

**A PERSPECTIVE ON JUSTIFYING THE UKRAINE – RUSSIA WAR
ELEMENTS OF PROPAGANDA**

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Abstract

This article represents a deep dive research into communication aspects that induce the justification and maintenance of the war in Ukraine (2022) using propaganda elements. We are witnessing an ongoing conflict, and we don't know how it will end, what the international implications will be, how the behaviors of the great powers will change, or what the small countries will do. I focused my research of this article on two relevant events. The first event is external and has a diplomatic nature (the Munich International Security Conference), and the second one is internal and concerns the legal nature of the phenomenon (the Ukrainian regulations on the Law of Minorities). I examined these two events through communication channels and message transmission perspectives. I put together arguments on how the belligerent states (Russia and Ukraine) are both focused on a permanent win.

Keywords: *propaganda, Ukraine, war, Russia.*

Introduction

The war in Ukraine began on 24 February 2022, under the circumstances of long-standing tensions between Russia and Ukraine. The beginning of this conflict may have some roots in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea and seized part of the Donbas region (Luhansk and Donetsk). Days before Ukraine has been invaded, Russia recognized in 2022 two self-proclaimed separatist quasi-states in Donbas, the Donetsk People's Republic, and the Luhansk People's Republic.

Analyzing the justification of the war in Ukraine, involves the evaluation of domestic and international political communication. Caught up in the conflict, the two states use various forms of communication that are meant to induce countless interpretations of the conflict. The media play an important role in shaping and expressing opinions. It is one way in which the two states exercise their power. Not only are "conventional instruments of power (economic pressure and military force)" used, but also public opinion "both inside and outside the

country." (McNair, 2007, p. 238) An international conflict involves several actors. McNair points out that in foreign policy, governments and other political actors use the media to attract public opinion to their side. "Image has come to rival substance in the calculations of politicians and their advisers (...) Public opinion, whether domestic or global, has come to represent for all governments a key factor in the design and implementation of foreign policy" (McNair, 2007, p. 239).

Public manifestation of the war, increase the presence of the fake news, disinformation, manipulation and propaganda. The terms have been used by both sides (both Russian and Ukrainian). The analysis of propaganda elements used in public speeches, news broadcasts on classical radio and TV channels or online channels becomes essential in the international sphere when it comes to the question of winning in the media war. The media have expanded their reach. Once an event is produced, it takes a relatively short time for it to be covered by the media. As a result, the foreign policy of states is in the public eye and any situation risks being distorted if it is not handled responsibly in terms of communication.

Based on these points of reference, the present article is an analysis of the communicational aspects of propaganda that induce a possible justification of the war in Ukraine (2022) and its maintenance in the public space. The idea of research on an ongoing event from any perspective is a real challenge for any researcher. We have an evolving conflict and this bring a limit to the the scope of scientific knowledge. We do not know how it will end, how the big powers will change their behaviors and what the small powers will do.

However, the analysis that I will be undertaking is not focused on the diplomatic actions, domestic or foreign policy strategies that Russia and Ukraine (or any of the states involved) undertook before the conflict started or during the conflict, nor on an explanation of the elementary role that the smaller powers have in setting their own foreign policy strategies.

The premise I started from is that propaganda plays an important role in motivating the war that has started in Ukraine. In other words, the propaganda discourse justified the conflict from the very beginning. On this basis, I propose the following research questions: How does Russia justify the invasion of Ukraine through propaganda? What elements of propaganda are used by the political actors involved? What is the declarative aim of the forces involved in the conflict? By what methods do they propagate them at home/outside?

I answer these questions, by analyzing the text content from media sources.

The main interest element that played a primary, explanatory role in Russia's invasion of Ukraine is the propaganda.

Propaganda elements will be listed according to the sender: propaganda of belligerent states (Russia and Ukraine), European propaganda, NATO propaganda. As regards the systematization of propaganda according to the accuracy and recognition of the source of the information, we distinguish between: Assumed (white) propaganda (the source is correctly identified and the information in the message tends to be accurate, with a high degree of accuracy); unassumed (black) propaganda - has a hidden source or is credited to a false authority and spreads untruths, fabrications, fears or deceptions; uncertain (grey) propaganda - has a source that may or may not be correctly identified and the accuracy of the information is questionable.

Hans Morgenthau (1939) points out in his article *International Affairs: The Resurrection of Neutrality in Europe*, published in *The American Political Science Review*, that the role of the minor powers in the power dynamics of the international system is non-existent, stating that the fate of the neutrality of small states will not be decided by them, but by the Great Powers, decisions taken on the basis of their real or presumed interests, not on the basis of legal formulas and ideological principles (apud. Morgenthau, 1939, pp. 473-486). Ukraine is one of a wide range of states whose fate has been decided by the Great Powers. Long under Russian influence, for the past 15 years, Ukraine has been, pro-European and pro-Atlantic. For the Russian leadership, Ukraine is a buffer zone between the (former) USSR and NATO. That is why Russian President Vladimir Putin has tried to blur Ukraine's eventual rapprochement and even integration into the European Union and NATO. Putin embraced irredentist views, challenged Ukraine's right to statehood and falsely claimed that Ukraine was ruled by neo-Nazis persecuting the ethnic Russian minority. The so-called special military operation, as Putin called his action, aims: to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine and to support the right of the peoples of Ukraine to self-determination.

Propaganda's elements

As noted above, Ukraine's efforts to join NATO have intensified over the past 15 years (NATO-Ukraine Commission, 2021). With an enemy on its border, Russia would not have been comfortable. In 1991 Ukraine, together with Russia and Belarus, worked to disintegrate the Soviet Union, then turned its attention west to the European Union and NATO. In order to enhance President Putin's phrase "one nation", Russia invades Ukraine several times and punishes it by cutting off gas supplies. With the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia is

showing that its power and influence over Ukraine is far superior to Ukrainians' pro-Western aspirations.

The real motive of Kremlin power was therefore to keep a zone between what NATO stands for and what Russian power stands for. It is true that, perhaps for the North Atlantic Alliance, Ukraine is the same thing: a buffer state. The response of NATO member states, even if not explicit, can also be understood in these terms. The European Union also retaliated in the first months of the conflict. The most publicised actions were those concerning the sanctions imposed on Russian multinationals and Russian citizens¹. In order to justify certain actions, each actor involved used propaganda elements to some extent.

As defined by Rémy Rieffel (2008, p. 69) "propaganda is a technique designed to address both the individual and the mass - in other words, individuals included in an anonymous mass and a crowd seen as a collection of individuals: by relying on both representations, there is a greater chance that the proposed objective will be achieved". Whether in the service of democratic or authoritarian societies, propaganda tends to shape attitudes and impose social stereotypes, condition, control and manipulate individuals.

In Rieffel's view, propaganda must be total in order to achieve its objective. In other words, the propaganda must use of all available meanings, it must be sustainable and continuous, and it must be organized, "it must have a strong political and ideological system, to provoke action, to trigger reflexes, and not just the changing ideas". In this way propaganda *short-circuits thinking and provokes adherence to an orthodoxy* as the totality of doctrines imposed by the dominant party.

In terms of the internal attack zone, effective propaganda is built on a solid foundation of opinions, thoughts, feelings (the psychological aspect) and beliefs and values (the fundamental currents of society). Propaganda is worthless if it is not grounded in reality. Propaganda uses certain processes (apud. Domenach, 2004):

The rule of simplification (Domenach, 2004, p. 69) includes slogans, words that express an idea with the force of evidence. Slogans were used (*Support Ukraine, Stop the war, Glory to Ukraine, Glory to the defenders of Ukraine* etc.), images and symbols (*Anti-Putin protests in major European cities. In Bucharest, demonstrators demanded an immediate ceasefire*, 2022): Putin resembling Adolf Hitler, the Ukrainian flag.

¹ See in this regard "EU sanctions against Russia in plain language", found on 25 February 2023 on the link <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ro/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/sanctions-against-russia-explained/>

The rule of distortion and caricaturing (Domenach, 2004, p.74) involves eliminating information that could be harmful and retaining those who reinforces the propagandist's message; some details are omitted and others emphasized, certain facts are distorted. Vladimir Putin has repeatedly stated that *the invasion was the only correct decision* as a measure to prevent aggression. In Donbas, Russia is *fighting for the motherland and no one should forget the lessons of the Second World War*. Putin justifies the invasion of Ukraine in his Victory Day speech (9 May 2022)² on the grounds that "the West was preparing to invade Russia. NATO was creating tensions on the borders. They didn't want to listen to Russia's voice, they had other plans" (*Putin's Victory Day speech: accusations against the West, 2022*).

The rule of orchestration (Domenach, 2004, p. 76) consists in the uninterrupted repetition of the main ideas, subjecting the audience to a continuous avalanche with the doctrine to be inoculated or the ideas to be assimilated. By orchestration is also meant any *special mission* whereby certain media sources are tasked with *launching lizards*. "The manner in which national and international opinion reacts is a valuable clue to foreign policy orientation - *the lizard* is particularly used for war propaganda or to prepare for political change" (Domenach, 2004, p. 80). The approach of the political actors in the conflict to the conquest of Chernobyl and then the Zaporozhye power plant could be included in this rule. Tactically, Russia's conquest of Chernobyl is meaningless. But the threat of nuclear disaster constantly broadcast by Russian channels implicitly threatens Europe, which would prefer, in such circumstances, not to get involved in armed conflict. In March 2022 the attacks on Kharkov, the capture of the civilian nuclear power plant in Zaporozhe and the occupation of the decommissioned Chernobyl plant were interpreted as Russian war propaganda "to prevent Ukraine from producing nuclear weapons" (Gherman, 2022).

Through the transfer rule (Domenach, 2004, p. 83) the prior beliefs of the target audience are not attacked head-on; their adoption is simulated, so that they can be diverted to other purposes; the transfer (or transference) allows for adoption among different target audiences. Since the invasion the Russian President has met several times with mothers of soldiers sent to war in Ukraine in an attempt to reassure those who have lost or are about to lose their children or spouses in the conflict. In these meetings, the Russian president's *emotional* speeches come as a welcome relief to the Russian population watching events. In the Russian collective mind "there is an instinctive feeling that wives have a right to hold power

² In Russia "Victory Day" (9 May) is the day to commemorate those who perished in World War II. The Soviet Union lost millions of citizens in that conflict,

to account" (*How real was Putin's meeting with the mothers of soldiers sent to war in Ukraine? Who are actually the women present at the meeting with the Kremlin leader*, 2022). Putin is therefore in a position to require all men to participate in the conflict, transferring responsibility to them.

As for *the rule of contagion* (Domenach, 2004, p. 86), it creates the illusion of unanimity, exploiting people's concern to be similar to others, their inclination towards conformity. Here, pro-Putin and anti-Putin rallies are worth mentioning, as they are a means of contagion and use elements that give a crowd a unique soul, such as banners, flags and photographs.

Domenach also talks about *counter-propaganda* (2004, p. 98), where the opponent's themes are repeated, weak points are attacked, the opponent is disregarded or ridiculed. An example of Ukrainian counter-propaganda is the revelation in *Ukrainska Pravda* (Pohorilov, 2022) of one of the meetings Putin had with the mothers and wives of soldiers, claiming that the mothers invited to the meeting with the Russian president were in fact representatives of Kremlin government structures.

Another example is the distribution of videos by pro-Russian online media channels in regions under the control of Vladimir Putin's army. In the footage ethnic Ukrainians apologize for insulting Russian soldiers, and some even claim to have taken *denazification courses*.

On Friday, the pro-Russian *Telegram channel Khersonskiy Vestnik* published a video in which a Ukrainian woman apologized for calling the Russian army "orcs" and said she had gone through a "denazification course", according to the independent portal Agency. Russian investigative journalists point out that this is not the first apology video from Ukrainians. In another video, a woman originally from Odessa apologizes for "spitting on a Z sticker and ripping it off a car". In another video, from March, a driver apologized for "nationalist slogans" he uttered during a traffic altercation. (*"Denazification" online. Pro-Russian networks distribute videos of Ukrainians apologizing*, 2022)

The merit of propaganda, whether of Russian, Ukrainian, European or American origin, is that it reaches, all the individuals to whom it is addressed, through popularity. The level of individuals intelligence, also induces the level of intelligence of propaganda. The larger the group, the lower the intelligence level of the propaganda.

In order to demonstrate what role propaganda played in justifying the war in Ukraine, I have investigated two events in this article, one external, of a diplomatic nature, the second internal, of a legal nature. We have analyzed the two events from the perspective of message

transmission through communication channels and tried to find a possible explanation for the media impact of the information transmitted.

Two events, one message

The Munich Security Conference was the last major international security event before the conflict broke out.

On 18 February 2022, the 58th meeting of the Munich International Security Conference took place, an annually event since 1963. The conference is "the most important independent forum for debate and exchange of views among the highest-level decision-makers, leading personalities in international relations and global affairs, and academics" (*Ministry of Foreign Affairs co-organizes the Munich Leaders' Meeting, the format of the Munich Security Conference, prior to the NATO Foreign Ministerial in Bucharest, 2022*).

By the time the conference began on 18 February, Russia had already deployed more than 150,000 troops to Ukraine's borders. Although the threat was imminent, Putin says it is all *a purely technical operation*, not sharing with the public what it means. All Russian messages about alleged troop withdrawals have not been verified. The propaganda has been uncertain. As for Domenach's rules, they are followed by Russian propaganda. The purely technical operation in mid-February 2022 turned into *special military operations*, the target audience being NATO forces. The phrase *special military operation* invites military conflict and is already awaiting a response, whereas *purely technical operation* informs us of a mechanical matter, which is in a real, physical domain.

The conference launched a report entitled *Turning the Tide, Unlocking Powerlessness*, which looked at the problems in Afghanistan, Mali, the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, China and global inequalities. This Report can be part of the propaganda formula that NATO had at this Conference. A substantial chapter is devoted to the risks in Eastern Europe, in particular developments on NATO's eastern flank. The report includes several questions on the basis of which discussions were held at the conference: Will Ukraine be invaded? Is the withdrawal of Russian troops from the border just a ploy to lull Western vigilance, with Moscow then delivering the coup de grace? How many of Russia's demands for its own security can NATO accept? Is the Alliance's eastern flank becoming the Achilles heel of European security? How will the multiple global crises be resolved? The report also described that just as individuals can suffer from a state of *collective powerlessness* (a psychological term describing the feeling

that nothing anyone does can bring about positive change), societies can also come to believe that they are incapable of controlling the challenges they face.

Official conference speeches were framed around Russia's security concerns as "totally exaggerated", given that NATO has not taken a single step eastward towards the Russian Federation's border in 18 years. "How is this issue suddenly so serious, after 18 years? Ukraine's admission to NATO is not on any agenda." In fact, the issue would be Russia's desire to be surrounded by subordinate countries that "give up their total independence". "Which of course is not possible" "Each European state must decide its own fate, without threatening other countries." (Wolfgang Ischinger) Wolfgang Ischinger, head of the conference, added: "No one is threatening Russia."

Under the umbrella of the sanctions imposed on Russia, in the immediate aftermath of the outbreak of the conflict the speeches of the representatives of the European Union states focused on certain general messages: 'Nobody can want' a NATO-Russia war' (German Chancellor Olaf Scholz) (Zelenski: Russia's claims become 'more realistic', 2022), the creation of a 'peacekeeping mission protected by armed forces' (Polish Deputy Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski) (Ionescu, 2022).

The Ukrainian President told the conference that "Some countries commit crimes, while others display an indifference that makes them accomplices (...) Whether they give us hundreds of modern weapons or five thousand helmets. We appreciate any help, but everyone should understand that these are not charitable contributions that Ukraine should ask for or remember. This is your contribution to the security of Europe and the world" (Knight, 2022) - these were the messages sent before the conflict began, messages that rolled over and in an emotional dimension took other forms such as "real support, not just words", "We are here. We are defending Ukraine" and so on.

In April 2022, in a speech to the Romanian Parliament, Volodimir Zelensky pointed out that an article justifying the genocide of Ukrainians had been published on the website of the Russian state news agency RIA Novosti: "The article describes a clear and calculated procedure for the destruction of everything that makes Ukrainians Ukrainians and our own people. Those who they will not be able to break and conquer. It is said that the "de-ucrainianization" and "de-Europeanization" of Ukraine should be achieved. It is said that even the name of our state should be erased. Basically, it is said that the death of as many of our people as possible in the war is only welcome." (Popescu, 2022) All of President Zelenski's speeches in 2022-2023 (in the US Congress, in the parliaments of some EU states, at the UN

General Assembly, in the European Parliament, at the 2022 Grammy Awards) were constructed in the same way. President Zelenski's speech was discussed from the beginning as an American speech, aimed at answering a few questions: why did the Russian army do this, why do we have to defend Ukraine together, what should be done. Antonio Momoc (2022) talks about a communication of dress and gestures also as far as Zelenski is concerned. "The media appearances of Ukrainian President Volodimir Zelenski, in a hoodie and unshaven, in the context of the war with Russia have reinforced the image of an authentic Hero" (Surugiu, R. & Podaru, D. (coord.), 2022, p. 152).

Returning to the Munich conference, Russian propaganda uses Moscow Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zaharova, who, before the conference began, said: "We must note with sadness that this conference has become more and more a transatlantic forum in recent years. The Munich expert meeting has lost its objectivity and the inclusion of different points of view" (Munich Security Conference starts without Russian delegation, 2022). It is worth noting that Russia did not participate in this international conference attended by 35 heads of state and government; not even Sergei Lavrov, Russia's foreign minister, was a delegate. Although the invasion was and is contested outside Russia's borders, inside the country V. Putin enjoys support. According to Arutunyan (2014, apud. Momoc, 2022, p.152), "the Putin cult has spread from the bottom up, having the advantage of the blogosphere and social networks: part tsar, part secretary general, part patrimonial master."

Another element that I am bringing to this article has legal nature. On 16 January 2022 a law came into force obliging the print media in Ukraine to publish in the official language of the country. The purpose of the law is to counteract the use of the Russian language. The law "On the principles of the functioning of state policy on languages" was signed by former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko shortly before Volodimir Zelensky took office. From 2019 to 2022 there was a transition period, during which all newspapers, national magazines, publishers had to publish first in Ukrainian and then in another language. According to the initiators, the law is intended to combat the influence of the Russian language in the public sphere. "Ukraine's state language policy is criticized by Russia. Protecting the rights of Russian speakers was one of Russia's stated public motives for annexing the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea and supporting pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine, an armed conflict that has resulted in nearly 13,000 deaths since its outbreak in 2014." (Matcovschi, 2022).

The law guarantees the position of the Ukrainian language in the fields of state management, services, education and media; it also provides for the liability of officials for not

knowing the state language. The document stipulates that deputies, officers, civil servants, doctors at municipal and state hospitals, school principals, lawyers, notaries are required to know the state language. (On 16 July the Law "On the Principles of the Functioning of the State Policy on Languages", 2019 came into force in Ukraine).

According to Ukrainian Radio an attempt to promote the adoption of a law "On Ukrainian language" has already existed in 2012. The act caused protest actions and after its adoption a number of city and regional councils recognized Russian as a regional language. 57 elected representatives of the people addressed the Constitutional Court as early as 2014 with the demand that it recognise the law as unconstitutional (Veaceslav Kirilenko: the adoption of a new law "On the Ukrainian language" is urgently needed, 2018)

Another piece of legislation aimed to depriving Russia of one of the key instruments of the "hybrid war" against Ukraine, is a decree that Zelensky signed in May 2020. The legislation put into action the National Security and Defence Council's decision "On the application, cancellation and modification of personal, special economic and other restrictive measures". Referring to this document Ukrainian Radio stated that "The Supreme Rada in Kiev considered the issue of extending the period of banning Russian websites on the territory of Ukraine. This decision provides for the application of restrictive measures against Russian social networks and online services. The measures concern, in particular, the accounts on "Mail.ru", "VKontakte", "Odnoklasniki" and others. (Russian websites and online services will still be banned in Ukraine, 2020)

In Ukraine, almost 20% of the population is ethnic Russian. Many local and central government officials are Russian, Russian is spoken in entire regions.

These laws (on the Ukrainian language and banning Russian websites and online services), promoted in Ukraine, are part of the Ukrainians' propaganda arsenal to support the defense of the state and the nation. These are just two examples.

Based on these elements, it can be interpreted that, from a certain perspective, what first Poroshenko and then Zelenski wanted to achieve, resembled an intention to impose a pre-determined pattern (a "Procrustean bed") through a so-called "coercion" of Russian-sourced activities. The goal was total independence from Russia. Russia interpreted all these legal actions to be carried out on the "Nazi pattern". Hence the Russian phrase "special operation" for the "denazification and demilitarization" of Ukraine - promoted and propagated to the smallest corners of Russia.

Instead of conclusions

Referring to "hate speech" or hate propaganda, George Cherian (2021) defines this type of propaganda as a sustained and coordinated communication campaign aimed at justifying discrimination or even incitement to violence against communities at risk, especially by essentializing them as inferior, alien or even dangerous³. This kind of propaganda continues to facilitate injustices against minorities of all kinds and, over time, has laid the foundations for genocide, imperial conquest, enslavement, colonialism and so on. Hate propaganda is a sophisticated strategy based on the sentiment of hate as an intense, irrational emotional reaction. Cherian refers to 5 aspects which we will list here:

- 1) Hate propaganda violates human rights (Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (signed by 74 countries including the Russian Federation and Ukraine) which obliges states to prohibit speech that amounts to incitement to hatred). Because legal thresholds vary, democracies need social norms that do not allow discriminatory speech to take hold.
- 2) Hate propaganda is more than fake news. It is an orchestrated system of lies that can be exposed through fact-checking projects, including artificial intelligence. But this verification may be powerless where identity matters to the extent that the hate campaign is built on "us and them", as if only these identities define societies ("We're white, they're colored. We're Hindu, they're Muslim. We're locals, they're foreigners"). Stories are created, symbols and legends are used, even science - a plethora of news that creates disgust and fear.
- 3) Denigrating an ethnic group (or other group) to deny them their rights, through a "behind the problem" technique in which the agents of hate play the role of victim rather than oppressor. They cause outrage at a perceived offence against 'their group', which they claim was caused by 'the out-group'. What we are dealing with here is an imagined offence, an extremely versatile tactic. The trigger can be a film, a cartoon, a book, a building, any cultural product that can be interpreted as another symbol of injustice or looming danger. This has been knowingly facilitated by internet platforms such as Facebook.
- 4) Propagation of hatred is achieved through stratification, distribution. Direct and inflammatory messages are communicated by activists and subservient journalists, but

³ See also Cherian, George (2021, 80-91) Hate propaganda in *The Routledge Companion to Media Disinformation and Populism*,

these movements could also include think tanks that may have pseudo-intellectual messages (the media resorts to a kind of "information-washing service" in the course of apparently objective reporting; this requires the professional services of mercenaries, public relations and marketing consultants who help design and execute propaganda campaigns)

- 5) The smartest hate campaigns are highly resistant to regulation. Democracy's laws against hate speech tend to be impotent. Moreover, such laws only work well when there is a direct cause-and-effect link between an isolated act of speech and measurable harm. When the message is distributed and layered without an obvious driver, it can become impossible for prosecutors to prove liability.

To the question "What can states do?", there are a few solutions Cherian provides: social networking platforms need to be more strictly regulated; too much attention is paid to moderating individual cases of toxic interlinking. Much more investment is needed in media that should promote civic values (the media should have a well-defined public service role, run by professional journalists who are not controlled by government and are independent of commercial interests). The policy objective should be to build society's resistance to hate propaganda by cultivating more open identities and a clearer understanding of our collective destinies.

As for the invasion of Ukraine, Russian propaganda promoted the idea that Putin went to war to defend the Russian nation identified by language (if we think of the Ukrainian language law). Along the way, Russian propaganda reached paroxysm (if we refer to one of the propaganda messages: "the army simulated nuclear-capable missile launches in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad" (Russia simulated nuclear-capable missile launches / Iskander missile launches from Kaliningrad were simulated electronically, 2022)). In other words, the propaganda uses nuclear rhetoric to claim that Putin intends to deploy tactical nuclear weapons. The Putin regime's philosophy relies on three components: autocracy (absolute control of power exercised by one man), national values (historical symbols, patriotism, specific cultural landmarks, etc.) and the church. Propaganda was also constructed along these lines. Religious propaganda, for example, focuses on the fact that Russians defend themselves and if they die, they will go to heaven.

Zelensky's speech is American. The Russians are rapists, the Russians are killing all Ukrainians, the Russians say the name of the state of Ukraine must disappear, the Russians say killing as many Ukrainians as possible in the war is welcome. In addition, NATO must help,

NATO states must jump to Ukraine's aid and so on. Ukrainian propaganda gives rise to historical figures, such as the 'Kiev ghost' (Major Stepan Tarabalka took out over 40 Russian planes by 13 March when he was shot down in an attack) and invokes the superpower of a small army, referring to the huge amount of destruction it managed to inflict on the Russian army. Ukraine has even drawn new lines in strategic communication and marketed every step: either with a pair of socks emblazoned with the UKR - RUS score at the Chernobayevka military base, or with the embroidery of a strawberry that only native Ukrainians can pronounce correctly⁴. As for NATO's discursive rhetoric, it has been to alienate Putin from the people, to distance him permanently. NATO repeatedly calls for peace negotiations. They are firmly on Ukraine's side and will continue to help that country. The phrase: Putin is spreading lies is also frequently used within NATO.

What will be the future of the two countries? Who will win? How much will the way the actors involved have communicated and are communicating count in the arithmetic of the win? It is hard to say with certainty at this point. Taking into account the challenges and obstacles mentioned in the first part of the article, this article points in certain directions, offers openings and points of analysis that could be exploited in the future.

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