup>[26]</sup> Lastly, the perceived threat from and a growing prejudice toward mixed persons was directly connected to the consolidation of the British Empire. Only after the British government assumed responsibility for India from the British East India Company is a real change of attitude toward mixed persons evident. With a new Government of India Act in 1784, 'new' British from England were sent to "clean up" the Company and to institute a proper bureaucracy and civil service.<sup>[27]</sup> These new members to the British community in India came with a mentality that everything Eastern was corrupt and inferior, encouraged by budding scientific racism that preached white superiority.

Subsequently, four official edicts that abruptly changed the entire status of the mixed population by singling them out for restriction were issued. The first in 1786 put a halt to the practice of sending mixed children to England for higher education. The second in 1792 prohibited the employment of any persons *with Indian extraction* in the upper or official cadres in civil, military, or marine branches of Company service. A third in 1795 excluded all persons of Indian extraction from any post in the military service of the Company except certain non-combatant ranks such as fifers, drummers, and bandsmen. Finally in 1808, all Eurasians were summarily discharged from both high and low ranks of the regular British army.<sup>[28]</sup>

The consequences of the edicts were considerable both economically and socially. The former pattern of economic socialization into services of the Company was now terminated. While Eurasian men with high standing in the military were

able to find employment by leading the armies of Indian princes, most found themselves uniformly unemployed.[29] Compounding the state of affairs was the reality that Eurasians were largely a landless community with no agricultural or industrial traditions.[30] The status of Eurasians, and Eurasian men in particular equally declined.[31] Moreover, the fact that the mixed population was singled out for special treatment set a precedence in which Eurasians were officially treated categorically. The once British equals were now a separately identifiable unit or class unto themselves.

The social ostracism of Eurasians by the British was succeeded by a comparable rejection by other Indians. “Thrown back on the indigenous Indian population,” Eurasians were rejected as, “Aliens and unacceptable cast-offs from the colonial masters.”[32] Their perceived ‘foreign-ness’ was largely attributed to their former association with the ruling group and their general lack of identification with the land of their birth. Although Eurasians were not the first product of racial mixing in Indian history, they were the first to not merge into Indian society.[33] That they were unacceptable is largely attributed to Hindu beliefs of purity which interpreted the European half-caste as unclean or impure, aided by a popular perception that all Eurasians were illegitimate and born in lust. Some maintain that upper-Caste Hindus disapproved of such non-endogamous relations as they also ‘threatened’ the essence of the caste system.[34] Finally, Varma argues that historically Indians could only accept foreigners in the capacity of rulers. Thus once the British expelled Eurasians, Indians were compelled to as well.[35]

While British ostracism signified their fall from grace, Indian rejection sealed their fate as a people apart. But double exclusion served to stimulate a new community consciousness and solidarity based on shared feelings and experiences of exclusion.[36] The fact that all Eurasians shared the exclusion and downgrade in status *en bloc* - rich or poor, fair or dark, British Eurasian or Portuguese Eurasian, etc. - and for the same reason (as half-castes), led to an emergent sense of commonality and thus solidarity that transcended socio-economic status and exact European ancestry. Thus a former amalgam of individuals with differing ancestry, class, shades of colour, education, occupation and life experiences, steadily coalesced to protect their shared interests.[37]

The narrow limits of opportunity open or acceptable to the Eurasian elite, and the rising rhetoric of British social and racial prejudice in the early nineteenth century, led to a spirit of self-help and unity amongst Eurasians which led in the 1820s to an agenda of educational, occupational and political initiative.[38] During this 'repressive period' Eurasians formed social clubs and organizations, built schools especially for the instruction of Eurasian children, and in 1829 drafted a petition which was presented to the British Parliament in London.[39] The petition, contained all disabilities and grievances suffered by the Eurasian community in India: (1) an anomalous legal status,[40] (2) ambiguous application of Civil Law to Eurasians,[41] (3) exclusion from the higher ranks of the civil and military services, and (4) inability to receive education in England. While much of the communal activity of the day was the initiative of the Eurasian elite, schools and associations that existed for the benefit of all Eurasians indicate a willingness on the part of the better placed to take ownership of the community as a whole. Dover characterizes such behaviour as, "communal patriotism." [42]

However rosy a picture emerges, it is nevertheless necessary to indicate that the budding Eurasian community was still a reluctant one. While their imposed definition as a people in the middle of the colonial hierarchy was more or less accepted because of their ascendancy over other Indians, they did not accept British ideas of a distinct Eurasian racial or ethnic identity.[43] As Hawes notes, rather than forging an ethnic identity, elites aimed to lessen the social and occupational gap which began to separate them from mainstream British society. He adds, "If a sense of 'belonging' is accepted as an essential attribute of a true community, the predicament of Eurasians was that they sought to belong to the British community." [44] But what Hawes fails to acknowledge is that such a reaction is understandable. Given that Eurasians were formerly part of the ruling group, socialized as Britishers, educated in mission-run, and later British-run schools in English, spoke English as a first language, wore Western clothes, and conformed to largely Western habits, it seems reasonable that their identification as Britishers would not disappear overnight. So rather than interpreting these responses as pathetic acts of imitation as Hawes suggests, they can more accurately be understood first, as being somewhat expected, and second, as attempts to counter-define their officially imposed position as Muzondidya suggests. While Eurasians

accepted their new *status*, they resisted British preferences to re-define their *identity* outright.

The intense attention the Eurasian elite paid toward nomenclature throughout the nineteenth century is testament to their efforts at counter-definition. Bordering on the compulsive, a string of names were adopted and abandoned before reaching near consensus on Anglo-Indian. As Varma explains, *East Indian* was at one point preferred by Calcutta Eurasians, who presented the 1829 petition before the British parliament in this name. However, acceptance of the name was tenuous, as those who were for complete identification with the British did not favour it. Another name floating around Calcutta was *Indo-Briton*, but it was rejected in Bombay and Madras for alienating Eurasians of non-British ancestry. *Eurasian*, which remained popular in usage, was deemed to be too general and also degrading, as it was perceived to be synonymous with half-caste. Compounding the confusion was that in different contexts, different names continued to be used. The first census of Bombay in 1864 referred to the community as *Indo-European*, but meanwhile in Madras, the community was leading back toward Eurasian!<sup>[45]</sup>

Finally, by the end of the nineteenth century, *Anglo-Indian* - already popularly associated with resident Britishers in India - emerged as a satisfactory term that could glamourize and even elevate the status of the community. While the name alienated those of non-Anglo origin, the expected returns were judged to be more valuable. Schermerhorn argues that Eurasians had already made a number of gains by stressing a one-sided Anglo culture in order to preserve a certain position in commercial and administrative circles.<sup>[46]</sup> Since the mid-nineteenth century, new avenues of employment opened up for Eurasians in the railways, telegraphs and postal service as the government needed reliable labour to construct and extend these services. Furthermore, employment in the civil service opened up substantially because of British distrust of Indians after the Mutiny in 1857, as a reward for Eurasian loyalty.<sup>[47]</sup> In the minds of the Eurasian elite, retention of their western-oriented mores had translated into economic stability for the masses of the community. The adoption of an appropriate name would finalize the counter-definition of their social and cultural identity as Britishers.

Yet rather ironically, while the Eurasian elite was on the one hand trying to equate

Eurasian and then Anglo-Indian as being *British*, ordinary Eurasians were becoming increasingly content on becoming just *Anglo-Indian* on the other.

After restrictions were lifted on travel to India, an increase in the number of British women led to a gradual equalizing of the sex ratio in the resident British population. Keen to protect their turf in the marriage market, the wall of social and cultural exclusiveness was re-drawn around British society.[48] As this invigorated form of racism became the defining perception of the social field, “Even the most daring European man would think twice because social ostracism in the small and incestuous circle that was European colonial society, meant virtual death.”[49] Endogamy, already a reality for Eurasian males and less fortunate females, became the standard for the community. The effect of increased employment opportunities in the decades preceding and following the Mutiny was to stabilize a stumbling community.[50] Preferential employment in the communications and internal security forces in particular enabled significant numbers to attain a comfortable middle class status. The general effect was a boost in community spirit and pride. Endogamy became a completely feasible and pleasurable prospect, as did joining community associations and clubs. Around this time certain occupations became Anglo-Indian-infused, and the community behaved like a caste in the sense of maintaining craft exclusiveness.[51] Men took to the railways especially, and also to the police, customs, and telegraph departments, while Anglo-Indian women, not bound by caste inhibitions, found niches as nurses, teachers and office workers. Furthermore, access to a solid education by the colonizers granted Anglo-Indians the distinction of being the only community in India thought to be one hundred percent literate.[52] All together, the growing concentration and insulation of largely middle-class Anglo-Indians in school, work, and residential areas (including the railway colonies), cumulated to deepen their communal solidarity and identity as *Anglo-Indians*.

Extended British social exclusion and the increasing voluntary insulation of Anglo-Indians culminated in the development of an Anglo-Indian culture distinct from both British and ‘Indian.’ Essentially, while Anglo-Indians retained the British as their cultural reference group, the wholly European ways of more early Eurasians gradually gave way to more mixed ones.[53] While English was their mother tongue,

the accent (accused by the British of placing emphasis on the wrong syllables) and vocabulary (peppered with words and sayings from the local vernacular) differed from both the British and other English-speaking Indians due to their growing insularity.[54] Similarly, while their dress followed European styles, Anglo-Indian fashion was criticized by British women for being outdated, and even worse - colourful and gaudy - with a liking for materials and jewellery considered typically Indian.[55] Anglo-Indians also did not eat British food exclusively, and in time genuinely Anglo-Indian dishes and sweets were concocted.[56] Lastly, the development of Anglo-Indian values such as a strong family unit and equality of the sexes are reported to have developed.[57]

An up-and-coming Anglo-Indian culture not only provided the community with a fresh dose of pride, but also with the confidence to respond actively to another up-and-comer, Indian nationalism. The earlier period of Indian nationalism instigated a political awakening amongst Anglo-Indians to seek to retain their rights and privileges. As the British moved to Indianize the services in an attempt to pacify nationalists, Anglo-Indians felt that they were losing their “birthright” of effortless access to government employment.[58] The Anglo-Indian elite put their squabbles aside and amalgamated in a joint effort to mobilize and connect their constituency on a nation-wide basis. The mobilization process was significant in that it engendered a larger community consciousness above that of the regions, which in turn assisted an understanding of belonging to something bigger than what was realized before.[59]

Mobilization also served to clarify and solidify Anglo-Indian group boundaries and cultural markers. As Anglo-Indian leaders were busy seeking and obtaining official recognition of the community and representation in the Central and Provincial Legislative Councils,[60] the matter of who exactly qualified as an Anglo-Indian suddenly increased in importance. European ancestry in the male line was still the definitive qualification, but the ranks of Anglo-India were being increasingly infiltrated by mainly Indian Christians from below and Portuguese-Indian miscellany from the side, with assumed surnames in order to obtain material benefits and status.[61]

The infiltrators were a concern for the Anglo-Indian leadership. On the one hand,

they inflated overall group numbers which was useful vis-à-vis the government in the struggle for greater representation and influence. But on the other hand, leaders viewed the influx as a drag on the community, as mainly those of lower status assumed the identity.[62] The problem was becoming acute as genuine Anglo-Indians of higher standing began to shy away from associational activities due to the mushrooming of lower 'masqueraders.'[63] The best hope for maintaining overall community status lay in the rigorous adherence to traditional markers of Anglo-Indian-ness that could act as cues to compel poorer comrades to look reasonably respectable - these included: the exclusive use of English except when speaking to servants; exclusive western dress that included a shirt tucked into pants with a belt for the men (as an un-tucked shirt was considered too Indian) and a variety of 'frocks' for the women; shoes and socks were to accompany every outfit (to be barefoot was taboo); shorter hair that was curled and maybe even dyed for the women (as straight long hair was considered to be typically 'Indian'), if Roman Catholic one could flaunt their religiosity, the use of cutlery even when eating Indian meals usually eaten by hand, and readily accessible knowledge of your European ancestry.[64]

In the later period of Indian nationalism, it became increasingly apparent that the community's hope for a continued existence lay in the goodwill of Indian leaders, and not in British patronage. The British denied the Anglo-Indian community's request for one seat in the Constituent Assembly, which was responsible for drafting the new Constitution, while Congress leaders were willing to designate two of their own seats for the Anglo-Indians.[65] In short, Anglo-Indians were forced to re-question their loyalties and re-orient their identity. It became apparent that if the community was to survive in independent India as a distinct entity, Anglo-Indians would have to fight to preserve their culture as *Indians*. With fresh leadership in 1942, the Anglo-Indian community entered the nationalist fold. Anglo-Indians would now seek their rights as any other minority group within the context of Indian national life. During the lead-up to Independence, the mantra of the community had become "Anglo-Indian by community, Indian by nationality." [66]

## PART TWO: FROM SLAVE, TO COLOURED, TO SOUTH AFRICAN

The Coloureds are the inheritors of a diversity of national and ethnic backgrounds.

They are traditionally the offspring of European colonizers and imported slaves, and between slaves themselves at the Cape.[67] The fact that not all Coloureds necessarily have “white blood,” will be seen as one way in which the mixed population designated as “Coloured” divided themselves internally, contrary to official classification which came to treat all Coloureds as a bloc.

To be sure, the operation and legacy of slavery will be shown to be highly significant in the development or non-development of a genuine Coloured identity or community. Mixed persons with Emancipation did not abruptly abandon internal hierarchies and boundaries formed during the period of slavery. Similarly, because cultural assimilation occurred in tandem with miscegenation, as slaves were encouraged to fit into the dominant white social structure, Coloureds, and more importantly their original maternal groups, for all intents and purposes grew to be western in culture, social life, religion, and language.[68] Much later under Apartheid, extended social exclusion of Coloureds from whites did not result in the gradual development of a Coloured culture, as most Coloureds resented being categorized with dissimilar others, and actively resisted a unified ethnic or cultural identity.[69] What did form and endured in the Coloured population was a fundamental split between those who identified and sought inclusion with white South Africans, and those who identified and sought inclusion with black South Africans.

Contrary to the early particularized treatment of individual Eurasians, the ‘slavery factor’ in South Africa meant that Coloureds were always treated categorically. As such, differentiation was continually a part of their social reality, only varying between more or less. As white settlement at the Cape in 1652 by the Dutch East India Company developed into a permanent colony, stock farming became the standard activity. Since the indigenous peoples that the settlers encountered - the Hottentots and Bushmen[70] - were deemed to be inadequate for labour, the importation of slaves began.

As a continual process of absorption of new slaves and miscegenation took place, the growing people of colour were socially and culturally “acculturated, but not absorbed” into the European settler society as the labouring class.[71] During this early colonial period, sexual relations between slave owners and members of their

families with slave women were not uncommon. When intermarriage occurred between a European man and a slave or mixed woman, the children were usually absorbed in the European group if pigmentation allowed.[72] However, intermarriage with slaves was not encouraged socially, partly because as a settler colony, there was always a more even pool of European men and women. While intermarriage was generally not a realistic option, extramarital relations were deemed perfectly acceptable instead. The mixed children of these casual or irregular unions inherited the legal status of their mothers,[73] thus maintaining the social distance between colonial settler and slave.

Interestingly, the slavery condition did not imbue a shared slave experience that transformed into group cohesion. Slaves were not treated uniformly as a single unit. It was only after Emancipation that all of the slave *elements* began to be grouped under a general term and regarded as a more or less single entity. Before then they were only components: slaves, colonial Hottentots, free blacks, free Malays, and Bastards.[74] A broad slave consciousness was hindered by the fact that each element occupied a slightly different status in terms of usefulness to their owners. Asiatic slaves were deemed to be both culturally and technologically superior to African slaves. Moreover, freed slaves occupied a higher status than slaves, while most slaves considered themselves and were considered by others as superior to the indigenous Hottentots.[75] Thus by Emancipation, a definite hierarchy existed amongst the mixed-race population.

With Emancipation in 1834, no pressing reason existed for the mixed population to coalesce as a community. With slavery abolished, formerly oppressed individuals obtained a number of civilian freedoms and rights as part of the recognized civilian population.[76] Some even obtained the right to vote. For many, it was quite probably interpreted as a positive improvement on their previous status. Therefore, there existed no real antagonism toward whites to jumpstart a special community awareness. Since access to political rights was tied to property-ownership, something newly freed slaves were unlikely to have, most of the emancipated were politely shut out of politics. However, because access to the vote laid the onus on the individual to do well for himself (by buying property) it was generally not widely interpreted as outright discrimination by the former slaves.[77]

By the later decades of the 1800s and early 1900s, a small but growing Coloured elite emerged that were able to vote. Concentrated mainly in the Western Cape, white political parties took an interest in winning their votes. Affected by their white political socialization, Coloured elites aspired toward integration into white society, and not a separate Coloured identity.[78] Only after the Boer War,[79] when it became clear that the franchise would not be extended to non-whites in the other provinces, did the Coloured elite begin to contemplate separate Coloured political organizations to defend and advance their interests as a group. But, as Van der Ross insists, this initial period is significant in that it established a pattern of Coloured elites appealing to white people in order to serve their interests.[80]

But in order to understand the budding political behaviour of Coloureds and the development of a distinct Coloured politics, it is necessary to better grasp the sentiments and identifications of such individuals through a consideration of their heterogeneous origins and their cultural orientations. The essential argument of virtually all authors writing on Coloureds is that their heterogeneity impeded the development of an overarching sense of solidarity and community consciousness.[81] We must therefore establish in what sense Coloureds were homogeneous and in what sense they were heterogeneous.

If Coloureds can be said to be homogeneous at all, the closest features are language, religion, and geography. On a national basis, the majority of Coloureds speak Afrikaans as their first language. The only exception to this rule appears to be in Durban, where “most” speak English,[82] and in the Cape region where around thirty-five percent are bilingual with English.[83] Even amongst urban and rural Coloureds, the tendency for Afrikaans to be the first language is roughly the same. Similarly, the overwhelming majority of Coloureds are Christian - the only exception being the Cape Malays, a group of Coloured Muslims from the Cape.[84] The Dutch Reformed Church is the most popular Christian denomination (29.4 percent), followed the Anglican churches (18 percent), and to lesser extents the Methodist and Catholic churches.[85] Geographically, up to eighty-five percent are believed to live in the greater Cape region, with thirty percent in the Cape province.[86]

But despite the fact that common language, religion and geography[87] are hardly

insignificant features, and that they are usually associated with features of ethnic groups and nations,[88] the ways in which Coloureds were heterogeneous nevertheless trumped those that were homogeneous. The major factors that contributed to Coloured heterogeneity were the diverse origins and exact combination of their racial and ethnic mixing.

In addition to being dispersed regionally, Coloureds of different regions are also of different ancestral origins. The differing paternal and maternal groups are of significance because not only do they have varying implications as to the cultural orientation of the offspring, not all are of equal status socially. The Durban Coloureds are of Mauritian and St. Helenan stock.[89] Dickie-Clark argues that these forbears were already largely western in culture upon arrival in Natal, and that they were later accorded the legal status of white persons by Afrikaners there. The significance is that today Durban Coloureds tend to be better off than most other Coloureds in South Africa, as their descendants were able to maintain “white” standards and preserve cultural parity with whites. As already mentioned, most speak English.[90] In contrast, some offspring of European and black parentage in the same Natal province speak a ‘Bantu’ language at home.[91]

The progeny of European and Hottentot mixture in the North-West Cape became a distinct group of their own form both the European and Hottentot known as Bastards. Because of European disdain for the indigenous Hottentot, the mixed offspring were accorded a status superior to the maternal group, Bushmen, and later blacks. Although the term sounds derogatory, the Bastards apparently bore it proudly to perpetuate the memory of ‘white blood’ in their veins.[92]

Contrary to popular perception, most Cape Coloureds are not the result of white-black, white-Indian, or Indian-black mixes. Instead, the main original groups contributing to the Cape Coloureds are: (1) slaves - from Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Madagascar, Mauritius, St. Helena, and other regions in East Africa; (2) Hottentots; (3) Bushmen; and Europeans - mostly Dutch, but also some French, Swedish, Danish, Belgian, German, and British.[93] The most common crosses were European men and slave women, European men and Hottentot women, slave men and slave women, slave men and Hottentot women, and slave men and Hottentot-Bushmen women. Therefore, not only is it possible to be Coloured and have no

recent or traceable European ancestry, but also to have no European ancestry. Interestingly, Patterson argues that the most common cross that produced the Cape Coloured people of today was that between slaves and Hottentots. More contemporary mixes in the Cape are between Coloureds and blacks, and Coloureds and Indians.[94]

The diverse combinations of ancestral mixing were of continued significance post-Emancipation because of the persistence of a racial hierarchy and racial consciousness in South African society in general. Thus, exact ancestry was linked directly to status. Except lightness of colour was not the only physical trait linked to status - absence of Hottentot traits such as pepper-corn hair, flat noses, or Negroid traits such as crinkly hair were prized and conferred status.[95] As Cilliers explains, Coloureds generally attached more value to hair form than skin colour, since the Bushmen and Hottentots had a relatively fair pigment to begin with. In other words, since fair skin did not necessarily mean white ancestry, hair form was a more accurate indication of 'primitive' or 'civilized' origin.[96] Frizzy hair signified aboriginal origins, while straight hair signified slave or even white origins.

Additionally, there is a tendency for many lower-class Coloureds to have little or no white admixture, while more middle and upper-middle class Coloureds tend to have more. One effect was that over time, more affluent, 'and whiter' Coloureds came to see themselves as almost a people apart from their less fortunate' cousins.[97] Similarly, while the mixing of some Coloureds took place over many generations ago so that some individuals have forgotten their origins, there are other Coloureds whose mixing is much more recent in time and fresher in memory.[98] 'Newer' Coloureds such as Coloured-blacks and Coloured-Indians may have different sympathies, sentiments, and cultural orientations that 'older' Coloureds who were largely acculturated into European ways of life.

Moreover, racial or ethnic considerations also overlapped with socio-economic ones. The Coloured population structure included a minute upper class, a small middle class, and a large lower class.[99] Given that the daily reality of many Coloureds included poor socio-economic conditions, an absence of a development of group pride seems understandable. Furthermore, the split had also developed in regards to occupation type between a skilled labour and artisan class and unskilled

labour.[100]

A last sense in which Coloureds can be considered heterogeneous is in terms of culture. However, this argument has to be justified as Coloureds have also been interpreted as homogeneous because of culture. Firstly, it has been argued that because the culture of Coloureds is the same as other white South Africans, the development of a genuine Coloured identity has been impossible. More importantly, Coloureds do not seek a culture of their own.[101] The assertion that the culture of Coloureds is essentially the same as that of whites is generally accepted. But what these authors fail to mention is that whites did not form a homogeneous bloc either.

Broadly speaking, the culture of all whites was European, but certain cultural specificities no doubt differed by class and region - the most obvious being language and religion. What needs to be refined in these arguments is that the cultural reference group for Coloureds was not all whites, but whites in their same geographical and economic environment. Thus upper-class Cape Coloureds did not take their cultural cues from rural Afrikaner farmers. This is significant because while our outcomes of no Coloured culture are the same, the reasoning is different. Rather than being pure similarity to whites, it is actually the multiplicity of white reference groups that is continuing to keep Coloureds disconnected, while still adhering to a European-oriented culture overall. The example is useful in that it uncovers the tendency for Coloureds to look to more than one reference group. This is significant because during the lead-up to and introduction of Apartheid, the tendency persisted but changed - usually better-off Coloureds retained whites as their reference group while the less-off increasingly shifted to blacks.

Until the turn of the twentieth century, the term *Coloured* introduced by the British, referred to all non-Europeans. But in the process of reconstitution following the Boer War, the Coloured petty bourgeoisie and skilled strata attempted to defend their position in the face of an upsurge in racism against all non-European people, by their assertion of a distinct identity and sacrifice of black interests.[102] Encouraged by the fact that white parties continued to court their votes, the new Coloured elite saw an opportunity to seek exemption from a number of repressive actions against all non-Europeans.

The first instance that set the precedent by redefining Coloured to mean all non-black non-Europeans was a sanitation crisis in the Western Cape that called for the forced removal of all non-Europeans.[103] Adamant that the culprits were in fact only black South Africans, the Coloured elite appealed to the government for an exemption from the order. Meanwhile the government, feeling the influence of imported social Darwinism and eugenics, had come to decide that because of their white admixture, the mixed population provided a unique potential to lead all non-European people. Thus it was decided that the mixed population should be prevented from entering into an alliance with other non-Europeans.[104] The appeal for exemption from those mixed people who had the franchise provided the government with an opportunity to introduce their new policy, while also appearing to appease the Coloured elite.

While the claim to a *Coloured* identity enabled Coloureds in the Western Cape to escape removal, commitment to a Coloured identity was tenuous amongst the elites. Their aspiration was still assimilation into white society, and the fear was that any excessive appeals on the basis of distinct Coloured identity would hinder any chances for that assimilation.[105] Thus as Lewis argues, the creation of Coloured political organizations around this time did not lead to Coloureds becoming an ethnic group. Acceptance of a *Coloured* identity was reluctant and defensive. More importantly, it was supposed to be temporary.[106] Belief in its momentary character enabled the elite to 'brush over' their disagreements about what it actually meant to be Coloured. While an elite Coloured solidarity was created, a genuine identity was not.

While Coloureds continued to secure some exemptions for themselves, the gradual whittling away of Coloured political rights culminating with the introduction of Apartheid, caused a serious split within the ranks of Coloureds between rebels and realists.[107] Apartheid was a re-moulding of the already-existing system of racial segregation in terms of an ideology rooted in Afrikaner nationalism, of which ethnic identification provided a pillar. As Afrikaners become a "volk" or nation, the logic of keeping the nation pure required segregating all non-whites into a multitude of "nations," each forcibly relocated in fragmented "homelands." [108] The Coloured elite, which 'accepted' the social set-up of Apartheid but subtly protested against the

status ascribed to themselves as a separate nation, became known as the Europeanizing group. The Coloured masses, which never wholly identified with the tenuous Coloured political identity as defined by the elite, protested against the entire framework of Apartheid and sought identification with other non-whites in a discourse of non-racialism and black unity.[109]

So rather than instilling a sense of community amongst all Coloureds, Apartheid further aggravated already-existing divisions. The fact that the Population Registration Act of 1950 defined a Coloured person as one who was not already defined as “White” or “Native”, [110] hardly helped to cultivate commonality. As Coloured people were forced to live together, those of different socio-economic status, ethnic origins, and pigment were lumped together. The result was a lack of community spirit and a lack of desire to identify with the new area and people.[111] New neighbours were often snobby toward each other, and most suffered a loss of pride with forced removal from their ‘real’ homes and neighbourhoods. More fundamentally, Apartheid took a notion of Coloured identity that was formerly only accepted by the Coloured elite, and only for temporary political purposes at that, and forced it institutionally on a majority of people who fundamentally disagreed with it. Thus Coloured responses to instead ‘go white’ or ‘go black’ can be understood as attempts at counter-definition to become regular *South Africans*. As Apartheid attempted to use “their” identity as a tool against them, denying any separate meaning to the imposed Coloured identity became routine.

## CONCLUSION

What’s in a name? Smith describes a collective name as the “identifying mark” of ethnic communities, “By which they distinguish themselves and summarize their ‘essence’ to themselves - as if in a name lay the magic of their existence and guarantee of their survival.” [112] This quote points to the key distinction between the stories of the Coloured and Anglo-Indian identities - Coloureds sought to minimize distinction with others, while Anglo-Indians eventually sought to maintain distinction with others.

It is manifested vividly in each group’s treatment of nomenclature. The fact that Coloureds made no attempt to change their imposed designation is testament to

their tenuous acceptance of it as a purely political and temporary identity *en route* to assimilation into the greater society. If Coloureds had shown too much interest in their identity it would have undermined their future chances at assimilation. While commitment to a Eurasian community consciousness began reluctantly, obsession over an appropriate name indicated willingness of the group to take ownership for itself. Then owing to a budding culture, increased social isolation, and the ripple effects of Indian nationalism, Anglo-Indians coalesced to protect their identity in order to 'survive.'

The basic argument of this paper has been that greater communal solidarity existed among Anglo-Indians than Coloureds in pre-democratic India and South Africa. While both Eurasians and Coloureds began as imposed identity categorizations on the basis of their racial mixture, the reactions of the individuals so classified markedly diverged. As shown, the social contexts immediately preceding and following the categorization of both groups were fundamentally dissimilar. As Eurasians began as equal Britishers, social ostracism was demeaning and widely perceived as an act of betrayal. Furthermore, double rejection from both the paternal and maternal groups effectively forced Eurasians to look inward. The fact that all Eurasians regardless of socio-economic status, pigment and exact ancestry felt the stigma of their mixed blood together and at the same time enabled a budding community consciousness that transcended stark internal divisions. Due to the internal boundaries and hierarchy inherited from slavery, Coloureds were unable and more importantly, uninterested in overcoming internal division. Their original status as non-equals meant that social exclusion was always a part of their social reality. After Emancipation, and experiencing new civil freedoms, no reason existed to impel Coloureds into self-conscious action as social ostracism did in India. Coloureds by this point were acculturated into Western, white ways - including their original maternal groups - which meant that there was no other maternal or cultural option for them to possibly identify and belong to.<sup>[1]</sup> Moreover, the fact that white political parties appealed to those Coloureds who could vote, instigated a process of intense identification with white society on the part of the growing Coloured elite. Rather than identifying with each other, they identified with whites. Thus, even while the Coloured elite reluctantly cooperated to protect their shared interests in the face of rising racial and political discrimination against all non-

whites, none were keen on flushing out the concept of a Coloured identity, as it was viewed as something purely 'for the time being.'

However reluctantly it may have begun, the social, educational and political organizations and networks formed by Eurasians following rejection nevertheless provided the new social outcasts with a sense of belonging and self-worth. Later, with new employment opportunities beginning with the building of the railways and later in the civil service following the Mutiny, Eurasians were becoming an economically stable, socially insulated, and endogamous community. Facing a new round of revitalized cultural racism with the introduction of British women to India - who were interested in drawing thicker lines around what it meant to be British both racially and culturally - the social isolation of Eurasians deepened, and soon ordinary Eurasians began to see and feel the distinctiveness of their Anglo-Indian ways. While adoption of an Anglo-Indian identity among the Eurasian elite was intended to be the cherry-on-top of a protracted process to re-define their identity as Britishers, ordinary Eurasians became increasingly content on becoming just Anglo-Indians. The rising 'threat' of Indian nationalism and the British divide and rule policy of dealing with Indians as separate communities, obligated the Anglo-Indian elite to embrace their Anglo-Indian-ness (as ordinary Anglo-Indians were already beginning to do) and fight for their rights and privileges as a separate and recognized minority community.

The union of elite and ordinary Anglo-Indian opinion concerning their identity, driven together by Indian nationalism, did not similarly occur between divided Coloureds. Rather than mending splits of opinion, Afrikaner nationalism – culminating with the introduction of Apartheid – further wedged the Coloured population apart politically into rebel and realists – between those who still aspired to merge into white society and those who preferred identification with non-whites. By the end of Apartheid and during the transition to democracy, what appeared to look like Coloureds jumping ship from their own identity was in fact the rightful assertion or correction of what they genuinely identified as all along.

Put another way, the core argument has been that while Anglo-Indians evolved into a genuine ethnic *community*, Coloureds remained as an ethnic *category*. Ethnicity is a useful concept to invoke because of its essence as a social construction about

identifications of difference and sameness on the basis of colour/race, language, religion, or some other attribute of common origin.[113] The ethnic status of Anglo-Indians and Coloureds derives from their mixed ancestry - as racially and ethnically (in terms of nationalities) mixed groups.[114] It is imperative to interpret these mixed groups in broader terms than purely race in order to better understand the sentiments and self-identities of these individuals behind their behaviour. Too narrow a focus on race carries the danger of harping too much on the *categorical* space created by colonizers for mixed people without appreciating the meaning such people did or did not ascribe to their imposed status. Furthermore, interpreting these groups within the tent of ethnicity can better reveal the subjective rationality behind their actions.

Smith draws the distinction between ethnic *categories* and ethnic *communities*. While both can denote population groups with collective names, common ancestry, a shared history, a distinctive culture, and an association with a territory, to qualify as an ethnic community, "There must also emerge a strong sense of belonging and an active solidarity, which in times of stress and danger can override class, factual, or regional divisions within the community." [115] It seems reasonable to suggest then that colonial-imposed mixed-race categories such as Coloured and half-caste qualify as ethnic categories – they are given names, they have some kind of common ancestry or history or reason to be grouped together, and they sometimes or not have an association with a territory. The point is that they are only categories. Once we recognize this, the behaviour and actions of the individuals so categorized suddenly appear somewhat more rational. For example, Coloured disinclination to identify with being Coloured has nothing to do with the fact that they are somehow psychologically deficient and white-loving. Instead, disinclination is explained by the fact that it was largely an imposed identity accepted only by a tiny elite, and for temporary purposes at that. If being Coloured was neither a genuine ethnic identity to begin with, nor did it evolve into one, attributing non-identification with it on the bizarre-ness of Coloureds is unjustified. Similarly, that Anglo-Indians evolved into a genuine ethnic identity has nothing to do with finally 'going along' or 'giving in' to their colonial masters. Instead, it can better be understood as the end-product of an on-going process of definition and counter-definition, and as an example of the meaning and shape individuals under imposed

identities give to that identity.

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[1] Courtney Jung. 2000. *Then I was black: South African political identities in transition*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, p. 199.

[2] The “Coloured” Parliament, as part of the Tricameral Parliament established in 1984 which created separate parliaments for Whites, Coloureds, and Indians.

[3] Courtney Jung. 2000. *Then I was black*, p. 199-200.

[4] From Anon. 2000. Film of nurse’s obsession with British sparks protests in India. *The Ottawa Citizen*, 16 March, sec. F, p. 5., and Anon. 2000. Merchant Ivory film outrage. In *BBC News | Entertainment* [online]. UK: 7 March [cited April 11, 2005]. Available from World Wide Web: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/668835.stm>.

[5] Luke Harding. 2000. Merchant film draws Anglo-Indian ire. In *The Tribune* [online]. Chandigarh, India: 11 March [cited April 11, 2005]. Available from World Wide Web: <http://www.tribuneindia.com/2000/20000311/world.htm#5>.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Anthony D. Smith. 1986. *The ethnic origins of nations*. Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, p. 41.

[8] James Muzondidya. 2002. Towards a historical understanding of the making of the Coloured community in Zimbabwe, 1890-1920. *Identity, Culture and Politics* 3(2), p. 92.

[9] Conceptual propositions from Anthony D. Smith. 1986. *The ethnic origins of nations*, p. 14, 22, 30.

[10] The legal definition of an Anglo-Indian, in the Indian Constitution, does not discriminate between various European nationalities - any European ancestry in the male line is sufficient. See Kamlesh Kumar Wadhwa. 1975. *Minority safeguards in India: Constitutional provisions and their implementation*. Delhi: Thomson Press, p. 15.

[11] The term Eurasian was coined by Alfonso de Albuquerque who ‘named’ the mixed-race community from above. The term gradually fell into general use. From Lal Bahadur Varma. 1979. *Anglo-Indians: A historical study of Anglo-Indian community in nineteenth century in India*. New Delhi: Bhasha Prakashan, p. 6.

[12] The exact date of arrival was 1498. From Evelyn Abel. 1988. *The Anglo-Indian community: Survival in India*. Delhi: Chanakya, p. 9-10.

[13] Ibid., p. 10.

[14] The argument is that present day Luso-Indians are mainly Goans, while present day Indo-Portuguese simply identify as Eurasian, or those that have inter-married or assimilated with other Eurasians now identify as Anglo-Indian. Another example of present day Luso-Indians are the Feringhis, a Christian community from Kerala. The story of Feringhi attempts to become Anglo-Indians will be discussed later in the paper. From Megan Stuart Mills. 1997. *Ethnic myth and ethnic survival: The case of India’s Anglo-Indian (Eurasian) minority*. A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of York University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy, p. 69-73.

[15] While “Indian way of life” is not explained by the author, the implication seems to be that culturally and in terms of identity, the Luso-Indians or Goans became ‘more Indian’ than other Eurasians. From Evelyn Abel. 1988. *The Anglo-Indian community*, p. 10.

[16] Megan Stuart Mills. 1997. *Ethnic myth and ethnic survival*, p. 70.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 70.

[18] Again, the Indo-Portuguese Eurasians being the main exception. For example, Eurasians from the French settlements of Chandernagore and Pondicherry are believed to have in time meshed with either the broader Eurasian population, or more frequently with the local, aka ‘Indian’ population. See Frank Anthony. 1969. *Britain’s betrayal in India: The story of the Anglo-Indian community*. New Delhi: Allied Publishers. However, it should be acknowledged that the historiography of these ‘other’ Eurasians is substantially less developed than that of Portuguese and British Eurasians. Thus the stories of these Eurasians may or may not be as straightforward as we are encouraged to believe. However, one example of how the merging of Eurasian populations progressed was British tendencies to, “Recruit Eurasians in Goa, East Bengal and Burma to become the artillerymen at British stations far from the Portuguese territories where they originated.” See Megan Stuart Mills. 1997. *Ethnic myth and ethnic survival*, p. 70.

[19] For more on the social contexts of settler vs. non-settler colonies see Julie Evans, Patricia Grimshaw, David Philips and Shurlee Swain. 2003. *Equal subjects, unequal rights: Indigenous peoples in British settler colonies, 1813-1910*. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, p. 2-6.

[20] Evelyn Abel. 1988. *The Anglo-Indian community*, p. 13 and Lal Bahadur Varma. 1979. *Anglo-Indians*, p. 13. This is not to say that non-marital relations did not take place. Concubines, as Varma explains, did in fact exist. The penchant for marriage most likely came from the influence of Christian missionaries, as well as the desire of high rank British officials to intermingle with women of similar social standing - marriage was likely the only acceptable option for these higher placed unions.

[21] R.A. Schermerhorn. 1979. *Ethnic plurality in India*. Tuscon: University of Arizona Press, p. 214.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 216.

[23] Account paraphrased from Christopher J. Hawes. 1996. *Poor relations: The making of a Eurasian community in British India, 1773-1833*. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, p. 11-14 and Evelyn Abel. 1988. *The Anglo-Indian community*, p. 13-14.

[24] R.A. Schermerhorn. 1979. *Ethnic plurality in India*, p. 215.

[25] *Ibid.*, p.215.

[26] Rules of patronage dictated that the sons of high-ranked officials and military officers could inherit their positions upon the father’s retirement or death. The idea that a Britisher from Britain would be passed over for a Eurasian caused friction between Directors of the Company in England and administrators in India. Rather than race per se, the root of the problem was sour grapes over job competition. Evelyn Abel. 1988. *The Anglo-Indian community*, p. 17 and Dolores Faye Chew. 2002. The search for Kathleen McNally and other chimerical women: Colonial and post-colonial gender representations of Eurasians. In *Translating desire: The politics of gender and culture in India*, edited by Brinda Bose. New Delhi: Katha, p. 19.

[27] Evelyn Abel. 1988. *The Anglo-Indian community*, p. 20-21.

[28] R. A. Schermerhorn. 1979. *Ethnic plurality in India*, p. 215 and Frank Anthony. 1969. *Britain’s betrayal in India*, p. 20-22.

[29] Frank Anthony. 1969. *Britain’s betrayal in India*, p. 23. Here, Anthony also notes how some other

rejected Eurasians were able to find work as writers, musicians, and bankers. Again, these cases are more of the exception than the rule.

[30] Cedric Dover. 1937. *Half-caste*. London: Martin Secker and Warburg, p. 122-123.

[31] While all Eurasians were lowered a notch in social status, discrimination, to an extent, was gendered. Eurasian women continued to be sought after by British officials for marriage, particularly the higher placed ones. However, their tolerance in upper circles was tenuous. The only way for a Eurasian daughter of a British man to keep her social status was to marry another European official. If she married another Eurasian, however 'equal' in status, she would be considered to have married back into her "class." Thus, while some Eurasian women were able to thwart their slide in status, it was by no means universal. See Christopher J. Hawes. 1996. *Poor relations*, p. 17-19.

[32] R.A. Schermerhorn. 1979. *Ethnic plurality in India*, p. 234.

[33] As Varma explains, Aryan, and later waves of Greek, Saka, Scythian, Kushan, Hun and eventually Muslim/Moghul invasions each led to varying degrees of racial admixture. However, during these periods, no mixed community could be born with a separate identity of its own. Identification with the land of adoption or of birth did not allow the chance for the emergence of a mixed community claiming an individuality of its own. Lal Bahadur Varma. 1979. *Anglo-Indians*, p. 5-6.

[34] Evelyn Abel. 1988. *The Anglo-Indian community*, p. 28 and Lal Bahadur Varma. 1979. *Anglo-Indians*, p. 193.

[35] Lal Bahadur Varma. 1979. *Anglo-Indians*, p. 193.

[36] Lionel Caplan. 2001. *Children of Colonialism: Anglo-Indians in a post-colonial world*. Oxford and New York: Berg, p. 91, Megan Stuart Mills. 1997. *Ethnic myth and ethnic survival*, p. 27-30, R.A. Schermerhorn. *Ethnic plurality in India*, p. 234, Lal Bahadur Varma. 1979. *Anglo-Indians*, and Noel P. Gist. 1972. The Anglo-Indians of India. In *The blending of races: Marginality and identity in world perspective*, edited by Noel P. Gist and Anthony Gary Dworkin. New York: John Wiley and Sons, p. 56.

[37] K.S. Singh. 1998. *India's communities*. People of India National series vol. IV. Anthropological survey of India. Delhi: Oxford University Press, p. 95.

[38] Paraphrased from Christopher J. Hawes. 1996. *Poor relations*, p. 73.

[39] It is important to note the regional character of Eurasian communal activity during this period. Activity was generally limited to the Provinces, where the majority of Eurasians resided, but the 'Calcutta Group' is generally acknowledged to have led the way during this period over Madras and Bombay - a point that later caused prickly relations between the groups. The point is that group consciousness was still in its early stages and somewhat confined. Evelyn Abel. 1988. *The Anglo-Indian community*, p. 22.

[40] For purposes of defence and education Eurasians were considered 'British subjects,' and for purposes of employment they were considered 'Statutory Natives of India.' There was thus much debate and confusion amongst Eurasians as to which nation they belonged to. Were they *British* or *Indian*? Frank Anthony. 1969. *Britain's betrayal in India*, p. 3.

[41] There were three kinds of Civil Law at the time - Hindu law, Mohammedan law, and English civil law. Eurasians were considered British Subjects only within Calcutta, and in criminal matters Eurasians fell under Muslim law. Eurasians in the rest of the sub-continent had no protection from any civil law. Evelyn Abel. 1988. *The Anglo-Indian community*, p. 24.

[42] Cedric Dover. 1929. *Cimmerii? or Eurasians and their future*. Calcutta: Modern Art Press, p. 49.

[43] From the beginning of the nineteenth century in particular, scientific racism, which preached the biological inferiority of non-whites, came to increasingly inform British attitudes in India - lending a scientific justification for Eurasian exclusion and of course, continued dominance over other

Indians. For more on scientific racism, and its cousin social Darwinism, see Lionel Caplan. 2001. *Children of colonialism*, p. 4-6 and Ian Goldin, 1987. *Making race: The politics and economics of Coloured identity in South Africa*. London and New York: Longman, p. 22.

[44] Christopher J. Hawes. 1996. *Poor relations*, p. 73-74.

[45] Account paraphrased from Lal Bahadur Varma. 1979. *Anglo-Indians*, p. 24-35.

[46] R.A. Schermerhorn. 1979. *Ethnic plurality in India*, p. 234.

[47] Evelyn Abel. 1988. *The Anglo-Indian community*, p. 32-33.

[48] Dolores Faye Chew. 2002. *The search for Kathleen McNally and other chimerical women*, p. 9-11.

[49] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

[50] R.A. Schermerhorn. 1979. *Ethnic plurality in India*, p. 218.

[51] Lal Bahadur Varma. 1979. *Anglo-Indians*, p. 22.

[52] While the curriculum of the Anglo-Indian school system was set by the British, and often critiqued as instilling an anti-Indian complex into the minds of Anglo-Indians, the argument here is that a separate school system for British and Eurasian children in itself, in addition to offering opportunities for social intermixing of Anglo-Indians of all classes, did its part to encourage feelings of group pride and distinctness. For how the schools instilled an inferiority complex toward the British, and a superiority complex to other Indians, see Lionel Caplan. 2001. *Children of colonialism*, p. 92, Frank Anthony. 1969. *Britain's betrayal in India*, p. 108-109, and Kenneth E. Wallace. 1930. *The Eurasian problem: Constructively approached*. Calcutta and Simla: Thacker, Spink and Co., p. iv. Anglo-Indians only attained influence over the Anglo-Indian school system after Independence, along with other Indians.

[53] Lionel Caplan. 2001. *Children of colonialism*, p. 91, Megan Stuart Mills. 1997. *Ethnic myth and ethnic survival*, p. 373, Olive Peacock. 1991. *Minorities and national integration in India*. Jaipur: Arihant Publishers, p. 48, and Lal Bahadur Varma. 1979. *Anglo-Indians*, p. 52.

[54] Olive Peacock. 1991. *Minorities and national integration in India*, p. 37, 42.

[55] Christopher J. Hawes. 1996. *Poor relations*, p. 79

[56] Lal Bahadur Varma. 1979. *Anglo-Indians*, p. 52.

[57] It does not matter whether these values are the same values as any other group. What matters is that they are believed to somehow have a twist unique to that only that group in the minds of its members. I.e. the objective reality is not the point. See Megan Mills. 1997. *Ethnic myth and ethnic survival*, p. 373 and Anthony D. Smith. 1986. *The ethnic origins of nations*, p. 22.

[58] Evelyn Abel. 1988. *The Anglo-Indian community*, p. 132.

[59] Megan Stuart Mills. 1997. *Ethnic myth and ethnic survival*, p. 247.

[60] Under the Government of India Act of 1919, the Anglo-Indian community was officially recognized and given special representation in the Central (one seat) and Provincial Legislative Councils (the number of seats depended on the region - for example one was awarded in the Punjab and four in Bengal). The first Anglo-Indian elections were held in 1926, due to the separate electorate for minorities that was granted in the Morley-Minto reforms of 1909. Finally, the Government of India Act of 1935 recognized the rights of Anglo-Indians in respect to appointments in government jobs and grants to improving the Anglo-Indian school system. For a detailed account see Evelyn Abel. 1988. *The Anglo-Indian community*, p. 101-149.

[61] K.S. Singh. 1998. *India's communities*, p. 95. Once such group attempt to assume the Anglo-Indian identity came from the Feringhis of Kerala, a Christian community. In the 1930s, they attempted to join the dominant Anglo-Indian association but were excluded by Anglo-Indians on account of their low literacy, use of Malayalam as a first language, and the fact that they cannot establish their descent from European progenitors. A similar attempt was made to infiltrate the Anglo-Indian community in the 1960s, but then president of the All-India Anglo-Indian Association, Frank Anthony, similarly rejected the Feringhis. In the 1990s, some South Indian Anglo-Indian organizations admitted English-speaking Feringhis, but the AIAIA based in New Delhi has not altered its position. Megan Stuart Mills. 1997. *Ethnic myth and ethnic survival*, p. 71.

[62] Lionel Caplan. 2001. *Children of colonialism*, p. 72.

[63] Also referred to as 'R-M A-Is'- ready-made Anglo Indians.

[64] Lionel Caplan. 2001. *Children of colonialism*, p. 98 and Lal Bahadur Varma. 1979. *Anglo-Indians*, p. 52-53.

[65] Evelyn Abel. 1988. *The Anglo-Indian community*, p. 44-45, 159-160 and Frank Anthony. 1969. *Britain's betrayal in India*, p. 150-157.

[66] Frank Anthony. 1969. *Britain's betrayal in India*, p. 150-151.

[67] As it will be shown soon, *Coloured* did not originally involve crosses between Europeans and resident black South Africans (such as Zulus) as is commonly assumed, as virtually no such black South Africans resided in the Cape at the founding of the colony in 1652. Instead, the Dutch encountered the aborigine 'Hottentots.' Euro-Hottentot mixing declined substantially with the importation of slaves in 1658. Mark Christian. 2000. *Multiracial identity: An international perspective*. London: MacMillan Press, p. 88 and Gavin Lewis. 1987. *Between the wire and the wall: A history of South African 'Coloured' politics*. New York: St. Martin's Press, p. 5.

[68] S.P. Cilliers. 1963. *The Coloureds of South Africa: A factual survey*. Cape Town: Banier Publishers, p. 13, 24.

[69] R. E. Van der Ross. 1979. *Myths and attitudes: An inside look at the Coloured people*. Cape Town: Tafelberg.

[70] Hottentots were an aboriginal tribe, perceived to be a primitive, nomadic hunting group, and too lazy for colonial labour. Bushmen were a similarly confusing kind of tribe that colonials preferred to avoid. Many members of these groups were killed during battles to conquer land, particularly the Bushmen. The ones who survived were eventually driven out of the Cape, and later out of distinguishable existence. As Wade explains, because indigenous peoples were hard for settlers to interpret and explain, other African and Asian slaves were preferred because they were already 'known' to man. See Peter Wade. 1997. *Race and ethnicity in Latin America*. London: Pluto Press, p. 25-27. For specific information on Bushmen and Hottentots see Sheila Patterson. 1969. *Colour and culture in South Africa: A study of the status of the Cape Coloured People within the social structure of the Union of South Africa*. New York: Kraus, p. 10, 27.

[71] Gavin Lewis. 1987. *Between the wire and the wall*, p. 8.

[72] In the event that this happened, these mixed offspring would go on to marry other whites and thus 'disappear' into white society. See Sheila Patterson. 1969. *Colour and culture in South Africa*, p. 19.

[73] Known as "the uterine descent rule," it was a form of control designed to retain the slave population and relinquish the white father's parental responsibility. Abebe Zegeye. 2002. A matter of colour. *African and Asian Studies* 1 (4), p. 330.

[74] The origins of, and group definitions of these 'elements' will be given shortly.

[75] Account paraphrased from Sheila Patterson. 1969. *Colour and culture in South Africa*, p. 22-24,

165.

[76] S.P. Cilliers. 1963. *The Coloureds of South Africa*, p. 12.

[77] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

[78] Gavin Lewis. 1987. *Between the wire and the wall*, p. 12-15.

[79] In 1806 Great Britain seized the Cape from the Dutch and began to impose their rule. After slavery was abolished, the Boers (Dutch settlers) decided to move out of the Cape and escape British 'liberalism.' The Boers created two new republics (in which non-whites did not have political rights) that the British were soon keen on bringing under the Empire. The culmination of these developments was the Boer War (1899-1902) in which the British were victorious. Paraphrased from Barry Denenberg. 1991. *Nelson Mandela: "No easy walk to freedom."* New York: Scholastic, p. 19-27.

[80] R. E. Van der Ross. 1979. *Myths and attitudes*, p. 69.

[81] Such authors include Gavin Lewis. 1987. *Between the wire and the wall*, R. E. Van der Ross. 1979. *Myths and attitudes*, G.J. Gerwel. 1975. Coloured nationalism? In *Church and nationalism in South Africa*, edited by Theo Sundermeier. Johannesburg: Ravan Press, and H.F. Dickie-Clark. 1972. The Coloured minority of Durban. In *The blending of races: Marginality and identity in world perspective*, edited by Noel P. Gist and Anthony Gary Dworkin. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

[82] H.F. Dickie Clark. 1972. The Coloured minority of Durban, p. 26.

[83] Sheila Patterson. 1969. *Colour and culture in South Africa*, p. 14.

[84] In 1970, ten percent of Coloureds in the Cape, and 6.4 percent of all Coloureds in South Africa were Cape Malays and thus Muslim. R. E. Van der Ross. 1979. *Myths and attitudes*, p. 65.

[85] S.P. Cilliers. 1963. *The Coloureds of South Africa*, p. 58.

[86] R. E. Van der Ross. 1979. *Myths and attitudes*, p. 26.

[87] Some authors even insist that if we confine our attention to a Coloured sub-group, such as the Cape Coloureds, they too lack reasonable homogeneity in order to form a genuine community. For an example see G.J. Gerwel. 1975. Coloured nationalism?, p. 67.

[88] Anthony D. Smith. 1986. *The ethnic origins of nations*.

[89] H.F. Dickie-Clark. 1972. The Coloured minority of Durban, p. 26.

[90] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

[91] 'Bantu' meaning a black (ex. Zulu) language. Sheila Patterson. 1969. *Colour and culture in South Africa*, p. 15.

[92] *Ibid.*, p. 20.

[93] *Ibid.*, p. 16.

[94] *Ibid.*, p. 18-21.

[95] *Ibid.*, p. 164, and S.P. Cilliers. 1963. *The Coloureds of South Africa*, p. 27.

[96] S.P. Cilliers. 1963. *The Coloureds of South Africa*, p. 27.

[97] Sheila Patterson. 1969. *Colour and culture in South Africa*, p. 165.

- [98] R. E. Van der Ross. 1979. *Myths and attitudes*, p. 18.
- [99] G.J. Gerwel. 1975. Coloured nationalism?, p. 68.
- [100] Ian Goldin. 1987. *Making race: The politics and economics of Coloured identity in South Africa*. London and New York: Longman, p. 19.
- [101] R.E. Van der Ross. 1979. *Myths and attitudes*, p. 2, 37, G.J. Gerwel. 1975. Coloured nationalism?, p. 70, and H.F. Dickie-Clark. 1972. The Coloured minority of Durban, p. 37.
- [102] Mohamed Adhikari. 1991. Between black and white: The history of Coloured politics in South Africa. *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 25 (1), 107 and Ian Goldin. 1987. *Making race*, p. 25.
- [103] Ian Goldin. 1987. *Making race*, p. 24.
- [104] Ibid., p. 22.
- [105] Mohamed Adhikari. 1997. 'The product of civilization in its most repellent manifestation': Ambiguities in the racial perceptions of the APO (African Political Organization), 1909-23. *Journal of African History* 38 (2), 288 and Gavin Lewis. 1987. *Between the wire and the wall*, p. 58-59.
- [106] Gavin Lewis. 1987. *Between the wire and the wall*, p. 25.
- [107] Courtney Jung. 2000. *Then I was black*, p. 175.
- [108] Ian Goldin. 1987. *Making race*, p. 78.
- [109] Black unity derived from common oppression by whites, not skin colour. The fact that it was conceived as a purely political, and not ethnic or cultural identity, enabled it to resonate amongst many lower-class Coloureds in particular, but not exclusively. Courtney Jung. 2000. *Then I was black*, p. 191.
- [110] R. E. Van der Ross. 1979. *Myths and attitudes*, p. 5.
- [111] Ibid., p. 14-15.
- [112] Again, the Cape Malays form the only exception - as these slaves maintained their Muslim faith - and went on to form a reasonably identifiable sub-community. Virtually all other slaves were Christianized.
- [113] Peter Wade. 1997. *Race and ethnicity in Latin America*, p. 16 and Donald L. Horowitz. 1985. *Ethnic groups in conflict*. Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, p. 41.
- [114] The ethnic status of Anglo-Indians is also derived from their cultural mixture.
- [115] Anthony D. Smith. *The ethnic origins of nations*, p. 22-23.