

# Competition for Jurisdiction Over Food Industry in South Korea

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## ABSTRACT

In spite of the government's multilateral effort to control food safety, there have been constantly many shock events threatening citizens' health. This paper points out the matter of food safety management system with a view of competition for jurisdiction over food industry among the Ministry of Health and Welfare and the Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries and affiliated organizations. Use description qualitative method in research. Each ministry has separate basic positions and approaches to food industry policy: regulation and promotion. The policy image has been changed into "regulation" as public anxiety and concern for hazardous foods has grown since the end of 1990. They compete to take charge of promoting or regulating the food industry by establishing or amending laws, expanding organizations and mobilizing a coalition. Coordination by policy committee, cooperation between agencies, and integration of agencies were introduced as measures to eliminate unnecessary competition for jurisdiction.

Keywords: Competition, jurisdiction, food policy

## ABSTRAK

Meskipun kerjasama multilateral antar pemerintah untuk mengontrol ketahanan pangan sudah dilakukan, masih saja terjadi beberapa kejadian yang mengancam kesehatan masyarakat. Artikel ini memfokuskan pada kajian sistem manajemen ketahanan pangan dengan tinjauan kompetisi yuridiksi diantara kementerian pangan, pertanian, kehutanan dan perikanan dengan lembaga - lembaga terkait. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan deskripsi kualitatif. Setiap kementerian telah memisahkan dan melakukan pendekatan

kebijakan industry pangan : Regulasi dan Promosi. Kebijakan pencitraan menjadi sebuah "regulasi" untuk mengatasi permasalahan pangan yang menjadi perhatian masyarakat sejak tahun 1990. Mereka berkompetisi untuk mengeluarkan regulasi tentang industry pangan dengan mengeluarkan beberapa aturan hukum. Koordinasi menggunakan komite kebijakan, kerjasama diantara agen, dan integrasi agen telah diperkenalkan sebagai alat untuk mengeliminasi kompetisi yuridiksi yang tidak penting.

Kata kunci: Kompetisi, Yurisdiksi, Kebijakan pangan.

## **INTRODUCTION**

Food safety problems are directly connected to people's lives. The government should take the responsibility to protect the health of its people from threat of food. In Korea, in spite of the government's multilateral effort to manage food safety, there have been constantly many shock events threatening citizens' health such as 'garbage mandu', 'kimchi with parasites' eggs', 'snack with rat head' and 'melamin in snacks'. Whenever these menacing events occur, there is criticism of the government's food safety management system. Why does not the food safety management system of Korea work properly? What are the problems within the existing system, and how can we take care of them? This paper basically focuses on the competition causing policy confusion among organizations. And this paper aims to analyze the competition for jurisdiction over food industry policy among some related ministries and agencies, especially the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MW), the Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MIFAFF) and affiliated organizations.

To investigate the specific aspects and solutions of the competition among them in the area of food industry, this article uses qualitative research on this competition case. The first section of this article shows review of the existing literature in the field of competition or conflict study. The second section identifies the setting triggering the competition among ministries and agencies and the aspects of the competition for jurisdiction by analyzing changes of related laws, organizations and support base. The third section elaborates effects of the competition and solutions to ease unnecessary competition.

## **THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK**

Competition has some similarities to conflict in concept and reality. To distinguishing sharply between competition and conflict is a difficult

work and the two terms are often used synonymously or interchangeably. Some scholars in this field tried to clarify the definitions of them. Deutch (1973) implies that although competition produces conflict, not all instances of conflict reflect competition. Fink (1968; 454) describes the difference as one of parallel striving (competition) versus mutual interference (conflict) among parties trying to reach a position. And Schmidt & Kochan (1972) present a behavioral conceptualization of the process of conflict by distinguishing conflict from competition. They consider perception of goal incompatibility as a precondition for either conflict or competition. But two terms can be differentiated in the realm of interference, or blocking activities. When the units are striving respectively to attain incompatible goals in the process of competition, there is no interference with one another's attainment. Based on studies on conceptualization, this paper defines competition as "behavior or conditions which do not include interfere, or blocking activities when striving to reach the position which cannot be occupied simultaneously".

However, there is a need for research of competition among organizations to review the existing literatures about conflict which has a strong similarity to competition in a conceptual and phenomenal characteristic. Therefore, this study examines both competition and conflict study as much as not breaking the definition as previously stated.

## RESULT AND ANALYSIS

This study focuses on inter-organizational competition of the types classified according to the level of actors and inter-governmental organizational competition of the types classified according to the characteristics of actors. Most research on competition among government departments or agencies reflect on the causes, aspects, and solution of the competition. The following parts would contain causes and solutions of competition among governmental organizations previous studies suggested.

### 1. Causes of Competition Among Governmental Organizations

*First*, overlapping jurisdiction resulting from a blurry boundary between departments is one of the main causes inducing competition among government organizations. As March & Simon (1958) stated, joint deci-

sion making may bring about organizational conflict and some departments exercising jurisdiction over the same domain in the process of policy formation and implementation may produce conflict. The unit winning a competition for jurisdiction can expand the size, budget and manpower resource of the organization (Kim & Shin, 1991), and get autonomy which is essential to mobilize resources and ensure policy coherence (Wilson, 1989).

Although a policy is a part of the domain which are recognized as the jurisdiction of other ministries by law or customary practice, a ministry exercises influence over the policy through frequently and strongly expressing its own opinion or occasionally securing various political resources (You & Yun, 2006).

*Second*, policy orientation and policy priority of each department can be a cause of competition. It is natural that every department has separate political positions and views, because each of them pursues different goals and has different customers. The conflict resulting from contradictory policy orientation and priority is often generated in the environmental policy domain. When a ministry tries to work on developmental projects which may destruct environment, a clash of conflicting opinion among related ministries is inevitable. According to Kim & Shin (1991), a conflict over which alternative is the best one to resolve a given policy issue may occur and it is a difference in strategies rather than goals.

*Third*, various laws, guidelines, ambiguity and imperfection of procedures can also raise a competition among organizations. A policy making process in government involves too complex communications to apply right rules, and most rules are vague and fluid, and thus organizations will experience confusion in applying rules. In addition to this, the following factors may also cause a competition: one is communication disorder according to professionalization of policy issues (Park, 2000; You & Yun, 2006), the other is evasion of responsibility for duties which include some characteristics: troublesome work, low-benefits, a heavy responsibility. The case investigated in this paper is about competition for jurisdiction over food industry between Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) and Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MFAFF) which have separate policy orientation.

## 2. Competitive Strategies of Governmental Organizations

Most empirical research on competition and conflict between governmental organizations focuses on various response strategies employed. According to Ju & Hong (2001), strategic response activities of governmental organizations in a conflict may vary depending on the structure of policy participation. From this study, a conflict between governmental organizations which do not involve other actors has a simple structure of policy participation. To put it concretely, each organization in a conflict tries to enact a law which gives advantages to it and goes through a legal process, and seeks to change its own organization.

Kim (2000) divides aspects of the inter-ministration competition in government public key infrastructure into competition in institution, agency, and coordination function. You & Yun (2006) classify strategies of the conflict on E-government policy to capture an advantageous position into expanding organizations & functions, establishing or reforming laws and winning political support. Similarly, Kim et al (2007) approaches to the competition in the content industry of Korea from the viewpoint of laws competition, organizations competition and programs competition. In addition, through analyzing the promotional and regulatory functions for the content industry, the aspects of the competition are presented systematically and comprehensively. Jeong (2003) conducted research on the policy conflict in environmental policy within the central government, and in this study various strategies employed by the Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry and the Ministry of Environment are suggested.

These strategies are as follows. *First*, “justification” means that a ministry tries to carry its position and interest to other ministries and the administrative executive. *Second*, “acquisition of support” means that a ministry explains policy intention and a basic position and appeals cooperation and support to an assembly and parties. *Third*, “spread of support” means that a ministry acquires broad support and interest from client groups or interest groups and press and thus enhances its positions and status. On the basis of previous studies, this paper examines the competition for jurisdiction over food industry of Korea in terms of establishing or amending laws, expanding organizations, and mobilizing a coalition.

### **3. Resolutions of Competition Among Governmental Organizations**

Kim & Shin (1991) suggest negotiation between actors, committee between ministers for policy coordination, and opening conflict to the public as resolutions of conflict between governmental organizations. Park (2000) approaches policy coordination of ministries of Korea in the view of formal coordination mechanism. Because the existing formal coordination mechanisms have trouble in coordination of similar and redundancy functions, some measures are provided to remedy shortcomings caused by existing mechanisms for coordination. Concretely, introducing Junior Minister, reducing departments, operation a temporary coordinating committee, and evaluation for policy coordination are stated.

Empirical studies in specific policy domains provide more concrete and practical ways to solutions. These solutions can be divided largely into inter-agency cooperation, coordination through high level, integration of functions performed by related departments. First of all Kim (2000) insists co-preparing resources, conducting personnel exchanges and sharing information as solutions of the inter-ministration competition in government public key infrastructure from the viewpoint of resources, planning, implementation, and communication raised by Jennings (1994). You & Yun (2006) present some solutions to deal with the conflict in E-government policy. In the case of minimizing possibility of an occurrence of the conflict, the measures of improving driving systems and re-setting role sharing are needed, and in the case of solution of conflict, vertical and horizontal coordination mechanism need to be strengthened.

Kim et al (2007) focuses on integration of functions carried out by related departments to control negative effects of competition in the content industry of Korea. Specifically, they recommend that cooperation and coordination have not worked well and a government organizational redesign of the content industry is suggested for the presidential administration to be inaugurated February, 2008.




FIGURE1. COMPETITION OVER JURISDICTION AMONG ORGANIZATIONS

## RESEARCH METHODS

This research use literature review as method to make analysis more depth. Literature review needed because of an scientific analysis need an argumentation which is include a proove answer in analysis. This research use more than literarature, so that a proove answer can be made because it is proved by more than one scientific literarure.

## RESULT AND ANALYSIS

### 1. The Change of the Policy Image of Food Industry: From “Promotion” to “Regulation”

As the agricultural market liberalization according to Uruguay Round negotiations in 1994 is realized, a variety of ways to protect and cultivate domestic farmers are sought. First of all the government provided the institutional foundation aimed at improving farm income to permit farmers and fishermen to enter the food industry. It is to stabilize domestic agricultural production base against the opening and changes in market conditions and to improve income of farmers and international competitiveness of agricultural products through facilitating the participation of farmers in the food processing industry. Specifically, this measure includes contents such as funding for the agricultural products processor, encouraging research and development of traditional foods and traditional food industry, and introducing quality certification system for traditional foods and specialties. Meanwhile, after the United States’ success of recombinant DNA experiments in 1973, genetic manipulations were used for

food production in earnest in 1990s. Concerns about the hazards of a new food through genetic manipulation (GMO: Genetically Modified Organism) began to appear in the late 1990s. The EU obligated the GMO labeling system on GM crops in 1997, while the U.S. opposed the GMO labeling system by reason of cost of growers and food companies.

There are much controversy about the risks of GMO and opposing views around GMO labeling in Korea which imports more agricultural products from the U.S. The Ministry for Agriculture amended a law supposed to implement the GMO labeling in 1993, but finding target items is so difficult as a matter of technology and the cost, and thus execution of the system had been postponed. However, as the survey result that 18 products of 22 species are containing GM Crops in circulation performed by the Korea Consumer Protection Board was exposed in November 1999, the demand for GMO labeling was strongly raised. In the wake of scandal, the 'genetically modified tofu', the Korea Food and Drug Administration(KFDA) determined the execution of the GMO labeling in late 2000 and thus consumers was able to know about whether the agricultural products they purchased are produced in accordance with genetically modified process. Since 2004, as many shock events causing controversy occurred consistently, the debates on food safety were expanded. The scandals of 'garbage mandu' in June 2004, 'kimchi with parasites eggs' in November 2005, importation of cattle suspected of mad cow disease in 2008, 'snack with rat head' in October same year and 'melamin in snacks' in September same year occurred in a row, and the voices in criticism of the domestic food safety management system are raised. These circumstances developed more actively competition for jurisdiction the Ministry of Health and Welfare(MHW), KFDA and the Ministry for Agriculture(MA) which have a legal system able to intervene in food safety policy.

## **2. Strategies : Law, Organization and Coalition**

### *a. Establishing or Amending Laws*

The competition over jurisdiction of food security policy between the MA and MHW appears most clearly through the process of establishing or amending laws. In this study, key laws related to competition for juris-



diction of both agencies are selected as follows: 'Agricultural and Marine Products Processing Industry Promotion and Quality Control Act', 'Agricultural and Marine Products Quality Control Act', 'Food Industry Promotion Act', and 'Nutrition Education Act' in the MA and 'Food Sanitation Act', 'Framework Act on Food Safety', and 'Special Act on Food Safety for children' in the MHW.

The MA provided the institutional foundation aimed at facilitating farmers and fishermen to enter the food industry through enacting the 'Agricultural and Marine Products Processing Industry Promotion and Quality Control Act' according to concerning the damage to the farmers and fishermen after UR negotiations. This act, the first one regulating misrepresentation of rice production, resolves the problems according to the lack of criteria for agricultural management. It made the MH manage the food made from agricultural products and is the law on which the MH is able to assert jurisdiction based. Along with the well-being trend, the Act amendments in 1996 set quality standards of organic agricultural production which secures safe agricultural production to prohibit abusing the title of organic agricultural products. This newly renovated legislation can be seen to make the MA secure jurisdiction over organic agricultural products, regulates farmers considered as client groups of the MA, and guarantees consumers' right to know.

The MA which obtained the right to manage the agricultural, marine food sector came to expand jurisdiction over livestock in 1997. The Korea Dairy and Beef Farmers Association made the petition, 'Treatment of Livestock Hygiene Reform Bill', which requires transfer of the livestock management control exercised by the MWH. Resulting from the passage of this law, the right of the administrative supervision and manufacturing license over ham, sausages, milk and livestock products is transferred from the MHW to the MA. Meanwhile, the motion for changing laws of the MWH was not active. Despite the remark, the MHW established the 'Food Sanitation Act' which has great impact on competition between the ministries in October 1995. This act includes 'Food Recall System' for thorough food management protecting from increasing food safety risk factors such as water pollution, pesticide use and the distribution of imported food not determined.

In the late 1990s, as concern about the danger of GMO was proliferated, the MA established the 'Agricultural and Marine Products Quality Control Act' which is able to authenticate the quality of agricultural products with certain conditions and includes the detailed provision to introduce the GMO labeling. The MHW added the provision containing the new definition of GMO and the criteria of display on GMO products to the 'Food Sanitation Act'. This bill states directly the authority of the KFDA for GMO safety problems. The new provisions established within the same law mandate safety assessment for the GMO imported, developed, and produced and to ban the sale of products in case foods are not evaluated and are condemned as unfit to eat.

Beginning with the 'garbage mandu' scandal, a series of events that threaten food safety occurred by the end of the 2000s. Public anxiety and concern for hazardous foods builds the pressure for related ministries to integrate food safety management system. At this time, various food safety measures including disclosure of food sellers' personal information, installation of organization managing food safety, recapture of unreasonable profits, and class action lawsuit against junk food were poured out, so a significant portion of the law was changed.

The MA abolished the previous law, 'Agricultural Products Processing Industry Promotion' and newly established the 'Food Industry Promotion Act' in 2007. The newly established law aims to promote the food industry for farmers and supply various foods with high-quality through forging a linkage between food industry and agriculture. This law can be seen as the consequence of the efforts of the MA which tried to expand jurisdiction over food industry with a view of 'promotion'. In addition, when importation of cattle suspected of mad cow disease caused quite a stir throughout society, the MA revised the 'Agricultural Products Quality Management Act' which made the MA acquire the administrative authority over indicate system of origin, raising issues of inefficiency resulting from broken procedures. Specifically, the KFDA dedicated to manage the indicate of origin in restaurants under the 'Food Sanitation Act', however, the MA can enable to make administrative measures according to the rules of origin through the National Agricultural Products Quality Management Service (NAQS), an affiliated organization.

In response revised bills related to the 'Food Sanitation Act' were introduced, eventually in 2008 the 'Framework Act on Food Safety' is established. This act aims to build a system such as a food safety policy committee to coordinate distributed functions and authority of food safety management comprehensively and create an institution to respond more swiftly to the matters of the emergence of hazardous foods.

Meanwhile, in this period, the second law competition results from an effort to complement the basic act established previously. In 2008 the 'Special Act on Food Safety for children' aims to create environment in which clean and safe foods can be sold in schools and its surrounding areas and manage more thoroughly a level of safety and nutrition of catering, and thus children can have proper eating habits and be protected from various diseases. The MA causes a reaction by establishing the 'Nutrition Education Act' in 2009. This act makes a contribution to improving dietary life, development and succession of traditional dietary culture, eco-friendly dietary practices, development of agricultural food industry and thus, improving quality of people's life. It can be seen as a symbolic response, rather than as a policy prescription.

TABLE EXPANSION OF JURISDICTION BY LAW COMPETITION

The Ministry for Agriculture (MA) (established year)	Interpretation Ministry/expanded jurisdiction	The Ministry of Health&Welfare (MHW) (established year)
Agricultural and Marine Products Processing Industry Promotion and Quality Control Act (1993, but abolished in 2007)	*MA(1993) -Facilitating farmers & fishermen to enter the food industry -Misrepresentation of rice production *MHW(1995) -Food Recall System *MA(1996) -Organic agricultural products	Food Sanitation Act
Agricultural and Marine Products Quality Control Act (Agricultural Products Quality Control Act) (1999)	*MA(1999) -GMO labeling *MHA(2001) -GMO labeling	
Food Industry Promotion Act (2007)	*MA(2008) -Indicate system of origin	Framework Act on Food Safety' (2008)
Nutrition Education Act (2009)	*MHW(2008) -Managing food safety for children	Special Act on Food Safety for children (2008)

#### b. Expanding Organizations

The patterns of competition depending on expansion of organizations

can be classified into through restructuring organizations and establishing agencies. The most significant strategy for expanding organizations is foundation of the KFDA. In February 1998, the MHW upgraded the Food and Drug Safety Headquarters to the KFDA and tried to make the KFDA play a leading role of the checking food.

Despite a multifaceted effort of the MA to expand jurisdiction, the foundation of the KDA is the driving force to assert the administrative authority for food safety, and at that time the MHW could make a powerful voice about safety issue of GMO based on expanded organizational resources in the late 1990s. The Korea Health Industry Development Institute (KHIDI) founded in a similar period conducts business of support for the health industry as a quasi-governmental organization. The KHIDI performs policy development through analyzing the impact of introduction of new institutions about food safety on related food industry by affiliated organization within the KHIDI. In response, the MA also founded the National Agricultural Products Quality Management Service (NAQS) through integrating existing related organizations. The NAQS was designated as an agency with exclusive jurisdiction over agricultural and marine distribution management in 1994, and started to investigate agricultural products in 1996. It is the MA affiliated agency taking charge of enforcement such as agri-food safety survey, GMO labeling management, and food inspection.

With regime change in 2008, the MA was expanded and reorganized into the Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MFAFF) because of transfer of affairs related marine and food industry. The Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries affiliated agencies, the National Fisheries Research and Development Institute (NFRDI) and the National Fisheries Products Quality Inspection Service (NEIS), has been changed to belong to the MFAFF. A significant part in this study is incorporating the meaningful term, 'food', which shows the results of the extension of jurisdiction symbolically. As the size and role of the organization is expanded, the part dealing with the food safety is bigger than before in the MFAFF. Meanwhile, under the MHW the National Institute of Food and Drug Safety Evaluation (NIFDS) is newly reorganized in 2009. This institute builds scientific and technological support systems including

research development, risk assessment and test analysis of the polices performed by KFDA and performs as a think-tank of safety management while the National Institute of toxicological research was abolished.

*c. Mobilizing a Coalition*

Strategies to mobilize a coalition in competition among agencies are not essential, but are expected to play a positive role in competition. They had been seen as forming a coalition between ministries and client groups to pass the bill, and providing information or areas for communication. The strategy of mobilizing a coalition was more often used by the MA. The MA trying to expand the jurisdiction more eagerly developed the strategy of mobilizing outside support actively.

In June 1996 the MA organized an association, 'Association of Agricultural, Fisheries Food Safety and Quality Improvement Promotion', consisting of MA, academics, media, consumer groups. In this meeting, the basic plan for safety tests of agriculture, fisheries, and livestock was determined. The plan confirmed includes measures to prevent abuse of the title, 'organic food products', provisions to regulate the abuse, and plans of food safety inspection of beef, chicken, and pork. As a result of effort to form a coalition and share a position, in 1997, the process of the passage of the petition, 'Treatment of Livestock Hygiene Reform Bill', is characterized by a remarkable political coalition. The Korea Dairy and Beef Farmers Association required transfer of jurisdiction over livestock from MHW to MA which is expected to form policies favorable to client groups. The bill was passed quickly, and the jurisdiction is finally moved from the MHW to MA. In addition, since the mid-2000s, legislation to manage food safety systems effectively was actively sought as many events that hazardous foods were distributed occurred. The MA especially boosted government support to parts of food manufacturing using agricultural products and food service industry and tried to promote associative network among industry, academy, research institute, and government to legalize the 'Food Industry Promotion Act'. Groups consisting of farmers also urged that the MA should supervise the food industry because the MHW focused on health and hygiene policy with a view of not "promotion" but "regulation".

*d. Resolutions of Competition for Food Industry*

The measures able to eliminate unnecessary competition for jurisdiction among ministries are classified into coordination by a policy planning committee, cooperation between agencies and integration of agencies.

*First*, the formation of the policy planning committee which integrates and coordinates food policies comprehensively can be suggested. This measure keeps the existing organization sustaining as it is and thus can make a manager of the organization management avoid the resistance generated by merging organizations. The 'Food Safety Policy Committee' constituted in 2008 on the basis of the 'Framework Act on Food Safety' is a temporary body in which Prime Minister participates as a chair, and the Minister of the MFAFF, the Minister of the MHW, the KFDA chief and experts play a part as a member. However effects of the system are negligible because it cannot be in charge of managing the whole process from production to distribution to consumption and also impose the burden of policy coordination generated by different view of related inter-agency. In addition, 'Agriculture Vision 2020' published by the MFAFF in 2010 contains a plan about establishment of the 'National Food Commission' as part of the advancement of the national food system. It is responsible for food-related affairs comprehensively as a legislative organ chaired by the Prime Minister for all aspects of food-related policies. However it also involves problems similar to 'Food Safety Policy Committee' the MHW established.

*Second*, voluntary cooperation between conflicting organizations is effective way for easing competition. Notably, in 2009, the business agreement (MOU) between the 'Rural Development Administration (RDA)' and the KFDA was signed to promote public health and improve efficiency of agricultural food safety management. Specifically, the RDA provides information related to the research and development while the KFDA provides standards for evaluation of safety and effectiveness. The MOU is able to give consumers confidence in food and improve efficiency of safety management. In addition to cooperation, information sharing can be a good solution to competition. Typically, 'Foodnara' website (<http://www.foodnara.go.kr/>) which provides food safety infor-

mation is suggested as a food safety information service. In this website, various information including food commercially available, emergency alerts of food safety incidents and health knowledge for user of portal is offered. Earlier, in the enforcement decree of the 'Nutrition Education Act' passed in 2009, the contents about setting nutrition education system are included and thus it is essential to cooperate with the MHW responsible for food industry education.

*Third*, the measure of the merging ministries' functions has been raised several times, however, a careful approach to using the strategy is needed as long as the interests of various ministries and organizations are combined with the way to merge. First, an attempt to establish the 'Ministry of Food Industry' in 2006 was made. This way is to establish integrated food safety organization which manages steps systematically from production of agricultural, marine, and livestock products to consumption of them while abolishing the KFDA, affiliated organization of the MHW. It was dissipated as objections to putting the Ministry of Food Industry which have to conduct a lot of executive tasks of the Prime Minister are raised. Because the way of integration is burdened with a lot of resistance, there are advantages and disadvantages depending on which ministries focused on integrating. First, if a newly founded organization is operated focusing on the KFDA under the MHW, producer protection and safety management is separated and thus effective food safety regulation can be achieved. However, compared with the MFAFF, food safety infrastructure is vulnerable so the administrative costs increase and public distrust of the KFDA's management skill is still great. On the other hand, the MFAFF can be proactive with a slogan, 'farm to table', and can take measures swiftly as soon as the problem occurs, but may not enforce strong regulations pursuing conflicting aim, 'food industry development', and it is not a specialized departments with food experts so it is difficult for the MFAFF to manage materials for food.

## CONCLUSION

The jurisdiction is stable, but not absolutely constant. It can be regarded as changeable through the political dynamic among various actors inside and outside government. The competition for jurisdiction



can be understood well when dividing into laws, organizations, coalition. Each organization uses not a single of strategy but various strategies simultaneously through a systematic arrangement of strategies. In the early competition the MHW exercised exclusive jurisdiction over food industry while the MA came to acquire partial jurisdiction over food made by agricultural and fisheries product in the process of preparing countermeasures to nurture farmers and fishermen. The policy image has been changed into "regulation" as public anxiety and concern for hazardous foods has grown since the end of 1990. Between the MA and the MHW, the competition was fierce in terms of establishing or amending laws, expanding organizations and mobilizing a coalition. The competition results in confusion of food safety management system, evasion of responsibility for food safety, eventually threat to citizens' health. Coordination, cooperation and integration were introduced to remove the negative impact of competition for jurisdiction. Some suggestions can be made in line with the implications from this study.

*First*, jurisdictional competition is not limited to one between the ministries and can be in conjunction with activities of client group (interest group) and Standing Committee. A remarkable political linkage is formed in this study. In 1997, a client group of the MA required transfer of jurisdiction from MHW to MA which is expected to make policies favorable to them.

*Second*, the policy paradigm could be changed according to which ministry have a jurisdiction. The contents of law which each ministry established and revised can be seen in similar way, but policy orientation which each ministry has pursued appears differently. In case of the MA, although the MA enacted or enforced laws regulating the farmers and fishermen, the "promotion" of food industry could not be given up by the MA. This phenomenon has an implication in terms of integration as a resolution of competition. If the related ministries and agencies are unified focusing on the MA, the MA should not be captured by client group and be responsible for public health.

*Third*, solutions of unnecessary competition stated above involve merits and demerits and thus it is helpful to introduce three measures simultaneously. In case of food industry in Korea, temporary but frequently



committee meeting for coordination, multilateral cooperation, and reorganization into a unified agency ultimately sought can be suggested.

This research can be expected to get some comment as follows. One is that this study can be complemented through in-depth studies. Much of the analysis was performed depending on news articles, websites by the limitations of data collection. The In-depth interviews with representatives of the ministry will enable to deploy vivid analysis such as atmosphere inside the actual ministries and policy officer's emotion. Another is that to understand this competition between coalition can be considered as more valid than to understand competition between a single unit. This study shows that jurisdictional competition is not limited to one between the ministries and can be in conjunction with activities of client group (interest group) and Standing Committee.

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