

## THE ECONOMIC—TECHNICAL SYSTEM AND THE TRADE UNIONS' DILEMMA

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This paper deals with the problem of democracy in enterprises, or more precisely, the process of achieving workers' self-management and self-government through democratic multilevel processes in work life in mature capitalist societies. We will pay attention to the concept of workers' *interests* within a power structure, and their interpretation of this *problem-situation*. The workers' situation within the enterprise is a source of *dilemma*, which has importance with respect to the question of transition to self-management. We will discuss this with reference to an historical example from Norway.

### 1. *The capitalist firm as an economical-technical power structure and the concept of workers' interests*

The capitalist firm as a production unit can be described as an economic-technical system. In terms of political economy<sup>1)</sup>, this system is the unity of the labour process and capital accumulation. Labour is subordinated to the production of surplus value. The function of trade unions in this frame of analysis is connected to the concept of labour power as a commodity. In the labour market, workers are forced into competition with each other *vis à vis* the capitalists. Organization grows out of the necessity to secure employment and the market conditions of labour power.

With the workers' immediate experience of the work situation as the point of reference, the economic-technical imperatives, profitability and technical rationality appear as *inexorable, insatiable* and *one-sided*. The system tends to threaten human qualities like the need of *confiden-*

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1) With reference to K. Marx' analysis in *The Capital*.

ce, limitation in the face of pressures and *many-sidedness*.<sup>2)</sup> Conflict of interests is exposed in the immediate work situation, and the workers develop solidarity and collective attitudes as a system of defence.

In this way, the worker is a member of the enterprise as an economic-technical system. This system constitutes a power structure based on the interests of capital owners and management. The establishment of workers' participation and control implies the assertion of workers' interests through changing the power structure.<sup>3)</sup>

In this connection, we will point out an analytical distinction between three types of interests. The workers, as members of the economic-technical system, are necessarily agents of these interests.<sup>4)</sup> The point is that in concrete situations these interests can appear contradictory.

i) At first it is of fundamental importance to have employment. The worker has an immediate interest in maintaining his own workshop. As a class, the workers have an interest in maintaining employment. At the same time, this interest maintains the institution of wage labour as such. Reproduction of capital depends on the "existence" of a working class. Hence, one might denote this type of interest as *conformity interest*.

ii) Secondly, the working class has an interest in reforms which improve working conditions in the enterprise and living conditions in the society. The struggle for shorter working hours, improved work environment and higher wages is the traditional domain of this sort of interest articulation. This *reform interest* is concerned with changes within basic structures at enterprise level and society level.

iii) Thirdly, the working class has a *transitional interest* based on the development of many-sided human needs and social security in the long run.

This interest implies the transformation of fundamental production relations in a capitalist society.<sup>5)</sup>

Furthermore, the concept of the trade unions' double position<sup>6)</sup> is significant to the distinction between these interests. On the one hand,

<sup>2)</sup> Sverre Lysgaard, *Arbeiderkollektivet* (Workers Collective), Oslo 1972.

<sup>3)</sup> Different kinds of arrangements have been introduced in Western capitalist societies under the label of industrial democracy. This has been a process of institutionalization of workers' participation at different levels of organization without basically changing the power structure.

<sup>4)</sup> The following concepts are introduced, but not theoretically worked out, by Ragnvald Kalleberg in:

*En sammenliknende drøfting av en systemteoretisk og en politisk-økonomisk foretaksmodell*. (A comparative analysis of a theoretical system and a political-economical model of enterprises).  
Institute of Sociology, Oslo 1978.

<sup>5)</sup> The discussion of transitional interest raises the question of fundamental problems of socialism and the transitional period between capitalism and socialism. This is too broad a question to go into further detail in this article. We will, however, make some comment later on.

workers claim interests as wage earners (conform and reform interests). The trade union contributes to the maintenance of wage labour as an institution. Integration in the capitalist system and the capitalist state will come up as a problem. On the other hand, the union organization represents permanent opposition to capital. This opposition comes into conflict with capitalism itself (transitional interest).

Thus, the double position of trade unions represents a dilemma in current union activities. Interests of different character and at different levels might turn into contradictions.

In this connection, it is also necessary to deal with the categories of *subjective interests* as different recognitions or ideologies, and *objective interests* as a change towards an equalization of structurally given positions (on essential socio-economic variables). These categories should be interpreted as to the relation between subjective and objective dialectics as part of the processes of knowledge in the labour movement.<sup>7)</sup> We cannot, however, deal with this complicated question in this short presentation.

The distinction between the three types of interest has to be seen as an analytical distinction. Making the concepts more concrete, it might be difficult to strictly keep the distinction. It is, however, important to see this concept of interest as a point of departure in discussing the transition to workers' self-management and the mentioned dilemma of unions. Before going further into this question, we will introduce some main aspects with regard to *institutionalization and regulation* in Norwegian work life since the Second World War. This development has also been signified as a process of democratization of work life.

## 2. An historical example.<sup>8)</sup>

After the end of World War II, the Norwegian labour movement had a very strong position within the formation of society:

— Both the labour parties (the social democrats, DNA, and the communists, NKP) and the trade unions increased their membership substantially.

<sup>6)</sup> Throughout the history of Marxism and socialist theory, different aspects of the trade unions' double position has been emphasized. For this discussion, see:

Richard Hyman, *Marxism and the Sociology of Trade Unionism*. London 1971.

Moreover; Autorenkollektiv, *Thesen zur Gewerkschaftsanalyse*. PROKLA, nr. 2 1972. (In Danish, KURASJE, nr. 11 1975).

Perry Anderson, *The Limits and Possibilities of Trade Union Action*. In: Tom Clarke and Laurie Clements, *Trade Unions under Capitalism*. Glasgow 1977.

Given the trade unions' double position, the degree of unionization and the level of local activity is discussed with respect to industrial democracy in Norway, in:

Tom Colbjørnsen and Olav Korsnes, *Trade Unions — Resource or Regulation?* ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 1978, vol. 21, nr. 3.

<sup>7)</sup> Georg Klaus, *Moderne Logikk*, Berlin 1965. Reference in: Regi Enerstedt, *Dialektikk og samfunnsvitenskap*. Oslo 1969. s. 40—42.

- In the general election, they gained the majority of the votes, of seats in the parliament, and formed the Government.
- In this way, the Norwegian Labour Party (DNA) found it possible to use governmental regulations as an instrument for their policy. This position was expressed by the direct economic regulations (i. e. restrictions on imports, prices and wages) in the first post-war years (1945—1952), which partly negated the liberal forms of the market powers.
- Ideologically, the labour movement in exile had prepared a radical programme for democratic development of the post war political and economic systems. This concretization of transitional class interests pointed to an integration of the economic sphere into a democratic decision-making and economic-planning structure. The structure was based on Production Committees (PU) at the level of production units, on Industrial Councils (BR) for each branch, and National Coordination Council (DOS) as a sort of plan commission as a parallel structure to Parliament and Government.

The breakthrough of this labour movement ideology, towards hegemony, was so strong that even the bourgeois parties in the parliament (Stortinget) made a compromise on a political joint programme for national unity and development. Together with this strong subjective and objective starting position, as we mentioned above, the situation was chaotic with half-damaged means of production (caused by the war). At the same time, the struggle against the Nazi occupators had brought about a national unity across social class borders. This unity was practised through the political joint programme and parliamentary cooperation; its primary task was the economic revival of the country.

*This rebuilding was, however, also a question of choosing the direction of development.*

The structural position of the Labour Party Government in this situation can be described in terms of contradictions between "national responsibility" to secure (to start) reproduction on an extended scale, and on the other side, the following up of the programme which integrated the economic development of the productive forces and a radical democratic development of the production relations in a socialist direction.

This picture is further complicated by the fact that class interests, which are connected with the rapid development of the productive forces

<sup>1)</sup> Robert Feiring, *Sosialiseringsspørsmålets utvikling i norsk arbeiderbevegelse*. Institute of Sociology, Oslo 1978.

The study deals with the development of the concepts of democracy and socialization in the Norwegian labour movement.

ces (economic growth), can merge with economic development based on capitalism for certain periods.

Using the terms introduced above, the situation can be interpreted as the difficulty to differentiate positively between conformity and transitional interests. Furthermore, it was the question of ability to plan in concrete details the development of the productive forces within the frame of democratic and socialist production relations.

In addition to the ideological and strategical obscurity, the whole situation consisted of confusion which made it impossible to tell whether institutional reforms resulted in democratic transformation or they remained reforms within the existing relations of production.

The situation was further complicated by the manipulations of social-democratic leaders within the Government (the Party) and LO (The Federation of Trade Unions) making agreement on the proposal for Production Committees with The Employers' Confederation (NAF) in December 1945.

During the first years after peace (1945—1952), class contradictions were deepened. Among other things, this conflict was increased by the systematization and integration of preliminary decrees (e. g., Lex Thagaard) into a system of laws in order to make direct regulations of the economy and to connect this with the programme for democratization. This could be done through new organs for planning and management (PU, BR, DØS). Such a connection and political-economic reform could exceed the existing bourgeois democracy characterized by its separation between the political and economic systems.

The political struggle on the direction of development was fought between the bourgeoisie and the working class parties, but the conflict was also transferred into the social-democratic party itself.

The result of these struggles was a political-economic and ideological period of reaction.

In the national economic field, the direct postwar regulations were abolished (1948—1952) in favour of indirect means of regulations (monetary and finance policy). The opening towards a traditional market economy took place in close connection with an integration in the international capitalist system; as a receiving nation of Marshall aid (1948—1952), the affiliation to GATT (1948) and to OEEC (1948) which implied the freelisting of commodities for import by reduction of tariff rates. This was later carried through by affiliation to OECD and EFTA.

Also, membership in NATO (1949) closed the possibilities for other directions of development.

Ideologically, the situation was characterized by anti-communism and cold war policy; among other things, as a result of the events in Czechoslovakia in 1948, the Korean War in 1950—51, and the McCarthyism in the 1950's which shaped a front against all "leftism".

Within Norwegian social democracy this integration caused — and was caused by — the revision of the strategic notion of socialization (1949—1953) from a notion which unified economic growth (development of the productive forces) and democratization (development to

wards socialist relations of production) to a fragmentary set of viewpoints.

Around 1960 the Norwegian Labour Party developed one notion about "industrial democracy" which concerns reforms towards different kinds of participation within the industrial unit, and another notion about "economic democracy" which expressed a wish to develop democratic control of the economy.

These notions give the impression that a well-integrated strategy existed; like a "pincers movement" opposite (the capital with initiatives from "below and within" and from "above and without". However, such a total and integrated strategy did not exist. On the contrary, the ruling social democracy at this point of time both programatically and in practice developed a one-sided notion about economic growth (development of the productive forces) within the frame of an economy which was capitalistic in its nature, but which in its forms was modified by state regulations (interventions). In spite of the reforms, the achievement of industrial democracy is still far in the future. The situation today is still characterized by powerlessness, and economic democracy is in practice reduced to governmental budget policy.

This situation, however, was a result of gradual changes. The first setback came as early as 1945 by the establishing of an agreement between the Federation of Trade Unions (LO) and The Employers Confederation (NAF) concerning Production Committees (PU).

The aim of LO was to establish decision-making committees within the enterprises with a majority of worker representatives. The result of the negotiations was, however, an agreement giving these committees only advisory status, and imposing upon the employers a limited duty to inform. This result was a compromise, and can only be explained by the Governments (the party DNA's) pressure within The Federation of Trade Unions (LO).

The point is that the Government wanted a "voluntary" agreement and would like to avoid regulating these labour relations by law, which could be experienced as a compulsion by employers and cause trouble.

The arrangement on the Branch Councils (BR) 'however' had to be done by legislation in 1947 in spite of the resistance from the employers and the bourgeois parties. This law lacked the direct connection to the PUs, which could have made it possible to establish a micro-macro structure for planning and management. The main problem turned out to be that the law which made possible the direct regulation of industrial branches by workers' representatives and representatives of the public administration, was not utilized.

In 1960-61, the law was revised according to the proposition (the bill) from the right wing party Høyre in 1947, and the BRs became only councils for the exchange of information.

The supreme council for economic coordination, DØS, was abandoned in 1954 on the initiative from the organizations of different capital-owner groups, but with a formal blessing from the ruling social democratic party.

The main task for the PU's was to discuss all the aspects and problems of production. From events which follow, it will be proved that this

meant *one-sided claims for increased productivity and not an increase of workers' influence in the decision-making processes:*

— The recommendation from the "Rationalization Committee of 1945" which was appointed by LO, led to the foundation of the Federations own bureau for rationalization matters.

— In 1947 The Norwegian Employers Confederation (NAF) and LO concluded an agreement on time and motion studies (MTM).

— In 1948, "The Labour Movements Committee for Growth of Productivity" was established (between LO and DNA).

— In 1950, the revision of The Agreement on Production Committees confirmed their task to work for an increase of productivity by cooperation between workers and management.

— In 1951, an initiative was taken from "The Norwegian Office of Marshall Aid" to secure productivity increasing education.

— In 1953 NPI, (The Norwegian Institute for Productivity) was founded on the basis of money from Marshall Aid. This can be looked upon as the Government's (the state apparatus') recognition of its own responsibility in this matter.

— The American TWI programmes (Training Within Industry) were from 1947 for the management and from 1949 for the shop stewards, till far in to the 1960's the base for education of representatives to meet their obligations in their respective organizations and in the PU's and the BR's as cooperational bodies. Programmes existed for cooperation, for management and for production techniques. The aim of this training was to increase efficiency, and the programme of teaching were made possible through the resources of the STI (The Technological Institute of the State).

However, some of these initiatives — from the point of view of The Federation of Trade Unions — can be understood as an attempt to influence the rationalization initiated by the managements.

In this way, one can interpret the "strategy" as a democratization through class cooperation. The institutionalization of cooperation might represent improvement corresponding to workers' *reform* interests. This activity, however, remained a technical and economical rationalization (mainly on capitalist conditions) although the labour part should now participate. One must remember that the preconditions for the peace solution in 1945 was a *parallel* development of both the productive forces *and* the relations of production. This did not happen.

That this evidently was the reality can be seen from the response of workers. The enthusiasm for the established PUs disappeared. When the PUs did not respond to the expectations and visions of "a new kind of democracy", the establishing of PU's culminated and broad activity was displaced by resignation and passivity. In addition, many committees stopped functioning.

We will end this historical example with the assertion that LO and DNA have not exceeded the dilemma between transitional and conformity class interests (by changing the production relations). Instead, Norwegian social-democracy has one-sidedly stimulated increased productivity and economic growth. This development of production forces, however, has to some extent made it possible to attend to workers' reform interests, partly by carrying through social reforms (eg. education sys-

tem, social security funds), partly by trade union activity to increase wages. This development was a result of general capitalist development and social-democratic policy. Only smaller recessions have appeared since the last war.

The quality of work life and work environment was not discussed until the early 1970's.<sup>9)</sup>

In spite of the reforms in the field of industrial democracy from the late 1950's till today, which have increased the workers' rights to be informed and the right to appoint workers' representatives in bodies with deciding authority, we will assert that the situation is principally the same today as was mentioned in the historical example.

### 3. *Interests in conflict*

We will now give some further comments on the concepts of conformity, reform and transitional interests in general and related to the preceding example.

The worker is an employee in the enterprise primarily dependent on survival of the enterprise as an economic-technical system within national and international market competition. Among different management strategies, to survive under these conditions, the permanent increase of work productivity is of crucial importance. The employees have to adjust themselves more-or-less passively to the consequences of economic-technical development (geographical mobility, requalification, unemployment due to technological change and so on. They are dependent on an increase of productivity to improve the conditions of wages and working hours. The increase in productivity often appears as a presupposition even to improve the work environment. In critical situations for the economic-technical system, reform interests may easily be subordinated to the interest of maintaining employment. (This is a current issue in Norway now, as effecting a new work environment law within the context of economic crisis.)

As we have seen in the case of early postwar development in Norway, the problem was more to overcome the repercussions of war and secure basic material needs than the threat of bankruptcy conditional on economic crisis. In this way, the conformity interest may be prominent in different contexts.

Along with the integration of national economy into international capitalist development, class cooperation related to technological change of workers' participation and control. In the actual case, development and increased productivity could replace and confuse the development represented (objectively) conformity and reform workers' interests. The interest in system transformation was kept latent.

<sup>9)</sup> One reservation has to be made.

During the early 1960s, a project was initiated based on the socio-technical approach. A joint committee was set up between LO and NAF, and cooperative experiments were carried out mainly through autonomous work groups. The contents of these projects partly concerned job enrichment and job enlargement philosophy. The later discussion on the quality of work life is partly due to these field studies.

Dilemmas and confusion arise from the fact that the institutionalization of workers' rights and possibilities to claim their conformity interest coincides with management's interest in taking care of capital. It has been a common situation to see directors and shop stewards going together in governmental negotiations about financial support.

Conflict may, however, come up even at this level of interest, when it is appropriate to capital interests to close down factories. (Managing concrete capital does not always coincide with the managing of abstract capital.)

To comment on the transitional interest, this problem concerns the basic conflict between labour and capital. This interest implies the abolition of capitalist-organized production. The transformation must bring about collective ownership, the division of labour between management/planning and manual production has to be phased out and finally market mechanisms have to be subordinated to a planned economy. This has to be the most important precondition of real workers' self-management; "the withering away of the state" and "the withering away of the market" as the dominant regulator of the economy.

The position of market relations and commodity production as the dominating institution in the context of the transition to socialism seems to be the most controversial question among the characteristics mentioned. Within a framework which emphasizes the direct producers' possibilities to exercise control over their products and the social units of production, the workers' power to decide the institutional setting and rules of the game within which enterprises operate, is of critical importance.

It seems evident that:

"a system of self-management operating under market economic rules and conditions tends to result in differential accumulation and uneven development defined in material as well as in social and political terms. At the micro-level, this entails social differentiation and hierarchization within enterprises, e.g., growing income differences. Differential control and development of capabilities in relation to processes of production arise due to the technical division of labour and differential involvement in work and management processes. Unequal resource accumulation and uneven development occur between enterprises and, at the macro-level, between sectors and regions. (...)

*The pressures to adopt more capital-intensive technologies, to increase enterprise size, and to adopt new organizational forms (such as divisionalization) adapted to modern market conditions are not as much a matter of worker choice as "given" by the conditions and development of market processes and institutions.*"<sup>10)</sup>

<sup>10)</sup> Tom Baumgarther and Tom Burns, *Institutional Conflict and Power. The Case of Capital and Financial Institutions in Relation to Self-management*, September 1978. Paper prepared for the First International Conference on Workers' Management, Dubrovnik, October 11-13, 1978. S. 7 and s. 10.

Furthermore, it can be argued more theoretically, with specific reference to Marx, that commodity production is not compatible with self-management institutions. The main point will be the contradiction between commodity production and social planning because of the very nature of commodity production, that is, because of commodity fetishism.

"Social relations of production must be perfectly intelligible, that is, "transparent" or "legible" for self-government to be cumulative, to have a liberating and educating role. Otherwise, the opposite purpose may well be served: progressive mystification of the social relation of production and further ossification of an arbitrary initial set of relations between producers. The increased understanding of a mythical world may only increase Man's ability to manipulate it. A comprehensive world is a precondition for self-government, since only in that case the process of learning is at the same time the process of humanization. The world of commodities, as Marx demonstrated, does not satisfy this precondition".<sup>11)</sup>

In our context now, however, in regard to complete participatory democracy or self-governing socialism (or a situation in which development towards this type of society is not basically repressed), the essential problem is related to the reform interest. As a problem of strategy in the labour movement, it is sufficient to refer to the classical discussion on reformism versus revolutionary reforms.<sup>12)</sup> In the social sciences an essential topic in recent decades has been the integration of the working class into the capitalist system through socio-economic reforms. The main position has been "the end of the ideology thesis" versus different Marxist orientations.<sup>13)</sup> Institutionalization of class conflict is a key problem, and within this scope the process of democracy in work life is of vital importance.

In Section 2 we tried to record in its broad features one period in such a process of institutionalization in Norway. This development has often been referred to as a process of democratization. Another interpre-

<sup>11)</sup> Ranko Bon, *A Note on Commodity Production and Social Planning*. In: R. B., *Notes on Social Planning*, Ljubljana 1977.

<sup>12)</sup> As to the concept of "structural reform" and "counter powers", see for example:

A. Gorz, — *Réforme et Révolution*. Paris 1969.

— *Nykapitalismen og arbeiderklassen*. Oslo 1967.

— *Work and Consumption*. In: P. Anderson/R. Blackburn, *Towards Socialism*, New York 1966.

<sup>13)</sup> For the "end of ideology" tradition, see the works of Daniel Bell, R. Aron and S. M. Lipset.

A brief but distinguished Marxist contribution, chiefly discussing the generation of working class consciousness;

Michael Mann, *Consciousness and Action among the Western Working Class*. London 1977.

Other Marxist contributions, see;

Evelies Mayer, *Theorien zum Funktionwandel der Gewerkschaften*. Frankfurt 1973.

Tom Clarke, *Industrial Democracy: The Institutionalized Suppression of Industrial Conflict?* In: T. Clarke and L. Clements, op. cit.

tation of the phenomenon would understand this as an integration of social conflict through bodies of class cooperation inside and outside the enterprises institutionalized through agreements and legislation.

In the process, dilemmas occurred on the one hand between subjective interests based on the ideological conception of industrial democracy, and the objective workers' interests based on the structural positions of the working class. On the other hand, dilemmas occurred when different aspects of workers' interests, such as conformity, reform and transitional interests, turn into contradictions.

The ideological uncertainty exercised a serious influence on organizational processes, both in connection to and within the labour movement (e.g., the negotiations and agreement on the Production Committees in December 1945 and the congress of the Federation of Trade Unions in 1946). It was difficult at these moments to decide on the necessary means for a clear socialist tendency in political and economical development. Loyalty to the Labour Government and its interpretations of the situation was most important for the majority of workers.

Throughout the 1940's and the 1950's the development in national and international politics was successful as to the government's primary objective: rapid economic growth and improvement of the individual standard of living. The costs for the working class were, however, not frivolous. Still, development up till now has turned out to be sufficient to meet conformity and reform interests, and this narrow interpretation of class interest has maintained legitimacy.

In addition, the turning of ideology towards anti-communism contributed to the transformation of potentially transitional reforms towards further democratization and socialization into immanent system reforms.

To sum up, the development of this period can be seen as intersectorial and multilevel processes in which class interests were difficult to identify. Intended means for the realization of transitional interests were transformed through ideological confusion, political-organizational manipulations and leading macro-economic processes of international capitalist integration.

The main purpose of our discussion is to illustrate critical dilemmas when it comes to the approaching of reform interests. As we presented the concept of reform interest, it might be difficult to maintain the distinction as to the two other concepts of interests. This problem is related to the fact that reforms may, on the one hand, be some sort of "conformity reforms". This does not exclude the possibilities of conflict between labour and capital. The question is, however, whether changes tend to threaten capital interests "in the long term" or "in the last instance". Conflict can be channelled into compromise bargaining, which then perhaps unintentionally reinforces its own precondition, the growth of surplus available for distribution. *In this way, conflict becomes functional*. Trade unions "force" management to increase productivity.<sup>14)</sup> Institutional-

<sup>14)</sup> Torstein Bjaalland, *Etableringen av produktionsdemokratiet 1945—1960*. (The Establishing of production democracy 1945—60). Chapter 6 in: T. B., *Bedriftsdemokratisering*. (Democratizing Enterprises). Institute of Sociology. Oslo 1979.

nalization also tends to isolate each type of conflict from other types. Class conflict in the enterprise is fragmented into separate wage, work environment, personnel policy, etc., disputes.

On the other hand, reforms may be considered as "transitional reforms" taking into account the transitional interest. This type of reform has to fundamentally break with the basic structures of capitalist relations of production.

In this way, the problem of uncovering the strategic consequences of reform activities is both the most difficult and the most important task of the trade unions and labour movement.

The dilemmas which we have pointed out arise from situations in which interests of unequal character turns into conflict. Conformity interests may be contradictory to progressive reforms and conformity and reform interests may repress the consideration of transitional interest. As we have seen in the case of Norwegian production committees the extension of democracy and the linkage of economic and industrial democracy were rigorously subordinated to the increase in productivity.

Baumgartner and Burns point out in their approach to the analysis of self-management that "a major task for societal analysis is to identify the conflicts and contradictions occurring or likely to occur in particular institutional arrangements and to specify and analyze the dilemmas these present".<sup>15)</sup>

On the basis of this analysis concepts and strategies have to be worked out to contribute to desirable societal development.

In the field of industrial democracy, we suggest the necessity to differentiate the concept of workers' and working class interest. The point of our discussion in this paper has been to stress that a certain dilemma comes about when arrangements of worker representation are introduced into the decision-making processes within the capitalist firm. This dilemma represents the tension between conformity and transformation.

As we have defined the conformity interest of workers, this interest is directly related to the connection between *internal organization* of the firm and the *institutional setting* in which it operates. Thus, it seems likely that the possibilities of resolving the dilemma and bringing about the transformation of production relations at firm level depend intrinsically on the linkage of organizational changes at microlevel and institutional changes at macrolevel. The question of maintaining employment, e.g., to secure survival of the concrete production unit in the context of the individual worker, or unemployment due to technological changes as a problem occurring in the context of the local enterprise, has to be dealt with through the linkage of micro and macro politics.

As far as the development in the Scandinavian countries is concerned, which is characterized by a strong position of social-democratic parties, the strategy has been disintegrated. The attempt to modify the institutional setting of the economy has been left to governmental initiatives. In this way, the extent to which dilemmas becomes intelligible has been limited.

<sup>15)</sup> Op. cit. s. 7.

## EKONOMSKO-TEHNIČKI SISTEM I DILEMA SINDIKATA

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### R e z i m e

Ovaj članak se bavi problemom demokratije u preduzeću ili, preciznije, procesom realizacije radničkog samoupravljanja putem višestepenih procesa na radnom mestu uslovima zrelih kapitalističkih društava. Autori posvećuju posebnu pažnju konceptu interesa radnika unutar strukture moći i njihovoj interpretaciji ove problemske situacije. Situacija u kojoj se nalaze radnici u preduzeću je izvor dileme koja ima poseban značaj s aspekta pitanja prelaza na samoupravljanje. Ove probleme autori posmatraju u kontekstu posleratnog razvoja Norveške.

Posle drugog svetskog rata norveški radnički pokret imao je veoma jake pozicije u društvu: članstvo se znatno povećalo, ostvarena je većina u opštim izborima u obrazovanju vlade, a na samom početku posleratnog perioda stvorena je mogućnost realizacije radikalnog radničkog ekonomskog i političkog programa.

Posleratna obnova postavila je i pitanje pravaca daljeg razvoja.

Strukturna pozicija Laburističke vlade u ovoj situaciji može se opisati terminima protivrečnosti između "nacionalne odgovornosti" da se, s jedne strane, obezbedi (da otpočne) reprodukcija u proširenim razmerama, i da se, s druge strane, sledi program koji integriše ekonomski razvoj proizvodnih snaga i radikalno demokratski razvoj proizvodnih odnosa u socijalističkom pravcu.

Tokom prvih godina posle rata (1945—1952) klasne suprotnosti su se produbile.

Na planu narodne privrede direktno posleratno reguliranje je ukinuto (1948—52) i zamenjeno indirektnim sredstvima usmeravanja (monetarna i finansijska politika). Otvaranje u pravcu tradicionalne tržišne privrede odigralo se u uskoj vezi sa integrisanjem u međunarodni kapitalistički sistem: kao zemlja koja je primala Marshallovu pomoć (1948—1952), pridružila se GATT-u (1948) i OEEC-u (1948), što je impliciralo liberalizaciju uvoza proizvoda snižavanjem carinskih tarifa. To se kasnije ostvaruje putem članstva u OECD-u i organizaciji EFTA.

Unutar norveške socialdemokratije ovo integrisanje je uzrokovalo reviziju strateškog pojma socijalizacije (1949—1953) od pojma koji je sjedinjavao privredni rast (razvoj proizvodnih snaga i demokratizaciju (razvoj u pravcu socijalističkih odnosa proizvodnje) ka fragmentarnom skupu gledišta.

Norveška Radnička partija negde oko 1960. godine razvila je pojam "industrijske demokratije" koji se odnosi na reforme u pravcu različitih vrsta participacije unutar industrijskih proizvodnih jedinica, i drugi pojam "ekonomske demokratije" — koji izražava želju za razvojem demokratske kontrole (upravljanja) čitave privrede.

Ovi pojmovi pružaju utisak da postoji dobro integrisana strategija. Takva obuhvatna i konsistentna strategija, međutim, ne postoji. Čak suprotno tome, vladajuća socijaldemokratija, u ovom trenutku, i programski i u praksi, razvija jednostran pojam ekonomskog rasta (razvoja pro-

izvodnih snaga) u okvirima privrede koja je po svojoj suštini kapitalistička, tako je u svojim manifestacionim oblicima, modifikovana državnom regulativom (intervencijama). Uprkos reformama ostvarenje industrijske demokratije još uvek je stvar daleke budućnosti. Stanje danas još uvek karakteriše nemoć, a ekonomska demokratija u praksi je svedena na vladinu budžetsku politiku.

Centralno mesto članka predstavlja tvrdnja da se javlja određena dilema sa uvođenjem aranžmana radničkog predstavljanja u pravcu odlučivanja u kapitalističkom preduzeću. Ova dilema ishodi iz činjenice da se koncept interesa radnika može diferencirati u tri tipa interesa. Radnik je član preduzeća kao ekonomsko-tehničkog sistema. U ovom kontekstu radnici su nužno subjekti (agensi) ovih interesa:

1. Kao prvo, od fundamentalnog je značaja biti zaposlen. Radnik ima neposredni interes da zadrži svoje radno mesto (svoj posao). Kao klasa radnici imaju interes da održe zaposlenost. Istovremeno ovaj interes podrazumeva instituciju najamnog rada kao takvog. Reprodukcijski kapital zavisi od postojanja radničke klase. Stoga je moguće označiti ovaj tip interesa kao konformistički interes.

2. Drugo, radnička klasa ima interes za reforme koje poboljšavaju radne uslove u preduzeću i životne uslove u društvu. Borba za tekuće radno vreme, poboljšano radno okruženje i više nadnice, spadaju u tradicionalnu oblast ispoljavanja ovih interesa. Ovi reformistički interesi odnose se na promene osnovnih struktura na nivou preduzeća i na nivou društva u celini.

3. Treće, radnička klasa ima interese zasnovane na razvoju višedimenzionalnih, bogatih ljudskih potreba i društvene sigurnosti u dugom roku. Ovaj interes podrazumeva transformaciju fundamentalnih proizvodnih odnosa u kapitalističkom društvu.

Uvođenje participativnih reformi u kapitalističkom preduzeću predstavlja institucionalizaciju klasnog konflikta na mikronivou, što može da stvori niz teškoća s obzirom na pomenute različite aspekte interesa.

Dilema na koju autori ukazuju može proizaći iz situacija u kojima interesi različitog karaktera dolaze u sukob. Konformistički interesi mogu biti u suprotnosti sa progresivnim reformama, a konformistički i reformski interesi mogu politizovati razmatranje "transformacionih" (revolucionarnih) interesa. Kao što se može videti na primeru norveških proizvodnih komiteta, proširenje demokratije i povezivanje ekonomske i industrijske demokratije rigorozno je podređeno povećanju produktivnosti.

## A NOTE ON THE MERITS AND DEMERITS OF TWO ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF SELF-MANAGEMENT IN STATE ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES

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1. The transition to self-management of the State Economic Enterprises (SEE) in a mixed economy would be desired by the political organ to achieve certain specific goals. In order to discuss the optimal form of self-management in the SEE and the path of transition toward it, the goal to be achieved by this reform should be set down. In other words, the political organ should spell out the arguments of its objective utility function to be maximized in order to determine the optimal self-management model. In this paper, I shall first determine the factors that are likely to affect the utility function of the political organ. Then I shall specify two extreme forms of self-management in order to discuss their respective impact on the utility function of the political organ.

2. The major factors that affect the political organ's preference among various self-management models can be aggregated in five proxy variables. In the context of the Turkish economic structure and political system, I think that these factors (or variables) can be reduced to five major proxies. They can be defined as the arguments of the political organ's utility function to be maximized under the constraint of self-management rule in the SEE.

The first argument is the maximization of new employment ( $E_n$ ). This is a proxy that represents the surplus in the SEE available for re-investment. In the context of a labour surplus economy, it would be realistic enough to represent the profits (surplus) of the SEE as new employment. Although new employment can also be created through technology choice, we can omit this possibility by assuming that the discretion of self-managers regarding technology choice is not an important factor in employment creation, or by assuming that the choice of technology can be affected by some other policy means that is in the control of the political organ, and therefore, unrelated to the form of self-management.

The surplus of the SEE is determined by the difference between sales proceeds and wages withdrawn from the enterprise, the interest char-

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