

The Relation of the Whole to the Part in Interpretation Theory and in the Composing Process

James L. Kinneavy

Key problems in modern hermeneutics are explored: part-whole relationships and the correlated merism-holism debate, the importance of situational context in Greek and Roman rhetoric and its relation to current interpretation theory as well as composition theory, and the problems with the (dominant) sentence and theme emphases of much theory and teaching. The range of materials, of authors, and of ideas being discussed in the "new" hermeneutics is surveyed.

If I were a committee, this study would be labeled a "progress report." Indeed, it is an example, if not a model, of "exploratory discourse." For it presents an important problem and an ongoing attempt to arrive at a solution. There is a hypothesis, but not yet a thesis.

The hypothesis has a very practical origin. It is concerned with the failure of our attempts to integrate several "parts" of the composition to the whole. There are 70 years of research which demonstrate overwhelmingly that the isolated teaching of grammatical skills has little or no transfer to use in actual composition.¹ There are parallel studies in library science which demonstrate that library skills taught in isolation also fail to transfer to real situations.² There are similar studies in mathematics education which demonstrate that a curriculum which is too oriented to the teaching of mere computational skills produces fewer problem solvers than a curriculum which forces students to use computational skills in verbal and more abstract settings.³ I suspect that the same can be said of the insulated teaching of logical skills.

My question about all of these skill operations is the same: "What catalytic agent enables the student to see the relevance of skill exercises to actual writing situations?" I can sympathize with those who, in the present literacy crisis, fault us with neglecting these skills. Students do need vocabulary development, sentence maturity, paragraph instruction, introduction to library techniques, etc. Yet I know that isolating the skills

and teaching the skills to the neglect of the act of writing is almost certainly a waste of time--as much of this research tells us.

On the other hand, there is much evidence that beginning with the whole and moving only incidentally to the parts (mechanical skills of punctuation spelling, sentence skills, paragraph skills) does not seem to be entirely successful either. At the University of Texas, where I teach, there has been a rhetorically based program for years, with emphasis on writing or nine fairly long themes a semester. For quite some time there was not even a handbook for grammar and usage employed. Yet several tests recently have convinced us that these skills were being ignored, that the whole does not necessarily take care of these kinds of parts. Our experience is not at all unique.

We need the parts and we need the whole. Beginning with the skills, the parts, and moving to the whole does not seem to work. Beginning with the whole and moving only incidentally to the parts seems to be not entirely successful either. Is there a way out of the dilemma?

I had, in earlier work, been concerned with the relationships of part to whole, but had not found a satisfactory model for explanation of the composing process. However, I now believe that the treatment of whole and part in interpretation theory seems more promising than the model of Piaget which I had used in handling the nature of description or the model of mereology of Lesniewski, which I had tried and rejected in the same circumstances, but for different reasons.⁴

The treatment of the whole-part relationship in interpretation theory is embodied in the notion of what is usually called the hermeneutic circle. One writer succinctly explains the circle as follows:

We understand the meaning of an individual word by seeing it in response to the whole of the sentence; and reciprocally, the sentence's meaning as a whole is dependent on the meaning of individual words. By extension, an individual concept derives its meaning from a context or horizon within which it stands; yet the horizon is made up of the very elements to which it gives meaning. By dialectical interaction between the whole and the part each gives the other meaning; understanding is circular, then. Because within this "circle" the meaning comes to stand, we call this the "hermeneutic circle."⁵

By rhetorical, if not poetic, justice, the hermeneutic circle had its origins in rhetorical theory, particularly in the organic metaphor of the head and limbs of Plato's *Phaedrus*. Gadamer tells us that Luther and his successors . . . applied this image, familiar from classical rhetoric, to the process of understanding and developed the universal principle of textual interpretation that all of the details of a text are to be understood from that contextus (context) and from the scopus, the unified sense at which the whole aims.⁶

Others go even further back in their search for the origins of the hermeneutic circle and find it in Heraclitus, Parmenides, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, Celsus (the jurist), and later in Hegel, Fichte, and Schelling. It crystallized in Frederick Ast, was developed by Schleiermacher and Dilthey, and was expanded to all understanding by Heidegger.

This notion of interpretation or understanding is obviously the inverse of rhetoric, as Schleiermacher remarked.⁸ In fact, the processes of producing or composing a text and of interpreting it are very similar, a similarity to which some have called attention.⁹

Both involve the act of interpretation. The writer interprets the world to the reader by means of a text; the reader interprets the text of the writer in order to interpret the world. The world, the text, and the act of interpretation are all involved in both activities, though in the reverse order.

It is not therefore surprising that, as Gadamer has pointed out, Melancthon set out to write a rhetorical treatise on the *commonplaces* (a rhetorical term) of Christian doctrine but ended up writing a treatise on how to interpret the Scriptures.¹⁰ It seems only proper, then that the hermeneutic circle, having originated in rhetoric, having subsequently been enriched in interpretation theory, now return, like Joseph from Egypt, back to the promised land and help the homefolk.

One of the most important tenets of the circle creed seems particularly promising for composition theory. There is a strong concern for the continually changing relation between whole and part,¹¹ the relative notion of what is whole and what is part,¹² the dialectic that continually functions between whole and part,¹³ and the reciprocal interdependence of each on the other.¹⁴

Now I believe that this model of the composing process is consistent with what we know about the habits of professional writers as well as students. Indeed, while reading about the dialectic of the hermeneutic circle, I was continually reminded of passage after passage in the *Writers at Work* series of interviews by the *Paris Review* of professional writers. The interviews focussed specifically on the working habits of composition. The changing notions of part and whole, the taking over of a plot by a character who was initially a minor personality, the additions and deletions of small and large segments, the provisional writing and rewriting in order to achieve an elusive whole, etc., all seemed to me to be accurate instances of the hermeneutic dialectic.¹⁵

One way of looking at the part-whole relationship is to distinguish among levels. Linguists, rhetoricians, structuralists, and interpretation theorists are among those who have successfully used this technique. Thus linguists often view the sentence as the whole and the lower level components as parts. On the other hand, the sentence, as such, is not a major concern with many literary critics. Thus what is a whole at one level of

analysis or production may be viewed as a part at another level, and the relationship of a part to a whole at one level may be completely different from the relationship of the same part to a whole at another level.

As has already been pointed out, level differences are not new to language theory, either in rhetoric or in interpretation. Much exciting work has been done at different levels by modern scholars. Part of this success has been brought about by applying the same model to different layers and analyzing for similar component relationships. In rhetoric I think immediately of the success of the tagmemic "particle-wave-field" model, which Pike and others apply very successfully at the phonemic level, at the morphemic level, at the paragraph level, at the utterance level, and at the full conversational and behavioral levels.¹⁶ I have tried to do the same with the semiotic structure of "component-reference-use" at different levels of interpretation and composition.

In some respects, both models work effectively at different levels. But we are also learning that, in important respects, the levels are not symmetrical. Hirsch, quoting Bazell, has insisted on this and has suggested that the more we move into the larger rhetorical patterns of composition, the more asymmetrical the levels become.¹⁷

Although there is some evidence to support this position, more investigation must still be made at many of the levels, and comparisons among the levels have also to be made. In an attempt to compare (and contrast) some emphases at quite different levels, I have assembled the chart in Figure 1. Emphases in composing theory are represented on the left and emphases in interpretation theory are given on the right. These names or movements are only intended to be suggestive, not at all to be exhaustive.

It is, however, a curious fact (for which I have no adequate explanation), that theories of producing and theories of interpreting emphasize quite different aspects of the two processes. For this reason, it will be necessary to switch back and forth between the productive and the interpretive processes, given the scholarly emphases.

At the lowest level of the chart, it is possible to find some who have viewed the structure of the phoneme as the micro-structure which can be used as the model of all higher level analyses. The success of de Saussure at the phonological level has indeed left a distinct impression on much subsequent study, particularly with structuralists and post-structuralists in France. Thus Derrida in *Of Grammatology* says:

Linguistics thus wishes to be the science of language Let us first simply consider that the scientificity of that science is often acknowledged because of its *phonological* foundations.

Phonology, it is often said today, communicates its scientificity to linguistics, which in turn serves as the epistemological model for all of the sciences of man.¹⁸

Lévi-Strauss has, on the other hand, warned of the dangers of a simplistic analysis of all levels of culture in terms of phonemic and distinctive features.¹⁹ As will be pointed out later, he categorically rejects the notion that the myth is made up only of linguistic structures. However, he cannot resist comparisons. Having suggested that the myth is the sum-total of all of the individual variants of a myth (a criterion beyond the individual text, therefore) he concludes, "To put it in even more linguistic terms, it is as though a phoneme were always made up of all its variants."²⁰

Sentence Emphases

However, it is the work of Lévi-Strauss himself using the sentence as a basis for analyzing myths that has attracted much of the attention of the structural and post-structural French thought in this connection. Paul Ricoeur, a contemporary hermeneutic theorist, is impressed with the centrality of the sentence. Writing in 1969, he states:

	COMPOSING	INTERPRETING
	Universal History	Dilthey, Droysen, VonRanke, Hegel, Gadamer
	Cultural Situation	Bultmann, Jonas, Dilthey
Sophists, Plato, Aristotle, Burke, Britton, Booth, Kinneavy	Situational Context	Schleiermacher, Hirsch, Bitzer, Black, Speech act theory, Tillich
D'Angelo, Moffett, McDrimmon	Text	Luther, Many new critics, Derrida
Christensen	Paragraph	
Christensen, Morenberg, et al. Many generative linguists	Sentence	Ricoeur, Genette
	Word	
	Morpheme	
Some structural linguists	Phoneme	(Derrida)

Figure 1. Persons and movements emphasizing different levels.

The question is to know if all the levels are homologous. All of my investigations will rest on the idea that the passage to a new unity of discourse, constituted by the sentence or the utterance, represents a cut, a mutation, in the hierarchy of levels. I will not moreover, exhaust the question of levels. I will even glimpse at possibly other strategic levels such as the text, the internal coherence of which calls for a different sort of intelligibility than the sentence or than the word in its position in the sentence.²¹

It is at the level of the text that the hermeneut usually operates, he maintains.²²

However, writing a year later, he returns to the centrality of the sentence. Despite the fact that the written text is not *langue* but *parole*, he says, using the terminology of de Saussure,

. . . the specificity of writing with regard to affective *parole* rests on traits susceptible of being treated as analogous to *langue* in discourse. This hypothesis of work is perfectly legitimate; it consists in saying that under certain conditions the large unities of *langue*, that is to say the unities of a degree superior to the sentence, offer organizations comparable to those of small unities of language, that is to say those of a degree inferior to the sentence, those precisely which are the *result* of linguistics.²³

He cites the analysis of the Oedipus myth by Lévi-Strauss as an example of such a procedure and adds that Roland Barthes and A.J. Greimas follow the same technique. He summarizes:

One finds in these authors the same postulates as in Lévi-Strauss. The unities above the sentence have the same composition as the unities below the sentence.

.....
For the cluster of relations for which Levi-Strauss carries back the mytheme is again of the order of the sentence and the play of oppositions which are located at the very abstract level of the mytheme is still of the order of the sentence and of meaning.²⁴

The reason he gives for this is that the relations between the components of the myth (and other sociological relations, such as those of blood relationships) can be expressed in "the form of the sentence."²⁵ This is a strange argument, the validity of which I shall return to later after looking at the other analyst who is often credited with finding in the sentence the structural model for higher level analyses.

Beginning his analysis of narration in "Discours du récit," Gérard Genette poses the foundation of his analysis as follows:

Since every narrative . . . is a linguistic production assuming the relation of one or of several events, it is perhaps legitimate to treat it, as monstrous as this may seem, as the development given to a *verbal* form, in

the grammatical sense of the term, the expansion of a verb. *I walk*, *Peter has come* are for me minimal forms of the narrative, and inversely the *Odyssey* and the *Remembrance (of Times Past)* do nothing more than amplify (in a rhetorical sense) statements such as *Ulysses returns to Ithaca* or *Marcel becomes a writer*. This authorizes us, perhaps, to organize, or at least to formulate, the problems of analysis of narrative discourse according to categories borrowed from the grammar of the verb, and which here can be reduced to three fundamental classes.²⁶

He then calls his three classes those of time (tense), mood, and voice, terms borrowed, he says, from grammar. He concludes the long paragraph by repeating:

Once again it must be said that there is here only a borrowing of terms, but that there is no pretense to a rigorous homology.²⁷

His *time* has to do with the order of events, the duration of events, and the frequency of events. His *moods* concern, he says, problems of distance which American critics of the Jamesian tradition generally treat in terms of the opposition between *showing* and *telling*. The third category of *voice* treats problems of first and third person narration and their interrelationships.²⁸

There is, therefore, something of a grammatical framework of analysis erected by Genette for his lengthy investigation of narrative structures. Nonetheless, for instance, in his analysis of the order of events there is no recourse to technical issues of tense at all. Nor is there any attempt to reduce structures to the order of the sentence. His typical micro-analyses of short passages from the *Odyssey* and *Jean Santeuil* use, for example, 5 sentences which are *not* equivalent to the 5 events being analyzed, then 3 sentences embodying 9 events but with only 2 temporal units involved, and then a passage of 14 sentences embodying 15 events but only 7 temporal units. The macroanalysis of the *Remembrance* uses 10 segments for the entire novel, a few comprising only a page or so of text and several comprising hundreds of pages.²⁹

In fact the structures he finds within these micro and macro-structures are not patterned like sentences at all, nor do they reflect any *tense* design either. The same may be said of his mood and voice analyses. Consequently, though Genette begins with a framework that seems analogous to one drawn from grammar, the superstructures he discovers are not grammatically homologous at all.

The same must be said of the myth structures of Lévi-Strauss. It is true that he plasters his walls with single sentences drawn from the many versions of a myth. He then arranges, deranges, and rearranges these sentences in clusters to arrive at the structure of the myth, the clusters being certain repeated thematic patterns. Relating this work to linguistic structures, he says,

To sum up the discussion at this point, we have so far made the following claims: (1) If there is a meaning to be found in mythology, it cannot reside in the isolated elements which enter into the composition of a myth, but only in the way in which these elements are combined. (2) Although myth belongs to the same category as language, being, as a matter of fact, only a part of it, language in myth exhibits specific properties. (3) Those properties are only to be found *above* the ordinary linguistic level, that is, they exhibit more complex features than those which are to be found in any other kind of linguistic expression.³⁰

The basic constituent units of myths he calls mythemes and he uses sentences to serve as the mythemes with which he builds his mythic structures. However, these isolated units do not constitute the myth.

From this springs a new hypothesis, which constitutes the very core of our argument: The true constituent units of a myth are not the isolated relations but *bundles of such relations*, and it is only as bundles that these relations can be put to use and combined so as to produce a meaning.³¹

Indeed the final formula for myth which he gives in "The Structural Study of Myth" has no grammatical or sentence parallel at all. Therefore it is difficult to see that either Genette or Lévi-Strauss have postulated a sentence structure for the study of discourse. In fact, Ricoeur's argument that myths and blood relationships have sentence structures because they can be written about in sentences would make all structures in all disciplines sentential. And the argument that because Lévi-Strauss starts with sentences as mythemes, the large structure is sentential is also fallacious. One could also argue that the Cathedral at Rheims has the architectural structure of a molecule of stone because it is made of stone.

In one sense the most unabashed sentence emphasis in the analysis of language has been that of many of the speech act theorists. The work of Austin and Searle exemplifies this emphasis. Searle is very aware of this stress. He is also aware of the objection that might be made to such a technique. He says,

It still might seem that my approach is simply, in Saussurian terms, a study of "parole" rather than "langue." I am arguing, however, that an adequate study of speech acts is a study of *langue*.

.....

There are, therefore, not two irreducibly distinct semantic studies, one a study of the meanings of sentences and one a study of the performances of speech acts. For just as it is a part of our notion of the meaning of a sentence that a literal utterance of that sentence with that meaning in a certain context would be performance of a particular speech act, so it is a part of our notion of a speech act that there is a possible sentence (or sentences) the utterance of which in a certain context would in virtue of its (or their) meaning constitute a performance of that speech act.

.....

Therefore, it is in principle possible for every speech act one performs or could perform to be uniquely determined by a given sentence (or set of sentences), given the assumption that the speaker is speaking literally and that the context is appropriate.³²

Searle is attempting to justify his study of discourse (*parole*) to linguists interested in the kind of language analysis which linguists usually make (*langue*). However, his technique is open to objection from the opposite position, that of scholars interested in the full text. From this point of view he might just as well be accused of reducing *parole* to *langue*. And this is what he actually does--analyze a speech act by analyzing an equivalent sentence. For example, Searle's analysis of a *promise* speech act is made by analyzing sentences like "X made a promise."

I really don't know of any evidence that enables an analyst to reduce a whole discourse to a single equivalent sentence, or even a few of them; Searle doesn't even give an example. Actually, Searle ordinarily limits himself to the single sentence. Most discourse analysts would respond that a good deal has been lost when one tries to so abstract a discourse. As Paul Valéry has said, "Résumer une thèse, c'est en retenir l'essentiel. Resumer une oeuvre d'art, c'est en perdre l'essentiel."³³

In literary criticism, such a reductionism was called by one famous critic the heresy of paraphrase. But Searle exempts literary discourses from his analysis--though for different reasons than those which prompted Cleanth Brooks' condemnation of such summarizing.

However, many scientists would not even concede the first half of Valéry's statement. The summary of an elaborate proof is not equivalent at all to the proof. And no logician would grant the position that a given particular proof can be analyzed by analyzing the nature of proof itself. Yet that is what Searle is doing. Such a position ignores the individuality of any given speech act. On this account all proofs are the same, all promises are the same, etc. No one would deny that they have something in common, but they also have something individual.

Searle, however, in the process of analyzing his isolated sentences, finds it necessary to posit "appropriate conditions" in the speech act situation in order that a promise, a request, a command, etc., be meaningful. A promise, for example, predicates a future act of the speaker, the listener must prefer that future act over its opposite, the act must be one that the speaker would not normally do anyway, the speaker must sincerely intend to do what he promises, and the promise "counts as the undertaking of an obligation to do the act."³⁴

In other words, although Searle bypasses text in his analysis, he does not bypass situational context. Indeed, he continually refers to something like a

"suitable context," or an appropriate context.³⁵ Promises, in fact, extend beyond the situational context into the cultural context.³⁶ This analysis, it might be added, has proven extremely useful. A possible source for this emphasis on the context of situation in the ordinary language philosophers may well have been Malinowski, especially as he was transmitted through Firth. Langendoen remarks in this connection,

It is interesting to observe that the Oxford philosophers have maintained an outlook on semantics that bears great resemblance to that of Malinowski, Firth, and their linguistic followers, although there does not seem to have been much exchange between these two groups.³⁷

Mary Louise Pratt, writing eight years after Searle, recognizes the danger of reducing texts to single sentences. She writes,

Searle claims that "the characteristic grammatical form of an illocutionary act is the complete sentence" (it can be a one-word sentence) (1969:25), and indeed, speech acts have been discussed mostly in terms of single sentence utterances. Nevertheless, it is clear that the appropriate conditions for explaining, thanking, or persuading, for example, must at some level of analysis be seen as applying to explanations, thankings, or persuadings that are many sentences long. This is an issue to which few speech act philosophers (and few linguists) have addressed themselves, and to which I shall return in the next chapter.³⁸

In the next chapter she continues,

More broadly, the question is whether and to what extent the terms and categories designed to describe language at sentence level can be applied at the level of discourse, that is, to utterances of more than a single sentence. (In some cases, the real question seems to be whether terms originally developed by sentence theory actually belong to discourse theory.) These are questions that no one has so far answered, and that most linguists and language philosophers lamentably tend to avoid by choosing one-sentence examples.³⁹

She rejects Ohmann's attempt to get around this difficulty.⁴⁰ She herself uses several full texts and a good number of multi-sentence parts of texts in attempting to establish more clearly the appropriate conditions of "The Literary Speech Situation," as the largest and most important chapter of her book is called. She recognizes that both Searle and Grice were, in effect, working out the components of the situational contexts for different kinds of utterances.

Speech act theory, then, early emphasized sentence, bypassed text, and moved into situational context. In Pratt, at least, there is a respect for sentence, partial text, full text, and situational context. And occasionally Searle but especially Grice and Pratt insist on the operation of cultural or institutional norms in order to understand some kinds of utterances. Thus they range in emphases from sentence to cultural context.

On the production side of the chart, Bazell has shown convincingly that the phoneme level is a very different structure from the morpheme level, and both of these are quite different from the sememe level (roughly the word level).⁴¹ He does not discuss higher levels in any detail at all except to remark that each situation is so different that the structure would have to be distinct.⁴² Generative grammar, though not ordinarily considered a part of composition theory, yet does imply a production technique.

Still on the production side of the chart, I have placed the names of Christensen, and then those of Morenberg, Daiker, and Kerek. These represent the scholars who believe that the sentence is the basic structure of the composition as a whole and that to teach the sentence is to teach the theme. I will return to Christensen later. In the meantime let us turn to the recent experiment in Miami, Ohio, by Max Morenberg, Donald Daiker, and Andrew Kerek.

The analogue in classical rhetoric, incidentally, for such a position would have to be that of the Sophists ridiculed by Plato in the *Phaedrus*. Some Sophists presumably reduced all persuasion to matters of style, such as figures of speech and of thought, and structures of prose rhythm. For this reason, some historians have practically equated the sophistic concept of rhetoric to the stylistic. Yet this analogue, I shall attempt to show later, is not even fair to the Sophist most frequently accused of such a position--Gorgias.

Morenberg and his colleagues, however, have proposed a version of the centrality of the structure of the sentence to the structure of the composition as a whole that claims more than the wildest sophist or stylist ever did in the history of classical rhetoric. Working with 12 classes of about 25 students each, Morenberg and his colleagues taught *only sentence-combining* to the 6 experimental freshman composition classes for a semester. By sentence-combining I mean the joining of several simple sentences together into more involved sentences using phrase or clause embeddings. The control classes read and discussed anthologized essays on current topics, engaged in some grammar work, and studied rhetorical principles. Both groups wrote 8 compositions as the term assignments, the first serving as the pretest and the eighth as the posttest.⁴³

Variable controls were very rigid, possibly more so than in any other major study in composition research of which I am aware. The pre- and posttests were graded by three different groups operating with different norms. The first grading was by English teachers who simply gave a holistic grade (on a scale of 1 through 6) to the essays. The second grading was by another set of English teachers who gave a final score based on a consideration of six component factors: ideas, supporting details, organization, voice, sentence structure, and diction. This second scoring was called the analytic grade. The third set of graders scored the themes on

syntactic maturity only. Syntactic maturity scores are based on the number of words per clause, the number of clauses per thought unit, and the numbers of words per thought unit; a thought unit is defined as a main clause with all of its modifiers, clausal and non-clausal.

The results obtained after one semester's work were spectacular. The experimental group's scores on all three ratings were significantly greater than the control group's (in some instances in the .001 degree of significance). Despite the fact that the experimental group had read no anthologized essays and had engaged in no reflective discussions on current topics as had the control group, the experimental group scored significantly higher in "ideas," "supporting details," "voice," and "syntactic maturity" than did the control group. Let me quote the authors in their announcement of the most interesting finding.

The results of the multiple regression indicate that the single best predictor of the holistic score is the quality of a paper's structure. More specifically, the single analytic factor of sentence structure predicts 64.6% of the variance of the holistic rating.⁴⁴

What this means is that the ordinary English teacher, whatever he says he grades for, really seems to grade a theme by the quality of its sentence structure. The other eight factors, it might be remarked, accounted for only 6.7% of the variance. All of these findings would seem to support the centrality of the sentence in the composing process.

Now there are some interesting speculations that might be made about these findings. One of them is the ominous suggestion in rhetorical production that the structure of the sentence is central to the essence of the theme itself. This would seem to parallel the structuralist statements of Ricoeur and others.

There are some serious reservations that must be made about this study before such a claim could be made, however. It must be pointed out that the control group did not do nearly so much writing as the experimental group (counting daily sentence combining as writing). Secondly, maybe English teachers are not the great judges of a theme's values that they are usually assumed to be. Conceivably by quite specific norms, such as, for example, factual and organizational criteria such as are used to judge the usual newsstory in journalism, or the rigid evidence that a scientist might require, or the careful definitions that a logician might demand in a classification paper, these papers might rate as vacuous, illogical, and undefined. Thirdly, another parallel structured writing program with equivalent writing practices might account for comparable results.

One final reservation that must be made about the Miami study, however, is probably the most serious one. Unlike all the other sentence combining research studies, Morenberg and his colleagues insisted on put-

ting the sentence into a context, often a paragraph or an entire theme. The sentence, therefore, was incorporated into the whole. O'Hare had recommended such a rhetorical incorporation, although he had not carried it out in his work;⁴⁵ but Mellon had designedly avoided such an incorporation as had Hunt before him.⁴⁶

Consequently, the Miami study represents a combined text and sentence emphasis.

An interesting phenomenon common to all four of the sentence theories of discourse which have just been reviewed is that in each case there was an initial commitment to the sentence and then the gradual working up toward a partial text, whole text, or situational context level in order to make sense of either the production or the interpretation. The sentence combiners begin with only isolated sentence combinations in Hunt and Mellon, suggested the desirability of a rhetorical context in O'Hare, and supplied the paragraph or text in the exercises of Strong and the research work of Morenberg and his colleagues. Although Lévi-Strauss begins with sentences, he works through the level of motifs (partial texts) to whole texts and many-text versions of the same myth, all for the purpose, of course, of analyzing the culture of the group under consideration. Genette, beginning below the level of the sentence with the verb, occasionally considers single sentences, but usually works at the level of part text (the large segments of Proust, for example). Speech act theory has followed a similar progression. Searle and Grice, attempting to account for individual sentence meanings, have ended up positing appropriate conditions in the situational context. And, Pratt, the most recent theorist in the speech act tradition, is really much more concerned to delineate the conditions of the literary speech act situation than she is to analyze individual sentences. In addition, she also investigates full and partial texts.

Some sentence patterns, in particular those of Francis Christensen, have been imposed on the paragraph with some success. However, Alton Becker, taking a tagmemic approach, criticizes Christensen for this imposition.

I think Rodgers is right when he criticizes Christensen (and, indirectly, Josephine Miles, and, I might add, a number of "generative" linguists) for seeing the paragraph as a "macro-sentence or meta-sentence."⁴⁷ Rodgers, in fact, accuses Becker of precisely the same illicit procedure.⁴⁸ It certainly does seem true that not all paragraphs can be analyzed by the structures of the Christensen sentence (indeed he never claimed that they could). It is also obvious that other than presently known sentence norms are necessary to account for certain literary paragraphs (i.e., stanzas) or expressive paragraphs. In fact Christensen's basic structure seems to be a classificatory one, ill suited to other than classification kinds of paragraphs.⁴⁹

It is interesting to note that the Christensen formula was not applied to the entire theme in the Nebraska Curriculum Demonstration Center materials, although I have heard that the attempt was made. However, there are those who maintain that a theme is just an extended paragraph, although there is no evidence of which I am aware that supports this notion. Given the limitations of the Christensen paragraph, it might be said that to attempt to expand it into a full theme would be like blowing up a tire and expecting an automobile to result.

There are no interpretation theories coordinate to the composition theories at the middle levels of the hierarchy--as far as I am aware--although some reading theories (especially Goodman) reach up into those levels, but without specifying the paragraph as such, for example.

Text Emphases

At the level of the full text, from the standpoint of interpretation theory, there are certainly those who have insisted on the autonomy of the text. In one sense that is what the Luther revolution in interpreting the Bible was about. For him, outside norms were irrelevant--the Bible was the "whole" and the parts were to make sense within it as a unity.⁵⁰ All scripture was for him "*sui ipsius interpres*," its own interpreter.⁵¹

A good many practitioners of the new criticism were, in a sense, literary protestants. Their creed might well have been summarized in "the text, the whole text, and nothing but the text." They were equally afraid of being contaminated by the intentional or the affective fallacy. Their position, it might be defended, was justified at the time because of the inordinate importance given during the preceding period of literary criticism to the historical context and the life (situational context) of each author. This is a movement in the opposite direction from some of those which we have analyzed above. Their counterparts, in composition theory, I have suggested are theorists like D'Angelo, McCrimmon, and (with reservations) Moffett. Indeed, most freshman English texts with the deification of "theme" present almost a solid front for the autonomy of text. The freshman English theme as it is usually taught is most frequently written without an explicit aim, takes no particular view of its subject matter, is oriented to no particular medium, and is preferably done with no serious thought preparation. In other words, it is aimless, modeless, mediumless, and unprepared. No serious professional writer would dream of producing a text under any of these conditions.

There are a few exceptions to this view, both in English and speech communication, as we shall see later. But the typical English teacher in composition as the typical English teacher in interpretation of literature is a true blue believer in the autonomy of text.

Situational Context Emphases: Antiquity

Nevertheless the dominance of the autonomy of text has not always been the rule in the history of rhetoric. In antiquity, at least, three (or four) important doctrines militated against it. The most important of these was the notion of *kairos*. If I hesitate to translate the word, I have the authority of S.H. Butcher, who says that *kairos* is a word which has no "single or precise equivalent in any language."⁵² Liddel and Scott give four basic meanings to the word, three of which are relevant here: (1) fitness, proportion, due measure; (2) the critical time or occurrence, the right time; (3) the state of affairs. Actually in the Presocratics, in Socrates and Plato, in Aristotle and as late as Dionysius of Halicarnassus, the word usually meant a combination of these three meanings. Funaioli defines *kairos* as follows:

The *kairos* when resolved into the rhetorical skill...can be defined as that which is fitting in time, place, and circumstances', which means the adaptation of the speech to the manifold variety of life, to the psychology of the speaker and hearer: 'variegated, not absolute unity of tone'.⁵³

This notion runs through Hesiod, Pindar, Philolaus, the Pythagoreans, nearly all of the Sophists, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and later Greek writers.

English and American classical scholarship has not given as much attention to this notion as has German and Italian scholarship. Guthrie, an English historian of Greek culture, remarks on this: "Some have made a great deal of this *kairos-Lehre*, in which among other things they see medical influence."⁵⁴ In strictly rhetorical scholarship it has, to my knowledge, been almost completely overlooked.

Protagoras represents one interesting variation in the theory. He saw in the "situation" or the "experiences" the elements of a strife which had to be mastered. By mastering these elements of experience, man becomes the master or measure of experience of all things (*panton chrematon metron estin anthros*)-- I am here following Untersteiner's translation.⁵⁵

The element of strife in experience represented a concern of nearly all of the Sophists. They were well aware that what was just in one situation was not just in another, that justice had an element of the probable in it that could go either way in a given set of circumstances. Consequently Protagoras maintained that it was man who mastered this indeterminacy. By looking at things differently man could put different values on them and could *by persuasion* make it possible for something of a lesser grade of knowledge to take on a higher level of knowledge.⁵⁶

To adapt to these different situations, Protagoras seems to have been the first to devise the notion of the topics and to have extended the ambivalence of the opposites to all spheres of practical activity (there are two sides

to everything).⁵⁷ Scott Consigny, in his article, "Rhetoric and Its Situations," rightly recognizes that the topics were an attempt to get at the diversity of situations.⁵⁸ But it should be pointed out that the topics in classical rhetoric only took care of the subject matter issue in the situation--the *kairos* involved much more than subject matter.

Gorgias, however, was the Sophist who centered his entire system of thought around the *kairos*. Zeller lists among the major rhetorical works of the Sophist a questionable *peri Kairou* by Gorgias.⁵⁹ In contrast to Protagoras, Gorgias felt that the *kairos* was the irrational power that broke up the opposition of the antitheses in the situation and made possible *by persuasion* of self and of others the perception of something as objectively knowable, the ability to decide between right and wrong, and the capacity to discern the ugly from the beautiful.⁶⁰ This irrational power of the situation in effect made the decisions. There is thus an important distinction from the position of Protagoras. Whereas in Protagoras, man mastered experience, in Gorgias experience was the master--the situation determined whether something was ugly or beautiful, whether the act was just or unjust.⁶¹

This is true of all fields which Gorgias investigates. Untersteiner examines the application of this doctrine in several areas. He then concludes, "The ethic, esthetic, and rhetoric of Gorgias are all based on *kairos*."⁶² This statement comes after he had devoted some 76 pages to examining the epistemology of Gorgias, also based on *kairos*. In other words, Gorgias had a situational epistemology, rhetoric, ethic, and esthetic--all founded on the persuasive power of the logos. In each area the situation (*kairos*) could make one element in the antithesis appear more probable (and therefore more persuasive) than the other element by forcing the decision--remember that the word *pithanon* in Greek meant both probable and persuasive.

The contingent nature of such a morality, epistemology, and ethics struck Socrates as particularly harmful, says Guthrie.⁶³ To place the basis of virtues in conventions, varying from place to place, was dangerous. As Guthrie says, outlining Socrates' position:

Serious thought about the laws of human behavior had begun with a radical skepticism, which taught that it rested on no fixed principles but each decision must be made empirically and *ad hoc*, based on the expediency of the immediate situation (*kairos*). From this theoretical soil grew the pride of youthful rhetoric in its ability to sway men to or from any course of action by mastery of the persuasive use of words.⁶⁴

Socrates and Plato repudiated such an epistemology, such an ethic, and such an esthetic. Indeed, Plato's world of ideas where justice, beauty, goodness, and courage were immutable and true and not subject to the

vagaries of situational probabilities can be considered 'the response of Plato to the Sophistic, especially Gorgian, relativism.

But Plato did not, interestingly enough, reject a situational rhetoric. Near the end of the *Phaedrus*, when Socrates has outlined what the study of an ideal course in rhetoric should entail, he concludes:

But it is only when he [the student of rhetoric] can state adequately what sort of man is persuaded by what sort of speech; when he has the capacity to declare to himself with complete perception, in the presence of another, *that here is the man and here the nature that was discussed theoretically at school--here, now--present to him in actuality--* to which he must apply *this* sort of speech in *this* sort of manner in order to obtain persuasion for *this* kind of activity--it is only when he can do all this and when he has, in addition, grasped the concept of *propriety of time*...it is only then, and not until then that the finishing and perfecting touches will have been given to his science.⁶⁵

The climactic words in this translation, *propriety of time*, are the English rendition of *kairos* in Greek. And the whole passage is a fair summary of one important facet of *kairos* doctrine.

Aristotle uses the notion of *kairos* in many of his works,⁶⁶ and sees medicine particularly as a typical illustration of the necessity to adapt to the individual situation.⁶⁷ The concept, if not the word, pervades the *Rhetoric*. Aristotle, while agreeing with Plato on the importance of *kairos*, nonetheless disagrees with Plato on the dangers of the mere probabilities in such situations. Aristotle feels that the existence of a probability at least precludes the determinism of a certainty. The probable allowed the intervention of man and permitted man to achieve some mastery over the situation. Thus the sciences and the areas of the probable are the sciences of the free.⁶⁸ In a sense, Aristotle reverts to something like the position of Protagoras: man is the master of the situation.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus, teaching in Rome 20 years after the death of Cicero, states that nobody until his time, not even Gorgias, had defined the notion of *kairos* adequately.⁶⁹

Nevertheless, the word passed into the *koine*, the Greek common language used throughout the Mediterranean world from Syria to Gaul in the Hellenistic and Roman period. It is an important word in the *koine* of the New Testament, used 86 times (a significant number)⁷⁰ and in some very notable passages. For our purposes maybe one of the most revealing uses is in Mark I, 15, where Jesus, having just come out of the desert after his forty-day fast and temptation, inaugurates his public ministry. Jesus' first quoted words are: "The time [*kairos*] is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand; repent ye, and believe the Gospel." This is a very rhetorical statement, both practically and theoretically. The words for believe and belief are derived from the noun *pistis*, the word used

throughout Greek rhetoric for the rhetorical appeals or proofs (ethical, pathetic, and logical, in Aristotle). Mark's choice of two words with long rhetorical traditions in Jesus' first recorded statement to the Mediterranean world is significant. And, of course, the emphasis on situational context is obvious. Throughout the New Testament, persuasion to belief is made to depend on the rightness of the time: *pistis* depends on *kairos*. This idea is so pervasive in the New Testament that the theologian Tillich maintains that the word *kairos* reached its deeper meaning of a fullness of time, or a decisive time only in the early Christian period.⁷¹ In Tillich, the *kairos* is so important for the fundamental receptivity of both individual and whole cultures to the kingdom of God that he makes the notion the cornerstone of his entire theology, as another eminent theologian, Erich Przywara, has remarked.⁷²

In any case, the Greek New Testament certainly continued the relationship between persuasion and *kairos*.

Among the Romans the notion seems to have been almost dissolved into that of fitness or propriety (*prepon*). Even among the Greeks the two notions were very closely allied. Consequently, when we are looking for a version of the importance of the situation in Cicero or Quintilian, we should ordinarily look at the associations made with the concept of fitness, which Cicero usually translated as *decorum*. Since this notion has received much more attention in rhetorical and ethical circles than has the notion of *kairos*,⁷³ I won't delay long this second important depository of the situational context. It might be pointed out, however, how much Quintilian expanded the areas to which fitness applied compared even to Cicero where the concept is almost ubiquitous. The difference is in the explicit specification of areas. Pohlenz remarks that Cicero, like Isocrates and Gorgias before him, had joined the *kairos* and the *prepon* in such passages as *De Oratore*, III, 210: "id quidem perspicuum est, non omni causae nec auditori neque personae neque tempori congruere orationis unam genus," and he also refers to *Orator*, 21 and 74. In addition he cites from Quintilian, in what he calls a summary statement combining *kairos* and *prepon*. It concerns:

. . . quid dicat (31), cur (39), apud quem (43), quando (46), locus et tempus (48), causae (57), apud judicem (75), whereby one can also bring in other things.⁷⁴

The third notion in Hermagoras, Cicero, and Quintilian in which the notion of situational context is embodied is in the distinction between the hypothesis and the thesis in the *stasis*-doctrine. The hypothesis was an actual issue embodied in a real situation; the thesis was an abstract and general discussion of an issue. Cicero rejected the thesis as being irrelevant

to rhetoric. Here, as in the notion of decorum, Cicero insisted on a real situation.⁷⁵

Thus, if we separate the notion of the topics from that of the general *kairos*, there are four major concerns in antiquity attempting to cover the problem of the situational context: *kairos*, *topoi*, *prepon*, and *hypothesis*.

Situational Context: Modern Emphases

The full history of the disappearance of the concept of *kairos* from the subsequent rhetorics has yet to be written. And the ascendancy of the notion of the autonomy of text is a historical trend that has yet to be documented. Religious authority, the rise of print, and other influences probably have something to do with these two competitive tendencies.

At any rate, at the present time the autonomy of text is challenged by many who argue beyond the text to some norm for understanding. In law, of course, legislative intent and legal precedent are norms beyond the text. In rhetoric, there are those who, like Black and Bitzer, argue for the preminence of the rhetorical situation and tend to minimize the text in favor of history.⁷⁶ In Biblical criticism the Catholic Church has always asserted the norms of tradition and authority in interpreting the Bible. Today in Biblical criticism and in general hermeneutics there are the demythologizers who maintain that the message of the Bible must be separated from the local and temporal cultural myths in which it was necessary to embody the message. All of these movements challenge the autonomy of the text. Their parallels in composition theory are the people who assert the importance of the dramatic situation (Burke), the importance of a specific audience and purpose (Booth, Britton, and Kinneavy).

One important voice who repeatedly called for consideration of the situational context and whose voice is often ignored even by some of his closest followers is that of Freud. Incidentally I prefer the term *situational context* because it is more general than *rhetorical context*. Besides a *rhetorical context* there could be distinguished a *literary context* (as Pratt has done), a *religious context* (as Tillich has done in *The Religious Situation*), a *political situation* (Nazis used the term *kairos* for the idea that the *political situation* was right for the adoption of their ideas⁷⁸), a *scientific context*, etc. Consequently, it seems better to revert to the general term of Malinowski, accepted generally by anthropologists today.

A typical warning can be seen from this quotation from *The Interpretation of Dreams*:

At the same time I must expressly warn the investigator against overestimating the importance of symbols in the interpretation of dream-translation to the translation of symbols, and neglecting the technique of utilizing the associations of the dreamer. The two techniques of dream-

interpretation must supplement one another; practically, however, as well as theoretically, precedence is retained by the latter process, which assigns the final significance to the utterance of the speaker, while the symbol translation which we undertake plays an auxiliary part.⁷⁹

The message of this admonition is seen again and again in Freud.⁸⁰

Beyond text are levels like the entire corpus of a particular writer, or his complete life, or the complete culture within which the work was produced, or even universal history.⁸¹

Given all these levels and the possibilities of asymmetrical systems within them with different whole-part relations, the important question for the teacher of discourse composition is: At what point(s) does transfer of grammatical, library, usage, and even logical skills take place so that they are effectively used in composing? In other words, how are parts woven into the whole?

The long discussion of levels and varying emphases, both in rhetoric and interpretation, may enable us to return to the first tenet of the hermeneutic circle creed in order to see the operation of the whole-part relationships of a discourse and its components posited in a situational and a cultural context.

This paper, in fact, can serve as a vivid illustration of the four relationships between whole and part: their continual changes, the relative notion of what is whole and what is part, the dialectical relation of each to the other, and the reciprocal interdependence of each on the other. At first let me consider some of the higher levels in the chart and then I will turn to some of the lower levels.

The first version of this paper was at the 1974 Conference of College Composition and Communication. Against the background of the "Back to Basics" movement in the situational context, I was protesting a tendency to equate "basics" with mechanics; my emphasis was on the entire text of a theme, not just on its mechanics, as I delivered a talk on "Holism and Merism in Composition Theory." In 1977 at the same conference, my talk was part of a panel on hermeneutic theory and the composing process (situational context). As a result I added the hermeneutical circle as a rationale and method for integrating the relationships of whole and part. I also added the long section on levels, and talked briefly about the intermediate levels, to which I had paid little attention in the 1974 talk.

In November, 1977, at the Western Speech Communication Conference in Phoenix, I gave the third version. I felt that a speech audience would be understanding of an emphasis on situational context (in view of the stand on rhetorical situation by people like Bitzer and Black). Therefore I emphasized situation more and pointed out to that audience the extreme importance of *kairos* in early classical rhetoric (an importance speech writers have ignored). In addition, I enlarged the speech (I was allowed an hour in

that situational context) and consequently I added some emphases at various levels which I had not hitherto included, particularly the three theories of Morenberg et al., of Genette, and of post-structuralists interpreting Lévi-Strauss as supportive of this position. In front of a speech audience I felt that I could also make some derogatory remarks about the text emphasis on the part of both the English composition teacher and the English literature teacher. Consequently the operative *parts* within the speech changed radically and the notion of *whole* moved solidly into situational context. In brief, the notion of parts had moved from a grammatical and mechanics concern to the sentence and the notion of whole had moved from text to context.

Just before Christmas, 1977, I was asked by Donald McQuade if I had anything that might be publishable in a forthcoming special issue of *Language and Style*. I sent him a copy of the Phoenix talk, offering to spruce it up for final publication if he was interested. He asked me to make several minor adjustments to the larger audience of *Language and Style*. I felt that the more linguistic audience of *Language and Style* might seriously criticize the paper if it ignored speech act theory, especially since Pratt's application of speech act theory to literary discourse had just appeared. Notice that both of these considerations derive from situational context. Consequently I added the section on speech act theory and attempted to make the paper more intelligible to a larger audience than the typical CCCC crowd.

Although the entire manuscript had now almost doubled from even last year's size, I excerpted the sections on sentence theories of discourse (Miami, Genette, Lévi-Strauss) and juxtaposed them to the historical notion of *kairos* at a talk in Denver this year. Nearly all of that was new material for the CCCC audience.

This printed version, therefore, represents a fifth whole with different parts of a developing, continually changing, reciprocally dependent dialectic between various notions of whole and part, limiting the notion of part to a larger segment of discourse--something between paragraph and text.

The lower levels have also been strongly influenced by the various situational contexts. The terms "holism" and "merism" have given way to whole and part. In the 1977 CCCC talk Mr. Hirsch, rightly, I believe, felt that "hermeneutic" would be a more frightening word than "interpretation" theory. I used "rhetorical situation" for the speech audience in Phoenix (because that is the term used by speech scholars), but reverted to "situational context," Malinowski's earlier and more general term.

All of this seems to suggest that the proponents of situational context are right--situational context seems to be the critical level. Only in the dialectic with the situational context do the word, then the sentence, the section,

and even the text encounter the real tentativeness, changing relationships, relativity, and reciprocal interdependence which are determinative. This corresponds to what we know about the learning of a foreign language: we learn it rapidly and efficiently when we have to use it in Mexico City, or Bordeaux, or Freiburg in order to buy plane tickets, or order food, or find lodging, etc.

In the classroom then, when we can pose real communication situations there is the highest likelihood of transfer of skills. Otherwise the situational context has to be simulated. And the further away the level is from the situational context, the less likely is there to be the motivation to transfer. This is my hierarchy hypothesis.

1. See Ingrid Strom, "Research in Grammar and Usage and Its Implications for Teaching Writing," *Bulletin of the School of Education, Indiana University* (1960), pp. 1-21. Also see Richard Braddock et al., *Research in Written Composition* (Champaign, Ill.: NCTE, 1963), p. 34; Frank O'Hare, *Sentence Combining: Improving Student Writing Without Formal Grammar Instruction*, Research Report No. 15 (Urbana, Ill.: NCTE, 1971). For a British view see Andrew Wilkinson, *The Foundations of Language* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 32-34.

2. Patricia Senn Brievik, "Effects of Library-Based Instruction in the Academic Success of Disadvantaged Undergraduates," in H.B. Rader, ed., *Academic Library Instruction: Objectives, Program and Faculty Involvement* Ann Arbor, Mich.: Pierian Press, 1975), pp. 45-55.

3. L. Ray Carry and J. Fred Weaver, *Patterns of Mathematics Achievement in Grades 4, 5, and 6: x-population* (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University School Mathematics Study Group, 1969), especially Chapter 6 and Appendices B and D, pp. 167ff., and 201 ff.

4. See James L. Kinneavy, John Q. Cope, and J.W. Campbell, *Writing--Basic Modes of Organization* (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1976), pp. 30-34, for a use of the Piaget model in teaching description. See Eugene C. Luschei, *The Logical Systems of Lesniewski* (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company, 1962), pp. 151 ff., for a summary of Lesniewski's theory of mereology. The defect in Piaget's model, for my purposes, is that his three matrix structures do not seem to include some obvious non-mathematical structures, such as plot. The drawback in Lesniewski's theory, for my purposes, is that he reduces parts of a whole to subsets of a set. But the part-whole relationship is often not that of a subset-set relationship; that is, a door-room relationship is not that of a kind of a room to a room.

5. Richard E. Palmer, *Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1969), p. 87.

6. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, Tr. G. Barden, J. Cumming. (New York The Seabury Press, 1969), p. 154.

7. See John C. Maraldo, *Der Hermeneutisch Zirkel* (Munich: Verlag Karl Alber, 1974), p. 13; Gadamer, pp. 154 ff.; Emilio Betti, *Allgemeine Auslegungslehre als Methodik der Geisteswissenschaften* (Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1976), pp. 219-220.

8. Gadamer, p. 167.

9. See Betti, comparing the *iter geneticum* with the *iter hermeneuticum*, pp. 179 ff., 222; Gadamer, 19 ff.; for more lengthy considerations on the relation between rhetoric and hermeneutics, see Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, tr. and ed. David E. Linge (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 20-26; see further Klaus Dockhorn, "Gelehrten-Anzeigen," *Göttingen*, 213, Heft 3/4 (1966), 169-206.

10. Hans-Georg Gadamer, in a talk at Gustavus Adolphus College, St. Peter's, Minnesota, Dec. 2, 1977, mentioned that Melancthon, starting a book on rhetoric, ended up writing one on the interpretation of written texts. I assume he refers to *Loci communes rerum theologicarum seu hypotoposes theologicae*, Luther's (and Protestantism's) first important theological treatise. The rhetorical origin is obvious in the first two words of the title--the abbreviated form by which the work is usually known.

11. See Betti, pp. 220, 221, 222, 224.

12. See Gadamer, p. 167, discussing Droysen; pp. 236, 237, 268 ff., discussing the concept of horizon, especially p. 273.

13. See Gadamer, p. 163, Maraldo, pp. 33-50; and the two volumes *Hermeneutik und Dialektik*, ed. Rudiger Bubner, Konrad Cramer, and Reiner Wiehl (Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1970), *passim*, especially I, 167 ff. and II, 273 ff.

14. See Maraldo, explaining Schleiermacher, p. 31; Betti, p. 224.

15. See Malcolm Cowley, ed. *Writers at Work: The Paris Review Interviews* (New York: The Viking Press, Inc. 1958). There are two additional volumes in the series.

16. For applications of these concepts at various levels, see Kenneth Pike, *Language in Relation to a Unified Theory of Human Behavior*, 3 vols., (Glendale, Calif.: Summer Institute of Linguistics, 1960); for the discourse level, see Richard Young, Samuel Becker, and Kenneth Pike, *Rhetoric: Discovery and Change* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1971); for the paragraph level, see below.

17. E. D. Hirsch, Jr., *The Aims of Interpretation* (Chicago, Ill.: The University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 66.

18. Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, tr. G. Spivak (Baltimore, Md.: The John Hopkins University, 1976), p. 26, his italics.

19. Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology*, tr. Claire Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf (New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967), p. 33.

20. Lévi-Strauss, p. 208

21. Paul Ricoeur, *Le conflit des interpretations* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1969), p. 81.
22. Ricoeur, p. 81.
23. Paul Ricoeur, "Qu'est-ce qu'un texte?" in Bubner, *Hermeneutik*, II, 190.
24. Ricoeur, *ibid.*, p. 191, p. 196.
25. Ricoeur, *ibid.*, p. 196.
26. Gérard Genette, *Figures III* (Paris: Editions due Seuil, 1972), p. 75.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 76
28. *Ibid.*
29. *Ibid.*, p. 80, p. 81, pp. 84-5.
30. Lévi-Strauss, p. 206.
31. Lévi-Strauss, p. 207, his italics.
32. John R. Searle, *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 17-19.
33. Paul Valéry, *Variété, III* (Paris: Gallimard, 1936), p. 158. "To abstract a thesis is to retain the main point. To abstract a work of art is to lose its main point."
34. Searle, pp. 62-63.
35. See pp. 84, 85, 86, 90, 91, especially p. 92; on p. 94 the context becomes part of the formula; see also pp. 116, 117, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 149, 152, 186.
36. See Searle, p. 152.
37. D. Terence Langendoen, *The London School of Linguistics: A Study of B. Malinowski and J.R. Firth* (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1968), p. 19, note 1.
38. Mary Louise Pratt, *Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1977), pp. 85-86.
39. Pratt, p. 141.
40. Pratt, pp. 141-142.
41. C.E. Bazell, *Linguistic Form* (Istanbul: Istanbul Press, 1953).
42. Bazell, p. 88 f.
43. Donald Daiker, Andrew Kerek, Max Morenberg, "Sentence Combining and Syntactic Maturity in Freshman English," *CCC*, 19 (February 1978), 36-41.
44. Daiker, p. 14.
45. O'Hare, p. 69, p. 76.
46. John C. Mellon, *Transformational Sentence Combining: A Method for Enhancing the Development of Syntactic Fluency in English Composition*, Research Report No. 10 (Champaign, Ill.: NCTE, 1969), p. 2; Kellogg Hunt, *Grammatical Structures Written at Three Grade Levels*, Research Report No. 3 (Champaign, Ill.: NCTE, 1965), p. 151.
47. A.L. Becker, "Symposium on the Paragraph," *CCC*, 17 (May, 1966), 71.
48. Paul C. Rodgers, Jr., "Symposium on the Paragraph," *CCC*, 17 (May, 1966), 73.

49. *Ibid.*
50. Gadamer, p. 153.
51. Gadamer, p. 154.
52. Quoted in Rhys Roberts, ed., *Dionysius of Halicarnassus*, tr. Rhys Roberts, *On Literary Composition* (London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1919), p. 304. He refers to S.H. Butcher, *Harvard Lectures on Greek Subjects*, pp. 117-120.
53. Mario Untersteiner, *The Sophists*, tr. from the Italian by Kathleen Freeman (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1954), quoting Gino Funaioli, *Studi de letteratura antica*, (Bologne, 1946), I, 176, Untersteiner, p. 197
54. K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1969). III, 272, n. 4.
55. Untersteiner, p. 41.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 47, pp. 52-53.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
58. *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, VII (1975), 175-186.
59. Eduard Zeller, *History of Greek Philosophy*, tr. S.F. Alleyne (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1881), II, 485n.
60. Untersteiner, pp. 116 ff.
61. Untersteiner, p. 161.
62. Untersteiner, p. 161.
63. Guthrie, p. 431.
64. *Ibid.*
65. Plato, *Phaedrus*, tr. W.C. Helmbold and W. G. Rabinowitz (Indianapolis, Ind.: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1958), 272 E. ff.; the italics under the several occurrences of *this* are the translators' and the other italics are mine.
66. See Herman Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicus* (Berlin: Akademische Druck, U. Verlangantalt, 1955), p. 358a.
67. *Nich. Ethics*, 1104a, 8-9.
68. See H. H. Joachim, *Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics*, ed. D.A. Rees (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1951), pp. 2, 14-18.
69. *On Literary Composition*, tr. W. Rhys Roberts (London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1910), 12, 84.
70. The number depends on the concordance consulted. This figure is from J.B. Smith, *Greek-English Concordance to the New Testament* (Scottdale, Pa: Herald Press, 1955), p. 187; George Wigram, *The Englishman's Greek Concordance to the New Testament* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan Publishing House, 1971), 9th ed., pp. 398-399, gives 83. At any rate, the number is high.
71. Paul Tillich, "Kairos and Logos," *Philosophie und Schicksal: Schriften zur Erkenntnislehre und Existenzphilosophie*, Gesammelte Werke, IV, 46; cf. also "Kairos I," *Der Widerstreit von Raum und Zeit: Schriften Zur Geschichtsphilosophie*, Gesammelte Werk, VI, 10. For further lengthy statements of Tillich on *kairos*, see "Kairos II, Ideen zur Geisteslage der Gegenwart," 29-41, "Kairos and Utopie," 149-156, both in *Gesammelte*

Werke, VI; and "Kairos and Karoi," *Systematic Theology*, (Chicago, Ill.: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), III, 369-72.

72. "Christian Root-Terms: *Kerygma, Mysterium, Kairos, Oikonomia*," in Thomas A. O'Meara, O.P., and Celestin D. Weisser, O.P., eds., *Paul Tillich in Catholic Thought* (Dubuque, Iowa: Priority Press, 1964), 202-204, quoted in Carl J. Armbruster, S.J., *The Vision of Paul Tillich* (New York: Sheed and Ward), 1967, p. 270.

73. See Max Pohlenz, "To Prepon," *Kleine Schriften*, Vol. II, ed. Henrich Dorrie (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1965), pp. 100-139.

74. Pohlenz, 109.

75. *De Inventione*, I, 6, 8. Different terms are used by different authors for these concepts. Yon believes that Cicero may have repudiated the position of the *de Inventione* in the *de Oratore*, I, 31, 138 and II, 24, 104 and in the *Orator*, XIV, 45, 46. See Albert Yon, ed., *Cicero, L'Orateur, Du meilleur genre d'orateurs* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1974) pp. XLVII-XLVIII.

76. Lloyd F. Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation," *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, I (1968), 1-14; Edwin Black, *Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965).

78. Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, III, 371.

79. Sigmund Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, tr. A.A. Brill, in *The Major Works of Sigmund Freud*, ed. Robert Maynard Hutchins and Mortimer J. Adler (Chicago, Ill.: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), p. 285.

80. See pp. 180, 181, 182, 200, 201, 202, 205, 206, 209, 210, 211, 212, 237, 240, 332, 336, 338; on the dangers of interpretation of fictional dreams of poets and novelists, see p. 327.

81. See Gadamer, pp. 167, 174, 190, for Dilthey and Droysen; see Maraldo, p. 74.

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