Discussion

Hall Bjørnstad: Thank you. I don't have so much to say. So the question is to understand the complexities of unparalleled exemplarity and I already made a lot of noise throughout the workshop and, through hearing the various reactions, I think it has been … in Ron's paper there must be obvious links, Frauke's paper, Michel now, the question of the embodiment, for example. There have been many points…The question of parody is interesting. It is difficult today to read the text I am analyzing without reading it as parody. But, it is important to resist the modern interpretation, reading in a mode where it either has to be parody or active propaganda. So, I try to resist that, to read that something is happening that we can all use.

It's interesting, too, that we know Louis's reaction, his comment on the book is supposed to be "I'd have liked it a little more if you had praised me a bit less." So, okay, I will leave it at that and wait for the discussion….

Daniel Johnson: I appreciate the way you tried to coordinate our papers. I should say at the outset that exemplarity, for me, was … kind of a sub-figure that helped me figure out what was happening (in one sense) going from Defoe's in many places well-articulated invisible realm to Richardson's seeming desire to want to retain a sense of an invisible realm but …to submerge it somehow. And so, this got me thinking about the project of the realist novel and how it turns instances which are now [indistinguishable] …these are instances existing within a world that is familiar to us, commonplace, everyday, kind of world, at least to the reader. The very fact that these instances exist within this realm means that they can be turned into an example, and that creates kind of a problem—a problem of, well, one term we've used is "wild exemplarity" or "exemplarity unchained" because what is a reader going to take away from these instances that are potentially accessible to anybody and as you've seen in the earlier papers, in the *Pamela* controversy, for example? Maybe the example is *not* that we should all try to act like Pamela, although, there are a lot of reasons for immorality. In fact, it's more realistic to think that Pamela has some kind of lower economic, shiftier motives. So, the example is an unruly thing.

Coordinating… what can be done with examples from Defoe to Richardson: Richardson is at a point historically where he sees himself communicating to an agnostic, if not an atheistically leaning kind of audience and so… whereas, Defoe perhaps feels in the 1720s that he could still draw on apparitional examples as something that might serve as an apologetic for Christianity. By Richardson's time, he is so focused on wanting to get that reader into a relationship with the first cause (with God) that he has to focus on God and that relationship and how someone like Clarissa might access it. To delve too deeply into apparitional evidence as examples *would* expose it to parody, and this is indeed how Henry Fielding treats the supernatural in the case of *Joseph Andrews*. Yet at the same time, as a good Christian author he cannot completely jettison this system of angels and invisible forces, and so he submerges evidence of the supernatural into an area that's *below* exemplarity. Yes, if you know how to read the novel correctly (through this Christian lens) then you can see, right, through to the language of potential supernatural agency, but that is not it's main purpose. It's main purpose, again, is to focus attention back on Clarissa's relationship with the first cause, rather than the secondary cause. I don't know if that helps clarify at all, but I thought I would start out with it.

Richard Nash: Jesse, you're up first.

Jesse Molesworth: Yeah, Dan, you know, we've talked about this and, you know, I actually love the idea of a, sort of, supernatural approach to the rise of the novel, but, you know, at the same time I'm going to give you the objection that I think you are going to encounter again and again, and that is—you know, it's Damrosch's thesis in *God's Plot and Man's Stories*.[1] And, that is to say that the form of the novel expunges those elements of the supernatural and the fairy world and so forth, and his great example, obviously, comes in *Robinson Crusoe*. So when we have that scene in which Robinson Crusoe throws the grain out of his cave in anger in order to produce the plant that then becomes the bread that feeds him, it's not good enough to say that God caused this grain to come to fruition, it's not good enough to say that spirits or fairies did it, or so forth. You know, I… this happens to be a view of the novel that I don't agree with, but I'm just wondering how you would respond to that objection about the secularity, the necessary secularity of the form of the novel?

Johnson: Well, I think that's somewhat what I'm gesturing to, of why there's a breakdown of exemplarity because… In a sense, you can at least see Defoe trying to smuggle in within the definitions of everyday reality a sense of spiritual communication, but whether it works or not is another question … and it seems like it's *not* working. When he—I guess a question would be: when Crusoe implicates various impulses as influencing him to make a decision that will save him from disaster one way or another, does he protest too much and is this kind of a rationalization that comes after the fact despite his efforts to stage this as sort of "in the moment" impulses?

And so, I'm not necessarily disagreeing with that so much as saying I believe there is an attempt to bring the supernatural within the definition of this everyday reality, but it ultimately fails and that can be seen in the way that both *Robinson Crusoe* and, in fact, Richardson are read throughout the eighteenth century into the nineteenth century. Karl Marx saying that *Crusoe* has these spirits, yes, but they're for entertainment purposes only, and I'm not really aware of anybody who read Richardson in the sense of having subtler supernatural agencies other than an interest in what God is trying to do. So does . . . ?

Molesworth: That helps, yeah, you can do that to Fielding as well, you know. [Laughter].

Nash: Was that intended as a follow up or as a comment?

Molesworth: I'll leave it at that.

Nash: Julia?

Julia Douthwaite: Okay. Mine is for Hall, and I was just curious about two things in your paper. First, on page fifteen where at the top of the page the claim is made that "the king has become his own example in an auto-exemplarity that threatens to bring the panegyric system to an end"—there I would just like to ask you to think about hyperbole in the seventeenth-century novel. And, you know, notably, in the *La Princesse de Clèves* hyperbole is everywhere, she was "la plus belle princesse," etc. etc. There is very little concrete detail of what these people look like or anything about their characters except that they are the best or the most beautiful or the finest or the what have you. Hyperbole and litotes is the other (strangely enough) rhetorical fig-

[1] Leo Damrosch, *God's Plot and Man's Stories: Studies in the Fictional Imagination from Milton to Fielding* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).

ure that run through *La Princesse de Clèves*, as I'm sure you know. So, and at the very end, we already quoted the final line: "elle laissa des exemples de vertu inimitable," right, this inimitable example. So, my question, my first question, would be: how is this novel different from the kinds of materials you're studying here?

And then, the second question has to do with the first page of the article, where you state that one of the goals is to see how "this reflection can contribute to our understanding of a turning point in the *ancien régime* cultural construction of authority" and after reading it (and I really liked the essay) but I still don't understand what *is* that "turning point" and what we are supposed to take away in terms of a progression toward something, or from something to something? I had an inkling that it might be the sense that, the fear that no one can fill his shoes later, this worry at the end of his regime that they've set themselves up for this disappoint, but I'm not sure that that was what it was.

So, I just wanted you to address those two questions, please.

Bjørnstad: I'll start with the second. So, at least that concern about filling the shoes at the rhetorical level, [the concern] that something has happened in excess and the closing of the encomiastic system which makes it difficult to continue if you think of Versailles with the exemplarity of history of Louis XIV painted on the ceiling above the court where life will continue. So, in a way the high point literally has been passed. And of course that accentuates your question about the auto-exemplarity. So, it brings me to your first question and, of course, yeah, it is very rare, but in the royal crisis it turns on itself, so it's a self-mirroring, looking, becoming it's own ideal …in a different way than, for example, in *La Princesse de Clèves*. So, and not only to the court and (to an extent) to the world, but even to the king … by seeing himself portrayed in this way as the absolutist moment. So, it partakes in the same movement but is its accentuation to the point of culmination after which you cannot pass. I don't know if that's a satisfying answer. … So that's an important question, but the second question I will be even more interested in hearing everybody's opinion about whether … So, this strange text by Vertron is maybe the beginning of the movement ending with Ron's image of the King's head. It's, in a way… the beginning. It's [the desacralization of the monarchy] not starting from below, but somehow from *above*. But, that's a main question that I'm interesting in hearing others' takes on, their ways of rejecting, rephrasing, rethinking, re-contextualizing that.

Nash: If you're sincere about that—just to intervene for a moment before going to the next question—one thing I am thinking about, in this conversation, is the oddity of that phrase. "Unparalleled" is not an odd phrase; "unparalleled" is… I get that. It's "the none, but itself, can be it's parallel." It's such an odd locution, and seems to be an odd locution even though there seems to be real cultural difference between the French context and the English context. It is striking to me that they show up, that this phrase shows up in both contexts and seems to be (as your pointing to in the French context) one that perhaps for the very reasons that your pointing to can be offered as a form of hyperbolic *over*statement of "unparalleled." By taking the notion of "unparalleled" and raising the stakes on it, that can be taken as a form of panegyric—whereas in the English context when that appears it almost immediately turns to parody. So for me, it's that rhetorical structuring of the notion of "unparalleled" that seems particularly intriguing. That would be half the observation that I have. Hall, would you like to follow up?

Bjørnstad: Yes, that's something. So, another way of phrasing this would be a small, but important point made by Ron at the end of his discussion of how "terror" used to be judged as something positive—it made part of the majesty of God, of the king, and his reign. And I think, there's something in the emergence of the discourse of the sublime in late seventeenth century, which hasn't been studied properly… that it's coming out in the royal context, the royal historiographer of Louis XIV, and most of the climate of the discourse of the sublime is on the king, it's not about aesthetics. So, in a way this need to praise the king, to continue finding new ways of praising the king is important in the promulgation and the development of the early rethinking in early modern times of the sublime in ways that haven't been pursued enough, I think.

Nash: We have a short comment?

Ronald Schechter: Well, yeah, I mean since you're referring to what I said in my paper or what I said briefly about my project in which terror is kind of a sign of majesty (or "terribleness" is kind of a sign of majesty) and so… in answer to your question "What happens after Louis XIV?" I think that might be what you're asking: what happens to hyperbolic praise and the idea, you know, of a kind of unparalleled king after Louis XIV, are you wondering whether that is applied to Louis XV or Louis XVI or sort of still retrospectively to Louis XIV?

Bjørnstad: That is not… my thesis would be that the breakdown of the old terror paradigm, it's not that it loses its power, but it's mobilized to make Louis XIV even more terrible, even more majestic to that excess… and from there it goes down. So I what I, I used the word resacralization, I'm not happy with that expression, but it's something along those lines.

Schechter: But something like that, I mean…there is I think a great deal of continuity in representations of kings as (in very much the same lines you have here) as, kind of, hyperbolic, hyperbolically great, if that makes any sense? Exemplary in the sense of unparalleled. It's sort of obligatory to talk about your sovereign in that way, you know, since nobody could possibly meet that sovereign's standard and that's, you know, that's applied very much to Louis XV. Louis XVI not quite as much, but he doesn't really have as much time to build up that; he doesn't have the years that Louis XIV or XV has to try and build that up.

But just parenthetically, you know, I would point out that Voltaire writes a book about Louis XIV, *Le Siècle de Louis XIV* and, in I think a very un-ironic way, a kind of un-Voltairean way, he praises Louis XIV for many of these famed exploits that he's praised for in the texts you talked about and, you know, for being the terror of his enemies—that was what made it a great century, that France was feared, that the king was the terror of his enemies.

Bjørnstad: And then in ways we're talking about… the cataclysm in that book. And, in a way, he would have contributed to establishing the sense of [France's] going downhill.

Schechter: Right. So, that's the other side of it. The idea that "Once upon a time we were the terror of our enemies…" but at the risk of that breaking down

Bjørnstad: And it was not only Louis, but the age…

Schechter: Right, the whole age but now we aren't any more.

Bjørnstad: So that it's nostalgic.

Nash: Just to do a little stocktaking of where we are, I have Rebecca, I've got Guillaume and Frauke, so get ready with your questions. Rebecca you're up.

Rebecca Spang: Building very much on that exchange we just had: we think of the eighteenth century in many domains as a continuation of the quarrel of the ancients and the moderns, but the modern in the French context in the eighteenth century is often defined as the age of Louis the Great. It's like we stopped being modern at that point and so all we can do is sort of parody or imitate the greatness of Louis XIV unless we become a commercial, seafaring people like the British—but that would be absurd. [Laughter] So, I think there is also a sort of geopolitical, international tension at work there, where it seems like there is a new model of what it would be to be modern and great which is Atlantic, and which is actually going to make a lot of sense in Bordeaux or La Rochelle or Nantes and makes no sense at all in Paris and Versailles.

And then, I'm also thinking of the coronation portrait of Louis XVI and I think the coronation portrait of Louis XV and I know the coronation portrait of Charles X (in 1824) and I think of Louis XVIII in 1815 and they are all posed exactly like the regal Louis XIV… So they are, in trying to take on the mantel of greatness, becoming parodies. And, I think this is especially obvious by the time you get to Charles X in 1824 because nobody dresses like that anymore; in trying to look "kingly" in 1824, you just look silly. So, I think Richard's point about parody is extremely well taken in trying to think about what happens to kingship after Louis XIV.

Bjørnstad: So maybe you give me there a way of rephrasing the earlier answer… So how is this different from earlier praise of the king? so in a way the praise is brought to a point where you can't go higher?

Spang: Yeah.

Bjørnstad: —and through the royal sublime in many ways. So, then you just, all you can do is repeat it, but by the fact of it being a repetition it's already not the same, it's not exemplary or at least not "unparalleled."

Spang: Yes, exactly. Yeah, yeah, yeah, and that would also fit in with the point I made about that passage that Chris [Chiasson] cited from Wieland about "it cannot hurt to communicate this example." It is precisely by communicating it too many times that it stops being exemplary and unparalleled and obviously sort of exists everywhere. So the work of kingship… in the age of mechanical reproduction. [Laughter]

Nash: Johannes has indicated a short intervention.

Türk: So, what seems to me interesting to consider in this respect—and we haven't talked a lot about it—is a notion that's always connected to the exemplary and that's the notion of authority. That's something entirely different from power or… and I think, in a certain way, I mean, imitation exists during in Louis XIV reign, not only later. So, in a certain way one could say authority

actually ceases to exist once it no longer has the power to prevent repetition from turning into parody. And so, that's a real historical factor: power.

I think there are a couple of counter… and the whole idea of secularization, at least in the German context, is very connected to Protestant thinkers and if you look at someone like Carl Schmitt, you know, before he becomes associated with the Nazi regime, he claims that in institutions there is something like *real* authority that, for example, inhabits for a long time the Catholic Church… it has to do with rhetoric, it has to do with an institution, it's not power, and it's disappearing. And, in a way, he has this non-secularized view on the development of modern institutions in which I think authority is the core term. I'm not sure if this is helpful, but it's something I think. I mean, already the rhetorical treatises talk about how different forms of exemplarity have power or not, right? So the literary, for example, has little power. Whereas historic examples have more power; the judgments of people have little power. It's all a very fine, interesting system that we no longer really buy into and that changes over time, so that will be on the micro level of a historical…. So that's a… yeah.

Bjørnstad: It's extremely different to, of course… explain the difference between a parody and a non-parody, and then whether it has authority or not would be a… you need to explain it from the outside in, you can't explain it from the text itself. It reminds me of—

Türk: And it's not legitimacy. The way that modern politics is always thought of is: is it legitimate and does it have authority? That is a different way of thinking about institutions.

Bjørnstad: It reminds me of a book about medieval exemplarity whose author escapes me now who uses as a working definition of exemplarity, that exemplarity is the cultural and vernacular authority… that would go nicely along with what your saying.

Robert Schneider: Is that Lyons?

Bjørnstad: No, it's a medieval—

Schneider: Okay.

Nash: Frauke, I think you're up.

Frauke Berndt: I'm not so much interested in kingship… but in structure.

Schneider: What?

Berndt: Structure. So, I think your main point is on page fifteen and it says (the first line): "The king becomes his own example in an auto-exemplarity that threatens to bring the panegyric system to an end"… right? So, and I think that is a very provocative thesis: it is something that occurs in our discussion again and again… this paradoxical idea of auto-exemplarity. How can something be auto-exemplary, right? So, I would like you to comment on that, and by doing that I would like to understand the two dimensions or the two axes of the example; you have that horizontal dimension and then the other one, the vertical dimension, right. And, that reminds me of Jakobson's model of the text and in funny ways the notion is the other way around—because

he would say a paradigm always is a vertical dimension, whereas syntax then would be the horizontal dimension, in the rhetoric sense or whatever. Can you comment on that? And, maybe should, if you work on that, you should consider the ladder because it confuses you if you know it.

Bjørnstad: I haven't put those together, so it would be interesting to go back to Jakobson and look at it…. So, to me, Gelley's distinction between the two dimensions of exemplarity helped me to understand why it is impossible to properly understand exemplarity… because those two dimensions seem to be present always.

Berndt: Right, and we already talked about those, so—

Bjørnstad: But, at the same time I feel like it would be interesting to push it further, so that would be a way to try to do that. I'm going to try to do that next time in my study. The parody is also—

Berndt: How are they related? that would be my question. How are the two dimensions and the auto-exemplarity related to each other? I mean it's one condition for the other or . . . [pause]?

Bjørnstad: It seems to me that that path towards excess that comes in the vertical scale necessitates somehow the mirror structure… but I'm not sure about this and this is the point I need to push further in the project. To me, it's very symptomatic that family instructions everywhere in the cultural imaginary around Louis XIV, and you may know the book by Louis Marin called the *Portrait of the King*, which is based on a book by André Félibien which was also called the *Portrait of the King* which is… So, Félibien writes a book addressed to the king describing a painting of the king that the king had in his own bedroom… so it's like a double, triple layer of specularity. And Félibien says to the king that he can see himself "comme dans un glace très pure" [like in a very accurate mirror].

And there, and also in my… the part of my project on the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, there are two levels of mirror structure in Le Brun's portrayal of the life of Louis XIV (in addition to the whole host of mirrors on the wall), there are two further levels of mirror structure that haven't really been analyzed, but must be at the core of the self-image of absolutism. So it's clearly extremely central, but I'm still working on ways to figure it out… But, to me, it's linked to this overcharging and eventual breakdown of the system…It's just a way of saying "good question."

Nash: Guillaume?

Guillaume Ansart: I just wanted to mention also another interesting structure of exemplarity that emerges in Hall's paper on page thirteen…to have an example this is not a single item extracted from a group, but in fact is a sum total of the whole group. As it were, the item and the group are the same thing, actually. And, it's interesting also because it makes the example problematic in the sense that it's the sum total, the end point of the series—or can it be continued, can it add to the sum as the next thing, for instance, or is it complete? Just a point.

Bjørnstad: Yeah, and to some extent it's made apparent at the end of the paragraph after the quotation that I know that there seems to be a model here of confirmation. So, it's not, so maybe

it's not so much a crisis as that organic model of the two bodies of the king, which means that there will be a king, and maybe not a going down from Louis XIV. So that, that's also something about this book that's just piling up models different ways of thinking kingship, different models of praising… in incompatible ways. It's also the last quotation I quote from that book, where it's about the novelty of Louis XIV as so many new things under the sun… which is interesting in terms of the late seventeenth-century novelty is especially problematic as a category…where you have not succession at all, but pure novelty.

Nash: I'm pausing for a moment because there are too many thoughts in my mind… I'll keep them to myself. Julia, you're next.

Douthwaite: OK, I just wanted to build on that, and it seems to me now this notion that Guillaume just quoted, that quote …isn't this a crime of *lèse*… not lese-majesty, but "lese-monarchy"?! to claim that this is the *one*, the unparalleled, the sum of all? What does that leave for later? And, it reminds me of a quote from Balzac's "On Modern Government" (in 1832, I think), where he says if the notion of legitimacy did not exist, we would have to invent it. And he says, he argues why the people have to be kept silent and apart from the king—they have no say in the king and in his legitimacy and they must not have any say and the unfortunate examples of Louis XVI and Charles X show that. But this notion of if legitimacy did not exist we would have to invent it—we're here on the other side of the French revolution looking back at the mistakes we've made and saying, you know, we should've been more strong about this… and this seems to be the slippery slope that Louis XIV that… that he allowed his people to do this; this is not good for the monarchy. Saying that, you know, no one will ever do as good as me; well that's not okay. When you're a monarch, you're one of many, you're not the only one, you're supposed to be humble enough to leave something for your successors to do.

Bjørnstad: It's like the problem of [inaudible] wanting to be Le Grand , since Louis—

Douthwaite: Well, but he's Le Plus Grand, he's not just Le Grand.

Bjørnstad: Louis the Greatest. And, then Louis the Next….

Douthwaite: So, that seems to be a lack of foresight on his part, that he didn't point that out on behalf of monarchy as an institution. [Laughter].

Bjørnstad: That's a good way of getting at the last point. Yeah, yeah, from the perspective of the monarchy.

Nash: We have a moment here, so I'm going to come back to the last comment you made about novelty. It got me wondering if, if…—let me throw this out as a formulation: I thought you said and, if I heard you correctly, I think Mary will be on your side…

Mary Favret: You don't want that. [Laughter]

Nash: And, I think everyone else will take issue, perhaps, but I'm not sure. And that is… it sounded to me as though: if we think of exemplarity formally, the logic of exemplarity is anti-

thetical to the logic of novelty and innovation. And I'm thinking—actually I'm thinking about the paper yesterday about Locke and I was thinking about Dryden, Dryden's relationship to Locke, and I'm thinking about when he was talking about the dangers of innovation, political innovation. And, that seems to be very much… that in the political context you're talking about the virtue of exemplarity precisely should be the perpetuation of monarchy but (as Julia's pointing out) if you claim this extraordinary exemplarity for this particular monarch you undercut the logic of monarchy itself. But in Daniel's paper I'm back to wondering about whether the breakdown of the apparitional exemplarity that you're talking about here is more akin to what I heard as Mary's resistance to talking about exemplarity and novels… novels seem to be inimical to a rhetoric of exemplarity. So I'm… and again we have people. Peter [?], you're first, and then Johannes and Rebecca.

Johnson: Could you rehearse that argument again on why exemplarity is inimical to the novel?

Favret: Well, I think I was a little more forceful than I'm going to be now, but… it's just simply that it seems like we have got many papers to talk about novels and I sorta thought… well, now I'll put it forcefully, well, duh, exemplarity breaks down in the novel. It's the novel, you know, it's the… and so I'll talk about that last line from the *Princesse de Clèves*, and say "If it's the first novel, one of the things it tells you [about novels] is that this is an imitable example." What you have is an example, not an exemplar, so get over it, you're not going to get exemplars in the novel. We know that because other forms… The novel, it's kind of constituted that way, Bakhtin will tell us that, I mean, everyone's going to tell you that. If you want exemplarity, go to drama or you go to tragedy or you go to history painting, why would we ever think it's news that—I'm being very polemical here—it's no news that exemplarity doesn't work well in the novel and when you try, as I think *Clarissa* is saying, to try to make it exemplary it runs into all kinds of problems and usually somebody dies, right? [Laughter] Because you can't just say somebody is an exemplar in a novel.

Johnson: That's not the way for monarchs.

Favret: Right, that's what Richard's trying to say. Well, maybe that's, maybe that is what's happening… and actually I think that goes back to what Michel was saying from the perspective of Kant. You know, that oddly enough he's going to say in the aesthetic realm, yes, you have to make your own example. The exemplarity there is not of a series; there's no rule guiding the series, which is what you would want in monarchy: you would want a rule or concept that governs a series, we call this series "lineage" or whatever, right? But the novel, in that sense, doesn't respect lineage, you know, and doesn't respect governing concepts. That's my sort of… well, I read Bakhtin in graduate school.

Nash: And as you prepare to respond to Mary, let me just say that suddenly things have happened and there are hooks going up everywhere and so following these responses I now have Johannes, Rebecca, Oz, Connie, and Susan… should I take you as hook or a full question?

Susan Staves: Full question.

Favret: Also, I should say I was a member of the committee that accepted lots of papers about novels. [Laughter]

Douthwaite: So, it's your fault then.

Johnson: Well, I guess you can maybe see this happening in Richardson's obsessive concern to try to control what the meaning of a Lovelace or a Clarissa is, is that kind of what you might be gesturing toward? The example as soon as you posit it within the novel is already getting out of the hands of the author who controls it, so it can be taken in a direction that was not first intended. So that readers will come to love Lovelace and say "No, please give us a marriage or a different ending." Is that the kind of thing you're talking about?

Douthwaite: Well, the characters are so complex in novels. You have to be one dimensional to be an exemplar, right?

Favret: Well there's two things: I think there's the nature of the novel, the ontology of the novel, and then there's also mechanical reproduction, the fact that the novel hits a mass audience at a certain point (certainly with *Clarissa*). Exemplarity is not sustainable in that environment.

Johnson: So we have lots of potential examples coalescing into exemplarity or something like that . . .

Douthwaite: [inaudible] because people are unfathomable, we are all complex, we contradict ourselves all the time. So if you try to be realistic in a novel you're going to be necessarily unexemplary.

Nash: Though I'm going to come back to the comment…that I was reading in the presentation. That what strikes me as interesting here is that what Richardson does, what we read Richardson as doing, seems in some ways at odds with and contradictory to what he's setting down in his hints for a notes for a preface. He's saying let me tell you what I'm doing and what his (the reader closest to his goal) is trying to claim is a status of exemplarity that the form of the novel itself seems to be resisting. Not to jump in there.

Are we… can I go to Johannes?

Türk: Mary actually came up with a term that almost sums up what I want to say and that's that a rule guiding the series … because it seems to me that if there is room for innovation in the logic of the example, totally. Even in rhetoric handbooks, the end is always to learn from examples, but then to do it better. But you, in some way you give the exemplary the, an authoritative status because you think that the field it opens is the field you accept, enter, and then supersede or… and I think that's why what I found interesting in that remark that was my, my little hint that it's actually not repetition versus innovation, but rather if you accept the example as rule-giving *for* your innovation.

And, that leads me to a very brief speculation that I feel there is almost something like a hysterical excess going on in what Hall describes. And hysteria is kind of symptom that has to do with, you know, excess, with the production of an empty excess around a problem in the end of authority. So, that's… but that's maybe a little speculative.

Bjørnstad: Well, but I think the paper invites speculation.

Nash: Rebecca.

Spang: Gosh, if I were to speculate on that I would say we have to think about the Fronde again. But what I wanted to talk about wasn't the Fronde but to jump ahead a hundred years. Because the comment about "le plus grand" (and the next) made me think, "Ah, yes, right, so how is the monarchy talked about, say, during the Seven Years War?" And, you don't hear very much about the greatness of Louis XV, what you hear about is the nation. And so, then I was thinking about Eric Santner's book *The Royal Remains,* and wondering if this isn't also a way to bring the supernatural in—that some of the supernatural power of the king will be reconstituted in the phantom entity that is the nation (over the course of the eighteenth century), in different ways in different political contexts. And, maybe if we throw that in as another term to think about…?

Constance Furey: I'm going to pass and then come back.

Nash: OK.

Bjørnstad: Let's say, Rebecca, that it's already there… it's actually been going on from the body of the king to the body of the nation, so maybe having the body of Louis XIV up over court life—

Spang: Yes.

Bjørnstad: —kind of empties a certain way of figuring. Yeah, so that's very interesting, so thanks.

Spang: And it actually… it suddenly makes me think isn't this basically the argument of Elias' *Court Society*? Doesn't he say that what actually worked under Louis XIV becomes under Louis XV and Louis XVI people thinking, "Oh, I can't *believe* we have to go watch this guy put on his bathrobe"?! [Laughter].

Nash: What happens when you imitate the unparalleled exemplarity…

Bjørnstad: Just to repeat the observation: So, it [the monarchy] is exactly the same, but exactly therefore that's why it doesn't work.

Nash: Oz?

Oscar Kenshur: Yeah, I just wanted to ask Mary if there are any qualifications to her observation or not. [Laughter]. What I'm thinking of is the comic novel, the eighteenth-century comic novel where you have characters who seem more allegorical (judging by names like Allworthy or, you know, judging by names like Yorick) in other words, it seems to me like there might… I'm wondering if the comic novel is working in a different trajectory that allows for exemplarity in a way that, you know, the novel that's moving toward the nineteenth-century novel doesn't?

Favret: Well, I think people have been saying—and Richard was making it clear that in his mind—the comic undermines exemplarity, so once you put it in a comic context you risk parody or invite parody. And so, Squire Allworthy… Yeah, I mean, are we really to… you know, nobody's writing hymns to *him*! I mean—

Kenshur: I probably shouldn't have used Allworthy, I probably should've used, you know… I probably should've come up with a name that's more satiric, rather than exemplary.

Favret: Well, "Lovelace" is a good one, and I think we realize in reality it doesn't quite work, you know? You thought Lovelace was so hot … [Laughter]

Nash: Our small hooks keep pushing the queue back, so Connie's back in small hook and Johannes is right after Connie.

Furey: I think what we're talking around now is really Frauke's question about the relationship between the horizontal and the vertical and the excess. And, it seems to me that that's… Hall, it's your point, that the impossibility of exemplarity, it's not that there's, sort of, one way it works from the vertical and another way it works from the horizontal, but that in a way the unruliness is that it is self-destructive in a sense. Now in another vocabulary at different times [in this workshop] there have been interventions where people try to talk about the vocabulary words we could sort of use to acknowledge this impossibility. Or, I mean … I think, in a way, "instance," [to Anahid Nersessian] your happiness with instance—oh yes, it's an instance, which is to say it can't "stand in." But the tension you were describing in Kant, Michel, I think is analogous, really to what you're doing.

There's a way to think about this in relation to the impossibility of exemplarity in the novel that I think… so examples, right? Jesuit education, parallels, there's ways in which examples are fine. You repudiated example yesterday similar to the way I think you're repudiating exemplarity today. But exemplarity is it's own impossibility, I think. …

Bjørnstad: To me, the two most modern ways of thinking exemplarity (which I've discussed already with Frauke and Michel) is what happens here with Louis XIV… in trying to push it further after having exhausted the traditional language of exemplarity. It seems nearly applicable to what you have been discussing, to make sense of what's going on in these passages in a very strange way. So, that makes sense to me … or that makes sense as a way of trying to advance further.

Michel Chaouli: But isn't the wonder that the language exhausts itself? There's no particular reason why it should exhaust itself—it's not like there is a "use by" date on certain ways of being or speaking, so it's… so *that* needs a kind of figuring out. If you say it exhausts itself—well, why would something like this exhaust itself, it seems inexhaustible, right? Anyway, I don't have an answer I'm just—

Nash: Befuddled.

Chaouli: Sorry?

Nash: You're just befuddled.

Chaouli: I'm befuddled, yes.

Nash: Johannes. [to Chaouli] We're not going to clear it up for you.

Turk: Yeah, just in the novel … the self-destruction of exemplarity becomes very visible in the interspersed novellas in *Don Quixote* [multiple murmurs of agreement] which is interesting, for example, in one the jealous husband, you know, his wife is totally pious and moral and whatnot so he sets up a trap to test her and tells his friend you can come and visit her and so on and so what ensues though is there is really a love affair and the whole story ends in death, you know, for both lovers. So, there's a way in which Cervantes is totally interested in the example going radically wrong, and not only for Don Quixote himself, but in these novellas in a much more interesting way because they, in a way, auto-destruct the whole program of the medieval novella in a very concrete fashion. And so, in a certain way, the novel is not what excludes the example; his problem is that the example goes wrong and actually has to become part of what one calls "experience" in the modern sense, it seems to me. I was trying to bring the auto-destruction back to the question of the novel that Mary had posed and say—

Ansart: And in *Jacques the Fatalist* . . . [inaudible 1:08:30-1:08:55].

Douthwaite: Well, and it goes to the name issue, too because le Jacques is a thing in France, you know, in French he would be a simpleton man, a low-brow person of lesser intelligence and le Maître would be the person of superior intelligence, but actually in the novel that's not the case, right, so.

Kenshur: Well, just similar in certain ways—

Douthwaite: But it is a comic novel, a comic, picaresque novel which is making fun of exemplarity and with those names and with the very stories put in it, too. "Madame de La Pommeraye," for example, which is just like one of these stories that we just referred to, there's a, it's that tale in *Jacques le Fataliste* told by the innkeeper's wife in the picture that I put in here with the dog, she's singing and making love to the dog, but she also tells a story about a man who, you know, one of these elaborate stories where he's trying to test the virtue of a girl who could not be as virtuous as she appears, and it goes on…. It actually, it was set up by a woman who wants to make that man…. well, she wants to get her vengeance over him, but it turns out to fly in *her* face because he ends up marrying her anyway and being happy with her even though she's not a paradigm of her virtue and he's fine with that. [Laughter]. So, yeah, it's making fun of exemplarity in lots of ways.

Kenshur: What you say about *Jacques le Fataliste* you could say also about *Le Neveu de Rameau* which isn't a novel, you know.

Douthwaite: Right, you don't have to talk about novels ….

Nash: The hooking of comments and questions is getting harder and harder to follow, I have Mary left with another hook and then perhaps we'll get to Susan's question.

Favret: I just want to get back to Daniel's paper…and to respect what you're trying to do because it seems to me, as we hear people talk, that what's surprising or unusual is that Defoe or Richardson would feel like they could smuggle in some allusion to that verticality, say, through this invocation of an invisible world and that they would do it straight (as it were). You know, that they would try to do it in an un-mocking, not comic way. That, that, that seems quite curious and I wonder if you think there are other examples where that happens, where the novelist tries to play it straight and try to recuperate some climate for exemplarity?

Johnson: That's part of the extension of what I'd like to do. Look into novels that are sort of off the cannon and see if that is happening anywhere else. I mean, the thing that comes to mind as sort of an epitome of this breakdown process, or this inability of exemplarity to demonstrate spirits, in some way comes back to that passage in Samuel Johnson that I happen to quote. He said "It's curious that for thousands of years on this earth, we have not inevitably decided whether there has even ever been an instance of the spirit of any person appearing after death." And, he goes on to say "all argument is against it, but all belief is for it." And so, he mirrors this attitude in *Rasselas* as well when they're at the tombs. They're—I think it's Pekuah is afraid of the spirits of the dead appearing at the tombs—and Imlac says "Well, you know, I'm not going to argue against the testimony of the ages that there's any kind of spirit, but there's no reason that they should be here rather than anywhere else." So, what you have in the end is a discussion about potential spirits acting in the real world but it never appears within that real world, it can't be an example, there's never—and he and I agree about this—there's never been a confirmable instance of a spirit appearing.

So, that's why it's so bizarre to me as well that Defoe and Richardson seem to use this language of invisible communications even after—if you want to go back to the example of Locke and also filtered through Addison—you know, the idea that there is a spiritual realm potentially existing up there but we don't have the correct sensorium to access it, so we're not going to talk about that. So, I don't know if that speaks . . .?

Favret: Yeah, that's helpful.

Nash: Susan.

Staves: Yes, I have a comment rather than a question… a comment that looks for a response on the subject of hyperbole, not about the novel, but on hyperbole. And, I am interested in the relation between, on the one hand, hyperbole, and (on the other hand) the theological and political implications of French Gallicanism in the Catholic Church because the French Gallican version of Catholicism attached an authority to the monarch that had been previously attached to the pope. Giving, for example, the French monarch a say in the appointment of French bishops in France (an authority the pope had had). Institutionally, in order to be ordained as a Catholic priest in France and then eventually to become a bishop, you had to take a kind… you had to swear to the supremacy of the king in a variety of matters.

Most of the Irish clergy were educated and ordained in France during this period and this becomes really significant for the relation of liberty. Because by the time the Irish were looking for

Catholic emancipation in Ireland they can say, "You don't have to worry anymore that we owe political allegiance to the pope… because of Gallican Christianity," you know. Meanwhile, of course, what you get, going to back to Richard's remark earlier about secular communication, is a severe critique of hyperbolic language directed towards [i.e., in praise of] the king. Hyperbolic language that, from a Protestant point of view, ought to be directed towards God and not the king, so that monarchical politics becomes a form of religious idolatry (and a very bad thing). The, the only problem, the only, you know, practical, political problem in Ireland was although the Irish clergy could claim reasonably that because the French king had developed this they now didn't have to be worried about as "lackeys of the pope". They had actually taken effective oaths to the French king…which is the kind of thing the British state views as a sort of problem. [Laughter]. So that's a comment about the, sort of, political and theological significance of the hyperbolic language that you're directing our attention to.

Bjørnstad: So, as a parallel along the same lines… something that I'm struggling to figure out is: France becomes radically less tolerant at exactly the same time as this hyperbolic language reaches its high point. And as I point out the Vertron text is published in the same year as the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. So, the idea of everything as working or on the way… but that's not a question exactly of Gallicanism, but inside of Gallicanism …a, you would say, a stronger… need. Yeah, thank you.

Staves: [inaudible].

Bjørnstad: Yes, so that would be the observation Rebecca made before of eighteenth-century books, the function of the different elements between it is complicated, but, of course, the major French clerics are also the convergence of that, too.

Nash: Tracey, you have the last question.

Tracey Hutchings-Goetz: So, this is, sort of, a comment and it might morph into a question for Daniel. I liked your paper very much, but I couldn't help but think that there seems to be a missing link, sort of, between Defoe and Richardson. And, Richard's comments about parody and its, sort of, relation to exemplarity… allowed me to start thinking about *Gulliver's Travels* and the often ignored third book and the latter half of the third book which features a literal example of interactions with the spiritual realm. So, Gulliver himself actually ends up in a location where he can literally converse with spirits and I was wondering how that kind of parodic, or how that moment might function as a sort of parody of the example (and this is on your page two) of how spiritual communication could be something that's literalized, finally. So, Gulliver is in this space, this land, albeit accidentally, where he can literally communicate with spirits: how might that put pressure on the model of spiritual interaction that's proposed by Defoe and how that might lead to this revision or progression to Richardson?

Johnson: That's a great question, maybe that will appear in the area between …[Laughter] …because it's complicated by the fact that Swift himself was a clergyman, so what exactly is being communicated by that kind of a parody? Whereas, what I'm gesturing towards in my concluding remarks is that the gothic novel is a kind of parody (especially in Walpole) that indicates a certain distance from the literal belief in spirits being able to interact and being sensed. And so,

the gothic novel is kind of enacting that secularization that we were talking about, but the idea that Swift is doing this already in *Gulliver's Travels* is really great …The answer is: I don't know.

Hutchings-Goetz: Well, the thing—a strange thing, too—is that he is trying to summon up exemplary figures. He wants to talk to… I think, Brutus? I'm trying to remember some other ones… but he's, it's about, sort of… It's also related to ancients and moderns….

Nash: Okay. With that we end our panel and take a fifteen minute break. [Applause].