

## Responsibility of rebuilding in Mali between reality and challenges

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### Abstract:

Wars and conflicts have been a source of increasing concern and concern even after they have been extinguished, due to the disasters and consequences they cause at all levels. Therefore, the post-conflict and war phase and the resulting interventions have attracted attention to finding ways to get countries out of the cycle of returning to instability, and instead focus on getting rid of their consequences, restructuring their institutions and supporting development, and this strategy is called peace building, which is considered one of the levels of the principle of the responsibility to protect, and which the United Nations sought to implement in Mali after the deterioration of the security situation, however, this strategy has known many challenges.

**Keywords:** conflicts, rebuild, transitional authorities, United Nations mission, challenges.

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### Introduction

The protection of international peace and security does not stop at preventing the occurrence and escalation of conflicts, or intervening to extinguish them, but rather extends to building peace<sup>1</sup> through a group of mechanisms that work to strengthen international

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1 -Johan Galtung defines peace building as: “The process of creating self-supporting structures that eliminate the causes of wars, and provide alternatives to them in situations where wars may occur. Conflict resolution mechanisms should be integrated into the societal structure, and exist as a reservoir within the society itself to draw upon, just as a healthy body that has the ability to generate its own antibodies and does not need specialized management such as medicine”.

John Paul Lederach defines it as: “A concept that includes the processes carried out by local actors, which are all the forces of society, individually and collectively, as well as the authority, and international actors, including international institutions, non-international institutions, and states, which aim to revive civil society, rebuild infrastructure, and restore institutions that were destroyed by war or civil conflicts, and these operations may seek to establish these institutions, if they do not exist, in a way that prevents the outbreak of war again, and that would help strengthen the peace building process”.

For more information, see Fahil Jabbar Chalabi, Building Peace and Social Cohesion in Nineveh Governorate, Publications of the Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution Studies, University of Dohuk, D.B.N., (D.I.), 2017, pp. 17, 18.

Former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali defines peace building as: “Working to identify and support structures that will promote and consolidate peace to avoid a relapse into conflict”, [www.psychologyandeducation.net](http://www.psychologyandeducation.net)

peace and security, and avoid the recurrence of disasters that afflict the security and stability of countries that have long suffered from miserable conditions, due to the increase in human rights violations, and to ensure the establishment of international peace and security, efforts were made to find what would guarantee it, which finally led to the adoption of a comprehensive approach that takes the form of a series consisting of three levels, starting from measures to prevent these conflicts (the responsibility to prevent), and avoiding military intervention and resorting to force, except in very special circumstances (responsibility to respond), provided that the intervention is followed by rebuilding and reconstructing the intervening state, by following a set of mechanisms and with the cooperation of several parties (responsibility to rebuild). This integrated approach is what is called the principle of the responsibility to protect, which was legislated to protect the population of the state from Four types of crimes: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Mali was one of the countries in which the principle was applied as a result of the conditions the country reached, which necessitated its rebuilding and reconstruction.

Was the application of the third level of the principle of the responsibility to protect in Mali sufficient to ensure stability and security?

### **The first axis: the need to activate the responsibility for rebuilding in Mali**

The Malian lands are a hotbed for several armed groups that have emerged and strengthened as a result of circumstances that led to the expansion of their influence in many areas of the country, and because of the military intervention to deter these groups, negative consequences have resulted at all levels, which makes it necessary to rebuild the remnants of the use of force in them.

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see paragraph 21 of the Secretary-General's report: Peace Agenda Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, General Assembly, Ses. 47, p. 7.

As stated in his report submitted in 1998 on the causes of conflict and work to achieve lasting peace and sustainable development in Africa, what he meant by the term post-conflict peace building "is the measures taken at the end of the conflict to promote peace and prevent the return of armed confrontation". See paragraph 5/5 of Document No. A/57/303 containing the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, December 2001.

The 2001 Brahimi Report also defined peace building as: "Activities undertaken on the other side of a conflict, to reassemble the foundations of peace and to provide the tools necessary to build on those foundations, nothing more than the mere absence of war." See:

-Rob Jenkins, Peace building from concept to Commission, Routledge Global Institutions Series, New York, USA, 2013, P.20.

### **First - The deterioration of the security situation in Mali:**

The deteriorating security conditions in Libya helped the Tuareg groups by supplying them with weapons and military equipment, which encouraged them to march towards the capital, Bamako, to overthrow the regime and seize power, and at the head of these rebel groups is the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, which demanded self-rule and independence for the lands of Azawad due to the marginalization to which its population is exposed. There is also the Ansar Eddine organization, which seeks to establish an Islamic state in the northern part of Mali, in addition to other groups, most notably the Unity and Jihad Group, centered in the city of Gao, and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb<sup>1</sup>, as these groups were about to take control of the capital, Bamako, following a major attack on central Mali, at a time when the Malian government was at its weakest, and in March 2012, demonstrations took place in which members of the army participated, denouncing the government, as the military coup overthrew President Amadou Toumani Toure, and based on an official request from the Malian government, the French forces intervened, and their aircraft carried out the first bombing operations against the extremist groups that were about to advance in southern Mali on February 11, 2013, and they also subsequently sent ground forces numbering 2,500 soldiers, with which Malian army units and forces from the group's countries participated, and 3,000 soldiers of West African economic forces<sup>2</sup>.

The situation in Mali remained in need of support and assistance to achieve stability, even though the French military intervention in Mali led to stopping the advance of extremist Islamic groups towards the south of the country, threatening the capital, Bamako, and liberating most of the main cities in the north, which pushed these groups into rugged mountainous areas in the north-east of Mali on the Algerian border<sup>3</sup>. Subsequently, African forces were deployed under the International Support Mission in Mali and under African leadership, and in response to the request for assistance submitted by the Government of Mali to the United Nations to assist the Malian transitional authorities in the areas of

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1 -Mohamed Boudiaf, Limited War Strategy, Operation "Serval as a Model," Journal of the Standard in Research, Humanities, Social and Cultural Sciences, Vol 8, Issue 1, June 2017, pp. 127-128.

2 - Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, The Mali Crisis and Foreign Intervention, Policy Analysis Unit at the Arab Center, Doha, Qatar, February 2013, pp. 4-6, at the link: [https://www.dohainstitute.org/ar/PoliticalStudies/Pages/Francis\\_Recent\\_Military\\_Intervention\\_in\\_Mali.aspx#](https://www.dohainstitute.org/ar/PoliticalStudies/Pages/Francis_Recent_Military_Intervention_in_Mali.aspx#)

Access date: 02/13/2020, at: 22:32.

3 -Ibid., pp. 9-10.

political negotiation, security sector reform and humanitarian assistance<sup>1</sup>, the United Nations sent an initial assessment mission to Bamako on October 1 to 5, 2012, to work with the Malian authorities and clarify the details of the required assistance<sup>2</sup>, as the Security Council issued on April 25, 2013 - and based on Chapter VII of the Charter - resolution No. 2100 establishing the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, where it decided to transfer the powers of the International Support Mission to the Integrated Mission in July 2013, and this mission was entrusted with carrying out its tasks for an initial period of 12 months<sup>3</sup>.

**Second: The limited results of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Mission to achieve stability in Mali:**

The United Nations mission, known as Minusma, was entrusted with several tasks to support the Malian government in rebuilding, which was included in the decision to establish it, and these tasks were:

**1- Achieving stability in major population centers and supporting the re-extension of state authority throughout the country through:**

- Supporting the transitional authorities in Mali, and achieving stability in major population centers, especially in the north, by deterring threats and taking active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas;
- Supporting the transitional authorities in Mali in expanding the scope of state administration and re-establishing it throughout the country;
- Support national and international efforts aimed at rebuilding the security sector in Mali, especially the police and gendarmerie, through technical assistance and capacity building, co-location work and mentoring programmes, as well as the rule of law and justice sectors within the limits of their capabilities and in close coordination with other partners, donors and international organizations working in these areas.
- Assisting the transitional authorities financially through training and other forms of support regarding mine action and weapons and ammunition management.

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1 -Document No. S/2012/894, containing the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali, November 28, 2012, paragraph 11, p. 4.

2 -Ibid., paragraph 12.

3 -Document No. S/RES/2100 (2013), containing Security Council Resolution No. 2100, adopted at its 6952nd session held on April 25, 2013, paragraph 7.

- Assist the transitional authorities in developing and implementing a program to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate former combatants, dismantle militias and self-defense groups, and take into account the needs of demobilized children<sup>1</sup>.

**2- Supporting the implementation of the transitional road map, including the national political dialogue and the electoral process, which includes:**

- Assisting the transitional authorities in Mali to accelerate the implementation of the transitional road map with a view to fully restoring constitutional order and democratic governance;

- Exerting good offices, building confidence, and facilitating work at the national and local levels, through local partners as necessary, in anticipation of its outbreak, preventing it, and mitigating its effects and resolving it;

- Assisting the transitional authorities in Mali and local communities in northern Mali to facilitate progress towards establishing a comprehensive national dialogue, achieving the reconciliation process, and negotiating through various means, such as strengthening negotiating capacity and strengthening the participation of civil society, including women's organizations;

- Support the organization and conduct of comprehensive, free, fair and transparent presidential and legislative elections, including by providing appropriate logistical and technical assistance and effective security arrangements<sup>2</sup>.

**3- Protecting civilians and United Nations staff, through the following:**

- Protecting the civilian population exposed to the threat of imminent physical violence within the limits of its capabilities and areas of deployment, without prejudice to the responsibility of the transitional authorities in Mali.

- Providing special protection for women and children affected by armed conflict, including by deploying special advisors for each group, and meeting the needs of victims of sexual and physical violence in armed conflict.

- Protecting United Nations personnel, facilities and equipment, and ensuring security and freedom of movement for such personnel and related personnel<sup>3</sup>.

**4- Promoting and protecting human rights, through:**

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1 -Document No. S/RES/2100(2013), op. cit., para. 16(a).

2- Document No. S/RES/2100 (2013), op. cit., paragraph 16 (b).

3 -Ibid., paragraph 16 (c).

- Monitor any abuses or violations of human rights or international humanitarian law committed throughout Mali, help investigate them and report them to the Council, and contribute to efforts aimed at preventing them.
- Providing support for the full deployment of human rights monitors throughout the country;
- Monitoring violations and abuses against children and women, including all forms of sexual violence in armed conflicts, assisting in investigations thereof and submitting reports thereon to the Council;
- Assisting the transitional authorities in Mali in their efforts to promote and protect human rights<sup>1</sup>.

5- Supporting humanitarian assistance operations by contributing to creating a safe environment for the safe delivery of humanitarian aid under civilian leadership, in accordance with humanitarian principles, and the voluntary return of internally displaced persons and refugees, in close coordination with actors in the field of humanitarian assistance<sup>2</sup>.

6- Supporting the preservation of cultural heritage by assisting the transitional authorities in Mali in protecting cultural and historical sites from attacks, in cooperation with UNESCO.

7- Supporting national and international justice, as the mission was asked to support the efforts of the Malian authorities aimed at bringing those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity to justice, taking into account the referral of the Malian authorities responsible for the situation in their country to the International Criminal Court since January 2012<sup>3</sup>.

To carry out its tasks, the Council authorized the mission to use all necessary means within the limits of its ability<sup>4</sup>.

The same resolution welcomed the deployment of a European Union training mission to provide training and advice to the defense and security forces in Mali<sup>5</sup>, as the Security Council has extended and amended the mandate of the integrated mission in Mali several times. The last amendment was included in Resolution No. 2480, which extended the

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1- Document No. S/RES/2100 (2013), op. cit., paragraph 16 (d).

2 -Ibid., paragraph 16 (e).

3 -Ibid., paragraph 16 (f) and (g).

4 -Ibid., paragraph 17.

5 -Ibid., paragraph 22.

mission's mandate until June 30, 2020<sup>1</sup>, while the strength of the integrated mission remained a maximum of 13, 289 military personnel and 1,920 police personnel<sup>2</sup>, and stressed that the mandate of the integrated mission should be implemented based on the first priority of supporting the agreement by the government, the armed groups affiliated with the coalition, the coordination and other stakeholders related to Mali, while the second priority was to facilitate the implementation of a comprehensive strategy led by Malian political leadership to protect civilians, reduce tribal violence and restore Establishing state authority and presence and resuming the provision of basic social services in central Mali<sup>3</sup>.

The process of rebuilding in Mali was not easy, especially in light of its complexity, the multifaceted nature and multiplicity of tasks assigned to the integrated mission, the lack of capabilities of the mission's personnel in the field of investigations, analysis, surveillance and monitoring, and the lack of equipment and devices, in addition to the slow deployment of the mission's personnel and equipment, which hindered its ability to fully implement since its establishment, as well as the lack of coordination between the civilian, military and police components, and the mission's personnel being exposed to repeated attacks. However, we do not deny some of the Mission's achievements, including its playing an effective role in ensuring electoral security during the presidential election period, as joint patrols were carried out between the Mission and the Malian police in Bamako, Timbuktu, Gao, Mopti and Kidal, starting on July 27<sup>4</sup>, and in the second round of the presidential elections on August 12, 2018, there was an improvement in the polling stations, which recorded only 2.1% of the centers that were not opened, due to the improvement in the reorganization and deployment of about 6,000 Malian defense forces with the support of the Integrated Mission<sup>5</sup>.

Several joint missions between the Government, MINUSMA and the international community were sent to Mopti, Gao and Timbuktu to create conditions for the return of judicial administration to these areas, including conducting an assessment of the needs

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1 -Document No. S/RES/2480 (2019), containing Security Council Resolution No. 2480 at its 8568th meeting held on June 28, 2019, paragraph 17.

2 -Document No. S/RES/2100 (2013), op. cit., paragraph 18.

3- Ibid., paragraph 20.

4- Document No. S/2013/582, containing the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali, October 1, 2013, paragraph 20, p. 6.

5 -Document No. S/2018/866, containing the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali, September 25, 2018, paragraph 21, p. 4.

necessary to reopen prisons<sup>1</sup>, as the Department of Peacekeeping Operations concluded in its strategic review of the Integrated Mission in Mali, that the most important political aspects of the new development in the strategic context since the establishment of the mission were the restoration of constitutional order, the removal of the military clique that carried out the coup in March 2012, and the limited progress in the reconciliation process. Despite these achievements, there are still several aspects to achieving stability in Mali, including most of the tasks stipulated in the mission's mandate<sup>2</sup>, because what the integrated mission has done is limited and modest given the size of the mission and the tasks assigned to it.

### **The second axis: Challenges of responsibility for rebuilding**

The Responsibility for Reconstruction in Mali and even in the rest of the collapsed countries faces several obstacles that prevent it from contributing to the reconstruction and building of societies emerging from the crucible of military interventions that have inflicted heavy losses on them at all levels, as there are many challenges that still prevent the effectiveness of the Responsibility for Reconstruction, including:

#### **First: Challenges related to the United Nations**

The responsibility for rebuilding is closely linked to the United Nations, on the basis that the United Nations is the global body authorized to protect international peace and security in all its dimensions, however, the practices of this body for the reconstruction process have not received sufficient attention to establish an integrated peace process.

- Let us begin with the concept of the responsibility for rebuilding: If we take the 2005 document of the World Summit Conference as an agreed upon international text, we find that it completely ignores this concept, and focuses in particular on the responsibility to respond; Did the heads of state and government agree on the responsibilities of prevention and reconstruction only?

If we take into account that the responsibility for prevention is based primarily on the state's responsibility to take what is necessary to prevent the occurrence of genocide crimes, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, and the role of society here is only complementary in building the state's capabilities for prevention, then only the responsibility of responding remains, which the participants unanimously agreed upon: Is

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1 -Paragraph No. 34 of the Secretary-General's report on the situation in Mali for the year 2013, op. cit., p. 8.

2 -Document No. S/2014/403, containing the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali, 9 June 2014, paragraph 61, pp. 17-18.

this agreement merely an affirmation of their acceptance of military interventions, without rebuild

and reconstruction?

What confirms our proposal is the neglect of the Secretary-General's reports related to the responsibility to protect, such as the responsibility to rebuild as an essential element of the principle of the responsibility to protect, despite the fact that there are noticeable similarities between the responsibility to prevent and the responsibility to rebuild (encouraging dialogue, reconciliation between sects, legitimate and comprehensive institutions). In contrast, the Committee on Intervention and State Sovereignty divided the principle into three recognized responsibilities: Prevent, react and rebuild, as from a theoretical and practical standpoint, the responsibility to rebuild needs to rise to a prominent position as an essential element of the principle of the responsibility to protect<sup>1</sup>.

- The Security Council's continued monopolization of the tasks of maintaining international peace and security is one of the obstacles standing in the way of rebuilding operations, as the Council's selective policy appears not only in the decisions it issues in the field of intervention, but even with regard to rebuilding. For example, the Security Council's action in the wake of the Libyan crisis was limited and insignificant compared to its role in issuing the decisions to take the necessary measures and authorizing member states to protect civilians. Selectivity also appears in choosing the appropriate and necessary means for rebuilding.

The dominance of the Security Council extends to include the new structure created for peace building , as a simple reading of the content of the two resolutions establishing the Peace building Commission reveals the distinguished role of the Security Council in the field of protecting international peace and security, as well as the countries contributing, whether financially or humanly, to the body, and if the purpose of establishing this body was to support the activity of the Security Council in the field of maintaining international peace and security, it is clear that the Security Council has sought to maintain its dominance over matters related to this basic mission<sup>2</sup>, and its monopoly is not limited to the field of maintaining international peace and security only, but extends to building Peace by

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1- Srinjoy Bose and Ramesh Thakur: The Un secretary-General and the forgotten third RTP Responsibility, Global Responsibility to protect, 8October2016, p353.

2 -Khalfan Karim, The Security Council and the Challenges of International Peace and Security, A Study in Light of Proposals for Reforming the United Nations, Journal of the Thinker, Volume 9, Issue 10, February 2016, p. 41.

maintaining the connection of this new body with its members, whether in terms of ensuring that the permanent members remain among the members selected by the Security Council or through major contributors of shares or military personnel<sup>1</sup>. The other thing that limits the mission of the Peace building Commission is that its provision of advice is not done on its own, but is controlled by other parties, foremost of which is the Security Council. Likewise, requests for advice submitted by the Economic and Social Council or the General Assembly with the approval of a state that is going through exceptional circumstances are about to If it falls into conflict, it will be restricted if the Security Council considers it<sup>2</sup>, which constitutes an obstacle to the Committee in preventing it from performing the tasks for which it was established.

The new peace building structure, represented by the Peace building Commission, the Peace building Fund, and the Peace building Support Office<sup>1</sup>, was full of negatives, because there were areas of overlap and duplication with the Department of Political Affairs and Peacekeeping at the United Nations, as these bodies did not replace the current structure, as much as a new addition to an old-fashioned one, which has resulted in a confusing number of disconnected units in the UN system, dealing with a variety of peace building issues in a fragmented and ineffective manner<sup>3</sup>, and what weakens the role of the Peace building Commission in rebuilding societies after the conflict is that its role is limited to providing advice, in addition to its limited performance, as almost the same countries on its agenda remained after the end of the conflict in both Libya and Mali on the basis of applying the principle the responsibility to protect in its repressive aspect, and these agencies that were created in the same period in which the 2005 World Summit approved the principle of the responsibility to protect, which is supposed to be a pillar of this principle, did not appear in practical application of a role for these agencies and their role is almost limited For the modest contribution from the Peace building Fund in these two countries.

The problem of financing is one of the obstacles standing in the way of the United Nations performing its peace building tasks, as the Charter established rules governing financing operations, so that the General Assembly is responsible for reviewing and approving the budget, and determining the member states' quorum of the body's expenses<sup>4</sup>. To enable the

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1 -Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution No. 1645, adopted at its 5335th session held on December 20, 2005.

2 -Ibid., paragraph 12.

3-Srinjoy Bose, and Ramesh Fhakur, op.cit, p360.

4 - Article 17 of the United Nations Charter.

body to continue performing its duties, the United Nations Charter imposed sanctions on the state that abstained from paying its financial obligations, which may amount to a ban on voting<sup>1</sup>, and despite these arrangements, the United Nations was subject to pressure from some major countries, which used financing operations as a tool to pressure it to change its positions on some international issues, as well as internal conflicts.

### **Second: Challenges related to peace building operations:**

The United Nations relies heavily on peace missions to rebuild societies emerging from conflict, and to ensure the implementation of the mandate required of it, this requires its own funding, which is considered one of the biggest challenges facing peace operations, and it is clear that these missions have no source of funds other than contributions from countries members, because the United Nations Charter did not oblige these countries to contribute a regular budget to its budget, and each member pays an amount that is determined based on the net output and per capita income of the member state, it is noted that approximately 75% of subscription revenues are paid by only about ten member states, which enables them to influence The United Nations<sup>2</sup>, in addition to this, is the increase in peace operations, which requires more spending, especially with the multiplicity of mandates assigned to it, which is identical to the peace mission in Mali.

The success of peace building operations depends on the availability of the human element, all of whose members may pose a problem that hinders rebuilding operations, due to the reluctance of some countries to provide members of their forces in forming international peacekeeping forces, and in this regard, former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali denounced the West's indifference and complicity in deploying forces in Rwanda, while they attached great importance to the conflict in former Yugoslavia when the political will existed to resolve the conflict there<sup>3</sup>.

In Mali, the slowdown in the deployment of the integrated mission was considered one of the most prominent reasons that hindered the mission from implementing its mandate, which called on the Security Council to express its concern about this, and requested several times to accelerate the completion of the mission's deployment process. The multiplicity of actors in the reconstruction process can achieve significant successes, but this is not without

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1 -Article 19 of the United Nations Charter.

2 -Srinjoy Bose, and Ramesh Fhakur, op.cit, p363.

3 - Qali Ahmed, Peacekeeping Forces: A Study in Light of International Developments, a dissertation submitted to obtain a doctorate in science, specializing in law, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, Mouloud Mammeri University, Tizi Ouzou, 2012/2013, pp. 331-332.

negatives, because the multiplicity of peace missions, which may be regional or international affiliated with the United Nations, in addition to the presence of other parties, may lead to a lack of coordination and planning among them, which leads to overlapping and complexity of tasks, and coordination may even be absent in a single mission between civilian and military personnel, as evidenced by the deterioration of the security situation and the undermining of the peace rebuilding process in Mali despite the presence of the French party alongside the integrated mission of the United Nations and the Group of Five Sahel countries, in addition to Other parties.

Among the challenges faced by the integrated peace mission in Mali are the multiplicity of tasks assigned to it, in addition to the inconsistency of these tasks with the mandates and are not appropriate for them, and the deployment of these forces in more difficult areas, and giving them broad mandates, including stabilization and rescue tasks, and supporting governments, and in some cases, the trend is towards combating terrorism and insurgency rather than development.

The lack of cooperation with peace missions constitutes one of the obstacles facing these missions. Some countries may deliberately refrain from providing assistance to peacekeeping forces under the pretext of doubting their credibility and impartiality, which is what actually happened in international conflicts.

In Yugoslavia, given that the nature of the conflict was primarily ethnic, these forces were accused, given their composition of different nationalities and nationalities, of bias towards some parties to the conflict of the same nationalities and nationalities, which caused the lack of cooperation in the form of non-compliance with the force's mandate, as well as failure to implement international resolutions related to the conflict<sup>1</sup>. The tasks of peace missions are affected by the circumstances surrounding them, which make their members vulnerable to danger, as members of the Integrated Mission in Mali have been exposed to continuous attacks as a result of the unsafe environment and the multiplicity of armed groups in it.

### **Third: Other challenges:**

The process of rebuilding collapsed states faces many challenges, which are not limited to the structural aspect of peace building or peace missions, but rather include other aspects, including:

- The huge financial resources scheduled to be allocated for reconstruction, which is linked to the extent of the destruction in the infrastructure of countries emerging from conflict.

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1 - Qali Ahmed, op cit op cit., p. 337.  
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- The convergence of time for reconstruction operations in collapsed countries, as this is a major problem facing countries that have gone through internal conflicts and civil wars, because donors aspire to rebuild these countries at simultaneous times, which places double financial burdens on the budgets allocated for reconstruction, or may It leads to interest in one country at the expense of others.
- The politicization of international donor contributions, which is considered among the problems facing countries in restoring their health, as some donors intend to link their contributions to the conditions of changing the structures of existing political systems, which is evident in Britain's approach during the General Assembly meetings in September 2017, which stipulated a Political transition away from president Assad for the reconstruction of Syria<sup>1</sup>.
- Paying attention to short-term programs, as it is often noted that donor countries are often reluctant to commit to long-term projects for the recipient country, and instead prefer to focus on more short-term goals and quick gains.
- Lack of attention to the gender aspect in the reconstruction processes, despite its emphasis many times in the reports of the Secretary-General, as the gender perspective is almost absent in most reform programs despite its importance in reducing gender-based violence.

This was a set of obstacles to peace building processes, which needed to be seriously reconsidered and reformed.

### **Conclusion:**

The principle of the responsibility to protect received great attention, at least in its theoretical aspect, but the levels of this responsibility did not receive the same attention, because the largest share was for the second level, and when we say this we mean the responsibility to respond, while the responsibility for rebuilding was marginalized despite the extreme importance of this level, given its role in the reconstruction and construction of the remnants of the military intervention, therefore, the responsibility to rebuild should be viewed as an integral part of the strategy of the principle of the responsibility to protect, by confronting the obstacles that limit its effectiveness in building peace in Mali and other collapsed countries.

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1- Future Center for Advanced Research and Studies, Challenges of Reconstruction in Hotbeds of Arab Conflicts, 09/25/2017, available at the link: <https://www.futureuae.com/ar-22/Mainpage/Item/3266>, Access date: February 22, 2020, at 12:00  
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