

The Doolittle Raids

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On April 18, 1942, eighty men embarked on one of the most extraordinary and daring air raids in American History. Undoubtedly, most historians view the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo as an example of bravery and ingenuity present in the United States military during World War II. As General Doolittle remarked, "I was proud of my crew and all the other volunteers who were willing to lay their lives on the line for a risky mission that I could not tell them about until we were on the carrier."¹ Although the bravery and heroism of the mission leaves no doubt, there is a great deal of debate regarding the success and impact of the mission. Most histories of the Doolittle Raid credit the mission with raising American morale, lowering Japanese morale and confidence, and precipitating the Battle of Midway, which the Japanese lost. The difference between these histories rests with the emphasis the historian places on each positive consequence of the raid, and the extent to which the historian acknowledges the negative results of the raid. Carroll Glines, the most prolific scholar of the Doolittle Raid, argues that the psychological effect on the Japanese public and military was the most important result of the mission. James Merrill and others make a case that the rise in American morale was the most important part of the mission. The final group of historians question the true success of the Doolittle Raid. They weigh its positives against its negative in alerting the Japanese and causing thousands of deaths to the Chinese. In all, the historiography of the Doolittle Raid starts with the foundation set by Carroll Glines. Historians researching the Doolittle Raid, begin their research by analyzing the psychological effects of the mission. Although not explicitly aimed at explaining the Doolittle Raid, John Dower sheds light on America's anger and need for revenge against the Japanese. Dower's research, combined with Merrill's history, forms the thesis of this paper. The Doolittle Raid relieved America's strong desire for revenge and provided a significant morale boost that pushed the United States to ultimate victory in the Pacific.

Carroll Glines is the foremost scholar on the Doolittle Raid and has spent much of his life writing books related to the topic. A World War II veteran himself, Glines hails the raid as an important part of American victory in the Pacific. Although he may write with some bias and over glorify the accomplishments of the military, Glines supports his arguments with very solid research and documentation. Glines's most prominent work, *Doolittle's Tokyo Raiders*, was the first comprehensive and analytical book written solely on the Tokyo Raid. This 1964 book made Glines' interpretation fundamental to researching and analyzing the Doolittle Raid. It is also very important for scholars researching the critical points of the World War II. Glines emphasizes the psychological impact the raid had on the entire country of Japan. He states, "the impact on Japanese morale, the primary objective of the raid, was considerable."² In his view, the Doolittle Raid completely changed the mindset of the Japanese people. Before the war and after Pearl Harbor, they were confident in their

leadership and safety of their homeland. The Japanese believed they could defeat America as they continued to hear about the victories of their military. From Pearl Harbor onward, the Japanese continued to dominate without any strong display of Allied resistance.³ After the Tokyo Raid, "The psychological effect was a creeping, insidious realization that, in spite of propaganda to the contrary, the confidence of the people was severely shaken."⁴ Doubt began to enter their minds, and they lost confidence in their government and military. The Japanese government recognized the negative effect this could have, and continued to produce propaganda that would alter the impact of the raid.⁵ The military leaders also experienced the negative psychological effects of the Doolittle Raid. In *Doolittle's Tokyo Raiders*, Glines points out the anger and shock the raid caused to Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto and other leaders. As a direct result of the Doolittle Raid, Yamamoto moved to take possession of Midway Islands and secure the Japanese position in the Pacific.⁶ This raid proved to be disastrous for the Japanese and was a major turning point in the war.

Glines' analysis of the Doolittle Raid's psychological effects has remained constant throughout his works. Consequently, it has caused other historians to focus on the psychological effects of the event. In his 1984 book, *The Doolittle Raid: America's Daring First Strike Against Japan*, Glines continues to focus on the negative psychological effects of the raid on the Japanese citizens and leaders. Using much of the same language from his 1964 book, Glines adds a little emphasis to the immediate effect of the Doolittle Raid on the Japanese government. In the philosophy of the Japanese government, losing credibility to the public was a catastrophe.⁷ Glines summarizes his interpretation of the Doolittle Raid by saying, "the psychological after-effects and the fact that the Battle of Midway might not have been fought except for the Doolittle raid are the real reasons this single air raid has become a legend and deserves to be remembered."⁸ Glines focuses on the psychological effects because he believes they are the most important impact of the Doolittle Raid. Little physical damage resulted from the Tokyo Raid, but the psychological damage on the Japanese led them to a decisive defeat in the Pacific. Glines' emphasis on the psychological effects of the raid has pushed other historians to begin their research in this area.

Many other scholars have continued in Glines' footsteps in writing about the Doolittle Raid. Duane Schultz, John Keegan, and Janusz Piskalkiewicz have focused their history on the raid's impact in changing the course of the war. They have concentrated on the raid's psychological affect on Japanese military leaders in persuading them to initiate the Battle of Midway. Writing after Glines, these historians base their ideas on Glines' foundation, and continue to support his arguments. Although Schultz, Keegan, and Piskalkiewicz place little emphasis on the Japanese citizen, they follow Glines' analysis that the Doolittle Raid forced the Japanese military leaders into a decisive defeat in the Pacific. Duane Schultz examines Admiral Yamamoto and his personal sense of failure, by quoting Yamamoto's biographer. Yamamoto's "normally clear judgment was warped by the Doolittle Raid."⁹ Everything Yamamoto was assigned to protect seemed to have been destroyed. This created a sense of urgency for Yamamoto to increase Japan's defensive capabilities. Schultz argues that this led Yamamoto to push prematurely for the battle of Midway, which was a pivotal and decisive battle in the War in the Pacific.¹⁰ Like most scholars, Schultz acknowledges other effects of the Doolittle

Raid, including the boost it provided for American morale. However, Schultz makes very clear in his introductory summary that the primary success of the Doolittle Raid was the psychological blow it provided to the military leaders of Japan. This blow caused the course of the war to be forever altered in the Battle of Midway.¹¹ Like many scholars writing about the Doolittle Raid, Schultz bases his interpretations on the foundation established by Carroll Glines.

John Keegan agrees with this interpretation and states that the Doolittle Raid "might nevertheless have been judged a fiasco if it had not registered with the Japanese high command."¹² Keegan dismisses the psychological effect on the common Japanese citizens and emphasizes the influence the Doolittle Raid had in pushing the Japanese high command to "provoke a decisive battle" at Midway Island.¹³ Although the Doolittle Raid was not the only reason Japan moved to Midway, Keegan writes that it was an important factor in turning the tides of war in the Pacific. Janusz Piekalkiewicz also emphasizes the psychological effect the Doolittle Raid had on Japanese military leaders. Piekalkiewicz states that the raid scared the Japanese high command and caused them to focus more on defending their homeland. In his view, the raid was extremely important in causing Japan to bring forces back to protect their homeland and to set a date for the Battle of Midway.¹⁴ Carroll Glines was extremely influential in emphasizing the psychological effects the Doolittle Raid had on Japanese citizens and high command. His research and history has helped to solidify the importance of the Doolittle Raid in changing the course of war. Many other historians have followed in his footsteps and have further outlined the importance of the Doolittle Raid in precipitating the Battle of Midway. Although some historians have questioned the strength of this connection, most historians acknowledge that the Doolittle Raid had some effect in causing this important naval battle.

Other historians have argued that the main success of the Doolittle Raid was its ability to raise American morale in a time of need. Morale is vital to a country's war efforts and is of particular interest to military historians. The pioneer and leader of this philosophy is James Merrill. Merrill writes about the many other accomplishments of the Tokyo Raid, but focuses on its significance in providing good news to Americans and shifting the momentum of war in the Pacific. Like Glines, Merrill emphasizes the psychological effects of the raid. In his 1964 book *Target Tokyo*, Merrill discusses the barrage of negative news following Pearl Harbor. The numerous problems caused Americans to become concerned about their military strength in the Pacific.¹⁵ Merrill connects the negative news for the allies and the United States, to a strong need for something good to happen. As military defeats continued to take place, this need grew in urgency and importance. Merrill states that public "concern intensified by the death of the British battleships *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* off Malaya in the Gulf of Siam."¹⁶ In Merrill's interpretation, the most influential impact of the Doolittle Raid was its success in breaking this string of bad news and setbacks for the United States. It created an end to American military problems and started a large string of successes in the war against Japan.¹⁷ Momentum shifted, morale soared, and the United States used the Doolittle Raid to push for further success. Merrill writes, "The Eighteenth of April, like a false dawn, held the promise of eventual victory in the Pacific."¹⁸ Americans sensed this promise and gained an increased confidence in their military and ability to achieve victory.

Other historians have also followed in Merrill's interpretation of the Doolittle Raid. Although C.L. Sulzberger and B.H. Liddell Hart write more general histories of World War II, they still argue that the most important result of the Doolittle Raid was the lift it provided to American morale and confidence. Written after 1964, these histories continue in Glines' lead and focus on the psychological effects of the raid. However, they support Merrill's argument that the greatest psychological impact was with the Americans. Sulzberger also emphasizes the bad news and failures of the American military in the first months of the war. The first months of the war offered little hope and encouragement for the American public, with news of the U-boats sinkings, defeat in Luzon, and the destruction of large parts of the allied fleets.¹⁹ Sulzberger states, "It was clearly necessary for Americans to prove to themselves that they were capable of hitting back, and to prove to the Japanese that they would suffer for their imprudence."²⁰ The Doolittle Raid offered this proof to the American public and military. Although Sulzberger writes that the Doolittle Raid did not directly change the course of war, he concludes that it provided an important psychological lift to Americans.²¹ In his book, *History of the Second World War*, B.H. Liddell Hart credits the Doolittle Raid with significantly raising American morale, and forcing Japan to concentrate more on the defense of their country and surrounding islands. Even so, Liddell Hart writes, "The prime result of the raid was the fillip it gave to American morale, which had been badly shaken by Pearl Harbor."²² This raid gave the United States a lift and provided momentum for the rest of the war. Liddell Hart writes only two pages about the Doolittle Raid in his seven hundred-page history of World War II. Despite this, Liddell Hart describes the Tokyo Raid as one part of the puzzle that changed the course of war for the Americans and Allies. Merrill, Sulzberger, and Liddell Hart all argue that the most important effect of the Doolittle Raid was the psychological boost it provided to American momentum, confidence, and morale. This view on the Doolittle Raid remains an influential part of its historiography.

Although most historians recognize the successes of the Doolittle Raid, many also acknowledge the negative effects of the raid. Even Glines, the most glorifying historian of the raid, recognizes the devastating after effects on the Chinese. In *Doolittle's Tokyo Raiders*, Glines includes a chapter entitled "The Chinese Help...And Suffer the Consequences." This chapter describes the horrific punishments and deaths the Japanese inflicted on the Chinese for helping the Doolittle Raiders. In one account, the Japanese captured the man who had harbored Lieutenant Watson, "wrapped him up in some blankets, poured the oil of the lamp on him and obliged his wife to set fire to the human torch."²³ Glines includes this example to show the swift and horrific revenge the Japanese pursued as a result of the Doolittle Raid. This shows that the impact of the Doolittle Raid was not all positive. In his 1984 book, Glines provides even more details and statistics regarding the plight of the Chinese. He uses Chiang Kai Shek's statements, government records, and General Claire Chennault's observations, to portray the cruel three-month campaign that claimed the lives of approximately two hundred fifty thousand Chinese.²⁴ Many innocent people were killed, and Glines recognizes that it was an effect of the Doolittle Raid. In examining the Doolittle Raid, Glines says that "it is the aftermath of Japanese terror and brutality, which has few equals in modern military history, that provides a reminder for all of man's capacity for cruelty to his fellow man."²⁵ Glines's insight on

the plight of the Chinese calls for historians to take a step back and look at the total effects of the raid. Even so, he blames the Japanese, and still credits the Doolittle Raid as an integral part of American victory in the Pacific.

Other historians weigh the negative effects of the Doolittle Raid more heavily. Donald Miller strongly considers the negative effects of the raid in his history of World War II. Although Miller credits the raid with raising American morale, he discusses the executions of three Americans and the death of a quarter million Chinese.²⁶ He links these deaths to the Doolittle Raid and questions whether we should really consider it a success. Miller never explicitly states his opinion of the Doolittle Raid, but infers that it created more harm than success. In Samuel Eliot Morison's book, *Strategy and Compromise*, he portrays the Doolittle Raid as "spectacular," but with little real impact on the war.²⁷ In other words, it was a show of bravery that was not strategically significant in the grand scheme of World War II. Morison continues to write that the raid "probably did us more harm, by putting the enemy on his guard, than it did us good in lessons learned."²⁸ In this statement, Morison directly refutes the notions of Glines and other scholars who claim that an important effect of the raid was to make Japan more defensive. Similar to Glines, Miller and Morison acknowledge the negative effects of the Doolittle Raid. In contrast, they emphasize these effects more heavily and infer that the Tokyo Raid was not a success.

The historiography of the Doolittle Raid has sparked interest in the popular press as well. Recent newspaper articles on the Doolittle Raid tend to glorify and emphasize the bravery of the Doolittle Raiders. In addition, these articles have used the arguments of Glines and Merrill regarding the psychological effects of the raid. Much of this recent attention is also due to the fact that the raid was nearing its sixtieth anniversary. In a 2002 article appearing in the *Houston Chronicle*, Jeff Wilkinson writes very nostalgically about the Doolittle Raiders and their contributions to the country. He writes, "They lifted American fighting spirit when it was at its lowest ebb, giving the country hope for the long struggle ahead."²⁹ This is directly related to the historical argument made by James Merrill in his book *Target Tokyo*. Wilkinson tells the story of the Doolittle Raid in a way that expresses his appreciation, respect, and awe of their bravery. He portrays the raiders as long shots who made significant contributions to American victory in the Pacific. Agreeing with Merrill's interpretation of the raid, Wilkinson portrays the amazing boost in morale that the Doolittle Raid provided.

In a 2002 *Boston Herald* article, Tom Farmer also writes about the tremendous success of the Doolittle Raid. Farmer depicts Doolittle and the raiders as national heroes and symbols of bravery. In his view, the raid was successful in boosting morale, causing the Japanese to be more defensive, and to hurry into the Battle of Midway. This threefold success was highlighted by the raid's ability to boost spirits and change the attitude of the American people. Farmer includes part of an interview with Doolittle Raider Royden Stork, which exemplifies his point that the Doolittle Raid provided a huge emotional lift to America.³⁰ Wilkinson and Farmer's interpretations of the raid reflect a combination of the different scholarly interpretations. Although they agree with Merrill's interpretation about the primary effect of raid, they tend to mirror Glines' glorification of the raid.

Jichuan Wang expressed his concern about this type of glorification in a recent article in the *Dayton Daily News*. Of Chinese descent, Wang is particularly concerned with the Chinese role in the Doolittle Raid. He discusses the recent depictions of the raid, including the silver screen portrayal in *Pearl Harbor*. Recent articles and the movies have glorified the American bravery and success of the mission, but have failed to acknowledge the role of the Chinese. Wang asks the question, "What price did the Chinese pay for rescuing the American pilots?"³¹ He refers to the fact that two hundred and fifty thousand Chinese were killed as a result of the raid, and compares this number to the under ten thousand Allied soldiers that were killed on D-Day.³² The Chinese suffered greatly as a result of the Doolittle Raid, and Wang states that they should be given some credit. Wang also infers that the large number of Chinese casualties might suggest that the Doolittle Raid was not quite the success that it has been portrayed as in recent articles in movies. Recent history and articles on the Doolittle Raid have tended to place an increased significance on the bravery and impact of the Doolittle Raid. Wang's article is a call to step back and analyze the larger picture of the historic Tokyo Raid. Wang is influenced by his own connection to China as well as history of the raid that has discussed the Chinese role. Wang challenges historians to consider the Chinese role more strongly in the future. Only time will tell how historians respond to this type of argument. As the plight of the Chinese becomes better known, historians will surely pay more attention to their important role in the Doolittle Raid.

The historiography of the Doolittle Raid has contributed different interpretations regarding the impact and legacy of the daring mission. Carroll Glines has provided the foundation for interpretation of the Doolittle Raid and has encouraged most historians in this field to consider the psychological effects of the mission. Important insight into the impact of the Doolittle Raid has come from historian John Dower. In his book, *War Without Mercy*, Dower describes the strong hatred for the Japanese that appeared after Pearl Harbor. The Japanese were viewed as evil, sneaky, conniving, primitive, and most of all "treacherous."³³ These feelings continued to grow as Japan remained aggressive and on the attack. As a result of Japan's surprise attack at Pearl Harbor, Americans developed "a thirst for revenge" that the Japanese never anticipated.³⁴ Dower provides a powerful description of the climate that fostered the creation of the Doolittle Raid. The American public, military leaders, and President Roosevelt called for revenge against the Japanese, and would not relent until this objective was achieved. Mixing Dower's ideas with the philosophy of James Merrill produces an argument that will be the central focus of this paper. The Doolittle Raid satisfied America's need for revenge against the Japanese and provided a morale boost that propelled the United States to victory in the Pacific.

Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor created a great deal of anger and resentment in the United States. Responding to this attack, President Roosevelt delivered his famous address to congress asking for a declaration of war. He stated, "Yesterday, December 7, 1941-a date which will live in infamy-the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by the naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan."³⁵ Roosevelt chooses his words carefully and emphasizes the date December 7, 1941, as a day the United States will avenge. Roosevelt also points out

the fact that the Japanese had "deliberately sought to deceive the United States by false statements and expressions of hope for continued peace."³⁶ Portraying the Japanese as deceitful, treacherous, and evil, Roosevelt mobilizes the United States for revenge against the Japanese.

Vengeance was on everyone's mind in America after the Japanese surprise attack. At Pearl Harbor, the United States lost five battleships, one hundred and sixty-two planes, and suffered over forty two million dollars worth of physical damage.³⁷ The most significant and personal loss, however, rested with the two thousand four hundred and three casualties. These heavy losses resonated with Americans and triggered feelings of racism, hatred, and a powerful desire for revenge. John Dower emphasizes the existence and consequences of America's need for revenge following Pearl Harbor. In fact, Dower states that Japan's "surprise attack provoked a rage bordering on the genocidal among Americans."³⁸ The public and military were so angry at Japan that the idea of striking back neared the point of obsession. Along with obsessing about revenge, Americans developed a strong sense of racism. Both revenge and racism were fueled and perpetuated by the media. In a *Time Magazine* article, they reported that the main reaction to Pearl Harbor was expressed in the statement, "Why, the yellow bastards!"³⁹ Also, the *New Yorker* magazine classified the Japanese as "yellow monkeys."⁴⁰ This type of racist portrayal of the Japanese was typical in the time period following Pearl Harbor. Despite the cunning and well-planned attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese were often portrayed as primitive and unintelligent. In fact they were often represented as "ape-like" and "subhuman."⁴¹ In the eyes of many Americans, the Japanese were capable of participating in dastardly attacks that were beyond the civility of other countries. Throughout America, in the form of newspaper articles, magazine articles, movies, and songs, the Japanese were touted as racially and mentally inferior to Americans. Swift revenge was necessary to affirm Americans' ideas of superiority. This would raise morale to the level necessary to achieve victory in the Pacific.

President Roosevelt and high profile military leaders fueled racism and the passion for revenge. As James Merrill states, "Since the Day of Infamy, 7 December 1941, President Roosevelt had been eager for the army and Navy to strike at the very heart of Japan, deliver the destruction of war to the Japanese people, and retaliate for Pearl Harbor."⁴² Roosevelt exuded this necessity of quick revenge to the American public and military leaders. Doolittle states in his autobiography that Roosevelt expressed his strong desire and demand to achieve revenge on Japan as soon as possible.⁴³ In this meeting with military leaders, Roosevelt relayed an order that resonated with the entire United States military. Doolittle states that this order was repeated numerous times by Roosevelt and led to a tremendous amount of brainstorming. Roosevelt's obsession for revenge only increased the obsession of the many military leaders. One man who became extremely obsessed with achieving revenge on the Japanese was Admiral William Halsey. Halsey's famous saying was "Kill Japs, kill Japs, kill more Japs."⁴⁴ This saying was varied at times to the motto, "Remember Pearl Harbor-keep 'em dying."⁴⁵ Halsey not only expressed his desire for revenge to the public, but also added to the fire of racism and Japanese hatred. Halsey's attitude became typical of the American public's attitude. President Roosevelt fueled racism and Japanese hatred by implementing Japanese internment camps.

Japanese Americans were taken away to camps as a result of distrust, racism, and homeland security. On February 19, 1942 President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 and endorsed a policy taking over a hundred thousand Japanese from their homes.⁴⁶ This government endorsement of racial profiling encouraged more racism, distrust and hatred of the Japanese. It also increased the American desire to seek revenge. America was continuing to protect itself from an attack, but had yet to strike back at Japan. The American people realized the threat of Japan but had yet to see its own military offer a significant threat.

The New York Times depicted the Japanese as time bombs that could attack at any time. In the days following the Pearl Harbor attack, the *Times'* front page was filled with headlines describing Japanese aggression and invasions. The headlines continued to report the damage at Pearl Harbor as well as Japanese attacks in Malaysia and the Philippines. The Headline of December 10, 1941 read, "Roosevelt Sees a Long, World Wide War; Japanese Invade Luzon, Fight in Malaysia; 2 Big British Warships Sunk, Tokyo Says."⁴⁷ These headlines were common for many days after Pearl Harbor and created the picture of the Japanese as an aggressive and significant threat to America. On December 21, 1941, the *Times* ran a section of photographs, including the Manhattan skyline and military defensive preparations.⁴⁸ This section stressed preparation and insinuated that the Japanese were planning another sneak attack on America. These types of headlines and photography sections not only increased fear, but also increased hatred and the desire for revenge against the Japanese.

After Pearl Harbor, the mood of the United States was filled with anger and disbelief. No Americans experienced these feeling more than members of the United States military. Admiral Donald D. Duncan was a critical part of planning the Doolittle Raid and remembers the origins for the dangerous mission. He remembers the public cries of "Where is the Navy?" and "Why don't we do something?"⁴⁹ The military experienced strong pressure from the public and the President to devise a plan to attack Japan. In addition, members of the military possessed the most intense desire for revenge. Realizing the importance of satisfying America's need for revenge and restoring confidence in the military, the dangerous Doolittle Raid was planned. A sense of urgency and excitement among the military leaders helped to put the plan together quickly.⁵⁰ Although, the raid would be a large risk, the rewards would be even greater. Admiral Duncan describes how the excitement and desire to avenge Pearl Harbor led to the efficient and effective planning of the Doolittle Raid.

Colonel Ross Greening, a Doolittle Raid pilot, provides a vivid description of the sense of urgency for revenge against the Japanese. Greening explains the role of the press in emphasizing the need to bomb Japan and avenge Pearl Harbor.⁵¹ In fact, "Large sums of money were offered to the first individuals to carry out such a raid."⁵² The American public was so obsessed with the idea of revenge, that they were offering rewards to anyone who could satisfy their obsession. Japan had made things personal by initiating a surprise attack on America's homeland. The public and military of the United States was determined to make it personal for the Japanese. As a symbolic gesture of revenge, the Raiders attached medals to the bombs. These medals had been given to a number of Americans "symbolizing Japan's everlasting friendship with the United States."⁵³ Those aboard the USS *Hornet*, held a ceremony

attaching these medals to the bombs that would rain terror on Tokyo. In addition, men who had loved ones killed at Pearl Harbor were allowed to write messages on the bombs.⁵⁴ This enabled the men to gain a sense of revenge and finality. This ceremony aboard the aircraft carrier is a perfect example of the strong desire for revenge that demanded the Doolittle Raid. Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor had created an emotional response in all of America. Everyone wanted to strike back, and the military realized the importance of doing so. Perhaps the most telling sign of America's dedication to revenge comes from the Doolittle Raid's stand-by crews. As the Raiders prepared to take off on the most dangerous mission of their lives, the stand-by crews ran around shouting, "You lucky devils! You lucky devils!"⁵⁵ These men offered money to the Doolittle Raiders hoping to take their place and have the opportunity to bomb Japan. "Co-pilot Thadd Blanton would always remember that men were willing to pay \$150 to die."⁵⁶ The spirit of these men was typical of the United States military at this time. Everyone wanted a shot at hitting Japan. Americans demanded revenge against the Japanese and would not relent until it had been achieved. Consequently, American morale rested on this point.

Doolittle himself recognized the low American morale after Pearl Harbor. America had suffered a long string of defeats following the surprise attack and was in desperate need of positive news. Doolittle writes, "I hoped we could give them that by a retaliatory surprise attack against the enemy's home islands launched from a carrier, precisely as the Japanese had done at Pearl Harbor."⁵⁷ Nothing would boost American morale more than finally getting revenge on the Japanese. Bombing Tokyo, even with a small number of planes, would quench America's desire for revenge and provide a significant morale boost. President Roosevelt demanded this from Doolittle and other military leaders. Doolittle recalls, "Roosevelt emphasized that he wanted a bombing raid on the home islands of Japan as soon as possible to bolster the morale of America and her allies."⁵⁸ Although the Doolittle Raid was limited in the physical damage it could produce, it was specifically produce the necessary effect. Roosevelt and military leaders designed a mission that would satisfy America's need for revenge and provide a boost in morale to all of America.

Admiral Henry Miller shines light on how the Doolittle Raid was specifically aimed at achieving these goals. For one, the military designated their best men to the successful implementation of this mission. Doolittle, Halsey, and Admiral King were three of the best military officers of their time. This caused Miller to think, "My gosh, this is pretty fast company I'm in."⁵⁹ The fact that the military was willing to risk its best men on the Tokyo Raid signifies the importance attached to making it a success. The military realized the urgency of avenging Pearl Harbor and raising the morale of Americans. Although the mission was small, the resources committed to it were large. Miller describes the amazing amount of detail present in the planning of the raid and states his pride in the accomplishments of the crew.⁶⁰ When everything was said and done, the raid's plan was successful in providing a "big shot in the arm to the great American public."⁶¹

As Carroll Glines put it, "no group of airmen ever undertook a more dangerous combat mission with less chance of survival."⁶² The Doolittle Raid was extremely risky for all those involved. Yet, it was the only way possible for America to strike back at Japan. Despite the risk, the military deemed it necessary to achieve revenge

and change the tides of war. Many of the Doolittle Raiders have written accounts of the raid that shed light on the careful planning and perceived impacts of the mission. Ted Lawson does so in his vivid portrayal entitled *Thirty Seconds Over Tokyo*. He discusses with great detail the time aboard the USS Hornet en route to the launch point. As Lawson and the other raiders finally were told the destination was Tokyo, the pieces of the puzzle began to come together. Lawson writes, "We began to realize just how incredibly well planned the mission was the following day."⁶³ On board the Hornet, the raiders listened to a series of lectures, from top military minds, on procedural issues and the differences between the Japanese and Chinese.⁶⁴ This would be extremely important for safety and security after the mission was carried out. Training was thorough and well planned from the moment the Doolittle Raiders were chosen, to the moment they took off from the deck of the USS Hornet. The military dedicated their bravest, brightest, and most organized men to plan this mission. Obviously, they planned the Doolittle Raid in way that would best meet their objective of getting revenge and lifting the morale of the American people.

Detail was of the utmost importance to the success of the Doolittle Raid. Minute problems could spell the difference between a disaster and an important victory. Although the Doolittle Raid was designed to raise the moral of the American people, a failed mission could logically produce the opposite effect. Therefore the military recognized the importance of detail and careful planning and dedicated their best men to the mission. This instilled confidence in the Doolittle Raiders and allowed them to accomplish their mission. Jacob Manch exuded this confidence as he prepared for take-off. He thought about the long hours of preparation, and believed in the abilities of his crew.⁶⁵ Manch writes, "I had the fullest confidence in the B-25's and that we would make it off the deck safely."⁶⁶ Manch's account is a testament to the many men who helped plan and prepare for the Doolittle Raid. In addition, Manch sheds light on the importance the military placed on this mission. The Doolittle Raid was carefully planned, organized, and orchestrated to fulfill the ultimate goal of avenging Pearl Harbor and raising American morale. As discussed earlier, the public, military, and president's demand for revenge precipitated such an intense and well-planned course of action.

The planning and preparation all ended on April 18, 1942 at 8:20 A.M. Doolittle took off from the USS Hornet and led the first B-25 to Tokyo.⁶⁷ The other fifteen planes followed and the Doolittle Raid was underway. The Raiders bombed different targets in and around Tokyo but caused little physical damage. The "official survey of the consequences of the Doolittle raid listed fifty dead, 352 wounded, and ninety buildings gutted by fire and explosions."⁶⁸ Although this was far from the damage done at Pearl Harbor, the Doolittle Raiders had accomplished their objective. They had struck back in the heart of Japan and had helped to satisfy America's desire for revenge.

Americans were finally able to read the newspaper and see that the United States had struck back at Japan. On April 18, 1942, the headline of the *New York Times* read "Japan Reports Tokyo, Yokohama Bombed by 'Enemy Planes' in Daylight."⁶⁹ In contrast to many of the headlines since Pearl Harbor, this one did not point out another Japanese victory. Although the article goes on to say that the Japanese reported light damage, the bold print signified to Americans that something had

finally been done. Apparently, the United States military had finally taken the first step in avenging Pearl Harbor. For the following two days, *Times'* headlines continued to draw attention to the Tokyo Raid. The headline of April 20, 1942 stated, "Tokyo Factories Reported Hit in Raid; Two New Alarms Keep City on Alert."⁷⁰ For the first time since the United States entered the war, there was news of an attack on Japan. The *Los Angeles Times'* headline on the morning of April 18, 1942 was even larger and more dramatic. It read, "Tokyo, Kobe, Yokohama, Bombed!"⁷¹ The word "Bombed" was printed in enormous bold letters that covered a fourth of the page. Although the headline did not specifically give credit to the United States, Americans could infer that they had finally struck back. This type of headline jumps at the reader and connects right with their sense of pride and revenge. The attack was downplayed by the Japanese, but this did not change the fact that Americans were finally able to read some positive news.

Printed in Lima, Ohio, *The Lima News* provides a good example of a small town newspaper headline. *The Lima News* actually produced more provocative headlines to describe the Doolittle Raid. This was probably the case because the editors did not have to concern themselves as much with being objective. On April 18, 1942, the headline read in large bold letters, "Yankees Bomb Tokyo."⁷² In addition, there is a picture of the Tokyo skyline with the headline "Gets First Taste of Own Medicine."⁷³ *The Lima News* goes a little further than the *New York Times* and expresses the public sentiment. *The Lima News* was subjective, but at the same time, provided a more accurate depiction of the anticipated public reaction to the Doolittle Raid. The public would view the Doolittle Raid as Japan getting what they deserved. These types of headlines gave people a sense of satisfaction and helped to quench their desire for revenge. Also on the front page of the April 18th edition of *The Lima News*, there was a story titled "Bombs Over Tokyo Promise Better Times For World."⁷⁴ In the article, Dewitt Mackenzie discusses how this was an organized attack that showed the Americans and Allies were turning the war around.⁷⁵ The April 19th headline of *The Lima News* also provides insight to how American morale and sentiment was improved. It read, "Japs Fear More U.S. Bombs."⁷⁶ In the eyes of Americans, fear was finally shifting from the United States to the country of Japan. Since confidence and morale are interrelated, the shifting of fear was an important impact of the Doolittle Raid. The April 18th and April 19th editions of *The Lima News* are perfect examples of how American morale was raised by the Doolittle Raid. The American public read these headlines, saw the American military was avenging Pearl Harbor, and believed in their abilities to be victorious over the Japanese. *The New York Times*, *The Los Angeles Times*, and *The Lima News* may have produced headlines to a different degree, but they share one important similarity. They both let the public know in big black letters that the United States had finally struck back.

In *Target Tokyo*, James Merrill includes primary sources to show how the Tokyo Raid helped to satisfy America's need for revenge and provided an immediate impact on morale. Harrison Forman, Chinese correspondent to *The New York Times*, sent a dispatch regarding the Chinese reaction to the Doolittle Raid. In this dispatch, he reported the reaction of the Chungking War Minister who stated, "The nightmare of the Japanese militarists can be shattered only by bombs. These raids on Japan proper are only the beginning."⁷⁷ Although this represents the Chinese reaction, it helped to

influence the reaction of the American people. As the media reported these types of opinions, Americans were more likely to believe that the United States would continue to successfully attack Japan. Confidence leads to higher morale. Also in *Target Tokyo*, Merrill includes two cartoons depicting American sentiment about the Doolittle Raid. In the cartoon from the *Arizona Republic*, two unintelligent looking Japanese men are running frantically to a bomb shelter. The caption at the top of the cartoon reads, "Oh Son of Heaven, How D'ylike Them Apples?"⁷⁸ This is an obvious expression of America's satisfaction with its first taste of revenge. In a cartoon from *The Milwaukee Journal*, an apelike, primitive, Japanese man is sitting in a pile of debris reading a sign that says, "Jimmy Doolittle Led Tokyo Air Raid."⁷⁹ Both cartoons play to America's desire for revenge, giving the average American a renewed belief in his own superiority. This belief provides confidence and increased morale. Cartoons like these appeared in newspapers all over the country and helped to increase the effects of the Doolittle Raid. Americans enjoyed finally reading about an attack on Japan, as it allowed them to bask in their satisfaction of revenge.

James Doolittle did not immediately recognize the success of the Tokyo Raid. In fact, after he and the members of his crew were forced to bail out, Doolittle stated, "I had never felt lower in my life."⁸⁰ He believed that he might even be court marshaled for his part in the raid.⁸¹ Part of this is due to the fact that Doolittle held himself to such high standards. Although a perfect raid with no lost planes or men was a virtual impossibility, Doolittle believed it could be done. As time passed, Doolittle began to realize the success of the raid. He "learned that the surprise bombing of Tokyo was everything President Roosevelt had wished for and what we hoped we could deliver for him."⁸² Taking a step back and listening to the press and public opinion, Doolittle was able to see that the raid had provided a huge increase to American morale.⁸³ Doolittle concludes the reason for this boost in morale is the fact that America had finally "fought back."⁸⁴ America had finally gotten some revenge on the Japanese, and answered the demands of the public.

After Doolittle returned to the United States, he received an enormous amount of congratulatory letters from both the public and other military men.⁸⁵ Some of these letters from the public even included money and bonds made out to Doolittle.⁸⁶ This shows how much Americans wanted revenge and echoes the reward offers made before the raid. People were so exhilarated and appreciative of Doolittle's efforts that they found the time and generosity to write letters that included money. Although Doolittle returned the money, the overwhelming number of congratulatory letters made him realize that the Tokyo Raid was successful in raising American morale. Doolittle also received many letters from military men showing their appreciation for his efforts. One letter from Admiral Halsey had a particularly profound effect. Halsey writes, "I do not know of any more gallant deed in history than that performed by your squadron, and that it was successful is entirely due to the splendid leadership on your part."⁸⁷ Admiral Halsey gives a great deal of credit to Doolittle, but also stresses how important the raid was in the overall course of the war. Also, Halsey shows his appreciation for Doolittle finally achieving revenge on the Japanese. Again showing his hatred for the Japanese, Halsey tells Doolittle to "Keep on knocking over those yellow bastards."⁸⁸ Doolittle received a number of letters from the public and military that showed everyone's joy in the bombing raid on Japan. All of these letters provide

important insight on how the Tokyo Raid was perceived by Americans. Clearly, the Doolittle Raid helped to satisfy American's need for revenge, which led to a significant rise in confidence and morale.

The Doolittle Raiders have written firsthand accounts that show how the raid led to a significant rise in American and Allied morale. Eldred Scott writes about how important the Chinese viewed the Doolittle Raid. After the raid, the Chinese helped Scott and many other Doolittle Raiders to safety. Knowing that they may have been putting themselves in jeopardy, the Chinese helped the Americans "so they could bomb Tokyo again."⁸⁹ In addition, many of the Chinese viewed the Doolittle Raid as a sign of hope for the people of the world.⁹⁰ After experiencing and reading about the attitudes of the Chinese, Scott knew that the Doolittle Raid was a success.⁹¹ The attack on Japan, provided a means for restoring hope and confidence in America. Scott knew that Americans would share the same sentiment as the Chinese.

Perhaps the most emotional and gripping account of the Doolittle Raid was written by Captain Ted Lawson. In his primary account, *Thirty Seconds Over Tokyo*, Lawson begins by describing the personal pain he suffered as a result of his part in the bombing raid. He writes, "I watched a buddy of mine saw off my left leg. And finally I got home to my wife after being flown, shipped, and carried around the world."⁹² Lawson obviously experienced a great deal of physical and emotional suffering from the Doolittle Raid. Despite his huge sacrifices, Lawson still considered the Doolittle Raid to be a success. Although Lawson says that he thought about himself for a while after raid, he eventually turned his thoughts to the impact his mission had on the American people.⁹³ Naturally, it took some time for Lawson to get past his own severe injuries and analyze the larger picture. Stepping back, Lawson was able to see that the Tokyo Raid provided a tremendous boost to American morale. Lawson responded to a fellow Raider's question asking him if he thought the mission fulfilled its purpose. He said that that he believed the Tokyo Raid was a success for the main reason "that our people got a lift out of it."⁹⁴ Lawson continued by saying, "It made them sure that we could go to work on the Japs, no matter how far away they were."⁹⁵ In other words, Lawson emphasizes that the main reason for the success of the Doolittle Raid was that America finally struck back at Japan. Achieving revenge and showing an active military, gave satisfaction and confidence to Americans. This triggered a significant rise in morale among the American public. Lawson's account of the Doolittle Raid is both powerful and insightful. Written only a year after the raid, it goes a long way to prove the importance Americans placed on striking back at Japan. Even in a disabled state, Ted Lawson realized that the major success of the raid was to help satisfy American's need for revenge. In addition, this raid proved to the public that the United States military was capable of more attacks that would ensure further revenge against the Japanese.

Lawson also includes in his book a copy of the War Department's official communiqué. Although it was released nearly a year after the raid, it includes important information concerning the government's evaluation of the raid. Regarding the targets and attack guidelines, the War Department writes, "This objective was carried out with accuracy and complete success."⁹⁶ The report goes on to take credit for "freezing" Japanese forces and preventing them from being used in offensive scenarios.⁹⁷ Although the report does not explicitly mention increasing American

morale, it shows the way that the government wanted the public to perceive the raid. Almost everything in this report points to the raid as a success and worthwhile mission. After the Doolittle Raid, the government only released materials that would point towards the ultimate success of the raid. As shown earlier, many high ranking officials felt strongly about the importance of achieving revenge on the Japanese. President Roosevelt, Halsey, and Doolittle all realized the importance of raising American confidence and morale. Consequently, they understood the necessity of maintaining a positive perception about the raid. Most reports after the raid included little concrete information, but stressed the bravery, intelligence, preparation and courage of the United States military. All of these things gave confidence to the American public and led to a surge in morale. The War Department's report a year later included more information, but was also a culmination of self praise designed to further convince the American public of the Doolittle Raid's success. As stated in the report, "One by one, each objective of each plane was checked off."⁹⁸ For the American public, the objective of striking back at Japan was finally achieved.

The Doolittle Raid lifted the moral and confidence of the American public, military, and the president. President Roosevelt reacted with jubilation when he heard about the success of the mission. Roosevelt's speechwriter, Samuel I. Rosenman provides a description of Roosevelt's reaction and mood after hearing the good news. Rosenman described the president as "overjoyed," knowing "the heartening effect it would have on American morale and the morale of our Allies."⁹⁹ President Roosevelt was determined to avenge Pearl Harbor and had finally realized this objective. Although Roosevelt could only tell the public the bombers came from "Shangri-La," he made sure to emphasize the importance of the symbolic mission.¹⁰⁰ Since President Roosevelt had been calling for a bombing raid on Tokyo immediately after Pearl Harbor, the realization of this demand had a strong personal impact. The Doolittle Raid increased the morale and confidence of President Roosevelt. Consequently, he enthusiastically relayed these feelings to the American public and military. The newspapers had just the effect Roosevelt wanted as they jubilantly "speculated on every possible angle of the Doolittle Raid."¹⁰¹ The entire nation was caught up in the accomplishment of the Doolittle Raid even though they did not know the specific details. The only detail they needed to know was that the United States had finally bombed Japan. This knowledge led to soaring morale throughout the country.

As James Merrill states, "The Eighteenth of April, like a false dawn, held the promise of eventual victory in the Pacific."¹⁰² After Doolittle's Tokyo Raid, Americans had reason to believe in their military again. They had the confidence and satisfaction that the United States could attack Japan just like they had attacked Pearl Harbor. After Pearl Harbor, revenge was extremely important to a majority of Americans. President Roosevelt exemplified this need for revenge in his famous speech to Congress following Pearl Harbor. Roosevelt declared, "No matter how long it takes to overcome this premeditated invasion, the American people in their righteous might will win through to absolute victory."¹⁰³ Roosevelt point blank tells the American people that they will get revenge and defeat the Japanese. This call for revenge permeates throughout America and creates a strong hatred towards the Japanese. John Dower discusses how this hatred leads Americans to view the

Japanese as primitive and "ape-like."¹⁰⁴ As these feelings of hatred and revenge continued to grow, it became all the more necessary for America to strike back at Japan. Although the Doolittle Raid was small compared to the Japanese forces at Pearl Harbor, it was specifically designed to achieve important objectives. The military dedicated its best men to organize, plan, and implement the raid. This shows their belief in the importance of bombing the homeland of Japan. President Roosevelt and military leaders realized the necessity of avenging Pearl Harbor and raising the morale of the country. In the end, the Doolittle Raid accomplished these goals. The extraordinary bravery and courage of eighty men, with the powerful leadership of "Jimmy" Doolittle, caused the tides of war to change in the Pacific. Living in New York City or Lima, Ohio, people were finally able to experience the first tastes of revenge. President Roosevelt, the military, and the general public were all energized by the accomplishments of the Doolittle Raiders. In fact, Doolittle was "flattered to learn how much the American people appreciated the raid on Japan."¹⁰⁵ April 18, 1942, marks one of the most amazing and influential air raids in American History. In the end, the Doolittle Raid should be remembered for giving Americans their first taste of revenge and providing a significant morale boost that led America to victory in the Pacific.

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