

Adam Starzyk*, Natalia Tomaszewska**

CONCEPTION OF INTERMARIUM IN POLISH FOREIGN POLICY IN XXI CENTURY

ABSTRACT

Poland interests and her policy are strongly determined by her geopolitical conditions. More than 40 years of people democracy under USSR domination brings in whole region civilization and economic backwardness. After 1989 Poland attempts to “catch up” the Old Europe. Initiative of Three Seas is one of such attempt. Increasing relations with central and southern Europe especially in case of diversification of raw materials – like gas – can bring to region an independence from Russian supplies. Three Seas goes back to conception of Intermarium, and redefine her on amended conditions of modern world. In this article the Authors will present short history of conception Intermarium, main assumptions of polish foreign policy and will try to answer the question is this conception is still present in polish foreign policy, even if in changed form of Three Seas.

Keywords: Intermarium, Three Seas, polish foreign policy, Andrzej Duda policy, and eastern policy

1. INTRODUCTION

Polish foreign policy has changed dramatically after 1989 and regaining sovereignty by Poland. Since collapse of Soviet bloc every government in this country has its own idea how to lead foreign policy, what are their main goals and programs to realize them. In last 27 years Poland had few strategic aims and the policy was totally subordinated to them. Foremost it was the accession to North Atlantic Treaty and the membership in European Union. However accomplishing them mean a new challenges and the need of new strategy in policy.

International situation as well as the foreign policy must fit to the variable and sometimes heavy to predictable international environmental. That is why foreign policy must represent

* Institute of Political Science, University of Wrocław, Poland, adam.starzyk@uwr.edu.pl

** Institute of Political Science, University of Wrocław, Poland, natalia.tomaszewska@uwr.edu.pl

not only the vital interest of particular country but also, must answer for challenges of contemporary world.

The motto of polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs “*To serve Poland, create Europe, understand the world*” shows not only the scale of interest area but also knowledge of potential and possibilities. For Poland strategic region of her crucial interest are Europe and her closer neighborhood, especially on east. Concerning the fact she is the eastern boundary of EU, relations with states like Ukraine, Belarus or Russia are most important. Towards some countries this engagement was expressed for example by influence on European Union members to establish the Eastern Partnership. It gives the tools on international scale, to create the new forum of cooperation, and foremost gives the opportunity to strengthen relations.

There must be underlined that the concept of Intermarium was lately also undertaken by the one of the most known intelligence agency Stratfor (“Washington returns to the Cold,” 2015) which shows that this conception is current also beyond our region.

This paper is an attempt to overview on polish foreign policy through years by prism of Intermarium. Authors will focus on the historical aspects and evolution of this concept, especially the shape of this theory represented by Józef Piłsudski. Also will be pointed the most important elements of this theory over the years. Authors will analyze is this concept is present in polish foreign policy, by primarily comparison the strategy of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, policy of President and the actions of government. In this paper Authors will also try to answer what consequences can have the implementation of this concept for central and east Europe and foremost for Poland. Authors will also mention the latest visit of Donald Trump in Poland on 17th June 2017. We will try to analyze its possible consequences, future implications and the possibilities of development of Intermarium in prism of political statements.

THE CONCEPT OF INTERMARIUM

The concept of Intermarium refers to countries of central and east Europe, and in broader sense to southern Europe to the Adriatic Sea. M.J. Chodakiewicz proves that the history of this theory reach to the Slavic tribes and the Medieval ages (Chodakiewicz, 2012, p.43–47). He argues that Intermarium is not only a political concept, but also a cultural and historical community. It was created by the bonds of territory, traditions, religion, and language and also by common fight against Russian and German tribes through centuries. Increasing power of Russian state on east and strong German tribes on west created a form of constant fear and conviction that there is a strong need of common defense.

First real implementation into force of Intermarium concept start in XVI century by established the Polish – Lithuanian Commonwealth. It

“was a multiethnic state assembled on a voluntary basis. It encompassed Poles, Ruthenia’s, Lithuanians, Armenians, Jews, Tartars, Germans, Dutch, Scots, swedes, Italians, French, and others joined together by common culture and institutions. (...) the Commonwealth was also antithetical too much of what “Western Europe” stood for between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries: royal absolutism, religious intolerance, civil strife, and constant wars. Further, Poland – Lithuania was a jarring contradiction to the patrimonial tyranny of both the Russian – Muscovite and the Ottoman empires” (Chodakiewicz, 2012, p.61).

It fully represents how diverse was this political formation, still fulfilling their functions. In XVI – XVII century Polish – Lithuanian Commonwealth can be called the superpower, with military and economic power on unprecedented scale. However the same factor which gives it greatness, two hundred years later gives the collapse.

In 1795 the history of Commonwealth ends due to Russia, Prussia and Austria, which have made the partitions of Poland. For more than 100 years invaders tried to uproot the nationality, destroy statehood, and erase the existence of the state. True renaissance of Intermarium was the second decade of XX century, when Poland reclaims the independence. Two contradictory political factions of interwar Poland argue about the shape of new state. This “new state” had to confront with territorial claims of neighbors. Strategic aim in that time was the protection of borders. Although to some lands, beyond our borders in 1918, were not officially claimed, the desire to retrieve them was strong. These two goals in perspective of higher need, which is safety, were rather difficult to reconcile. A struggle for lands, especially the Eastern borderland (Kresy Wschodnie), was incompatible with the conception of common cooperation. Two contradictory political factions, who were mentioned before, were gathered around Roman Dmowski and Józef Piłsudski (Krasuski, 1985, p.5). The first one preached the incorporate theory, in which Poland must develop good relations with Russia, and other states between them should be divided and absorbed.

Józef Piłsudski the Supreme Commander of Polish Military Force represents the second fraction and the federation theory, which strongly based on implementation of Intermarium in policy II Republic of Poland.

He claimed that real threat is Russia, and the only way to oppose it, is the alliance of central and east European countries. That can be expressed by creating a federation of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, Belarus, Yugoslavia, Romania and Finland (Konsepca „Międzymorza” i Polska polityka zagraniczna w latach 1936–39, 2012). For Poland it can be the best opportunity to create a buffer of safety between her and Russia (Okulewicz, 2001, p.13–15). However Piłsudski also expressed the need of establishing cooperation, a political – military agreement with this states, to support them and create a true possibility of deterrence. In opinion of Aleksandra Łaska the main sense of Piłsudski’s policy can be expressed in sentence, that “polish independence, in early years after it regaining, supposed to be build on the independence of states in region federated with her, also their independence, should be built on polish” (Łaska, 2012).

In Piłsudski’s theory Intermarium would be a defensive alliance, to protect foremost Poland but also other allied countries from Russia. The idea had deteriorated after Polish – Russian war in 1920 and annexing Ukraine by Bolshevik Russia.

In other form this theory were continued by the minister of foreign affairs Józef Beck. In document of Ministry of Foreign Affairs titled “Rules of polish policy in Central Europe and Balkans” the unknown author describe main assumption of polish foreign policy at that time as the necessarily of creating a space between Germany and Russia to fully develop political ability the Poland (Łaska, 2012). Underling was the fact that named countries have expansionist nature, states between them must create a way to neutralize this destructive aspirations. “It envisaged Poland as a regional power and leader to the countries situated between the two threatening countries: the USSR and Germany” (Grzechnik, 2014, p.88).

The time of soviet domination in central and east Europe effectively prevents any attempt to implementing this concept. After 1989 it was revived. In 1994 was established the League of Intermarium States Parties however it worked till end of 90s’ and did not influence broader on policy of any engaged countries (Iszczuk, 2014, p.9–10).

The history of Intermarium can be understood in short as the opposition towards Russian expansion, which taking under consideration war in Georgia in 2008 or situation in Ukraine since 2014 seems to be more than actual. However gathering so many diverse countries in one alliance based on culture and common threat of Russia can be not enough to repulse the threat.

To systematize, in many configuration, Intermarium assumes an alliance of countries between Adriatic, Black and Baltic Seas (in polish: koncepcja ABC – morze Adriatyckie, Bałtyckie i Czarne). It covers with the idea of Great Poland from sea to sea, as it was in time of Commonwealth prosperity. History of this region shows that the risk of invasions and wars are highly probable and the solitary defense was never possible. Geopolitical determinants like a large number of small and medium-sized countries, lack of major natural barriers, especially on the European Plain, which for ages serve as invasion superhighway (Ukraine's Geographic Challenges, 2014) shows that in these countries vital interest lies the necessity of creating a good strategy of survival.

Poland in concept of Intermarium was and still is a main state, on which such alliance is based, as the biggest country in region, with relatively stable economy and big population. "For Poland, the existence of a powerful Germany and Russia poses an existential problem, the ideal solution to which is to become a buffer that Berlin and Moscow respect. A secondary solution is an alliance with one for protection. The latter solution is extremely difficult because dependence on Russia or Germany invites the possibility of absorption or occupation. Poland's third solution is to find an outside power to guarantee its interests" (Poland's strategy, 2012). Before first world war Poland politicians believe that such guarantors can be France and Great Britain. Now not only on polish political scene we can observe a turn towards United States, as a strategic ally and the guarantor of security of NATO members. George Friedman, an American political scientist also in his book *Next decade* underlined the necessity of strengthen Poland and the region. However ensures and scientists theories can be insufficient in case of crisis.

As Chodakiewicz claimed the territory of Intermarium is

"culturally and ideologically most compatible with American national interest and political culture as the inheritor of the freedom and rights stemming from the legacy of the Polish – Lithuanian/Ruthenian Commonwealth. Second it is the regional pivot and a gateway to both East and West. Third, since the Intermarium is the most stable part of the post-Soviet area (and the most free and democratic) the United States should focus on solidifying its influence there to use it as a springboard to handling the rest of the successor states, including in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Russian Federation itself" (Chodakiewicz, p.11–12).

The possibility that American support can increasing the cooperation between Intermarium countries is rather uncertain. However arising of a strong bloc of states in eastern Europe, is consistent with the interest of USA. In the face of weakening the US position in the world, improving relations between Erdogan and Putin, unfavorable situation on Middle and Far East, increasing the cooperation between Germany and Russia, caused the emergence of need to look for new possibilities. This may mean but not necessarily a new chance for Intermarium.

POLISH FOREIGN POLICY OVERVIEW

Year 1989 was significant not only for Poland and post-Soviet region, but for whole world. New reality created by collapse of USSR influence on many countries, especially those which arise from the soviet bloc. The freedom which all post-soviet states seeks brings many challenges, like building their statehood from beginning, also the foreign policy. Expressing on international area states aspirations, position, interests, establishing a relationship are crucial for its existence.

Foreign policy has many definition, but shortly we can understand it as a particular country government or other state authority actions toward other states, or non-state actors. This definition was also shared by Joseph Frankel (Frankel, 1963, p.1). This policy branch is concentrate on national interest. Its obvious fact that every state in the world has its own interest, so essence of foreign policy lies in the endless confrontation of this interests (Łoś-Nowak, 2008, p.76). On the other hand Roman Kuźniar understand foreign policy as “organized and concentrate on external environmental effort of the state, subordinate to achieving its vital interests”(Kuźniar, 2000, p.112).

One of the most important vital interest is security. It can be understand as state sovereignty or territorial integrity, but still it is about to reduce to minimum the threats for state. In most of strategies of national defense we can read that participation in collective system of defense, in international political and economic organizations makes direct conflict becomes unprofitable and thus relatively increases illusory feeling of safety. To achieve it for many years polish foreign policy focused on becoming NATO and EU member.

Seeking of safety is not the only desire of nations and states. Foreign policies are determined by many different factors. We can distinguish many determinants like the international environment, which especially in central and east Europe after 1989 has been complicated, in result of emergence of new states. These determinants are also the size of country, population, political system, economy, natural resources, and relations with neighbors (Łoś-Nowak, 2008, p.78–80). Despite the determinants, which influence on process of formulating the foreign policy, sometimes it is create by subjective factors, like the prestige or when specific country want to play bigger role in international relations with lack of economic or military potential.

Every country to lead a coherent, comprehensible and logical for other entities policy must primarily identify and understand its own needs, interests and aims. Without it, formulate them into a strategy of foreign affairs as well as it implementation will be impossible.

INTERMARIUM IN POLISH FOREIGN POLICY

The idea of Intermarium in some sense is realized through Eastern Partnership or Visegrad Group. The main point which connect this political concepts is not only the geographical correlation, but foremost the idea of cooperation and common support in safety and energetic security.

Visegrad Group (V4) were create as a partnership for post-soviet countries to increasing their attempts to become a member of European Union. Creation of such group was possible by sharing common goals of foreign policy and similar possibilities to achieve. Coordination of activities and consult role of this organization is unquestionable. Join accession to EU this

countries in 2004 did not mean the end of V4. Still changing geopolitical and geostrategic conditions create a necessity of creating something more than only consultant group.

Eastern Partnership was a big step toward increasing the cooperation between European Union and her eastern neighbourhood. Poland's interest in such development was undeniable. Not only to build stable and strong states on our east border, but also to pull away countries like Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, from Russian sphere of influence. The danger flowing from attempts to rebuild the "near abroad" was confirmed beyond any doubt after war in Ukraine in 2014. Polish foreign policy as well as international environmental must be dynamic and must quickly adapt to changing circumstances. That is why Eastern Partnership as much as Visegrad Group in this condition and shape are no longer sufficient.

Intermarium in Radosław Sikorski policy. Radosław Sikorski as a Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the government of Donald Tusk represents the general pro-European strategy which was consequently realized since 2007 till 2015. Implementation of polish aims was possible only in cooperation inside the EU, which was clearly shown also in economic policy in that time. This was received as the abandonment of so-called Jagiellonian policy in favors of Piast policy. Changing the orientation in strategic directions of foreign policy from eastern to waster was clear. However, what must be underlined, even though Sikorski put more attention toward inter European relations, in his first expose many times he mentioned Belarus and other eastern countries.

In 2010 Radosław Sikorski, on conference "Achievements and Perspectives of the Eastern Partnership" in Warsaw (5.11.2010) declare that Poland after accession in EU structures never turn away from East, which exemplified in creating Eastern Partnership. In his presentation he declare that Poland expected far reaching cooperation, not only in increasing visa liberalization or signing the Association Agreements, but also in implementation of economic development plans (Grajewski, 2010). In that time he broadly defined what can look like polish eastern policy.

In 2013 in another speech in parliament (Information of Ministry of Foreign Affairs about aims of polish foreign policy in 2013, 2013) he put some pressure on relations with Ukraine and Russia, but almost totally skip other countries from Eastern Partnership (Information of Ministry of Foreign Affairs about aims of polish foreign policy in 2013, 2013). In his presentation Sikorski found place for countries like Burma, Chile or Nigeria, but not for Georgia, Armenia or Moldova. What cannot be unmentioned, former Minister, speak also about Visegrad Group. In his words the potential of economic and social growth of this region will influence on Europe, according to relation: strong Poland in Europe is the stronger V4 Group in Europe (Nieczypor, 2013).

That show, despite the fact the intensity of this relation decreased, they were still present, but unfortunately only on paper. We could observe voices both from political scene and from academic researchers that eastern policy in government of Tusk was rather ignored. We can observe also a discussion on whether this was abandoned or continued the so called conception of Parisian "Kultura". This exemplified in three main points, support the independence of Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus, implementation of the idea of "the East" as bridge rather than bulwark of European civilization an abandoned of polish-Russian competition under dominance in Easter Europe (Frenkel, 2016, p.88). Staying in mainstream of European policy (Musiałka, 2012, p.282) encourages conducting the eastern partnership under common interest of EU rather than individual aims of Poland. In that time not only the importance

and intensity of Visegrad Group has decreased but also the idea of Intermarium was not a part of public agenda.

Intermarium in Lech Kaczyński policy. The government led his own policy, while the President Lech Kaczyński (who was supported by the opposition, conservative party Law and Justice) implement the historical policy with the strong role of cooperation with states on our eastern and southern border.

“It was especially demonstrated in the area of energy cooperation, as Kaczynski initiated a series of meetings between Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Romania and the Baltic States. He wanted to pursue diversification of energy suppliers and an open European market to the Azeri producers via Odessa-Brody-Gdansk pipeline. Through his visits and assurances of highest estimation, Kaczynski strived to establish a network of contacts between the Polish and Caucasian elites. He also looked further in his ambitions in the hope of using opportunities offered by Kazakh energy resources” (Szelachowska, 2016).

Lech Kaczyński policy can be connected with Giedroyć and Mieroszewski thoughts. The essence of such believes was that the sovereignty of Poland cannot be built without the independence of Lithuania, Belarus or Ukraine. Still he underlined that this do not stand in oppose to good relations with Russia. Going further, peace and stability in region cannot be achieved without Kremlin support. However Russia should settle with her communist and imperial past, live in mutual respect with her neighbours and once for all abandon the attempts to rebuild her sphere of influence on region of central and east Europe.

Kaczyński's policy focused on historical and regional aspects. Even though his foreign policy toward East was consider as rather utopia, he think that his attempts to bound with Poland countries, which historically were important for us, has a specified aims (Idea i myśl Lecha Kaczyńskiego). He put the most significant pressure on energetic security – which now is the core of Andrzej Duda Three Seas conception.

One of the point of this concept – to oppose aggressive Russia – gains its timeliness after 2014. Still it seems that Sikorski as much as Schetyna did not see the threat of negligence of polish eastern policy. Lack of proportionality between Eastern and Western foreign policy has it consequences not only during war in Georgia but also beyond our direct abroad-Ukraine. During war in Georgia in 2008 Lech Kaczyński together with presidents from Baltic States and Ukraine came to Tbilisi to manifest the solidarity with Georgia. Although this visit has no any significant results, war in Georgia push her away from euro-Atlantic area, it was a manifestation of support, even if symbolic.

Intermarium in Andrzej Duda policy. After Kaczyński's presidency the Intermarium was absent in polish foreign policy till new president Andrzej Duda, who was elected in May 2015.

“As of 2015, Polish President Duda's foreign policy direction has been interpreted as reminiscent of Intermarium. By proposing strong ties with Sweden, the Baltic States, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania, Duda is attempting to recreate the Polish long-life plan of building a natural defensive alliance among like-minded neighbours in the face of the Russian threat, and with NATO military support” (The Rebirth of the Prometheans and Intermarium, 2016).

Main assumptions of Duda's presidency can be summary to strengthening cooperation with EU and NATO and continuing to build the international relations, with emphasis on strengthening regional cooperation. The second priority is expressed by attempts of President to rebuild Intermarium, as new concept of regional cooperation named Three Sea. This cooperation has primarily economic and energetic dimension, and is not a competitive block for Old Europe. The aim of such cooperation, what was many times underlined by polish authorities, is to increase the potential of central and east Europe, to catch up historical backwardness.

First foreign visit of president Duda took place in 23rd August 2015 to Estonia. This visit had a huge symbolic dimension. Estonia as one of the Baltic States, with relatively strong and numerous Russian minority and possessing territory that is strategically impossible to defend, have harsh relations with Russia. Cyber-attack on Estonian public administration, bank sector, media and other strategic systems in 2006 shows that Moscow attempts to regain her power (Traynor, 2007). This visit outlined the framework of future presidency of Andrzej Duda. Remarkable is fact what is the profile of foreign visits President of Poland. In almost 40% of cases the direction of visits is central and east Europe: Croatia (2), Slovenia (1), Hungary (3), Czech (1), Bulgaria (2), Romania (1), Slovakia (4), and Baltic states (1). It looks similar in case of visits foreign notables in Poland, which is more than 30%. Meaningful is fact that president of Croatia Kolinda Grabar – Kitarović has visited Poland four times till July 2017.

As was mentioned one of priority of Duda is regional cooperation. Nevertheless President of Poland often visits also west Europe, Germany, France, Belgium, and Great Britain. This shows that the direction of international relations of this presidency is balanced.

What must be underline is fact that the Intermarium in Józef Piłsudski's thoughts are rather impossible to create. The new political concept is no longer based on symbolical factors and political willingness to cooperate. Current Intermarium is based on energetics, transport, logistic, economy, to create a strong block of developed countries, with competitive potential, as strong pillar of EU. This is common for Kaczyński and Duda policy, is fact that they base the Three Seas cooperation on safety and energetic stability.

Next presidential visit in 12th June 2017 in Croatia were another step toward realization of political concept. On first summit of Three Seas Initiative "president Duda stressed that cooperation should be extended to other areas to be sufficiently strong: culture and science as well as student exchanges must come to reinforce this cooperation. But the heart of this cooperation is the creation of a true north-south European axis" (The Three Seas Initiative: Central and Eastern Europe takes charge of its own destiny, 2016).

Increasing the scale of relations with Croatia can be one of the most meaningful pillars of Three Seas which shows events that took place in second summit in Warsaw 5th July 2017, on which president Donald Trump was present. Again visit of USA president on regional summit in symbolic sense is a huge achievements of polish diplomacy, however in politics most important are facts. What are facts about countries lying between the Baltic, Adriatic and Black seas. Big area, Intermarium states are 28% of all EU territory, 22% of population, not more than 10% of EU GPB (The Three Seas Initiative: Central and Eastern Europe takes charge of its own destiny, 2016), and enormous dependence from Russian energetic materials – average 50–60% (in Estonia or Bulgaria its almost 100%) (Wiech, 2017). That shows what potential lies in attempts to provide a diversification on energetic market of central and east

Europe. Chance to develop energy infrastructure in region and to provide new supplies, can change the negotiating position with Russia. Supply of so called blue fuel is one of the pillars of Three Seas. Valid aim is to open the European market on new non-Russian gas supplies. New Polish port of reloading and regasification of liquefied natural gas in Świnouście and planned Croatian port of similar significance on island Krk. Possessing terminals will not determine the development of Three Seas or increasing the independence from Russian energetic blackmail. Building the expanded pipeline network and commercial links between countries can influence to changing unfavorable relation with Russia.

This economic blackmail or the manipulation of prices is typical actions of Kremlin and Gazprom. Such practices should rise in every state depend from Russian gas objections and create in political elite's necessity of diversification. However when Donald Trump discuss about new energetic possibilities, Hungary conclude a new contract with Gazprom. Similarly Austrian OMV – main gas company – participate in Nord Stream, which shows that they rather will be not interested in sabotaging this project by supporting Polish aspirations. Also Bulgaria, which is in 100% dependent from Russian gas, is more willingness to cooperate with Russia rather than invest in not yet ready Three Seas energetic program. Particular interests, skepticism and the lack of a forward-looking vision can be the factors that will slow down the Intermarium. In V4 in the most favorable situation are Czech Republic, which has already developed a diversity of supplies, and is not fully depend from Russia (2% – own production of gas, 30–35% from Norway, 5–7% Germany (Kafan, 2013). Therefore, for them, also do not exist an existential need to build whole international system of energetic diversification.

Baltic states market even if not the biggest (Lithuania – about 3 billion m³ gas, Estonia 700 million m³, Latvia 1,7 billion m³) are in significant majority depend from Russia. That's way Vilnius invest in Floating Storage and Regasification Unit (FSRU) in port in Klaipėda (Litewski pływający terminal LNG dotarł do Zatoki Perskiej, 2014), which allows to transport gas from Norway, and in perspective from USA and Qatar (Hyndle-Hussein, 2014). Despite looking for alternatives still at least ¼ of Lithuanian needs are provided by Gazprom. That is why authorities from both sides search possibilities to cooperate, which is expressed by for example the Gas Interconnector Poland-Lithuania (GIPL), the common project of Gaz-System and the Lithuanian transmission operator Amber Grid.

“The first proposal concerns the European Union's financial support for planning and design work for the interconnector, which may be up to 50% in accordance with regulations. On the other hand, funding for the construction phase covered by the second request can be up to 75% of eligible costs. In October 2013, the European Commission granted GIPL the status of a project of Community importance. Estimated value of the project is 558 million euro (including 422 million in Polish part). The interconnector should be launched in 2023. The gas pipeline linking both countries will allow access not only to the Lithuanian transmission network and to the gas pipelines in Latvia, but above all to the underground gas tanks near Riga, which will contribute to increasing gas security in the region” (Skołucka, 2014).

Another state which can gain a great deal on Intermarium is Ukraine. Kiev need twice more gas than Poland, almost 35 billion m³ blue fuel, which makes him a biggest market in central and east Europe. The lack of invitation for our eastern neighbor on Three Seas summit in Warsaw could cause astonishment, however 9th July Secretary of State Rex Tillerson visit

Kiev, which shows that Ukraine is another direction of US diplomacy. In July Petro Poroshenko proposed creating the international consortium that would control the gas transport system running through Ukraine. The idea is to be an alternative to the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline bypassing Ukraine, what can permanently complicate receiving gas (Nieczypor, 2017).

Russian monopoly on central and east European gas market shows that energetic aspect can make not only new business agreements but also new political and economic bounds. Looking on Intermarium by prism of interests of particular states shows that this conception does not quite reflect the whole central and east Europe. Even the business character of this group does not reflect the needs, and despite the Polish attempts to United States between seas to oppose aggressive politics of Russia seems to be shared by all mentioned countries.

Intermarium in Beata Szydło government policy. The concept of Intermarium is widely present and accented also by Prime Minister Beata Szydło government. Polish policy in region cannot be defined only by Eastern Partnership, eastern policy, Visegrad Group or Three Seas initiative. This must be considered holistically.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Witold Waszczykowski in his speeches frequently underline the importance of regional cooperation, foremost increasing cooperation inside Visegrad Group and conception of Three Seas. Similarly as it was analyze in case of President of Poland we can observe an increased activity in the field of foreign visits. Only in 2016, we can observe a large number of meetings, both realized by Prime Minister or Minister of Foreign Affairs (Inter alia in 2016: 23rd March, 9th June, 27th June, 26th August, 9th September, 14th September, 10th October, 2nd December, 8th November, 11th November).

Minister of Foreign Affairs in his expose in 2015 describe the most significant priorities for his department. In that list we can distinguish reinforcement role of Poland in EU and NATO, ensure the security of Poland, countries on eastern flank of NATO, and whole Europe, partnership relations with China, increasing the efforts of our diplomacy in Africa and widely understood eastern policy. The last element is not only the part of European neighbourhood policy, but also cooperation and integration in region, which can be implemented by V4 and Three Seas. Poland must support sovereignty and reforms in Ukraine and influence on revival of relationship between Europe and Belarus. Such rapprochement on line EU (Poland) – East, is meaningful not only in prism of security in region, but also in case of political stability and economic growth of Europe. Partnership with Belarus is another direction of Polish diplomacy. For Poland important are activities oriented on infrastructure and improvement of border control or border traffic. Expose from 29th January 2016 Waszczykowski also mentioned about association agreements with Georgia, Moldavia or Ukraine, and continuing to promote cooperation with Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan. South Caucasus is crucial in Russian foreign policy, by concerning this region as part of “near abroad”, which as was mentioned has significant meaning in Russia attempts to rebuild her power.

15th November 2016 in speech at the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, Waszczykowski, said that “the largest regional initiative is the Three Seas Initiative, which connects states from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea and the Adriatic” (The Three Seas Initiative: Central and Eastern Europe takes charge of its own destiny, 2016). 9th February 2017 he again claimed that for Poland significant meaning has the active regional policy and implementing into life the conception of Three Seas. In Polish interest lies accomplish the growth on level typical for

Western Europe. Also in this speech mentioned about Ukraine and Belarus, and the stability in region, what is crucial for development of Poland.

Of course, even the most significant, but still symbolic political meetings, speeches or declarations will not build strong structures. Interest of particular countries determines their foreign policy and aims which they attempt to achieve. It seems to be obvious for Polish authorities, who build the Three Seas, that they cannot create it directly on the foundation of Piłsudski's Intermarium. Not because it is outdated, but crucial assumptions still connects the states from Central, East and South Europe, like cultural closeness, historical experiences or geopolitical factors. Current initiative is not directed against Russia. Nevertheless these countries are aware of threat from Russian attempts to rebuild her old sphere of influence and an existential danger for state sovereignty, which shows the example of Georgia or Ukraine.

SUMMARY

Dynamic and variable international environment causes that states must adapt to new conditions. The Three Seas Initiative seems to be an adequate and modern answer for economic interests of involved countries and for political threats. What must be underlined Three Seas as new energetic-economic concept of cooperation is not directed against European Union, Germany or Russia. Main aim is to "catch up" the old Europe in economic but also in civilization aspects. Also what were many times underlined by for example Polish Minister of National Defense, or by former adviser for the National Security of President Obama general James L. Jones, who said that "Three Seas Initiative must be an element not only for European development but also for security" (The Three Seas Initiative: Central and Eastern Europe takes charge of its own destiny, 2016).

Russia by her aggressive foreign policy, not only connected with present war in Ukraine, annexation of Crimea, fought for being the only power in her geographical "near abroad", energetic blackmail, and European total addiction from Russian gas creates the insecurity in post-soviet area. Increasing the cooperation and integration between countries lies between Adriatic, Baltic and Black Seas gives not only real profits in the form of development of infrastructure or increasing economic bonds, but for most brings the possibility of future energetic independence. Central, east and south Europe energetic market is large, and still develop, constantly need more resources. This brings the threat that in future, as it was in past, Russia can slow down growth of named countries through unfavorable prices of raw materials or interruptions in deliveries.

Nevertheless Three Seas has no solid construction. Of course it has its historical roots, strong scientific and academic theory, based on ULB Giedroyc and Mieroszewski or Piłsudski conceptions. However, through years countries did not create any strong structural frameworks for Three Seas. Visegrad Group could be foundation, if it would present unitary line of policy, and has bigger meaning in region, than only informal group of exchanging thoughts. We can distinguish some issues, about which V4 has rather homogenous opinion like migrant crisis, but it is not enough to build on it stable community combined not only on temporary but on long-term interest based on common values.

Even if Three Seas will at least for now, based on strictly economic, energetic aims, this means this initiative will need investors. This is big opportunity for foreign investors from United States (latest visit of Donald Trump) or from China, to explore new markets. Central,

eastern and southern Europe need funds to develop, president of Croatia estimated that they need 50 billion Euros to catch up Old Europe. Poland increasing the investment in infrastructure not only energetic like LNG terminal in Świnouście, planned Central Communication Port, or another LNG terminal in Gdańsk, but also invest (almost 30 billion zlotys) in Via Carpathia, road which can improve transport and trade between the countries of the region.

Polish foreign policy since 2015 significantly strengthened the relations with countries beyond our eastern and southern border. Initiatives which polish authorities promote not only in Europe but on global scale, can bring in future positive results. Also Poland builds her stability, energetic and military security by tightening ties with countries like Baltic states, Visegrad Group, Croatia and many other. As it was mentioned in Piłsudski's conception Poland can no build her own sovereignty without sovereignty of her neighbours, sovereignty not only understand in political meaning, as territorial integrity. Warsaw is strongly connected with her region, not only by traditions, culture, common history, but also by interest. Appropriate foreign policy, reliable and accurate action of polish President and government can be key to create Three Seas not only as academic theory.

REFERENCES

- Adomeit, H. (2011, May 1). *Russia and its Near Neighbourhood: Competition and Conflict with the EU*. Department of European Interdisciplinary Studies, Natolin Research Papers. Retrieved July 7, 2017, from <https://www.coleurope.eu/research-paper/russia-and-its-near-neighbourhood-competition-and-conflict-eu>.
- Chodakiewicz, M.J. (2012). *Intermarium. The land between Black and Baltic Sea*. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers.
- Frankel, J. (1963). *The making of foreign policy*, London: Oxford University Press.
- Frenkel, M. (2016). *Polityka wschodnia ministra spraw zagranicznych Radosława Sikorskiego – kontynuacja czy odejście od koncepcji paryskiej „Kultury”*. Retrieved July 8, 2017, from <http://dspace.uni.lodz.pl:8080/xmlui/handle/11089/19004>.
- Musiałka, P. (Ed.) (2012). *Główne kierunki polityki zagranicznej rządu Donalda Tuska w latach 2007–2011*, Kraków: Wydawnictwo eSPe.
- Grajewski, Ł. (2010, October 15). *Polska: Jaka wizja na przyszłość dla Partnerstwa Wschodniego – relacja*. Retrieved July 7, 2017, from <http://www.eastbook.eu/2010/10/15/polska-jaka-wizja-na-przyszlosc-dla-partnerstwa-wschodniego-relacja/>.
- Grzechnik, M. (2014). *Intermarium: the Baltic and the black seas on the polish mental maps in the interwar period*, The Romanian Journal for Baltic and Nordic Studies, Vol. 6, Issue 1, 81–96.
- Hyndle-Hussein, J. (2014, November 5). *Litewski terminal LNG – Independence?* Retrieved 10 July, 2017, from <https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2014-11-05/litewski-terminal-lng-independence>.
- Idea i myśl Lecha Kaczyńskiego*. Retrieved October 23, 2017, from <http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum-lecha-kaczynskiego/idea-i-mysl-lecha-kaczynskiego/>.
- Information of Ministry of Foreign Affairs about aims of polish foreign policy in 2013*. (2013, March 20). Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych. Retrieved 10 July, 2017, from <http://>

- www.ms.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/wiadomosci/informacja_ministra_spraw_zagranicznych_o_zadaniach_polskiej_polityki_zagranicznej_w_2013_roku.
- Iszczuk, W. (2014). *Czas na Intermarium*, Głos Polonii, nr 9–10, 30–35.
- Kałań, D. (2014, March 14). *Okno na Zachód: znaczenie czeskiego rynku gazu ziemnego dla krajów V4*, Biuletyn PISM, 24, (1000), 1–2. Retrieved 10 July, 2017, from https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=13177.
- Koncepcja „Międzymorza” i Polska polityka zagraniczna w latach 1936–39.* (2012, 17 May). Retrieved 11 July, 2017, from <http://jpilsudski.org/artykuly-ii-rzeczpospolita-dwudzie-stolecie-miedzywojnie/polityka-zagraniczna-dyplomacja/item/2119-koncepcja-miedzy-morza-i-polska-polityka-zagraniczna-w-latach-1936-39>.
- Krasuski, J. (1985). *Międzywojnami. Polityka zagraniczna II Rzeczypospolitej*. Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy.
- Kuźniar, R. (2000). *Międzynarodowe stosunki polityczne*. In Halizak E. & Kuźniar R. (Eds.), *Międzynarodowe stosunki polityczne. Geneza. Struktura. Dynamika* (pp.14–29) Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.
- Litewski pływający terminal LNG dotarł do Zatoki Perskiej.* (201, July 24). Retrieved 15 July 2017, from <http://www.cire.pl/item,96816,1,0,0,0,0,litewski-plywajacy-terminal-lng-dotarl-do-zatoki-perskiej.html>.
- Łaska, A. (2012). „Trzecia Europa”, czyli idea Międzymorza. Retrieved 11 July 2017, from <http://www.stosunkimiedzynarodowe.pl/trzecia-europa-czyli-idea-mi%C4%99dzymorza>.
- Nieczypor, K. (2017, July 14). *Ukraina proponuje alternatywę dla projektu Nord Stream 2*. Retrieved 20 July 2017, from <http://www.energetyka24.com/629312,ukraina-proponuje-alternatywe-dla-projektu-nord-stream-2>.
- Nieczypor, K. (2013, March 20). *Polska polityka wschodnia w exposé ministra spraw zagranicznych*. Retrieved 12 July 2017, from <http://www.eastbook.eu/2013/03/20/polska-polityka-wschodnia-w-expose-ministra-spraw-zagranicznych-radoslaw-sikorskiego/>.
- Okulewicz, P. (2001). *Koncepcja „międzymorza” w myśli i praktyce politycznej obozu Józefa Piłsudskiego w latach 1918 – 1926*, Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie.
- Friedman, G. (2012, August 28). *Poland's strategy*. Retrieved 13 July 2017, from <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/polands-strategy>.
- Skolucka, K. (2014, October 30), *Litwa buduje gazową niezależność*. Retrieved 17 July 2017, from <http://jagiellonski24.pl/2014/10/30/skolucka-litwa-buduje-gazowa-niezaleznoscl>.
- Szelachowska, K. (2016, January 14). *The revival of Intermarium – Poland can talk the talk but can it walk the walk?* Retrieved 21 July 2017, from <https://www.stratfor.com/the-hub/revival-intermarium-poland-can-talk-talk-can-it-walk-walk>.
- Traynor, I. (2007, May 17). *Russia accused of unleashing cyberwar to disable Estonia*. Retrieved 9 July 2017, from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia>.
- The Three Seas Initiative: Central and Eastern Europe takes charge of its own destiny.* (2016, August 28). Retrieved 16 July 2017, from <https://visegradpost.com/en/2016/08/28/the-three-seas-initiative-central-and-eastern-europe-takes-charge-of-its-own-destiny/>.
- The Rebirth of the Prometheans and Intermarium*, (2016, March 14). Retrieved 18 July 2017, from <https://geopoliticalreview.alphainstitute.it/2016/03/14/the-rebirth-of-the-prometheans-the-baltic-black-sea-axis/>.
- Ukraine's Geographic Challenges.* (2014 September 3). Retrieved 19 July 2017, from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Eicrsq6K85I>.

- Washington returns to the Cold war strategy.* (2015, January 27). Retrieved 21 July 2017, from <https://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/washington-returns-cold-war-strategy>.
- Wiech, J. (2017, July 7). *Ile może Trójmorze, czyli realizm w czasach euforii.* Retrieved 17 July 2017, from <http://www.energetyka24.com/625697,ile-moze-trojmorze-czyli-realizm-w-czasach-euforii-analiza>.
- Łoś – Nowak, T. (Ed.) (2008). *Współczesne stosunki międzynarodowe*, Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego.