

in East Java and Central Java, and a small portion of West Java.

This paper intends to critically explain several previous studies that associated with the shift in the role of kiai. Explanations include the substance, the differences, similarities, advantages and disadvantages. The critical explanation will become the foundation for formulating theoretical categorization of shifting roles and political support of kiai in relation actors and structures.

LITERATURE REVIEW

As far as the author searches, in-depth study of the shifting roles and support of kiai in internal conflict of PKB in 2001-2011 has not been done. The study of the shifting role of scholars who have already done deals with: *First*, a shift in the pattern of kiai leadership, as practiced by Sunyoto (1990), Pradjarta (1999), Sukamto (1999), Endang Turmudi (2003), Muhsin Jamil (2005). *Second*, a shift in the role of kiai that related to socio-cultural changes, as done by Geertz (1983), Horikoshi (1987), Manfred Ziemek (1992), Feillard (1999), Afandi (2005), Miftah Farid (2007), As'ad isma' (2008), Benny Subianto (2010), Abdul Wahid (2011). *Third*, shifting political role of kiai, with examples of studies were conducted by Riaz Hasan (1985), Masdar F.Mas'udi (1991), Fathoni (1992), Kacung Marijan (1992), Gaffar Karim (1995), Tim Kell (1995), Faiqul Ihsan (1996), Laode Ida (1996), Ali Haedar (1998), Yusni Sabi (2000), Gregory J. Fealy (2003), Syamsul Arifin (2003), Ahmad Zaini (2003), Nahwari (2005), Sidik Jatmika (2005), Achmad Patoni (2007), Moesa (2007), Abdul Haris (2008), Kang Young Soon (2008), Andree Feillard (2009), Abdul Moqsid Ghazali (2009), Mulkan (2009), Syaiful Arif (2010), Said Agil Siradj (2010), Abdul Chalik (2010), Masruhan (2010), and Nirzalin (2011). *Fourth*, the shift role of kiai leadership in the *pesantren*. Studies were conducted by Siradjuddin Akbar (1968), Moesa (2002), Zaenal Arifin Thoha (2003), Sholahuddin Malik (2007), Fatkhuri (2008), Firman (2008), Ruslan (2009), Puspitasari (2009), Ruhendi (2010), In'am (2010), and Ustas (2010) are some examples. *Fifth*, the shift in kiai thinking, as written by Abdul Rahman Haji Abdullah (1997), Badrun Alaena (2000) and research results of Nur Ahmad Fuad (2010).

ANALYSIS AND RESULT

Judging from the results of the analysis, previous studies on the shift role of kiai, whether in relation to leadership, social change, education in boarding schools (*pesantren*), political behavior and thoughts theoretically can be categorized into three things, among others, *First*, the studies that explained kiai is a determinant actor in shift role and political support of kiai. *Second*, the studies which made the structure as a determinant actors in shift role and political support of kiai. *Third*, the studies which set link of kiai and structure as a determinant actors in shift role and political support of kiai.

1. KIAI AS AN AUTONOMOUS ACTOR

Several studies set kiai as a determinant actor of shifting role and political support of kiai 'assumed' that the problem of shifting roles and political support of kiai is the problems that related to individual quality (quality individual) kiai alone. Zaenal Arifin Thoha wrote that the cause in the shift pattern of kiai leadership (read: the delegitimation of kiai leadership) in *pesantren* Tebuireng in Jombang from charismatic leader to religio-feudal leader after Kiai Hasyim Asy'ari is due to a lack of integrity *kiaiship* (*kekiaian*) quality of the next generation (Thoha, 2003: 24-27). According to him, charismatic leadership is the leadership that is not just based on the managerial ability, but also by the ability of the spiritual leader and the authority of faith that is followed by the community. The pattern of leadership is synonymous with leadership of the Prophet Muhammad SAW, that is as the absolute frame of reference or a charismatic leader in the terminology of Max Weber. While the religio-feudal leadership is the leadership that is based on the value of the lunches feudalistic religious dress, where formal leadership legitimacy was derived from link between genealogical of the founder kiai of the *pesantren* with the next generation quality of *kiaiship*.

As the founder of the *pesantren* Tebuireng in Jombang and *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU), generally by *pesantren* community and Islamic society (NU), kiai Hasyim Asy'ari is considered to have *karomah*, which is supernatural powers that was only given by the creator to whom he wills because his devotion quality. Through belief that *karomah*, kiai Hasyim Asy'ari is not only known as caregivers of *pesantren*, but also be a role model, a sample, a spiritual leader, and a figure that can solve various problems in the society and the nation, ranging from problems of religion, social culture, economics, law,

education and politics, both locally, regionally, nationally and internationally. Delegitimation of leadership role of kiai in *pesantren* Tebuireng in Jombang occurs because there are no more kiai's who has the same kiaiship quality just like kiai Hasyim Asy'ari.

Zaenal Arifin Thoha also revealed that the same thing also happened at *pesantren* Turus in Kediri. *Pesantren* that was established by kiai Ahmad Khafidz applying leadership charismatic-feudal pattern. Gus Mad -familiar call- is a descendant of the founder of primary *pesantren*, it is *pesantren* Lirboyo Kediri. Beside being a *pesantren* caregivers, Gus Mad also is a chairman of the advisory at branch of NU in Kediri and a community role models. After the death of Gus Dur, delegitimation of kiai leadership role has occurred in *pesantren* Turus. Delegitimation of kiai role occurs because replacement kiai was considered has a lacked kiaiship quality like Gus Mad. As a result, *pesantren* Turus in Kediri pillar declined. The number of students have been on the wane, and the end, the prestige of *pesantren* was getting dimmer (Thoha, 2003: 27-28).

Zaenal Arifin Thoha Posts which concluded that the delegitimation of kiai leadership role in *pesantren* Tebuireng Jombang and *pesantren* Turus Kediri occurred because of decreasing quality of replacement kiai "could be" in accordance with the reality, which is that the replacement kiai has less charisma and kiaiship quality than the previous kiai. However, these conclusions seem to deny the external factors outside kiai such as pattern of recruitment, learning and management of boarding (*pesantren*). If the quality of a replacement kiai decreased, certainly there are issues with the pattern of recruitment, learning and management of boarding (*pesantren*).

In line with Zaenal Arifin Thoha, the results of Malik Sholahuddin study also showed that the fading of kiai leadership charisma in *pesantren* As-Syafi'iyah Jakarta, due to replacement kiai of Abdullah Syafi'ie lacked quality and personal excellence. However, in contrast to Zaenal Arifin Thoha, Sholahuddin Malik acknowledges that there are other factors that also affect delegitimation of kiai leadership role in *pesantren* As-Syafi'iyah Jakarta is the swift currents of modernization around the *pesantren* and lack of interaction between kiai with the community except to the extent recitation (www.lontar.ui.ac.id). While acknowledging there are other factors that affect the delegitimation of the replacement kiai role of kiai Abdullah Syafi'ie, Sholahuddin Malik keeps the declining

quality of replacement kiai as the determining actor.

Kiai and also NU activist, Ali Maschan Moesa in writing explaining that *pesantren* kiai leadership decadence is caused by the decadency of mastery over the yellow book. Kiai quality decreased because no longer able to master classic books that should be taught to students (Moesa, 2007: 56-68). In line with this, Hasan Hanafi explained that decadency of kiai intellectual leadership because the material in the yellow book that was studied in boarding schools (*pesantren*), especially in the field of theology into the handle basic creed of people did not associated with the pure consciousness and values of human actions. Kiai is not able to associate the material with the theology of the real problems that occur in everyday life. As a result of this, the gap appears between religiosity and practical charity. Individually, human thinking is disconnected with awareness, words and deeds. Such awareness would easily bring to double-moral attitudes that were reflected in the fragmentation of science and religion, speech and action, theory and practics, and the emergence of a scholar (*ulama*) who was greedy for the world. Due to further, the grandeur of the building boarding schools (*pesantren*) are not accompanied by science and moral virtue. This is the real thing that push the *pesantren* and kiai into the twilight (Thoha, 2003: 167-168).

Kiai as determinant shift actor also explained by Imam Nahrawi. According to him, the degradation of the kiai leadership role as a central figure, a priest, a role model and patron is caused by kiai involve in the world of practical politics (Nahrawi, 2005). In a different language but with the same meaning, Abdul Wahid also concluded that the involvement of the kiai in practical politics has caused the religious social disparities among the people and the collapse of the myth of compliance with kiai (Wahid, 2011). Kiai Said Agil Siradj explained that due to involvement in practical politics, a shift in the role of kiai as an agent of enlightenment people has been occurred, especially those who was marginalized by development (Siradj, 2010: 85-89). According to Syamsul Arifin, involvement of kiai in practical politics will result in the politicization of religious symbols, reducing the valuable nature of religion and the sanctity aura of kiai (Arifin, 1995). The dissertation of Achmad Patoni also recognized that kiai involvement in practical politics has led to a fragmentation of support among the people and reduction of kiai charisma. Kiai also experienced conflict

between the role as a role model and be a person to look for support to get power (Patoni, 2007: 173-175). Kiai is not neutral anymore and can no longer consistent (*istiqomah*) to educate students (Sulaiman, 2010: 101-110).

The influx of NU kiai into arena of practical politics has led to the waning of sincerity and genuineness that is built up in boarding schools (*pesantren*). This change were tried to hide performance wrap religious legitimacy. In politics, real NU kiai also implement a culture of patronage and have the same motivation with other politicians, it is the pursuit of personal and group interests (Zaini, 2003). The defeat of a candidate for governor of East Java from NU cadres in the East Java gubernatorial election in 2008, which Ali Maschan Moesa and Khofifah Indra Parawangsa, whereas East Java is the center of the NU kingdom shows that Kiai political fatwa is no longer effective. Kiai invated to support a candidate for governor from NU cadres are no longer effective, although Ali Maschan Moesa is board chairman of NU in East Java region two periods (Masruhan, 2010). Crushing defeat of presidential candidates Jusuf Kalla-Wiranto in the presidential election of 2009, when the pair is supported by hundreds of kiai from NU and Muhammadiyah in Central Java and East Java, more complete the data which kiai is no longer being a powerful edict to political problems (Ghozali, 2009). In a sense, kiai has led the delegitimation role due to entering the world of politics.

Studies were conducted by Yusni about the decline of *tengku dayah* authority crisis in Aceh, which is characterized by the displacement of kiai from *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (PPP) to *Golongan Karya* (Golkar) were not followed, showed that has been a delegitimation of kiai political role. *Tengku Dayah* is an epithet applied to an ulama in Aceh. Several studies indicate that there are kiai who are experiencing delegitimation role and charisma because of involvement in the world of practical politics can not be denied. However, if not careful can make troubleshooting stuck in the fallacy of dramatic instance or over-generalization, that is the use of one-two cases to support the general or common nature argument (Rahmat, 1999: 5). In a sense, if the case was generalized, it will bring negative stereotype that all kiai who engage in practical politics must be having delegitimation role and charisma. The entry of kiai in practical politics is regarded as the cause of delegitimation role or charisma of kiai. The stereotype is certainly a debatable problem

and issue, because there are some kiai who still have not experienced the charisma and delegitimation role despite of involvement in the world of practical politics (Suryanegara, 2009: x-xv).

From a theological perspective, the inclusion of kiai in politics can not be blamed, because Islam does not separate religion and politics. According to Islam, there is the intersection between religion and politics. By some, the intersection is seen only in the area of moral, not a formal policy areas such as state regulation and the establishment of political parties. But others say the opposite, which the intersection is located in the region and not just in the formal moral territory (Arifin, 2003: 27-30). Ulil Abshar Abdalla called the prophet Muhammad SAW is a prophet and also a politician. According to him, politician is interpreted as someone who fought for "dealing with possibilities" to face the concrete fact that full of possibilities. He further said that convincingly, in a career for 23 years, Muhammad SAW has been demonstrated not only as a moral reform through the prophetic career, but also social reform, even politics, through the establishment of a political system and the community in Medina (Abdalla, 2005: xiii-xviii).

Thus, involvement kiai in political actually have a theological meaning, though by no means preclude the emergence of a critique to engagement of kiai in politic precisely because of this theological reasons, in addition to considering the kiai social position in society. Politic is a reality that must be faced and can not be avoided by kiai. More important issue is how significantly kiai able to take the role of moral-based politics in a formal political space that tends to pull strong pragmatic interests. In addition, kiai should consider the influence of his involvement in political with the community (Arifin, 2003: 27).

In general, studies that put the kiai as a determinant actor of delegitimation or shifting roles, also "impressed" as judge, blame and put kiai as a suspect, but kiai did not live in a vacuum. The kiai who were studied are kiai who live in a certain system of social, cultural, economic, and political, which is more or less the system also contributes or affects political thought and behavior of kiai. The study also looks less empathetic and understand the world outside of kiai that influenced him intact. Expectations, desires, thoughts and behaviors of kiai certainly are influenced by the social politics environment in which the kiai are. Kiai is a complex individual figure, which

can not be understood without considering the various social factors associated with it, such as marital relationships, the transmission network science, religious and political organization, ideology and teachings (Faruk, 1999: xxii). Indeed kiai also have a dilemma (Thoah, 2003: 233). On the one hand kiai required to take on the major task of bringing the mission (*risalah*) messengers that include speech, knowledge, teachings, deeds, behavior, mental and moral thereby necessitating kiai to always devoted, diligent prayer and ascetic (break away from the size and importance worldly). But on the other hand, kiai inevitably also have to deal with the reality of social and political change, the pragmatic-materialist culture, the culture of instant and love of power. It was a common orientation could hardly inevitable. The reality of these changes occurred in front of the eye, so that must be faced and addressed, because it can not be avoided by kiai.

The study, which resulted in “*syu’udzon*” (prejudice) to the kiai seemed appropriate for the study of most of the modernists and western observers to NU kiai are considered opportunistic (Palmier, 1973: 160). Ernst Utrecht called NU as a political party that so opportunist, so it looks like a bunch of officers who are in the grip of some kiai (Utrecht, 1959: 456). Mochtar Naim marked NU had a tendency to be opportunistic in the political arena (Naim, 1960: 159). Leslie Palmer wrote that NU has a set of political and religious leaders (kiai) that is petty and ready to be manipulated (Hindley, 1966: 240). In observation of Donald Hindley, NU mostly composed of religious leaders (kiai) who are not versed in politics and mingled with the knowledgeable shallow opportunist who joined forces to seek personal gain. Brackman wrote that any group will be able to buy the support of NU, and that in Jakarta, the party (NU) was never taken seriously as a political force (among others) because of weakness that most leaders can, and has been, easily purchased by Sukarno (Brackman, 1969: 45).

2. THE STRUCTURE AS AUTONOMOUS ACTORS

In contrast to previous studies that make kiai as determinant actors of shifting roles, these studies assume that the structure as a determinant actors of shifting kiai roles. By doing a study of community congregation in Jombang (1990) and Kudus (1994), Usman Sunyoto concluded that the state intervention in the era of the New Order has pervaded almost every niche of life,

including the life of the religious community (congregation (*tarekat*) Qadiriyyah Wa Naqsyabandiyah and Naqsyabandiyah Kholidiyyah). So powerful position of the state so that intervention was practiced not only affect the political attitudes of the congregation community, but also touched the substance of the teachings that became the basic of both the congregation’s social community (Usman, 1998). On the pretext of legitimacy modernization, state intervened massively did not only on political choices and partisan elite institute, but also able to change the understanding of “*taqlid*” (absolute obedience) is becoming fundamental teacher-student interaction in the tradition of the congregation. As a result of these interventions, the political views of community congregation split into two, that are the fixed full *taqlid* to the teacher in all things, including politics, and that are *taqlid* to teachers only in matters of religion, but not the politics problem. The first group on the political affiliation to *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (PPP) because it is considered as an Islamic party and tend to be critical of government policies, although by no means hostile. While the second congregation, channeling their political affiliation to Golkar. This group has close relationships with local government officials and tend to compromise or to understand the programs and policies of government.

According Sunyoto, through the implementation of centralized development strategies of New Order and put bureaucracy as an important element as well as the floating mass policy (floating mass), making the country successfully shifted the role of political *tarekat* leadership. The role of the *tarekat* reduced was not as good as before. *Tarekat* is no longer a reference in politics and government. Kiai role in the matter has been replaced by a bureaucratic apparatus, began the village level up higher. Due to the policy of depoliticization New Order, there has been a shift in kiai leadership roles. Kiai was no longer be influential leaders in all fields (polymorphic), but only in one area (monomorphic), i.e the field of religion.

The study was conducted by Sunyoto Usman was able to show that the problem of shifting the kiai leadership role from polymorphic to monomorphic is not only deals with the issue of quality of individual kiai, but related to, or influenced by political strategy conducted by the New Order government. This explanation gave insight and extensive knowledge to us, but seem positioned kiai as

passive actors who do not have the emotional and rational consideration. Though kiai is a human and not as “inanimate object” that has no interest. The study was conducted by Arnold Green on political Islam in Tunisia showed that the tendency of *ulama* to support or oppose a regime based on the threat to the socio-economic interests of the people who are likely to arise as a result of his decision. Green also noted that *ulama* preferred the submissive (submissive) when dealing with a strong and authoritarian rulers (Bagader, 1983:172). In line with Green, Leonard Binder studies over politics in Pakistan, particularly the organization of traditionalist Barelvi *ulama*, Islamic *ulama* Jami’atul, it can be concluded to have similarities with NU. *Ulama* of Barelvi tend to align political recognition by government of the power to the position and development of Islam in the country. They also stressed that the government should provide protection in return for their support (Binder, 1991:33). Ann Lambton’s research on Persian *ulama* indicated that Persian *ulama* ambivalent about the cooperation with the government. Ann also noted that many *ulama* who choose to compromise with the government as a means to bind the government and strengthen the recognition of Islamic law (Bagader, 1983:256). Some of the above dissertation can be used also to describe the NU kiai have similar characteristics as institutional of *ulama*.

Muhsin Jamil admitted that the socio-political changes have led to a shift in the leadership system of awarding *tarekat* kiai by murshid (teacher of *tarekat*) into selected (through the mechanism of elections). It also led to a shift in the source of kiai authority from kiai charisma that is so personal becomes impersonal, that is institutions of *tarekat* (Jamil, 2005). Badrun Alaena mentioned that the marginalization of the political role of the NU community experienced during the New Order regime, so that put NU only as a spectator fringe or even as cheerleaders who do not have significant access to the constellation of political, economic, and social in national level has led to religious and social reform movement among young people of NU. They do the shifting meaning of the doctrine as a *mazhab fiqh* Aswaja be *manhaj al fiqr* (method of thinking). Changes the meaning of the doctrine Aswaja, it gives tremendous influence and impact for the formation of patterns of thought and behavior young people of NU, especially in the province of DIY, both in social, political, either religious that is new and different from previous genera-

tions. They show patterns of thought and behavior are critical and progressive (Alaena, 2000:170).

Geertz called kiai as a intermediary of culture between the *pesantren* with the “outside world” (cultural broker) (Geertz, 1960). Kiai filters which cultural elements are allowed in and which ones are not, which are acceptable and which are not. However, the development of communication and information technology, which makes flow of information massively, has made the kiai no longer possible to filter them. Kiai be losing the role, and then just run a secondary position and not creative. Kiai will experience a cultural gap in the surrounding communities. In other words, the kiai lost his role as a cultural broker due to rapid flow of information that flows along with the rapid changes taking place in society. Modernization, technological developments and social changes are also recognized by Imron Aripin as a factor that makes the kiai is losing his authority as the sole ruler in boarding schools and the loss of personality cult, whereas before boarding development largely depends entirely on personal ability of kiai (Aripin, 1993). By reason of modernization and adaptation to the times, some of *pesantren* implement management foundation to manage *pesantren*. Management foundation has led to no single authority at the school, because the power is no longer concentrated in kiai. Research of As’ad Isma also explained that the modernization and social change has led to a shift in the role of Tuan Guru (an epithet applied to an *ulama* or kiai) in Jambi Seberang community, both as a *madrasah* teacher, stakeholders, and recitation speakers in mosque or *surau* as well as guard the continuity of religious tradition (Isma’, 2008). Modernity also cause changes in the pattern of kiai relationships and students from paternalistic to functional. Kiai no longer take care of everything, including the management of existing *pesantren* because its own management (Feillard, 2009). Modernity is also recognized as having made a relationship kiai-students no longer the patron client but more rational. Students become more daring to criticize kiai if the kiai proved off the mark. Similar disclosed Turmudi that changes in the *pesantren* and the Muslim community in Jombang has affected *pesantren* and *tarekat* kiai leadership (Turmudi, 2004:320). From here then appeared *profanisasi* charisma, which reduced the influence of the kiai in society. The demonstration of the students at Pesantren Darul Ulum Jombang and Tebuireng clarified the evidence of that. An event that never imagined could

happen in both the senior *pesantren*. Changes in the political leadership of kiai occurs when NU issuing a policy of "return to *khittah*". As a result of the policy was a shift in *dakwah* orientation of kiai from the structural to cultural. Changes in the political of kiai cause changes in political Islam. The kiai who at first is always linked religion and politics, finally freeing politics from religious involvement. Back to *khittah* policy on the one hand, freeing the kiai and the people from affiliation to a particular political party, but on the other hand also lead to not only the emergence of various political orientations among NU members, but also the decline of political Islam and political influence of kiai itself.

Posts of Syaiful Arif said that the development of secular culture and political is characterized by direct elections, to choose political leaders, have changed the relationship between students and kiai from *sami'na wa atha'na* become autonomous choice (Arif, 2010:30-34). Khoiruddin who said that the swift currents of democratization in all spheres resulted in a shift position and change the political behavior of kiai from moral kiai to structural kiai. Correspondingly, Abdul Haris's study also confirmed that the swift currents of political openness led to a reorientation of politics of NU in Jember from cultural to structural (Khoiruddin, 2005:85). NU in Jember often display attitudes and political behavior "radicalistick progressive" associated with the tragedy of political failure that their often received. However, the progression-radicalism sticking when they fought and maintained their plot of practical politic (Haris, 2010).

Study's Team Kell on *teungku dayah* in Aceh also showed the same thing (Kell, 1995). The result of Kell's study concluded that political authority *Tengku Dayah* in Aceh has been delegitimated. According to him, the delegitimation is due to the regeneration crisis among *teungku dayah* clan. After the death of *teungku dayah*'s like Daud Beureuh class, there is no longer a new generation that is able to replace both in terms of scientific capacity, leadership and authority. He further explained that the absence of a new generation of *teungku dayah* was influenced by modernization in Aceh, which began in the 1970s. Modernization caused *teungku dayah*'s children prefer schools in modern and secular formal schools than in *dayah*. As a result, the potential of scientific and personal capacities that they have do not make them into reliable *teungku dayah*. Their scientific potential and personal capacity actually is absorbed in the

government bureaucracy (Kell, 1995).

All of the above study is capable enlightening that problems of shifting or delegitimation role of kiai turns laced with rigging systems or structures that surround the life of kiai. Kiai is no longer a suspect or suspects alone. Structures that can be transformed into a system of political, social or cultural with the name of democratization, modernization, an era of openness, social change, technology and information advances are factors that cause delegitimation or shift in the role of kiai This is in line with the assumption that the changes in the macro-level of social life are often influential in the micro-level, ie the life and behavior of individuals, in this case is kiai. Social change and the high level of social mobility was not merely indeed institutional aspect symptoms, but also sometimes due to the problems of personal adjustment (Soetomo,2008:204). However, some authors stuck in the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, which is a mistake to think because concretize something abstract (Rahmat, 1999:16-17). Political system, socio-culture, social change, democratization, depoliticization, modernization, and progress of information technology are something that can be abstract, so it is necessary that the structure to be concretized as external factors cause the shift role of kiai became clearly.

3. LINKAGE OF KIAI AND STRUCTURE FOR AUTONOMOUS ACTOR

In contrast to previous studies that established kiai and each structure as determinant actors shifting roles of kiai, the following are a few studies that integrate kiai and structure factors as determinants actors the shifting of roles kiai. One of the studies was conducted by Sidik Jatmika to NU kiai reform era in Kebumen, Central Java. The results of the study concluded that there has been a political repositioning of Kebumen NU kiai. There is Kebumen NU kiai in the reform era that is able to be political leaders (political leaders) or political players (political players), whereas the kiai has been eliminated in the New Order era. They successfully utilize the opportunities open participation in the reform era. The process of expansion of the kiai position for intermediaries culture (cultural broker) become a political player progresses through the learning of movement patterns, especially with respect to the expansion efforts of resources (source of authority) and instrument (means) on the kiai movement. According to him, the kiai in their

movement have a lot of examples and references that they adopted from various jargon and practices of democracy at the national level and then they adjusted with the local conditions, among others, strengthening communities, anti-discrimination, reconciliation, pluralism and gender equality. Kiai social movements performed on behalf of marginalized groups politically. It aims to reorganize their political power (Jatmika, 2005). Zaenal Arifin Thoha also wrote that some NU kiai used opportunities of changes to expand their position as an officer, politician or businessman (Thoha, 2003). Assessment of Benny Subianto about cultural broker also showed the same thing. Post-New Order that is synonymous with political openness and to see their potential as a vote getter, many NU kiai shifting the role from a cultural broker into a political broker (Subianto, 2010:115-122). Correspondingly, Kang Young Soon in his dissertation on NU politics in the reform era also showed that the political change in the direction of reform, many NU kiai who use it to enter the political arena by forming a political party such as the Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), Partai Nahdlatul Ummah (PNU), Partai Kebangkitan Umat (PKU) and Sunni (Soon, 2008).

The Study on the political agency crisis of *teungku dayah* in Aceh in the era of application of Islamic law by Nirzalin also described the link between the agent (*teungku dayah*) and the structure (state) (Nirzalin, 2011). Nirzalin studies show that political openness and the adoption of Islamic law in Aceh did not end the political agency crisis of *teungku dayah* that has occurred in the New Order era. This happened because even though the political structure changed but the power relationship between *teungku dayah* as an agent with the state as the structure remains unchanged. Their relationship remains dualism, in which the structure with their domination of bureaucracy and economic resources still dominate their rule against *tengku dayah* as the New Order regime. Legalization Islamic law from the beginning it was intended as a political package to resolve the Aceh conflict, so that its implementation are bureaucratic and politically controlled entirely by the central and local governments. Bureaucratization of sharia on the one hand necessitates government control, on the other hand it marginalize the role of *teungku dayah* in these arena. The practice of bureaucratic Islamic law, demands rational knowledge building, contextual, effective, efficient and pragmatic. While the knowledge of *teungku*

dayah is traditional and textual, so there is a gap between Islamic sharia -government style with *teungku dayah's* own. *Teungku dayah* did not have the capacity to adapt quickly the changes that occurred. Post-New Order regime seems to use Islamic law as a facility for dominating the power to *teungku dayah*, so that they can be used for the benefit of symbolic power. In this position the existence of Islamic law in Aceh was more seen as a commodity because it is used by the sheer power of the state to dominate the *teungku dayah's* power than a religious law that is a tradition and a culture that provides space for various social components to participate in it. This practice led to dispossession political independence and a critical attitude of *teungku dayah* towards the state (Nirzalin, 2011). All studies which made link kiai and structure as a determinant actor of the political agency crisis of kiai or shifting political role of kiai from cultural broker to political broker and to political player in the era of reform seem to be able to explain the problem in a comprehensive manner. The explanation which is given is also open awareness that the problem of shifting political role of kiai or political agency crisis of kiai in the reform era was not only related to the quality of the kiai alone, but also by the structure that is growing and surrounding kiai's life. With their quality, some of kiai able to use the era of political openness that has shifted the role from a cultural broker became political broker even political player, both at local and national levels. The era of political openness has been an important factor influencing the mindset and behavior of kiai. Although in the case of Aceh, the era of political openness marked by politization of Islamic law was also used the state to dominate *teungku dayah*. Kiai or *teungku dayah* is a human who is having emotional and rational consideration, then how can address opportunities openness, whether will be used or wasted, and if it is used how, in the end, all of it back to Kiai and it is determinate by kiai himself.

CONCLUSION

In general, studies that put kiai as determinant actors of delegitimation or shifting roles, "impressed" as judging, blaming and put kiai as a suspect, whereas kiai is not living in a vacuum. The kiai that were being studied were living in a certain social system, culture, economy, and politics, which were little more systems also provide contribution or influence the thinking and political

behavior of kiai. The study looks less empathy and understanding about the world outside that influence kiai is intact. Hopes, desires, thoughts and behaviors certainly are influenced by politics-social environment of kiai. Kiai is a complex individual figure, who can not be understood without attention to the social factors associated with him, such as marital relationships, knowledge of transmission lines, and organization.

While the study that put the structure as an autonomous actor relatively capable of enlightenment that the problem of shift role or delegitimation of kiai interrelated to systems or structures that surround the life of kiai. Kiai is no longer be accused or suspects alone. The structure that can be transformed into political, social or cultural in the name of democratization, modernization, an era of openness, social change, technological advances and information are factors that cause in shift role or delegitimation of kiai. This is in line with the assumption that the changes in the macro-level social life often affect the micro level, that is the life and behavior of individuals, in this case is kiai. Social change and the high level of social mobility did not merely have institutional aspect symptoms, but also sometimes lead due to personal problems and adjustments on religious and political orientation, ideology and doctrine.

Compared with the two previous perspectives, which made the link of kiai and structure as an determinant actor that cause political agency crisis of kiai or shift political role of kiai from cultural broker to political broker either political player in the era of reform appear more able to explain the problem in a comprehensive manner. The explanation has been given is also open awareness that the problems of shifting political role of kiai or political agency crisis of kiai in the reform era was not only related to the quality of kiai, but also by structure that developed and surrounded kiai's life. With the quality that kiai's had, some kiai able to utilize the era of political openness, thus shifting roles than just cultural brokers to political brokers, even political players, both on a local and national level. The era of political openness is important factor that influence the thinking and behavior of kiai.

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