

# The SLP/ILP Distinction in 'Have'-Predication

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'Have'-predication constructions, such as those in (1), describe relations of characteristic association, possession, kinship and property attribution which are generally conceived of as non-transitory, typical individual-level properties, ILPs (Carlson 1977, Milsark 1983, Kratzer 1989).

- |                                 |                                 |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1 a. The table has wooden legs. | d. That tree has wide branches. |
| b. The students have homework.  | e. I have two children.         |
| c. John has a dog.              | f. Mary has a clever wit.       |

One characteristic of ILPs and these 'have'-predicates is the ability to give rise to an inference of temporal persistence — a term coined by Condoravdi 1992. Predicates commonly classified as IL give rise to an inference that they hold indefinitely of their arguments, into the past and the future. For example, in uttering the sentence *I have a sister* there is an inference that this has been true for an indefinite period.

Certain 'have' predication constructions, however, do not seem to abide by this generalization. The 'have'-DP-PP constructions in which the PP-object and the subject of 'have' are co-indexed may express locative relations that do not give rise to a temporal persistence inference. (2a-f) describe temporary or transitory properties. This transitory character is not an aspect of the interpretation of all have-DP-PP constructions. The sentences in (2g-k) may, and often may only, assign non-transitory properties.

- |                                      |                                     |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 2 a. The table has newspapers on it. | g. The tree has a hole in it.       |
| b. The students have name tags on.   | h. The rock has lichen on it.       |
| c. John has a dog on him.            | i. The wall has a mail slot in it.  |
| d. That tree has an owl in it.       | j. My shirt has a stain on it.      |
| e. I have two children with me.      | k. My sister has a bottle of oxygen |
| f. Mary had her wits about her.      | with her.                           |

The transitory nature of the situation described is most apparent when comparing sentences like (3b,d) to their counterparts in (3a,c).

- |                                   |
|-----------------------------------|
| 3 a. Ralph has three boys.        |
| b. Ralph has three boys with him. |
| c. Sandy has a cat.               |
| d. Sandy has a cat on him.        |

Nonetheless, 'have'-predications in both (1) and (2) behave as ILPs with respect to at least one phenomena which has been argued to be sensitive to

the stage level–individual level (SL–IL) distinction, namely the interpretation of bare plural subjects. ‘Have’-predicates do not license an existential reading for bare plural subjects. It is this fact which is explored in this paper.

The existential reading is available in the example in (4a). This sort of sentence does not seem to involve predication on *unicorns* at all. As Milsark 1977 wrote in a discussion of very similar examples, the sentence is about the horizon, not about unicorns. Stative predicates, the majority of which are classified as IL, fail to license a weak existential reading of bare plural subjects, (4b). Instead they have generic interpretations.<sup>1</sup>

- 4 a. Unicorns appeared on the horizon.
- b. Unicorns are clever.

‘Have’ likewise fails to license the existential reading. ‘Have’-predicates of the form in both (1) and (2) license only generic bare plural subjects. In none of the sentences in (5) do the subjects have an existential reading, they are all interpreted as generics. The failure to license a weak existential bare plural subject is typical ILP behavior. (See Carlson 1977 and Diesing 1988,1992b among others.)

- 5 a. Postal clerks have packing tape (near them).
- b. Betel palms have betel nuts (on them).
- c. Houses have roofs (on them).
- d. Desks have at least one drawer (in them).
- e. Children have parents (with them).

This contrasts with the interpretation of bare plural subjects of stage-level predicates, SLPs. (6a,b) — taken from Diesing 1992 — may be interpreted as either existential or generic. Bare plural subjects in predicate locatives, (6c,d), are also ambiguous, and an existential interpretation is preferred.

- 6 a. Carpenter ants are destroying my viola da gamba.
- b. Firefighters are available.
- c. Machine parts are in the garage.
- d. Mice are on this train.

The data in (5) and (6) establish that ‘have’-predicates should not be assimilated to SL statives such as *be drunk*, *be sick* and the pure locatives like *be on the train*, all of which license existential bare plural subjects.

The challenge to the classification of ‘have’-predicates lies in the tension between their consistent failure to license existential bare plural subjects and the temporal inperistence of one subset of them. Two questions are raised by this opposition. The first looks for a more complete accounting of ‘have’-predicates according to other SL–IL criteria: how does ‘have’ behave in adjunct clauses of the sort discussed in Stump 1985, or with temporal modifiers, for example? The second concerns the explanation for the uniform behavior of

'have' in sentences such as (5). What, if not temporal persistence, do 'have'-predicates have in common that would account for their acting uniformly with respect to the interpretation of bare plural subjects?

One approach to this second question treats both types of 'have' sentences as built on ILPs. Under this approach, given our understanding of the data in (1) and (2), we must alter our view of the IL-SL distinction; it cannot depend on temporal characteristics such as the transitory or intransitory nature of a state of affairs, as is commonly assumed. I reject this approach on the basis of the answer to the first question. In section 1 below I establish that 'have'-predicates do not act uniformly with respect to other SL-IL criteria: the temporal nature of the property assigned determines whether a 'have'-predicate behaves as IL or SL. A different basis for the account of the bare plural subject facts must be considered.

In sections 2 and 3, I examine the bare plural subject facts more closely. I consider an account in terms of location independence (Chierchia 1992), but am forced to reject this approach. Instead I argue that what all 'have'-predications have in common is that they are categorical utterances, in the sense of the *thetic-categorical* distinction (Kuroda 1992, Ladusaw 1994).

Sentences of the type in (4a) in which a bare plural subject has an existential reading are said to serve as the basis to a *thetic* judgment. The terms can be extended to sentences that represent the judgment type; in this sense (4a) is a *thetic* sentence. Similarly, the availability of an existential reading of the bare plural subjects in (6) indicates that these are *thetic* sentences. Failure to license a weak existential bare plural subject indicates a predicate cannot appear in a *thetic* sentence. Hence the data in (5) can be considered as evidence that 'have'-predicates do not appear in *thetic* sentences. Instead, 'have'-predicates form the basis to a *categorical* judgment type.

Categorical sentences are about an individual and have clear predicational structure; *thetic* utterances, on the other hand, are descriptions and lack clear predicational structure. 'Have'-predicates form categorical sentences: a property (represented by the post-verbal DP) is predicated of an individual.<sup>2</sup> Stative predicates classified as IL fail to appear in *thetic* sentences. I argue 'have'-predicates share this distribution, but are not uniformly IL. In an exploration of their categorical nature lies the explanation for the bare plurals facts.

## 1 Affects of temporal persistence

Despite their uniform failure to appear in *thetic* sentences, 'have'-predicates cannot be uniformly classified as IL given the general expectations concerning the realization of an event in space and time that are taken to be crucial to the IL-SL distinction (Kratzer 1989, Diesing 1988, 1992, Chierchia 1992, Ladusaw 1994)

The temporal perspective on a situation involves whether or not the situ-

ation described by a predication is circumstantial or not. This is described in terms of intransience, temporal persistence or tendential stability. Situations are considered not circumstantial if they extend or hold for a relevant interval (which in actuality may be rather short).

The locative perspective on a situation involves whether or not the predication would hold of the subject if the position of the subject were arbitrarily changed (holding time constant). This characteristic is described in terms of location independence in Chierchia 1992. As noted there, properties such as *know Latin*, *be clever*, and *be a yoga master* are location independent in the sense that if *Kim is clever* is true at some time, it remains true even if *Kim's* location is arbitrarily changed. 'Have'-predicates describing part-whole relations, property attribution, kinship and certain possession relations are location independent; examples include *have seven vertebrae*, *have a kind heart*, *have a job*, *have a sister*, *have a laptop*, *have a car*. Chierchia claims that ILPs have both tendential stability and location independence. I will use his term, essential property, to describe predicates with both of these properties.

What should be clear is that 'have'-predicates, since they are not uniform with respect to the criteria of temporal persistence, are not uniformly essential properties. This is shown with respect to three IL-SL criteria in this section. Behavior with respect to these criteria is determined solely by the temporal characteristics of the 'have'-predicate. Elsewhere I have argued that *have* names a concept and has an argument structure (Schafer 1995). Temporal characteristics are not part of the lexical semantics of *have*. I assume these must be attributed to the property assigned by the post-verbal constituent.

### 1.1 Subjects with weak indefinite determiners

Milsark 1977 observed that ILPs could not be predicated of weak noun phrases, which include existential bare plurals and noun phrases with weak indefinite determiners like *a* and *sm*. We have seen that all 'have'-predicates pattern in the same way with respect to existential bare plural noun phrases. This is not the case though with respect to other weak noun phrases.

Like ILPs, 'have'-predicates denoting whole-part relations, kinship, possession, characteristic association or property attribution are odd (#) when predicated of a weak subject. Some examples are given in (7). However if the predicate denotes a location relation, the predication is felicitous, regardless of whether the construction type includes a PP co-indexed with the subject or not. This is illustrated in (8).

- 7 a. # Sm tables have tops.  
 b. # Sm houses have roofs.  
 c. # Sm rabbits have three eyes.  
 d. # Sm men have a sister.  
 e. # Sm parents have children.  
 f. # Sm workers have (appropriate) tools.  
 g. # Sm men have horses.  
 h. # Sm jack o'lanterns had candles in them.  
 i. # Sm houses have vines on them.  
 j. # Sm CEO's have kind hearts.
- 8 a. Sm people have children with them.  
 b. Sm workers have tools at their homes/(with them) at the work site.  
 c. Sm men have a book.  
 d. Sm workers have the key.  
 e. Sm men have a box on the front porch.  
 f. Sm children had a cat with them yesterday.  
 g. Sm broken jars had preserves in them.  
 h. Sm guys have a surprise for you.  
 i. Sm trees had decorations on them.  
 j. Sm men have horses with them.

The division among 'have'-predication data is remarkable from the perspective that both bare plurals and noun phrases with weak indefinite determiners are treated in the literature as having the same denotation (with the important exception of the work of Carlson). Nonetheless, unlike bare plurals, weak existential indefinite DPs do not resist the entity interpretation licensed by predicates in (8). This distinction between bare plurals and other indefinites can be taken as evidence for Carlson's view that bare plurals denote properties, a point I return to in section 3.<sup>3</sup>

Considering the temporal properties of the examples, the division in the data is not surprising. The examples in (8) pattern as SLPs, those in (7) pattern as ILPs. The 'have'-predicates in (7) give rise to an inference of temporal persistence through some relevant interval; those in (8) do not.<sup>4</sup> The unacceptability of the weak indefinite subjects in (7) is predicted if these subjects are licensed only by SL, temporally nonpersistent predicates.

## 1.2 Temporal modifiers

This same division among 'have'-predicates is evidenced with respect to the acceptability of temporal modifiers (Kratzer 1989). Acceptability of these modifiers in 'have'-predication constructions is not absolute, neither is it a matter of whether the construction is a simple 'have'-predication or a have-DP-PP construction. Instead it seems to be sensitive to whether the property predicated is temporally persistent.

- 9 a. \* Alice has a daughter this morning.  
 b. \* Harold had a salamander on Friday.  
 c. \* Alice [has a car] in the park.  
 d. \* The cupboard has a door this evening.  
 e. \* I had a secret in my house.  
 f. Alice has a daughter with her this morning.  
 g. Harold had a salamander with him on Friday.  
 h. Sm men have a book in this picture.  
 i. The rose has blossoms this year.  
 j. Peanut butter has sand in it at the beach.

### 1.3 Adjunct clauses

Finally I argue that the behavior of free adjuncts built on 'have'-predicates is also non-uniform and depends on the temporal characteristics of the property predicated of the subject. The relevance of absolute adjuncts, (10a), augmented absolute, (10b), and free adjuncts, (10c), to the IL-SL distinction was first noted by Stump 1985.

- 10 a. nominative absolute: His father being a sailor, John knows about boats.  
 b. augmented absolute: With the children asleep, Mary watched TV.  
 c. free adjunct: Walking home, he found a dollar.

Stump observed that when these adjuncts contain SLPs they have readings in which they quantify over situations. Adjuncts built on ILPs lack these readings (except under coercion, see Kratzer 1989).

For example, free adjuncts containing SLPs can serve to restrict a modal in the main clause. This reading may be paraphrased as a conditional. There is a reading of (11a) that can be paraphrased as (11b), and one of (11c) that can be paraphrased as (11d). (Rising intonation on the adjunct is necessary for the reading.) However the free adjunct in (11e) cannot be paraphrased as a conditional: the adjunct does not restrict the modal in the main clause.

- 11 a. Standing on a chair, Kim can touch the ceiling.  
 b. If he stands on a chair, Kim can touch the ceiling.  
 c. (Being) in the cellar, Bond may find the secret exit.  
 d. If he is in the cellar, Bond may find the secret exit.  
 e. (Being) clever, Bond may find the secret exit.

De Hoop and de Swart 1989 have shown that a free adjunct restricts the domain of quantification as in (11a,c) only when it denotes a non-singleton set of states of affairs; that is, when it is a typical SLP or a predicate that is not temporally persistent. Predicates that give rise to the inference of temporal persistence, typical ILPs, describe a singleton set of states of affairs. They do not have readings in which they quantify over situations, (11e).

The adjuncts in (12) contain 'have'-predicates, they have no reading that can be paraphrased as a conditional, and so seem to behave as ILPs.<sup>5</sup>

- 12 a. Having a sister, Kim can understand Sandy's dilemma.  
 ≠ If he has a sister, Kim can understand Sandy's dilemma.
- b. Having all the preprints, Kim might learn HPSG.  
 ≠ If she has all the preprints, Kim might learn HPSG.
- c. Having a nest in it, the tree might be good to study.  
 ≠ If it has a nest in it, the tree might be good to study.
- d. Having a bell on it, the cat may catch fewer birds.  
 ≠ If it has a bell on it, the cat may catch fewer birds.

If 'have'-predicates in fact pattern uniformly in adjuncts it would be quite mysterious. Adjunct readings are widely held to be sensitive to the temporal nature of the predicate in the adjunct clause, a characteristic that is not uniform across 'have'-predicates. In addition, it is unclear that a single explanation could be put forth for 'have'-predicates patterning uniformly with respect to adjunct readings and existential bare plural subjects, to the exclusion of other weak indefinite subjects and temporal modifiers. Further examination of the data indicates that the apparent uniform behavior of 'have'-predicates in free adjuncts can be attributed to a separate factor: the imperfect aspect that must appear on 'have' in these adjuncts.

The imperfect is an incomplete or unbounded viewpoint, and predicates marked with this aspect describe a singleton set of states of affairs in terms of the temporal organization of the situation described. In this way predicates marked with imperfect aspect share certain temporal properties with IL statives. Predicates that are not inherently temporally persistent, those that describe a non-singleton set of states of affairs, describe a singleton set of states of affairs when marked with the imperfect. This is evident in the behavior of the stage-level stative *drunk* in the adjuncts in (13). I annotate the effect as absolute, though it is more accurate to say that imperfect aspect favors a *because*-paraphrase over an *if*-paraphrase.

- 13 a. Drunk, Kim might forget the oath she took.  
 = If she were drunk, Kim might forget the oath she took.
- b. Being drunk, Kim might forget the oath she took.  
 ≠ If she were drunk, Kim might forget the oath she took.

I claim that the actual behavior of 'have'-predicates in free adjuncts is obscured by the effect of the imperfect aspect on the temporal properties of the situation. Adjuncts unmarked for imperfective aspect must be examined.

To the extent that the free adjuncts in (14b,d) and (15b,d) contain 'have'-predicates (and not predicate locatives), then we can observe that 'have'-predicates describing transient situations, (14), behave as SLPs with respect to the interpretation of free adjuncts. On the other hand, free adjuncts formed from temporally persistent 'have'-predicates, (15), have no reading that can be paraphrased as a conditional.<sup>6</sup>

- 14 a. Having a bell in it, my dog's ball may make too much noise.  
 ≠ If it has a bell in it, my dog's ball may make too much noise.
- b. A bell in it, my dog's ball may make too much noise.  
 = If it has a bell in it, my dog's ball may make too much noise.
- c. Having life vests on, the children can come aboard.  
 ≠ If they have life vests on, the children can come aboard.
- d. Life vests on, the children can come aboard.  
 = If they have life vests on, the children can come aboard.
- 15 a. Having French doors in it, the back room can be easily burgled.  
 ≠ If it has French doors in it, the back room can be easily burgled.
- b. French doors in it, the back room can be easily burgled.  
 ≠ If it has French doors in it, the back room can be easily burgled..
- c. Having pleats in them, this pair of pants can be folded neatly.  
 ≠ If they have pleats in them, this pair of pants can be folded neatly.
- d. Pleats in them, this pair of pants can be folded neatly.  
 ≠ If they have pleats in them, this pair of pants can be folded neatly.

I conclude that it is the temporal persistence of the relation described by the 'have'-predicate which determines its behavior with respect to all IL-SP criteria except the licensing of existential bare plural subjects. While 'have'-predicates do not form a uniform class with respect to the IL-SL distinction, they pattern as the distinction predicts, according to whether or not they denote a temporally persistent predication. The division among 'have'-predicates is not surprising if the temporal properties of the predication depend not on 'have', but upon the nature of the property assigned to the subject by the post-verbal constituent.

The bare plural facts must be viewed separately from these other SL-IL properties. All 'have'-predicates behave uniformly with respect to the licensing of existential bare plural subjects. The 'have' data show that interpretation of a bare plural subjects does not rest on the IL-SL character of the predicate, nor on whether a predicate denotes an essential property, nor on whether it is temporally persistent. An independent account of the bare plural facts is needed.

## 2 Affects of location independence

One possibility, defended recently in McNally's work, is that states of affairs that cannot be described in athetic sentence manifest what Chierchia 1992 refers to as location independence.<sup>7</sup> An appeal of this approach is that it is possible to distinguish this property from temporal persistence. It is conceivable, then, that it is location independence which determines the inability of 'have'-predicates to license existential bare plural subjects.

The criteria that has been used to separate location independence and transience is the behavior of free adjuncts. We have already examined the behavior of free adjuncts according to the IL–SL distinction. Free adjuncts built on SLPs can serve to restrict a modal in the main clause, thus sentences containing such adjuncts have a conditional reading unavailable when the adjunct is built on an ILP. (See figures (11), (12) and with ‘have’ (14), (15).)

However in the right context, ILPs can be “coerced” in Kratzer’s terms into behaving as SLPs in these contexts. An example similar to those in McNally 1995 and Condoravdi 1992 is in (16). The context provided by (16a) defeats the inference of temporal persistence associated with the predicates *to be blond* or, for that matter, *to have blond hair*: lifeguards can be blond on multiple, discontinuous occasions, assuming that there are a variety of dyes available for their use including blonde. *Blonde* remains a location independent property: at any given time, regardless of the arbitrary location assigned a lifeguard, hair color remains constant.

- 16 a. In this town, lifeguards dye their hair a different color every other day.  
 b. (When) blond, they have more fun.  
 c. Today, lifeguards are blond.  
 d. Today, lifeguards have blond hair.

Condoravdi 1992 has shown that even in these contexts the failure to license weak existential readings of bare plural subjects persists. While the context defeats the inference of temporal persistence, the bare plural subject in (16c) or (16d) cannot be interpreted as weakly existential: neither (16c) nor (16d) is understood to be true if some number of lifeguards are blond today, rather all the lifeguards in the town (that is, in the contextually relevant set) must be blonde. Coercion fails to affect the interpretation of bare plural subjects.

This shows that the interpretation of bare plurals is not directly dependent upon the temporal properties of the state or the way it is “individuated in time.” Consequently, the transience of certain ‘have’-predicates is not expected to affect whether or not they license bare plurals. McNally 1995 argues that certain predicates fail to appear inthetic sentences because they describe states of affairs that are location independent for one or more of their participants. This is formalized in terms of property-denoting noun phrases, as in (17), where bare plurals inthetic sentences are considered property-denoting noun phrases.

- 17 If a state of affairs *s* is location independent for any participant *x* in *s*, then *s* cannot be described in a sentence in which any of *s*’s participants are described by property-denoting NPs.

It is possible that the distinct property of location independence, even of transient ‘have’-predicates, can determine the failure of these predicates to appear

inthetic sentences. The question is, are 'have'-predicates uniformly location independent? They are not.

'Have'-predicates which entail whole-part relations, kinship, possession or property attribution can easily be classed as location independent stative predicates. These properties conceivably hold of the subject they are predicated of in any arbitrarily chosen place different from their location in the actual world. Assume, for example, I have a sister. If my location were arbitrarily changed, I would still in fact have a sister. 'Have'-predicates which entail relations of characteristic association are less clearly location independent. Still, if we assume the refrigerator has nothing on it or the oatmeal has bugs in it at some given time, even if these entities were moved to some other location at that same time, the refrigerator would continue to have nothing on it, and the oatmeal would still have bugs in it. Despite these facts, 'have'-predicates expressing locative relations are not location independent.

*Max has a spider on him* or *Sm students have the key to that room* are clearly not locationally independent. Judging location independence is less clear when the subject is inanimate and the post-verbal DP indefinite: *The bowl has a spider in it*, *The shelf has a book on it*. On one view if the shelf were transported to another location in an overlapping time the relation between shelf and book should be maintained. This is particularly true if it is the presence of the book which informs us that it is the same shelf which is changing locations. At the same time, there is a sense in which the shelf and the book are independent entities, and the location of the book is independent of the location of the shelf. In the former case a relation of characteristic association holds; the latter case involves a location relation.

This ambiguity also makes judging location independence of temporally persistent locatives such as those in (18) problematic.

- 18 a. The beach has cliffs overhanging it.
- b. The garden has a wall around it.
- c. The hot tub has a tent over it.

It is simply unclear in these cases if the situation described is locationally independent or locationally dependent: if the location of *the beach* in (18a) were arbitrarily changed, are the cliffs left behind? If the location of *the garden* in (18b) were arbitrarily changed, is it still surrounded by the wall? The difficulty arises in assimilating these examples to instances of characteristic association such as *The Secret Garden had a wall around it* or in attempting to reduce the examples in (18) to instances of location dependence.

Location dependence characterizes classically SL predicates such as those in (19) which can be used to describe essential properties when combined with certain subject nominals, such as *hole* or *dent*. These nominals necessarily express a relation between the entity they name and another individual, they denote relations: holes and dents must be in something.

- 19 a. Holes are in this sock.  
 b. Dents were in your fender.

A predicate licensing this type of location dependence fails to license an existential reading for a bare plural subject (Kuno 1971, Kimball 1973, McNally 1995). The special condition on the subject nominals in these cases permits McNally to essentially reduce location dependence to location independence: no situation that contains a hole can exclude the entity the hole is in.

'Have'-predicates which are location dependent include *The wall has a hole in it* or *The stocking has a run in it*; these can be viewed as describing situations that are locationally independent — if the location of the wall were arbitrarily changed, it would still have a hole in it. However, the same dependence that holds between a dent and your fender, or holes and the sock they are in does not hold between the cliffs above it and the beach or the wall around it and the garden in (18). Nominals like *cliff* and *wall* do not denote relations: it is not necessary that beaches or gardens or any other land form occur adjacent to them, even though cliffs must be high or steep or overhanging with respect to something, etc. Instead, the examples in (18) assimilate to other cases of temporally persistent, but not location independent predicates, such as *New Orleans lies at the mouth of the Mississippi*.

From this perspective, only a subset of 'have'-predicates denote location independent predicates. Yet bare plural subjects of all 'have'-predicates are clearly interpreted generically, *Shelves have books on them*. We cannot attribute this to their location independence. If we type predicates according to whether or not they are temporally persistent and whether or not they are location independent, 'have'-predicates can be found which instantiate all four sorts. It is unlikely, then, that their uniform failure to appear inthetic sentences can be explained via either of these characteristics.

### 3 'Have' occurs in categorial sentences

No 'have'-predication which is location independent appears in athetic sentence. However, the 'have'-predication data also indicate that there are 'have'-predicates that are not location independent and which fail to appear inthetic sentences. Thus failure to appear in athetic sentence cannot be attributed solely to location independence. What is special about 'have'-predicates that accounts for the fact that they act like location independent predicates with respect to the failure to appear inthetic sentences?

One aspect of 'have'-predicates which I have discussed elsewhere (Schafer 1995) seems to be relevant here. The subject of a 'have'-predicate is assigned a property. According to the classic notions of figure and ground, where the figure is an entity being assigned and the ground serves as the reference point, the subject of a 'have'-predicate is always the ground. This is part of the lexical

semantics of 'have'. In this way 'have'-predication constructions contrast with other locative constructions in which the figure maps to subject position.

Pure locatives are descriptions. There is no property assignment *per se*. They form the basis to a singular,thetic judgment type. Both the figure and the ground in these states bear relationships with respect to the whole eventuality, and this is how they are generally described, in the work of Ron Langacker and Leonard Talmy for example. But in 'have'-predication constructions a property is assigned with respect to the ground, not the whole eventuality. The predicates form part of the basis to a compound or categorical judgment type. The subject position determines the location of the state of affairs. When that subject of a 'have'-predicate is a bare plural, the bare plural must determine the location of the entire predication.

We must seriously consider the classic characterization of ground as reference point in this regard. The nominal which serves as the ground is referential. However weak existential bare plurals are non-referential — necessarily so, if we assume, following Carlson, that they denote properties. Because of this, they make very poor grounds.

The assignment of essential properties in 'have'-predication is a prototypical instance of the subject as ground or reference point: *Kim has a freckled nose, Her suitcase has a purple stripe, Her father has two daughters, His mother has a strong voice, He has a clip-board*. The same is true of *The car has rust on it, The mine has diamonds in it*. In these cases, for  $(x,y)$ ,  $x$  an entity with essential property  $y$ , any situation containing  $x$  contains  $y$ . The situation is identified by  $x$ . The subject still serves as the reference point in examples such as *The tree has bees in it, A table has newspapers on it, That wall has a picture of Truman on it, The suspect has a hat on*: for  $(x,y)$ ,  $x$  an entity with non-essential property  $y$ , one situation containing  $x$  contains  $y$ . What is constant in all cases is that the subject is the reference point.

How can these intuitions be expressed in a grammar? Suppose some entity, the chair, has a cat on it. What all of this points to is that as a precondition for asserting *The chair has a cat on it* the speaker must be committed to the chair being the sort of entity that can serve as a location for the cat. Consequently, the entity functioning as the ground, that is the subject or locative argument to a 'have'-predicate, must be individuated prior to assertion.

This is precisely the sort of presuppositions that were required in Schafer 1995 to account for the distribution of inanimates in 'have'-predication constructions. Overall felicity was determined by the satisfaction of the presuppositions attached to a 'have'-predication based on each relation entailed in the property assignment: in a possession relation such as *Alice has some important papers* the speaker must be committed to Alice being the sort of entity that can possess the papers, particularly Alice must be volitional; in a kinship relation such as *Alice has two children* the speaker must be committed to Alice being the sort of entity that can stand in kinship relations, particularly Alice

must stand in genetic or social relations defined by shared attributes; and so forth. It is through these preconditions that the unacceptability of sentences such as *The box has the papers* or *The lamp has two sisters* and *The table has a chair* is accounted for. What is sometimes called the Animacy Restriction on 'have'-predication is evidence of the presence of these presuppositions and the requirement that the subject of a 'have'-predication must be individuated.

Why is it that both this individuation and location independence fail to hold inthetic sentences? I believe the proposals in McNally 1995 present one answer to this question, and I will follow that work here.

McNally 1995 explores why a location independent state of affairs fails to occur inthetic sentences. Her proposal is that location independent states of affairs have presuppositions which conflict with the presuppositions involved inthetic sentences, in predicating something of a bare plural subject.

Her proposal develops from the idea that predicates that fail to appear inthetic sentences make poor presentational predicates. A presentational predicate licenses existential quantification over at least its subject argument. This proposal is attributed to a 1992 manuscript by Krifka, Pelletier, Carlson, ter Meulen, Link and Chierchia. McNally suggests a reformulation of this proposal in terms of property-denoting arguments — on a presentational use a predicate takes property-denoting arguments, rather than entity- or quantifier-denoting arguments. That is, existential bare plural subjects can occur in presentational sentences and these arethetic sentences.

In athetic sentence a predicate takes property-denoting arguments, and the introduction of new discourse referents is licensed not by direct reference but indirectly via the existence entailments of the sentence containing the predicate. For example, in a sentence like *Clouds are visible on the horizon*, *clouds* is property-denoting. The existence of some entities corresponding to *clouds* is entailed only obliquely, the existence force associated with *clouds* is epiphenomenal.<sup>8</sup> McNally suggests that there is a presupposition that an indirectly licensed discourse referent is either one which a speaker is unable to individuate or sees as irrelevant to individuate.

These presuppositions are shown to be inconsistent with location independence. McNally reasons from her generalization in (17) that location independence precludes indirect means of introducing discourse referents. She assumes that an utterance which describes a location independent state of affairs is felicitous only if it is consistent with Location Independent Presuppositions. These include, among others, i) the presuppositions that the sort of entity that a subject NP describes is one for which the property ascribed to it is location independent, and ii) that whatever has the property in the context is the sort of entity for which the property is uncontroversially location independent. Satisfaction of these presuppositions requires individuation of the subject.

In predicating a location independent predicate of a property-denoting bare plural subject, the satisfaction of the Location Independence Presuppositions

conflicts with the presupposition that indirectly licensed discourse referents cannot be or need not be individuated. It is this conflict between Location Independence Presuppositions and the presuppositions involved in the indirect introduction of discourse referents that accounts for the fact that location independent predicates do not occur inthetic sentences. When you attribute a location independent property to an entity, the individuation of that entity is logically prior to the assertion that depends on the location independent presuppositions.

I propose that 'have'-predicates express properties that are either location independent themselves or locative in the sense already discussed, where the subject serves as the ground and is assigned a property. In this way the presuppositions that must be met, sketched in (20), similarly conflict with those concerning indirectly licensed discourse referents.

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- a. The entity that a subject NP describes is one which may serve as a location and corresponds to whatever is the location of the property in the context.
- b. Whatever is the location in the context is the sort of thing that can serve as the location of the property.

From this perspective, the entire state of affairs represented by a 'have'-predication construction, that is the relation entailed by the predicate phrase, is dependent on the location of the entity described by the subject. When you attribute a figure as a property to an entity serving as its ground, the individuation of that entity is logically prior to the assertion that depends on the presuppositions in (20). If the property is assigned to a bare plural construed as a property-denoting NP whose discourse referent is indirectly licensed, the presuppositions that such an argument is not individuated conflicts with the presuppositions that they be individuated as potential locations, (20).

## 4 Conclusion

In this paper I have been concerned with the extent to which the IL-SL distinction applies to 'have'-predication. Faced with the fact that neither transience nor permanence (location independence) characterize all 'have'-predication constructions, IL-SL behaviors are expected to divide the construction. However all 'have'-predications act as IL in that no 'have'-predicate licenses a weak existential bare plural subject. This suggests that the ability to appear in athetic sentence is orthogonal to the IL-SL distinction contra Ladusaw 1994 (or that such a distinction is not discrete). Predicates that fail to license existential bare plurals, including all 'have'-predicates, form part of the basis to a categorical judgment in the sense of Ladusaw 1994. These predicates may be either essential or non-essential, but all have presuppositions

similar to those attributed by McNally 1995 to location independent states of affairs. The presuppositions require that the predicate assigns a property to an individuated entity.

I suggest that more often discussed IL statives, which fail to appear inthetic sentences, also divide according to whether they are location independent just as the 'have'-predicates were shown to here. That is, there appears to be a difference between predicates such as *be intelligent*, *know Latin* and *be a linguist* and predicates like *be cold* and *be bored* where the location of the subject determines the state. Like those 'have'-predicates which assign non-essential properties, *be cold* and *be bored* also occur with weak sm-NP subjects:

- 21 a. Sm people are cold (in this building).  
 b. Sm kids were bored at the movies.

In addition a number of other predicates act like 'have' in identifying their subject as a reference point, examples include *lack*, *need* and certain uses of *get*. Predicates with these properties do not appear inthetic sentences with bare plural subjects, *Children need winter coats*, *Tables lacked place settings*, *Cymbidiums get a 15-30-15 mix*. The presupposition involved in the predication conflicts with the presumption that individuation is optional, which comes with assigning properties to descriptions.

## Endnotes

\* I am grateful to the audience at the SALT V conference at the University of Texas, Austin for comments on this work, particularly Greg Carlson, Ray Jackendoff, Bill Ladusaw, Knud Lambrecht, Friederike Moltmann and Craig Roberts. I am especially indebted to Louise McNally for extensive discussion of the ideas in this paper.

<sup>1</sup> Chierchia (cited in McNally 1995) suggests that the entity interpretation is available if there is sufficient descriptive content to imply strong familiarity with specific entities. The bare plural subject in (ii) has an entity interpretation:

i. Teachers have mace.

ii. Teachers who have met my son have mace.

The reading, however, does not seem to be a true weak existential reading. It is not sufficient for the truth of (ii) that three or four of my son's teachers have mace; instead the sentence expresses a generalization about the contextually relevant set of teachers, all my son's teachers.

<sup>2</sup> The denotation of the post-verbal DP is assigned as a property to the location. I do not argue for the assumption that the post-verbal DP is the entity correlate of a property, rather than an entity, here. Louise McNally points out (p.c.) that the assumption invites comparison between the post-'have' nominal position and the postcopula position in the existential construction

as described in McNally 1992. This is a welcome means of capturing the often noted relation between 'have'-predication and existential constructions (See, among others, Clark 1978, Freeze 1992).

To capture the relationship between the two types of 'have'-predication constructions in (1) and (2), and the relation between 'have'-predication in general and the existential and predicate locative constructions, Schafer 1995 analyses the have-DP-PP construction as an ILP built out of SL, locative description. An IL property is essentially abstracted from an SL description. The locative, SL property *a cat on him* in (i) below forms a sub-part of a larger ILP, *have a cat on him*. The ILP is composed by abstracting over the location argument. This is shown in (ii,iv).

- i. Sid has a cat.  
 $s$  is Sid &  $s$  has a cat
- ii. Sid has a cat on him.  
 $s$  is Sid &  $\lambda x$  [a cat is on  $x$ ] ( $s$ )
- iii. A cat is on the chair.  
 $\exists c$   $c$  is a cat &  $c$  is on the chair
- iv. The chair has a cat on it.  
 $h$  is the-chair &  $\lambda x$  [ $\exists c$   $c$  is a cat &  $c$  is on  $x$ ] ( $h$ )

<sup>3</sup> The distinction is well-documented. For example, it has been argued that weak indefinite noun phrases can be assigned IL properties if descriptive content is added to the noun phrase which implies that the speaker is familiar with specific entities it describes. This works poorly for bare plurals:

- i. \* A man is tall. (generic only)
- ii. A man I know is tall.
- iii. \* Sm men are tall.
- iv. Sm men I know are tall.
- v. \* Men are tall. (generic only)
- vi. \* Men I know are tall. (universal only)

<sup>4</sup> 'Have'-predications that are temporally persistent appear to be able to license weak indefinite subjects if there is additional descriptive content which implies familiarity with specific entities. (See Chierchia's observation in footnote 1.) Examples include sentences such as *Sm hills around here have caves (in them) that are really incredible* and *Sm socks over there/that I just washed have holes in them*. The sock-example is vulnerable to the critique given in footnote 1: it is arguably not a true weak existential reading. My intuitions about the cave-sentence, however, is that the reading of *sm hills* here is weakly existential.

Also, notice that when the DP is definite in a simple have-DP construction the predicate assigns a temporally nonpersistent property. Thus *have the children* and *have the heart* can easily be predicated of *sm wolves* or *sm lab assistants*.

<sup>5</sup> Some speakers get a reading of the adjuncts containing locative 'have'-predications, (12c,d), in which they serve to restrict the main clause modal.

This judgment is compatible with the larger picture I am presenting of how 'have'-predicates relate to the ILP-SLP distinction. These speakers distinguish (14a,c) from (15a,c) The discussion in the text and this footnote can be replicated for 'have'-predicates in augmented absolutes, though I do not do so here.

<sup>6</sup> Free adjuncts without a copula are somewhat marked, e.g. (14b,d) are more acceptable in augmented absolutes (*With a bell in it...*). However the augmented absolute forces an understanding of *bell* as subject. Such an adjunct is compatible with a predicate locative but not 'have'-predication. It is likely that the examples in (14) fail to separate imperfect aspect from an adjunct containing a 'have'-predicate: these may not contain 'have'-predicates. This is suggested by the fact that simple have-DP predicates cannot occur in free adjuncts without the copula: \**Aphids this year, the rose is done for* vs. (*With*) *Aphids on it this year, the rose is done for*.

<sup>7</sup> For Chierchia, states like *drunk* are location independent but not tendentially stable. It is not clear how the fact that these predicates appear inthetic sentences will be captured in McNally's account. It is possible that certain 'have'-predicates also fall into this category, such as *have a nice piece of flounder*.

<sup>8</sup> For Ladusaw 1994 the existence of the eventuality is affirmed. Commitment to that description will indirectly commit the judger to the existence of the *clouds*. This can be viewed as an effect of unselective existential closure over the description.

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