

Freedom of Expression and the Enigma of State Authoritarianism in Turkmenistan: A Historical Appraisal of Saparmurat Niazov's Policies

Dr. Hina Khan

Abstract

Since the independence of Central Asia in 1991, the five Soviet successor states in the region have been grappling with the birth pangs of a pre-mature liberal democracy and the death pangs of a seventy-four-years old authoritarian system. The result is a centralized authoritarianism under the veneer of a superficially democratic edifice. Among the five Central Asian states Turkmenistan has stood out in dictatorial rule of particularly under the personality cult of the Turkmenbashi –the father of Turkmens, President Saparmurat Niazov. Among other victims the media and the freedom of expression seems to be a permanent casualty. In this context, this paper attempts to explore the situation of media control in Turkmenistan particularly during Niazov's era and its impacts on the perpetuation of authoritarianism in the region.

Keywords: Central Asia, Turkmenistan, freedom of expression, media, press, Saparmurat Niyazov, *Turkmenbashi*, liberal democracy and authoritarianism

Freedom of Expression and the Enigma of State Authoritarianism in Turkmenistan: A Historical Appraisal of Saparmurat Niyazov's Policies



Independence of Central Asia in 1991 has been rather a non-event as the incumbent Communist leadership continued in offices in all the five regional states. The Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), the western Central Asian state in the east of the Caspian Sea also witnessed a dull and rather shocked reception to independence which had come as a result of the unexpected breakup of the Soviet Union. In fact the Turkmen capital Ashgabat had been the venue of a somber meeting of the leaders of the five Central Asian states held on 12 December, 1991 to discuss the possible course of action after the trauma of Soviet breakup. (Rashid, 1994, pp. 2-5)

<https://oblates.ie/first-priest-from-turkmenistan-ordained/turkmenistan-map/>

The five leaders declared their willingness to join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) formed a few days ago by Russia, Byelorussia and Ukraine. The host, Saparmurat Niyazov the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Turkmen SSR was as confused as the

others. But the freedom had come though without a struggle, and had to be sustained. Just like the other four leaders of Central Asia, Niyazov switched his role from the Communist leader to the so-called liberal democratic President of the newly independent state of Turkmenistan. To Niyazov it was a freedom for himself, not his nation.

While the mood in Central Asia was somber, there was euphoria across the world. The hydro-carbon rich Muslim states were now out of the Soviet yoke, entering the ‘free world’ of liberal democracy. But the liberal democracy ala’ Fukuyama had no seeds in the region and the leaders of the region were not programmed for it. Hence, new constitutions drafted, Communist machinery dismantled, parties converted from ‘Communist’ to ‘Nationalist’, or ‘Democratic’, and elections held without even a semblance of the basic requirements of democracy. Fundamental rights, and basic freedoms remained absent from the scene. Under such circumstances, the freedom of expression was the first casualty. Criticism of governments’ policies was a crime – questioning the leadership, a sin.

In this backdrop, the present study aims to explore the extent of violation of freedom of expression with particular reference to media in Turkmenistan, one of the most suppressive states in the world particularly focusing on the tenure of its first president – Saparmurat Niyazov (1991-2006). It highlights the state’s tools and methods of media control with its historical background and the impact of this policy on the country and the region at large. For this purpose the paper is divided into three main sections: First, tends to develop a conceptual understanding of the four normative theories of Mass Communications which can be helpful in the study of state-media-society nexus in the case of Central Asia in general and Turkmenistan in particular; Second section an overview of the historical patterns of this nexus, especially the suppression of expression in Turkmenistan with a focus on the dictatorial rule of the late President Niyazov; The third section discusses the impacts of the missing freedom on Turkmenistan

under Niyazov and his successor regime. The paper has been completed with the help of reports from Reporters without Borders, Freedom House, and Institute for War and Peace Reporting Central Asia as well as personal correspondence of the Author with some civil society persons working in the region.

Section 1:

Freedom of Expression and the four envisaged roles of media – Towards a conceptual understanding

“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers”.

(Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN General Assembly Resolution 217, 1948)

Since the adoption of the above declaration, freedom of expression remained a dream for a large part of the world. Violations abounded and still abound. Discourses on Human Rights, International Relations and the Mass Communications continuously focused on the significance of this fundamental freedom with especial reference to the behavior of state. The realists tried to assert the prerogatives of the state to adjust the controls over freedom of expression and media according to the national interest and the exigencies of the situation (Balkin, 1990); the liberals strove to support the cause of free media (Gerhardt, 1992). On the other hand, the discourse on Mass Communications developed four basic normative theories in order to explain the states’ orientation and their behavior and policies regarding the freedom of expression. These theories assert that the media in any country is directly affected by the socio-political conditions under which it operates (Siebert, Peterson, & Schramm, Four Theories of the Press - The Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social Responsibility and

Soviet Communist Concepts of What the Press should be and do, 1963). Each one of these theories tends to explain the degree of state controls over media under various ideological influences and their impact on the concerned society as briefed below:

- 1. Authoritarianism Theory:** Under an authoritarian regime the state exercises complete control over media which is primarily state-owned though a small section of private media may exist under strict state monitoring. Tracing the origin of the theory to the post-Renaissance rise of absolute monarchies in Europe, Siebert (1963) highlights the absolutist idea that the 'truth' was a product of a limited group of 'wise men' who, by virtue of their positions owe the responsibility to guide the masses. Hence, only few reliable private press enterprises were given the license of publication under extremely strict conditions. Instantiated with thinkers from Plato to Hegel to the twentieth century fascist leaders such as Mussolini and Hitler, the concept of authoritarian control of media is viewed in the light of the realist obsession with 'national interest' and 'national security' which justifies all such controls (Siebert, *The Authoritarian Theory of the Press*, 1963) Likewise, when the tools of regulation, registration, licensing and censorship prove insufficient to control dissenting voices, extremely serious charges of treason and sedition were (and are) brought in by the authoritarian regimes to eliminate them and make them an example for the others.
- 2. Libertarian Theory:** The eighteenth century Enlightenment turned the tide of Western thought in favor of rationalism, democracy and natural rights of individuals. This led to the 'Libertarian' school of journalism which asserted the importance of free press. The idea dwelled on the enlightenment thinking that humans are rational beings and hence can differentiate between the true and false, good and evil. In this way the media as a platform for all types of ideas and information should be allowed to choose its own

path. This idea was further developed in the twentieth century when the world was divided into three poles: the so-called 'free world' of the 'capitalist west'; the 'totalitarianism' of the 'socialist east': and the 'underdeveloped south' (Clifford, Glasser, McQuail, Nordenstreng, & White, 2009, p. 4) Primarily hailed and adopted in the western democracies, this theory formed the cornerstone of the neo-liberal philosophy. Private ownership of media houses became a norm and the role of the state diminished. Media was hailed as the 'fourth pillar' of the state which works as a bridge between the government and the citizens and hence deserves complete freedom from state's tutelage.

3. **Social Responsibility Theory:** However, a parallel approach was popularized since the constitution of the 'Hutchins Commission on the Freedom of Press' during the Second World War. The Report of the Commission published in 1947 with the title, 'A Free and Responsible Press – A General Report on Mass Communications...' (Freedom of the Press, 1947). The report argued that the press owes a responsibility to the society and hence rather taking a laissez faire path, it must self-discipline itself by providing a selective version of information cautious, 'trustworthy' and 'disinterested', yet upholding the freedom of diverse opinions. This theory brought the state and the media at the same level, making the journalist responsible to the state as well as the society. However, the critiques of this theory question the sincerity of independent media professionals in imposing a self-restraint regardless of the monetary gains accruable otherwise.
4. **Soviet Communist Theory:** The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia (1917) and the Maoist Revolution in China (1949) led to a totalitarian state-control over all sources of information and expression. To the socialists, media must

serve the interests of the ‘working class’ as envisaged by the ‘party of the proletariat’ i.e. the Communist Party apparatus. With the abolishment of all private property, privately-owned media also ended in the Communist states. A centralized monolithic society required centralized, monolithic media with the noble missions of indoctrination, motivation and mobilization of citizens to become a productive part of the state machinery. Further promoting the Communist ideas in other states also was included in the responsibilities of the Communist media. The ideas of the state or the Party were to be the ideas of the people and dissent meant subversion and hence must be duly purged.

The above-mentioned theories had been discussed, synthesized, criticized, (Nerone, 1995) during the last three decades. They have been reexamined according to new situations However; their relevance has not been rejected altogether.

As far as the situation of media in the Central Asian States is concerned the authoritarian and the Soviet Communist theories seem to work at different levels of state-media relations at different intervals of time. The region has always been under the authoritarian regimes. Be it the Mongol and Turkic khanates of medieval times or the Tsarist colonialism of eighteen and nineteenth centuries, the freedom of expression remained restricted. The Soviet reconquest of the region ushered the Communist approach of media controls. Just like the other parts of Soviet Union, the ‘Iron Curtain’ drew over the Muslim Central Asian regions previously called Turkestan.

In this context, the next section overviews the state-media-society relations with specific reference to Turkmenistan in the light of the above mentioned theories.

Section 2:

From authoritarianism to more authoritarianism – Press in chains in Turkmenistan

Before succumbing to the Tsarist Russian onslaught, the northern Turkmen region was divided between the Uzbek Khanates of Khiva and Bukhara while the southern part was dominated by the Persians. By the nineteenth century the Tsarist expansion in Central Asia was completed with the conquest of Geok Tepe region (1881) in modern Turkmenistan (Khan, 1996). Most of the Turkmen territory was integrated into the new Trans Caspian Province of Russia and the initiation of the Trans Caspian Railway line. Russian attempts to promote education remained limited though they catalyzed the local reform movements in the promotion of learning. The Russian colonialism brought introduction of modern press to the region. The late nineteenth century saw the flowering of modernist reform movements in the region with a boom in literary activities. Pamphlets and periodicals started to make an impact on the local Muslim population. While the modernist reform movement and literary activity initiated by the Muslim Tatars spread to various Muslim regions, Turkmen region remained rather aloof of this development. However, the mouthpiece of the Jadid Movement, *Tarjuman* did reach the region with a limited number of readers (Zenkovsky, 1967, pp. 30-32). The jadid movement soon led to political activism among the Russian Muslim. The first Muslim Congress was held in Nizhni Novogrod in 1905, which among other things also put forward the demand for a free press for the Russian Muslims (Zenkovsky, 1967, p. 41) It seems understandable that while the Tsarist colonialism was all authoritarian in exploitation of Central Asia, the distance from Moscow and the upheavals in the capital kept the Tsarist controls less effective particularly the Muslim press saw a full-fledged renaissance during the early years of the twentieth century.

Communist Tools of Press Control: Soviet Communist Theory in action

World War I and the subsequent Bolshevik Revolution (1917) further led to a reawakening in Central Asian regions some of which also tried to get themselves liberated from the Russian rule. However, within a few months almost all such regions were brought back to Russian control, this time under the Bolsheviks and the Red Army. From the beginning press and especially the newspapers were considered an essential means of communication as well as indoctrination and propaganda. Hence, in the service of the over-whelming Soviet State, the press evolved as a messenger of state doctrine, policies, and orders from the Politburo (the political bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Soviet Union – major decision making body of USSR), to the soviet citizens – central to the perpetuation of the Revolution. Several laws ensured unconditional conformation:

- 1917 – Decree on the Press – Government gained power to suppress or close any newspaper that was suspected of supporting anti-Revolutionary ideas or sections of people.
- 1918 – Revolutionary Tribunal of the Press was established further empowering the state with press censorship and rights to punish journalists and newspaper editors whose writings were considered ‘crime against the people’ (read the regime) Meanwhile all the literature produced before the Revolution or in a foreign country which gave ‘politically incorrect’ information was destroyed (Ermolaev, 1997). All Russia Telegraph Agency (ROSTA) was setup to control advertizing and news reporting.
- 1922 – The Soviet Censorship Agency (*Glavlit*) was established for the whole USSR. In the beginning anti-Revolutionary material was seized and destroyed but soon the organs of rival Socialist groups and individuals were also not spared.

- **Stalin (1924-53)** in his tenure banned even rival Socialists and their ideas from the press.
- 1925 – Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) was created according to the new Nationalities Policy. Media hailed the policy as the final resolution of the nationalities question in Soviet Union (Wimbush S. E., 1986).
- Media was directed to publish only the rosy picture of Soviet Union and its satisfied people. Even the news of natural disasters, accidents and suicides etc, was forbidden. Hence the news of cruel deportations of thousands of peoples from the Caucasus region during the World War II was forbidden and the world knew about them only by late fifties (Wimbush S. E., 1986)
- Similarly, the disastrous earthquake in Ashgabad (Turkmenistan's Capital) was suppressed. It was only revealed later that about two-thirds of the population of the unfortunate city and its surroundings had vanished in the disaster.
- Khrushchev (1953-64) while embarking upon a process of 'de-Stalinization' removed some of the restrictions from the Press. For instance, common people were at least allowed to express their ideas on 'non-political' matters in the letters to the editors. Some satirical cartoons were also allowed. However, the opening meant freedom to criticize common people in their slackness in performing their duties as assigned by the state.
- Brezhnev's era (1964-1982) witnessed the end of Khrushchev's policy of media liberalization and reverting back to strict controls. This policy continued until 1985 the beginning of Gorbachev era and the end of the Soviet Union.

- Gorbachev's *Glasnost* (openness) program made him popular in the west and unpopular at home. The policy of easing restrictions and opening up the Soviet society to the world, allowing more space to the press and other media, was in effect a 'slow tortoise crawling towards the freedom of speech' (Simonov, 1991). Nevertheless, the ruling elite of the Turkmen SSR showed no intention to adopt the Glasnost reforms. The Turkmen leader Annamurad Khodzhamuradov remained loyal to Gorbachev but never accepted the 'openness' ensued by the latter. The lessons in authoritarianism were too deeply learned to forget.

Post-independence Turkmenistan – Authoritarianism Theory in action

Just like the other Communist leaders of Central Asian SSRs, Saparmurat Niyazov led his state in the moment of Soviet breakup. Serving as the First Secretary of Communist Party of Turkmen SSR since 1885 Niyazov was fully indoctrinated in Communist centralism while the Turkmen Communist Party was considered one of the most steadfast and unreformed party organizations in USSR. In the March 1991 all-Union referendum, majority of Turkmens voted in favor of continuation of USSR. Only after the failed August Coup in Moscow (1991) which was supported by Niyazov as a last attempt to restore the old Union, the Turkmen Communist Party, in a shock started looking for other options. In October, 1991 Turkmenistan declared its independence from the already dissolving Soviet Union and the Communist Party apparatus dismantled itself. The members of the Party were re-ordered into the new Turkmenistan Democratic Party (TDP) In fact, the change amounted to a mere shift of the 'ideological cover from Socialism to the newly discovered Turkmen Nationalism' (Nissman, 1993, p. 384) June 1992 witnessed the first popular presidential elections with the sole candidate Niyazov elected to the post. Next year he assumed the title of *Turkmenbashi* – THE leader of all Turkmens. The personality cult had begun.

The strategic location of Turkmenistan and the fact that the country was virtually floating on oil and gas proved supportive of the authoritarian regime. While the west waited for a success of liberal democracy ala' Fukuyama, the immediate longing for the untapped hydrocarbon resources led to a downpour of multinational companies to Turkmenistan (and the other regional states). The pipeline dreams became more important than democratization and the regime got full advantage in perpetuating, in fact strengthening authoritarianism with one personality at the helm – the *Turkmenbashi*. The leader made himself President for Life in 1999. Huge golden statues of the leader dominated the infrastructural edifice of the country. Stalin's Iron Curtain still surrounds Turkmenistan in the form of travel restrictions to the citizens, visa prohibitions to most foreigners and zero tolerance for dissent in any form. In this scenario, democracy remained unwanted and freedom of press and media unnecessary. What was deemed necessary for every Turkmen was to respect the leader and read the sacred book 'Rukhnama' written by the Turkmenbashi himself for the eternal guidance of the Turkmens (Kissane, 2009, p. 239). The sacred book was not only included in the curricula at all levels, it was also kept at the entrance of mosques to be kissed by the believers before offering prayers to Allah Almighty.

Under such conditions the freedom of expression cannot survive; free press and media remained a dream. The international nonprofit Reporters without Borders published its first worldwide Press Freedom Index in 2002. Since then Turkmenistan appears at the lowest levels of press freedoms.

<i>Year</i>	<i>Ranking/No. of countries ranked</i>	<i>Measure</i>
2002 (<i>Under Niyazov</i>)	136/139	91,50

2003	“	158/166	82,83
2004	“	164/167	99,83
2005	“	165/167	93,50
2006	“	167/168	98,50
2007 (<i>Post-Niyazov Period</i>)		167/169	103,75
2008	“	171/173	95,50
2009	“	173/175	107,00
2010	“	176/178	95,33

Table 1: Press Freedom Ranking of Turkmenistan in the first nine worldwide indexes generated by the Reporters without Borders. It is obvious that the trend set by Niyazov continued after his death. <https://rsf.org/en/world-press-freedom-index-2002-2010>

Absolute loyalty to the Turkmenbashi was not optional. The ‘subjects’ had to express and re-enforce their love and the trust of their leader by continuously sending letters to the state-owned newspapers. A ‘sacred Oath of Loyalty’ was to be recited every day by the students, professionals, army-men and also the TV news casters before and after a News Report. Sung like a song, a part of the Oath states ‘my tongue shall shrivel if I speak ill of the *Turkmenbashi*’. In 2005, a presidential order forbade foreign postal services’ deliveries in Turkmenistan hence, categorically barring international newspapers from the country (Walker, 2005). Reporters to foreign news agencies such as Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty have often molested, arrested and tortured. Disturbing news from the neighboring countries and elsewhere such as that of Georgia’s Rose Revolution (2003) was never reported (Templeton, 2004). Obviously, in the Freedom House ratings, Turkmenistan always comes in the lowest category of ‘Not

Free' states. But in Niyazov's Turkmenistan, nobody knew this. The youngsters who were raised in this suffocation took it as normal. Nobody cared.

Section 3:

The Price of being 'Not Free':

Professor Martha Brill Olcott, an authority on the region complains about Niazov's unpredictable and irrational behavior that will have 'tragic consequences for the people of Turkmenistan and the neighboring countries' (Hays J. , 2008).

In fact, Niyazov's Turkmenistan presented a living illustration of George Orwell's novel *1984* with the 'big brother' *Turkmenbashi* watching everyone from his images on roads, buildings and the currency-notes, with the help of monitoring cameras and an enormous surveillance system along with a complete check on the print and electronic media. His '*Rukhnama*' was equivalent to Quran and Bible and he himself more or less 'a prophet'. As long as he lived, there was no news without his news and no paper without reports on his sayings and activities. Quiet understandably, there were no newspapers on 22nd December 2006 as there was no news of the *Turkmenbashi* 'to fill the pages'. Niyazov was no more.

All remaining links with the outside world were cut off. No flights no internet. Telephones tapped and the lines dropped dead at the mention of the death of *Turkmenbashi*. But inside the country a somber atmosphere with all routine work continued. The people indoctrinated and programmed to love their leader were in a trauma. International War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) reported a women wondering 'What will we do now? Niazov did so much for us!' A teacher reported her students crying that it's the end of the world' (IWPR, 2006).

Nevertheless, the information-starved society had to pay and is still paying the price of their leader's phobia against 'openness'. First, the tradition ingrained by Niyazov could not be plucked out of the system. His successor Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow seems to follow Niyazov in many respects. The worldwide rankings in press freedom and human rights have not improved after the death of Niyazov (See the table above). Berdimuhamedow is criticized to have built a personality cult around him though this cult seems much modest and less bizarre as compared to that of eccentric Niyazov. The new president continues to rule an authoritarian regime while the dissent is still not tolerated. The 2010 rankings of the Freedom House still placed Turkmenistan on 95th number out of 96 countries ranked (Freedom House, 2010).

For the last two decades Turkmenistan has been isolated from the world due to its extra-ordinary curbs on national and international media. Yet it is in a need to establish economic and energy-based relations around the world. Tremendous hydrocarbon resources have led the world approach the authoritarian state, overlooking the human rights violations. Turkmenistan got membership in various international organizations including UNO, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) etc, though its relations with the world remained problematic. Niyazov proclaimed 'positive neutrality' which was recognized by the UN in 1995. Proclaiming not to get involved in any international conflict was in fact welcomed by many states. Nevertheless, there have been economic disputes at least with Russia and Iran – the two earliest partners of Turkmenistan in oil and gas deals and some observers were calling Turkmenistan an 'unreliable partner' (Pannier, 2015). Losing two old partners will make Turkmenistan totally dependent on the third one – China.

Further, Niazov always remained wary of the Afghan situation. But that also has led to more curbs on internal front; lest Taliban or Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)-like religious extremist groups emerge in Turkmenistan. Hence, in the name of religious

extremism, every rival inside the country was eliminated while Turkmen media remained silent. In addition, Niazov's 'open doors' policy also was received with positive interest across the world. Yet, the Turkmen doors were only opened for foreign investments and hydrocarbon deals. Hence, a number of energy deals were reached with Russia, China, USA, Iran and Pakistan. Yet the situation in Afghanistan remained a big hurdle. Conversely, the doors were never 'open' on the media front. Several reports have been produced in USA and the EU to highlight the situation. For instance, the CRS Report on 'Turkmenistan: Recent Developments and US Interests' gave a detailed account of human rights violations, and authoritarian policies in Turkmenistan, yet it defined US interest in the post 9/11 scenario in terms of eventual response of Niazov, who, after a few weeks of neutrality, declared that the 'evil (Taliban) must be punished' and agreed to allow US ground transport and over-flights to supply humanitarian support to the US led coalition in Afghanistan (Nichol, 2004). Hence the most authoritarian state in the world was tolerated as a partner in the War On Terror.

Professor Olcott, called 9/11 a 'second chance' for the region to establish itself as a new bastion of democracy and individual freedoms (Olcott, 2005). But nothing happened and the need for partners in the war over-shadowed the region's drift away from the western standards. This actually encouraged the successor of Niazov to continue most of his oppressive policies. On the other hand other regional leaders also followed the same course with impunity.

Conclusion

Western observers often took Niazov as a 'bad joke'. Washington Post called him a 'bad banana in a land of melons'. Yet his eccentricity has made a whole nation psychologically retarded. Freedom of expression in effect has no meaning and no appreciation. The authoritarian trend set by Niyazov has established itself as a normal in Turkmenistan. Press and other

media are still in chains. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are still heavily censored; their correspondents are still damned to worst torture and intimidation.

Boris Shikhmuradvov an exiled opposition leader saw the ‘whole nation being destroyed by this horrible man’ (Safronov, 2002). Not only the opposition but the media personnel also remained at high risk during Niyazov’s period. The authoritarian theory though challenged by many still seems to work in case of Turkmenistan under Niyazov and his successor. It must be remembered that in case of a dictatorship with a democratic façade (regular elections etc), the most effective constitutional weapon available to the people is media. It helps bringing public grievances forward and helps to act as a harbinger of socio-political changes. The authoritarian governments tend to control the media through restrictive legislations. This is the case of Turkmenistan. Yet, the Turkmen journalists, working for local or international media have shown a stubborn resilience in the performance of their duties often at the risk of their own lives, employment and property. It is imperative that a change is induced in these countries in order to give common people a voice of their own, without indoctrination and pressure. Only that will ensure a true and sustainable peace in the region.

Yet, it must be remembered that one major cause of perpetuation of the suffocating situation in Turkmenistan in particular, and whole Central Asia in general is not only their historical background, and their eccentric dictators, but also the policy of the west to overlook the violations of democratic norms and human rights in the resourceful countries which offer much to fulfill western interests. This has been done in the Middle East. This is being repeated in Central Asia. Result is perpetual turmoil and birth of extremism with anti-west agendas. And then they ask ‘why the people hate us?’

References

Balkin, J. (1990). Some Realism about Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment. *Duke Law Journal*, 1990 (3), 375-430.

Christians, C., Glasser, T. L., McQuail, D., Nordenstreng, K., & White, R. A. (2009). *Normative Theories of the Media: Journalism in Democratic Societies*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Clifford, C. G., Glasser, T., McQuail, D., Nordenstreng, K., & White, R. A. (2009). *Normative Theories of the Media - Journalism in Democratic Societies*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

Ermolaev, H. (1997). *Censorship in Soviet Literature (1917-1991)*. Boston: Rowman and Littlefield.

Freedom House. (2010). *Freedom of the Press 2010 - Table of Global Press Freedom Rankings*.

Freedom of the Press, T. C. (1947). *A Free and Responsible Press - A General Report on Mass Communications...* Retrieved from Internet Archive: <https://archive.org/details/freeandresponsib029216mbp/page/n7>

Gerhardt, M. J. (1992). *Liberal Visions of the Freedom of Press*. Retrieved from William and Mary Law School Scholarship Repository: <https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/1625/>

Hays, J. (2008). *Turkmenistan under Saparmurat Niyazov*. Retrieved from Facts and Details - Central Asia: http://factsanddetails.com/central-asia/Turkmenistan/sub8_7a/entry-4804.html

Hays, J. (2008). *Turkmenistan under Saparmurat Niyazov*. Retrieved from Facts and Details - Central Asia:

http://factsanddetails.com/central-asia/Turkmenistan/sub8_7a/entry-4804.html

IWPR, I. o. (2006, December 23). Reporting Central Asia (English) No. 476 part 2. *Turkmenistan - Post-Dictatorship Blues* .

Khan, H. (1996). The Russian Expansionism in Central Asia and the Region's Response. *Pakistan Horizon* , 49 (02), 33-57.

Kissane, C. (2009). Education in Central Asia - Transitional Challenges and Impacts. In A. E. Wooden, & C. H. Stefes (Eds.), *The Politics of Transition in Central Asia and the Caucasus - Enduring legacies and emerging challenges* (pp. 226-248). London and New York: Routledge.

Nerone, J. C. (1995). Last Rights: Revisiting Four Theories of the Press. In J. c. Nerone (Ed.). Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

Nichol, J. (2004). *Turkmenistan: Recent Developments and US Interests*. CRS Report for the Congress.

Nissman, D. (1993). Turkmenistan: searching for a national identity. In I. Bremmer, & R. Taras (Eds.), *Nation and politics in teh Soviet successor states* (pp. 384-397). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Olcott, M. B. (2005). *Central Asia's Second Chance*. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Pannier, B. (2015, October 12). Revision to Turkmenistan's Neutrality Policy. *Qishloq Ovozi* .

Rashid, A. (1994). *The Resurgence of Central Asia - Islam or Nationalism?* Karachi: Oxford Univesity Press.

Safronov, R. (2002, December 09). *Opposition in Exile: Turkmenistan*. Retrieved from Eurasianet: <https://eurasianet.org/opposition-in-exile-turkmenistan>

Siebert, F. S. (1963). The Authoritarian Theory of the Press. In S. et.al., *Four Theories of the Press...* (pp. 9-38). Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

Siebert, F. S., Peterson, T., & Schramm, W. (1963). *Four Theories of the Press - The Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social Responsibility and Soviet Communist Concepts of What the Press should be and do*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

Simonov, A. (1991). *Glasnost* . Retrieved from Glasnost Defense Foundation: <http://www.gdf.ru>

Templeton, T. (2004, October 10). *The Man Who Would Be King*. Retrieved from The Guardian International Edition: <https://www.theguardian.com/theobserver/2004/oct/10/features.mazine37>

Walker, C. (2005, April 19). *Press Freedom in the Former Soviet Union - A Report Card*. Retrieved from Freedom House: <https://freedomhouse.org/article/press-freedom-former-soviet-union-report-card>

Wimbush. *Soviet Deportations of Nationalities*.

Wimbush, S. E. (1986). The Soviet Muslim Borderlands. In R. Conquest (Ed.), *The Last Empire: Nationality and the Soviet Future* (pp. 218-234). Stanford: Hoover Institution Press.

Zenkovsky, S. A. (1967). *Pan Turkism and Islam in Russia*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.