

The Subjective Necessity of Nonviolence

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WHILE IT'S THE FIRST TIME JEFF TURNER—my partner for almost thirty years—has been in this room, it's not my first time. I've been here before, many times, and over several decades. You see, I started—but could not have brought off without the invaluable assistance of my co-director Janet Miller—the JCT-associated conferences (*JCT* a journal I also started but could not have brought off without Janet Miller, who served as Managing Editor). The first of these meetings was held at the Airlie House in Warrenton, Virginia, that location thanks to University of Virginia Professor Charles W. Beegle, a student of Paul Klohr, as is Janet Miller and Tom Poetter's mentor at Indiana University, Norm Overly. The year was 1978. Bill Schubert might have been there. James B. Macdonald was. At those first meetings, our conference wasn't large enough to occupy the entire place; maybe our second year there we learned that we were sharing the place with the CIA, a fact that prompted us to move the meeting. I think it was through University of Dayton Professor Joseph Watras that Paul Klohr learned of the Bergamo Center, as you know associated with the Catholic Church, not the CIA but another institution not all progressive people appreciate. Paul and I drove here in 1981—I was still teaching at the University of Rochester, where I'd met Janet Miller—and we decided it will do. The first conference was held here in 1982, the name JCT conference soon replaced by the Bergamo Conference (informally only, as the conference site director discouraged us from officially adopting the name).

Tonight, here, in this room where I've been so many times before, I am responding to the call of nonviolence, a call Hongyu Wang heard first and resounded to the rest of us in curriculum studies. What I'm presenting tonight is a course of study juxtaposing—a term Janet Miller brought to my attention, one also developed by Teresa Strong-Wilson—a series of fragments, a term Tom Poetter (2025) employs in his moving new book titled *Curriculum Fragments*. A literary-philosophical term, fragment is also a scientific, specifically geological term, as geologists reconstruct the past by “using mere fragments to tell a larger story” (Schulz, 2024). If you'd like a glimpse into Tom's curriculum fragments—before asking your university library to purchase a copy—go to www.curriculumstudies.ca—scroll down the table of contents on the left, click on our YouTube channel, and there—among other offerings—you'll find the book launches I've hosted, among them Tom's, but also others, including the launch of James Burns' (2023) important new book—*Curriculum and the Problem of Violence: Biopolitics, Truth, History and Fascism*—and

Hongyu Wang's 2021 *Contemporary Daoism, Organic Relationality, and Curriculum of Integrative Creativity*. Other curriculum studies texts I'd like to acknowledge as influential are Hongyu Wang's (2024) *Awakenings to the Calling of Nonviolence in Curriculum Studies* (preceded by her 2014 book *Nonviolence and Education: Cross-Cultural Pathways*), James P. Burns' (2023) aforementioned *Curriculum and the Problem of Violence*, Christopher Cruz's (2024) *Curriculum as Confession*, Molly Quinn's (2014) *Peace and Pedagogy*, and Kathy Bickmore's (2025) forthcoming collection *Constructive Conflict Pedagogies for Building Democratic Peace: Teaching Strategies from Around the World*. On Bickmore's (2024) essay "Schooling for Building Just Peace: Comparative and Canadian Perspectives on Facing Difference, Conflict, and Violence in Education"—which appeared in recently released *Curriculum Studies in Canada: Present Preoccupations*—I will comment now, fragment #1, a fragment telling a "larger story."

Fragment #1 Teaching Peace

Despite Canadian commitments to peace, pluralism and multiculturalism, Bickmore (2024) points out that Canadian schools are also shaped by their parent "patriarchal settler state" (p. 42). That painful paradox preoccupies Bickmore; she has focused her curriculum research on "persistent violence, disproportionately affecting marginalized people" (p. 42). She wonders how the curriculum might address "violence and social justice conflicts" (p. 42), thereby enacting those very commitments to peace and pluralism to which Canadians declare allegiance. Such a curriculum of conflict encourages the "continuing expression of difference" (p. 42), as well as ongoing study of "un-peace" (p. 42). Bickmore asserts that violence is "*not* inevitable" (p. 42), that "its underlying conflictual causes can be satisfied, redirected, ended, or mended" (p. 42), that nonviolence can, in fact, be taught. (So did Freud, by the way, although not as confidently as Bickmore.) She shows that "meaningful peacebuilding education" (p. 42), while "challenging," is nonetheless "possible in public schools" (p. 42).

How, you ask? "Peacebuilding," Bickmore (2024) explains, "involves multidimensional ongoing efforts" to "transform" the causes of conflict, then "to redress and repair their disproportionate harm to the most vulnerable" (p. 44). That occurs by "helping students to acquire language, concepts, skills, and relationships for recognizing, communicating, and deliberating about the cultural and social-structural causes and consequences of destructive conflicts, and about what people can do collectively about these problems," in so doing demonstrating that the school curriculum can support "youths' development of agency for transformative peacebuilding" (p. 45). What undermines peacebuilding is that the "curriculum tends to be skewed by unjust social structures and oppressive cultural beliefs and practices," often shifting "responsibilities for achieving just peace onto individuals, instead of enabling and inspiring them to probe social-structural, cultural and political factors that constrain as well as enable their agency" (pp. 45-46). (As we'll see, Judith Butler also demotes the role of the individual in nonviolence.) Despite the omnipresence of injustice, Bickmore (2024) remains "guardedly optimistic" that the curriculum "*can* help more young people, more of the time, to develop capabilities and motivating relationships for handling complex contemporary justice conflicts" (p. 46). In fact, when "multiple dimensions of conflicts and potential peacebuilding action options" are included in the curriculum, when "teachers find ways to listen and to support their self-expression and action roles," the

curriculum can create “space for young people to develop hope and capabilities, to build just peace in their own and others’ lives” (p. 46). Building just peace in her own and others’ lives was primary among Jane Addams’ achievements, for which she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1931.

Fragment #2 Conviction and Emotion

I take my title from Jane Addams’ “The Subjective Necessity for Social Settlements,” published in 1893,¹ an essay in which Addams explains that that her social settlement—Hull House,² in Chicago—was an “effort to add the social function to democracy,” an effort that rested “on the theory that the dependence of classes on each other is reciprocal” (Lasch, 1965, p. 29). Addams tells us the title refers to her analysis of the “motives which underlie a movement based not only upon conviction, but genuine emotion”³ (p. 29). She parcels her motives into three, the first being the

desire to make the entire social organism democratic, to extend democracy beyond its political expression; the second is the impulse to share the race life, and to bring as much as possible of social energy and the accumulation of civilization to those portions of the race which have little; the third springs from a certain renaissance of Christianity, a movement toward its early humanitarian aspects.⁴ (p. 29)

“Race” here means the human race (or species), “social organism” implies that society is alive and, despite political, class, and ethnic divisions, is one entity; “civilization” implies the centrality of reason in the expression of emotion, and that “certain renaissance of Christianity” seems less doctrinal than communitarian in its insistence on the equality of human beings.⁵

In contemporary America, at least among left and left-leaning academicians, talk of Christ connotes not left-wing but right-wing political activism, and specifically Christian Nationalism,⁶ a topic James Burns (2025) discusses in his new book. But recall that Christ has also been cast, even in America, as a left-wing internationalist, including in curriculum studies, in that sector of scholarship—understanding curriculum as theological text—we outlined in *Understanding Curriculum* (Pinar, 1995), a sector influenced by Liberation Theology as well as progressive Jewish thought and activism. I think of Pasolini’s portraiture of Jesus as social revolutionary in his 1964 film. Obviously, Addams had access to none of that but there was in her time a progressive pulse to Christianity, even some association with progressivism, even socialism (Handy, 2009). That progressive pulse—what Addams’ affirms as “social service”—led her to also pen “The Objective Value of a Social Settlement.” Here, however, I focus on subjective necessity, not of social settlements but of nonviolence, itself also with “objective value,” as the “problem of violence”⁷—as Burns (2023) puts it—plagues us all. It was racial violence that prompted Bayard Rustin’s affirmation of nonviolence, the focus of fragment 3.

Fragment #3 Nonviolence as a Political Strategy

Rustin merits a central place in the “national memory,” John D’Emilio (2003) asserts; he was a “key figure of his time” and, “more than anyone else, Rustin brought the message and

methods of Gandhi to the United States”⁸ (p. 1). Indeed, it was Rustin who “insinuated nonviolence into the heart of the black freedom struggle,” convinced that “violence could never bring justice and that war could never bring peace” (pp. 1-2). An “internationalist long before *globalization* became a catchword in American life,” Rustin knew that “ordinary individuals could make a vast difference in the world, and he communicated this conviction widely” (p. 2). If Rustin is insufficiently recognized today—although there is Netflix documentary—it is, D’Emilio suspects, it is “because he was a gay man in an era when the stigma attached to this was unrelieved” (p. 2).

D’Emilio (2003) deems Rustin the “perfect mentor” for Martin Luther King, Jr., Rustin a subjective synthesis of Quaker, Gandhian, and Marxist perspectives that was “unusual, if not unique,” enabling Rustin to become a “radical strategist able to combine vision, values, and program” (p. 2). Rustin’s “mark”—on both the Montgomery, Alabama, bus boycott (when and where he first met King) as a nationally significant event, and on the evolution of King as the nation’s foremost leader of nonviolent civil rights struggle—was “profound,” D’Emilio concluding that “Rustin was responsible” for installing “nonviolence into the very heart of what became the most powerful social movement in twentieth-century America” (p. 237). But, D’Emilio adds, discerning that contribution isn’t easy, as—despite being assertive in private—Rustin worked to erase himself in public, an ongoing effort he made in part due to his “Quaker” and “Gandhian modesty,” but also due to his arrests—perhaps most prominently in Pasadena, California—for acting out his homosexual desire (p. 237). This self-concealment was not only self-focused but also conveyed his concern that his legal record might jeopardize the moment to which he had dedicated his life. In King’s subsequent account of the Montgomery boycott, Rustin received no mention, and other accounts accord him only a marginal role (p. 237).

The truth is that King came to rely on Rustin almost at once, Rustin recalling that “my presence there was incommensurate and stimulating to Martin. I think he totally depended on me, not that I was always right, but I would tell him the truth” (as quoted in D’Emilio, 2003, p. 238). Rustin and King met secretly in Birmingham concerning the financial support that boycott required and, specifically regarding what funds those in the North might donate (p. 238). King, Rustin remembered, asked about nonviolent resistance, wondering what strategies might maintain the vibrancy of the protest (pp. 238-239). King also required a ghostwriter, since the protests left him no time for writing (p. 239). Rustin went to work right away, starting an article while in Alabama, finishing it the day he returned to New York, mailing it that same day to King. As he acted, so he wrote; sounding like Alain Locke,⁹ Rustin wrote that the boycotts announced the arrival of a “new Negro” with a “revolutionary change in the Negro’s evaluation of himself” and a heightened consciousness that “economics is part of our struggle” and, finally, that the protestors were employing “a new and powerful weapon—nonviolent resistance” (as quoted in D’Emilio, 2003, p. 239). He reassured King that he had accented the “moral aspects” of the protest, then he asked permission to publish the piece under King’s name in the April issue of *Liberation*; it was King’s first publication (p. 239). D’Emilio points out that King’s acceptance of Rustin’s writing implies his “trust” of Rustin, of Rustin’s ability to characterize King’s crusade in terms that the “novice activist felt able to embrace” (p. 239).

Rustin is most remembered as the organizer of the 1963 March on Washington, assembling 250,000 protestors (p. 354). As you know, King closed his address with an image of all Americans joining hands together, singing, in the words of an old spiritual: “Free at last! Free at last! Thank God Almighty, we are free at last” (as quoted in D’Emilio, 2003, p. 356). Rustin remembered “electricity in the air. Everyone who was there knew that the event was a landmark ... one of the

great days in American history” (as quoted in D’Emilio, p. 357) and, D’Emilio adds, “perhaps the greatest of his life” (p. 357).

Fragment #4 Interdependency

That Rustin brought off—with the help of many others—“one of the great days in American history”—is my segue to fragment #4, interdependency, a term Judith Butler (2021) invokes as affirming the social necessity of nonviolence, its social necessity for me implied in its subjective necessity. Butler emphasizes that “one self is implicated in another self,” rendering nonviolence an acknowledgement of that “prior social relatedness” (p. 9). Pinpointing “individualism” as the culprit, she critiques the concept, as nonviolence cannot, she insists, be “predicated” on individualism (p. 9). Even this defender of the individual wouldn’t want to *predicate* nonviolence upon any asocial conception; neither nonviolence nor the concept of the individual is asocial.

Butler (2021) doesn’t see the individual as asocial either, noting that “if” one is “constituted” through one’s relationships with others, then “part” of self-preservation implies preservation of “social ties that define the self and its world” (p. 9). Here Butler is admitting the social ties aren’t always let’s say supportive, not even in peace time, certainly not during times of (as Bickmore puts it) “unpeace,” admitting that “relationality is not by itself a good thing, a sign of connectedness, an ethical norm to be posited over and against destruction: rather, relationality is a vexed and ambivalent field in which the question of ethical obligation has to be worked out in light of a persistent and constitutive destructive potential” (p. 10). She continues by adding that ethical action is “never exclusively reflexive,” meaning that it could never be reliant upon the self-self relation “alone” (p. 10). That’s self-evident, as the situation—often if not always involving others, human and non-human—has embedded within it oneself. While obviously not dependent only on one’s relationship with oneself, ethical action is also obviously dependent on the self-self relation: for example, childhood abuse can become internalized, becoming self-abuse (Cikanavicius, 2017) and the abuse of others (Lansford et al., 2009).

Butler (2021) considers interdependency a “condition” of “equality” (p. 47), an ideal without which she thinks nonviolence becomes unintelligible. (Recall Rustin’s invocation of nonviolence in service to equality, at first racial then late in his life to gender equality.) Emphasizing equality’s “relational” nature, acknowledging that our relationality can also be the source of its self-destruction (p. 62), —an admission reminding me of Sartre’s quip “hell is other people” (Binder, 2023) and Freud’s pessimism concerning the control of human aggression, which Butler herself discusses later in the book—Butler again worries we overlook our interdependency and the vulnerability it installs if we dwell on nonviolence as an “individual mode of life” (p. 61).

Toward the end of the book, Butler (2021) reaffirms her vows, insisting that “vulnerability” is no “attribute” of the human subject, but instead a “feature” of “social relations,” although that abstraction she quickly genders, suggesting that skepticism toward nonviolence and its devaluation as only “passive” derives from another dualism, i.e. construing femininity as passive, masculinity as active (p. 201). Whether gendered or not, declining to act is not necessarily “doing nothing” (p. 202) Butler observes, and there times when simply surviving is sufficient (p. 201). Butler concludes as she began, calling for a “new imaginary,” one that affirms our “interdependency” (p. 203). In my view, a curriculum emphasizing dependency, interdependency, and the nonviolence

these require, would be a social psychoanalytic one (Kincheloe & Pinar, 1991), cultivating reasoned interpretations informed by evidence, argument, and imagination, an effort to free us from the ongoing trauma of human history. Let's look to history for a precedent supporting an intrapsychic strategy for affirming nonviolence.

Fragment #5 Detachment

The historical precedent I have in mind is unfashionably Western, even British, in fact Victorian. What Amanda Anderson (2001) terms the “powers of distance” communicates the considerable benefits of distancing oneself from the norms and conventions that characterize the common sense of any era (p. 5), although, as with the Victorians (the subject of Anderson’s study), there can be “ambivalence and uncertainty about the significance and consequences of such practices” (p. 3). She uses “distance” interchangeably with “detachment,” the latter term “meant to encompass not only science, critical reason, disinterestedness, and realism, but also a set of practices of the self, ranging from stoicism to cosmopolitanism to dandyism” (p. 7). (Yes, she has Oscar Wilde in mind.) Anderson acknowledges that “detachment takes many different forms, and produces many different effects,” including “harmful” ones, but she defends the “progressive potentiality of those modern practices that aim to objectify facets of human existence so to better understand, criticize, and at times transform them,” a practice, she reminds, that “marks the project of the Enlightenment and its legacy” (pp. 5-6). The “promises and dangers of distance,” she notes, “were understood as practices having an intimate and profound bearing on moral character,” the past tense because Anderson is studying the Victorian preoccupation with detachment (p. 9), an era now often denounced but, as her study underlines, still with powerful potential for the “cultivation of character, both drawing on and transforming the tradition of *Bildung*” (p. 6), and—I would add—*currere* (Pinar, 2011).

In affinity with concepts and traditions from which Wang works—*ubuntu*, Buddhist nonduality, and Taoist *yin-yang* dynamics (Wang, 2024)—Victorian conceptions on cosmopolitanism included “reflective distance from one’s original or primary cultural affiliations, a broad understanding of other cultures and customs, and a belief in universal humanity” (Anderson, 2001, p. 63). Anderson notes that the “relative weight assigned to these three constitutive elements can vary, as can the forms of identification against which ‘reflective distance’ is defined” (pp. 63-64). In antiquity, for instance, in the early elaboration of cosmopolitanism by the Cynics and the Stoics, “cosmopolitan detachment” challenged confined perspectives and affirmed the perspective of the polis” (p. 64). During the Enlightenment, detachment was defined against the narrow allegiances of religion, class, and even the state (p. 64). It could include “both intellectual and ethical dimensions, with a prominent emphasis on the practice of self-cultivation” (p. 64). Not until the nineteenth century did cosmopolitan detachment become defined in relation to nationalism, although even then still conveyed the “ethos” associated with the Enlightenment (p. 64).

Of course we in the West must confront the past—including legacies of imperialism, colonialism, genocide—but it’s also true that these hardly confined to the West, no exoneration but a reminder that the human capacity to become inhuman has not been segregated in one place, in no one (no matter how very long) time, among only one people or sets of peoples. “Western Civilization”—like Mac Sweeney (2023), I capitalise the term to indicate that “it is an invented

abstract category, rather than a neutral descriptive term” (p. ix)—can also inform our understanding of nonviolence, specifically late Victorian conceptions of detachment.

Fragment #6 Sisyphus

I close this fragmentary course of study with Camus’ (2018/1955) consideration of Sisyphus, a myth that for Camus constitutes a call to life midst death, Camus writing the essay in 1940, Europe then submerged in the deadliest conflict humanity has ever undertaken (The National WWII Museum New Orleans). In contrast to Einstein’s exchange with Freud, Camus ponders not world peace, ending aggression against others, but self-directed violence, the question of suicide (p. 3). This resounds in curriculum studies as the problem of being between hope and despair, first formulated by Roger Simon, that third in-between space being—I suggest—one of resolve, yes a form of synthesis (that final phase of the method of *currere*), but also a solidification of emotion, of what Jane Addams called conviction, the idea with which I started. No “solidification” or “conviction” for Camus; he is focused on the “worm” in the human “heart” (p. 5), suicide also a form of confession—recall Christopher Cruz’s (2024) conception of curriculum as confession—confession that life lacks “any profound meaning,” that there is no compensation for a daily life that can seem “insane,” Camus calling it “that daily agitation,” all topped off by the pointlessness of “suffering” (p. 5).

Understanding, Camus suggests—sounding phenomenological—is “not a matter of explaining and solving, but of experiencing and describing” (p. 94), but surely understanding involves all four. Where we concur occurs in his next sentence: “Everything begins with lucid indifference” (p. 94). Detachment, distance, non-attachment, indifference: each of these overlapping concepts implies non-coincidence with reality—what Camus terms “intelligence’s refusal to reason the concrete” (p. 97)—in which the “I” registers what happens. The “concrete” may resist reason, but it welcomes the senses; the abstract in abeyance allows the “triumph of the carnal” (p. 97), for me not only an affirmation of aspects of nineteenth-century (and not only French) decadentism, not only a repudiation of modernity but to my mind a political project, an anti-racist shattering of racist subjectivity. “Today,” Camus writes, “when thought has ceased to lay claim to the universal, when its best history would be that of its repentances, we know that the system, when it is worthwhile, cannot be separated from its author” (p. 100). We are of course interdependent—as Butler (2021) emphasizes—and yes, the individual can be considered a singularization of the universal, but neither insight refutes the fact that human reality is thought, in some sense even authored, by the libelously belittled individual. “Indeed,” Butler writes elsewhere, “thinking, like other solitary and even private activities (distinct from actions), takes place between me and myself or in dialogue with one other” (p. 227).

For Camus (2018/1955), the “purpose” of being “human” is presence, to “maintain awareness,” requiring “discipline” as well as “patience” and “lucidity” (p. 115). Key is “creation,” for Camus the “staggering evidence of man’s sole dignity: the dogged revolt against his condition, perseverance in an effort considered sterile” (p. 115). In this course we can’t help but think of “revolt” against violence, “perseverance”—conviction for Jane Addams—and resolve for me, that makes our cause crystallize in thought and action, continuing against all odds, like Rustin, seeking peace and pleasure. Camus emphasizes the dailiness of our “effort,” that effort dependent upon

“self-mastery,” that following from and contributing to subjective coherence that enables lucidity, a “precise estimate of the limits of truth, measure, and strength,” an “*ascesis*” (p. 115).

Camus (2018/1955) reminds us that the gods had condemned Sisyphus to roll a rock up a mountainside to its summit, at which point it fall back down, no punishment more “dreadful” than such “futile” and “hopeless labor” (p. 119). You’ve probably guessed already that Sisyphus is Camus’ “absurd hero,” his “passion for life won him that unspeakable penalty in which the whole being is exerted toward accomplishing nothing” (p. 120). For Camus, “this is the price that must be paid for the passions of this earth” (p. 120). Apparently, Sisyphus can afford to pay, as “he is stronger than his rock,” his punishment at times bringing him “sorrow” but also “joy,” Camus concluding: “This world is not too much” (p. 121). Indeed: “One must imagine Sisyphus happy” (p. 123).

More than inner peace, happiness may be the ultimate form of nonviolence, and not only subjectively, as happiness can be contagious. Happiness transcends hope—and despair—somehow suturing the wound between humanity’s “basic absurdity” and “implacable nobility,” Camus’ two poles of the “human condition” (p. 127), for Camus meaning that once the absurdity of our all-too-human situation is “recognized, accepted,” that once we are “resigned to it,” the human condition “has ceased to be the absurd” (p. 135). Recognition and acceptance of, as well as resignation to, the ongoing metaphysical “revolution” that is our fate—these would seem to be (for Camus for sure) among the dynamics of hovering¹⁰ between hope and despair, a subjective state of detachment that encourages coherence, synthesis, even resolve, these registering a specific reconfiguration of the self that swerves toward nonviolence. Instead of being whipsawed between opposites, the self can be restructured to accommodate ambivalence, dwelling in-between, hovering on that Aokian bridge that is no conveyance but a suspension, connecting us to neither this nor that but to both/and, self-suspended—detached, distanced—from what it experiences through the calm that is the “I”—yes, a figure of speech but also the source, entrusted with the gift of (my, your) life, a gift to be preserved, calling us to affirm the subjectivity necessity of nonviolence. And that is the larger story these fragments tell. Thank you.

Notes

1. This and a second statement of her early settlement philosophy—“The Objective Value of the Social Settlement”—Addams articulated as two public addresses—at a conference in Plymouth, Massachusetts, in the summer of 1892, statements “so effective,” Brown (2004) reports, that “these two speeches, and the published articles they quickly became, that they have acquired iconic status, frozen in time as Jane Addams’s signature statement, quoted as though she never revised her thinking beyond the age of thirty-two. While, in truth, she was revising her thinking even as she delivered the speeches, they still serve as eloquent samples of the ideas and prose she had been rehearsing in Chicago gatherings since 1890” (p. 263).
2. <https://www.nps.gov/places/hull-house.htm> Elshtain (2002) explains: “Hull-House had been up and running for three years when Jane Addams delivered what was destined to become a famous essay on ‘The Subjective Necessity for Social Settlements.’ This paper and its twin, ‘The Objective Value of a Social Settlement,’ provide a strong sense of Addams’s passionate commitment, her ability to analyze social conditions critically, and her recognition that in hard, constructive work lay not only her salvation but that of many other educated young women.... Building a democratic culture was the heart of the matter” (p. 94). That resonates with Dewey’s *Democracy and Education*—published more than two decades later. Seigfried (1996) sees Hull House as “not so much an example of Dewey’s theory of education, as it was already exemplary of what Dewey sought to theorize” (p. 74).
3. Ibid. For Addams, “conviction”—an expression of ethics—derived from experience. Knight (2005, 330) explains: “In ‘Subjective Necessity’ she had embraced experience as a positive teacher in a practical way. Here she was allowing experience to shape her ethics.” Seigfried (1996) notes: “For pragmatists, however, experience is not

simply uncritically reproduced; it is interrogated as to its value for a richer, fuller, more expansive life” (p. 57). So, there seems a voluntary even willful aspect to what otherwise would seem determined by need, i.e. “necessity.” For Lasch (1965), “[i]t was her awareness of the complexity of her own motives that saved her from the reformer’s habitual self-righteousness” (xviii).

4. Ibid. Brown (2004) tells us that Addams’ “most familiar theme—young people’s need to escape the deadening grasp of luxury—was incorporated here as the ‘humanitarian’ motive” (p. 264). For Elshtain (2002) “Addams’s ‘subjective necessity’ essay displays the American Social Gospel movement at its most attractive: full-throated, open-hearted, filled with hope about human and democratic prospects” (p. 97). Concerning the American Social Gospel movement, see: <http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/tserve/twenty/tkeyinfo/socgospel.htm>
5. “Inequality,” John Galtung theorized, is “one of the major forms of *structural violence*” (as quoted in Barash 2000, p. 43).
6. Christianity is hardly the only religion that has been harnessed to nationalism. Zionism – as enacted in Netanyahu’s genocidal war in Gaza (Neier, 2024, p. 9) – and Hinduism - as yoked to the BJP, the political arm of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a paramilitary Hindu cultural organization founded in 1925 that has campaigned for “Hindu unity, expressing admiration for the national unity model advanced by fascism and Nazism” (Prakash 2024, p. 49). Even “Daoist personhood is vulnerable to being subsumed by hierarchical systems as Chinese history as demonstrated,” as Wang (2021, p. 117) acknowledges.
7. Burns’s book “does not prescribe a curriculum of non-violence,” its intent being the enabling educators to “better understand violence and non-violence” (2023, 5).
8. D’Emilio 2003, 1. It is on D’Emilio’s text I will rely.
9. See 1997 (1925). Stewart (2018, 451) points out that “Locke did not envision the Negro Renaissance as exclusively Black.... In that sense, African American renaissance would not reproduce the error of American racism but would evolve to its fullest potential if it was transracial and transnational.” Rustin’s commitments were likewise “transracial and transnational.”
10. For Robert Musil (Peters, 1978), humanity hovers between reason and religion (or mysticism), the synthesis of which Musil termed "*das rechte Leben*," the creative or right life; in fact, Musil regarded the "synthesis of reason and mysticism had to be regarded as the most urgent task facing mankind in the twentieth century" (p. 12).

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