

## Lincoln, McClellan, and the Peninsula Campaign

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By 24 May 1862, Gen. George Brinton McClellan, commanding the Union Army of the Potomac, had forced his way up the Virginia Peninsula, a stretch of land between the York and the James Rivers. He had moved past the Confederate stronghold at Yorktown, marched through seas of mud, and was now within a few miles of Richmond.<sup>1</sup> His army was considerably smaller than he had envisioned it; before the whole force had landed at Fort Monroe, on the tip of the Peninsula, President Abraham Lincoln had removed first a division and then a whole corps from his command.<sup>2</sup> Extremely discouraged by this reduction of almost 60,000 troops, and fearing that he opposed an enemy almost twice his size, McClellan had repeatedly petitioned Washington for reinforcements.<sup>3</sup> In response, he had been informed on 18 May that Irvin McDowell's First Corps would be sent to him overland from Fredericksburg.<sup>4</sup> But now, on the 24th, Lincoln had telegraphed that, due to Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson's victories in the Shenandoah Valley, McDowell was being sent north in an attempt to trap Jackson.<sup>5</sup> McClellan, resigning himself to making "the best use of the forces at [his] disposal,"<sup>6</sup> acquiesced to the order. Only two days later, though, he was again requesting additional troops.<sup>7</sup>

The campaign that McClellan originally envisioned was not even supposed to take place on the Peninsula. Instead, he had favored landing his 100,000 man army at Urbana, on the southern bank of the Rappahannock River, and quickly marching it to Richmond.<sup>8</sup> The withdrawal of the Rebel force from Centreville and Manassass to the Richmond area on 9 March made this move impracticable, though. McClellan settled for landing at Fort Monroe and marching up the Peninsula, a move he regarded

as "less brilliant."<sup>9</sup> In many respects, then, the Young Napoleon's (a name derived initially from the country's faith in McClellan's military skill and his resemblance to the short French general) plans had been frustrated from the start, and Lincoln's telegram stating that McDowell would not be joining him must have only highlighted this fact to the general.

In fact, by the conclusion of the campaign, with the Army of the Potomac being withdrawn from the banks of the James in defeat, McClellan had already settled on an explanation for the many setbacks and frustrations he had experienced: he and his army had "fallen victims to the stupidity & wickedness at Washington which have done their best to sacrifice as noble an Army as ever marched to battle."<sup>10</sup>

Only McClellan's most ardent admirers have fallen behind this assessment of why the Peninsula Campaign failed. The almost impossible supposition chiefly implicates Secretary of War Edwin Stanton and Lincoln.<sup>11</sup> Outrageous as his claim may be, though, it should not be believed that the Lincoln administration was free from contributing to the failure of the Peninsula Campaign. As commander in chief, Lincoln ordered and oversaw military directives which were politically and militarily sound by themselves, but were unwise when considered in the context of the campaign on the Peninsula. Although General McClellan must still bear much of the blame for the campaign's failure, some of Lincoln's actions should be considered as contributing factors.

### Lincoln's Actions

Though generally regarded as a great war president, several of Lincoln's orders

immediately before and during the Peninsula Campaign were imprudent or unwise. His Washington Birthday Order of 27 January 1862, for example, directed that there be "a general movement" of all Union forces against the Rebels on or by 22 February.<sup>12</sup> Conditions such as weather, supplies, and the general condition of the troops were not taken into account. In McClellan's case, the order would have forced him to campaign in the deep mud of a Virginia winter and spring with a garrisoned enemy in front of him at Centreville and Manassas.<sup>13</sup> However, this order was more a response to McClellan's unwillingness to attack the Rebel army at Centreville and Manassas, and in the end it was suspended in regard to him. Having finally been given a sufficient prod, McClellan made his own recommendations for a campaign against the Rebels.<sup>14</sup>

That campaign, the eventual Peninsula Campaign, was approved with the understanding that a series of orders be carried out beforehand, one of which appeared in the President's General War Order No. 3 of 8 March. The order called for the capture of the Rebel batteries on the Potomac between Washington and the Chesapeake Bay.<sup>15</sup> Extensive campaigning was never required to carry it out, however, since on 9 March, the very next day, it was learned that the Rebels had evacuated their works at Centreville and Manassas, exposing the batteries on the Potomac. If attempted, however, the attack would have indicated to Joseph E. Johnston, then the Rebel commander, that the Federals were planning a flanking attack somewhere along the Chesapeake Bay or Virginia coast.<sup>16</sup>

Up to this time Lincoln's major military decisions, while being foolish, had not, for whatever reasons, hurt the North's cause. On 31 March, however, Lincoln, as he related to McClellan, "felt constrained" to remove Louis Blenker's division of 10,000 men from the Army of the Potomac.<sup>17</sup> Blenker was ordered to join General John Fremont, commander of the new Mountain Department, west of the Shenandoah Valley. Correctly guessing that McClellan would be upset over his reduced force, Lincoln tried to assure him that if he could understand the full circumstances then he would acquiesce to the order.<sup>18</sup> Those circumstances, basically,

were that Fremont, the first Republican candidate for President and an intrepid explorer, had just been removed from a command in the West and radical factions in the Republican party were pressing Lincoln to strengthen Fremont's next command.<sup>19</sup>

Regardless of political considerations, Fremont's troops were adequate to hold and protect the Mountain Department without Blenker. Also, the size of the Rebel army, at this time, was known only by the estimates that McClellan gave, and those estimates put it at least 100,000 strong.<sup>20</sup> With the main Federal army leaving the safety of the capital to attack this supposedly huge force, and Fremont already with, as T. Harry Williams points out, "more than enough troops,"<sup>21</sup> Lincoln should have turned a deaf ear to the political considerations of the Pathfinder and maintained McClellan.

Sending Blenker to Fremont only deprived the Army of the Potomac of 10,000 men. Washington's Birthday Order and the order against the Rebel batteries on the Potomac were, because of outside influences, of little real consequence. However, these orders all demonstrated Lincoln's lack of military understanding; he did not fully understand the logistical difficulties of a campaign, nor did he possess the ability to comprehend the full effects a military move would have on an enemy. The third order, Blenker's removal, was carried out, and its repercussions were far reaching. It showed again that Lincoln could not fully grasp the consequences of a single order in the broader theater, and it signaled a "splintering-off" of McClellan's forces.<sup>22</sup> Even more importantly, the order, along with the two previous ones, probably sowed the seed in McClellan's mind that the administration was against him. That seed would eventually grow into the conviction that the administration was filled with "traitors who are willing to sacrifice the country . . . for personal spite & personal aims."<sup>23</sup>

These orders all occurred before McClellan had even left for the Peninsula. On 4 April, after two days on the Peninsula, McClellan learned that McDowell's corps of approximately 40,000 had been detached from his army to further protect Washington.<sup>24</sup> The reasoning behind this action will be dealt with later, at this point it is sufficient to say that McClellan regarded it

as “the most infamous thing that history has recorded”<sup>25</sup> and maintained a continuous call for troops.<sup>26</sup> On 18 May, Stanton telegraphed that McDowell, stationed at Fredericksburg, had been ordered to march south towards Richmond, always keeping Washington covered.

However, on 23 May Stonewall Jackson attacked a Union force under Nathaniel Banks at Front Royal in the Shenandoah Valley and succeeded in driving him north down the Valley toward Winchester. In lieu of this new development, Lincoln countermanded Stanton’s order for McDowell to join McClellan and sent him into the Valley to trap Jackson.<sup>27</sup> Fremont, then at Franklin, West Virginia, was ordered east to help.<sup>28</sup> By itself, the strategy was a good one; the positioning of Fremont and McDowell squarely in Jackson’s line of retreat clearly demonstrated that the Lincoln administration’s military reasoning had improved since its unwise orders earlier.

The argument can be made, however, that McDowell’s presence in the Valley was unnecessary and that his corps would have been better used with McClellan. Lincoln, of course, hoped to use McDowell to destroy Jackson but he ignored several important factors. First, as McDowell himself pointed out, the First Corps, stationed at Fredericksburg, was “entirely beyond helping distance of General Banks.”<sup>29</sup> Second, McDowell’s line of advance into the Valley was longer than Jackson’s line of retreat out of it.<sup>30</sup> Plus, Jackson had the advantage of falling back upon his communications and supply line; McDowell and Fremont were forced to constantly extend and protect theirs. With a full understanding of these considerations McDowell urged Lincoln that he be allowed to join McClellan.<sup>31</sup>

McDowell wished to join McClellan because he believed that the junction of their forces would cause the “reduction of Richmond.”<sup>32</sup> McClellan agreed with this belief: “I now felt confident that we would on his [McDowell’s] arrival be sufficiently strong to overpower the large army confronting us.”<sup>33</sup> Many historians believe, however, that Lincoln made the best use of McDowell.<sup>34</sup> It should be noted, though, that they do so not because Jackson was a legitimate threat in the Valley. Rather, they argue that McClellan, instead of attacking, would only

have cried out for more reinforcements if McDowell had joined him.<sup>35</sup> The argument is a valid one; the Young Napoleon had, by this time, displayed an amazing ability to completely misjudge his opponent’s strength. But while there is no clear evidence that McClellan would have used McDowell immediately against the Rebels, there is no proof that he would not have.

In the end, the best argument for McDowell’s advance to the Peninsula is that if it would not have prompted McClellan to action, it at least would have complicated Gen. Robert E. Lee’s actions; Lee realized the importance of “diverting the army of McDowell at Fredericksburg from uniting with that of McClellan.”<sup>36</sup> Thus, when Lincoln ordered McDowell to the Valley he unwittingly helped Lee, who was anxious to “relieve the pressure at Fredericksburg.”<sup>37</sup>

While McClellan’s and McDowell’s combined force of over 140,000<sup>38</sup> would not have ensured the fall of Richmond, it at least is plausible to say that it would have complicated Lee’s plans; he may have still been able to take advantage of the Young Napoleon’s fears of a superior enemy, but he would have found it much harder to drive the enlarged and joined Federal army away from Richmond in retreat. Lincoln, either not considering the effect reinforcements would have on McClellan or not being aware of the effect, obviously felt justified in sending McDowell after Jackson. However, with most of his generals arguing that Jackson was only trying to draw McDowell away from McClellan,<sup>39</sup> Lincoln should have realized that the First Corps could do infinitely more good outside Richmond. In denying McDowell, Lincoln, who believed “to the last [of McClellan] that if he could once ‘get him started’ he would then handle the army well and do great things with it,”<sup>40</sup> passed up his best chance to give McClellan the confidence he needed to sustain the campaign.

### McClellan’s Actions

By the middle of April McClellan had his army engaged in a siege outside Yorktown and considered himself lucky to be away from Washington, “that sink of iniquity.”<sup>41</sup> The Lincoln administration’s mistakes were clearly evident to McClellan: the removal of Blenker’s

and McDowell's forces "was a fatal error."<sup>42</sup> Upon landing at Fort Monroe, however, McClellan began a series of his own mistakes that would eventually outmatch any damage Lincoln had done to the Peninsula Campaign.

That campaign, in and of itself, was a bone of contention between Lincoln and McClellan. Worried about the safety of Washington, concerned about a safe line of retreat if McClellan were to be defeated, and influenced by generals in McClellan's own army,<sup>43</sup> Lincoln had urged an overland march to Richmond from Manassas.<sup>44</sup> McClellan argued strongly for the flanking movement, however, prophesying a "most brilliant result."<sup>45</sup>

Pleased to at least have a plan of attack from his general, Lincoln agreed to McClellan's proposal under three conditions: that Manassas Junction be held with enough troops to prevent the Rebels from acquiring it; that Washington be left "entirely secure;" and that the remainder of the army be employed in pursuit of the Rebels.<sup>46</sup> It was the second point—the safety of Washington—that was to have the most influence over McClellan and the campaign.

Lincoln and Stanton had determined, after consulting with McClellan's corps commanders, that 40,000 men be left to defend the capital.<sup>47</sup> In compliance with this order, on 1 April, right before leaving for Fort Monroe, McClellan gave General Lorenzo Thomas his final report to the Secretary of War—a report that detailed over 70,000 troops for Washington's defence.<sup>48</sup> A problem soon arose in how McClellan had counted the available troops, though. Under close examination Lincoln and Stanton found that part of the covering force was stationed in the Shenandoah Valley, about eighty miles away.<sup>49</sup> McClellan had also performed several numerical tricks in determining the number of troops in and around Washington, such as counting some brigades twice and including a force of 3,500 recruits who were still under training. Additionally, General Wadsworth, commanding the Washington defenses, stated that the 19,022 troops he did have for duty were "imperfectly disciplined [and] . . . disorganized."<sup>50</sup>

With this information, Lincoln decided that his order to leave Washington "entirely secure . . . had been neglected;"<sup>51</sup> consequently, he

ordered McDowell, on 4 April, to be detached from McClellan's command and to command the new Department of the Rappahannock which was charged with the protection of Washington.<sup>52</sup> Although McClellan was responsible for McDowell's removal, he chalked the order up as more proof of the administration's deceit,<sup>53</sup> and complained that he was "incapable of continuing operations which had been begun."<sup>54</sup> He had intended for McDowell to sail up the York, disembark north of Yorktown, and attack the Rebel stronghold in the rear.<sup>55</sup> Without McDowell, he abandoned his flanking maneuver and quickly concluded that he had no choice but to siege Yorktown.<sup>56</sup>

The conclusion to siege because of McDowell's absence was faulty because the Yorktown defenders initially numbered only about 11,000 men.<sup>57</sup> McClellan actually arrived on the Peninsula believing there to be no more than 20,000 defenders<sup>58</sup> and predicting a rapid advance,<sup>59</sup> but soon changed his mind when reports of a "large force . . . [in] formidable" works reached him.<sup>60</sup> Actually, the Confederate commander, General John Magruder, a man of theatrical talents, had put on a convincing, if hollow, show of force for McClellan's benefit. Countermarching his men up and down the Confederate works and showing a bold confidence in firing on any Union troops who presented themselves, Magruder soon had McClellan convinced that a frontal assault would be inviting disaster and that a siege was necessary.<sup>61</sup> Moreover, McClellan never ordered an assault to test the strength of Yorktown even though there was, as General John Barnard, chief engineer of the army, stated in 1864, a gap in the Yorktown defense in which "there was nothing whatever."<sup>62</sup> McClellan denied ever having been informed by Barnard that there was a noticeable gap in the Rebel's defense.<sup>63</sup> This excuse for starting a month long siege skirts the fact that McClellan never tested the defenses, however, and was merely an attempt to "shield himself behind the opinions . . . of his staff . . ."<sup>64</sup>

To McClellan, losing McDowell "frustrated all [his] plans for impending operations,"<sup>65</sup> and only strengthened his main fallacy—his absolute belief that he always was fighting a numerically superior, if not overwhelming, enemy.

McDowell's absence, in his mind, only increased the already drastic odds against which he fought. It was this belief that originally kept him from attacking the Rebels at Centreville<sup>66</sup> and allowed the Rebels time to reinforce Yorktown effectively. As McClellan pushed his way slowly towards Richmond, the enemy grew ever larger in his mind. At the evacuation of Yorktown they were "from 100,000 to 120,00;" on 25 June, the start of the Seven Days, the Rebels had ballooned to 200, 000.<sup>67</sup> Confederate records show that the Rebel strength at Yorktown was, around 30 April, just under 56, 000 total men.<sup>68</sup> While less clear, it is generally believed that at the start of the Seven Days Lee commanded about 85, 000 men.<sup>69</sup> In contrast, the Army of the Potomac, on 20 June, had a little over 105, 000 men present for duty.<sup>70</sup>

The huge discrepancy between how many troops McClellan believed the Rebels to have and their actual number had no truly adverse effect until, with McClellan halted only a few miles outside Richmond and straddling both sides of the Chickahominy, Lee decided to end the stalemate. McClellan had, since approaching Richmond from the Chickahominy in early May, stationed part of his army north of the river and the rest of it south of the river. On the eve of the Seven Days, 24 June, John Fitz Porter's Fifth Corps of about 35, 000 men was on the northern side of the Chickahominy near Mechanicsville, about six miles northeast of Richmond. Porter's position was precarious; his corps was the lone Federal force north of the Chickahominy and a sudden flood might break contact with the rest of the army on the southern bank. McClellan was aware of Porter's vulnerability, but he claimed that an 18 May order directing him to extend his right flank north of Richmond for McDowell's advance had not been revoked with McDowell's march into the Valley, only suspended.<sup>71</sup> While this was technically true, it should have been clear by the end of June that McDowell would not be coming.

Lee was just as aware of Porter's hazardous position as McClellan was. Betting heavily on his opponent's extreme caution, Lee marched the majority of his force, about 60, 000 men, north of the Chickahominy to attack Porter on 26 June.<sup>72</sup> While this battle, the Battle of

Mechanicsville, was being fought, General Magruder and his force of about 25, 000 troops south of the river held the main Rebel entrenchments between Richmond and the rest of the Union Army,<sup>73</sup> approximately 70, 000 strong.<sup>74</sup> As at Yorktown, Magruder, countermarching men and having officers shout orders to nonexistent brigades,<sup>75</sup> kept McClellan at bay. He did not, however, convince two division commanders in General Samuel Heintzelman's corps: Joseph Hooker and Philip Kearny.<sup>76</sup> Hooker and Kearny found their way into McClellan's headquarters and reported that their two divisions could march into Richmond virtually unopposed. They demanded permission to make the march, if for nothing else than to release the 14, 000 Union prisoners in Richmond. Unconvinced, McClellan sent the two indignant generals back to their lines and ordered a general retreat.<sup>77</sup>

McClellan and his supporters have said that Magruder's works were too strong to assault.<sup>78</sup> This excuse is reminiscent of McClellan's quick acceptance of the belief that the Yorktown defenses were too formidable. And in both cases there was immediate evidence (Barnard in the case of Yorktown and Hooker and Kearny for Magruder) that the Rebel defenses were not as strong as McClellan believed them to be. In fact, the strongest defense Lee had during the campaign was probably McClellan's imagination.

Convinced then, that Porter's corps had been attacked by superior numbers while his southern force had been held at bay by equally superior numbers, McClellan set his mind to a retreat to the James River.<sup>79</sup> Once this decision had been made nothing, even victory, would sway him from it. The first task was to get Porter's corps south of the Chickahominy and started on the way to the James. To this end, Generals Edwin Sumner, William Franklin, and Heintzelman fought a rear guard battle on 29 June to allow the rest of the Union Army and its immense supply train time to retreat. This battle, fought south of the Chickahominy around Savage's Station, was a misguided and confused fight. The Rebels lacked coordination and the Federals lacked a definite commander, McClellan busying himself with moving the supply train south to the James.<sup>80</sup> Sumner was

the senior officer and assumed command, beating the Rebels back and then refusing to resume the retreat rather than “leave a victorious field”.<sup>81</sup> An aide sent to McClellan explained the victory, but McClellan, again not listening to his subordinates, refused to halt the retreat.<sup>82</sup>

In the case of Savage’s Station, McClellan may have been right in continuing the retreat. His men were spread out between the Station and the James<sup>83</sup> and “greatly exhausted.”<sup>84</sup> More importantly, the Rebels, who had not attacked with their full strength, were only beaten back, not defeated.<sup>85</sup> However, on the last day of the Seven Days, 1 July, McClellan did pass up a chance to regain the initiative.<sup>86</sup> Lee had trailed the Union retreat to Malvern Hill, a wide hill just to the north of the James River. Atop it, McClellan had placed Porter’s, Heintzelman’s and Sumner’s corps along with most of the army’s artillery.<sup>87</sup> Lee charged, but he was never able to coordinate all of his men into a unified attack and his army was, in McClellan’s words, “thoroughly beaten, with great slaughter.”<sup>88</sup> Porter sent a note to McClellan with “the hope that our withdrawal had ended and that we should hold the ground we now occupied. . . .”<sup>89</sup> McClellan had already decided to carry the retreat to Harrison’s Landing, though,<sup>90</sup> as at Savage’s Station, he was not present at the battle, making it easy for him to assume defeat.<sup>91</sup>

History has handed George McClellan the relatively sole responsibility for the failure of the Peninsula Campaign, perhaps because his mistakes are not only better documented than Lincoln’s, but the consequences are easier to see. Yorktown’s month long siege did not just waste time, it allowed the Rebels the time to prepare for McClellan’s eventual advance and to bring in as many reinforcements as possible.<sup>92</sup> Comparably, the danger in straddling the Chickahominy could not be lost on anyone when Lee, fully exploiting the situation it created, hurled two-thirds of his army on

McClellan’s weak flank. And the anger over missed opportunities, epitomized in Kearny’s angry outburst at McClellan after learning that the general would not allow Hooker and himself to attack Richmond,<sup>93</sup> is not easily forgotten.

Lincoln, perhaps shielded in martyrdom, has fared much better. Few argue that he should not have detained McDowell to protect the capital, but those that support his decision to then send McDowell into the Valley do not take into consideration, as Lincoln himself failed to do, the larger theater of war. McDowell would have added 40,000 to the Army of the Potomac, and if this substantial reinforcement would not have been enough to induce McClellan to attack immediately, as many argue,<sup>94</sup> it at least would have complicated Lee’s plans and probably given McClellan confidence enough to repel the Rebel attack without feeling the need for a retreat. Certain other orders, such as the removal of Blenker’s division and the insistence of removing the Potomac batteries, are relatively ignored, the political considerations or plain impracticability behind them merely glossed over as isolated mistakes of an inexperienced war president.<sup>95</sup>

George McClellan, ready to see danger in a vastly superior Rebel army or a government of “abolitionists & other scoundrels,”<sup>96</sup> did not view them as isolated. If the orders removing Blenker and McDowell from his command proved to him that the Lincoln administration was against him, than the Washington Birthday Order and the directive against the Potomac batteries laid the seed of doubt and mistrust in his mind. Illogical though it may be to use McClellan’s paranoia as a justification for the campaign’s failure, Lincoln’s orders did do more than simply complicate the Young Napoleon’s plans or deny him troops. His orders nurtured the seed until McClellan’s doubts about “the rascals”<sup>97</sup> grew into an almost consuming hatred for “men I despise from the bottom of my heart.”<sup>98</sup>

## End Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Stephen W. Sears, ed., *The Civil War Papers Of George B. McClellan: Selected Correspondence 1860-1865* (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1989), 273-74.
- <sup>2</sup> War Department, *The War Of The Rebellion: A Compilation Of The Official Records Of The Union And Confederate Armies series I vol. 11 pt. III* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1884. Reprint, Harrisburg, PA.: Historical Times, Inc., 1985), 52. and War Department, *The War Of The Rebellion: A Compilation Of The Official Records Of The Union And Confederate Armies series I vol. 11 pt. I* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1884. Reprint, Harrisburg, PA.: Historical Times, Inc., 1985), 10.
- <sup>3</sup> War Department, *War Of Rebellion*, I 11 I, 10.
- <sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 27.
- <sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.
- <sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>7</sup> War Department, *War Of Rebellion*, I 11 III, 192.
- <sup>8</sup> War Department, *The War Of The Rebellion: A Compilation Of The Official Records Of The Union And Confederate Armies series I vol. 5* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1884. Reprint, Harrisburg, PA.: Historical Times, Inc., 1985), 45.
- <sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 45.
- <sup>10</sup> Sears, *Civil War Papers*, 361.
- <sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 364.
- <sup>12</sup> War Department, *War Of Rebellion*, I 5, 41.
- <sup>13</sup> Warren W. Hassler, Jr., *General George B. McClellan Shield of the Union* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1957), 53.
- <sup>14</sup> War Department, *War Of Rebellion*, I 5, 42-5.
- <sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 50.
- <sup>16</sup> Hassler, *Shield of the Union*, 63-4.
- <sup>17</sup> War Department, *War Of Rebellion*, I 5, 58.
- <sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>19</sup> T. Harry Williams, *Lincoln and His Generals* (New York: Knopf, 1952), 77.
- <sup>20</sup> War Department, *War Of Rebellion*, I 5, 53.
- <sup>21</sup> Williams, T., *Lincoln and Generals*, 77.
- <sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 77.
- <sup>23</sup> Sears, *Civil War Papers*, 235.
- <sup>24</sup> War Department, *War Of Rebellion*, I 11 III, 66.
- <sup>25</sup> McClellan, *Own Story*, 308.
- <sup>26</sup> War Department, *War Of Rebellion*, I 11 I, 26-7.
- <sup>27</sup> War Department, *The War Of The Rebellion: A Compilation Of The Official Records Of The Union And Confederate Armies series I vol. 12 pt. III* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1884. Reprint, Harrisburg, PA.: Historical Times, Inc., 1985), 219.
- <sup>28</sup> War Department, *War Of Rebellion*, I 12 I, 643.
- <sup>29</sup> War Department, *War Of Rebellion*, I 12 III, 220.
- <sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 214.
- <sup>33</sup> McClellan, *Own Story*, 351.
- <sup>34</sup> Williams, T., *Lincoln and Generals*, 103. and Stephen W. Sears *George B. McClellan The Young Napoleon* (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1988), 191.
- <sup>35</sup> Williams, T., *Lincoln and Generals*, 103.
- <sup>36</sup> Lee, 6 March 1863, quoted in Clifford Dowdey and Louis H. Manarin, ed., *The Wartime Papers Of R. E. Lee* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1961), 211.
- <sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 163.
- <sup>38</sup> War Department, *War Of Rebellion*, I 11 III, 238. and War Department, *War Of Rebellion*, I 12 III, 214.
- <sup>39</sup> Sears, *Civil War Papers*, 276. and War Department, *War Of Rebellion*, I 12 III, 220.
- <sup>40</sup> John G. Nicolay and John Hay, *Abraham Lincoln A History* vol. 5, (New York: The Century Co., 1890), 172.
- <sup>41</sup> McClellan, *Own Story*, 306.

- <sup>42</sup> War Department, *War Of Rebellion*, I 11 I, 10.
- <sup>43</sup> Williams, T. , *Lincoln and Generals*, 56.
- <sup>44</sup> War Department, *War Of Rebellion*, I 5, 41-2.
- <sup>45</sup> McClellan, *Own Story*, 235.
- <sup>46</sup> War Department, *War Of Rebellion*, I 5, 56.
- <sup>47</sup> War Department, *War Of Rebellion*, I 11 III, 58.
- <sup>48</sup> *Ibid.* , 59-60.
- <sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>50</sup> War Department, *War Of Rebellion*, I 11 III, 60.
- <sup>51</sup> War Department, *War Of Rebellion*, I 11 I, 15.
- <sup>52</sup> War Department, *War Of Rebellion*, I 12 III, 43.
- <sup>53</sup> Sears, *Civil War Papers*, 230.
- <sup>54</sup> War Department, *War Of Rebellion*, I 11 I, 10.
- <sup>55</sup> *Ibid.* , 8.
- <sup>56</sup> *Ibid.* , 10.
- <sup>57</sup> War Department, *War Of Rebellion*, I 11 III, 436.
- <sup>58</sup> McClellan, *Own Story*, 256.
- <sup>59</sup> Sears, *Civil War Papers*, 225.
- <sup>60</sup> McClellan, *Own Story*, 262.
- <sup>61</sup> War Department, *War Of Rebellion*, I 11 I, 16.
- <sup>62</sup> Peter S. Michie, *General McClellan* (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1915) , 243.
- <sup>63</sup> McClellan, *Own Story*, 274.
- <sup>64</sup> Michie, *General McClellan*, 244.
- <sup>65</sup> War Department, *War Of Rebellion*, I 11 I, 10.
- <sup>66</sup> Sears, *The Young Napoleon*, 130.
- <sup>67</sup> War Department, *War Of Rebellion*, I 11 I, 51.
- <sup>68</sup> War Department, *War Of Rebellion*, I 11 III, 484.
- <sup>69</sup> Sears, *The Young Napoleon*, 207.
- <sup>70</sup> War Department, *War Of Rebellion*, I 11 III, 238.
- <sup>71</sup> War Department, *War Of Rebellion*, I 11 I, 31.
- <sup>72</sup> Sears, *The Young Napoleon*, 207.
- <sup>73</sup> War Department, *The War Of The Rebellion: A Compilation Of The Official Records Of The Union And Confederate Armies series I vol. 11 pt. II* (Washington , D.C. : GPO, 1884. Reprint, Harrisburg, PA. : Historical Times, Inc. , 1985) , 662.
- <sup>74</sup> War Department, *War Of Rebellion*, I 11 III, 238.
- <sup>75</sup> Bruce Catton, *The Army of the Potomac: Mr. Lincoln's Army* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc. , 1951) , 135-36.
- <sup>76</sup> *Ibid.* , 135-36.
- <sup>77</sup> *Ibid.* , 136.
- <sup>78</sup> H. J. Eckenrode and Bryan Conrad, *George B. McClellan The Man Who Saved The Union* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University Of North Carolina Press, 1941) , 95.
- <sup>79</sup> War Department, *War Of Rebellion*, I 11 III, 267.
- <sup>80</sup> War Department, *War Of Rebellion*, I 11 I, 61-2.
- <sup>81</sup> Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel, *North To Antietam Battles and Leaders of the Civil War* (New York: Castle Books, 1956) , 375.
- <sup>82</sup> Sears, *The Young Napoleon*, 217.
- <sup>83</sup> War Department, *War Of Rebellion*, I 11 II, 22.
- <sup>84</sup> McClellan, *Own Story*, 429.
- <sup>85</sup> Dowdey and Manarin, *Wartime Papers*, 217-18.
- <sup>86</sup> Williams, T. , *Lincoln and Generals*, 126.
- <sup>87</sup> McClellan, *Own Story*, 434.
- <sup>88</sup> War Department, *War Of Rebellion*, I 11 II, 23.
- <sup>89</sup> Johnson and Buel, *Battles and Leaders*, 423.
- <sup>90</sup> War Department, *War Of Rebellion*, I 11 II, 23.
- <sup>91</sup> Sears, *The Young Napoleon*, 217.
- <sup>92</sup> War Department, *War Of Rebellion*, I 11 I, 406.
- <sup>93</sup> Catton, *Lincoln's Army*, 136.
- <sup>94</sup> Williams, T. , *Lincoln and Generals*, 103.
- <sup>95</sup> Hassler, *Shield of the Union*, 53.
- <sup>96</sup> Sears, *Civil War Papers*, 250.
- <sup>97</sup> *Ibid.* , 202.
- <sup>98</sup> *Ibid.* , 364.

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