

# Amenable Argumentation Approach: Accommodating Emotional Arguments

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**Abstract:** This paper summarizes various interpretations of emotional arguments, with a focus on the emotional mode of argument introduced in the multi-modal argumentation model (Gilbert, 1994). From there the author shifts from a descriptive account of emotional arguments to a discussion about a normative framework. Pointing out problems with evaluative models of the emotional mode, a paradigmatic shift captured by the Amenable Argumentation Approach is explained as a way forward for the advancement of the emotional mode and multi-modal argumentation.

**Résumé:** Cet article résume diverses interprétations des arguments émotionnels, en mettant l'accent sur le mode d'argument émotionnel introduit dans le modèle d'argumentation multimodal (Gilbert, 1994). De là, l'auteur passe d'un récit descriptif d'arguments émotionnels à une discussion sur un cadre normatif. Soulignant les problèmes des modèles évaluatifs du mode émotionnel, l'auteur décrit un changement de paradigme capturé par l'approche d'argumentation comme une voie à suivre pour l'avancement du mode émotionnel et de l'argumentation multimodale.

**Keywords:** amenable argumentation approach, argument<sub>1</sub>, argument<sub>2</sub>, argumentative multilingualism, conceptual framework, critical-logical model, emotional mode, multi-modal argumentation

## 1. Introduction

This paper, in part, commemorates Michael A. Gilbert's multi-modal argumentation model, just over twenty-five years since its introduction to the argumentation community (Gilbert 1994). Of the four modes of argumentation that Gilbert theorized (logical, emotional, visceral, and kisceral), this paper focuses on the emo-

tional mode. The emotional mode of argument may not elicit wild opposition; however, inattention or indifference to emotional arguments from argumentation scholars within the community does not mean that emotional arguments are acknowledged as (credible) arguments either. This paper, in addition to acknowledging the value of multi-modalities in argumentation, mainly proposes a paradigmatic shift that would realistically be more welcoming towards the emotional mode. What this paper adds to the literature is a proposal for acknowledging, using, responding to, and evaluating emotional arguments without defaulting to the comfort of the logical tradition.

For Gilbert, a few criteria are imperative for his multi-modal argumentation model. Gilbert makes clear in several works that argumentation never occurs in a single mode (1994, 1997, 2019) and that oftentimes the modes are indistinguishable (2019, p. 316). Gilbert describes argument *modes* as “aspects” within an argumentative encounter (2019, p. 317). While we can direct our attention to a single mode and analyze it, sometimes to its detriment, argumentation has a mixture of the logical, emotional, kisceral, and visceral modes. An argument made, however, usually has a predominant mode of persuasion, even if there are multiple modes in play (Gilbert 1994, p. 163). The dominant mode presents the persuasive force or persuasive power of the argument being made. In addition, for Gilbert (2019), there is an openness to other possible means of communicating argumentative messages besides the modes identified in the multi-modal argumentation model (p. 214), demonstrating an open-minded, fluid approach to arguments.

In what follows, I summarize contemporary outlooks of emotional argument, with emphasis on Gilbert's emotional mode. Then I turn to a discussion of the evaluation of emotional arguments. This necessitates a discussion of relevant conceptual frameworks that currently tether the emotional mode. I suggest a needed shift in conceptual frameworks to fully embrace the emotional mode of argument, unencumbered by the “critical-logical model” (Gilbert 1997, p. 48). According to the critical-logical model, reasoning is linear and careful. Information is separated into relevant evidence and irrelevant information, and that which is not relevant is extraneous to the argument (e.g., emotional content, power relation-

ships, social outlooks, and so on). Until a proposed shift in conceptual frameworks occurs, those who practice emotional arguments (note: we all do) will continue to be misunderstood, or worse, dismissed altogether as irrational.

## **2. Emotional argumentation**

### *2.1. Emotion*

In the domain of psychology, the definition of emotion itself has “fuzzy boundaries” at best (Gross 2008, p. 498). With this noted, definitions of emotion that span broadly enough to be relevant to the context of argumentation follow. Carlson and Hatfield write that emotion is, “a generic and acquired motivational predisposition to respond experientially, physiologically, and behaviourally to certain internal and external variables” (Carlson and Hatfield 1991, p. 6). Another definition of emotion states that emotion involves physiological arousal, expressive behaviours, and conscious experience (Myers 2004, p. 500). These depictions of emotion are comprehensive enough to encompass different facets of emotion: those originating from evolutionary theories, cognitive theories, and social theories. When an interlocutor thus emotionally responds to an event or issue, their emotion arises from their appraisal of the situation, and their appraisal can stem from their personal identities, history, culture, and so on. This is to say that our emotional reactions are multidimensional in origin (i.e., how our emotional responses are formed). They are multidimensional in behaviour as well (i.e., how we communicate, or act out, our emotions), given that our identities and other factors precede and affect our actions.

In addition, I emphasize that emotions are a part of us all, inseparable from the relationships in which we find ourselves (Carlson and Hatfield 1991, pp. 7-8), whether personal, corporate, familial, political, and so on. When our emotions conflict with (the emotions of) others, this can lead to dissent and ensuing arguments, resulting in common marketplace measures such as court trials, professional interventions, couples' therapy, contested performance appraisals at the workplace, institutional punishments,

mediation, arbitration, and so on. A modest goal of this paper is to promote the acknowledgment of emotional argument across the interdisciplinary field of argumentation theory, pushing us closer to understanding, communicating, and even judging the emotional mode. To this end, we can fathom mechanisms and tools for resolving argumentative dialogues where there is an exchange of emotional arguments, such that the results are not alienating and/or disempowering to emotional arguers.

## 2.2. *Emotional arguments*

There have been various contemporary interpretations of emotional argumentation since the mid-1990s. Ben-Ze'ev (1995, 1996) states that emotions can function as reasons in an argument. Plantin reconstructs an argument to determine what reasons lead to an emotional claim (1999). When reviewing these accounts of emotional argument, what is clear is that an argument<sub>1</sub> (O'Keefe 1977) is assumed. An argument<sub>1</sub> is something that we make (i.e., a conclusion with one or more reasons proving it); its nature is its structure. These interpretations of emotional arguments focus on the arrangement of an argument, or how an arguer crafts an emotional argument—whether the argument is one with an emotional reason (Ben-Ze'ev) or emotional conclusion (Plantin). These scholars, in addition, also address how their conceptions of emotional argumentation are embedded in an argument<sub>2</sub> (O'Keefe 1977). An argument<sub>2</sub> is an interactive argumentative dialogue between two or more interlocutors. To understand how an emotional argument functions, in terms of its persuasive power, having an argument is crucial.

An emotion in an emotional argument is multi-dimensional, having a cognitive, evaluative, motivational, and feeling aspect according to Ben-Ze'ev (1995, p. 190), and in the interaction of argumentation, Ben-Ze'ev states that emotional arguments are rational in that they function to efficiently send messages (to other interlocutors). The theory of this conception of emotional argument is more detailed and rigorous than explained here; however, the takeaway is the account that Ben-Ze'ev describes recognizes that emotions are not wild and uninhibited. The emotion in an argument can be distilled to its cause (i.e., an explanation for *why* an arguer has an emotional reason) by paying attention to cogni-

tive and evaluative faculties. The emotion can also be understood as a precursor to making a particular argument by paying attention to motivational and feeling aspects within the context of an argument. It follows that interlocutors have agency (i.e., at some point in the process of argument-making individuals can articulate their emotions consciously), and thus there is some responsibility to understand and communicate emotional arguments when having an argument.

While Ben-Ze'ev's account has psychological backing, Plantin's theory of emotional arguments relies more on linguistics, even though the latter acknowledges that audiences' interpretations of emotional arguments (potentially different interpretations) are psychological in nature. For Plantin, emotional sentences help isolate an arguer who has an emotional argument. The emotion thus does need to be discursively explicit (Plantin 1999, pp. 5-7). Once determined, audiences can decipher what backing supports an emotional claim and reconstruct the argument accordingly. It follows from this theory that interlocutors and analysts of argumentation have at least some responsibility to practice emotional intelligence—this involves some awareness of emotional arguments, when they occur, and how they are constructed, rather than dismissing them as irrational because they may not conform to logical standards. While emotional arguments are structurally different for Ben-Ze'ev and Plantin, I take the liberty of claiming that their respective argument structures (while helpful for understanding an arguer's point) are important only insofar as they aid in a dialogue where emotional arguments are communicated. If arguments are social in nature—as described by Brockriede (1975) and Willard (1978)—emotional arguments are even more so by-products of interlocutors *engaged* in *having* an argument. When we study emotional arguments, argument<sub>2</sub> must take precedence over an argument<sub>1</sub>. In other words, without the context of argument<sub>2</sub> the discussion or evaluation of emotional arguments is moot.

For Gilbert, the emotional mode of argument is one where the persuasive power of an argument is rooted in its emotion (1994, p. 166). A mode of argument is described as a system of communicating messages in the context of an argumentative discussion. Furthermore, these systems are, “culturally dependent signs, sig-

nals and methods intended to pass information from one subject to another” (Gilbert 2019, p. 313). The emotional mode according to Gilbert is twofold. An emotional argument is one that either i) uses emotion as a reason for a conclusion, and/or ii) uses emotion to express an argument (1994, p. 166). This first aspect of an emotional argument is similar enough to Ben-Ze’ev’s definition of an emotional argument in that both scholars stipulate that emotions can function as reasons in an argument<sub>1</sub>. Gilbert takes the definition of an emotional mode of argument further by asserting that emotionally expressed arguments are also arguments where emotion has persuasive power, and in this case an argument<sub>2</sub> is necessary. Thus far, emotional arguments are arguments where i) emotion is a reason, ii) emotion is a conclusion, and iii) arguers express themselves emotionally. Finally, Walton (1992) extensively discusses an *ad misericordiam* and *ad baculum* in *The place of emotion in argument*. These schemes capture emotional arguments where audiences respond to arguments with their own emotion. Pre-dating the works on emotion in argument described above, Walton argued that depending on the goals in an argumentative dialogue, emotional appeals by the arguer may be reasonable (1992, p. 255).<sup>1</sup>

I want to underscore that arguments-as-things, or arguments that we make, are inseparable from arguments-as-acts, or arguments that we have. In other words, a comprehensive notion of the emotional mode of argument necessarily involves an argument<sub>2</sub>. To only study the structure of an emotional argument where emotion is a reason, for instance, is inadequate to understand the persuasive function of the emotional argument. The notion of an “argument” that is thus assumed when it comes to the theorization of emotional arguments is that *an argument is an interaction, requiring two or more interlocutors with conflicting views, and the communicative dialogue that ensues (whether it be a negotiation, persuasive dialogue, etc.) requires the interlocutors to communicate about their dissenting views in some capacity*. This definition of an argument is compatible with the definitions of Gilbert (1994,

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<sup>1</sup> More elaborate descriptive discussions of emotional arguments can be reviewed in Carozza (2007, 2011).

1997a, 2019), Brockriede (1975), Willard (1978), and can easily be accommodated by Ben-Ze'ev (1995, 1996) and Plantin (1999).

### 3. Emotional arguments and normativity

When it comes to elaborating on emotional arguments, the multi-modal model of argumentation is essential for two main reasons. First, Gilbert's model is open-minded, demonstrating an awareness that arguments are organic, based on the ebbs and flows of human communication, and argumentation must follow these fluid fluctuations (Gilbert 2019, p. 328). This recognition that an argumentation theory or model might be too limited or linear to capture *real* marketplace argumentation demonstrates fallibility. Below I make it obvious that recognizing our fallibility when it comes to developing theories and models is important to Argumentation Theory. Second, when we interpret and assess emotional arguments via the influence of the critical-logical model, then we impart harm (Gilbert 1994, p. 163), which I argue is worse than just ignoring emotional arguments. I take this a step further and argue that we paralyze the emotional mode of argument and any growth it can have descriptively and normatively if it remains tethered to the critical-logical tradition.

Gilbert has initiated normative frameworks for the emotional mode. Introducing the concept of the *principle of pragmatic emotionalization* (PPE), Gilbert demonstrates how the pragmatodialectical model of argumentation does not need to be extended very far to accommodate emotional argumentation (Gilbert 1997b, 2001). The PPE, "relies on a discord or inconsistency between the words being uttered and the message being communicated. When emotion and logic are in agreement, there is no difficulty; we know how to deal with such situations" (Gilbert 2001, p. 239). Ultimately this principle functions as a cue. When there is an inconsistency, or something feels "off" in an argumentative dialogue, the PPE prompts us to recognize a potential dissonance between logic and emotional messaging. Ideally, involved interlocutors need to do *the work* to determine what the intended meanings are in the dialogue. The problem with this approach is that the critical-logical tradition is in full effect; the PPE depends on logic.

Gilbert (2004) also writes, in a different work, that the informal logic tradition can be adapted to encompass the emotional mode. Relying on—too stringently, I argue—the logical mode, Gilbert focuses on the application of the acceptability, relevancy, and sufficiency conditions used for the evaluation of an argument<sub>1</sub>. What is more remarkable, though, is that Gilbert challenges the informal logic community to recognize that arguments are communicated using multi-modalities, and given this reality, informal logic needs to identify and augment what gets included in its notion of an argument. In agreement with Gilbert on this front, this at least presents any non-logically made argument from being judged as weak, fallacious, or non-argumentative altogether by informal logicians and others.

Anecdotally speaking, when there is resistance to emotional arguments the conversation typically turns to question what constitutes good emotional arguments. Not every emotional argument can be strong after all. What happens if an interlocutor is emotionally manipulative? How do we deal with this? Interlocutors have different emotions and emotional reactions to similar stimuli—how do we decide what emotion is acceptable, and so on? In an area of scholarship where normative models are emphasized, Gilbert's inauguration of evaluating emotional arguments is commendable. However, I worry that we are putting the cart before the horse when measures of evaluation utilize tools of existing critical-logical models. Convincing the argumentation community of the value of the emotional mode, and I do think it still needs uptake, cannot be achieved by forcing emotional arguments in logical spaces. Rather than adapt emotional arguments to speak the language of the critical-logical tradition, my stance in this paper is that we need to practice *argumentative multilingualism*. When we can truly orient ourselves with the emotional mode, without responding to it via the principles of the critical-logical tradition, then a reliable system of evaluating arguments can follow, a system that does not succumb to the exclusivity of informal logic, pragma-dialectics, and other models.

There are two crucial points that Gilbert makes that help explain why I think it is important to replace Gilbert's inaugural normative tools for emotional argumentation. Alluded to above,

Gilbert writes that interpreting non-logical messaging in an argumentative encounter with critical-logical tools (e.g., using language to interpret an emotional, visceral, or kisceral argument) is an instance of prejudice reductionism (1994, p. 163). The power of an emotional argument comes from its emotion, and when we summarize the argument or recount it verbally, the argument loses its persuasive power. Following from this, standardizing an argument—where we distill an argument’s premises and conclusions from background “noise” and organize it logically—is also a means of reducing arguments to their logical form. It is a given that in our communication of arguments, it is impossible to avoid language, and it is impossible to avoid language use in our recounting and analysis of these types of arguments. So, we cannot altogether separate from discursive accounts of emotional arguments. It is within our power, however, to reject the use of logical assessment tools within the emotional mode.

Gilbert also rejects a critical-logical interpretation of emotion that results in minimizing emotion to a communication vehicle for *how* an argument is expressed, as emotional arguments do contain messages about *what* the argument entails (2004, p. 260). Emotional arguments, according to Gilbert, "include such elements as degree of commitment, depth, and the extent of feeling, sincerity, and degree of resistance" (1994, p. 167). Thus, an emotionally involved arguer could add credibility or strength to the argument, and for Gilbert this is vital to the emotional mode. If emotional expression is dismissed as the vehicle of delivery, what occurs is an antiquated method of charging arguers with poor rhetoric.<sup>2</sup>

A conceptual framework rooted in the critical-logical tradition is susceptible to the very prejudiced reductionism Gilbert warns us about. Informal logic and the pragma-dialectical model are established schools of thought, both assuming their respective *correct* ways to proceed in both argument description and evaluation of particular argumentative dialogues. There is little evidence of growth or change in what these models encompass, and if there are they still do not accommodate Gilbert’s multi-modal approach

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<sup>2</sup> This is a different problem in argumentation theory, with potentially analogous issues related to the limits of the critical-logical model, but not the subject of this paper.

(this speaks to additions like strategic maneuvering). Interlocutors and their means of communicating messages are not able to be heard or understood even, and consequently, their communication may be dismissed. Even for Gilbert, applying criteria of the critical-logical tradition's views to non-logical arguments results in a sense of transgression (1994, p. 163; 1997a, pp. 99-100), where reducing arguers and their arguments to poor argumentation, or non-argumentation, is an inappropriate enforcement of the critical-logical model's expected codes of conduct. I propose a different direction—definitely a more clumsy and un-linear direction—to build a strong, fair, and inclusive normative framework for the emotional mode and multi-modal arguments overall.

#### **4. Amenable Argumentation Approach**

In her critique of critical thinking, Warren (1988) claims that all theories and models originate from some conceptual framework (p. 33), and critical thinking specifically originates from a patriarchal conceptual framework (pp. 31-32). Some of the criteria she explains in such a framework include that it is value-hierarchical, dominance is accepted, and it is exclusionary. For Warren, systems that devalue alternative means of thinking critically (such as the emotional mode), sustain win-lose dichotomies (e.g., see Gearhart 1979; Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Cohen 2013 for more on the argument-as-war metaphor), and (by definition) exclude non-logical arguments, such as the emotional mode. These systems cannot make room for acknowledging an emotional argument, let alone evaluating it without argument-making or argument-having deemed problematic in some manner—again, by the very definitions delineated in critical-logical schools of thought.

I argue that there is room to have a more interdisciplinary, and inclusive, approach to arguments. A much broader outlook for argumentation scholarship would not affect the rules and criteria from the different existing theories and models, but rather it would augment the tools of argument discernment, evaluation, and analysis that currently exist.

This may seem repetitive, but it bears repeating that before any normative design of emotional arguments can be attempted, there

needs to be an environment that can acknowledge these instances of arguments as *actual* forms of argument. I introduce a concept called *amenable argumentation approach* (henceforth referred to as AAA) that can help to this end.<sup>3</sup> This approach encompasses traditional and already-established argumentation theories, like formal logic, informal logic, pragma-dialectics, rhetoric, etc., and its modus operandi is *amenable* to adding new epistemological observations of argumentative practices that are excluded from current argumentation models. AAA thus incorporates all theories and models, amalgamating their tenets.

Previously, I have written that,

AAA functions within a conceptual framework that is more encompassing of different argumentation patterns. AAA is a fluid approach, an organic interpretation of the practice of argumentation. Its open method of argument depiction and analysis can successfully resist the limitations any one model succumbs to. It is not a model per se, it is an umbrella concept under which all schools of thought in the field of argumentation can fit. A result of this approach is that an interlocutor or analyst can reach for tools of argumentation from different models. Indeed there may be arguments that are at one point logically driven and at another point viscerally driven, yet aside from Gilbert's multi-modal approach to argumentation (1994, 1997, 2001, 2004) there are no models of argumentation that acknowledge these modal shifts in dialectical interaction as acceptable within their own systems. Although Walton addresses dialogue shifts in argumentation discourse (1998), his work does not accommodate modes outside of the tradition—meaning that in all dialogues it is still expected that an interlocutor utilize an approach fitting with what the critical-logical tradition considers rational. (Carozza 2009)

A pivotal attribute of this approach is that it is continuously growing and changing so that it is not a stagnant outlook of argumentation. This, admittedly, may be an unattractive aspect of the approach for some. However, people and their means of communication change over time depending on culture, subculture, age, status, gender, relationships, and contexts that they find them-

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<sup>3</sup> This is a concept first discussed in Carozza (2009).

selves in—the theories that describe, evaluate, and prescribe arguments should be amenable to reflect such changes as well. Furthermore, in the true spirit of multi-modal argumentation, it is possible that an argument dialogue can have a critical discussion that perhaps the pragma-dialectical model can help address, but then that same argumentative encounter can flow into an eristic dialogue with emotional arguments; however, the arguments made would likely be evaluated as fallacious by pragma-dialecticians. Something needs to be done to acknowledge the fluidity between different argument modes within different argument dialogues, and AAA is an approach that merges different theories and models as necessary. It values the *humanness* behind arguing and therefore coalesces theories, models, and practices. This might seem obvious, depending on what the discourse involves, we already use different theories and models of argument depending on the dialogue, for example. It is not this that warrants many objections—I hope!—but the expectation with AAA is that we also refrain from using logical tools to evaluate arguments they are not equipped to evaluate. We do not use formal logic to evaluate informal logic arguments, and similarly, we cannot use informal logic to evaluate arguments within the emotional mode. This is what may be objectionable since it is what scholars have been implicitly doing when they ignore emotional arguing as noise, that is: it is related to *how* one argues (Gilbert 2004), and more explicitly when they judge them as fallacious.

My goal with AAA is to alter the conceptual framework—so that currently less-valued modes become recognizable, accepted, and further investigated. Visceral or emotional arguments, for example, should not be exceptional arguments, especially since they have such wide applicability in the marketplace. Arguments rest on their respective arguers, who are not stagnant. They are active agents who come with different and changing variables. In fact, no two people come with the same conceptual framework, as the conceptual frameworks from which we each operate are socially constructed and affected by factors such as our gender, race, class, age, nationality, religious background, social affiliations, subcultures we subscribe to, and life experiences (Warren 1988, 1994). This can aid in our understanding of a given context that

affects individuals differently, or why arguers come to different conclusions regarding the same information. Our individual experiences, relationships, and other factors continually shape the conceptual frameworks from which we function. We cannot expect argumentation models, which remain static, to have the ability to accurately address arguments if interlocutors are themselves fluid, ever-changing agents. Scholars who approach arguments from a communications perspective would, hopefully, be more amenable to this approach (e.g., Jacobs and Aakhus 2002; Hample and Irions 2005; Goodwin 2007; Jackson 2019). AAA accepts that humans, argumentation scholars in particular, are fallible, and thus their theories and models are imperfect. AAA also expects argumentative multilingualism from argumentation theorists and arguers in the trenches, and in so doing it sets the groundwork for a more inclusive approach.

## **5. Inclusivity in argumentation theory**

To summarize several key commitments from above: i) multi-modal argumentation is a relevant model of argumentation that is capable of addressing an array of marketplace arguments; ii) the emotional mode of argument, while generally avoided by argumentation theorists, is a common occurrence that requires more uptake in the scholarship community; iii) assumptions and other ideological interpretations of argument based on the critical-logical tradition are too narrow and exclusive to accommodate the emotional mode; iv) AAA proposes a shift in conceptual frameworks that sustain different argumentation theories and models.

Having better tools to craft, listen to, respond to, evaluate, and solve emotional arguments is the primary intention behind this paper. Such tools can apply to sectors such as customer service, law, mediation and arbitration, counselling, and really any environment where argument-having occurs. Consider a college tribunal context. A tribunal was held when a student, referred to as the Complainant, alleged that another student, the Respondent, intimidated and repeatedly made the Complainant feel uncomfortable. The students were working together on a class group project, and the Respondent was the lead in the group. The Complainant al-

leged that the Respondent made the former feel uncomfortable in their study environment. A main point of contention was that the Respondent scheduled a group meeting off-campus. In addition to this, the Complainant alleged that the Respondent was rude and aggressive in their conversations.

To elaborate, the Complainant was not comfortable attending a group meeting in a neighbourhood that was not accessible by the city's public transit system. Consequently, the Complainant did not attend a meeting with the rest of the group when the Respondent insisted on this location for a group meeting anyway. The Complainant, new to the city and living on campus, requested that the location at least be on the public transit route, if not on campus. The Respondent, during the tribunal, made it clear that they had to juggle several responsibilities, and it was not obvious to them that the Complainant had a good enough reason for requesting a change of the meeting venue. According to the Respondent, if everyone else could figure out how to get to the location, the Complainant should make the effort too. Even so, the Respondent reported to the tribunal panel that they had made an accommodation for the Complainant, and someone else completed the work that the Complainant would have been responsible for at the meeting.

In addition to this specific situation, the Complainant alleged that being around the Respondent in the classroom and on campus, after this group meeting was held without the Complainant, was even more uncomfortable. The Respondent was treating the Complainant differently, and according to the latter, it felt like harassment. According to the Complainant, the Respondent would not include the Complainant when they were discussing the project. The Complainant stated that when they did contribute ideas, the Respondent was rude in response (e.g., rolling their eyes and dismissing the Complainant in front of other group members). Outside of group meetings, the Complainant alleged that any time the two students ran into each other on campus, the Respondent would "stare down" at the Complainant, and that this was intimidating. The Complainant was urged by a peer to contact the college's Student Services department, in order to seek a "no contact"

measure to be put in place between the Complainant and Respondent.

At the tribunal, the Respondent countered with two concerns. First, this complaint had become public and now people in their department would think the Respondent was verbally abusive, and this was untrue according to the Respondent. In addition, if both students were in the same course in the future, something that was likely to occur in their department, this could jeopardize the successful completion of the Respondent's education.<sup>4</sup>

In this situation, the college tribunal panel had to decide, on a balance of probabilities, whether the Respondent posed a threat to the Complainant's mental well-being moving forward. In a ten-page response letter by the Respondent to the tribunal panel, the Respondent did not demonstrate any understanding of their contribution to a hostile environment or working relationship, but rather took the time to defend their leadership decisions and made clear that they were a novice in leading and communicating with others in a collaborative environment. According to the Respondent, while there were no errors in their decision-making and communication of those decisions—the Respondent's proof for this was the successful completion of the course project, and that only the Complainant had issues with the Respondent—the panel should at least be charitable because the Respondent was a student. The Respondent stated that their insistence on the meeting location, and their communication after this meeting the Complainant did not attend, was necessary and not at all harmful to the Complainant. It was clear to the panel that the Respondent did not understand why the Complainant would request a no-contact agreement. With the use of critical-logical tools, a transcript of the tribunal documents and the tribunal hearing itself can be analyzed. Both students made arguments, and the arguments can be summarized and evaluated to derive a resolution. However, there were several more "logical" arguments from the Respondent than all modes of argument combined from the Complainant in this case. In writing, in private caucus, and during the tribunal, the Complainant repeat-

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<sup>4</sup> Specific details have purposely been left out of this context to preserve anonymity.

ed their concern and argument for a no-contact order, fearful of their well-being in future interactions. The arguments were obviously multi-modal in nature, including emotional arguments.

This college tribunal does not proceed as a court trial would proceed (e.g., innocent until proven guilty), and its mandate is restorative rather than punitive. A restorative process has some emphasis on interlocutors before actual arguments to resolve the issue in a mutually beneficial manner.<sup>5</sup> With this process, the emotional mode can be addressed, rather than organized as peripheral to the case. In some ways, the framework for such a tribunal has facets of AAA in place already. In the case described above the panel deliberated on several outcomes: a collaborative communication workshop for the Respondent, a diversity and inclusion session with the college's Human Rights office for the Respondent, training around mental well-being of self and others for the Respondent, a promise to avoid direct and indirect communication between students, a formal ruling that the students do not work together in future courses for the duration of their respective degrees, and the more extreme decision of a no-contact order between students that the Respondent would be responsible for adhering to. To derive their decision, the panel discussed not just the logical arguments, but other modes of argument that transpired as well. Even with this more inclusive mandate, the panel awkwardly deliberated the different arguments and their evidence.

The panel comprises neutral non-experts (a faculty member, a staff member, and a college student), who are *minimally* trained, aware of, or judgment-free when it comes to non-logical modes of argument, like emotional arguments. In the case described, the Respondent made seemingly compelling stand-alone logical arguments in a ten-page response (i.e., argument<sub>1</sub>). However, when considered with the Complainant's emotional arguments, those logical arguments by the Respondent were not satisfactory to dismiss the Complainant's allegations. The arguments blatantly ignored, or exhibited a lack of emotional intelligence, the effects of the Respondent's behaviours on the Complainant. Consequent-

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<sup>5</sup> More information about these processes can be discovered by researching "Restorative Justice."

ly, the Respondent failed to engage in a productive argument<sub>2</sub>, according to the panel, and in a restorative process, this is something that the panel would be interested in seeing to resolve the complaint in a mutually beneficial manner. I share this scenario, on the one hand, to show that we tend to effortlessly rely on the critical-logical model as a default mode, and we are quite comfortable with it—the Respondent definitely was and even the panel members were to a degree. On the other hand, there are other methods used within society that deviate from critical-logical values, and some of us are generally less adept and comfortable working within these more marginalized frameworks.<sup>6</sup>

## **6. Conclusion**

Considering emotions in argumentation theory has both negative and positive consequences. To begin with the negative: there is so much more to be aware of for interlocutors and argumentation analysts; there is very little grounding theory; it may be unfamiliar to us, as it is based on individual life experiences, exposure, cultures, traditions, and so on. The positive attributes, however, far outweigh the negative. Recognizing the role of emotion in argumentative discourse provides more context or details that would otherwise be construed as fallacious or peripheral to the core argument. The emotion that situates an argument provides a "big picture" effect, allowing different contextually relevant analyses of a given argumentative interaction, and it balances the focus between the argument and its arguers. In the end, articulating this approach benefits those who deal with emotional arguments daily: lawyers, judges, arbitrators, mediators, counsellors, psychologists, friends, parents, etc. We all come across emotional arguments, some professionally and some personally, yet an expanded theory that explains these arguments and gives us the tools to handle them, even with Gilbert's valiant attempts, does not prevail.

In a society where workplaces, institutions, social clubs, and so on aim to implement more diverse and inclusive mandates and mechanisms, and in a time in history where mental well-being is

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<sup>6</sup> Restorative Justice is one school of thought, and it is used in various institutions. Care pedagogy is another area that can inform normative theories.

beginning to be discussed more openly, expanding the emotional mode of argument functions analogously to these shifts to promote equity and fairness among arguers.

I implore the argumentation community to recognize the need to “mainstream” emotional arguments, if not because they cannot be blatantly denied, then because acknowledging them and contributing to the theory of the emotional mode can benefit the understanding and/or analysis of i) arguers who use the emotional mode, ii) emotional arguments (argument<sub>1</sub>), iii) audiences (sympathetic, resistant, and open-minded) of the emotional mode, and most importantly iv) argumentative dialogues that contain the emotional mode (argument<sub>2</sub>). Employing argumentative multilingualism, within the AAA framework, can aid in this end. As Gilbert writes, “We must never forget, in examining the models that make theorizing possible, that the models are but mere shadows of the reality” (2019, p. 328); after twenty-five years, it is time for a needed shift that includes acknowledgment and cognizance of the emotional mode in the relevant literature and the marketplace.

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