

***Munazara* and (non-)Authoritarian Argumentation**

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Abstract: I argue for broadening contemporary argumentation theory's normative scope by introducing a novel category of argumentative norms that synthesize virtue-theoretic and procedural rules. These norms are derived from *munazara*, a discipline distinguished by its systematic integration of ethics into procedural rules. Framed within normative democratic theory, I advocate the requirement of non-authoritarian argumentation for regulating public debate, targeting *how* reasons are exchanged, not *which* reasons are offered. My contention is that *munazara*'s ethical-procedural norms not only enrich argumentation's normative toolbox but also enable the operationalization of democratically enhancing public debate.

Resume: Je plaide en faveur d'un élargissement du champ normatif de la théorie contemporaine de l'argumentation en introduisant une nouvelle catégorie de normes argumentatives qui synthétisent les règles de la théorie de la vertu et les règles procédurales. Ces normes sont issues de la *munazara*, une discipline qui se distingue par son intégration systématique de l'éthique dans les règles procédurales. Dans le cadre de la théorie démocratique normative, je défends l'exigence d'une argumentation non autoritaire pour régler le débat public, en ciblant la manière dont les raisons sont échangées, et non quelles raisons invoquées. Je soutiens que les normes éthico-procédurales de la *munazara* non seulement enrichissent la boîte à outils normative de l'argumentation, mais permettent également la mise en œuvre d'un débat public démocratiquement enrichi.

Keywords: act-based norms, agent-based norms, derailment-based norms, *Munazara*, non-authoritarian argumentation, normative regulation of public debate, sequencing-based norms

1. Introduction

In this paper, I argue for broadening the normative scope of contemporary argumentation theory by introducing a novel category of argumentative norms that synthesizes virtue-theoretic and procedural considerations. I develop this category through engagement with *ādāb al-baḥth wa-al-munāzara* (hereafter *munazara*)—a seven-century-old Islamic discipline rooted in classical Islamic scholarly traditions and is concerned with the ethics and methods of inquiry and argumentation. What distinguishes *munazara*, for my purposes, is its systematic integration of ethical considerations into procedural rules. This integration enables *munazara*'s argumentative norms to bridge the divide between agent-based and act-based approaches to the assessment of argumentation. In doing so, the paper contributes to normative theories of argumentation by proposing a framework that combines procedural rigor with ethical conduct and thus enriches the normative toolbox of argumentation.

Furthermore, I frame this argument within normative democratic theory, proposing *non-authoritarian argumentation* as a requirement for the normative regulation of public debate. This requirement is characterized by its focus on regulating *ways of arguing* or *reasoning*¹ rather than *individual arguments* or *reasons*. In this way, citizens are permitted to offer arguments based on their deeply held convictions and identities while being restricted from doing so in authoritarian ways—for example, by asserting a monopoly on truth and validity, or dismissing interlocutors' perspectives outright. The central question then becomes: What norms can determine whether a given argumentative exchange is authoritarian?² Here, ethical considerations play a critical role, which in turn demands argumentative norms capable of capturing these considerations. This

¹ In this paper I use the terms “argumentation” and “reasoning” interchangeably.

² This paper's response consolidates ideas I have developed elsewhere. Together with Sadek 2019, it builds on Part I of *Towards a Munāzara-Inspired Ethical Argumentation and Debate Model*, an unpublished group paper produced as part of *Adab in Dialogue: Developing Argumentative Virtues in a Divided World* (ADAB), a John Templeton Foundation funded project at the Munazara and Argumentation Ethics Research Center. I was responsible for the structure and content of Part I “Theory”.

underscores the relevance of procedural yet ethically-oriented norms for the political-theoretic task of normatively regulating public debate. In this respect, the paper speaks to the relationship between ethics and argumentation, as well as to the ethical foundations of democratic politics. I develop my argument in three main steps and end with a short conclusion.

First (Section 2), I frame the overall context and set the stage for the remainder of the paper. This section is divided into five subsections that, respectively, introduce non-authoritarian argumentation as a promising requirement for the normative regulation of public debate (2.1); articulate its evaluative core (2.2); connect it to democratic civility (2.3); reflect on the scope of authoritarian argumentation (2.4); and propose self-work as an agential condition for the successful realization of non-authoritarian argumentation in actual argumentative encounters (2.5).

Second (Section 3), I survey the normative landscape of contemporary argumentation theory, identifying challenges faced by both act-based (3.1) and agent-based (3.2) norms in adequately capturing the evaluative core of non-authoritarian argumentation. While this discussion is primarily critical—focusing on the limitations of existing normative frameworks—it does not seek to diminish the importance of act- or agent-based norms, nor to reduce respective argumentation theories to their shortcomings. Instead, it highlights a gap across dominant approaches to argument assessment. I frame this gap in terms of a specific ethical dimension inherent to argumentation itself (3.3).

Third (Section 4), I address this gap by drawing on *munazara*. After making explicit the interdependence of agent and procedure (4.1), I derive two types of norms: sequencing-based norms, and derailment-based norms (4.2). I then show how these norms respectively exhibit an ethic of cooperation and an ethic of reciprocity, which together constitute *munazara*'s contribution to ethical argumentation and offer an integrative framework that reconciles procedural rigor with virtue-oriented concerns (4.3).

2. Overall context and stage setting

In this section, I introduce non-authoritarian argumentation as a promising framework for the normative regulation of public debate in democracies (2.1). What is distinctive about this framework is that its focus on regulating the process of argumentation (*how* reasons are exchanged) rather than the content of arguments (the kinds of reasons exchanged). Such focus prioritizes the dynamics of deliberative interaction between citizens over the acceptability of their claims. Building on this, I draw on Maeve Cooke's notions of situated rationality and ethical autonomy to articulate the evaluative core of non-authoritarian argumentation (2.2). When this core is violated, authoritarian argumentation obtains, a phenomenon that can manifest in varied forms. To illustrate this, I provide a practical example linking (non-)authoritarian argumentation to democratic civility (2.3), followed by a reflection on the scope of authoritarian argumentation (2.4). Finally, I conclude by emphasizing the role of self-work as an agential condition for citizens to successfully embody non-authoritarian argumentation in argumentative encounters (2.5).

That said, I should note from the outset that, due to considerations of space, I will not fully develop or defend all the ideas in this section. Such a task would require a separate paper. Instead, my aim here is to advance these ideas sufficiently to clarify the broader context of this paper's argument and to set the stage for the subsequent sections.

2.1. *The requirement of public argumentation*

A wide range of normative democratic approaches emphasize the critical role of political communication in realizing the democratic ideals of freedom and equality.³ Liberal, deliberative, as well as agonistic theories, including Rawls (2005), Habermas (1996), Young (2000), Mouffe (2000), and Tully (1995), rely on some variant of public argumentation (deliberation, persuasion, or contestation) to extend citizen participation and engagement in

³ While aggregative mechanisms, such as elections, might be necessary for reaching political decisions and individual rights are essential for the recognition of citizens as free and equals, they are insufficient for the full realization of democratic ideals.

multiple spheres of social and political life.⁴ Whether grounding legitimate political authority, defining conditions for public justification, or articulating democratic civility, these approaches confront the task of specifying the requirement of public reasoning: how to normatively construe it, regulate it, and assess its implications on citizens' conduct in public debates.

A central challenge that this task raises concerns the tension between democratic inclusion, which is a cornerstone of democratic legitimacy,⁵ and the need to normatively regulate debate to filter out the use of force, threats, and coercion so that processes of public argumentation are productive and not degenerate into mere confrontation or violence. Regulative norms, however, risk entrenching hegemonic interests, marginalizing minority perspectives, or silencing vulnerable voices. As Iris Marion Young (2000) argues in *Inclusion and Democracy*, even reliance on rational norms can itself become a mechanism of political exclusion. Young distinguishes different types of exclusion, chief among them is internal exclusion,⁶ which occurs even when individuals and groups are formally included in decision-making processes. Included constituencies may still find that "others ignore or dismiss or patronize their statements and expressions [...] that their claims are not taken seriously and may believe that they are not treated with equal respect" (Young 2000, p. 55). Other democratic theorists, including Ivison (2002), Tully (1995), and Thaler (2009), similarly troubled by the unfair exclusion of marginalized voices such as those of indigenous and colonized people, highlight the infiltration of power relations into public argumentation. Consequently, they argue

⁴ Public justification as a product of public reasoning is at the core of contemporary liberalism (Waldron 1993; Gaus 1996; Chambers 2010, ft.1). And both deliberative (Bohman and Rehg 1997; Elster 1998; Macedo 1999) and agonistic (Lars and Lasse 2005; Schaap 2009; Little and Moya 2009) theories of democracy invoke a variation of public argumentation (deliberation, persuasion, contestation).

⁵ "The normative legitimacy of a democratic decision depends on the degree to which those affected by it have been included in the decision-making processes and have had the opportunity to influence the outcomes" (Young 2000, pp. 5-6).

⁶ Young also talks of external exclusion which "names the many ways that individuals and groups that ought to be included are purposely or inadvertently left out of fora for discussion and decision-making" (Young 2000, pp. 53-54).

for contesting the very norms that regulate public debate, hence leading to understanding public argumentation as a collective process of shaping democratic norms rather than merely reflecting already accepted definitions of those norms.

The key question, then, is how to distinguish “appropriate” from “inappropriate” contributions to public debate without reproducing the very exclusionary practices democracy seeks to overcome. In prior work (Sadek 2020), I address this question in the context of the exclusivist-inclusivist divide, which centers on whether reasons rooted in comprehensive doctrines (e.g., religious reasons) should be permitted to justify laws and policies. I argued that this debate presupposes reasons-based normative frameworks (targeting reasons and regulating individual arguments), which leads to structural exclusion. To remedy this, I propose focusing on “ways of arguing” by deploying regulative norms that target *how* citizens exchange reasons rather than *which* reasons they invoke. Specifically, I defend the requirement of *non-authoritarian argumentation*, which permits citizens to offer reasons and arguments based on their deeply held convictions and identities while restricting them from doing so in authoritarian ways. By prioritizing process (how reasons are exchanged) over content (the types of reasons invoked), I also call for construing public argumentation as a collective and dynamic practice of shaping democratic norms.

These considerations support taking non-authoritarian argumentation seriously as a public debate requirement that promises to address the dilemma of stipulating norms while being inclusive. The critical question then becomes: how can non-authoritarian argumentation be operationalized? To answer this question, I turn to the evaluative core of this requirement.

2.2. *The evaluative core of non-authoritarian argumentation*

Non-authoritarian argumentation manifests in citizen-citizen interaction,⁷ and my concern is with ways of arguing that exhibit authoritarian behavior. So, what is non-authoritarian argumentation?

⁷ In Sadek 2012, Chapter V, I distinguish between practical-authoritarian reasoning (which can operate on the level of citizens or the level of the state) and theoretical-authoritarian reasoning (which can be formally-based or will-based).

Here, I follow Maeve Cooke, who notes that non-authoritarian reasoning springs from the notion of *situated rationality* which expresses an anti-authoritarian impulse regarding judgments of truth and validity and is characteristic of the modern Western self-understanding (Cooke 2006, p. 16). Situated rationality embodies the *ethical idea of autonomous agency*: “Ethical autonomy is the individual counterpart to political autonomy. It rests on the intuition that the freedom of human beings consists in important measure in the freedom to form and pursue their conceptions of the good on the basis of reasons that they are able to call their own” (Cooke 2007, p. 235).⁸ Cooke defines non-authoritarian reasoning negatively by defining authoritarian reasoning: reasoning that undermines ethical autonomy by violating either the epistemological or ethical dimension of situated rationality, or both.

The idea behind the epistemological dimension is that “human knowledge is temporal, subjective, and partial: our perceptions of the ways things are, or of how they should be, are unavoidably influenced by the historically specific, sociocultural context in which we live our lives as embodied, finite human beings. All access to reality, or to validity in a context-transcending sense, is mediated by history, context, and embodied subjectivity.” (Cooke 2006, p. 16). And the idea behind the ethical dimension of situated rationality is that critical social thinking “should be guided by the deep-seated, normative intuitions and expectations of the inhabitants of the social order in question.” (Cooke 2006, p. 17).

We, thus, get the following formulations of authoritarian reasoning: a citizen's reasoning is authoritarian when her conception of knowledge, “restrict[s] access to knowledge to a privileged group of people and tend[s] to assert the availability of a standpoint removed from the influences of history and context that could guarantee the unconditional validity of claims to truth and rightness” (Cooke 2007, pp. 234-235), and/or when her conception of justification “split[s] off the validity of propositions and norms from the reasoning of the human subjects for whom they are proclaimed to be valid” (Cooke

My focus here is on practical-authoritarian reasoning on the level of citizenship—authoritarian citizenship.

⁸ For more on “ethical autonomy” see Cooke 2006, Chapter 6, and Cooke 1999.

2007, p. 235). By violating situated rationality—asserting privileged epistemic access, and/or criticizing practices and identities without being guided by what concerned social members think and feel—a citizen’s reasoning undermines ethical autonomy and is thus authoritarian.

Further, and crucially, Cooke notes that “[t]here is no conflict in principle between non-authoritarian reasoning and an orientation towards some ‘otherworldly,’ transcendent source of validity (for example, God or the good)” (Cooke 2007, p. 235). This implies that the use of religious reasons and religious arguments does not in itself entail authoritarian reasoning or behavior. That is, non-authoritarian reasoning does not target the content of reasoning (religious or secular) but the way citizens reason. Whether contributions are included or excluded from public debate is not determined based on the kind of reasons they deploy, but on the way in which those reasons are given and received. The requirement of non-authoritarian reasoning thus permits citizens from deeply held convictions while prohibiting them from doing so in authoritarian ways. To operationalize this, we must ask what it means, in more practical terms, to argue in authoritarian ways. I answer by looking at the connection between non-authoritarian argumentation and democratic civility.⁹

2.3. *Democratic civility*

Reflecting on democratic civility, James Bohman and Henry Richardson write: “In sum, civility for those making arguments requires forthright rather than distanced engagement, and for listeners, it requires open-mindedness in considering anyone’s (civily offered) arguments” (Bohman and Richardson 2009, p. 272). The following summary rendition of Bohman and Richardson’s illustrative example of a devoutly religious citizen conversing with an atheist is most beneficial for our purposes (see Bohman and Richardson 2009, pp. 269-270).

If, when conversing with the religious citizen, the atheist presumptuously and arrogantly argues for a public policy by reference to God’s will, the religious can rightly conclude that the atheist is not

⁹ For more details on why civility can serve as a practical illustration, see 2020, Section 5.

respectfully engaging with her given the common knowledge that God's will has no normative grip over the atheist. That is the first kind of failure of civility on the part of the atheist; they call it "ad hominem hypocrisy." If, alternatively, the atheist totally avoids addressing her contender's religious objections to the policy, she would fail to address the religious citizen's real concerns and in effect be treating her as a dogmatic person and pointless to reason with. That is the second kind of failure of civility on the part of the atheist; they call it "cognitive apartheid."

To each of these failures of civility on the side of those making arguments, there are corresponding failures on the side of those listening to arguments. For the first we get "the incivility of closing oneself off to the arguments offered by another", for example, if the religious person does not even consider engaging the arguments of the atheist. And for the second, we get the "incivility of being unwilling to consider revising his or her position, which is effectively the same as refusing to continue to deliberate" (Bohman and Richardson 2009, p. 272), for example, if the religious is categorically not open to revising her position on a particular political issue.

So, how does (non-)authoritarian reasoning relate to civility so construed and its failures? Having internalized a conception of knowledge that is atemporal, objective, and impartial, an authoritarian reasoner will be closed to the arguments offered by those who reject, challenge, or attack her position; nor will she be willing to reconsider her position when listening to arguments not in line with her position. Further, this reasoner could comfortably deliver her arguments presumptuously and arrogantly while avoiding addressing the real concerns, needs, or interests of her contender since her conception of justification "split[s] off the validity of propositions and norms from the reasoning of the human subjects for whom they are proclaimed to be valid" (Cooke 2007, p. 235).

Non-authoritarian reasoners, on the other hand, accept and have internalized a conception of knowledge that is temporal, contextual, and partial as well as a conception of justification that respects the autonomous agency of those towards which it is offered. Those reasoners have the requisite conceptions of knowledge and justification for them to remain open to arguments, reconsider their positions

when listening, and engage forthrightly rather than distantly when presenting their own arguments.

2.4. *The scope of authoritarian argumentation*

As previously noted, the requirement of non-authoritarian argumentation prioritizes ways of arguing over the content of arguments and aligns with construing public argumentation as a collective endeavor that enables the contestation of democratic norms. In this endeavor, citizens must exchange reasons in non-authoritarian ways. The failures of civility just discussed, illustrate forms authoritarian ways of arguing can take.

On the one hand, non-authoritarian ways of arguing avoid ad hominem hypocrisy and cognitive apartheid in giving reasons, and avoids closing off or refusing to revise positions in receiving reasons. When citizens succeed in so doing, their contributions are heard and considered, allowing for meaningful mutual influence.

On the other hand, authoritarian ways of arguing reflect civic incompetencies such as unwillingness to listen to other's arguments and refusing to revise one's views. Citizens with such incompetencies tend to impose their ideas and views on others, not respecting others' will, and treating others as inferior, mere followers, or incapable of reasoning and revising their views when evidence calls for it.

Importantly, ad hominem hypocrisy, cognitive apartheid, and their corresponding failures on the side of those listening to arguments, are not exhaustive. There are numerous ways of arguing that violate situated rationality and ethical autonomy, and are thus manifestations of authoritarian argumentation. Such ways could be driven, purposely or inadvertently, by misinformation, hate, bias, prejudice, as well as power asymmetries and social and political structures of injustice. This broadening of scope, however, should not divert our attention from the fact that fundamentally authoritarian ways of arguing are about arguers' behavior, be they givers or receivers of reasons. In short, the multiple shapes and forms that authoritarian argumentation could take, concern *behavioral dynamics* between arguers, a point central to Sections 3 and 4.

To sum up, I have so far claimed (i) that non-authoritarian argumentation is a promising requirement for normatively regulating

public debate; (ii) that it is distinctive in targeting ways of arguing rather than individual arguments; (iii) that a plausible way of constructing its evaluative core is in terms of situated rationality and ethical autonomy (which we might add to, or reformulate); (iv) that it is connected to democratic civility; (v) and that it manifests in behavioral dynamics between arguers. In the next subsection, I add a sixth claim: (vi) that self-work is an agential condition for the successful realization of non-authoritarian argumentation in actual argumentative encounters.

2.5. *Self-work as an agential condition*

I now ask if citizens with the requisite conceptions of knowledge and justification—hence, they satisfy the epistemological and ethical dimensions of situated rationality—could still behave in authoritarian ways?

They could. This is because such citizens are expected to remain open to challenging arguments and willing to reconsider their positions. However, this openness exposes them to questioning their consciously or unconsciously accepted beliefs, principles, norms, ideals, or practices. The challenge lies in the fact that individual identities are, to a significant extent, constructed by some of these elements, which often serve as a safe haven for one's sense of self. Put simply, arguing with others can be uncomfortable and even feel threatening. As a result, even non-authoritarian reasoners might cling to what they already know and find comforting, rather than question and reconsider their understanding of the world and their place in it. Crucially, this is not because they reject non-authoritarian conceptions of knowledge and justification, but because they are affectively attached to the security of their established beliefs and practices.

The key distinction that non-authoritarian arguers must observe and not conflate is between norms, ideals, and principles in their abstract form, on the one hand, and their own interpretations of what these norms, ideals, and principles mean and entail, on the other. Doing so, however, requires a form of internal striving or struggle—a sort of “care of the self,” to borrow Michel Foucault's term (Foucault 1988, 2005). In this sense, we can speak of *self-work* as an agential

condition for the successful realization of non-authoritarian reasoning in actual argumentative encounters.¹⁰

3. Normative theories of argumentation: a snapshot

In this section I survey the normative landscape of contemporary argumentation theory, which operates within a rather strict dichotomy between agent- and act-based norms (Godden 2016). Typically, one category is prioritized over the other (Bowell and Kingsbury 2013; Aberdein and Cohen 2016). My central question is whether these norms can assess arguers' behavioral dynamics, a key factor in determining whether an argumentative exchange is authoritarian. I argue that both act-based (3.1) and agent-based (3.2) face challenges in this regard. While my critique focuses on their limitations of existing normative frameworks, it does not seek to diminish their importance or reduce argumentation theories to their shortcomings. Instead, I aim to highlight an "ethical" gap (3.3), which I will address in Section 4.

3.1. Act-based norms (*product, process, procedure*)

The 1958 publications of Toulmin's *The Uses of Argument* and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's *La Nouvelle Rhétorique* marked the "renaissance" of modern argumentation theories (Rigotti and Greco 2019, p. 131). Three decades later, Joseph W. Wenzel's seminal article, "Three Perspectives on Argument: Rhetoric, Dialectic, Logic" (Wenzel 1990), synthesized debates to show that "[a]ll arguments can be regarded as rhetorical, dialectical, and logical phenomena" (Wenzel 1990, p. 9). Wenzel's point is that rhetoric, dialectic, and logic do not represent different kinds of arguments but rather correspond to different perspectives on the same phenomenon: argumentation. The rhetorical perspective views argumentation as a process of persuasion. The dialectical perspective views it as a procedural method for making critical decisions and

¹⁰ See Sadek 2019 and 2020, for elaborations of this idea in terms of what I call the non-fundamentalist attitude.

solving problems. The logical perspective views it as a product—the outcomes people create when they argue (Wenzel 1990, p. 9).¹¹

Naturally, when a perspective evaluates an argument, it focuses on norms corresponding to its view of argumentation. Rhetoric emphasizes norms of persuasiveness (process-based norms), dialectic emphasizes norms of critical discussion (procedure-based norms), and logic emphasizes norms of soundness and validity (product-based norms). In this sense, the “goodness” of an argument is perspective-dependent.

The relationship between these norms remains contested. The “dialectical turn” critiqued logical criteria as insufficient for normative theorizing. Building on the ambiguity between product and process in the case of fallacies—where fallacies can relate to the form or content of an argument as a product, or to the process of argumentation (van Eemeren 2015, p. 4)—pragma-dialectics developed a research program in which argumentation is evaluated against the ideal of a critical discussion, which determines the normative criteria for the rationality of the argumentative procedure. Formal logic’s measurement of the goodness of an argument based on validity (form) and the incontrovertibility of premises (content) can no longer dominate argument assessment (van Eemeren 2009, p. 140; see also Lewiński and Mohammed 2016).

This shift has sparked a remarkable and commendable expansion in the intellectual scope of argumentation studies. However, normative theories remained insufficiently attentive to arguers’ obligations, dispositions, and intentions as constitutive of arguers’ behavioral dynamics that play a defining role in authoritarian ways of arguing. This neglect, one might say, is in line with Vasco Correia’s remark that we should attend to the “ethics of argumentation,” a dimension of argumentation that “focused neither on the norms of reasoning and discussion, nor on the norms of persuasiveness, but more exactly on the arguer’s *behavior* relative to those norms” (Correia 2012, p. 223; emphasis in original).

¹¹ Argument as “product” refers to argument1, or the set of propositions (premises) leading to a conclusion (O’Keefe 1977; Biro and Seigel 2006). Argument1 is contrasted with argument2, or the activity of arguing where products (argument1) are being traded.

Correia further notes that the ethics of argumentation “may be considered by some as a subdivision of Dialectic” in reference to pragma-dialectics’ “ten commandments,” and that virtue argumentation is more assertive and explicit about “the importance of an ethical approach in argumentation theory” (Correia 2012, p. 223). My question here is whether either of these suggestions can provide the norms we are looking for.

Consider, first, pragma-dialectics’ “Ten commandments for reasonable discussants” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2003, Chapter 8). The intended function of these commandments is to guide the conduct of arguers during argumentative engagements. They reflect pragma-dialectics’ acknowledgment of the agent’s role as a second-order condition for critical reasonableness. So, the initial impression is that pragma-dialectics is in fact concerned with arguers’ behavioral dynamics.

Pragma-dialectics’ commitment to the externalization principle, however, complicates that initial impression. The principle prescribes targeting “the public commitments entailed by the performance of certain language activities” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2003, p. 53). The basic idea, I take it, is that “public commitments” are, or can be made, accessible to others. Interpreting the principle charitably, we can say that the point is to avoid speculations about arguers’ internal states of mind, by keeping the focus of argumentative analysis and assessment on externalized commitments. While this does not explicitly prohibit addressing internal states, it restricts analysis and assessment to those states entailed by speech acts, hence accessible to others. This raises two difficulties for assessing authoritarian ways of arguing.

First is an agent-centered difficulty. The externalization principle marginalizes arguers’ dispositions, motivations, and intentions relegating them to secondary status. Talk about arguers has at best a derivative role. Though pragma-dialectics acknowledges agents’ role in argumentation, agents remain theoretically peripheral. Their role is indirect and somewhat practically irrelevant for the assessment of argumentation. This raises concerns for assessing authoritarian ways of arguing where the arguers’ behavioral dispositions and intent can be central.

Second is a behavioral-scope difficulty. Authoritarian ways of arguing manifest in behavioral dynamics, and “behavior” extends beyond “language activities” to include, for instance, body language and tone of voice. Further, the “dynamics” of behavior are not merely about singular acts, but about the interplay of successive acts between interlocutors. This raises concerns for assessing authoritarian ways of arguing since it is precisely the dynamics of arguers’ behavior that manifest authoritarian argumentation.

These challenges are not insurmountable. Disagreements within pragma-dialectics may arise over interpretations of the externalization principle, the inclusion of multimodal acts (e.g., nonverbal cues), and the prioritization of behavioral dynamics. I contend that progress in assessing authoritarian ways of arguing requires: a flexible interpretation of externalization; a multimodal analysis of acts of arguing; and a focus on dynamic behavioral patterns. For scholars receptive to this view, the norms of *munazara* developed in Section 4 offer a valuable enhancement to argumentation’s normative toolbox, one attuned to the interplay of ethics and dialogical rigor.

3.2. *Agent-based norms*

The recent turn to virtue (Aberdein and Cohen 2016), centers the agent as the locus of understanding and assessing argumentation. Following in the footsteps of virtue ethics and virtue epistemology (Aberdein 2020, p. 98), Cohen (2007) and Aberdein (2010) initiated a still-growing discussion on virtue argumentation theory (Aberdein and Cohen 2016, 2024).

Virtue ethics and virtue epistemology explain ethical action and epistemic performance through agential properties. Similarly, virtue argumentation answers the question “What makes an argument good?” by prioritizing the arguer’s character over the argument’s structure. While not dismissing act-based norms, virtue theorists argue that explanation flows from the agent to the act: a good argument is defined as one that the virtuous arguer (typically) makes (Cohen 2008; Aberdein 2018). If agent-based norms do not take priority over act-based norms, then virtue argumentation “would be merely ornamental” (Aberdein 2010, p. 170). In other words, if the virtuous arguer is explained in terms of the goodness of the

argument—such that a virtuous arguer is simply one disposed to conduct argumentation with good arguments—virtue argumentation becomes derivative of, and at best complementary to, traditional accounts of the good argument. In short, virtue argumentation, as it is currently presented in the literature, has a core commitment to the priority of agent-based norms over act-based norms.¹²

The virtue approach to argumentation appears to be a more promising alternative for our purposes, as it prioritizes agential norms and makes direct reference to considerations relevant to the ethical guidance of arguers' behavior: the virtues.

Despite this promise, however, virtue argumentation remains insufficient because it fails to operationalize how the virtues manifest in actual norms of reasoning and discussion. That is, it does not indicate how one can move from the act of arguing to argument assessment on the basis of argumentative virtues (see Oruç et. al. 2023b). Consider, for instance, that opponents of virtue argumentation may acknowledge the efforts of virtue theorists to define the virtuous arguer (Aberdein 2016, 2021) and to develop (Cohen 2005) and refine (Aberdein 2010, 2014) a taxonomy of the virtues and vices of the virtuous arguer. Nevertheless, they might still argue that these efforts are insufficient. They could contend, for instance, that the virtuous arguer serves merely as an *indicator* or signpost to “evaluate this argument,” and claim that any “goodness” revealed by such an evaluation would depend entirely on features of the act of arguing, without reference to the arguer. From the perspective of act-based theorists, there is no reason to believe that the goodness of an argument made by a virtuous arguer cannot be fully reduced to logical properties, procedural rules of an idealized critical discussion, or rhetorical processes. Their implicit demand is for an element that belongs to the act of arguing and that, while not reducible to act-based norms, depends on agential dispositions that are “overwhelmingly likely” (Aberdein 2018, p. 4) to manifest in good arguments. Virtue argumentation has not yet met this implicit demand (Oruç et. al. 2023b).

¹² Virtue theorists differ in what they consider to be the implications of that commitment on the need for, and features of, an argument assessment framework. For more details see Pagliery 2015, and Oruç et. al. 2023b.

3.3. The “ethical gap”

The preceding two subsections highlight concerns regarding adequately capturing behavioral dynamics critical to identifying authoritarian ways of arguing. These concerns stem from a disconnect between argumentative norms and considerations such as obligations, dispositions, and intentions. To address this gap, I turn to the *munazara* tradition. Before doing so, however, a word on the specific locus of my intervention is helpful.

Broadly, my intervention concerns the relationship between ethics and argumentation. The aim is not to undermine existing ethical analyses and connections, but to bring to the fore underexplored dimensions of ethical conduct in argumentation.

Ethics intersects with argumentation in multiple ways: the subject matter of an argumentation, “Should abortion be legal?”; the motivation of an arguer, arguing in bad faith; the consequences of argumentation could affect one’s and others’ psychology, and can be propagandist or conducive to anti-pluralist populism (Müller 2017; Mounk 2018). Furthermore, sometimes the argumentative engagement itself is ethical. Consider how the giving and asking for reasons could promote inclusion and individual autonomy or equality among participants (Habermas 1996, 1990); or how a speaker’s epistemic credibility might be affected by power relations (Fricker 2007). We can add to the list empirical studies that show how certain conditions, personal or institutional, can have an effect on how arguments unfold or on our ability to reason. For example: that group diversity impacts polarization (Sunstein 2000), or that bias and heuristics can adversely affect our ability for rational inference (Evans 2004; Mercier and Sperber 2011).

Our focus is the behavioral dynamics between arguers, or participants’ ethical conduct. That is, our interest is in how arguers could behave in argumentative encounters in more or less ethical ways. This overlaps with several of the just mentioned intersections between ethics and argumentation but is reducible to none. I approach the relationship between ethics and argumentation from the angle of participants’ behavior generally, and their (un)ethical conduct specifically. Ethical argumentation, in this sense, is concerned first and foremost with ethical considerations pertaining

to the unfolding of each arguer's choices of critical moves vis-a-vis the choices of the other—the dynamics of the argumentative interaction between arguers—as constitutive of the phenomenon of argumentation.

An adequate study of ethical argumentation thus understood, cannot merely look at whether and how the norms of reasoning, discussion, and persuasion relate to ethics. It must further look at participants' duties, obligations, and attitudes that get generated as they encounter one another in an argumentative situation.

4. *Munazara's argumentative norms*

In this section, I address the “ethical” gap in contemporary argumentation theory by extracting norms from the *munazara* tradition, which uniquely embeds ethical considerations into its procedural rules. After outlining the interdependence of agent and procedure (4.1), I derive “sequencing-based” (the ordering of arguers' critical moves) and “derailments-based” (diversions from intended procedure) norms (4.2). Finally, I show how these norms respectively exhibit an ethic of cooperation and an ethic of reciprocity, which together constitute *munazara's* contribution to ethical argumentation and offer an integrative framework that reconciles procedural rigor with virtue-oriented concerns (4.3).

4.1. *The interdependence of agent and procedure*

Munazara's ultimate aim is *izhār al-ḥaqq* (Gelenbevī 1934, p. 37)—the manifestation of truth or justice or reality (hereafter, manifestation of truth)—, which is achieved through a regulated turn-taking procedure for exchanging reasons. Given that truth in modern pluralist societies is a contested concept, I follow Patrick Bondy (2010) and rely on it at the metatheoretical level of argument evaluation rather than the level of the theory of evaluating argument. That is how Bondy explains the difference: “By ‘theory of evaluation’ I mean the set of criteria that a theory provides us with for evaluating arguments. By ‘the metatheory’ in terms of which the theory of evaluation is worked out, I mean the broader theory of argument, including reference to what it is that the criteria for argument evaluation are supposed to accomplish, in which the theory

of evaluation is articulated.” (2010, ft. 3). Furthermore, emphasizing the “manifestation” element, directs our attention towards arguers’ *behavioral dynamics* (to how *munazara*’s procedural constraints and recommendations make possible and facilitate the manifestation of truth¹³), and calls for a shift from “arguments” to “what arguers *do* with arguments” in the study of argumentation.¹⁴ The emphasis on “manifestation” is reflected in *munazara* scholars’ discussions about *when* should an arguer (protagonist or antagonist) deploy *which* of the various legitimate moves at her disposal, and what sort of behavior counts as a *violation of good argumentative conduct*. In these discussions, the unit of analysis was the arguer’ steps, tactics and ploys; in short, argumentative moves (al-Āmidī 1900, p. 7).

Thus, *munazara* procedure is move-based, and the regulation of moves was in the service of the manifestation of truth. To illustrate, consider the role of the antagonist. Scholars have designated three *types* of legitimate responses available to the antagonist in her encounter with the protagonist. Each of these types of moves questions the merits of a different aspect of the protagonist’s argument and, hence, are *critical* moves. These moves are “objection” (checks the acceptability of premises in the protagonist’s argument), “refutation” (examines the validity of the protagonist’s argument), and “counterargument” (challenges the sufficiency of the protagonist’s argument for the claim she is defending).

Although scholars agreed on the aim of *munazara*, they debated the optimal sequencing of critical moves to promote that aim. After listening to the protagonist’s argument for a certain claim, should the

¹³ This in line with *munazara* scholars’ recognition that mastering logic and producing cogent arguments is neither the only nor the most important consideration for the manifestation of truth.

¹⁴ Note the subtle difference in emphasis between virtue argumentation’s shift from the “act of arguing” to the “agent of the argument”, on the one hand, and *munazara*’s shift from “arguments” to “what arguers do with arguments,” on the other hand. Both shifts are agential (from the act to the agent) but the second is more explicitly specific in its reference to the actions of the agent, which is directly and inextricably related to the dispositions of the agent.

antagonist respond by first raising an objection, a refutation, or a counterargument? Three sequences emerged:¹⁵

1. Objection → Refutation → Counterargument
2. Refutation → Objection → Counterargument
3. Objection → Counterargument → Refutation

It is worth noting that the fact that *munazara* scholars raised the question of sequencing, and debated it over generations, is especially significant, given that contemporary argumentation scholarship has surprisingly not yet examined sequencing as a central component of argumentation, despite the predominance of dialogical and dialectical approaches. Two exceptions can be noted. The first is Lumer's epistemological approach, which mentions sequencing (1988, p. 461) but notes that prescribing sequences should be avoided given their complexities (Lumer 1988, p. 457). The second is van Laar and Krabbe's inquiries into critical reactions (Krabbe and van Laar 2011; van Laar and Krabbe 2013; van Laar 2001). With that said, two recent articles have teased out the implications of *munazara*'s three sequences for contemporary argumentation theory: Oruç et. al. 2023a, and Oruç et. al. 2023b. In the remainder of this subsection, I give a concise summary of select findings.

All three sequences are recommendations for the antagonist to contribute to the cooperative manifestation of truth in the best way possible. What sets them apart is *how* they do so. An examination of the justifications that scholars provided for preferring one sequence over another, reveals that each sequence is grounded on a specific *interpretation* of cooperative manifestation of truth. Each of these interpretations is embodied in the sequence it grounds, and that sequence expresses and promotes the interpretation that grounds it.

- Sequence1 is based on cooperation as coalescence and expresses/promotes coalescent-cooperation
- Sequence2 is based on cooperation as reliability, and expresses/promotes reliable-cooperation

¹⁵ Sequence1 is prescribed by Jurjānī (al-Jaunpūrī 2006, pp. 76–77); Sequence2 by Mullā Ḥanafī (2014, pp. 40–41); and Sequence3 by Sāqaqlizāde (al-Āmidī 1900, p. 60).

- Sequence3 is based on cooperation as efficacy, and expresses/promotes adversarial-cooperation

Moreover, coalescence, reliability, and efficacy subsist in a symbiotic relationship with the arguer. Each of these values makes normative demands on the antagonist. These demands get satisfied when the antagonist implements the corresponding sequence. That is, adherence to a particular recommended sequence requires that she chooses to deploy the right type of critical move at the right juncture of the argumentative encounter, and that she does so for the right reason, the manifestation of truth. When the antagonist is successful, she realizes the value corresponding to the sequence in question and, hence, fulfills her duty in the cooperative interaction, a duty that follows from her commitment to the manifestation of truth. In order to succeed, however, the antagonist needs to possess certain virtues. A pair of virtues is associated with each of the recommended sequences:

- Patience and humility (Sequence1)
- Diligence and open-mindedness (Sequence2)
- Agonism and strategy (Sequence3)

Without some degree of these pairs, the antagonist might not be able to successfully perform her role in contributing to coalescent-, or reliable-, or adversarial-cooperation.

Furthermore, and crucially, it is through the recurrent practice of a particular sequence that the antagonist gets to learn how to exhibit the virtues associated with that sequence during argumentative encounters. Because coalescence, reliability, and efficacy, restrict the antagonist's choices of available critical moves in specific ways, the antagonist in training struggles as she learns how to restrain herself so that she adheres to the respective sequences. Over time and with repetition, she develops the associated virtues required for implementing a recommended sequence. In addition, and simultaneously, this antagonist in training comes to internalize coalescence, reliability, and efficacy as argumentation values embodied in their respective sequences. Thus, the values of argumentation justify recommended sequences, and guide the antagonist's choices by serving as a normative source for the

restrictions that she is required to observe. And, as she struggles in observing these restrictions, she develops and exhibits the virtues required for adhering to sequences that embody argumentative values.

Finally, and given that sequencing belongs to the procedure while virtues belong to the agent, when we combine the symbiotic relationship between the values of argumentation and the arguer, on the one hand, with how recommended sequences concretize these values of argumentation, on the other hand, the dynamics of the interdependence between procedure and agent is fleshed out. For consideration of space, I will only briefly elaborate on such interdependence in Sequence1.

Start by noticing that the ordering of Sequence1 (objection → refutation → counter-objection) progresses from the weakest to the strongest critical move. Objection is weakest in that it is a mere request for clarification that calls for some support to one of the protagonist's premises (al-Āmidī 1900, p. 29; see also Krabbe and van Laar 2011, p. 213). The antagonist, however, must submit evidence for her refutation. And although a successful refutation is not powerful enough to deny the protagonist's claim (al-Samarqandī 1934, p. 126), it does require the protagonist to either undermine it or offer another argument in support of her original claim. Finally, counterargument is a direct attack on the protagonist's claim, and calls upon her to either show that the counterargument contains unacceptable premises (by raising an objection) or suffers from some deficiency (by raising a refutation).

Through such progressive unfolding, the antagonist gives the protagonist an opportunity to reflect on and identify weaknesses in her premises, followed by an opportunity to reflect and identify mistakes in her reasoning. Only now can the antagonist show the protagonist that even though she has acceptable premises and a deficiency-free argument, she has not yet established that her claim is sufficiently credible. Had the antagonist begun with a counterargument, the protagonist's opportunity to unravel weaknesses and mistakes would have been bypassed.

Thus, Sequence1's progressive unfolding opens a communicative space of disagreement within which the protagonist is permitted and assisted by the antagonist to reflect on the acceptability of her

premises and the deficiencies in her reasoning. Protagonist and antagonist are joined in a collaborative endeavor to assess the worth of the premises, the cogency of the reasoning, and the dialogical plausibility of the claim. That is a *coalescent-cooperation* that merges contenders for the sake of achieving their common goal. However, and this is key, for the antagonist to be able to open such communicative space, she must exhibit some degree of patience and humility. Without these virtues, she may not succeed in sticking to weakest → stronger → strongest unfolding when she has at her disposal knock-down moves from the very beginning. Furthermore, it is through the recurrent practice of Sequence1 that an agent learns how to exhibit patience and humility in their argumentative encounters.

Now, coalescence does not merely serve in the justification of Sequence1 as the best ordering of the antagonist's moves for the manifestation of truth. Coalescence gets concretized through the antagonist choices of moves at different argumentative junctures, which together constitute the progressive unfolding in Sequence1. In this sense, coalescence is embodied in, and expressed by, Sequence1. There is, thus, a strong connection between coalescence (value) and its corresponding sequence (procedure). There is further a symbiotic relation between coalescence (value) and the antagonist (agent). On the one hand, the antagonist realizes coalescence by implementing Sequence1, which in turn requires her to be patient and humble. Coalescence, on the other hand, makes normative demands on the antagonist. These demands get satisfied when she sticks to Sequence1 by deploying the right move at the right time. As she struggles to do so, she develops patience and humility.

4.2. Sequencing-based and derailment-based norms

Keeping with the case of the antagonist, the question is: against which norm are we going to assess whether an antagonist fared well in the way she orders critical moves in a given argumentative encounter?

Sequencing-based norms. Every ordering of moves is the result of a series of choices by the antagonist in question. These are choices concerning *when* to deploy *which* critical move. In addition to

choosing the appropriate critical move at different junctures of an argumentative encounter, we could include choosing the appropriate recommended sequence for a particular argumentative situation.

Munazara scholars have not really discussed that type of choice, and it might well be the case that some scholars thought of their preferred sequence as the best recommendation for *all* argumentative contexts. For my purposes in this paper, I can leave this question open, and I acknowledge that good argumentative conduct in different contexts might require implementing different recommended sequences. Therefore, an arguer's ability to discern which recommended sequence fits better a particular argumentative situation is another aspect of good conduct in argumentative encounters. These are choices concerning *which sequence* is best in *what context*.

To illustrate, in contexts where parties share considerable common grounds, it might be more feasible and beneficial to adhere to Sequence1, realize the value of coalescence, and seek coalescent-cooperation. Whereas, in contexts of deep disagreement, it might be more feasible and beneficial to adhere to Sequence2, realize the value of reliability, and seek reliable-cooperation. Sequence2, unlike Sequence1, does not begin with checking the acceptability of premises, where the impact of deep disagreements is highest. Instead, it makes acceptability-checking conditional upon reliability-checking in order to filter out inferentially unreliable arguments, which is most fitting in contexts of deep disagreements (Oruç et. al. 2023b).

The antagonist in question chose a sequence to adhere to in a particular context (one kind of choice) and, consequently, chose when to employ which critical move (another kind of choice). Both kinds of choices are involved in good "sequencing." What is important to realize is that argumentation values are at the core of both kinds of choices. An antagonist fares well in her ordering of critical moves when (a) she chooses the sequence that expresses/promotes the interpretation of cooperation most pertinent for the particular argumentative situation, and (b) she chooses the right move at the right time (i.e., adheres to the sequence she chose) out of her commitment, and with the intention, to realize the argumentation value embodied in that sequence. But we just learned

that argumentation values get concretized in the sequences they ground, and that they stand in a symbiotic relationship with the arguer. Coalescence, reliability, and efficacy account for the interdependence between procedure and agent that sequencing displays. A good argumentation is one where, among other things, the antagonist adheres to sequences that express and promote these values. Each of these values is a different interpretation of the overarching argumentative value of cooperation and can, thus, be considered sequencing-based norms that satisfy the manifestation of truth as the ultimate goal of argumentation.

Derailment-based norms. Scholars also discussed what sort of behavior counts as a *violation of good argumentative conduct*. This concerns derailments from the intended procedure. *Munazara* scholars understood derailments in terms of character failures and referred to them as argumentative vices. Several such vices have been identified, but four are most prominent:

- i. *Mukābara* (arrogance): doubting an incontrovertible premise without offering a supporting argument is considered arrogance (Āmidī 1900, p. 58)
- ii. *Tahakkum* (subjugation): insisting on a claim without offering a supporting argument is classified as subjugation (Cevdet Paşa 1998, p. 112)
- iii. *Ġaşb* (usurpation): counter arguing a not-yet-defended claim is described as usurpation
- iv. *'Ucūl* (hastiness): counter arguing a protagonist's claim right from the get-go is labeled as hastiness (Cevdet Paşa 1998, p. 112).

Derailments, like sequencing, relate to the procedure and the agent, and exhibit the interdependence between the arguer and the act of arguing. Also, like sequencing, derailments are ultimately in the service of cooperation, albeit from a different angle. Derailments are violations of procedural constraints (not those of sequencing strictly speaking) that are meant to preserve an *equal reciprocal relationship between the antagonist and the protagonist*. When these constraints are breached, cooperative truth-seeking is undermined. A simple but clear set of examples here would be cases where an arguer behaves with arrogance or hastiness, subjugates, or usurps as a result of

abusing their social rank, academic standing, structural prejudice, or social bias. Reciprocal equality preserves the overarching value of cooperation and serves the ultimate goal of manifesting the truth.

It is rather expected that untrained arguers would have a tendency to undermine reciprocal equality when they are cornered, feeling intimidated, or attached to their position. The arguer in training struggles as she learns how to restrain herself in order not to diverge from the intended procedure. The point of derailments is to help ensure that the arguer does not put herself, her way of thinking, or her opinion, first and in a way that does not do justice to the equal status of the contending party, her way of thinking, or her opinion. Thus, reciprocal equality in argumentative encounters makes demands upon arguers to listen carefully and with compassion or empathy to the opinions and arguments of her contender in order to be fair-minded, ask the right questions, and raise the right challenges. Arguers, unlike quarrellers or power-flexors,¹⁶ struggle to observe these limits and do so out of their commitment for reciprocal equality as a condition for cooperative truth-seeking. It is through such struggle that they develop the capacity to restrain their behavior so that they do not block, distort, or undermine cooperative truth-seeking. Reciprocal equality demands attentive listening, which is required in order for arguers not to exhibit derailment-vice. To be an arguer requires the intention, willingness, and competence to value and abide by procedural constraints for the sake of manifesting the truth; it requires participants to develop the dispositions (*malaka*) of being a *munāzir*.

Reciprocal equality accounts for the interdependence between procedure and agent that derailments display. A bad argumentation is one where, among other things, arguers repeatedly, and maybe intentionally, breach the procedural constraints that make possible and enhance cooperative truth-seeking. Reciprocal equality as a condition for the overarching argumentative value of cooperation is undermined by such derailments, and can, thus, be considered a

¹⁶ The quarreler's (*mujādil*) aim of silencing her opponent, and the power-flexor's (*munāzi*) goal of projecting dominance, lead them to employ moves, tactics, and maneuvers that are prohibited for the arguer (*munāzir*) (al-Jaupūrī 2006, p. 17).

derailment-based norm that satisfies the manifestation of truth as the ultimate goal of argumentation.

4.3. *Munazara's* contribution to ethical argumentation

Sequencing and derailments give us access to ethical dimensions embedded in the phenomenon of argumentation. Sequencing- and derailment-based norms impose requirements and make demands on arguers' dynamic interaction in argumentative encounters; they are norms of ethical argumentation. By way of better capturing *munazara's* contribution to ethical argumentation, I want to distinguish two types of ethics that sequencing- and derailment-based norms exhibit.

An ethic of cooperation. Sequencing-based norms exhibit an ethic of cooperation. Each recommended sequence is based on a value that represents a particular interpretation of the overarching value of cooperation (coalescence, reliability, efficacy), and by sticking to a recommended sequence, the antagonist expresses and promotes the corresponding type of cooperation (coalescent, reliable, adversarial). An essential part in the antagonist's cooperation with the protagonist is to implement a recommended sequence. In this sense, the ethical requirements that sequencing imposes (determining the choices of which recommended sequence to adhere to, when to deploy which critical move, and struggling to adhere to sequences) can be understood in terms of an ethic of cooperation.

An ethic of reciprocity. Derailment-based norms, on the other hand, exhibit an ethic of reciprocity. The four vices of arrogance, subjugation, usurpation, and hastiness are based on reciprocal equality, which is a condition for cooperative truth-seeking. By observing procedural constraints that undermine reciprocal equality, arguers make possible and promote the manifestation of truth. This in turn requires arguers to distance themselves from, and struggle against, behavior that instantiate derailment-vices for the sake of cooperative truth-seeking. Such distancing and struggling, require not only that arguers *refrain from* doubting incontrovertible premises before asking for clarifications (arrogance), insisting on a claim without supporting it (subjugation), counter-arguing a not-yet-defended claim (usurpation), counter-arguing a claim before asking

for the argument that supports it (hastiness), but also that arguers *listen to* each other attentively in order to encounter one another's perspectives with care and justice. Without such listening, arguers won't be able to get what their contenders are saying correctly and accurately. Such listening requires a certain ability to be fully present throughout the argumentative encounter and to be connected to one's contender without bias or prejudice. Only in this way will an arguer be ready and prepared to adequately receive, and be satisfactorily prepared to engage with, her contender and their ideas. In this sense, the ethical demands that derailments make (refraining from breaching procedural constraints and attentive listening) can be understood in terms of an ethic of reciprocity.

Together, the ethic of cooperation and the ethic of reciprocity, constitute the ethics of *munazara* and its contribution to ethical argumentation. This contribution has an external and an internal dimension. The ethic of cooperation is manifested externally in the choice of a recommended sequence and the deployment of critical moves accordingly, and internally in the struggle to adhere to sequences out of a commitment to the manifestation of truth. The ethic of reciprocity is manifested externally in the observance of procedural constraints, and internally in the struggle not to breach these constraints and in attentive listening out of a commitment to the manifestation of truth. We can, thus, say that the external dimensions of the ethics of *munazara* are instantiated in *procedural-regulation* while the internal dimensions are instantiated in *self-regulation*. It is the latter internal dimension that speaks directly to the self-work agential condition for the successful realization of non-authoritarian argumentation in actual argumentative encounters (2.5). Further, it is the arguers' commitment to the cooperative manifestation of truth that informs her argumentative behavior so that it is in line with the restrictions that the ethics of *munazara* imposes. Neither sequencing- nor derailment-based norms are properly met through mere rule-following. Arguer's intentions, motivations, and aspirations are ineliminable parts of the picture. Arguer's conduct in accordance with procedural rules should be the result of the relevant dispositions (rather than luck or duplicity), and she should be behaving out of an awareness of, and commitment to,

the values concretized in sequences (Oruç et. al. 2023b) and the reciprocal equality that gets undermined through derailments.

5. Conclusion

I have sought in this paper to develop argumentative norms capable of assessing authoritarian ways of arguing. These norms must take into account the multiple and varied ways in which arguers might violate situated rationality and ethical autonomy. That is, they must be able to assess arguers' behavioral dynamic as it unfolds during argumentative encounters. Contemporary normative theories of argumentation, whether act-based or agent-based, fail to adequately account for such behavioral dynamics, and so I turned to the *munazara* tradition and extracted sequencing- and derailment-based norms that are explicitly about arguers' behavioral dynamics, and embed ethical considerations directly into argumentative procedures. I contend that together, these norms take us a long way on the road of assessing whether a given way of arguing is authoritarian or not. Accordingly, we can say that authoritarian ways of arguing, at least some of them, are ways of arguing that fail to adhere to sequencing- and/or derailment-based norms. I also tried to show how these *munazara*-norms exhibit ethics of cooperation and of reciprocity. Such ethics of *munazara* can play a central role in identifying when a particular way of arguing is authoritarian because it frames the interactive relational dynamics that underpin *how* reasons and arguments are exchanged. Finally, I want to note that *munazara* norms, particularly sequencing ones, are a new kind of norms. And so, even if we disagree with how *munazara* scholars have justified and specified them, we can attempt developing different sequences that better serve our purposes.

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