

The Effects of the 'Nixon Shock' on Japanese Society and Politics

by Anna Hahn

On October 1, 1949, the People's Republic of China (PRC) officially took power in China after a two-year civil war. Following defeat, China's Nationalist leaders fled to the Chinese island-province of Taiwan and there set up what they deemed the official government of China. The United States, in the midst of the Cold War and eager to resist any communist country, maintained its recognition of the exiled Nationalist government even after it moved to Taiwan. At first due to the American occupation and later because of the Security Treaty,¹ Japan was forced to comply with and support the U.S. diplomatic policy of isolating the PRC. In the two decades following the end of the American occupation, the Japanese continued to have a "client-patron relationship with the United States,"² which meant that Japan was not able to establish its own policy toward the PRC. The United States "encouraged Japanese hostility toward China"³ and, since Japan depended on the United States, its government was pushed into making the same decisions as the United States in regards to China.⁴ Because Japan was thus forced to adopt a China policy nearly identical to that of the United States, the two governments promised to discuss any foreign policy decisions that would impact the other nation, specifically in regards to dealings with the PRC.⁵ Despite this promise, Henry Kissinger, Nixon's National Security Advisor, secretly visited China in July 1971, flying from Pakistan to Peking during a world tour to meet covertly with Chinese officials and to arrange a visit by Nixon to the PRC.⁶ Furthermore, when Nixon announced his intentions to visit communist China on live national television on July 15, 1971, he gave almost no warning beforehand to Japanese officials. The Japanese ambassador to America, Ushiba Nobuhiko, was told of the dramatic change in American policy only one hour before Nixon appeared on television, and Prime Minister Sato Eisaku was informed of Nixon's intentions only a few minutes prior.⁷ This lack of consideration on the part of the Nixon administration shook Japan deeply and threatened relations between the United States and Japan. However, while the Nixon Shock,⁸ as President Nixon's announcement came to be called, was a definite blow to the Japanese confidence and trust in America, it also served to hasten the establishment of formal relations between Japan and the PRC and, in the end, had positive implications for the Japanese people.

There were three reasons that the United States became interested in recognizing the PRC as the legitimate government of China. First, the anti-Vietnam War movement had gained momentum in the United States, and the American government was seeking an honorable way out of Vietnam.⁹ Nixon hoped that establishing relations with China would prompt the PRC to influence North Vietnam to be more lenient in its negotiations with the United States so that U.S. involvement in the war could end.¹⁰

Secondly, the realization that the PRC and the Soviet Union were not going to improve their relations made it acceptable for the United States to interact diplomatically with China. Lastly, and most importantly, the United States sought a relationship with China that would act as a deterrent to the Soviet Union and give it power over the Soviets as Cold War tensions continued.¹¹ Gerald Curtis, a professor of political science at Columbia University, states that it was "all too obvious...by the manner in which it was accomplished" that the U.S. decision to deal with China was about the Soviet Union, and that, from an American perspective, it had very little to do with Japan.¹²

The fact that the Nixon administration did not consider its relations with China to be about Japan may help to explain why the United States failed to inform the Japanese before announcing that it was seeking relations with the PRC. Scholars seem to agree that the reason that Nixon did not communicate with the Japanese government was that it simply did not occur to him. U.S. foreign policy was very much focused on the Soviet Union at the time; no attention was paid to Japan because the Japanese had little potential to harm the United States.¹³ As a result, American understanding of Japan was "not very deep."¹⁴ The extent of this ignorance becomes clear in a *New York Times* article on July 24, 1971, slightly more than a week after Nixon's announcement, which stated that "the new United States policy of seeking an accommodation with Peking should not itself cause serious differences between Washington and Tokyo."¹⁵ Another *New York Times* article from June 1972 reported that Henry Kissinger did not realize that the announcement of Nixon's visit would cause the problems that it did in Japan. Almost a year after the Shock, Kissinger met with Japanese leaders and responded to the feelings of anger and betrayal by promising Japanese leaders, "It will never happen again."¹⁶ Kissinger later admitted in his memoirs that failing to inform the Japanese had been "a serious error in manners."¹⁷ That top officials in the United States did not understand the mindset of the Japanese again shows that the majority of Americans' understanding of Japan was shallow.

While Nixon and Kissinger seem to have acted under a blanket of ignorance in dealing with Japan, there were some Americans who understood the implications that such a monumental foreign policy decision would have. Former U.S. Ambassador to Japan Edwin Reischauer was under the opinion that Nixon "committed a very silly act" by going to China without telling Japan.¹⁸ Scholar William Barnds recognized that while there were many Americans who felt that the United States could "deal rather cavalierly with Japan" because Japanese society depended upon the U.S. for so many things, "such complacency is dangerous."¹⁹

Indeed, such complacency on the part of the United States was dangerous. Nixon's announcement had severe consequences for the relationship between Japan and the United States, for Japan independently, and for Japan's relations with other countries. On July 17, 1971, the *Japan Times* reported that "Japan's foreign policy...has been shaken to its foundation."²⁰ As a result, the initial reaction of Japanese leaders when they found out about Nixon's trip to the PRC was one of shock, followed by anger, fear, embarrassment, betrayal, and a lack of trust in the United States. The announcement also triggered the end of Prime Minister Sato's career, as many blamed the leader and lashed out against him, and it hurled Japan into a new stage in its diplomatic history.

One of the reasons that Japanese leaders were so shocked to learn of the impending relations between America and the PRC was because of the speed at which U.S. policy changed. "The story about a Japanese ambassador in Washington learning of the American recognition of Communist China through a midnight phone call from the U.S. State Department [had] been a long standing joke" in Japan,²¹ but no one there expected the shift in policy to come so soon. "Frankly speaking," Foreign Minister Kimura Toshio admitted at a press conference on July 17, 1971, "I never thought that the Ping Pong diplomacy²² would develop at such a rapid pace."²³ As a result, Japan was caught severely off-guard, and Foreign Ministry officials were "visibly shaken" by Nixon's announcement.²⁴

One of the initial reactions among Japanese officials was anger towards the United States for failing to take seriously the mutual defense alliance between the two countries. Prime Minister Sato described Nixon's actions as "rude."²⁵ One Japanese United Nations delegate "likened Nixon's move to Judo and said that he felt he was thrown over the shoulder onto the ground by the United States."²⁶ The anger felt by government personnel was echoed in Japanese society at large. A *Japan Times* article cynically remarked that Kissinger "gets a kick out of confusing reporters and keeping them guessing. Those who know him say he will probably be laughing for some time over the way in which he bamboozled everyone and flew to Peking without a word leaking to the outside world."²⁷ Most Japanese people felt that the Shock was not necessary and that it certainly was not unavoidable; Nixon could have given advanced warning to their government.²⁸ The United States was seen as a bully, taking advantage of Japan. These feelings were reflected in a 1972 public opinion survey, which reported anti-American feelings to be higher than in 1971. The same survey showed that among 15 to 24 year-olds, there was a widespread opinion that the United States would become the new threat to Japan, ahead of China and the USSR.²⁹

The opinion that the alliance with the United States was crumbling speaks to the fear of abandonment that many Japanese also experienced immediately following the Shock. "For a time many Japanese feared that the Nixon Administration was making a fundamental shift in its Asia policy by making better relations with China the cornerstone of America's East Asia policy" instead of maintaining the strong alliance between Japan and the United States.³⁰ While the United States attempted to dispel this belief by assurance that its policy with China would not alter its relationship with Japan, fears still lingered, and "Japanese leaders were still preoccupied with the possibility of abandonment."³¹

A lack of trust and a feeling of betrayal pervaded the Japanese mindset following the Nixon Shock. These feelings were heightened by the fact that only three weeks before the announcement, Prime Minister Sato had asked for—and received—assurance that the United States would consult Japan before moving forward into a relationship with China.³² Only a few days before Nixon's announcement, Sato told the Diet, "I trust the Americans."³³ Given these sentiments, it is of little wonder that the Japanese felt betrayed by Nixon's actions. While the United States took measures such as holding a U.S.-Japan summit in San Clemente, California, in January 1972 and sending Henry Kissinger to Tokyo in June of that same year to restore Japan's confidence and faith in America, these actions were not enough to mend the rift between the two countries. The *New York Times*, reporting on the Summit, stated that

"it is evident that the two governments no longer have common policies, particularly on China."³⁴ In a striking contrast to his earlier statement of confidence, Sato, who began to advocate a hotline between Tokyo and Washington after the Shock "so that Japan [would] not be unprepared" for any future similar incidents, stated that he had "not been able to trust fully the United States since [Nixon's] sudden announcement."³⁵

Although the leaders of Japan were shocked and angered by Nixon's announcement, they fought to maintain a stoic and professional appearance in public. In the days immediately following the Nixon Shock, the *Japan Times* reported that top officials felt it was wise to wait and see what changes in the U.S. policy actually occurred as a result of Nixon's announcement before Japan enacted a new policy.³⁶ Despite their diplomatic patience, however, government officials realized that "unless Japan got ahead of the United States in the actual normalization, the Japanese people would not accept such a verdict" as being caught off-guard by the United States.³⁷ It was this competitive edge, coupled with the anger, fear, and betrayal, which prompted Japan to establish its own diplomatic policies and to look after its own interests rather than bending to those of the United States.

In "Japan and World Politics in the 1970s," John Maki, professor at the University of Massachusetts, points out that "a little noted beneficial effect of the 1971 'Nixon Shocks' was the kicking of Japan out of the American nest."³⁸ Japan's leaders seemed to recognize this; once the shock of not being informed about U.S. intentions with China wore off, the Japanese government quickly formed its own foreign policy standards. Beginning with China and then moving to other countries, Japan gradually achieved international power unprecedented in post-war politics. As it entered into the global world, Japan was able to escape from its "domineering relationship" with the United States. In turn, the United States also started to "take [Japan] seriously...as a fellow major actor in world politics."³⁹

While Japan moved with "remarkable speed" in establishing relations with China in order to catch up with the United States, Prime Minister Sato was unable to lead the country in this effort. Already unpopular because of past political decisions, the Japanese leader quickly became even more so in the wake of the shock, which greatly contributed to the end of his career. People directed their angry reactions about the announcement towards Sato, claiming that the event was the result of the Japanese policy of always following the United States, that the government had "allowed the U.S. President to jump over its head," and that the nation faced the threat of international isolation. Above all, the Japanese people began calling for a change of direction in the form of a new leader.⁴⁰ This sentiment of Sato's unpopularity was echoed in China, where Chinese Premier Zhou En-lai ignored his requests for diplomatic relations but announced that he "would welcome a new Prime Minister of Japan who had due respect for 'Chinese Principles.'⁴¹ Thus, although after Nixon's announcement it was an "expected fact" that Japan would restore relations with China,⁴² the process was delayed until a new leader came to power in Japan.

When Kakuei Tanaka became Prime Minister of Japan on July 6, 1972, he announced that the "restoration of Sino-Japanese relations [was the] paramount issue facing his Administration."⁴³ Because Tanaka was not as supportive of the United States and was willing to pursue a policy on the PRC independent of American influence, he was able to move much faster with regards to China than Sato had been

able to.⁴⁴ In order to ensure that his dealings with China would be a success, Tanaka immediately established a line of communication with Premier Chou En-lai. He also made sure that he had his party's support, he communicated with Nixon regarding his intentions, and he assured Taiwan's government of Japan's goodwill.⁴⁵ The results were both successful and fast. Just one day after taking office, Tanaka announced his intentions to establish relations with China. Chinese officials extended an invitation to visit on July 9, 1972, and Tanaka arrived in Peking on September 25, 1972.⁴⁶ While in China, Tanaka succeeded in his goals, announcing Japanese recognition of the PRC from Beijing on September 29.⁴⁷ The outcome of his trip surprised everyone and shocked the Nixon White House, which did not believe that his visit would be that fruitful.⁴⁸ Ironically, the Americans, who were responsible for the beginnings of this relationship in the first place, were unable, due to a number of different factors,⁴⁹ to establish their own formal relations with China until 1979.⁵⁰

The beginnings of diplomatic relations between the United States and China jeopardized the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty because many Japanese began calling into question the justification for the treaty.⁵¹ Under Article 9 of its Constitution, Japan was forbidden from having a military. Because of this, the agreement to allow American bases on Japanese soil in exchange for protection from the USSR and the PRC had been a necessary—if not welcome—trade for the Japanese people. By 1971, however, the United States and the Soviet Union had co-existed peacefully for more than twenty years since the start of the Cold War, a fact which greatly reduced the perceived Soviet threat to Japan. When the United States publicly recognized China, fears of the communist government there were also diminished, leaving “the average Japanese man in the street...to wonder whether the Security Treaty was really necessary.”⁵²

Despite the fact that Nixon's announcement came as an initial shock to the Japanese government and caused short term anxiety, in the long run, America's relations with the PRC proved to have some positive developments for Japan. Economically, Japan and China had already established non-governmental relations through trade in the 1950s due to both the enormous market that China represented for Japanese products and the fact that China was a “wealth of natural resources.”⁵³ While “the Japanese government...pursued a ‘separation of politics and economics’ policy by *officially* supporting the US policy of diplomatically isolating China,”⁵⁴ by the 1960s Japanese businesses had started to demand an increase in diplomatic relations in order to “promote economic exchange.”⁵⁵ The Nixon Shock presented the exact opportunity needed to expand that relationship into a diplomatic one as well, further increasing the economic benefits for Japan.

Nixon's announcement also gave Japan the opportunity to pursue its own foreign policy interests for the first time. After World War II, Japan “found its China policy virtually prescribed by the U.S. policy of isolation toward China.”⁵⁶ Because of the U.S. anti-communist strategy, Japan was “forced...to establish diplomatic relations with Taipei rather than Beijing.”⁵⁷ However, Nixon's announcement liberated Japan from being habitually trapped by U.S. foreign policy for two reasons. First, because the United States chose to communicate with the PRC, it was implicit that America had decided to acknowledge the communist government's legitimacy, which meant that Japan was able to do so as well.⁵⁸ Second, in failing to inform the Japanese government of its intentions before interacting with the PRC, the United States broke the trust that

the two countries had built. The secretive actions taken by the United States provided an excuse for Japan to form its own diplomatic relations with China regardless of U.S. position on the PRC.

In addition to forever changing the relationships between Japan and the United States and between China and Japan, the Nixon Shock also altered the relations between Japan and several other countries. The most obvious of these changed relationships was the one between Japan and Taiwan, which ended when Japan chose to recognize the PRC as the official government of China. Although Japan severed its diplomatic ties with Taipei, Japanese leaders told the Taipei government that they desired to maintain their cultural and economic ties. The Taiwanese responded by saying that they wanted nothing except for the Japanese government to "stop betraying its friends."⁵⁹ As the Japanese could obviously not recognize two separate governments as the legitimate rulers of China, they were forced to cede their friendship with Taiwan.

Relations between Japan and the communist nations of North Korea and the Soviet Union were also influenced by the Nixon Shock. In the aftermath of Nixon's announcement, "Japanese officials reconsidered their policy toward the communist countries with which successive U.S. administrations had forbidden Japan to have diplomatic and even economic relations."⁶⁰ Thus, in early 1972, Japanese Foreign Minister Fukuda Takeo sent government officials to Hanoi to discuss the possibility of relations with North Korea.⁶¹ Also in the wake of the shocks, the Soviet Union approached Japan to see if they could "gain influence" while anger toward the Americans was still a prominent feeling in Japan.⁶² In January 1972, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko visited Japan to discuss the possibility of improved relations between the two countries. However, neither of these relationships ultimately changed because the Japanese government was not upset enough about the Nixon Shock to sacrifice its still-strong relationship with the United States over either the Soviet Union or North Korea.⁶³ On a lesser scale, Japan did recognize Bangladesh and the Mongolian People's Republic as a way of embarrassing and lashing out against the United States.⁶⁴ These relations were significant because the United States had not yet recognized either country.⁶⁵ Despite the fact that the Japanese chose not to recognize the more important communist nations of North Vietnam and the Soviet Union, that they approached these nations was significant in and of itself. It showed that Japan was moving into a new era in its history in which it would stand on more equal footing with the United States.

The Sino-Japanese relationship that indirectly resulted from Nixon's announcement had many positive implications for both countries. Politically, the treaty built the framework for cooperation between the two nations and helped to end long-term hostility.⁶⁶ This goal was greatly aided by the concessions that China made in order to promote relations, including waiving claims against the Japanese for war reparations and agreeing that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was acceptable and could co-exist with a Sino-Japanese agreement.⁶⁷ Economically, the relations were a step forward for the countries because they opened an unprecedented trade market between China and Japan.⁶⁸ After establishing relations with each other, each country saw an increase in both its imports and exports.⁶⁹ Socially, the relations resulted in cultural exchange between China and Japan and brought about a deeper mutual

understanding between the peoples of both countries.⁷⁰ Therefore, while tensions and disputes between China and Japan persisted in the years following their normalization, the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries proved to be a positive development for both nations throughout the 1970s.

The Nixon Shock of 1971 was a turning point in Japan's history. While President Nixon may have been right when he said that his announcement "only accelerated an evolution in the U.S.-Japanese relationship that was in any event, overdue, unavoidable, and in the long run, desirable,"⁷¹ his actions were detrimental to the Japanese-American relationship. Despite an eventual improvement in relations, the "after-effects from the Nixon 'shocks'...lingered on in Japan and remain[ed] a sore spot in Japanese-U.S. relations" for many years after 1971.⁷² It is important to note, however, that the negative impact of the worsening relationship with the United States was not the only side effect of the Nixon Shock. In August 1971, Tanaka said that the U.S.-China relations were "...good news. Now everything is easier for Japan."⁷³ The Shock allowed Japan a way to at least partially escape from the dominance of the United States, and the country was given an opportunity to stand alone—and therefore, to stand taller—in world politics for the first time since World War II. As it started acting outside of the American realm, Japan grew more important in the eyes of other nations. In this way, the country began to re-establish its dignity and the respect it had lost in World War II and slowly moved towards the greatness it once held.

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Newspapers

New York Times

Japan Times

Endnotes

- ¹ The Security Treaty of 1952 stated that the United States would provide defense for Japan, which was without a military, in exchange for the provision of American military bases in Japan.
- ² John Maki, "Japan and World Politics in the 1970s," *Pacific Affairs* (Summer, 1973). Accessed on-line at JSTOR, 289.
- ³ Zhang Tuosheng, "China's Relations with Japan," *The Golden Age of the US-China-Japan Triangle: 1972-1989*. Eds. Ezra F. Vogel, Yuan Ming, and Tanaka Akihiko, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 207.
- ⁴ Robert Ross, "U.S. Relations with China," *The Golden Age of the US-China-Japan Triangle: 1972-1989*. Eds. Ezra F. Vogel, Yuan Ming, and Tanaka Akihiko, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 83.
- ⁵ Tillman Durdin, "Kissinger Eases Nixon Shocks," *New York Times* 18 June 1972. Pro-quest Historical Newspapers, E2.
- ⁶ Soeya Yoshihide, "Japan's Relations with China," *The Golden Age of the US-China-Japan Triangle: 1972-1989*. Eds. Ezra F. Vogel, Yuan Ming, and Tanaka Akihiko, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 212.
- ⁷ *Ibid*, 212-213.
- ⁸ There were also other "Nixon Shocks" that affected Japan during this time. Most notable are Nixon's announcement of economic changes in the gold standard in August 1971, which affected the value of the yen, and the soybean embargo of 1973, which seriously limited the availability of soybeans, a staple food in Japan. Both of these announcements were also made with little or no warning on the part of the Nixon administration.
- ⁹ Go Ito, *Alliance in Anxiety: Dilemma and the Sino-American-Japanese Triangle* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 10.
- ¹⁰ Peter Hahn, Personal Interview, 22 October 2006.
- ¹¹ Gene Hsiao, "The Sino-Japanese Rapprochement: A Relationship of Ambivalence," *The China Quarterly* (Jan.-March, 1974). Accessed online at JSTOR, 102.
- ¹² Gerald Curtis, "U.S. Relations with Japan," *The Golden Age of the US-China-Japan Triangle: 1972-1989*, Eds. Ezra Vogel, Yuan Ming, and Tanaka Akihiko, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 139.
- ¹³ *Ibid*, 143.
- ¹⁴ Nakanishi Hiroshi, "Japanese Relations with the United States," *The Golden Age of the US-China-Japan Triangle: 1972-1989*. Eds. Ezra F. Vogel, Yuan Ming, and Tanaka Akihiko, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 185.
- ¹⁵ "Japan, China, and the U.S." *New York Times*, 24 July 1971. Pro-quest Historical Newspapers, 24.
- ¹⁶ Durdin, E2.
- ¹⁷ Curtis, 140.
- ¹⁸ Ito, 86.

- ¹⁹ William J. Barnda, "The United States and Japan in Asian Affairs," *Japan and the United States: Challenges and Opportunities*. Ed. William J. Barnda, (New York: New York University Press, 1979), 274-275.
- ²⁰ "Gov't Policy Seen Badly Shaken by Nixon Move," *Japan Times*, 17 July 1971. Available on microfilm.
- ²¹ Masaru Ogawa, "Our Times: Nixon Pulls Surprise," *Japan Times*, 18 July 1971. Available on microfilm.
- ²² In April 1971, the U.S. Table Tennis team visited China at the invitation of the PRC, becoming the first Americans to visit since the Communist take over. While in China, they competed in ping-pong matches and toured the country, meeting with Premier Zhou En-lai. Time Magazine called this development "the ping heard round the world." Ping-Pong Diplomacy refers to the fact that after the team's visit, perceptions of the communist nation and its people changed in the United States and both countries began to be more cooperative in their policies towards the other. ("Ping-Pong Diplomacy," Online at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/china/peopleevents/pande07.html>, Accessed 7 November 2006.)
- ²³ "Gov't Policy Seen Badly Shaken by Nixon Move."
- ²⁴ Ibid.
- ²⁵ Ibid., 54.
- ²⁶ Ibid., 79.
- ²⁷ "Indisposition' Hid Visit to Peking," *Japan Times*, 17 July 1971. Available on microfilm.
- ²⁸ Fujii Kamiya, "Japanese-U.S. Relations and the Security Treaty: A Japanese Perspective," *Asian Survey* (Sept. 1972). Accessed on JSTOR, 719.
- ²⁹ Ito, 54.
- ³⁰ Barnda, 232.
- ³¹ Ito, 53.
- ³² William Overholt, "President Nixon's Trip to China and its Consequences," *Asian Survey* (July 1973). Accessed online at JSTOR, 714.
- ³³ Ito, 79.
- ³⁴ Ibid., 89.
- ³⁵ Hsiao, 107.
- ³⁶ Ogawa.
- ³⁷ Yoshihide, 213.
- ³⁸ Maki, 295.
- ³⁹ Ibid., 292.
- ⁴⁰ Ogawa.
- ⁴¹ Hsiao, 106.
- ⁴² Mataka, 64.
- ⁴³ Ito, 93.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid., 91-92.

- ⁴⁰ Hsiao, 109.
- ⁴¹ Yoshitake, 214, and Hsiao, 108-109.
- ⁴² "China and Japan," *Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan*, Online, Accessed 14 October 2006.
- ⁴³ Ito, 100.
- ⁴⁴ Several factors prevented the United States from more rapidly establishing relations with China: First, the Watergate scandal distracted the government. In the aftermath of the scandal, President Ford was immediately launched into a re-election campaign and was unable to focus more completely on China. Other factors included the widening of differences between the United States and China regarding how to deal with the USSR, the radicalization of China's domestic policies, and the widening perceptual gap about Taiwan between the two countries; the United States wanted to maintain at least partial relations with Taiwan, while Chinese leaders expected them to sever all ties with the Nationalist government. (Ross, 84, and Jia Qingguo, "Chinese Relations with the United States," *The Golden Age of the US-China-Japan Triangle: 1972-1989*, Eds. Ezra F. Vogel, Yuan Ming, and Tanaka Akihiko, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 117-118).
- ⁴⁵ Qingguo, 120.
- ⁴⁶ Ito, 50.
- ⁴⁷ Kamiya, 721.
- ⁴⁸ Ito, 80.
- ⁴⁹ Curtis, 139. Emphasis mine.
- ⁵⁰ Ito, 80.
- ⁵¹ Kamiya Mataka, "Japanese Politics and Asia-Pacific Policy," *The Golden Age of the US-China-Japan Triangle: 1972-1989*, Eds. Ezra F. Vogel, Yuan Ming, and Tanaka Akihiko, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 63-64.
- ⁵² *Ibid.*, 63-64.
- ⁵³ Overholt, 711.
- ⁵⁴ Hsiao, 114.
- ⁵⁵ Ito, 90.
- ⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 90.
- ⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 56.
- ⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 56-57, 91.
- ⁵⁹ Overholt, 715.
- ⁶⁰ U.S. relations with Bangladesh were prevented because of the close U.S.-Pakistan alliance. (Bangladesh had broken off from Pakistan to form its own independent Hindu nation.) Mongolia had not been recognized because it was a communist country. ("United States," Online at <http://countrystudies.us/bangladesh/111.htm>. Accessed 29 October 2006.)
- ⁶¹ Tuosheng, 193-194.
- ⁶² Hsiao, 110.
- ⁶³ Tuosheng, 205.
- ⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 193-194.
- ⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 193-194.
- ⁶⁶ Kamiya, 719.
- ⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 719.
- ⁶⁸ Hsiao, 112.