

Oikos/Polis Conflict: Perspectives of Gender Feminists and Islamic Revivalists

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Conflict has been an inescapable phenomenon of Western society, particularly since the sixteenth century. If the era of the medieval West is characterized by the conflict between Pope and Emperor, which eventually gave rise to modern nation-states, the postmodern era may rightly be described as one of conflict between family and state.

The postmodern conflict can be traced back to the *oikos/polis* conflict generated by Western political thought, which originated from Greek misogyny. In the same way the church was overthrown in the conflict in the medieval era, the family is being overthrown in the postmodern era by the neo-Marxist radical school of postmodern feminism, which is also called *gender feminism*.

Quite contrary to gender feminists, contemporary Islamic revivalists find no conflict between the two institutions of family and state. They give due recognition to both institutions and consider them as complementary to one another. This is quite observable in their views and activities in the area of women's issues, particularly that of women's political participation.

The aim of this paper is to examine the debate on women's political participation between gender feminists and contemporary Islamic revivalists. The paper shall demonstrate how gender feminists prefer women's political participation at the cost of deconstructing gender and family. The contemporary Islamic revivalists, however, support and encourage women's political participation—but not at the expense of family and the distinct identity of woman.

The paper is divided into three parts. In the first and second parts, the arguments of gender feminists and contemporary Islamic revivalists on women's political participation shall be analyzed. The third part shall identify and discuss the differences between them. It is followed by a brief conclusion.

Gender Feminists on Women's Political Participation

For a proper comprehension of gender feminism, a glance at feminist philosophy and its various schools in general is essential. Feminism is generally traced back to the eighteenth century as a theory of women's rights. Earlier, it only focused on raising the literacy rates of women, legally enfranchising them, and redressing many of their social grievances.¹ Mary Wollstonecraft's *A Vindication of the Rights of Women* (1792),² Harriet Taylor's "Enfranchisement of Women" (1851),³ and Mill's *The Subjection of Women* (1869)⁴ are lucid illustrations of the early liberal school of feminists.

The nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw the rise of modern liberal, socialist, and Marxist schools of thought.⁵ Modern feminists' arguments on the problems of women, unlike those of the early feminists, seem quite radical. Elizabeth Cady Stanton,⁶ a modern liberal feminist, argued that the male-dominated society is "one grand rape of womanhood," an assertion that illustrates this belief. Charlott Perkins Gilman, a modern socialist feminist, asserted that woman is the only animal whose sexual relations have an economic function.⁷ She argued that women are forced to seek husbands in the marriage market for their economic survival. Margarette Bentson, a modern Marxist feminist, argued that women constitute a class of people who are oppressed by men at home and outside with a double workload.⁸ For these feminists, marriage is enslavement, child-care a burden, and economic dependency on men an obstacle to their liberation. Hence, the only way they can be liberated is to join women to the outside workforce and to become economically independent. If the family role becomes an impediment to this, either men should be assimilated into the housework or there should be a socialization of domestic work and child-care.⁹

To a great extent, such an analysis of women's problems and their proposed solutions are defensive reactions against Western political theories of women, as mentioned earlier. Hobbes contended that men alone are competent to create civil power, civil society, and civil laws to which women should only submit.¹⁰ Locke held the views that men are more fit to rule and that women and children are accustomed to follow men both in the family and the state.¹¹ Rousseau did not even consider women eligible to give their consent for the General Will and deprived them of political participation.¹² Hegel claimed that if governmental affairs were entrusted to women, the state would be in jeopardy.¹³ Marx argued that the sexual act creates the division of labor in the family and enslaves the wife and children. The wife is treated as property, and the husband exploits her labor power.¹⁴ Engels believed that change in the site of production—from the household to the outside world—eventually changed society from matriarchal to patriarchal. He declared this "the world's historic defeat of the female sex."¹⁵ Hence, Marx and Engels identified the withering away of the state and the family as the key solutions to women's liberation.¹⁶ Feminist ideas about sex, fam-

ily, society, and state were developed against this background of Western political theories on women.¹⁷

Postmodern trends in feminism, such as gender feminism,¹⁸ represent a more radical departure from earlier modern feminist trends for the equal political participation of women. It is labeled *gender feminism* precisely for two reasons: First, it emphasizes "gender" and, second, it gives a different and unconventional connotation to that term. This term is not referred by the gender feminists as a polite term for the words *sex* or *male* and *female*. *Gender* is defined as the relationship between men and women based on a socially defined role.¹⁹ Gender feminists emphasize that the status and role of men and women are constructed socially and are subject to change. In other words, there is no natural man or natural woman.

The characteristics assigned to one sex are not natural but are constructed socially. Thus, heterosexuality is not natural but rather a social imposition, and homosexuality, lesbianism, and all other kinds of apparently deviant sexuality are legitimate and should be duly respected. One of the important aims of gender feminism is the demolition of the "biology is destiny" concept. This implies the deconstruction of the gender, which underlines the elimination of natural distinctions between men and women.²⁰

The roots of gender feminism can be traced back to the Marxist interpretation of history as a class struggle between two economic classes: bourgeoisie and proletariat. The end of class struggle and the emergence of a classless society would be possible only through proletariat revolution. Engels, in his *The Origin of the Family, Property, and the State*, discussed the suppression of women by men as the first class oppression in history caused by monogamy and the division of labor for child breeding. Hence, nineteenth-century Marxist feminist arguments and twentieth-century Marxist feminist thought are constructed against the background of Marx's and Engel's assumptions concerning the historical suppression of women as a class by the class of men.²¹ Gender feminism is a most radical twenty-first-century development of modern Marxist feminism.

In order to make a distinction between the earlier feminist trends and the gender feminist trend, Christina Hoff Sommers, in her *Who Stole Feminism?*,²² labeled the former *equity feminism*. Those who emphasize only the moral, educational, civil, and legal equality of the sexes are characterized as "equity feminists," and those who demand sex/gender class revolution and the elimination of all distinctions between the sexes are grouped as *gender feminists*.²³ To gender feminists, all institutions, including motherhood, is a political institution that causes the institutionalization of male control over women and children. Adrienne Rich, in her "Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence," asserted strongly that heterosexuality, like motherhood, should be recognized as a political institution.²⁴ She argued that heterosexuality is rape and is forced upon women for women's oppression by men. The categorization of masculine and feminine is, for Rich, a social construction and a product of the human mind and culture. The only way to fight patriarchal culture is to deconstruct

gender itself. If there is no gender as male or female, such gender inequities as sexism, homophobia, and misogyny would no longer be perpetrated in society. With such assertions in mind, gender feminists demand the acceptance of sexual orientation: acceptance of homosexuality, lesbianism, and transsexuality.²⁵

For sexual orientation, the basic obstacle is the family and, in the family, the social institutions of childbearing and child rearing. Applying the Marxist analysis of the family, Firestone identified childbearing and child-rearing roles as the root causes of women's suppression. She even went so far as to assert that if nature stands in the way of eliminating sexual differences, a fight against nature is justified and becomes essential. She wrote:

The natural is not necessarily a "human" value. Humanity has begun to outgrow nature. We can no longer justify the maintenance of a discriminatory sex class system on the grounds of its origins in nature. Indeed for pragmatic reasons alone it begins to look as if we must get rid of it.²⁶

The fight against nature is an essential strategic action for gender feminists to achieve their goal of a sex-classless society. Society's basic class division is between male and female, and this division has been political: male power and domination over the female. Heidi Hartman wrote:

The personal is political means, for the radical feminists, that the original and basic class division is between the sexes and the motive force of history is the striving of men for power and domination over women, the dialectic of sex.²⁷

Sexual division, which is a class division of patriarchal family for male domination, is perpetrated in all social, economic, and political institutions. Elements of patriarchy include, primarily, heterosexual marriage, female childbearing, child rearing, and housework. All of these elements give rise to women's economic and political dependence on men. Hence, the deconstruction of the basic political institution of heterosexual marriage is required to bring about a sex-classless society. For this, Hartman argued that all forms of sexuality—homosexuality, lesbianism, bisexuality, transsexuality—should be as acceptable as heterosexuality. Such an arrangement would not direct people toward heterosexuality alone for sexual needs and biological reproduction. New techniques can also be used for biological reproduction.²⁸

To bring about such an imaginative society, the creation of a gender feminist culture to render ideological and material support to women seems indispensable. Ann Ferguson and Nancy Falbre²⁹ asserted that "counter-hegemonic cultural and material support net-works" should be established to help "women outside the patriarchy." Four key areas are identified as important for a strong gender feminist movement: demands for publicly

supported child-care, sexual freedom, feminist controlled cultural and ideological production, and the establishment of economic and other support systems for women.

It is quite clear to gender feminists that such a culture and sexual freedom would lead to polymorphously perverse sexuality and would produce such men and women as have never existed before. Alison Jaggar wrote:

The end of the biological family will also eliminate the need for sexual repression Humanity could finally revert to its natural polymorphously perverse sexuality.³⁰ . . .

The destruction of the biological family, never envisioned by Freud, will allow the emergence of new women and men, different from any people who have previously existed.³¹

Hence, the destruction of the biological family entails the destruction of the "socially constructed" categories of masculinity and femininity as well as the deconstruction of the "socially constructed" roles of wife, mother, and so on, and the deconstruction of "socially constructed" occupational categories based on sexual differences.

The most important and far-fetched result expected by gender feminists from the destruction of the biological family is the statistical equality of men and women in all institutions. The abolition of the family would eventually liberate women from economic dependence on men and would take away their having to choose between housework and outside work. They would not be allowed to devote themselves to children and housework. In an interview, Simon de Beauvoir said,

No, we don't believe that any women should have this choice. No women should be authorized to stay at home to raise her children. Society should be totally different. Women should not have the choice, too many women will make that one.³²

It is quite evident from the above that gender feminists realize that if "choice" is given, many women would prefer housework over outside work. However, they insist for the good of such women that they be liberated forcibly from male oppression, since the choice of such women is "socially constructed." Such an agreement would ensure the equal participation of women in all areas of life from child-care centers to high-level politics. In other words, a revolutionary change in the conventional family ensures a radical change in the entire world. Susan Moller Okin, in an article entitled "Change the Family, Change the World," observed:

It would be a future in which men and women would participate in more or less equal numbers in every sphere of life from infant care to different kinds of paid work to high-level politics. If we are to

be at all true to our democratic ideals, moving away from gender is essential.³³

Thus, gender deconstruction becomes essential even for a true democracy. Obviously, gender feminists locate the cause of women's low participation in public life in gender and the family. So, the prognosis of the problem definitely lies in gender deconstruction and family abolition.

The deconstruction of the family institution, in fact, seems a first radical step for the reconstruction of economic and political institutions. Hence, after the deconstruction of the family and the compulsory enlistment of women in public life, gender feminists demand universal quotas, a 50–50 male and female division of all elected offices. The necessity of universal quotas for equal representation of the sexes is discussed in Mim Kilber's edited work *Women and Government: New Ways to Political Power* (1994).³⁴ Elizabeth Sledziewski observed:

Equal participation by female citizens in affairs of the polis will henceforth be considered a *sine qua non* of the completion of democracy. A democracy without women will no longer be seen as an imperfect democracy, but as no democracy at all.³⁵

Such an argument for equal participation based on sexual difference goes entirely against the spirit of democracy and also the gender feminists' own notion of eliminating sexual differences. However, for the long-term goal of the gender feminists—the classless society—such a redefinition of democracy seems necessary. To establish the “dictatorship of the proletariat” (taking the power of one class [women] from another class [men]), this demand for 50–50 quotas for women and men as decision makers is a strategic necessity. Through such an election process, women eventually will be able to control the government. Commenting on this, Dale O'Leary remarked:

Those pushing for a complete sex/gender class revolution have always had a problem: How does the class “women” take power from the class “men”? They cannot erase men from existence, they can't line them up against a wall and shoot them or ship them off to Siberia. The redefinition of democracy to include quotas based on sex differences solves the problem.³⁶

The imposition of the quotas would snatch another “choice”—the choice of the voters to vote for anybody, male or female. For instance, Kelber explained the implications of such quotas in the United States and asserted that the Constitution should increase the number of senators from each state from two to four—two men and two women. She recommended the institutionalization of multimember districts and proportional representation within the House of Representatives. According to Kelber, such an

arrangement would force voters to vote for women. Thus, gender feminists have tended to redefine democracy from their own perspective to achieve their ends.³⁷

After family, the next demon standing against the objectives of gender feminists is religion. Hence, they perceive "religion" from their own perspective and find it patriarchal, particularly Christianity. Elizabeth Schussler Florenza argued that biblical texts are not divine revelations, but rather products of an "androcentric patriarchal culture and history." They demand the empowerment of women to reimage the Christian god as Sophia (female wisdom).³⁸ Carol Chrost's essay, "Why Women Need the Goddess," echoed feminists' gender theology that, for O'Leary, is no theology at all.³⁹ However, an important point to note here is that the attack of gender feminists on Christianity and the demand for its reinterpretation is not for its own sake, but for the equal participation of women in decision making. This is evident from their several statements and report, in preparation for the Beijing conference. A report stated:

The rise of all forms of religious fundamentalism was seen as posing a particular threat to the enjoyment by women of their human rights and to the full-participation of women of their human rights and to the full participation of women in decision-making at all levels of society.⁴⁰

From several reports of the Beijing preparation meetings, including one entitled "Equality and Democracy: Utopia or Challenge," the gender feminists' influence is quite obvious. A statement by Vigdis Finnbogadottir, president of Iceland, can be cited as an example:

The gender perspective should be integrated in the curricula. Stereotypes must be eliminated in school-books and teachers trained to raise their awareness of this question, so as to ensure that girls and boys make informed career choices which are not based on gender-based traditions.⁴¹

Stereotypes to be eliminated from the curricula are images of "wives" and "mothers," which are understood from their reports. In fact, gender feminists were quite tactful in exploiting sexual, reproductive, and health rights to ensure that abortion and lesbian rights were incorporated into the United Nations' document for women. They condemned all positive arguments for "family" and motherhood put forward by pro-life and pro-family nongovernmental organizational activists as obstacles for the progress and development of women. Bella Abzug stated:

We urge the small number of male and female delegates seeking to sidetrack and sabotage the empowerment of women to cease this diversionary tactic. They will not succeed.⁴²

Quoting the following lines from a *Wall Street Journal* article entitled "Dating Game Today Breaks Traditional Gender Roles," O'Leary pointed out the influence of gender feminists on American youth:

In Ms. Dickson's generation young women openly enter into intimate relationships with both genders that are more than just experiments. They resist being described as straight, as gay—as even bisexual, which some think suggests promiscuity and one-night stands. Instead they use words like "fluid" and "omnisexual."⁴³

For gender feminists, such a culture of "sexual perversity" is a genuine culture as against the political culture of heterosexuals. One report by the Council of Europe Conference argued strongly that sexual life is not solely attached to married life. Women should be given the freedom to construct their own lifestyle and their own family and choice in reproduction. All of these are code words for homosexuality, lesbianism, and other forms of nonmarital and extramarital sexuality. The reproduction rights of lesbian women implies the right of lesbians to conceive children through artificial insemination and to adopt children. Hence, not surprisingly, gender feminists never condemn prostitution; in fact, they demand protection for "commercial sex workers."⁴⁴ Not surprisingly, they look upon heterosexuality as rape, marriage as unpaid prostitution, and the family and even motherhood as political institutions.

Thus, the above discussion of gender feminists' theoretical and practical efforts for the equal political participation of women (if one can still call them "women") demonstrates that they want to achieve their goal at the cost of gender and family deconstruction.

Islamic Revivalists on Women's Political Participation

There seem to be divergent views among contemporary Islamic revivalists on the issue of women's political participation.⁴⁵ Their views may be divided into two broad categories: traditional and moderate. The basic issue is the interpretation of Islamic texts concerning women in changing circumstances. We shall divide the issue into two parts: (a) general political participation, which includes the right to vote, to join and campaign for a political party and candidate for any office, to run for any legislative assembly, the right for the post of any minister and any higher office except *imāmah*; and (b) the right to be considered for the *imāmah*.⁴⁶

General Political Participation

First, I shall look at the stand of those revivalists who represent the traditional outlook.⁴⁷ This group has limited and narrow perceptions about the role of women. Basically, their arguments against women's political

participation, in particular, and public participation, in general, are supported either by their own narrow interpretations of Islamic texts or invalid generalizations. As a result, women are denied any active political role.⁴⁸ Their arguments, such as that women are less rational since two women are equal to one man for commercial witnessing, are rejected by moderate revivalists.⁴⁹

Moderate revivalists argue that Islam has assigned a dynamic role to women as vicegerents of God. The understanding of the traditional revivalists, who confine the role of women to the house, is unacceptable to moderate revivalists. They argue that the issue of witness for economic transaction should be understood in its proper context. Since women were less interested and less involved in economic activities, especially during the time of Prophet Muhammad, and there was no system of written documentation, it was suggested that, as a practical measure, at least two women should be witnesses so that one could remind the other if the other forgets. They also argue that if women are intellectually deficient, as conceived by some, even two or more intellectually deficient women would not solve the problem, but rather would augment it and increase confusion. Hence, it is contended that the tradition under discussion does not convey women's intellectual deficiency; rather, it provides a practical suggestion for solving the problem at a particular time and place. With regard to certain other traditions, moderate revivalists contend that these are considered weak by attested traditions or go against the practice of the Prophet, who consulted his wives on several occasions and followed their suggestions.⁵⁰

On the basis of all these arguments, if traditional revivalists wish to maintain the importance of family responsibility as being prior to all other outside responsibilities, this is not disputed and rejected. In fact, all revivalists give first priority to the role of women in the institution of family, which is the most important and fundamental institution for the overall development of Islamic civilization. Even the man's role in the family cannot be neglected. But traditional revivalists reach a different conclusion: The only field of activity for women is the family.

Moderate revivalists look at men and women as equal but not identical.⁵¹ They assign different roles to men and women, but also, to some extent, encourage women to participate in politics. Umri,⁵² one of the well-known scholars and activists of the Islamic revival movement in India, contended that Islam stands for equality of men and women and inspires its followers to struggle against all kinds of oppression and injustice against women. He maintained different roles for males and females in different jurisdictions but did not deny the active role played by women, particularly during the early history of Islam. He showed how eminent women in Islamic history participated in all public activities, including the political. A study of his works on women suggests that he encouraged women to be active and energetic in all fields for the sake of Islam. However, the role of women in the family occupies, for Umri, priority over all other outside functions. He encouraged women's education at all levels. A great number

of women, well-educated and politically conscious, are actively involved in the activities of the Islamic revival movement in India.⁵⁴

An analysis of the views of Mawdudi,⁵⁵ the founder of the contemporary Islamic revival movement in the Indian subcontinent, is appropriate here to gain a better appraisal of the moderate group's growing stance within the contemporary Islamic revivalist movement as a whole. Mawdudi not only supported but advocated strongly the rights of women to education and all other rights as granted to women by Islam. However, he emphasized the different roles and segregation of men and women.⁵⁶ Mawdudi supported his argument on moral grounds: The free intermixing of men and women in society causes moral decay and sexual lapses as, for example, evidenced in the West. To avoid the evil consequences of such unrestricted interaction, he recommended segregation. However, according to some revivalists, such an argument is unacceptable. They argued that women should not be victimized because of society's moral deterioration. To check moral deterioration, moral reformation is necessary, not rigid gender-based segregation. A more comprehensive reading of Mawdudi's writings suggests that he recognized a woman's right to education. While he was expounding his philosophy of education, he suggested strongly that women should be given military training along with appropriate education and training.⁵⁷

Mawdudi, like Iqbal and others, asserted emphatically the necessity of *ijtihad*.⁵⁸ This implies that Mawdudi viewed Islamic thought as not static but dynamic; it develops on the spirit of the Islamic texts while also being sensitive to empirical circumstances. Hence, following Mawdudi's approach for the development of Islamic thought, it seems necessary that traditional revivalists should depart from their traditional stance and adopt the moderates' stance on women. A close observation of the Student Circles of the Islamic revivalist movement in India and its allies, particularly the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI),⁵⁹ shows that there is a sign of departure from the earliest stance on women. However, as the Islamic Revival Movement in India has not yet taken part in parliamentary elections, there is no empirical evidence of its stance on women's political participation.

The stance of Arab revivalists on women can be traced back to the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood by Ḥasan al-Bannā in Egypt.⁶⁰ He established a Muslim Sisterhood and mobilized women for the cause of Islam and supported fully such women as Zaynab al-Ghazzālī, whose imprisonment, suffering, and brutal torture under Nasser's regime has left an impact on Muslim women.⁶¹

The position taken recently by some of the moderate revivalists, for example in Sudan, is a giant step forward in the development of women. The Islamic National Front (INF), under the leadership of Ḥasan al-Turābī,⁶² has not only endorsed theoretically the full political participation of women but has made it an empirical reality. In 1986, two women, Su'ād al-Fāṭih⁶³ and Ḥikmat Ḥasan Syed Aḥmad, were included in the parliament

under the aegis of the INF. Presently, 10 percent of the Sudanese parliament consists of women, three women have been appointed ministers, and one woman judge sits on the supreme court. Moreover, the government has established quotas to increase the number of women participants.⁶⁴

The first strategic action undertaken by the INF for women's public and especially political participation were the desegregation of its male and female wings and the institutionalization of a single structure for both, in the mid-1970s.⁶⁵ This has helped women revivalists to interact with their male counterparts, share experiences, and inspire each other to work for the cause of Islam. It does not mean that there are no separate women's organizations to encourage women. There are many national and international level women organizations, such as the Sudanese Women's Union (headed by Sumayyah Abū Kashhāwā,⁶⁶ a competent moderate revivalist) and the International Organization of Muslim Women (headed by Viṣāl al-Mahdī, another moderate revivalist and the wife of Ḥasan al-Turābī).⁶⁷

These women activists and Ḥasan al-Turābī support strongly the political participation of women. In an interview,⁶⁸ al-Turābī asserted emphatically that the Islamic Movement in Sudan (IMS), since the very beginning, has been very mindful of the need to create an active role for women in all spheres of life. Hence, the movement has encouraged women and given them all possible opportunities to enhance their abilities and devote themselves to the Islamic cause. Such views of the Movements' leadership were reconfirmed and elaborated further by Zakariyā Bashīr,⁶⁹ an intellectual ideologue and activist of the Movement, during an interview. He said that the IMS has surpassed all other Islamic movements in the world on its attitude to women. Referring to the Popular Defense Forces, he pointed out that women are trained militarily to fight for the cause of Islam.

During a series of formal and informal talks with Su'ād al-Fāṭih, a pioneering woman leader of the IMS, and others like Abū Kashhāwā and Zakīyā 'Awād Sātt, it was quite obvious that they all supported fully women's political participation. However, they did not deny that preference should be given first to the family and then to work outside. It was emphasized further and elaborated upon by al-Mahdī, during an interview,⁷⁰ that women should contribute to society and in the field of their own interests—but not at the cost of the family, especially of small children who require proper attention.

It is clear from the above discussion that there is a similarity of opinion between traditional and moderate revivalists on the precedence of family over outside work. Sudan's moderate revivalists differ from the traditional and moderate revivalists of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh in their full encouragement of women for political participation and in their practical integration of women in politics and even jihad. Hence, these moderate revivalists are better categorized as hard-core moderate revivalists.

There are some more moderate revivalists moving from moderate to hard-core moderate revivalists, such as the Tunisian Islamic Movement's Rāshid al-Ghanūshī.⁷¹ In his analysis of the Movement's position on women

in the past, he pointed out that it was defensive and reactive. He asserted that a moderate departure from the earliest stance was already in progress in the Islamic Movement. Hence, the number of women has increased. Several steps have been taken to make it possible for women to enter leadership ranks and to ensure their membership in parliament. Women moderate revivalists are taking an active part in contemporary politics, and many have been imprisoned.⁷² They can be characterized as soft-core moderate revivalists.

Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) comprises both the traditional and the moderate revivalist trends. According to a recent statement, it has guaranteed equal status to men and women and has taken measures to include women in its decision-making council.⁷³ These initiatives also characterize Jordan's Islamic Action Front. Although there were twelve women among its founding members, only recently one woman was included in its decision-making council.⁷⁴ According to Iṣḥāq Farhān,⁷⁵ its secretary general, the movement accepts the political participation of women and realizes that it still has to go a long way toward implementing it.

Similar conditions prevail in the Islamic movements of other Muslim and non-Muslim countries. Quite recently, many steps have been taken by revivalists to create consciousness and mobilize Muslim women for more political participation. Thus, it can be concluded from the above discussion that there is a diversity of opinion among revivalists on the general political participation of women. A general move from the traditional to the moderate stance is now visible among revivalists.

Leadership of the State and *Imāmah*

The subject of women's leadership is controversial. All classical Muslim jurists, while discussing the qualification of the imam along with other factors, emphasized that the imam should be able to perform *ijtihād* and strong enough to wage *jihad*. Even a cursory reading of classical juridical texts shows that what they meant by *imam* is not a political head of a modern nation-state, but rather the all-embracing leader of the Muslim *ummah*. He combines the function of *khalīfah* (being the highest authority in all social, political, and economic affairs) and imam of the congregational prayers. This is obvious from al-Māwārdī's⁷⁶ identification of seven necessary qualifications that include, more particularly, the abilities of *ijtihād* and *jihad*. Similarly, Ibn Khaldūn's⁷⁷ specification of five important qualifications for *imāmah* (leadership) and his particular reference to the *imāmah* of the congregational prayers also shows that he viewed the imam as the highest leader of the Muslim *ummah*. Hence, if *imāmah* is perceived from the global perspective of a leader of the entire Muslim world, all revivalists, ranging from traditional to radical, do not consider women eligible for this office.

Mawdudī's discussion of the Islamic state shows clearly that the state envisaged by him was not the Muslim state of contemporary times. His

envisaged state was modeled on the spirit of the Prophet's four immediate political successors (*al-khulafā' al-rāshidūn*), but in context with the time and place, as is clear from his discussion of the legislature, executive, and judiciary.⁷⁸ Such a state would not include, in the earlier stage, the whole *ummah*, since it is first established in one geographical location as a model for the world. However, it would be universal in its scope in the long term, as it would have been created so that the universal Muslim community could serve as a witness to the truth.⁷⁹ Obviously, it might be for this reason that the qualifications attributed by Mawdudi to the leadership of the state resemble those of the office of the imam or *khalīfah* of the Muslim *ummah*. It included, among other elements, that the head should be a man, in accordance with the Qur'anic verse that "men are in charge of women" (4:34).⁸⁰

For some Muslim scholars, the leadership of women by men on the basis of the above verse is confined to the family and therefore cannot be extended to the political field. But revivalists, for several reasons, do not prefer women for the leadership role. Badawi observed:

According to Islam, the headship of the state is no mere figurehead. He leads people in the prayers, especially on Fridays and festivals, he is continuously engaged in the process of decision-making pertaining to the security and well-being of his people. This demanding position, or any similar one, such as the commander of the army, is generally inconsistent with the physiological and psychological makeup of women in general.⁸¹

Even al-Turābī did not assign the *khalīfah* to a woman. Bashīr elaborated the views of al-Turābī as

an enlarged social role for the Muslim women, including her right to participate in the political process by nominating and electioneering on behalf of a candidate seeking even the highest Muslim office of *khalīfah*. Her right to consultation in political matters, as well as her right to stand for any public office (except the office of *khalīfah*) is emphatically asserted and defended.⁸²

Thus, for al-Turābī, a woman can hold any high position except that of *khalīfah*. However, Muḥammad al-Ghazzālī, a famous Egyptian scholar, argued in one of his recent works that, even according to some authentic juristic interpretations of Islamic law, women can be accorded important positions: judges, ambassadors, cabinet ministers, and rulers.⁸³ According to a recent fatwa of Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, another Egyptian scholar, women can be allowed to hold high offices in parliament, serve as judges, and issue fatwas. However, he makes it emphatically clear that women, while holding such high public offices, should not forsake their family role.⁸⁴

All of this reveals that all revivalists have more or less the same opinion on *imāmah*.

Gender Feminist and Revivalist Views on Women's Political Participation

First, the gender feminists' approach to the issue of women is confrontational and conflict based. They categorize "men" and "women" as two opposite classes that are antagonistic to each other. Therefore, all institutions, from family to state, including heterosexuality, marriage, motherhood, and so on are considered patriarchal and political.

Contrary to this, the Islamic revivalists' approach seems to be holistic and comprehensive. They do not place men and women in opposite classes, but rather consider them as different sexes that complement each other as God's creation. For this reason, they do not view men and women as being in conflict with each other for their individual rights. All institutions, from family to state, are conceived as responsible social and political institutions wherein both men and women perform different roles based on their abilities and merit as vicegerents of God.

Second, gender feminists, due to their conflict-based approach, assume that there is a conflict between two institutions: family and state. Such a perspective is, to a great extent, generated from Western political thought. To overcome this conflict, Western political thinkers pushed women inside the family, whereas gender feminists pulled them out of the family and into the state. To achieve this goal, they follow Machiavelli's doctrine that "the ends justify the means." Homosexuality, lesbianism, transsexuality, and all other forms of nonmarital sex and families are justified and legitimized for the ultimate goal of women's political participation.

Revivalists do not consider that family⁸⁵ and state are in conflict with each other. They look at the family as a basic unit not only for the state but also for civilization. The family role of women is neither trivialized nor totally abandoned, but duly respected and acknowledged. Hence, a woman's family role is not sacrificed to her political role or vice versa. All forms of pre- and extramarital sex are forbidden, and proper and legal sexual relationships between husband and wife are accepted and considered as *'ibādah* (an act of worship). Marriage is regarded as a sign of God for the union of husband and wife to dwell in tranquility.⁸⁶ Motherhood is looked upon as a blessing of God.⁸⁷

The right of women's political participation is acknowledged and supported. However, political participation is not considered an independent and isolated issue, one cut off from the rest of a woman's and a society's life. The political participation of women and men is a part of the whole range of life's activities and involvement. Political participation is not an end in itself, but a means to a higher end, namely, the establishment of peace and justice on earth by both men and women as the vicegerents of God, which should be achieved by noble means. Hence, a woman's family role and her political participation are duly respected. One role is not crucified for the sake of another, but the roles are prioritized: family first and

political participation second. This implies that the family role and political participation are the legitimate and ethical means for the legitimate and ethical goal. Women's political participation and their family roles are seen by revivalists as essential parts of the whole of life,⁸⁸ not as functions independent from the rest and as the purpose and end of life. Based on this holistic approach to women, they maintain an ethical relationship between means and ends.

Third, the gender feminists' conception of all institutions and structures as patriarchal shows their pessimism. Since Western political philosophers presented patriarchal structures of both family and state in their theoretical models and reflected them in practical life, this group has assumed an attitude that is too pessimistic. Therefore, they look at man as selfish, egoistic, unreliable, and as one who only aspires to absolute domination. Based on this pessimism, they not only consider heterosexuality, marriage, and motherhood as results of a dominant patriarchal culture, but even consider biological differences between men and women as patriarchal assertions against natural facts.

They declare that "biology is not destiny" and ask women to fight "nature" to overcome biological differences (if any). The emphasis of gender feminists on fighting "nature" can be traced back to the development of Western epistemological philosophies, particularly since the sixteenth century. Throughout its development, from rationalism, empiricism, scientism, and positivism to pragmatism, its important purpose remained the conquest of nature so that man could make himself independent of it and, eventually, its sovereign.⁸⁹

It is obvious that, like any other Western theory, the fundamental problem of gender feminist theory is methodological and epistemological in nature. The issue of women is approached through "reason" and "sense perception." The ultimate object of attaining knowledge is to overcome different problems through overcoming nature and, thereby, becoming independent from God. But the problem of gender feminists is much more difficult and complex. They reject all observations of social and natural scientists that are based on this methodology, if they present gender differences between men and women, claiming that it is all a conspiracy of the patriarchalists.⁹⁰

For this reason, they have developed their own epistemology on the basis of which they have formulated a new set of relationships between sex and power. It seems that they have applied Foucault's critique of power for their own ends.⁹¹ Looking into his account of the disciplinary practices that produce "docile bodies" and his explanation of the relationship of the human body with power, gender feminists demand complete rights over their bodies. Their demand for reproductive rights in order to legalize abortion is a good example of seeking to empower their bodies for all forms of nonmarital sex.

Contrary to them, revivalists are neither too pessimistic nor too optimistic, but rather moderate in their conception of man and the relationship

between man and woman. Although they accept male leadership of the family and the state, they are totally against male domination in both fields. They make a clear differentiation between male leadership and male domination (patriarchy). Although some have labeled male leadership of the family as patriarchal,⁹² their elaboration of male leadership goes entirely against the patriarchal family.

Leaving aside the terminological confusion for certain reasons, it is more essential to emphasize how their explication of the family structure goes against patriarchy. All revivalists assert that male leadership does not necessarily mean male autocracy or despotism in the family. They argue that leadership entails responsibility and governing the governed, which demands taking care of the governed and discharging functions with benevolence and not with domination and oppression. All of this goes against the patriarchal family, which entails absolute male domination and women's subjugation.⁹³

Such revivalist views are completely in line with Islamic epistemology and methodology. They approach the issue of woman as any other issue: through revelation, reason, and sense perceptions. Furthermore, their aim at attaining knowledge to solve the issue of woman is not to make man independent from nature and God, but rather to make him subservient to God and to work more efficiently as a friend of nature and vicegerent of God, not as enemies of both.⁹⁴

Fourth, gender feminists are deconstructionists, as are other post-modern deconstructionist feminists: Derrida,⁹⁵ Cixous,⁹⁶ Irigary,⁹⁷ and Kristeva.⁹⁸ They emphasize the necessity of deconstructing gender, family and society, the state, the world, nature, and God and reconstructing all of these based on their own perspective. They argue that all of these institutions (the world and even God and religion) are structured on the views of men and for men's domination of women.⁹⁹ Hence, equal political participation is necessary, for through equal political participation women can gradually overthrow men and establish a dictatorship of women, which would be a transitory period of settlement giving rise to a sexless and classless society.

This implies the deconstruction of all previously existing structures and institutions and the establishment of new institutions having no gender differentiation. As the basic obstacles to women's political participation, dictatorship, and a sexless and classless society are gender differentiation and the family, they assert that gender differentiation and marriage-regulated family are not biological relations but rather socially constructed images that should be demolished. Instead, sexual promiscuity and a free-sex culture should be promoted in order to deconstruct gender and family and ascertain women's political participation.

Revivalists, unlike gender feminists, argue that the deconstruction of gender differentiation and the family would lead humanity to the brink of an abyss from which it would be hard to rescue.¹⁰⁰ Hence, women's identity and their basic family role are vital for the development of human civi-

lization. Revivalists assert strongly that women should be encouraged to participate politically but that they should not forsake their family role or identity for it.

The problem is that although revivalists support women's political participation and emphasize that women should not neglect their family roles, they do not suggest any mechanism for it.¹⁰¹ The political participation of women along with the performance of their family role is a challenge for women, for it will give rise to their double workload problem,¹⁰² as mentioned by most feminists. The problem cannot be ignored, even though the different strategies identified by feminists over time (i.e., socialization of housework and child-care,¹⁰³ the demand of wages for housework from the state,¹⁰⁴ assimilation and counterassimilation of men and women into the family and outside work with two part-time salaries,¹⁰⁵ and gender and family deconstruction¹⁰⁶) may not be acceptable to revivalists. Furthermore, confining women within the family with no political participation, as suggested by Western political theorists, is not an appropriate solution for revivalists. However, the latter have yet to provide any concrete strategy or general framework to overcome the practical problem of women's performance of their family roles along with their political participation from an Islamic perspective.

Conclusion

The above analysis of gender feminists and Islamic revivalists suggests that the former want a few rightful and more unrightful rights at the expense of the identity of womanhood, whereas the latter seek to achieve the already granted rights of women through the maintenance of their identity as women. Gender feminists create an atmosphere of conflict between men and women and also between the institutions of family and state. Revivalists, on the other hand, bring men and women together for mutual trust and cooperation with each other in order to avoid the crisis and conflict between them and the family and state. They look at men and women as copartners in constructing Islamic civilization.

Endnotes

1. Jane Rendall, *The Origins of Modern Feminism: Women in Britain, France, and the United States 1780-1860* (London: 1990).

2. Mary Wollstonecraft, *A Vindication of the Rights of Women* (London: Everyman, 1929).

3. Harriet Taylor, "Enfranchisement of Women," in *The Subjection of Women and the Enfranchisement of Women*, ed. Kate Soper (London: Virago, 1983).

4. J. S. Mill, *The Subjection of Women* (London: Virago, 1983); see also T. S. Mill, *Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1910).

5. Rosemarie Tong, *Feminist Thought: A Comprehensive Introduction* (London: Westview Press, 1992).

6. Elizabeth Cady Stanton and S. B. Anthony, *Correspondence, Writings, Speeches*, ed. E. C. Dubois (New York: Schocken, 1981).

7. Charlott Perkins Gilman, *Women and Economics* (London: Putnam and Boston: Small, Maynard, 1906); see also Gilman, *Human Work* (New York: McClare Philips, 1904); Gilman, *The Man-Made World* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1911).

8. Margarette Bentson, "The Political Economy of Women's Liberation," *Monthly Review* 21, no. 4 (1969).

9. For the Western analysis of feminist schools, see Valarie Bryson, *Feminist Political Theory: An Introduction* (London: The Macmillan Press, 1992). For an Islamic analysis of feminist schools, see Zeenath Kausar, *Women in Feminism and Politics: New Directions towards Islamization* (Petaling Jaya, Malaysia: STAD, IIU Malaysia, 1995).

10. Inferior and subjugated images of women are presented by all Western political philosophers starting from Plato and Aristotle. For a critical analysis from an Islamic perspective, see Zeenath Kausar, *Women in Feminism*; for Hobbes's political thought and views of women, see Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. John Plamenatz (London: Fontana, 1962); see also Hobbes, *Elements of Law*, ed. F. Tonnie (London: Frank Lass, 1969).

11. John Locke, *Two Treatises on Government*, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1960); also see Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. A. C. Fraser (New York: Dover, 1959).

12. J. J. Rousseau, *Emile*, trans. Allan Bloom (New York); see another translation of *Emile* by Barbara Foxley (London: Everyman, 1911).

13. G. F. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Rights*, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1967).

14. Karl Marx, *Capital*, trans. S. Moore and E. Aveling (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1954).

15. F. Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1972).

16. F. Engels, "The Condition of the Working Class in England," in K. Marx and F. Engels, *Collected Works* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1976); see also K. Marx and F. Engels, "The German Ideology," in *The Marx-Engels Reader* (New York: 1978).

17. Dianna Coole, *Women in Political Theory: From Ancient Misogyny to Contemporary Feminism* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1993).

18. For a critical analysis of gender feminism, see Dale O'Leary, "Gender: The Deconstruction of Women—Analysis of the Gender Perspective," written in preparation for the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, China, September 1995.

19. See Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1990).

20. *Ibid.*, 6-12.

21. For nineteenth- and twentieth-century Marxist feminist thought, see Tong, *Feminist Thought*, 39-70.

22. Christina Hoff Sommers, *Who Stole Feminism?* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994).

23. *Ibid.*, 258.

24. Adrienne Rich, "Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence," in *Blood Bread and Poetry*, 27. For further details, see O'Leary, "Gender," 1-6.

25. Sexual orientation is explained by gender feminists as follows: No discrimination should be made on the basis of acceptance of all forms of sexuality including homosexuality, lesbianism, bisexuality, and transsexuality. In addition, transvestites are equivalent to heterosexuals. Many terms like this, as explained above, are used and defined in different ways by transsexuals in their articles, which they circulated during the Preparation Committee Meetings for Beijing. Gender-perspective articles on every issue are available from such nongovernmental organizations as the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission and the Women's Environment and Development Organization.

26. Shulamith Firestone, *The Dialectic of Sex* (New York: Bantam Books, 1970), 10.

27. Heidi Hartman, "The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism," in *Women and Revolution* (Boston: 1981), 13.

28. *Ibid.*, 5-19.

29. Ann Ferguson and Nancy Folbre, "The Unhappy Marriage of Patriarchy and Capitalism," in *Women and Revolution*, 80; see also O'Leary, *Gender: Deconstruction*, 10-11.

30. Alison Jaggar, "Political Philosophies of Women's Liberation," in *Feminism and Philosophy* (Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams and Co., 1977), 13.

31. *Ibid.*, 14.

32. Sommers, *Who Stole Feminism?*, 257.

33. Susan Moller Okin, "Change the Family, Change the World," *Reader* (March/April 1990): 75; see also Okin, "Women and the Making of the Sentimental Family," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 11, no. 1 (Winter 1982); Okin, *Women in Western Political Thought* (London: Virago, 1980).

34. Mim Kelber, ed., *Women and Government: New Ways to Political Power* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994). It is important to note here that Kelber edited this book and Bella Abzug wrote an introduction. Kelber and Abzug are both leaders of gender feminism within the United Nations.

35. Kelber, *Women and Government*, 33.

36. O'Leary, "Gender," 24.

37. Kebler, *Women and Government*, 217.

38. See Elizabeth Schussler Florenza, *In Memory of Her* (New York: Crossroad, 1987).

39. O'Leary, "Gender," 26.

40. The Council of Europe organized a conference for Beijing Preparation in which many prime ministers and presidents of various European countries participated. The quote is taken from a report of the conference entitled "Equality and Democracy: Utopia or Challenge," (Straubourg: Palaise de l'Europe [9-11 February 1995]): 38.

41. *Ibid.*, 38.

42. One of the speeches of Bella Abzug, during a Beijing Preparation Meeting, on 3 April 1995. These lines are quoted by O'Leary in "Gender," 5.

43. Wendy Bounds, "Dating Game Today Breaks Traditional Gender Roles," *Wall Street Journal* (25 April 1995). Quoted in O'Leary, "Gender," 27.

44. It is quite obvious in various lobbying documents prepared by such feminists in their nongovernmental organizations. See Sommer, *Who Stole Feminism?*, to study the misuse of the due demands of equity feminists by gender feminists for freedom of all forms of sexuality.

45. The term *revivalists* is used in this paper, in a general sense, to refer to all Muslim scholars, leaders, and workers of Islamic revival movements in the Indian subcontinent and the rest of the Muslim world. The Islamic Revival Movements include the Jama'at-e-Islami Hind, Jama'at-e-Islami Pakistan, Jama'at-e-Islami Bangladesh, the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, and all Islamic revival movements working for the same objectives as the Muslim Brotherhood under different names in Sudan, Jordan, Algeria, Tunisia, and elsewhere.

46. *Imamah* is used here for the highest executive office of the leader of the Islamic world, which includes the office of *khatifah* for sociopolitical affairs and the office of the imam for congregational prayers.

47. The term *traditional revivalists* is used in this paper to refer to Muslim scholars and leaders who give very narrow and limited interpretations of the Qur'an and Sunnah. However, while such scholars are common outside the various revivalist movements, they are very few within these movements.

48. See Abdul Hamid's series of articles entitled "Political Rights of Women in Islam," in a monthly official journal of the Jama'at-e-Islami Hind, *Ziondgi-e-Nau* (New Delhi), which is translated by Anzar Ahmed Qasmi in Urdu: September 1992: 35-50; October 1992: 45-56; (November 1992: 41-54; December 1992: 45-50.

49. *Ibid.*, September 1992: 35-50 and October 1992: 45-56.

50. *Ibid.*, December 1992: 45-50.

51. Moderate revivalists are Muslim scholars who are involved in the Islamic revivalist movement and have a moderate approach toward the issue of women. In general, they accept the general political participation of women, equal education, and women's need for a dynamic role. Further categorization is made among them on the basis of their attitude

toward the "segregation" of men and women, their practical integration of women in decision-making bodies (*shūrā*) at different levels, and also in politics, including jihad etc.

52. Syed Jalaluddin Ansar Umri has been a member of the central *shūrā* of the Jama'at-e-Islami Hind for a long time and is currently its vice-president. He has many books to his credit on different issues. Some of his works on women include *Rights of Muslim Women: A Rejoinder*, *Women in Islamic Society*, and *Women and Islam*. All were published by the well-known research institution based in Aligarh, Idarta-e-Tahqeeq-o-Tasnees-e-Islami, India.

53. See Umri, *Women and Islam*, trans. Zeenath Kausar (Aligarh: Idarta-e-Tahqeeq-o-Tasnees-e-Islami, 1990).

54. There have been separate women and girls circles in the Jama'at from its inception. In these circles, a significant portion of Muslim women are well-educated and skilled in various professions. They have their own women leaders at every local and state level who coordinate the works of all of the women's circles.

55. Mawdudi needs no formal introduction. His establishment of the Jama'at as an Islamic movement, his scholarly writings on different issues and problems of the Muslim world, and his contribution to the contemporary Islamic resurgence are accepted and acknowledged by all Muslim and non-Muslim scholars. Here, it is important to point out that he had a serious interest in conscientizing and mobilizing Muslim women from the very beginning of the movement's formation. At a time when most scholars elsewhere in the Muslim world were still busy with the question of whether Muslim women should be given the right of education and public participation, Mawdudi was writing special pamphlets and booklets to encourage women to work for Islam while observing *hijāb*.

56. Mawdudi, *Purdah* (Lahore: 1982).

57. Mawdudi, *On Education*, trans. S. M. A. Rauf (Karachi: 1988), 125.

58. Mawdudi, *Tafhimaat*, art 3 (Delhi: Markazi Maktab-e-Islami, 1989), 20-33.

59. SIMI, formed in April 1977, has the same aims and objectives as the Jama'at. It is the movement of young students up to 30 years of age. There is no rigid segregation. On certain occasions, such as demonstrations, protests, and rallies, its female members join with their male counterparts and participate fully.

60. See Thameem Ushama, *Hasan al-Bannah: Vision and Mission* (Kuala Lumpur: A. S. Noordeen, 1995).

61. Zaynab al-Ghazzālī, an activist and member of Muslim Sisterhood of Egypt, is known for her great rhetorical power and leadership qualities. She was greatly devoted to the revival of Islam. She was imprisoned and tortured for six years. The inhuman punishments to which she was subjected in prison are a testimony of her spiritual strength and an example for Muslim men and women.

62. Ḥasan al-Turābī is behind the present military regime of Sudan and is leading the process of Islamization of the Sudanese government and state.

63. Su'ād al-Fātiḥ, a pioneer of the Islamic Movement of Sudan, especially for women, is currently a professor of Arabic. She has been secretary of the Islamic Women's Front and a member of many other organizations. She is also one of the founding members of the Girls' College of Education in Riyadh.

64. See Najib Ghadbian, "Islamists and Women in the Arab World: From Reaction to Reform," *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* 12, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 30-32.

65. *Ibid.*, 31.

66. Sumayyah Abū Kashhāwā is a Sudanese scholar and activist. I held informal talks with her about the work of the Women's Union. She manifested her profound understanding of both Islam and the West on the issue of women and their solutions.

67. Viṣāl al-Mahdī is another Sudanese activist who is loved and respected by all women. I recorded a videotaped interview with her about the issues of Islamic movements and women.

68. I recorded a videotaped interview with Ḥasan al-Turābī during my visit to Sudan in 1994. I participated in an International Conference on Women, organized by the International Organization of Muslim Women. The interview with Ḥasan al-Turābī has not been published yet.

69. Zakariyā Bashīr has authored many books, among them *Muslim Women in the Midst of Change* (Leicester, UK: The Islamic Foundation, 1980). I interviewed him on Islamic movement in Sudan and women's role in the movement. The interview is recorded but not yet published.

70. I interviewed Visāl al-Mahdī about women's role in the Islamic movements. The interview is recorded but not yet published.

71. For Rāshid al-Ghanūshī's ideas and the leadership, see Francois Burgat and William Dowell, *The Islamic Movement in North Africa* (Auston: 1983).

72. Ghabdian, *Islamists and Women in the Arab World*, 27, 30.

73. *Ibid.*, 29-30.

74. *Ibid.*

75. Iṣḥāq Aḥmad Farḥān is currently secretary of the Islamic Action Front, president of Zarka Private University, member of the Board of Trustees of the International Institute of Islamic Thought (Herndon, VA, USA), minister of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs of Jordan (1970-73), and former senator of the Jordanian parliament (1980-93).

76. See al-Māwārdī, *al Aḥkām al Sulṭānīyah*, trans. Sajidur Rahman Siddiqi (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1990).

77. See Ibn Khaldūn, *Muqaddimah*, trans. Raghīb Rahmani (New Delhi: Ittiqad Publishing House, 1987).

78. See Mawdudi, *Islamic Law and Constitution* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1985).

79. To understand the arguments of Mawdudi on the necessity of establishing the Islamic political system to witness the truth to humanity, see his book (recently edited by Khurram Murad), *Witness unto Mankind* (Leicester, UK: The Islamic Foundation, 1990).

80. Mawdudi, *Islamic Law and Constitution*, 243.

81. Jamal Badawi, "Women in Islam," in *Islam: Its Meaning and Message*, ed. Khurshid Ahmad (London: Islamic Council of Europe, 1975), 142-43.

82. Zakariyā Bashīr, *Muslim Women in the Midst of Change* (Leicester, UK: The Islamic Foundation, 1980), 13.

83. Ghabdian, *Islamists and Women*, 28.

84. *Ibid.*

85. See Khurshid Ahmed, *Family Life in Islam* (Leicester, UK: The Islamic Foundation, 1981).

86. See Umri, *Woman and Islam*, 25-32.

87. *Ibid.*, 19-24.

88. For women's political participation in Islam, see Zeenath Kausar, "Towards Equality, Development and Peace: Political Participation of Women in Islam and UN Platform of Action," paper presented at a workshop on Women, Shari'ah, and Development: Towards the 4th UN World Conference on Women, Beijing, jointly organized by the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM), IKD and IIIT, Malaysia on 17 August 1995.

89. See Mohammad Mumtaz Ali, *Islam and the Western Philosophy of Knowledge* (Petaling Jaya, Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications, 1994).

90. See O'Leary, "Gender," 12-13.

91. See Michel Foucault, *Power-Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings—1972-1977*, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980). For a critical analysis of Foucault, see Sandra Lee Bartky, *Femininity and Domination* (New York: Routledge, 1990).

92. Lamyā' al-Fārūqī in her book *Women, Muslim Society and Islam* (USA: Muslim Students Association, 1988), described the Islamic family and society as patriarchal (p. 43). However, her description of the male leadership of the family and state go against male-domination as is evidenced particularly on page 44, where she discusses the term *qawwama*. Similarly, I labeled the Islamic family and society as patriarchal in my book *Women in Feminism and Politics* (p. 63). However, after further research on patriarchy I found that to call the Islamic family and society patriarchal is misleading. Patriarchy is not mere male leadership but male domination and female subjugation. See Filmer's *Patriarchia* (1680) and the Western political thinkers' arguments and explanations of patriarchy. All of this goes directly against the very spirit of Islam. Henceforth, I do not see patriarchy as an acceptable

descriptor for the Islamic family and society. I will make the necessary changes in the book in its second edition.

93. See Hammudah Abd al-Ati, *The Family Structure in Islam* (Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1977), 168-82.

94. See Ali, *Islam*.

95. Jacques Derrida, *The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: 1987).

96. See Helene Cixous, "Castration or Decapitation?," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 7, no. 1 (1981): 41-55.

97. See Luce Irigaray, "And the One Doesn't Stir without the Other," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 7, no. 1 (1981): 60-67.

98. See Julia Kristeva, *Desire in Language*, trans. Leon Rowdiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), and also see her *Power of Horrors*, trans. Leon Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).

99. Although postmodern feminists have some differences within their circle, they have a common stance on the illumination of the internal contradictions in systems of thought for the reinterpretation of traditional theory, like deconstructions.

100. See Umri, *Women and Islam*, 10-18.

101. Whatever practical steps have been taken by revivalists in general on this issue are confined to the opening of some educational centers and unions for women, whereas concerted steps are required to integrate women into public life along with making allowances for them for their family role.

102. To understand the problem of double workload, see Zeenath Kausar, *Women in Feminism*, 62-63.

103. See August Babel, *Women under Socialism-1878* (New York: Schocken Books, 1971).

104. See Dalla Costa and Selma James, *The Power of Women and the Subversion of Community* (Bristol: Falling Wall Press, 1973).

105. See Betty Friedan, *The Second Stage* (London: Michael Joseph, 1981).

106. See Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: 1990).