

Editorial: Introducing a New Journal

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In his first editorial for *Phenomenology+Pedagogy* in 1983 Max van Manen posed the rhetorical question: "How does one introduce a new journal?" Some 20 years later we echo van Manen and ask: "How does one introduce a journal anew?" And of course, like van Manen, we too have to say that "we admit a sense of accomplishment; it was not an easy birth." But once the thought of resurrecting *Phenomenology+Pedagogy* was awakened, there was no way back. Instead we had to start thinking about how we, while remaining true to its original phenomenological intent, could develop and bring the journal up to date.

Part of this process has involved a change in name, and an expansion in scope. By replacing "pedagogy" with "practice" in the journal's title, we intend to broaden its emphasis to include professional and everyday practices in addition to specifically pedagogical ones, and to underscore the many ways in which phenomenology and practice are linked: By a common emphasis on the pre-reflective, habitual, dispositional, situated, and corporeal, and by a common intellectual her that traces back through the likes of Dreyfus and Bourdieu back to Heidegger.

As hermeneutic-phenomenologists we embrace the Heideggerian view that Being-in-the-World is a concernful preoccupation with our fellow human beings in the world we share. This means that we are less interested in abstract theorizing than in trying to understand experiences as they are lived. Along with Merleau-Ponty, we believe that phenomenology "tries to give a direct description of our experience as it is, without taking account of its psychological origin and the casual explanations which the scientist, the historian or the sociologist may be able to provide" (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. vii). In other words, the type of phenomenology we seek to cultivate does not aim primarily at the production of empirical or theoretical observations or results. Instead, it offers experiential accounts of space, time, body, and human relation as we live them.

In the first issue of *Phenomenology+Pedagogy*, Max van Manen reminded us that, "phenomenology consists of the effort of regaining a fuller grasp of life, of the nature and significance of our lived experiences. Merleau-Ponty called this the program of "re-learning to look at the world" by "re-awakening our basic experience of the world" and thus our efforts are aimed at re-achieving a direct and primitive contact with the world as we live it from day to day." *Phenomenology & Practice* will remain true to this vital imperative.

In the hurly-burly of contemporary society, we are easily tempted to simplify the complexity of professional practices, just to get through the day. Some professionals and scholars assume the ultimate authority of theoretical knowledge and argue that practice should be understood only as applied theory. Obviously, this is not how the notion of "practice" is

understood within the scope of this journal. Instead, we are more inclined to agree with Kockelmans, who argues that:

all praxis and all 'practical' dealings have their own way of tarrying... We must first try to compare the 'seeing' proper to our daily concern with the way of 'seeing' characteristic for science, and in so doing we must set out by characterizing first the *circumspection* which is the guide for our practical concern. (Kockelmans, 1970, p. 153)

Kockelmans here insists on the importance of a way of seeing, which after Heidegger he characterizes as a concerned and measured circumspection (*Umsicht*). He implies that this circumspective seeing is a necessary complement to scientific understandings in activities that involve practice and the practical. And yet, not even Kockelmans' view on "practice" is exhaustive for our understanding of the enigmatic features embedded in the notion. Practice is not untouched by science and theories. All professionals bring scientific knowledge into their daily practices; teachers are not without educational theories, social workers are not without sociological or psychological theories, and nurses are not without medical theories. Thus we may hold, contradictory to what Kockelmans says, that practice does not have its *own* way of tarrying. Perhaps even more importantly: practice is not a secluded zone isolated from our daily life. Practice is not something *apart* from our life world; it is *a part* of it.

For being and nonbeing
arise together;
hard and easy
complete each other;
long and short
shape each other;
high and low
depend on each other;
note and voice
make music together;
before and after
follow each other

The things of this world
exist, they are;
you can't refuse them. (Lao Tzu, 1997, p. 4-5)

Perhaps we need to commence our journeying into "practice" by delving into the complexity implied in terms and phrases like 'arise together,' 'complete,' 'shape,' and 'follow?' What we need to explore is how – or if – theory and practice are co-emergent, 'completing' and 'shaping', and 'following' each other or if, as Kockelmans holds, practice indeed has its own way of tarrying.

Josefson (1991) provides a memorable description of a nurse who has been monitoring a patient for some time. One day as the nurse enters the room she gets the feeling that the patient's condition has deteriorated. She finds it difficult to put into words how she knows this or in precisely what way the patient's condition has changed. So she calls for a doctor to make some tests. The doctor comes, examines the patient and finds nothing to worry about; the tests are just fine, everything is normal. A few hours later the patient dies. What kind of knowledge informed the nurse's actions, but eluded the doctor's diagnostics?

Josefson's description of the nurse's lived experience shows how knowledge sometimes arises in and through practice, through our corporeal, temporal, spatial, and relational lived experiences. And these experiences, these kinds of tacit knowledge are hard – sometimes impossible – to put into words because they reside more deeply in our bodies than in our minds.

This is important to acknowledge because many professions (such as teaching, nursing, and counselling) involve not only transferable skills and specialized bodies of knowledge, but also what can be called "pathic" capacities of discretion, intuition, and tact.

In this context, phenomenological research has as its paradoxical task the study of this "non-cognitive," ineffable yet ineluctable experience and knowledge precisely through the use of language. It is in these directions that the relevant contributions of phenomenology for the epistemology of professional practice, ways of knowing the world, seem to lie.

The five articles in this first issue of *Phenomenology & Practice*, each in its own distinctive and unique way, contributes to this paradoxical task, to a phenomenological "tarrying" at varying sites and loci of practice.

We open this first issue of *Phenomenology & Practice* with an article by Max van Manen. The founding editor of this journal, and a leading scholar in hermeneutic-phenomenology and its application in human science research, van Manen has for decades investigated professional practices – primarily pedagogy and nursing – and consequently pointed us to the pathic and existential dimensions of these practices. Moreover, van Manen has in numerous articles discussed and developed a methodology, inspired by the so-called Utrecht school, which has proven most fruitful in explorations into the human lifeworld and professional practices.

van Manen's article, entitled *Phenomenology of Practice*, takes as its point of departure a quotation from the correspondence between Rilke and Benvenuto, which frames van Manen's exploration as a kind of in-seeing, in-knowing, and in-grasping activity. Through a review of contemporary discourses on "practice" (for instance Gadamer, Derrida, and Bourdieu) van Manen shows how tenuous the sources of intelligibility are. Given the complexity and difficulty that "practice" has presented in the social sciences and philosophy, how can it be productively approached in phenomenology? Drawing on Husserl and Heidegger, van Manen explores the relationships between lived experiences, modes of being, and practice. In so doing he lets us see that there is a much closer relationship between practice and life than between practice and theory. The competence of professional practitioners is, van Manen argues, tied to pathic knowledge, i.e. "actional" knowledge that arises relationally, situationally, corporeally, and temporally. But the "non-cognitive" nature of these pathic modalities makes them elusive to theory and to language itself.

Clearly, that statement entitles us to ask: In what way can phenomenology enrich professional practices? van Manen offers the work of the aforementioned Utrecht School as an illustration of how description and reflective writing can be applied sensitively to the exploration of pathic knowledge. van Manen ends his article by calling attention to how a phenomenological text, just like a philosophical text, can do something *with us*, how it teaches us to *see* and how it may reverberate with our life experiences – and with our sense of life's meaning. In so doing, phenomenology can cultivate insights into the pathic dimensions of professional practices.

The second article, "The creativity of 'unspecialisation:' a contemplative direction for integrative scholarly practice" by Kate Galvin and Les Todres starts as an exploration into forms of knowledge that since the enlightenment have guided scholarship in relation to practice. What was once seen as modernity's great dignity– the differentiation of science, art, and morality – has become postmodernity's great disaster, the dis-integration of knowing, valuing and doing.

Drawing on Aristotle and his concept of *phronesis* in which knowing, doing and valuing are inseparably intertwined, Galvin and Todres make significant reference to Heidegger on Denken and Gendlin on the "entry into the implicit."

Based on this, Galvin and Todres promote a scholarship that is "unspecialised," since it opens up for feeling and for creative thinking and doing as ways of integrating the knowledge of head, heart and hand. Such an integrated form of knowledge would see scholarship as "seamless" way of being. But what is this way of being? To illustrate how integrated knowledge is essentially an embodied way of being, Galvin and Todres offer an experiential account of an artist, who is struggling to find an expression for "more than words can say." The meaning at the core of this experiential account is easily translatable to other professional practices such as nursing, counseling, and pedagogy. Nurses, psychologists, and teachers too constantly struggle to find ways of seeing their patients, clients, and pupils holistically through their lived experiences.

Throughout the article, Galvin and Todres show how forms of applied knowledge, which integrate knowing and being, and include the ethical dimension of the 'good,' constitute a creativity of "unspecialisation." In this way, the authors point us to a different view on what scholarship is – in practice – and how integrated applied knowledge presents a path to a more profound and reflective understanding of human existence.

Traces of this kind of scholarship are detectable in the third article of this issue, "The Gestural Identification of Children: A phenomenological Preface to Movement Education." In this article, Stephen Smith advocates a curriculum for teacher education that is rooted in experiential knowledge of the body. Movement education, Smith argues, has been superseded by a highly specialized biomechanical view of the body, which effectively erases the gestural basis of embodied motion. By posing significant questions about embodied and intercorporeal consciousness of both children and adults in interaction with them, Smith's argument moves beyond just practical pedagogical and curricular concerns. The educable child is first and foremost someone who experiences the world sensually and who identifies with the world in a gestural, corporeal way. Smith holds that in order for adults to understand children's experiences we need to observe them directly and not through the myopic lenses of our adult-centered theories in which children are viewed merely as adults in the making. Here the notion of "observing" is understood not as being a detached observer, who *looks at* children moving but rather as a participant, who *sees* children in a way that make the adult recollect what it was like

to experience "the first rush of movement" as a child. In this kind of "observing" we move from knowing about children through viewing their actions from above to understanding one's relation to children by becoming engaged in their activities.

Drawing on van den Berg's postulate on the significance of human movement Smith places children's movements in three settings: In the landscape of action, in the intention of the moving person, and in the glance of another. The glance of the other is further explored through Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the glance as a supportive, loving look and the gaze as ways of looking which confine the moving child.

By retelling literary and autobiographical narratives, Smith shows how primary mimetic moments of childhood can carry through to adulthood and thus connect the times of childhood and adulthood through motions of the flesh. Smith's exploration of children's mimetic, embodied relation to the world provides the means for a more insightful, phenomenological understanding of children's corporeal reality. The article thus prompts adults to reflect on and develop a capacity for aligning themselves alongside children in a way that more fully embraces the child's "first rush of movement."

The skepticism towards pre-made theories and analytic schemes, and the promotion of a holistic, phenomenological way of seeing children is further developed in our fourth article, "Foreignness and Otherness in Pedagogical Contexts" by Wilfried Lippitz. Central to this piece are the consequences of using theoretical frameworks as a means of gaining a pedagogical understanding of children. The paper begins with Langeveld's statement that adults are always at risk of overlooking that which is "other" or "foreign" in the child, thus reducing him or her to a cliché in the adult world. Lippitz then takes us through a range of European views on *Bildung* or "formation," including those of Comenius and Humboldt. Together, these provide the groundwork for Lippitz's further analysis of the relationship between foreignness and the pedagogical relation between adults and children. Lippitz asks: "How can we as adults, as pedagogues, see the otherness and the foreignness in children that is not only abstract and schematic?"

Finding neither Comenius' cosmological *Bildung* nor Humboldt's neo-humanistic Self-*Bildung* sufficient for an understanding of pedagogy and the pedagogical relationship, Lippitz turns to German humanistic pedagogues, strongly influenced by ethics and individuality (Kant), and hermeneutics (Schleiermacher and Gadamer) for guidance. Above all, the Kantian transcendental philosophical tradition and the humanistic, religious approach to pedagogy are singled out for special attention.

Lippitz then moves on to the German psychoanalyst and Marxist, Sigfrid Bernfeld, who argues that the adult encounter with a child is really an encounter of two children: the child before me and the child I once were. Such a perspective renders the child, in his foreignness and otherness perpetually beyond the reach of the pedagogue.

Lippitz concludes the article by returning to Langeveld and a more radical view of foreignness. By means of a father's literary plea that his eyes should never be the child's measure, that his eyes should always see the otherness in the child, the author shows how this foreignness is essential for understanding between adults and children. The foreign, Lippitz concludes, actually opens up the possibility of pedagogy.

Practice, of course, is not limited to professional practice. As Aristotle has said, life or *bios* itself represents a kind of practice. The ways in which pre-made theories tend to always fall short in every-day experiences is the focus of Terrie Lynn Thompson's article "Finding ourselves in a Predicament: Now what do I do?" Sometimes, in the most unexpected moments we find ourselves completely at a loss; at a loss for words, a loss for knowing what to do, or even a loss or inability to think rationally. Something disrupts our orderly and well-organized everyday world. In these moments, we are in a predicament.

"What is a predicament and how can we understand it?" Thompson asks. Starting from a formal definition of the notion "predicament," Thompson goes on to present and interpret lived experience of predicament in terms of their lived meanings. When we suddenly find ourselves in a situation in which there is no clear or obvious way out, how are we able to "handle" the situation? Through description and interpretation, Thompson compellingly shows how it is possible to react to a predicament, not by falling back on theoretical knowledge, but rather by living through with sensitivity and openness. Thompson uses Gadamer to describe how the kind of knowledge we gain through lived experiences is a kind of moral knowledge, a deliberating with oneself.

Drawing on Heidegger's notions of *Being-in-the-world* and *Dasein*, Thompson shows how a predicament touches on every fibre of our being: It alters our sensed feeling of temporality, spatiality, corporeality and relationality. A predicament, Thompson argues, forces us to deliberate – on the spot – to the different choices available to us in that precise moment. To facilitate a deeper understanding of the meaning of such moments of deliberation, the author turns to Ricoeur who argues that "choice is a fixing of attention" in a context dominated by the unexpected and the foreign. Thompson ends her article by returning to Heidegger. By means of Heidegger's notion of authenticity, Thompson argues that a predicament could provide a window for a deeper understanding of ourselves, our fellow human beings, and the world we share.

Finally, we conclude this first issue of *Phenomenology & Practice* with two book reviews: Tone Saevi provides a review of Gert Biesta's *Beyond Learning: Democratic Education for a Human Future*, and Norm Friesen reviews N. Peter Steves' *The Things themselves: Phenomenology and the Return to the Everyday*.

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