

Globalization: A Contemporary Islamic Response?

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Neoliberalism, as a global system, is a new war in the conquest of territory. The end of the Third World War, or Cold War, certainly does not mean that the world has overcome bipolarity and rediscovered stability under the domination of the victor. Whereas there was a defeated side (the socialist camp), it is difficult to identify the winning side. The United States? The European Union? Japan? Or all three? ... Thanks to computers, the financial markets, from the trading floor and according to their whims, impose their laws and precepts on the planet. Globalization is nothing more than the totalitarian extension of their logic to every aspect of life. The United States, formerly the ruler of the economy, is now governed - tele-governed - by the very dynamic of financial power: commercial free trade. And this logic has made use of the porosity produced by the development of telecommunications to take over every aspect of activity in the social spectrum. The result is an all-out war.¹

In the 1950s and the 1960s, a phase in the history [of the Third World] that the supporters of globalization wish to marginalize and assassinate, culture was in fact made up of two kinds: imperialist/hegemonic culture and liberationist/nationalist culture. Those influenced by the ideology of globalization desire to create a new genre of culture: the culture of opening and renewal and that of withdrawal and stagnation. - Muḥammad 'Ābid al Jābirī.²

We are told that the world is shrinking, that vast distance has been conquered by computer and fax, and the Earth is now a "global village" in which all of us are connected as never before. It feels, however, quite the opposite. It feels as if distancing and disconnection are shaping modern life. If anything is shrinking, it is the fullness of being that is experienced by the modern self ... Psychologists report [high] levels of depression and anxiety ... For most people today, the web of friends, nearby family members, and community relationships is a shrunken fragment of what previous generations experienced. - Charlene Spretnak.³

Knowledge that was free, open and for the benefit of society is now proprietary, confidential and for the benefit of business. Educators who once jealously guarded their autonomy now negotiate curriculum planning with corporate sponsors. Professors who once taught are now on company payrolls churning out marketable research in the campus lab, while universities pay the cut-rate fee for replacement of teaching assistants. University presidents, once the intellectual leaders of the institutions, are now accomplished bagmen. - John Harris.⁴

Introductory Critical Remarks

It is almost impossible to give a simple definition of the term *globalization*, for it carries a number of implications in the economic, social, political, ideological, and intellectual realms. My concerns in this essay are to raise several critical questions about these implications, especially in relation to the contemporary Muslim world; offer some critical remarks on the state of contemporary Islamic thought; and suggest ways to grapple with the subtle and deep epistemological, ethical, and scientific shifts that globalization has engendered recently. Also, at the outset I would like to say that the Islamic perspective on economy and community has not been taken seriously by the proponents of globalization, mainly because there has not been a systematic Islamic appreciation and critique of this phenomenon. It is true that there has been a political backlash against Western modernism in some Muslim countries, most notably in Iran, Sudan, and Egypt; however, *a Muslim intellectual response to the problematics engendered by globalization is past due.*

Regardless of the complex epistemological undercurrents of contemporary Islamic thought, it has not yet fulfilled its intellectual potential, for

it has failed to grapple with some of the most critical issues of our time. Where is the Islamic critique and appreciation of modern nationalism, democracy, the nation-state, modernity, and even the oft-discussed colonialism and neocolonialism? Except for a few individual studies and reflections, contemporary Islamic thought has not presented a comprehensive—let alone convincing—perspective or perspectives on the many issues and questions besetting the contemporary Muslim world. The lacuna is most apparent on the question of both modernity and globalization.

To shed some light on the nature of modern Islamic thought, one must differentiate among, for example, Islamic thought and Arab or Pakistani thought. One could take modern Arab thought to mean the last one hundred years of the intellectual production of both religious and secular Arab thinkers. In other words, one must not equate Arab thought with Islamic thought, since the former includes all those religious and secular tendencies, trends, and patterns of thought that reflect the bewildering number of questions and issues that have preoccupied modern Arab thought.⁵ Islamic thought, on the other hand, has a theological center and an intellectual framework of reference defined by the central place of the Qur'an in Muslim life and thought.

The above remarks beg the question of the nature of the Muslim presence in the West generally. It would be fallacious to argue that the Muslim world is out there, separate from the West, and that the Muslim presence in the West is unimportant to the Muslim world because it lacks authenticity. With the onslaught of modernity and the migration of Muslim intellectuals, engineers, doctors, and professionals to the West since the turn of the twentieth century, it is important to raise questions about the nature and direction of Muslim intellectual contributions in the West.

On the whole, apart from a few academics who follow the Muslim perspective, the Muslim community in the West has not produced its own intellectuals, those thinkers who can aid the Muslim community in its daily encounter with modernism and globalization. The failure of this Muslim community to grasp the central problems surrounding its presence in a non-Islamic, though religiously tolerant environment, reflects the deep social and psychological anguish suffered by Muslims in a Western milieu. The Muslim community is in an ideal position to reflect from within, so to speak, on the nature of globalization and guide the Muslim world in understanding the hazards created by neoliberalism and the new forces of the market. It is quite impossible to escape the conclusion that the Muslim community in the West is hard-pressed to apply its ethos to the new realities of the world—realities that do not seem to subscribe to any monotheistic worldview, but rather to those of consumerism and competitiveness.

As a result of the above factors, there is an almost complete obsession with the issue of tradition and how to conserve it in a fast-changing and sometimes merciless world. This is not to say that the issue of tradition is irrelevant or unimportant. However, it seems to me that it is now time to transcend the conceptual formulations of such nineteenth-century Muslim thinkers as Muḥammad 'Abduh, Jamāl al Dīn al Afghānī, and Sayyid Aḥmad Khān by inventing a novel Islamic manner of thinking that responds creatively to the rigorous rules of critical philosophical and ethical thinking. No thinking can probe the problematic of globalization unless it is totally abreast of recent trends in critical theory, economic and social thought, their implications for religious thought in the Muslim world and the West, and the ethical response that contemporary Islamic thought must present to assert its vitality and relevance. Islamic thought must seek the aid of critical tools, besides those of revelation, to provide sufficient answers to the problems of the contemporary Muslim world.

Three Premises, Numerous Arguments

To reclaim vitality, modern Islamic thought must reinterpret the main theological and normative precepts of Islam in a manner that opposes the totalitarian nature of the contemporary Muslim world's ruling political and educational systems, as well as the great boost they have received with the onslaught of globalization on the world market and the universal human psyche. If one accepts the claim that the crux of the Islamic worldview is egalitarianism, then one must conclude that to follow Islamic ideals, one must oppose the forms of political, economic, social, or intellectual oppression that currently seem to dominate the Muslim world. In other words, we must promote an Islamic worldview that is liberationist in nature and meaningful to the average person. *This is the first premise.*

The second major premise is somewhat historical and related mainly to the colossal social and economic changes taking place in the modern capitalist West and their political and intellectual impact on the modern Muslim world and thought in general. It is naive to assume that modern Islamic thought follows specific internal dynamics that have nothing to do with the complex mutations in modern Western thought, or that modern Islamic thought refuses to borrow from external sources. To grasp the nature of economic, political, and philosophical transformations in the modern Western world is to wrestle seriously with the whole history of Western thought, from Marxist and neo-Marxist to capitalist and globalization, its latest manifestation. One may argue that Western—especially American and European—history has witnessed major transformations in its worldview, the latest being globalization. Islamic thought is still bogged down by some of the problematics engendered by modernity.

To most thinkers in the Muslim world, from the radical to the most conservative, globalization seems to be an inevitable phenomenon. In one sense, it is true that because of the fundamental historical, political, and economic mutations in the modern West, the fate of the Muslim world is highly intertwined with triumphant Western capitalism. However, several questions remain to be answered: What does globalization mean in the context of a postmodern, post-Soviet, post-Cold War world, and in the context of aggressive/hegemonic Western capitalism? What is the fate of nation-states, constructed during the Cold War era, under globalization? How has civil society in the Muslim world changed in the past decade? Is the recent collapse of the Indonesian economy and society a direct result of globalization's encroachment?⁶ What is the role of Muslim intellectuals in this age of severe transition?

How can one preserve the essential features of Muslim identity in the above context, especially if those features have been construed in a pre-globalization stage? If one translates *preservation* as a defense mechanism, what conceptual tools must one create to revitalize modern Islamic thinking about globalization? Lastly, since manufacturing consent in contemporary society is based on the power of ideas, and the leading (capitalist) ideas are taught in private schools and universities across the Muslim world, where does the common interest of the people lie?

My third premise derives from the last question. The Muslim world is going through a dramatic process of change in its educational systems. The best education is privatized and is the preserve of the children of the elite—the same elite that has waged a silent and highly subtle intellectual *revolution against the masses* in recent decades. The mushrooming of private educational institutions and distance-learning centers in Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia drives the point home that education is a highly priced commodity sold to the highest bidder.⁷ There is no need to bother about “the revolt of the masses” or a liberal synthesis of education.

As the progressive privatization, elitization, Westernization, and Americanization of education has been significant in many Muslim countries, common people have been robbed of their traditional pride, and a new consciousness based on class-education distinction and social-economic segregation has been promulgated. The following observation about a tribal people in northeastern India is applicable to the Muslim world.

No one can deny the value of real education—the widening and enrichment of knowledge. But today in the Third World, education has become something quite different.

It isolates children from their culture and from nature, training them instead to become narrow specialists in a Westernized urban environment. This process has been particularly striking in Ladakh, where modern schooling acts as a blindfold, preventing children from seeing the very context in which they live. They leave school unable to use their own resources, unable to function in their own world.⁸

In the Third World, indigenous creativity is sacrificed for the sake of academic and scientific specialization that promises financial gain.⁹

The Post-Cold War Muslim World or the New World Order

To be sure, globalization is not a new phenomenon; it emerged with the triumph of *laissez faire* capitalism in the post-Industrial Revolution era and the expansion of European imperialism. In other words, triumphant European imperialism created deep structural, economic, political, cultural, and religious transformations in the so-called Third World, all of which led to a permanent interaction between North and South.¹⁰ Imperialist domination was double-edged: it led to the modernization of some leading institutions and segments of the colonized world, such as the army, the police force, and the educational system, but also created social and economic disequilibrium, major urban-rural gaps leading to rural migration to the city, and a bilingual and anxious indigenous intelligentsia.¹¹

The nation-state, a response to the penetration of bourgeois capitalism that emphasized an autonomous national economic and cultural independence, sought to create new structures and foundations for the new state in order to bypass the traditional dependence created by a defunct imperialism. The existence of the Soviet Union and the ensuing Cold War gave new nation-states some room in which to maneuver. However, two major events shifted the balance in the 1970s and the 1980s in favor of the capitalist West: the conquest of the huge Chinese market by American capitalism,¹² and the collapse of the Soviet system and the ensuing end of the Cold War that signaled the triumph of the capitalist West over the socialist East.¹³ These two major events, without historical parallel, left nation-states easy prey to the challenges and dangers of the New World Order's new geopolitical and economic realities.¹⁴

The above change proves once again the importance of economic decisions in the direction of world politics and the future. Profit-driven and highly competitive capitalism begins a new drive: the conquest of space after the conquest of terrain.¹⁵ Enter the multinational companies

that see the future of capitalism in conquering new space and new immaterial territory. To succeed, they seek to create a global climate that allows competitiveness without the controlling hand of the nation-state. This tendency of "aggressive capitalism" run amok, so to speak, is all the more dangerous because of the absence of a multi-international economic and political system. In the mono-system of neoliberalism, one author notes that,

In this era of widespread liberalization, private firms are commissioned, in collaboration with the States and the international bodies responsible for helping them, to promote abundance and well-being. These are enterprises producing goods and, increasingly, services, the most effective of which ignore frontiers. Their sole motor, their sole reason for being, is profit; it is a fact that a huge gulf separates the goal that is set from the capacity to reach it. And, without pushing into the background those which have failed in the North, it must be stressed that the South is out of the running.¹⁶

Creating a globalized climate amenable to a new type of international profit has had a negative impact on indigenous economies. In a sense, it creates new sets of rationales and values that are not in tune with the cultures, traditions, and histories of indigenous peoples and nation-states. The logic of capitalism is not to maintain or develop healthy social and economic systems, but to make profit as quickly as possible.¹⁷

The last thought begs the question of the newly gained relationship between the multinationals and the nation-state; the role of the state in society; the deep changes in power relations, not just between North and South, but also with the countries of the South; the nature of civil society; and the implications for democracy in the Third World.¹⁸

Globalization challenges the nation-state to open up its space and borders for a novel type of competitiveness free of any control.¹⁹ The nation-state's political elite is expected to co-operate fully with the economic enterprises, and the accumulation of national capital is very often impossible because many Third World nation-states are burdened with large debts owed to international financial institutions. The rules of the game change here: national development and growth in the Third World are hampered by the accumulation of capital on an international scale. According to Samir Amīn, in the 1950s and 1960s globalization was somewhat controlled by three international factors: the intervention of the capitalist state in the process of capital accumulation; the Soviet project

of socialist economy; and the Bandung project of the non-aligned world formed under the auspices of Sukarno, Nehru, and Nasser.²⁰

With privatization mushrooming in the countries of these now-deceased leaders, the nationalist/socialist project of self-sufficiency and the empowerment of the poor has come to a deadly halt. In the Arab world, for example, the Gulf region was forcibly cut off from the rest of the Arab world by the Center that intensified its hegemony, both economic and military, in the wake of the military defeat of Iraq in the second Gulf war. What this means, according to Amīn, is that the Gulf states are now “protectorates that are devoid of any freedom to maneuver both economically and politically.”²¹ In the words of Immanuel Wallerstein, the Third World won the political battle in the 1950s and 1960s, whereby decolonization “had been achieved almost everywhere. It was time for the second step, national development.... The second step was never to be achieved in most places.”²² In the age of liberalization and integration, globalization does not permit local economies to breathe on their own.²³

The failure of nationalist economies in such countries as Indonesia, India, Egypt, and Algeria is proof of the triumph of rational technology in the advanced West. However, as some economists have pointed out, the spread of “financial liberalization” or “technological globalization” cannot be determined by technological factors alone; politics has a lot to do with the spread of rational technology and globalization. It is the political desire of the Center to subjugate all nation-states, with the possible exception of Israel, to the exigencies of the capitalist market.²⁴

Advocates of globalization envision a kind of “global village economy” that facilitates the spread of modernization and technological rationalization throughout the world. They propose that globalization has led to the integration of hitherto marginalized and impoverished societies into the world market. In their view, globalization did not just result in the creation of millions of new jobs and the improvement of social and economic conditions for the poor, but also led to an opening in the cultural and mental space of the poor nations.²⁵ Even if one accepts such views, which has become an inevitable process in many Third World countries, one must turn a blind eye to other no-less-significant accompanying processes: “globalitarian regimes” are more entrenched than the “totalitarian regimes” of yesteryear.²⁶ The global oppression of the nation-state has created new ways to oppress civil society by the already “oppressed” nation-state, broken down social cohesion in the Third World, and whittled down the democratic space in society. Civil society is suffocated as a result of the new shifts in power boundaries in society, and freedom of expression becomes a rare commodity.²⁷ As one astute author observes,

As the industrialized nations are gradually figuring out, the new world order imposed by the globalized economy means a race to the bottom for everyone, as jobs are eliminated in the name of global competitiveness or exported and the transnational corporations assume a level of power above any government. Even in a country like India, where 10 percent of the 980,000,000 residents comprise a new middle class that has benefited from the globalized presence of transnationals, the other 90 percent are simply not in the plan for the dazzling future. The 10 percent with disposable income constitute a large enough market to cause salivation among the global players: India is called a great success story.²⁸

In the new nation-state of the 1980s and 1990s, democratic space has been challenged to the core. One would expect that the advanced Center, carrier of the slogan of "democracy" for so long, would promote real democracy in the South. This is far from true. Under globalization, a new relationship is being forged between the political elite and the economic powers, especially the multinationals.²⁹ In the Muslim world, this has meant that the tribal, quasi-constitutional state, controlled by the same family or clan, had gained additional repressive powers. Civil society suffers from the additional loss of freedom, and working people and women are disempowered.

The multinationals' gradual penetration of the Third World economies, far from eliminating poverty and alleviating the misery of the urban and rural poor, has led to three intertwined phenomena: an increase in the number of poor and unemployed people, the concentration of wealth in the hands of the political elite, and an increase in state repression.³⁰ Indonesia is a prime example. With the onslaught of modern technologies under the guise of globalization, the old Western mission of *mission civilisatrice* is reaffirmed in the new/old gods of money, technology, investment, and prosperity.

In the Third World, the image of the intelligentsia is transformed radically in the age of globalization. In the colonial era, the indigenous intelligentsia played a leading role in both political and cultural independence. Although they were, according to Benedict Anderson, a "lonely, bilingual, and highly anxiety-ridden intelligentsia,"³¹ they nevertheless reflected the anguish and suffering of their people. They fought for independence from their colonial masters, whose schools they had attended. The new intelligentsia of "Third World globalization" do not share this anxiety. Scientists, technocrats, engineers, and researchers all have something in

common: a preoccupation with business and investment, all expressed in a new mode of English, that of the London School of Economics or the Harvard Business School. In the words of Pierre Bourdieu, those new technocrats tend to favor economic profit at the expense of social and mental dislocation in Third World societies. The technocrats support, what he calls, a "structural violence" in these societies, that is, an increase in the number of the unemployed and marginalized in society.³²

English, and to be more specific American English, assumes a leading role in the age of globalization. One cannot be a successful technocrat without mastering the secrets of American business English. It is true that American English developed from the womb of British English during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. But it is equally true that American English during that period was responding creatively to the new social and economic conditions of the new world. In their fight against British domination, Americans developed a new linguistic authority that did not subscribe the old rules of the Queen's English. Noah Webster, the leading American linguist of the nineteenth century, promoted the notion that "it is quite impossible to stop the progress of language—it is like the course of the Mississippi, the motion of which, at times, is scarcely perceptible."³³

During the Cold War (1945-89), the American political elite failed to deploy English against their enemies, mainly because academic English was the preserve of leftist intellectuals who abdicated "curatorship of the great books, abandoned traditional values, and subverted the social order."³⁴ However, with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, formal business English has taken the offensive. The new technocrats of both North and South have adopted a formal type of English that is more conducive to the business and financial world than to the world of the humanities.

To be sure, the increase in misery and economic poverty is not the sole preserve of the Third World.³⁵ This same phenomenon is unfolding in the Center, such as in France, England, and the United States. Urban decay is apparent in the major cities of the Center, which, in a deep sense, is symptomatic of the lack of educational and social well-being among the poor. The use of drugs and the proliferation of domestic and societal crime indicate that a significant portion of society in the advanced Center has been marginalized. In other words capitalism, in its drive to accumulate capital, acquires more and more profit only at the expense of creating havoc in the weak sector of society, both domestic and overseas. As one author puts it, "capitalism generates, at the same time, both prosperity and poverty."³⁶

As seen above, the New World Order did not emerge from a vacuum. With the collapse of the Soviet system in the early 1990s, after decades

of severe struggle, the Third World became easy prey for American hegemony.³⁷ Regardless of whether or not Iraq intended to challenge Western hegemony in general and that of the United States in particular by invading Kuwait in 1990, amassing Western troops under the United Nations' banner in the Gulf sent shock waves across the Muslim world. The military defeat of Iraq preserved, if not enhanced, the West's national interests, which, in clear historical irony, further strengthened the Gulf's authoritarian political regimes and obliterated any real chance to achieve democracy for many years to come.

In addition to signaling major shifts in world alliances and witnessing the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower, these two events have raised once again, and perhaps in a much more acute fashion, the issue of Western, especially American, cultural hegemony and its impact on Third World cultures. It is far from true that the American impact on the Muslim world in the post-Cold War era is limited to economic and political matters; rather, it is primarily intellectual and conceptual, for Muslim ruling elites have adopted the capitalist West's functioning ideas as their ideal model.³⁸

Due to the entanglement of the West with the Muslim world since at least the early nineteenth century, modern Islamic thought has been baffled by the West as a phenomenon. Since the dawn of colonialism in the early nineteenth century, Muslim intellectuals have asked: "What is the West?" The West has posed a major challenge to the modern Muslim and Arab mind, one that has forced modern Islamic thought to critique the past and attempt to appropriate the modern West's scientific spirit. However, the West has remained an undefined term in modern Islamic thought (does it exemplify colonialism, liberalism, Christianity, capitalism, or socialism?). The West, as a scientific and socio-cultural entity, has always been on the offensive.

The *nahḍah* (renaissance) thinkers of the nineteenth-century Arab world and the liberal thinkers in Muslim India³⁹ were intrigued by the different possibilities provided by the "Western mind" and Western science. They were aware of the severe stagnation of their societies and that this stagnation violated a major Islamic principle: the common interest (*al maṣlaḥah al 'āmmah*). They sought to ameliorate conditions by reviving this doctrine and linking it to the need for Western science. In other words, in the thought of the *nahḍah* intelligentsia, Western science and the Muslim doctrine of common interest did not coalesce; on the contrary, for Muslim doctrine to be well-served, the logic of modernity (i.e., science) must be adopted.⁴⁰ Thus, R. R. al Ṭaḥṭāwī, Muḥammad 'Abduh, Sayyid Aḥmad Khān, and their colleagues thought that this tension (stagnation vs. science) could be resolved only if the intellectual Muslim elite

of their times linked its doctrinal philosophy to the logic of Western science and philosophy—an advocacy of progress, the central concept of nineteenth-century European modernity. However, while trying to resolve this contradiction, a second and perhaps more astounding one was revealed: that of colonialism and science, two givens of the West. The nineteenth-century Muslim thinkers were well aware that the West did not simply mean science, but military and political domination as well.

The double tensions of Muslim stagnation and Western science, Western science and Western hegemony, have defined the parameters of the main challenges facing the Muslim mind since the nineteenth century. This double bipolarity became more complex in the mid-1950s after the end of official colonialism in most Muslim states. The new nation-states sought to modernize without sacrificing the common interest, whether derived from Muslim or nationalist thought, and sought economic and social independence from the West while still relying on it. As globalization began to lay its economic egg in the early 1970s with the economic conquest of China, and came to fruition with the collapse of the Soviet system in the 1990s, the Muslim world became eternally ensnared in the web of the capitalist West. Further, the power gap between the Muslim world and the West began to widen to such an extent that a country like Syria, which used the Soviet Union during the Cold War to bolster its status, appeased the West by sending troops to fight Iraq. Muslim political regimes soon realized that it would be suicidal to challenge American authority. This fundamental power differential is having a deep impact on the internal functioning of Muslim societies and is leading to wider gaps between rich and poor within the Muslim world. The accompanying international shift in power also is solidifying Muslim military and political elites.

Cultural Independence under Globalization

The modern Muslim nation-state has inherited a world of contradictions. As it sought cultural and political decolonization after independence, neocolonialism began to manifest itself immediately by forging new economic and political relationships that would give the Center the upper hand when dealing with the international and economic affairs of its former dependencies. In the opinion of many Arab thinkers, globalization is the latest stage of neocolonialism, “it is the culmination of the success of the Capitalist project worldwide.”⁴¹ Neocolonialism has permitted the Center to preserve its markets and cultural influence, and sometimes its troops, at minimal cost.

While it is possible to measure and quantify economic factors, it is difficult to measure culture in the same way. The end of official colonial-

ism left behind a complex cultural package that cannot be overcome overnight. The intellectual elite of the *ancien regime*, some of whom fought political but not cultural colonialism, found themselves in commanding positions and caught between their adopted Western culture and the indigenous culture. Those who opted for Arabization, as in North Africa, support cultural diversity and independence from the dominant culture of the West.

Postcolonialism emerged from neocolonialism and is its twin brother, a product of the New World Order.⁴² As a historical event of tremendous importance to the lives of Muslims and non-Muslims, colonialism very often entails the military occupation of one country by another (viz., a European country), as well as direct control of natural resources, which makes a difference in the strategic interests of the colonizer.

The political elite of the new nation-states have sought to modernize their countries by blindly imitating the West, and have benefited from the political and military protection bestowed upon them by the West. For example, in some of these countries the West has never raised the issue of human rights or the absence of democracy, for its overall concern is to preserve its strategic interests. Thus, principles are easily sacrificed. The basis of neocolonialism is a new form of economic domination that allows other discrete forms of domination, namely, political, cultural, and intellectual.

During the Cold War, Third World countries felt somewhat relieved from the West's cultural and political pressure because the balance of world power permitted them to function somewhat freely. However, the status quo changed with the collapse of the Soviet system and the military defeat of Iraq. These two events left the Arab world and Arab culture defenseless in face of American hegemony. With the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower, a number of states, such as Cuba, Syria, and Libya, were, and still are, accused by the Center of supporting terrorism.

The Periphery has been dependent on the Center since the colonial era, and the diffusion of ideas through satellites instituted a new relationship between the Muslim world and the West. The Center practices what one may call a hegemonic "imperialist culture."⁴³ Most Muslim thinkers who grew up in the shadow of colonialism draw our attention to the major conclusions of European, and even some American, thinkers about the rise of United States in recent years and its global cultural impact, even in Europe: "The American empire is the only one in the world. It is absolutely supreme, and it is the first time in human history that this curious phenomenon has survived."⁴⁴ The United States is a unique empire: it is a major producer of all sorts of goods as well as an avid consumer. Its his-

tory, from the very beginning, is marked by an extreme tendency toward expansion: "The whole of American history is marked by a perpetual tendency toward expansion: thirst for land, thirst for power, thirst for novelty, thirst for glory - as many needs as can be satisfied."⁴⁵

According to the famous American literary critic Edmund Wilson, American expansion overseas in the wake of Nazi Germany's defeat was not by coincidence:

We thought we were liberating Europe and fending off the imperialism of feudal Japan, but we turned up after the war [World War II] occupying or controlling foreign countries all over America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, and sometimes as unwelcome as the French in Algeria, the British in Cyprus or the Russians in central Europe. After years of being shocked by the imperialism of others, we are developing a new kind of our own, and we find ourselves scowling at the Soviet Union and spending billions for weapons against it—and weapons even the testing of which is dangerous to our own population—without any real provocation and for the simple sub-rational reason that we are challenging the Soviet Russians for domination of large sections of the world.⁴⁶

The recent manifestation of globalization, in the view of many Third World intellectuals, is a triumphant Americanization that has advocated a new kind of cultural and economic model: "Besides being an economic system, globalization is an ideology that serves this system. Americanization and globalization are highly intertwined."⁴⁷

In its drive toward development, the Muslim world needs Western science and technology. However, Western science cannot be imported without the cultural and ethical values that made it. During its imperialist phase, the West used culture and ideas to colonize the Third World. That is why Orientalism as well as missionary and similar activities flourished. Classical imperialism was sustained by the physical presence of the mother country's troops overseas; both physical and mental conquest went hand in hand. The situation is somewhat different in the age of neoimperialism with its rapid advances in technology. The intellectual and cultural integrity of small nations is endangered. The purpose of colonialism was to create an indigenous cultural elite with Western values and plant Western systems of education and thought in the Third World. The culture of colonialism was ideological in nature. Today, the cultural invasion through advanced technology leads to the following conclusion: Besides being ide-

ological in nature, Western culture seeks to subdue the means of criticism and rationalism in the Third World. In our case, it is aimed at Arab and Muslim "reason," attempting to make this "reason" forget its unique and glorious past.

An unfortunate fact of today's world is that no one can rival American economic and intellectual hegemony. This country has huge economic resources, military prowess, advanced technology, and a will to conquer the whole world intellectually.⁴⁸ Therefore, I rephrase an earlier question: What is to be done in order to achieve an overall rational cultural, political, and social renaissance in the contemporary Muslim world? Islamic thought cannot avoid the full implication of the contemporary cultural challenge of the West, especially of the United States, in the context of the New World Order.

The New World Order, inaugurated in the aftermath of the military defeat of Iraq, has become a political phenomenon of universal proportion. In the Arab world, for example, the nationalist response to the West assumed a grassroots orientation after the end of the Cold War. Most states lost interest in Arab unity. What Muḥammad 'Ābid al Jābirī, a leading Moroccan ideologue of Arab nationalism, says has some relevance,

Arab existence is well and alive. The recent war that the allies have launched against Iraq has undoubtedly pointed to the vitality of Arabism and its enshrined presence in the souls of the Arab masses that rallied to support Iraq, very often against the wishes of their governments. Also, what is of significance in this regard is the Arab nationalist position that the Francophone Maghrebi thinkers took, many of whom were deprived of learning Arabic in their childhood. In addition to rallying their support behind Iraq, they expressed their dismay at and frustration with the European attitude toward Iraq.⁴⁹

During the age of imperialism, the main purpose of the Arab nationalist project was to ensure the independence of the Arab world. The independence of Algeria helped achieve that goal. However, the 1967 war was a major setback in that it did not allow Arab unity and solidarity to take deep organizational and intellectual roots in society. The emergence of the regional state in the Arab world, both as an Arab and international political fact and as a social, economic, and psychological condition that cannot be overstepped, places more hurdles in the way of the Arab nationalist project. The Arab world is divided now more than ever. In addition to cultur-

al challenge and political division, it has to consider the Zionist project and its metamorphosis in the context of the New World Order.

Based on the above arguments, one would say that the more urgent task of the Third World is to seek economic and political liberation from this new hegemony. A crucial factor is cultural decolonization, since the principal goal of postcolonialism is cultural hegemony and the propagation of Western values in the Third World.⁵⁰ The North refuses to embark upon a thorough conversation on cultural values with the South on the supposition that its own values are the norm—that is, they are universal values—and that adopting them will solve the social and economic problems of the Third World.⁵¹ Not counting its nuclear and military prowess or economic and political influence, “post-colonialism is a weapon that aims at destroying cultural diversity”⁵² in today’s world and creating one universal homogeneous culture: Occidentalized culture.⁵³

It is no accident that most international hot spots are located in the Muslim world. The main reason for this is the West’s refusal to come to terms with a system of values other than its own. However, the problem is not caused purely by external factors. The Muslim world, like most of the Third World, suffers from the absence of democracy, a crisis in human rights, and a lack of democratic channels through which its people can express their ideas freely. Such a situation, however, has produced no major outcry from the West. Under the regime of globalization, arms production in the West is on the increase, and its main consumers are in the South, Africa, the Middle East, and Afghanistan. Civil wars are on the increase, mainly in the South. The West, including the now defunct Soviet Union, learned a great lesson after World War II: not to wage any wars in Europe or the North.

A major dilemma facing the contemporary Muslim world is safeguarding universal cultural diversity and pluralism in the face of mounting American hegemony. The answer lies in achieving major change in the thinking of both the North and the South. The North must recognize cultural diversity, and the South must affirm its cultural independence. According to one North African Islamist: “Cultural decolonization, namely, that of hearts and minds, is, in effect, an undertaking of several generations.”⁵⁴

The United States has begun to mount a war against its new universal enemies in the wake of the Soviet system’s collapse. This is expressed clearly in Samuel Huntington’s thesis.⁵⁵ The West has become preoccupied with the “menace” of Islam or Islamic “terrorism” or “fundamentalism.” The entire Muslim world, with its cultural and ethnic complexity, has been reduced and atomized into these terms. The fact that most Muslims live in countries ruled by authoritarian regimes supported by the

West and its democracies is ignored.⁵⁶ In fact, real cultural decolonization begins when the West and the Third World intellectual elites consider seriously the thesis that modernization must not mean occidentalization, and that there are non-Western ways to modernize.

A fascinating phenomenon that characterizes modern civilization is the profound mutation that takes place as a civilization transitions from a "culture of production" to a "culture of information and scientific knowledge." This is possible because of radical breakthroughs in science and technology. Due to the scientific superiority of the West, the information gap between North and South has become insurmountable, and yet it continues to widen day by day. For example, in 1990, the United States possessed 56 percent of the world's total databanks, especially those of research and science. The European community possessed 28 percent, Japan 12 percent, and the Third World 1 percent.

The information gap between North and South has been compounded in this age of globalization by "soft power," defined as the power of cybernetics and the launching of technological warfare from a distance. According to Richard Falk of Princeton University, the current thinking of Western and American elites is that the cybernetic potential is unlimited:

Certain strategists in the United States dream of taking control of the cybernetic networks and the fairy-tale riches that, apparently, will be produced by the intellectual industries of learning and knowledge. They want to build the new empire of the electronic era, at the center of which will be a global market entirely enervated by the technology of the future.⁵⁷

A country as powerful and as young as the United States is still fascinated by the early immigrants' conquest of the American heartland's prairies. Initially, the amount of land to be conquered seemed unlimited. But by the end of the nineteenth century, this territorial expansion came to a halt and the American mind had to grapple with new frontiers. The new frontier of the New World Order is the conquest of space, which means having full access to cybernet resources. With the brain drain from the poor countries continuing and the migration of many high-tech experts from the former Soviet Union, the United States has enormous technological resources. American globalization has begun in earnest.⁵⁸ One must note, however, that the advanced Center encourages the migration of skilled professionals from the Third World and that it has begun to enact laws making it much harder for nonprofessionals to immigrate.⁵⁹

This has resulted in Western economic and political superiority; the spread of Western ideas via the acquisition of Western technology; the brain drain from the Third World to the advanced Center; and the gradual infiltration of Western cultural, intellectual, and scientific values into the Third World. All of this results in an absence of serious cultural dialogue between North and South: "On the other hand, it is the absence of communication and cultural tolerance that risks endangering peace in the years to come."⁶⁰

However, despite the "information superiority" exhibited by the West, its people still know very little about the people of the Third World and the challenges facing them. The current mass media in the triumphant Center is no better than its counterpart of twenty years ago, for it still wages a war of ignorance about the real problems affecting the South. This double face of globalization (too much information on the Third World but too little knowledge of its problems) becomes more dangerous when new capital forces penetrate every corner of the world and fashion it according to the demands of the new global economy.⁶¹ The advanced West uses its superior research technology to make more profit at the expense of the Third World, especially as the unequal conditions between North and South seem to persist.⁶²

Globalization also has accelerated the brain drain from the Third World to the advanced Center. Many Third World intellectuals and professionals prefer to reside in the United States. This process has been rightly termed *intellectual hemorrhage*, since it depletes poor countries of much-needed expertise in all scientific fields. Many emigrate not just in search of better economic and social standards, but because the development process in their native countries lacks the appropriate vision to incorporate them productively. Very often, this is complemented by blind imitation of the modernized North, which leads to a transfer of technology with no creative contribution from the South. In other words, the South can purchase technology, but it must create its own forms of modernity and modernization. However, these forms cannot be created if native skilled professionals continue to leave. As a consequence of this unfortunate state of affairs, the Muslim world and the rest of the Third World suffer from the interdependent problems of illiteracy, an absence of rigorous scientific research, and a lack of democratic values.

This bleeding of mental resources is an alarming phenomenon. However, it has led to some positive results, especially in the advanced Center, where a dialogue about competing cultural and religious values is taking place between people of different religious and cultural communities.⁶³ In addition, the North needed Third World workers. Europe imported skilled and nonskilled labor from many Muslim countries, most

notably Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Turkey, and Pakistan. This continuing exodus exposes the continuing underdevelopment of these countries. "Underdevelopment is the inability to create or use skilled human resources intelligently."⁶⁴ Skilled migrants do not leave for financial reasons alone, but because their adopted country offers a better chance to obtain further education in their profession and more opportunities for advancement.

Scientific knowledge is a major landmark of development and progress in contemporary society. Due to rapid advances in science and technology, the world of knowledge will double its scientific information in the next decade or so. This is tremendous, in view of the fact that we are learning more in a decade than our ancestors did in a thousand years. But the West and Japan control most of this knowledge, and the best brains of the Third World continue to migrate to the Center. This causes fundamental "knowledge" gaps between North and South and, coupled with the North's feeling of cultural superiority, makes it difficult to establish effective North-South cultural communication: "It is a question of ethnocentrism that makes it difficult to establish true cultural communication."⁶⁵ The West, now 22 percent of the world's population and perhaps only 16 percent 30 years from now, consumes 70 percent of total world resources and has three major obsessions: Third World demographic trends, the Judeo-Christian ethic, and Japan.⁶⁶

The world is facing the challenge of cultural pluralism. The future holds two possible scenarios: the reinforcement of a monolithic international system, as seen today in the New World Order characterized by American supremacy, or the maintenance of cultural diversity, a value that the world must defend. Without defending this right, the Third World will not achieve full cultural liberation and independence. The West is recreating past history by a new form of recolonization: post-colonialism.

Globalization is constructing a new world that, a few decades from now, will look very different. Major transformations are already occurring: the collapse of socialism and the spread of privatization to such countries as China, India, and Egypt; the rise of regional powers, such as the European community, in the wake of American supremacy; the widening of social and economic gaps between rich and poor within and between countries; the globalization of exploitation, a natural consequence of privatization and multinational investment; the rise of ultranationalism, ethnic cleansing, and new refugee problems; the internationalization of crime, especially Mafia-related crime; the destabilization of the nation-state; and the creation of new international enemies.⁶⁷

Zionism and Globalization

Further, in post-colonialism, the Zionist project has taken on a new role that is financed and morally supported by the United States as *le chef de file du post-colonialisme*. The passage from colonialism to post-colonialism has been aided by the ex-colonizing countries and ratified by the United Nations. And against this context, the Zionist project has sought the recognition of the chief Arab states.

The Zionist project, beginning around the same time as the Arab nationalist project in the nineteenth century, reinvented itself under the Likud government by stubbornly clinging to dichotomies: civilization vs. barbarism, compassion vs. terrorism, democracy vs. totalitarianism, and democratic Israelis vs. backward Arabs and Muslims.

What might happen to the Zionist project in the future is an important question. For example, it is almost impossible to predict with exact accuracy where Israel will be 50 years from now. However, as globalization begins to take deep roots in the world economy and culture, I think that the Middle East in general and Israel in particular will be less important than they currently are to the economic, military, and political strategies of the capitalist Center. Both (Arab) petroleum and Zionism (or any other form of Middle Eastern nationalism) will have to change their character drastically in order to meet the deep political, cultural, and economic changes that will be engendered by globalization. What the above means is that it is impossible to envision the fate of Israel 50 years from now without taking into account the importance of the Middle East as a whole in the same period.

The year 1948 saw the triumph and the culmination of the Zionist project: the creation of a strong Israeli nation-state, whose aim was supposedly to provide a safe haven to its citizens and presumably world Jewry.⁶⁸ Some 50 years later, Israel emerges as the most powerful military state in the Middle East, thanks to the military debacle of Nasserism in the 1967 war and the destruction of the military capabilities of Iraq in the second Gulf war and its aftermath. Although attracting a diverse population from many corners of the world (i.e., from the Arab world, eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Ethiopia), the majority of the Jews of the Center (i.e., West Europe and North America) have so far shown no real intention of migrating to and living in Israel. In a sense, this leaves the grandiose Zionist project unfulfilled and thus curtailed in spite of the huge financial sacrifice the Jews of the Center have made on Israel's behalf. In a sense, the Jews of the Center who have been in the forefront of globalization detest, in essence, the limited and nationalist essence of Zionism. Although they are its biggest supporters at this stage in history, it is possible that they will oppose it in the future.

Several factors have hindered the mass emigration of Center Jews to Israel: its military nature (since 1948, Israel has gone through several major wars) and the nature of the Palestinian problem created in the wake of Israel's establishment. As the Palestinians are perceived as a nation that has been wounded deeply since 1948, there is less and less certainty in the Western world about the central tenets of Zionism, especially in the hands of the Likud.

To my mind, the next 50 years in the life of Israel will be somewhat different from the past 50 years. There is a growing dissatisfaction among many Israeli and overseas Jews with the military nature of the state; an increasingly greater appreciation of Palestinian suffering; and a deep understanding, by even the most Zionist of Jews in Israel, that the Israeli economy cannot survive permanently on foreign aid, be it American or European or even Jewish.

The fate of the Palestinians and the Israelis will be more intertwined due to demographic and cultural factors. On the demographic side, the current birth rate of the Jewish and Palestinian populations suggests that the Palestinians in Israel (those who carry Israeli citizenship and who are currently estimated at 850,000) will be around 2.5 million 50 years from now, excluding those in the West Bank and Gaza, who are estimated to become around 5-6 million 50 years from now. It is doubtful that the Jewish population in Israel will be more than 9 million 50 years from now. Second, on the cultural level, Israeli Jews who immigrated from the Arab world will have more say in the cultural and political affairs of Israeli society and, despite their conservative political leanings, will advocate a cultural Arab-Israeli rapprochement. This is normal in view of the fact that many of them are trying to rediscover their cultural and religious identity, which was constructed outside of the existing Israeli/Palestinian boundaries.

All of the above will help dilute the Israeli state's strong military nature and create a more humane and Middle Eastern-bound Israeli society, a society that sees its survival in reconciliation with its Middle Eastern environment and Arab/Islamic culture in general.

The Globalization of American Islam

I would like to touch on one last major point that relates to the life of the Muslim community in the United States. Many American Muslims believe that only in this country do Muslims have a real opportunity to form a genuine Islamic identity, consciousness, and worldview. This position is predicated on the following:

1. American cultural and religious space, as it has developed over time, tolerates the formation of new cultural and religious identities;

2. Since the cultural makeup of the American Muslim community is very diverse, this country is one of the few areas in the world that could enable Muslims coming from diverse cultural and ethnic backgrounds to mingle freely with each other, and thus pave the way for the formation of a universal Islamic culture, with unique American characteristics, within the boundaries of secularism. In other words, some cling to the view that the Muslims in the heart of the globalized West have a better chance than in any Muslim country to construct a truly universal Muslim community. This thesis is very attractive, and it requires our deep consideration.

Internal events in the life of the American Muslim community (both immigrant and indigenous) and recent external changes in the world order, especially the collapse of the Soviet Union and increasing American entanglement in the Muslim world's economic and political affairs, have transformed the Muslim community from an exotic (and sometimes scary) group of people into a conspicuous and expanding community. Muslims cannot afford to keep their distance from American religious life and the real challenges that secularism poses to the theistic mind.

The American Muslim community is still laying its intellectual (viz., religious) and institutional foundations by appealing both to the central Islamic tradition developing in the Islamic core (the Middle East) over many centuries, and by negotiating, although feebly and perhaps with an unclear vision, with American modernity for a place for Islam in this culture. Muslims know that both to survive in this country and to preserve their Islamic identity, a new group of Muslim intelligentsia needs to emerge to reinterpret the vast Islamic tradition in a new situation while analyzing the coexistence of other religious communities with the present social and political order.

Muslims must recognize that they live in a multicultural, pluralistic and religiously diverse society, and that some of their classical legal formulations (e.g., *dār al ḥarb* and *dār al Islām*) might not suit their new position in American society. Eventually, Muslims would have to formulate new legal and theological concepts to express their community's unique nature, its interaction with other religious communities, and its tolerance of many diverse views and philosophies. In other words, Muslims should answer the following criticism shared by some observers of Islam in the American scene,

Muslims who take their religion seriously cannot believe in separation of religion and state, and religious pluralism is a concept alien to the ideal of a Muslim society.

Consequently, Muslims in the United States should be allowed to practice their religion but not to the point where it inhibits or threatens the religious freedom of others, and certainly not to the point of practicing *jihād* (holy war) against non-Muslims.⁶⁹

This formulation comes from a hostile observer. I think that the most important questions are: How can Muslims interpret the new threats of American globalization to both the Muslim world and the poor masses in the United States? Have American Muslims been used as tools in the hands of globalization in order to impoverish the Third World?

It seems that one way to forge a Muslim consensus on these questions is to achieve a measure of true understanding between the two larger communities that comprise American Islam: the indigenous and immigrant. Both groups face a common challenge: how to articulate an Islamic consciousness that can grasp the central tenets of both modernism and globalization, and that is aware of their impact on the contemporary Muslim world.

Further, it is possible to raise the question of how to produce an American Muslim intellectual class that is authentic to its larger Islamic tradition and firmly engaged in the major questions and problems facing the various sectors of the Muslim community, sectors that represent a wide range of cultural, social, and economic backgrounds and aspirations. American Muslims are in a better position than many other Muslims to enlighten the Muslim world on the scope and hazards of globalization and thus resolve some of the central questions facing contemporary Muslim thought.

Final Thoughts

The Western mind-set, which has shaped the socioeconomic and intellectual destinies of the world since the Industrial Revolution, has centered on the notion of progress.⁷⁰ To some, the potential for progress appeared unlimited.⁷¹ The physical and mental terrain of the Third World was there to occupy and colonize. According to one author, in the modern world view, "a salvational sense of progress places economic expansion and technological innovation at the center of importance."⁷² The phenomenon of progress has posed a major challenge to traditional cultures, their socioeconomic bases, and their ethical worldviews. Globalization has not given up on progress, even the most damaging forms of progress, such as those leading to a new form of colonization. According to Hannah Arendt, the classical notion of progress led to a "process of never-ending accumu-

lation of power necessary for the protection of a never-ending accumulation of capital [which] determined the 'progressive' ideology of the late nineteenth century and foreshadowed the rise of imperialism."⁷³ Globalization is leading already to a new form of colonization that is more subtle and destructive than the classical one.

Furthermore globalization, the latest manifestation of the modern mind-set, has created confusion as to what is important in life. Traditional notions of prosperity, connectedness, community-building, and aiding the poor have been displaced by new aggressive notions of what life means.

Before the dawn of the twentieth century, the Muslim world's religious intelligentsia considered European progress to be devoid of any ethical foundation. Some, however, argued that the Western mind-set had a centuries-long intent to build on ethical foundations that did not subscribe to those of the monotheistic revelations.

Under the aegis of globalization, the ethic of the Western mind-set encourages the fast accumulation of wealth and its accompanying power. Extravagant consumerism is the norm. In the view of Richard Falk,

At present, it is mainly the consequence of the globalization of Western cultural influence, including its commitment to modernization, that has produced a world order crisis of multiple dimensions: nuclearism, industrialism, materialism, consumerism.⁷⁴

In view of the colossal consequences of globalization, a new popular consciousness has to evolve to understand and resist the negative tendencies of globalization. The Muslim world must work hard to revive the social, financial, and economic ethics of Islam, as a monotheistic phenomenon, to combat these dangerous inclinations. It is important to revive a sense of community that withstands the attacks of individualism, which have become the rule of the day in advanced industrial societies and their Third World satellites. With increasing gaps between North and South, and rural-urban gaps within most countries of the South, and the increasing number of marginalized and impoverished people in the cities, there is no escape from reviving the Islamic communal ethic that "commands the good and prohibits the evil."⁷⁵

It is important to remember that for traditional philosophies and worldviews to remain alive in a highly competitive and individualistic world, solutions must be offered on the basis of the traditional worldview. These solutions must take into account the social and psychological rav-

ages created by globalization in the Muslim world.⁷⁶ In other words, how can we formulate Islamic answers to the economic and cultural problems and dislocations created by globalization and its allies in the Muslim world? We must not forget the most relevant example of Indonesia, a country that launched a seemingly adventurous modernization program in the late 1960s and whose economy collapsed all of a sudden in early 1998. One wonders what went wrong in the country! It is amazing to realize that the personal wealth of ex-president Suharto and his family almost equals the approved loan of the International Monetary Fund to Indonesia. Therefore, the question is: How do the political and military elites in the Muslim world manage to gather such unbelievable wealth under the aegis of globalization?

Endnotes

1. Sub-Commandant Marcos, "La 4e guerre mondiale a commence," [The Fourth World War has begun.], *Le Monde Diplomatique* (The Diplomatic World) (August 1997), 1.
2. Muḥammad 'Ābid al Jābirī, *Qadāya fī al Fikr al Mu'āṣir* [Issues in Contemporary Thought] (Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al Wiḥdah al-'Arabīyah, 1997), 144.
3. Charlene Spretnak, *The Resurgence of the Real: Body, Nature and Place in a Hypermodern World* (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1997), 11.
4. John Harris, a Canadian journalist for *This Magazine*. Quoted by Maude Barlow and Heather-Jane Robertson, "Homogenization of Education," in *The Case Against the Global Economy: And for a Turn Toward the Local*, edited by Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith, (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1996), 62-63.
5. See Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi', *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), Chapter One.
6. Indonesia has received a lot of coverage in the West lately. Consult the following articles: V. S. Naipul, "Indonesia: The Man of the Moment," *The New York Review of Books* (11 June 1998), 40-45; Noam Chomsky, "L'Indonesie, atout Maître du Jeu Américain," *Le Monde Diplomatique* (June 1998).
7. See Gérard De Selys, *Tableau noir, appel à la résistance contre la privatisation de l'enseignement* (Bruxelles: EPO, 1998).
8. Helena Norberg-Hodge, "The Pressure to Modernize and Globalize," in *The Case Against the Global Economy: And for a Turn Toward the Local*, edited by Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith, (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1996), 36.
9. See Theodore Roszak, *The Cult of Information: The Folklore of Computers and the True Art of Thinking* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986); Vandana Shiva, *Mono-cultures of the Mind: Biodiversity, Biotechnology, and the Third World* (Penang, Malaysia: Third World Network, 1993).
10. In the case of India, for example, see R. Mukhrjee, *The Rise and Fall of the East India Company* (Berlin: Veb Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1958).
11. See Edward Shils, *The Intellectuals and the Powers and Other Essays* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1972), especially Chapter Three, "Intellectuals in Underdeveloped Countries."
12. See H. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), and *The White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979).

13. On the domestic effects of the Cold War in the United States, see James T. Patterson, *Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945-1974* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

14. See J. Decornoy, "Capital Privé, Développement du Sud et Solidarité Mondiale: Les multinationales, omniprésentes et ... impuissantes." *Le Monde Diplomatique* (Novembre 1988), 8-9; M. Horsman and A. Marshall, *After the Nation State* (London: Harper Collins, 1994); K. Ohmae, *The Borderless World* (London: Harper Collins, 1990); and R. Reich, *The Work of Nations* (New York: Knopf, 1991). According to Samir Amīn, "Although the new globalization [of the 1990s] has inhibited the ability of the nation-state to manage its domestic economy, it has not cancelled out the presence of the state." Samir Amīn, *Fi muwājahāt azmat 'aṣrīnā* [Face to Face with the Crisis of Our Age] (Cairo: Sinā' li al Nashr, 1997), 71.

15. B. Karlin, "Space: New Frontier for US Entrepreneurs." *International Herald Tribune* (14 September 1988).

16. Decornoy, "Capital Privé," 9.

17. Amīn, *Fi muwājahāt*, 20-21.

18. See Z. Laidi and et al., *L'ordre mondial relache* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationales des Sciences, 1994).

19. See S. Strange, *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

20. See Samir Amīn, *Les défis de la mondialisation* (Paris: L'Harmattan/Forum du tiers-monde, 1996).

21. Amīn, *Fi muwājahāt*, 133.

22. Immanuel Wallerstein, *After Liberalism* (New York: The New Press, 1995), 15.

23. See Daniel T. Griswold, "Blessings and Burdens of Globalization," *The World and I* (April 1998): 30-35.

24. See P. Bairoch and E. Helleiner, *States Against Markets: The Limits of Globalization* (London: Routledge, 1996).

25. See Peter Martin, "La mondialisation est-elle inévitable? Une obligation morale." *Le Monde Diplomatique* (June 1997), 14. The author claims the following: "Les débats sur la mondialisation se polarisent généralement sur ses enjeux économiques. Je voudrais, pour ma part, mettre en avant les arguments profondément moraux qui plaident en sa faveur, et que l'on peut résumer en une phrase: l'intégration accélérée de sociétés autrefois marginalisées est la meilleure chose qui soit arrivée du vivant de la génération d'après-guerre. La mondialisation constitue une authentique collaboration par-delà les frontières, des sociétés et des cultures, contrairement aux collaborations factices des dialogues Nord-Sud et des élites bureaucratiques. Non seulement elle a sapé les fondations de l'empire du mal soviétique, mais elle est en train d'en faire autant en Chine. Même sans ces effets politiques directs, ses vertus auraient été extraordinaires: elle a provoqué une énorme amélioration du bonheur humain dans les sociétés ayant su saisir les chances qu'elle offre. Cette transformation produira les effets exactement inverses de ceux invoqués par les gens qui, à gauche, en font le procès. Sous son impulsion, le pouvoir se déplacera irrésistiblement des pays développés vers le reste du monde. C'est le désir d'empêcher à tout prix ce transfert qui sous-tend la vision du monde des critiques de la mondialisation. Leurs arguments, de mon point de vue, reposent sur un désir viscéral de préserver le statu quo et de pérenniser l'hégémonie de leur idéologie profondément conservatrice ... Les critiques les plus raffinés admettent que des millions d'emplois ont été créés. Mais, disent-ils, il ne s'agit pas de véritables emplois, mais d'une exploitation éhontée de la main-d'oeuvre. Allez dire cela aux travailleurs bien formés de Hongkong, de Singapour, de Malaisie, de Thaïlande, aux ouvriers de l'électronique d'Acer, aux

ouvriers de l'automobile de Daewoo. Allez dire cela aux travailleurs de la Chine méridionale qui ont échappé à la vie misérable et éreintante des campagnes et qui avancent - effectivement dans les pires conditions de travail - vers une authentique prospérité et une authentique autonomie de vie." Ibid., 14.

26. Ignacio Ramonet, "Régimes globalitaires." *Le Monde Diplomatique* (January 1997), 1. According to Ramonet, "On appelait 'régimes totalitaires' ces régimes à parti unique qui n'admettaient aucune opposition organisée, qui subordonnaient les droits de la personne à la raison d'Etat, et dans lesquels le pouvoir politique dirigeait souverainement la totalité des activités de la société dominée. A ces systèmes succède, en cette fin de siècle, un autre type de totalitarisme, celui des 'régimes globalitaires'. Reposant sur les dogmes de la globalisation et de la pensée unique, ils n'admettent aucune autre politique économique, subordonnent les droits sociaux du citoyen à la raison compétitive, et abandonnent aux marchés financiers la direction totale des activités de la société dominée." Ibid.

27. See Paul Hirst and Graham Thompson, *Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Government* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).

28. Spretnak, *Resurgence of the Real*, 34.

29. See C. de Brie, "Le couple Etat-nation en instance de divorce." *Le Monde Diplomatique* (May 1989).

30. See Nancy Birdsall, "Life is Unfair: Inequality in the World," *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1998): 95-113.

31. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Routledge, 1991)140.

32. Pierre Bourdieu, "L'essence du néolibéralisme," *Le Monde Diplomatique* (March 1998), 3.

33. H. L. Mencken, *The American English: An Inquiry into the Development of English in the United States* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), 25.

34. Richard Ohman, "English and the Cold War," in *The Cold War and the University: Toward an Intellectual History of the Cold War Years*, edited by Noam Chomsky et al., (New York: The New Press, 1997), 73.

35. See E. J. Perkins, *The World Economy in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Schenkman, 1983).

36. M. Beaud, "Jamais Tant de Richesses, Jamais tant de Misère ... Sur les causes de la pauvreté des nations et des hommes dans le monde contemporain." *Le Monde Diplomatique* (Novembre 1997), 11.

37. See Charles William Maynes, "The Perils of an Imperial America," *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1998): 36-49.

38. One must note that even some European, most notably French intellectuals, are discussing how to respond to what they see as the American cultural menace directed at Europe, and are seeking ways to protect cultural diversity and reviving their cultural independence vis-à-vis the United States. See Paul-Marie de la Gorce, *Le Dernier Empire* (Paris: Grasset, 1996), and Ignacio Ramonet, "L'empire américain." *Le Monde Diplomatique* (February 1997), 1. Henry Kissinger reflects the American view on this matter, "A united Europe is likely to insist on a specifically European view of world affairs—which is another way of saying that it will challenge American hegemony in Atlantic policy. This may well be a price worth paying for European unity, but American policy has suffered from an unwillingness to recognize that there is a price to be paid." Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 82. Another architect of contemporary American policy argues that the strategic task of the United States is to prevent the emergence of a dominant and antagonistic Eurasian power and to create a stable

continental equilibrium with the United States as the political arbiter. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives* (New York: Basic Books, 1997), especially Chapter Two.

39. A. Ahmad, *Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).

40. For a detailed discussion, see Abu-Rabi', *Intellectual Origins*, especially Chapter One.

41. 'Abd al Ilāh Bilqazīz, "al 'Awlamah wa al hawīyah al thaqafīyah" [Globalization and Cultural Identity], *al Mustaqbal al 'Arabī* (March 1998), 92.

42. "Le post-colonialisme est un phénomène très récent qui date du début des années 1990, comme suite à la chute des régimes communistes, la Guerre du Golfe et l'effritement du peu d'unité que le Tiers Monde était parvenu à construire...Le post-colonialisme est, avant tout, le produit du 'nouvel ordre mondial'." Mahdi Elmandjra, *La décolonisation culturelle: Defi majeur du 21ème siècle* (Marrakech [Morocco]: Editions Walili, 1996, and Paris: Futuribles, 1996), 208.

43. See for example Muḥammad 'Ābid al Jābirī, *Introduction a la critique de la raison arabe* (Casablanca: Editions le Fennec, 1995) and *al mashrū' al nahdawī al 'arabī* [The Project of Arab Renaissance] (Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al Wiḥdah al 'Arabīyah, 1996).

44. Paul-Marie de la Gorce, *Le Dernier Empire* (Paris: Grasset, 1996), 16.

45. Claude Julien, *L'empire américaine* (Paris: Grasset, 1968), 25. The same ideas are presented by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber in, *Le défi américain* (Paris: Denoel, 1967).

46. Edmund Wilson, *The American Earthquake: A Chronicle of the Roaring Twenties, the Great Depression and the Dawn of the New Deal* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1996), 569.

47. Muḥammad 'Ābid al Jābirī, "al 'Awlamah, niẓām wa aydiyolojīyah," in *al Majlis al Qawmī li al Thaqāfah al 'Arabīyah, al 'Arab wa taḥadīyāt al 'awlamah* (Rabāṭ: al Majlis al Qawmī li al Thaqāfah al 'Arabīyah, 1997), 15. Several Islamist and Arab nationalist thinkers share the above views. For example, the Egyptian Islamist, Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Mabruk contends in a very controversial book that the United States encourages pragmatism in the Muslim world as a means of colonizing this world in a new way. See Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Mabruk, *Amerīa wa al Islām al nafi'i* [America and Pragmatic Islam] (Cairo: Dār al Tawzī' wa al Nashr al Islāmīyah, 1989), especially pp. 191-211. See also 'Ādil Ḥusayn, *al Iqtisād al Miṣrī: Min al Istiqlāl ilā al Taba'īyah* [The Egyptian Economy: From Autonomy to Dependency] (Cairo: Dār al Mustaqbal al 'Arabī, 1986), and Ramzī Zakī, *Mushkilāt Miṣr al Iqtisādīyah* [Egypt's Economic Problem] (Cairo: Dār al Fatā al 'Arabī, 1982).

48. Ignacio Ramonet, "L'empire américain." *Le Monde Diplomatique* (February 1997), 1. See also Paul Salem, "al 'Arab wa al 'awlamah," *al Mustaqbal al 'Arabī* (March, 1998): 78-90.

49. Muḥammad 'Ābid al Jābirī, *Mas'alat al hawīyah: al 'Urūbah, al Islām wa al Gharb* [The Issue of Identity: Arabism, Islam, and the Occident] (Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al Wiḥdah al 'Arabīyah, 1995), 16.

50. "Mais la libération du Sud passe d'abord par une décolonisation culturelle car un des principaux objectifs du post-colonialisme est l'hégémonie culturelle et la propagation des valeurs occidentales. Les conflits à venir seront des conflits de valeurs et il y a une très grande urgence à développer une communication culturelle entre le Nord et le Sud." M. Elmandjra, *La Décolonisation culturelle*, 214.

51. "Le Nord a déployé jusqu'à présent très peu d'efforts pour comprendre et encore moins pour parler le langage du Sud. Il faut accorder une priorité aux systèmes de valeurs

pour se rendre compte que la crise actuelle entre le Nord et le Sud est une crise du système total." Mahdi Elmandjra, *Retrospective des futurs* (Casablanca: Ouyoun, 1992), 164.

52. Elmandjra, *La Décolonisation culturelle*, 215.

53. Mahdi Elmandjra, *al Ḥarb al ḥadāriyah al Ūlah* [The First Civilizational War] (Casablanca: 'Uyūn, 1994), 21-22.

54. Elmandjra, *La Décolonisation culturelle*, 15.

55. Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*.

56. Brian Goodwin, *How the Leopard Changed Its Spots: The Evolution of Complexity* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1994); Mitchell M. Waldrop, *Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992)

57. Richard Falk, "Vers une domination mondiale de nouveau type." *Le Monde Diplomatique* (May 1996), 16. Professor Falk goes on to describe in detail the new meaning of freedom that is being invented by the supporters of cyberspace technology: AM. John Perry Barlow, éminent futurologue, cofondateur de la Fondation de la frontière électronique de Davos (fait significatif, ce village suisse accueille chaque année les responsables du capitalisme mondial), a publié une "Déclaration d'indépendance du Cyberspace". Elle s'ouvre par ces mots: "Gouvernements du monde industrialisé, géants fatigués faits de chair et d'acier, j'arrive du Cyberspace, la nouvelle habitation de l'esprit (...). Vous n'êtes pas les bienvenus parmi nous. Vous n'êtes pas souverains là où nous rassemblons." Et de défier ouvertement tout contrôle territorial: "Vos concepts juridiques de propriété, d'expression, d'identité, de mouvement et de contexte ne s'appliquent pas à nous. Ils sont basés sur la matière. Il n'y a pas de matière ici." M. Barlow s'engage à "créer une civilisation de l'esprit dans le Cyberspace." Elle sera, selon lui, 'plus humaine et plus juste que le monde auparavant créé par vos gouvernements'. Dans cette optique, l'Etat n'est à l'évidence en rien source de pouvoir, d'identité, d'autorité légale."

58. See Joseph Nye et William Owens, "America's Information Edge," *Foreign Affairs* (March-April 1996).

59. S. Sassen, *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

60. J. Nye and W. Owens, "America's Information Edge," 29-30.

61. See William Greider, *One World, Ready or Not: The Manic Logic of Global Capitalism* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997); A. Gresh, "Les aleas de l'internationalisme," *Le Monde Diplomatique* (May 1998), 12.

62. Richard Barnet and John Cavanagh, *Global Dreams: Imperial Corporations and the New World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994); M. L. Bouguerra, *Le recherche contre le Tiers-Monde* (Paris: PUF, 1993).

63. For a detailed discussion of this subject, consult Claude Liauzu, *Race et civilisation: L'Autre dans la culture occidentale* (Paris: Syros, 1992).

64. Elmandjra, *La Décolonisation culturelle*, 175.

65. *Ibid.*, 188.

66. *Ibid.*

67. See the interesting article by Le Sous-Commandant Marcos, "La 4e guerre mondiale a commencé," *Le Monde Diplomatique* (August 1997).

68. See Zeev Sternhell, *The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism and the Making of the Jewish State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

69. Dinesh D'Souza, "Solving America's Multi cultural Dilemma," *The World and I* (January 1996), 35.

70. See Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi', "Beyond the Post-Modern Mind." *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* 7 (September 1990): 235-56.

71. See Jean-Marie Domenach, *Enquete dur les idees contemporaine* (Paris: Points, 1987).

72. Spretnak, *Resurgence of the Real*, 2.

73. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1963), 143.

74. Richard Falk, *Explorations at the Edge of Time: The Prospects for World Order* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 48

75. See David R. Griffin and Huston Smith, *Primordial Truth and Postmodern Theology* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989). One must note that Christian thinkers and theologians were quicker than their Muslim counterpart in providing ethical answers to the challenges of globalization. Consult, Hans Kung, *A Global Ethic for Global Politics and Economics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), especially Chapter Two.

76. See Akbar S. Ahmed, *Postmodernism and Islam: Predicament and Promise* (London: Routledge, 1992); Akbar S. Ahmed and Donnan Hastings (eds.), *Islam, Globalization and Postmodernity* (London: Routledge, 1994); Walden Bello, *New Third World: Strategies for Survival in the Global Economy* (London: Eathscan, 1990).