

## CANADA'S DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE TOOLKIT

Date: November 22, 2022

Disclaimer: This briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies.

## **KEY EVENTS**

On November 22, 2022, Lane Anker, Acting Assistant Chief of Defence Intelligence (ACDI) Canadian Forces Intelligence Command (CFINTCOM), presented on *Canada's Defence Intelligence Toolkit*. The key points discussed were the role and structure of CFINTCOM, the major global disruption points impacting Canada, and the means available to Canadian defence intelligence to address these challenges.

#### NATURE OF DISCUSSION

Mr. Anker presented an overview of the Defence Intelligence toolkit, the key issues consuming the attention of Canadian Intelligence, and how the Defence Intelligence Enterprise (DIE) is evolving to meet new and historic challenges. He began by situating CFINTCOM within the broader Canadian intelligence community, and then proceeded to discuss current optimization efforts underway to enable the DIE to counter this evolving threat environment.

## BACKGROUND

Mr. Anker began by situating CFINTCOM within the broader Canadian intelligence community, highlighting its singularity as Canada's only true all-source intelligence organisation—meaning multiple single source disciplines such as Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), and others, in addition to its robust all-source analytical capacity. CFINTCOM produces all-source operational and strategic intelligence analysis in support of decision-makers and operational planning. Mr. Anker explained that the Commander of CFINTCOM is dual-hatted as Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI), serving as the functional authority for intelligence across the DIE, within the Department of National Defence (DND) and Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). Mr. Anker noted that CFINTCOM regularly participates

in information sharing with the broader Canadian Intelligence Community (IC), receiving single source support from various partners and agencies depending on their specific operational authorities and mandates.

Mr. Anker discussed the strategic threat environment for Canada, noting the shift from a focus on sub-state actors and the Middle East and Central Asia regions, to a new era of Strategic Competition involving Russia and China. He cited Russia's ground invasion of Ukraine and the ascension of China as a dominant geopolitical power as key disruptors to the post-World War II international rulesbased order.

Beyond Strategic Competition, Mr. Anker highlighted several accelerators and disruptors to global stability: namely, the climate crisis and ensuing security challenges; pandemic risks; disruptive technologies; and violent extremism. Mr. Anker focused on climate change, stating that while no region is exempt, the implications for already fragile regions will be particularly severe as food insecurity, displaced persons, and stresses will exacerbate political, social, and economic instabilities. He acknowledged that this will place additional demands on Canadian diplomacy and the CAF.

Mr. Anker pointed out that, to a certain extent, the Canadian population has been disconnected from conflicts waged overseas but that new problem sets carry stronger undertones within the nation—namely in the case of Arctic and North American security. In the Arctic region, Mr. Anker noted that issues surrounding Russia, China, and climate change all intersect with evolving environmental factors, impacting commerce, competition, infrastructure, and health. He discussed the implications on North American security via the development of strategic nuclear forces of competitive states, including long-range aviation bombers, ballistic missile submarines, and land-based mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). He also pointed to grey zone malign activities intended to undermine national democratic institutions, but stated that this is the responsibility of other departments.

Mr. Anker indicated that policy was not in his portfolio, but noted the 2017 defence policy Strong, Secure and Engaged (SSE), the 2019 Arctic and Northern Policy Framework (ANFP), and NORAD Modernization as key guiding documents for Canada. As per ANFP and SSE, Canada is pursuing the acquisition of a range of maritime, land, air, and space capabilities; seeking to strengthen relationships with key international and domestic partners; and is investing in Arctic research and development, including Green Defence initiatives. The commitment to the NORAD modernization includes \$4.9 billion dollars over the next 6 years, and total funding of \$38.6 billion over the next 20

The Journal of Intelligence, Conflict, and Warfare Volume 6, Issue 1



years, with a focus on five key areas: surveillance; decision making; air weapons; support and infrastructure; and science and technology.

Mr. Anker then addressed the ways in which CFINTCOM and the wider Defence Intelligence Enterprise (DIE) is adapting to meet these threats, pointing to a comprehensive Defence Intelligence Enterprise Renewal (DIER) that outlines key problem definition statements, including issues related to working as an enterprise; evolving the workforce; developing robust intelligence capabilities; and legal and policy oversight. He stated that several optimization measures have been implemented that help to evolve the DIE into a more coherent, collaborative, and efficient enterprise. These measures include consolidating the management of the entire intelligence cycle; developing a Joint Intelligence Operations Centre designed to integrate operational to strategic level intelligence; a robust review and compliance directorate; and enhanced CDI functional authorities that includes a new governance structure.

Mr. Anker elaborated on the evolution of CFINTCOM, pointing to the modernization of key intelligence disciplines —such as HUMINT, GEOINT, and OSINT— as well as a restructuring of assessment teams and a revolutionization of products provided by the organisation to suit a clientele that operates within an increasingly transnational, intersecting, and accelerated threat environment. He made special note of the crucial role that recruitment plays within the organisation, both in the current and future operating environments.

In conclusion, Mr. Anker stated that the threat landscape has grown increasingly complex, dynamic, interconnected, and harder to discern, particularly if the elements of disinformation and hybrid warfare activities are taken into account. As a result, there is an ever-increasing appetite for Defence Intelligence at the very highest levels of government.


# **KEY POINTS OF DISCUSSION**

- CFINTCOM is Canada's only true all-source intelligence organisation. It engages in all-source operational and strategic analysis to support decision-makers and operational planning, and regularly participates in information sharing with the broader Canadian Intelligence Community.
- The strategic threat environment for Canada has shifted from a focus on sub-state actors and the Middle East and Central Asia regions, to a new era of Strategic Competition involving Russia and China. Russia's ground invasion of Ukraine and the ascension of China as a dominant geopolitical power are key disruptors to the post-war international rules-based order.

The Journal of Intelligence, Conflict, and Warfare Volume 6, Issue 1



- Beyond the emergent Strategic Competition, there are several accelerators and disruptors to global stability, namely climate crisis and ensuing security challenges; pandemic risks; disruptive technologies; and violent extremism. Climate change in particular will place additional demands on Canadian diplomacy and the CAF.
- To a certain extent, the Canadian population has been disconnected from conflicts wages overseas, but the new problem sets carry stronger implications within the nation—namely in the case of Arctic and North American security.
- CFINTCOM and the wider Defence Intelligence Enterprise (DIE) is adapting to meet these new threats, namely through a comprehensive Defence Intelligence Enterprise Renewal (DIER) that lists key problem definition statements. Additionally, the modernization of key intelligence tools, the restructuring of assessment teams, and the revolutionization of products have been pursued to operate in an increasingly transnational, intersecting, and accelerated threat environment.



© (LANE ANKER, 2023)

Published by the Journal of Intelligence, Conflict, and Warfare and Simon Fraser University Available from: https://jicw.org/

The Journal of Intelligence, Conflict, and Warfare Volume 6, Issue 1

