Aku Visala and Olli-Pekka Vainio, eds. *Theological Perspectives on Free Will: Compatibility, Christology, and Community*. Routledge Studies in Analytic and Systematic Theology. Routledge, 2024. vii + 224 pp. $144.00 (hbk); $43.99 (pbk).

Jeremy W. Skrzypek
Ohio Dominican University

How should we understand the relationship between theological and philosophical approaches to understanding free will? Are they, and should they remain, entirely distinct, having no bearing on one another whatsoever? Do they conflict with one another, forcing us to choose between the two? Do they complement, constrain, or illuminate one another? Do philosophy and theology ultimately converge on a singular and consistent view of human and divine freedom? Philosophers and theologians have been puzzling over such questions for centuries. More recently, there has been a resurgence of interest among analytic theologians, that is to say, those analytic philosophers and systematic and historical theologians who explore theological questions using the tools of contemporary analytic philosophy. Aku Visala and Olli-Pekka Vainio's *Theological Perspectives on Free Will: Compatibility, Christology, and Community* is an excellent contribution to this ongoing discussion. The volume offers eleven new essays, plus an introduction by the editors, each of which pushes the relevant debates forward in new directions. Given the breadth of topics that it covers, the volume also serves as a helpful overview of the debate for anyone wishing to get up to speed on these issues. In what follows, I will first provide a summary of each of the essays included in the volume. I will then offer some critical reflections on the volume as a whole as well as several of the specific issues discussed therein.

The volume is divided into three parts. The first part features essays that discuss the compatibility of theological and philosophical perspectives on free will. The second part features essays that discuss various social aspects of human freedom and their relevance for philosophical and theological perspectives on free will. The third part features essays that discuss Christ's freedom.

The first two essays are companion pieces. In his "Why Christians Should (Still) Be Compatibilists," Jesse Couenhoven presents a cumulative theological case for compatibilism. He argues that compatibilism makes the most sense of God's freedom in light of his essential moral perfection, the freedom of the blessed in heaven, Christ's incarnate freedom, and human agency in light of the transformative nature of grace. Compatibilism, says Couenhoven, is also no worse off than libertarianism with respect to the problem of evil and the problem of hell. In his "Weighing Compatibilism and Libertarianism in Analytic Theology," Kevin Timpe responds directly to the Couenhoven piece. He argues that the various considerations concerning human and divine freedom presented by Couenhoven give the Christian no reason to prefer compatibilism over libertarianism. And because the most plausible way of reconciling compatibilism with the problem of evil and the problem of

Journal of Analytic Theology, Vol. 13, Fall 2025
10.12978/jat.2025-13.0904-51181010
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hell is to accept strong universalism (a view rejected by the majority of voices in the history of Christian thought on the topic), there is a cumulative case to be made, instead, that Christians should be libertarians.

If human beings are completely lacking in any kind of free will, this would seem to undermine much of what we care about personally, socially, legally, politically, and theologically. It would seem that we could no longer hold anyone morally responsible for any of his or her actions. It would make inappropriate any kind of censure, condemnation, or punishment of any individual, regardless of the severity of his or her wrongdoing. In "Can an Unfree Person Have a 'Deep Self'?," Leigh Vicens argues that even if it were true that human beings were completely lacking in any kind of free will, there is still room for a kind of basic moral desert. Individuals, and not just their actions, can be censured, condemned, and punished, as long as the actions that prompt such reactions are reflective of either the person's higher-order desires or certain stable and persistent attitudes or behaviors that are closely linked with the underlying identity of the acting person, her "deep self."

In our ordinary, everyday speech, we seem to speak of certain propositions about the future as being both true and knowable. For example, if I were to predict that a flipped coin will turn up heads, and it does, it seems that we would want to say that my earlier claim about the future was true. And we often speak as if it is possible to know someone so well that we can know what they will freely do in a particular situation. There is thus a semantic case to be made against open future open theism, according to which the future is causally, epistemically, and alethically open. In his "The Semantic Case Against Open Theism and Experimental Philosophy," Ferhat Yoney points to recent work in experimental philosophy that suggests that our ordinary intuitions and attributions concerning knowledge and truth are not as stable or reliable as we might think (for example, there is evidence that our intuitions about certain cases depend upon the order in which those cases are presented). If this is right, then perhaps open theists should not be so concerned about the semantic case against it.

If God is the direct cause of absolutely everything that exists, including every one of my own actions, how can I be said to be free in the libertarian sense, that is, in the sense of having genuine alternative possibilities? W. Matthews Grant's extrinsic model of divine agency aims to resolve this apparent conflict by identifying God's causing of my action with the action itself (or, more precisely, with that action and the monadic relation of causal dependence it bears to God). On this model, both God and I are the cause of my action, but neither my action nor God's causing of that action is in any way prior to, or determinative of, the other. On this model, God's causing of my action *just is* that action and the relation of causal dependence that it bears to him. In his "Freedom, Even If God Decrees It" Fr. James Dominic Rooney argues that Grant's model works only because there is, in fact, a kind of counterfactual explanatory priority of the individual's action over God's causing of it. This actually makes Grant's account no better than two of the standard models of God's providence: Molinism and Banezianism. But there is no problem with that, according to Rooney, since there is nothing wrong with our actions having a kind of counterfactual explanatory priority over God's knowledge or action. The only problem here would be if our actions exerted some kind of causal priority over God's knowledge or action. What the two other standard models do better than Grant's, says Rooney, is explain the mode or manner of cooperation between free creatures and God.

In "Free Together: On Christian Freedom and Group Ontology," D. T. Everhart argues that recent work in social ontology and social psychology can help us to understand better and appreciate more the strong social aspects of St. Paul's theological conception of human

freedom. According to Everhart, human beings are free and responsible agents not in spite of, but because of, our deep relationality with others. Belonging to healthy, virtuous communities, such as the Church, the mystical body of Christ, enables us to develop a sense of self and personal responsibility and to flourish as the kinds of creatures that we are. As Everhart puts it, "we are free when we are free together" (116).

Free will is often taken to require a kind of conscious control over what we do. A free agent must have conscious access to the reasons, emotions, beliefs, and attitudes that are operative in her decision, and she must be able to consciously reflect on, weigh, dismiss, or determine the force of those reasons, emotions, beliefs and attitudes. In "Free Will, Cognitive Biases, and Theology," Simon Kittle argues that recent empirical work on the nature and scope of cognitive biases, especially recent work on "priming" effects, seems to indicate that human beings typically do not possess the sort of conscious control just described. In the face of such evidence, Christians should abandon libertarianism and any kind of retributivist understanding of human or divine punishment.

The next two selections offer Lutheran perspectives on the compatibility of free will, grace, and salvation. Aku Visala begins "Bound Choice and the Mystery of Eternal Punishment" by presenting an inconsistent triad faced by Christians trying to reconcile their theological commitments with the existence of genuine human freedom: (1) God wills the salvation of every person, (2) God exercises ultimate control over which persons are saved, and (3) some humans are in fact not saved. He argues that Lutherans in particular are likely to find this inconsistent triad especially difficult because there are confessional statements that seem to commit them to the truth of all three claims. He argues, moreover, that simple appeals to mystery are inadequate for several reasons: the inconsistency pertains to a central aspect of Christian faith, it leaves the believer without any logical way to reconcile the content of his or her belief or to understand the key claims to which he or she assents, and it creates a steep divide between the believer and God.

In "A Theological Three-Body Problem," Olli-Pekka Vainio considers a similar difficulty for Lutherans. Vainio points to a kind of three-way tension, a "three-body problem," at the heart of Christian belief. Insofar as one resists theological determinism, one risks falling into a kind of Pelagianism, or vice versa. In order to avoid being pushed too far in either of those directions, one can retreat into a kind of mysterianism, but, by doing so, one risks falling into a kind of anti-realism concerning key theological claims.

The final two selections concern Christ's freedom. Jesus Christ, the incarnate Son of God, was in fact sinless. But could he have sinned? Was sinning a live option, a genuine possibility for him? Both authors aim to preserve some sense in which Christ could have sinned, even if he never did. In "Another Look at the Final Temptation of Christ," David Worsley argues that the key to understanding Christ's freedom is to take a closer look at the sort of freedom involved in the first fall, that is, the fall of Satan. In the first moment of his existence, Satan, an angel created good by a perfectly benevolent creator, with a fully functional and operative intellect and will, chose to rebel against God and was thus cast into hell for all eternity. But how could a creature created good by a perfectly benevolent creator—with a fully functional and operative intellect and will—freely, rationally, and responsibly choose to go against its own creator, given what it knows about God and God's plan for creation? In short, Worsley's proposal is that the first sin is a result of impatience: Satan desires perfect, beatific knowledge of God (a knowledge that he lacks in that first moment) but is unwilling to wait to receive that knowledge from God at the proper time and in the proper manner. In a similar way, the incarnate Christ, in his human nature, desires to maintain his own perfect, beatific knowledge of the Father (a knowledge that he possesses

throughout), and is reluctant to give that up. Now, one understanding of Christ's suffering on the cross is that part of that suffering includes a kind of brief separation from the Father, a temporary loss of access to that intimate knowledge of the Father that he had enjoyed throughout his life. If this account is correct, then it was possible for the incarnate Christ to disobey the Father and reject his own suffering and death on the cross out of his desire to maintain that knowledge, even though, in fact, Christ successfully resisted this temptation and carried out his Father's will.

In his "The Impeccable Freedom of Christ," Johannes Grössl argues that Christ could have sinned in at least this sense: In his human nature he possessed the requisite power to sin, or the capacity to develop such a power. This power in Christ's human nature, or the capacity to develop this power, was never actualized because, as God, he ensured that he was never placed in any of the circumstances that would enable that power or that capacity's actualization, but, counterfactually, had that human nature been placed in such circumstances, Christ would have had the genuine possibility of sinning.

As should be clear from my summary above, the volume covers a wide array of important topics: from divine freedom to human freedom to Christ's freedom. I was pleased to see even a brief reference to Mary's freedom in the final selection, a topic that I think has been insufficiently appreciated and insufficiently explored. The only major topic that I can think of that is not addressed somewhere in the volume is the issue of prophecy: How can I be free in the sense of having genuine alternative possibilities if someone else bound by time (another human being or the human nature of Christ) knows precisely what I will do? While the issue of divine omniscience and human freedom is covered in several pieces, the additional wrinkles introduced by the case of human prophecy are never mentioned.

A notable virtue of the volume is that all of the major perspectives on free will are represented: leeway libertarianism, sourcehood libertarianism, various forms of compatibilism, and even free-will skepticism. A variety of theological perspectives are also represented (Catholic, Reformed, and Lutheran, among others), though there is, as is not uncommon for volumes of this sort, a heavy emphasis on Christian theological perspectives, often to the neglect of those from other religious traditions.

It was also exciting to see the authors approach these issues from several different disciplines and subdisciplines. Here we see insights not only from the philosophy of religion and philosophical theology, but also metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, social/political philosophy, experimental philosophy, and even the social sciences. It was especially welcome to see some of the essays reflect the recent "social turn" in metaphysics and epistemology.

The essays in the volume come in at varying lengths. Some of them are long and detailed, offering a slow and sustained argument, while others are brief and suggestive. On occasion, I found the shorter pieces lacking in some important details or development. In replying to Couenhoven, for example, Timpe often resorts to pointing the reader to arguments fleshed out in more detail in his other works (which, I should add, is not entirely unfair, since anyone working on these issues is bound to be already familiar with Timpe's exemplary contributions). And in the Rooney piece, the author's descriptions of Molinist and Banezian approaches to reconciling God's providential care over creation and human freedom are extremely brief, even cursory. Someone not already familiar with these schools of thought is bound to find his very quick discussion hard to follow (which, once again, is not entirely unfair, since anyone looking for an analysis and assessment of Grant's model is probably already familiar with its main competitors).

The essays in this volume are at their best when they take a step back to consider larger methodological issues. How ought we to proceed when we find ourselves faced with an apparent conflict between some particular theological claim and our own philosophical conclusions concerning the nature and scope of human free will? A great example of this can be found in the second half of Timpe's essay, when he discusses some candidate principles for resolving cases of apparent conflict between what Christians have traditionally held or what official conciliar documents have stated, and our own present-day philosophical or theological determinations. I found myself wanting to see a bit more of this sort of methodological reflection in the second half of the volume, especially in the essays included in part 3. Why should we want it to be true of Christ that he in some sense could have sinned, even though he in fact did not? Is it because his inability to do otherwise would make him less worthy of worship or his sacrifice less worthy of awe and admiration? Is it because understanding Christ as acting freely despite his inability to sin would somehow undermine the need for us to have alternative possibilities whenever we freely act? Or is it because we have been taught or told by some authoritative source that Christ acted freely in precisely this way? How we answer these questions will determine what sort of urgency, if any, there is to find a solution to this apparent problem concerning Christ's freedom. Looking back on a few of the earlier essays, while reading the Yoney piece, I found myself wondering: Why should we place any stock in a semantic case for a substantive metaphysical view? And with respect to the Kittle piece, I was struck by how little discussion there is about why, when faced with an apparent conflict between some metaphysical or theological view concerning free will and recent empirical studies, we should hold fixed the controversial results of those studies and adapt the former to better line up with them.

These problems notwithstanding, there is a lot to like about this volume. I think that the essays will be read and cited by scholars working in these areas. I also think that others looking to become more acquainted with contemporary perspectives on free will from some of the best analytic theologians currently working in the field will find what they seek. Overall, this is a great volume, and I look forward to seeing more volumes like it in the future.