

## ANALYTIC OF DASEIN' AS EQUIPMENTALIZATION AND DEFORMALIZATION OF SEINEDES

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### Abstract

One of the errors of pre-Heideggerian metaphysics according to Heidegger is the failure to recognize that the *point-de-part* of ontology is Fundamental Ontology. This is what he also called 'Analytic of *Dasein*', that is, Analysis of *being-there* or human being. Given that *Dasein* is the ontological explicator wherein the *Being* question can be properly investigated, Heidegger reduces meaning as a referential function of *Dasein* expressed in modes such as *being-in*, *being-with*, *being-by* and *being-for-the-sake-of*. To this end, meaning is no longer private or a product of consciousness but a Framework or what Heidegger also termed Deployment Totality. The problem however, is that within this Framework, *Seinedes*, which is a part of *Being* is reduced to an *Equipment* except given *Dasein's* encounter. Through the method of philosophical hermeneutics, this paper interprets Heideggerian 'Analytic of *Dasein*' as overtly an equipmentalization and deformatization of *Seinedes*. The equipmentalization and deformatization of *Seinedes* contradicts meaningfulness as a Framework. To deploy Totality, one must take cognizance of the existing *being-in*, *being-with*, *being-by* and *being-for-the-sake-of* for the *being-there* to properly exist as a *being-in-the-world* and for meaning to be properly conceived as a Framework.

**Keywords:** Ontology, *Dasein*, *Seinedes*, Framework, Equipment, Phenomenology.

### 1. Introduction

The analytic of *Dasein* is a central feature of Heidegger's thought. *Dasein* becomes important because of its peculiar ontological structure. It is characteristically different from other entities as it has an understanding of *Being* and can raise the questions of *Being* (Sreekumar, 1). This manner of questioning or ontological questioning is new and revolutionary. Traditionally, ontology was concerned with 'what there is'. According to Dahlstrom, precisely, it was the attempt to determine the most basic and general ways of being (Dahlstrom, 2010: 395). Ontology or ontological investigation therefore, attempts to provide a kind of inventory (inventories) of being, specifically of what there is. The content and order or ordering of such inventories and its properties remained a major problem from the earliest philosophers (when ontology and its scope was yet completely undetermined) down to Aristotle and the medieval philosophers when ontology became a defined discipline and its problem evolving from, not just the questioning of content and ordering, but, of, the question of what exactly is the meaning of *Being*. So the fundamental concern of ontology within the questioning of the content of being and its ordering revolved around reality and appearance, unity and plurality, essence and existence,

empirical and meta-empirical, and particular and universal. As earlier noted, until Aristotle, there was no clear cut distinction between ontology and cosmology. As Dahlstrom argued:

The history of ontology itself reflects considerable difference of opinion as to whether the fundamental sorts of being are substantial individual entities (relatively permanent 'things' in a more prosaic sense), structures, classes, properties (e.g quantities or qualities), relations, collections, composites, dispositions, functions, accents, processes, and/or any number of other determinations of *Beings* (**Ibid.**)

More precisely, in as much as the scientific enterprise of theoretical explanation provides the horizon for descriptions of what there is as it has being since Aristotle, no ontology is purely descriptive (**Ibid.**). So essentially, it deals with questions concerning what 'entities' may be ordered or grouped, related within a hierarchy, taking cognizance of similarities and differences. At this time, even the definition of 'entities' was contested and had so many restrictions: is it that with a distinct existence as an individual unit considered apart from its properties? Or that within a category or class, having existence but dependent to an extent, with distinct properties not completely apart? In Dahlstrom words, closely connected to this last difficulty is the problem of determining suitable constraints. In the process of trying to get a handle on what is and what is not the case, ontology inevitably and quite reasonably issues constraints (**Ibid.**).

So these inevitably and quite reasonably constraints issued by ontology consisted largely of a set of fundamental, often long-mining and implacable disputes about what there is; which is also accompanied by reflections about the discipline's own methods, status and fundamental concepts such as being, existence, identity, essence, possibility, relation, fact and the world, and most recently, *Dasein* and *Seinedes*.

## **2. Ontological Explicator: The *Dasein***

Following Heidegger's original thought, one would expect a direct and clear engagement and elucidation of what it means "to be", of the essence of phenomenon and the meaning of *Being*. However, for Heidegger, our attempt to understand the meaning of *Being* are futile. *Being* is inaccessible and its meaning cannot be apprehended completely. The reason for this lies in the way *Being* reveals itself to *Dasein*.<sup>29</sup> And how exactly does *Being* reveal itself to *Dasein*? According to Heidegger:

Manifestly, it is something that proximally and for the most part does not show itself at all: it is something that lies hidden, in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does not show itself: but at the same time it is something that belongs to what thus shows itself, and it belongs to it so essentially as it constitutes its meaning and its ground (**Mohammad, 2001: 329**).

Thus, to understand the meaning of *Being*, *Being* is not the place to begin, but in that which it shows itself, unlike its ontological hiddenness, rather in that which it belongs essentially and constitutes its meaning and its ground – *Dasein*. Suffice to state, that the inaccessibility as a result of *Being's* hiddenness according to Kamal, is not something

insignificant or temporary that may not influence our philosophical understanding of reality, but essential and constitutes its meaning (**Ibid.**). This view may sound contradictory, but this is exactly Heidegger's meaning in 'Being and Time'. In fact, he went on to argue that given the hiddenness and unhiddenness (via *Dasein*) of *Being*, the very unhiddenness or recovery is 'the most dangerous, for here, the possibilities of deceiving and misleading are especially stubborn' (**Heidegger, 1992A: 59**). One is therefore forced to ask; how can the concepts be understood of *Being* of an entity such as *Dasein* without understanding the meaning of *Being* as a prior condition for its existence? How far will an understanding of *Dasein* lead to the answer of the question of *Being* (**Mohammad, 2001: 329**)?

Analysis and understanding of being prior to *Being* is understandable and possible given that the meaning of *Dasein's* existence is conditioned by and presupposes understanding of the meaning of *Being*. Mohammad Kamal will say that, this is because *Being* is transcendental in the Kantian sense (**Ibid.**), but differently, being is like the micro while *Being* is the macro. So understanding the meaning of being is nothing other than understanding *Being. Dasein* (man) however, becomes the starting point or ontological explicator because it is ontologically distinctive (**Mohammad, 2001: 328**). More so, Heidegger chooses man as the logical starting point for his inquiry because:

He observed that we have a very unique and privileged relationship to *Being* – of all entities in existence, organic and inorganic, only humans can question, and seek to understand *Being*. Also, the very fact we raise the question in the first place clearly implies that we uniquely have some type of prior understanding of *Being*, however clouded it may be (**Watts, 2001: 16**).

*Dasein* is ontologically unique in comparison to other beings that is, *Seinedes*. This unique relationship places him in a privileged relationship to raise and engage *Being* unlike *Seinedes*. This uniqueness is simply, self-awareness. For instance, *Dasein* unlike other entities that are encapsulated exclusively in a present moment and position is deeply rooted in a past heritage whilst simultaneously occupying the present and projecting forward towards future possibilities, and we define who we are in terms of all this (**Ibid. 16-17**). As an explicator thus, *Dasein* stands in relation to *Being*, spanning from past, to present and into the future. The obscurity or concealment of *Being*, to an extent is also a feature of *Dasein*. As Heidegger puts it, we are ourselves the entities to be analyzed. The *Being* of any such entity is "in each case mine". *Being* is that which is an issue for every such entity (**Heidegger, 1992A: 67**). The concealment of *Being* therefore is an unconcealment concretized in the '*there-being*'. But even this is not all that simple and straight forward, it is still an issue for this entity – *Dasein*. This is why Heidegger argued that, this way of characterizing *Dasein* has a double consequences:

1. The 'essence' ('*Wesen*') of this entity lies in its 'to be' (*Zu-sein*). It's *Being-What-it-is* (*Was-sein*) (essential) must, so far as we can speak of it at all, be conceived in terms of its *Being* (existential).
2. That *Being* which is an issue for this entity in its very *Being*, is in each case mine. Thus *Dasein* is never to be taken ontologically as an instance or special case of some genus of entities as things that are *present-at-hand* (**Ibid. 67-68**).

It is therefore understandable, the baptismal of the human being as fundamental ontology. And it's equating with the term, existence. The 'what-it-is' of *Dasein* is *Being*. But differently, the nature of this being is existence. And we must not forget, that the very nature of every entity (including *Seinedes*) is 'to be' which is *Being*. However, Heidegger moves a step further, by arguing that, the essence of *Dasein* lies in its existence. Accordingly those characteristics which can be exhibited in this entity are not 'properties' *present-at-hand* of some entity which 'looks' so and so and is itself *present-at-hand* (**Ibid. 68**). A phenomenological understanding of the double consequence of characterizing *Dasein* as "an issue for this entity", simply expresses the onto-existential nature of *Dasein* as not an opaque or object or *present-at-hand* absent consciousness, self-awareness and especially possibility. It also shows time as the horizon of *Dasein*, thus *Being*. Interestingly, the question Heidegger asked with regards to time is also a break from traditional conception. Accordingly, what does it mean "to be" in time rather than: what is time (**Watts, 2001: 17**). The point being that, existence as *Dasein*, and it being an issue, *Dasein's* being as *being-in-the-world* contends and confronts within a horizon: Time. The ability to confront one's existence and to also contend (question) existence itself (*Being*) is a feature of *Dasein* that happens within time. In other words, first, it is historical and second, it has an ending, that is, temporality. Michael Watts argues:

Heidegger claims that the future is the most important dimension of my temporality 'because the choices I make for my future, determine who I am now and, paradoxically, the future can also be the source of my past. Temporality, Heidegger concludes, makes up the primordial meaning of *Dasein's* (human beings) *Being* (**Ibid. 18**).

Possibility is the mode of *Dasein* in temporal historicity. According to Heidegger, this is the formal meaning of *Dasein's* existential constitution (**Heidegger, 1992A: 69**). He went on to further argue, that to interpret this entity 'ontologically; the problematic of its *Being* must be developed from the existentiality of its existence (**Ibid.**). Heidegger thus, is reiterating the existential nature of *Dasein* existence. The existentiality of *Dasein* existence is not just the feature or realm of possibility or possibilities, but it is the 'clearing' wherein *Being* is discovered, or *presencing*. More so:

This cannot mean, however, that '*Dasein*' is to be construed in terms of some possible concrete idea of existence. *Dasein* should not be interpreted with the differentiated character (*Differenz*) of some definite way of existing, but that it should be uncovered (*aufgedeckt*) in the undifferentiated character which it has proximally and for the most part (**Ibid.**).

Evidently, interpreting this entity *Dasein* as existential and also ontological is not merely the point of *Dasein's* *Being* being undifferentiated from existence, again, of its existence being an existentiality, that is, not just an issue for this entity, but a project of possibilities spanning within a horizon (temporal historicity), rather, we are saying that the existence of this entity *Dasein* is not a concrete idea of existence like *Seinedes*. *Dasein* is the clearing for being, that is, the place where *Being* reveals itself. *Being* is uncovered in this undifferentiated character which *Dasein* has proximally and for the most part. The ability of *Dasein*, to connect from the past while in the present, and the envisaging into the

future is an undifferentiated feature that Heidegger similarly defined as transcendence or averageness (**Ibid.**). He argued:

Out of this kind of *Being* – and back into it again – is all existing, such as it is... that which is ontically closest and well known, is ontologically the farthest and not known at all (and its ontological signification is constantly overlooked).... We call this everyday undifferentiated character of *Dasein* averageness (*Durchschnittlichkeit*) (**Ibid.**).

It was Husserl who originally characterized intentionality in terms of transcendence, even in “Logical Investigations”, and indeed, who elucidated transcendence in terms of its relation to temporality (**Dermot, 2000: 39-40**). Being is not static. It is not merely *presencing* as the earliest philosophers held. The reaching out (or *unconcealment*), as in *Dasein*, which span in historical temporality is credence to this. As Heidegger elucidates, *Dasein's* transcendence, that is, the fact that *Dasein* is already somehow beyond itself, already dwelling in the world, among things, and not locked up in the privacy of its own consciousness (**Heidegger, 1992B: 135**). This is why the phenomenology of existential phenomenology is not limited to the private content of consciousness as an intentional relation (intentionality); a product of regional ontology hence *Being* is beyond mere category or categories. Heidegger notes:

The intentional relation, a foundation of transcendence or averageness, has too often being misunderstood in Cartesian terms as the subject trying to reach object, must instead be founded on the '*being-with*' or '*being-by*' of *Dasein*, i.e., intentionality is a form of ontic transcendence which can only be understood if *Dasein's* more basic ontological transcendence is understood (**Ibid. 134-135**).

The existential ontological nature of *Dasein* is fully brought to light with Heidegger's recognition of an ontic and ontological transcendence. *Dasein* is ontically closest and known as that entity which *Being* is an issue to this being. At this level, we can also talk about ontical transcendence, *Dasein* as *being-in-the-world* is only possible as a *being-with*, *being-by*, *being-in* and *being-for-the-sake-of Seinedes*. So while the ontic is 'ontologically' necessary, hence *Seinedes* 'is not as ontical' as Heidegger is leading us to believe, yet *Dasein* is 'the farthest and not known at all', which Heidegger believes is an 'ontological signification constantly overlooked (**Heidegger, 1992A: 69**). This is however, ontological transcendence (existentiality, possibility, temporality, historicity, etc). *Being*, we must not forget is transcendent. More so, beyond this *unconcealment*, ontological transcendence is also a reaching beyond, the existence of possibility in time. Averageness thus, is that undifferentiated character of *Dasein*; that it is both ontically closest and well known, and similarly ontologically the farthest and unknown at all, is seen in *Dasein's* ontic (*Seinedes*) and ontological (projectiveness) transcendence. So transcendence, as *being-in-the-world*, self projectiveness, which as we have noted is both ontical and ontological, is actually within the totality of the *Being* of *Dasein ahead-of-itself* and nevertheless *already-in-the-world* (and given the ontical level of transcendence), also as *Being-alongside*, that is, entities encountered within-the-world; *Seinedes*.

### 3. Formal Existential Framework/Deployment Totality

Heidegger's most systematic conception of meaning does not exist in isolation. Meaning is not possible as a solo within entities, or existing individually. It cannot be understood within an entity existing apart from a web of other entities. In fact, understanding is not possible within being, specifically *Seinedes* absent equipment and encounter (by *Dasein*). As Heidegger puts it;

When entities within-the-world are discovered along with the being of *Dasein*, that is, when they have come to be understood – we say that they have meaning (*Sinn*) (**Ibid. 83**).

Thus, Heideggerian theory of meaning within the gamut of existential phenomenology stands on four pillars. First, understanding (and interpretation) as the substructure of meaning. In other words, meaning is not possible absent understanding and knowledge. Second, meaning is disclosed in the form of a Totality, also termed Deployment Totality or Formal Existential Framework rather than as units with individual entities. Third, what we understood are entities within the world and *Being* ('to be'), not meaning, ontically and ontologically. Fourth and finally, the being of *Seinedes* is unmeaningful, only *Dasein* is meaningful. According to Heidegger, only *Da-sein* has meaning, thus only *Da-sein* can be meaningful or meaningless, and all beings whose mode of being is unlike *Da-sein* must be understood as unmeaningful, as essentially bare of meaning as such, can be absurd (**Ibid. 151**).

One is not shocked at this conclusion, hence from the fore-going, the premises of positing *Dasein* as the only being that really exist; its *Being* as Fundamental Ontology, is a systematic attempt to render *Seinedes* as a mere equipment. Suffice to quickly state, that we must not forget that “Being and Time” is a Fundamental Ontology, conceived as an existential analytic of *Dasein* wherein the phenomenon of meaning is the wherein of intelligibility and upon-which of a projection of the understanding of the *Being* of beings in their possibilities (**Ibid.**), a reified point of departure and deployment, and the central image of encounter before meaningfulness is possible in *Seinedes* – i.e. *ready-to-hand* or *present-at-hand*. This is of course, the locus of equipmentalization.

From the analysis so far, two things remain consistent in all of Heidegger's thought, and these are, firstly, that *Dasein* is the place where the *Being* question should begin. Secondly, that meaning is referential totality. We have raised a lot of questions and arguments against this, but our concern now is to understand the logical consistency of these two grounds in relation to *Seinedes*, particularly as equipment– *readiness-to-hand* and *present-to-hand*.

Thus, beyond the unmeaningfulness, essentially bareness of meaning and absurd existential status of *Seinedes*, referential relation or totality becomes an unconditional pre-requisite for the meaningfulness of beings-*Seinedes*. However, there cannot be any referential relation in the absence of an encounter. In fact, the very nature of reification or referential relation is straightforward ontological approach, or occupational, or correlational – encounter. And technically, an encounter is not possible absent *Dasein* – fundamental ontology. To elucidate, let us use Heidegger's example in his book 'History of the Concept of Time' with a little embellishment; when I enter my study to work on this

paper, it is out of the room that the desk, chair, books, pen, computer appears. In other words, I don't see enumerable individual things (books, pen, table, lamp, shelves, computer, desk, etc.) that I then assemble into a room impression. And if this research work proceeds without distraction problems (e.g., no ink in my pen, computer issues, research material or chair missing, etc.), all the room and its contents will recede into unobtrusiveness. The scenario of the referential totality over peculiar priority of the referential totality over the things themselves (**Heidegger, 1985: 188**).

So Heidegger does not just see meaning as referential totality, over and beyond mere conception and obstruction, but most basic and most concrete a part and parcel of *Dasein's* everydayness. As showed in this example, the desk, chairs, computer, pen, books, printer, etc. are not individual meaningful things. They are not even numerical. They are a referential whole or totality thus meaningful by virtue of this and their encounter with the researcher, writing this article, that is, the *Dasein*. It is by virtue of each being *ready* to use – thus a *ready-to-hand* – that it is meaningful. It stands 'ready' for the *Dasein*, thus an encounter. Invariably, the absence of *Dasein*, and of its usefulness (especially during encounter), it is merely present (*present-at-hand*) and unmeaningful or essentially absurd. So meaning is not just a worldhood of the world as totality within *Dasein's* encounter or in my immediate environment wherein *Seinedes* are not numerable or individualized, rather it is a web, an *in-order-to* or *for-the-sake-of* to help define *Dasein's* purpose or projections. No wonder Heidegger claims an indispensability of *Seinedes* in *Dasein's* ontic-transcendence. This is why the reified or referential relationship that exist in the study is not restricted to the researcher alone, anyone who enters that room and recognizes it as a study, according to Heidegger, all of us are moving in a common totality of surrounding (**Ibid.**).

#### 4. Equipmentalization and/or Deformalization of The Being of Seinedes

Heideggerian theory of meaning as Framework denies any primordial or ontological meaning or essence in *Seinedes*. It concludes by arguing that it is not things but references which have the primary function in the structure of encounter belonging to the world (**Ibid. 200**). Thus, Heidegger's analysis of everydayness, as interpreted by the pragmatists, are taken as an analysis of tools in which the being of equipment in its *readiness-to-hand* (*Zuhandenheit*) is characterized in terms of a usability, instrumental for *Dasein* (**Sena, 2011: 75**). The point being that, *Dasein's* everydayness as *being-in-the-world* in its ontological transcendence is analyzed in terms of an ontic transcendence rather than a series of existentiality, thus interpreting *Seinedes* as a tool, reducing its being to an equipment in its *ready-to-hand* and characterizing its nature and meaning in terms of its usability or function within the work world of *Dasein*. Heidegger himself, in his analysis of *readiness-to-hand* characterizes such a pragmatic understanding as Ontic (**Ibid. 76**). However, Heidegger sees no problem with this because it serves his purposes of fundamental ontology and conceiving meaning as a Framework. This is a contradiction. Hence, things in their not-state, or dormant state, a state of unmeaningful–*present-at-hand*, becomes meaningful only when they have a need or use to serve *Dasein*. It is also when they are ready to render services that an encounter takes place. Heidegger tell us that:

Primordial structural totality, lies before (*vor*) every factual attitude and situation of *Dasein*..., so this phenomenon by no means, expresses a priority of the practical attitude over the theoretical. When we ascertain something *present-at-hand* by merely beholding it, this activity has the character of care just as much as does a 'political action' or taking a rest and enjoying oneself (**Heidegger, 1992A: 238**).

This is in line with an existing structure/reality. Being as 'there' can never be in isolation. It is always *in-the-world*. *In-the-world*, everydayness is always an *in-order-to, for-the-sake-of, being-with, being-in*, etc. the whole notion of projecting or fundamental ontology, thus gives *Dasein* the monopoly of meaningfulness; ascertaining something (*Seinedes*) as *present-at-hand* or *ready-to-hand* by merely beholding it in the light of its willing and wishing. As Heidegger puts it, that very potential-for-being for the sake of which *Dasein* is, has *being-in-the-world* as its king of *Being*. Thus it implies ontologically a relation to entities within the world (**Ibid.**). Consequently, it seems that even though only *Dasein* could be described as meaningful essentially, yet its meaningfulness rests on its *being-in-the-world*, that is, a *being-in, being-by* and a *being-with* other entities, *Seinedes*.

More so, that it is not things but references which have the primary function in the structure of encounter belonging to world (**Heidegger, 1992B: 200**), reiterates Heideggerian concept of meaning as reification and deformatizes *Seinedes* as unmeaningful absent encounter. Heidegger in fact further argued, that by the term 'reference' here, we shall now more accurately designate as 'to mean' (*bedenten*). The structure of encounter thus specified in references as meaning we shall call 'meaningfulness' (*Bedeutsamkeit*) (**Ibid. 200-201**).

So in the whole or structural totality, *Dasein* stands at the centre. But, what is this structural totality? It is reference. According to him, when we say that the basic structure of worldhood, the *Being* of the entity which we call world, lies in meaningfulness, this amounts to saying that the structure as we have characterized it thus far, the references and the referential on texts are basically correlations of meaning, meaningful contexts (**Ibid. 203**). So how are meaningful contexts meaningful without the contexts, units, *Seinedes* meaningfulness? Heidegger did not consider this inconsistency, rather in the 'History of the concept of Time', he recognized 'Kindred phenomena', which are, taking something as a sign (an omen like the south wind as a sign of rain, as a fetish is to a primitive man) and making something into a sign (car's traffic light) or a knot in a handkerchief) and according to him, they all provide insight into the character of a superior presence which is constitutive for being a sign (**Ibid. 209**). In other words, they *appresent*, make present, handy for *Dasein's* concerned commerce (**Ibid. 206**). Again, our initial example of the reified involvement of the chair, books, computer, pen, research materials, printer, etc., having receded into unobtrusiveness becomes a study and goes to show the ontologic-meaningfulness deformatization or demeaning of *Seinedes* in the light of referential context or Framework.

It is however important that we do not miss a very salient point in this analysis, which is, the Heideggerian equipmentalization and macroscopic view as the root of

meaningfulness. Heidegger does not see things (*Seinedes*) individually apart from *Dasein*. All other beings must deploy totally or in totality to be meaningful, or remain unmeaningful and absurd. His thinking into the phenomenon of meaning is not concentrated on the distinctive characteristics or nature of these different entities, rather his point was the macroscopic view; meaningfulness, the worldhood of the world, a given point in time and place. However, beyond the conception of *Seinedes* as unmeaningful, how valid then is the notion of a Framework and does it still have a place in the overall being of Being? Again, given the complexities of the conception of meaning as a structural whole, how do we glimpse to the particular meanings that constituted the whole, or is there none?

### 5. Conclusion

Any analysis of *Dasein* that reduces the gamut of *Seinedes'* ontological *beingness* within *Being* is inconsistent with the ontological structure of *Being* as the locus of beings: *Dasein* and *Seinedes*. The argument that meaningfulness can only be conceived as a structural whole, that is, a Framework, only stands when the unity of the individualized entities are recognized as the indispensable factor that makes this Framework possible. It is this indispensable factor missing in Heideggerian Analytic of *Dasein* that makes his conception of *Seinedes* an equipmentalization and deformalization of meaningfulness within this being, a part of *Being*.

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