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SPEECH 



OF 



HON. ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS, 

OF GEORGIA, 



ON 



TH£ PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1856; THE COMPROMISE 
OF 1850; AND THE KANSAS-NEBRASKA ACT OF 1854. 



DELIVERED 



IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 6, 1857. 






. 



WASHINGTON: 

PRINTED AT THE OFFICE OF THE CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE. 

1857. 



SPEECH. 



The President's Annual Message being under consider- 
ation, on a motion to refer and print — 

Mr. STEPHENS said: . 

Mr. Speaker: I have no desire to prolong 
this debate. If the House had not manifested so 
decided an indisposition to take a vote the other 
day, I should have remained silent. A discussion 
on the President's message, and the subjects em- 
braced in it, on a motion to print and refer, such 
as this, commenced and continued as it has been, 
is unusual in this House. These topics are 
generally considered in Committee of the Whole 
after the message has been referred. But this 
discussion to me, thus far, has not been uninter- 
esting, and to the country, I trust, it will not be 
unprofitable. 

We have just passed an important crisis in our 
history — one of the most important, if not the 
most important, perhaps, in it. We are even 
now in the midst of events which will hereafter 
be marked as an epoch in the politics of the coun- 
try. The issues in the late Presidential election 
brought into array two great parties, (I shall 
speakonlyof two, because the contest was mainly 
between them,) organized upon principles well 
defined, well ascertained, and directly antago- 
mstical, hostile, and conflicting. Old parties were 
dismembered and broken up; and men who looked 
upon these^ principles thus put in issue as para- 
mount to all others, took their position accord- 
ingly, without reference to past associations, 
formed upon issues no longer vital or living. The 
principles entering into the canvass were clearly 
and openly proclaimed, and the issues on them 
squarely met on both sides. These issues in- 
volved the harmony, if not the stability of the 
Republic. I do not augment its importance when 
I say that the result was a fearful one. It was 
so considered and felt from one extremity of the 
Union to the other. The conflict is now over. 
The issue, so far as the election was concerned 
is now decided. The result is known. The 
immediate danger is past. The public mind, so 
lately wrought up to the highest degree of excite- 
ment 1S quieting; and we may do well, now that 



the campaign storm is over, and its perils sur- 
mounted, to recount some of the incidents, and as 
voyagers of another kind, take new reckonings 
for our future course. With these feelings I enter 
this debate. 

And may I not pause here in the beginning to 
congratulate the House— congratulate'the coun- 
try, and to congratulate even you, Mr. Speaker, 
against your will, upon our safe deliverance? 
Am I not right in assuming that the news of the 
result of the late election, which we are consider- 
ing, as it winged its flight through the land, made 
the great majority of the people throughout this 
vast Republic breathe freer, easier, and deeper, 
everywhere ? To men of every class it brought 
joy and gladness. To the plowman, as he was 
treading his furrow— to the mechanic, as he plied 
himself to his daily toil— to the merchant at his 
counter — to the banker at his desk— to the mari- 
ner, as he breasted the surges of the sea, as well 
as to the statesman pondering over questions of 
deep interest to all. To men of every grade and 
occupation, including some even of those, I be- 
lieve, who stood in opposition to those with whom 
I acted, all breathed freer and easier when the 
result was known. The whole country was re- 
lieved from an uncertain apprehension. Men felt 
relief. Trade felt it. Commerce felt it. Business 
in its every department— in its quickened energy 
and activity — in its various channels, felt it. 
And, sir, I can say for myself, I never addressed 
the House before upon any subject with greater 
personal gratification than I do at this time, in 
review of the questions which characterized the 
late contest, and the principles which I consider 
as having been sustained by the popular verdict 
rendered. 

Sir, what are those questions and principles? 
Let us look at them, and examine them according 
to their intrinsic merits. Some gentlemen seem 
not to understand them; some seem to overlook 
them; some seem not to appreciate them, or to 
underrate them; while others still seem disposed! 
to divert the mind from the great leading issues 
to minor points, and attempt to create the imprea- 



sion that the election turned upon the latter, and 
not the former, and that nothing of real and vital 
importance has been determined. The issues 
were dodged, say they, in some sections, and 
differently expounded in different sections. This 
is the case with the gentleman from Kentucky, 
[Mr. H. Marshall,] who so earnestly addressed 
the House a few days ago, and who I regret is 
not now in his seat. Hence his repeated sallies 
upon "squatter sovereignty," and the different 
opinions entertained by some persons at the 
North, as well as the South, touching the power 
of the Territorial Legislature of Kansas to 
exclude slavery. 

Now, sir, I do not intend to follow those who 
either ignore, overlook, underrate, or endeavor to 
divert attention from the main and essential facts 
of the case. In what I have to say to-day 1 shall 
come directly to the subject. I maintain that two 
great principles have been sustained and vindi- 
cated in the late election, both embracing a policy 
vital to the harmony of the two great sections of 
the country, and essential to the preservation and 
continuance of the Union of these States. 

These principles are: first, that there shall be 
no congressional prohibition of slavery in the 
common territory. This principle was openly, 
boldly, and universally advocated on the one side, 
and as fearlessly and fiercely denounced on the 
other. Besides this there was another principle, 
just as boldly and unequivocally maintained on 
one side, and as fiercely assailed, though not so 
openly denounced in convention, on the other; 
and that is, secondly, that new States arising and 
springing up in the common Territories may and 
shall be admitted as States into this Union either 
with or without African slavery, as the people 
therein may determine for themselves when they 
come to form their State constitution. These, 
sir, were the great and essential principles of the 
late contest. They were proclaimed at Cincin- 
nati, on the one side, in the following words: 

" Resolved, That claiming fellowship with, and desiring 
the cooperation of all who regard the preservation of the 
Union under the Constitution as the paramount issue, and 
repudiating all sectional parties and platforms concerning 
domestic slavery which seek to embroil the States and 
incite to treason and armed resistance to law in the Terri- 
tories,',and whose avowed purposes, if consummated, must 
end in civil war and disunion, the American Democracy 
recognize and adopt the principles contained in the organic 
laws establishing the Territories of Kansas and Nebraska, 
as embodying the only sound and safe solution of the 
'slavery question,' upon which the great national idea of 
the people of this whole country can repose in its determ- 
ined conservatism of the Union — non-intervention by Con- 
gress with slavery in State and Territory, or in the District 
of Columbia. 

" 2. That this was the basis of the compromises of 1850, 
confirmed by both the Democratic and Whig parties in 
national conventions, ratified by the people in the election 
of 1852, and rightly applied to the organization of Terri- 
tories in 1854. 

" 3. That by the uniform application of this Democratic 
principle to the organization of Territories, and to the ad- 
mission of new States, with or without domestic slavery 
as they may elect, the equal rights of all the States will be 
preserved intact, the original compacts of the Constitution 
maintained inviolate, and the perpetuity and expansion of 
this Union insured to its utmost capacity of embracing in 
peace and harmony every future American State that may 
be constituted or annexed with a republican form of gov- 
ernment." 

" Resolved, That we recognize the right of the people of . 



all the Territories, including Kansas and Nebraska, acting 
through the legally and fairly expressed will of a majority 
of actual residents, and whenever the number of their 
inhabitants justifies it, to form a Constitution with or with- 
out domestic slavery, and be admitted into the Unionnpon 
terms of perfect equality with other States." 

These principles involving the constitutional 
rights of nearly one half the States of this Union, 
and the equality of the States themselves, and 
without which the Union of the States cannot 
and ought not to be maintained, so clearly and 
distinctly set forth, and inscribed upon the ban- 
ners of one party, were just as distinctly contro- 
verted and assailed by their opponents in the 
canvass; for though the platform put forth by the 
other great party to which I allude, in its organ- 
ization at Philadelphia, says nothing about the 
admission of a slave State, yet their policy leads 
to the same result as if the denial had been openly 
proclaimed. Their principles were announced 
in the following words: 

" That the Constitution confers upon Congress sovereign 
power over the Territories of the United States for their 
government, and that, in the exercise of this power, it ie 
both the right and the duty of Congress to prohibit in the 
Territories those twin relics of barbarism— polygamy and 
slavery." , 

Thus, sir, was the issue distinctly made and 
joined. The friends of the Union under the 
Constitution on the one side rallied against the 
enemies of both, as I conceive, arrayed on the 
other. There was no dodging or evasion any- 
where, on the part of those at least who main- 
tained the constitutional right. The contest was 
fierce. The issue, so long as the result was 
doubtful, was well calculated to awaken fearful 
apprehensions. The battle was gallantly fought 
— the victory nobly won. Sectionalism has bee» 
signally rebuked and constitutionalism gloriovsly 
triumphant. Nor am I disposed to consider Cia 
victory thus achieved as a barren triumph onl> . 
It must and will tend to settle, if it has not per- 
manently settled, questions of the gravest import 
and highest importance. It has effectually re- 
affirmed upon a rehearing the principles estab- 
lished in 1850. That is a great point gained. The 
principle then adopted in our territorial policy 
was that there should be no congressional restric- 
tion against slavery in the Territories. 

The Wilmot proviso was put down and aban- 
doned; and the people settling and colonizing the 
public domain from all the States alike, without 
hindrance, limitation, or control by Congress, 
were left to form and mold their institutions with- 
out any restrictions except those imposed by the 
Constitution of the United States, with the right 
guarantied of being admitted into the Union either 
with or without slavery, as they might determine 
for themselves. This policy, adopted in 1850, 
being the basis of what is known as the compro- 
mise measures of that year, has, I say, been reaf- 
firmed. It was thought by many, on the adop- 
tion of this policy in 1850, that agitation upon the 
subject of slavery would cease, so far as the Ter- 
ritories were concerned, at least. But subsequent- 
events have shown that the snake was " scotched" 
only, not " killed;" and it may be now that it is 
only scotched again, and not yet killed . How this 
will be time must determine; but, judging from the 



past, we have reason to hope. The principles enter- 
ing into the contest between Mr. Jefferson and the 
elder Adams were not more clearly marked out, 
and squarely met on both sides, than they have 
been in this; nor were they, in my judgment, more 
essential to the preservation of the liberties of 
this country, upon constitutional principles, than 
the questions just decided; and hereafter, sir, in 
the distant future, if that bright future awaits us 
which I can but hope does, 1856 will be looked 
back to and dated from, just as 1801 has been in 
our past history. 

I stood by the policy adopted in 1850, and now 
I trust firmly established, not because I thought 
it gave the people of the South the full measure 
of their just rights, but for reasons and consid- 
erations which I need not now enumerate — for 
the same reasons I stood by it in 1854, when it 
was carried out in the Kansas-Nebraska bill; and 
for the same reasons, with a renewed steadfast- 
ness of purpose, I stood by it in its greatest peril 
in 1856. 

Much, sir, has been said about the Kansas bill 
in this debate. Much was said about it in the 
late canvass. It was the leading topic every- 
where, and its principles were made the turning 
point everywhere; indeed, the issue — the great 
issue in the contest, was made with the direct 
view of having its principles and policy approved 
and indorsed or rejected and repudiated by the 
people. It is because this measure, so directly in 
issue, has been so triumphantly sustained, that I 
so much rejoice in the result. No man can say 
that this issue was dodged. It was presented oy 
its friends in the organization of this House at the 
beginning of the last session. It was the basis of 
the organizational Cincinnati, and formed one of 
the most prominent features in the programme of 
principles there announced. And while it was 
not named in so many words in the Philadelphia 
programme, yet all know that the party there 
assembled was organized mainly in opposition to 
that measure and the principles upon which it 
was based. In the newspapers, and on the hust- 
ings, nothing was railed against so bitterly and 
unceasingly as the "iniquity," "the cheat," 
and "the infamy," of the Kansas bill. This 
measure, therefore, may be considered as one 
of the things most emphatically indorsed by the 
people in the late election. 

I am the more rejoiced at this, because I know 
something of the difficulties attending its passage 
— the violence, the passion , and fanaticism evoked 
against it. I well remember the opinions then 
given — that the North never would submit to it; 
and that the seats then filled by those who voted 
for it from that section would never again be 
filled by men of like sentiments. By indignant 
constituencies, such members were to be driven 
forever from the public councils: Forty-four mem- 
bers from the North in this House voted for the 
bill, only one of whom, I believe, acted with its 
enemies in the late struggle for its maintenance. 
To the present House, owing chiefly to causes I 
need not mention, only eighteen were returned 
from that section in favor of it. This was matter 
of great boast at the time. But, sir, to the next 
House we have forty-nine members already chosen 



from the North at the late elections, upon the 
distinct issue of their advocacy of this bill . This 
is five more than the number originally for it; the 
cause grows stronger instead of weaker. This is 
one of the results of the late election particularly 
gratifying to me in itself. It shows what men of 
nerve, with fidelity to the Constitution, relying 
upon the virtue, intelligence, loyalty, and patriot- 
ism of the people, can effect. Language would 
fail me in an attempt to characterize as they de- 
serve those sterling and noble spirits who bore 
the constitutional flag in the North against the 
popular prejudice and fanaticism of the people of 
their own section, in this contest. 

Sir, it is an easy thing for a man to drift along 
with the popular current. Any man can do that. 
Honors thus obtained are as worthless as they 
are cheap; but it requires nerve — it requires all 
the elements that make a man, to stand up and 
oppose men in their errors, and advocate truth 
before a people unwilling to hear and to receive 
it — to speak to those who " having ears hear not, 
and having eyes see not." History furnishes 
some examples of this sort; but the history of 
the world, in my judgment, has never furnished 
nobler and grander specimens of this virtue than 
the late canvass in the North. When a man 
discharges his duty upon any occasion, he de- 
serves respect and admiration; but when a man 
discharges his duty against the prevailing preju- 
dices of those around him, and even against his 
own natural feelings and inclinations, that man 
commands something higher than respect and ad- 
miration. The elder Brutus, who sat in judgment 
and pronounced sentence against his own son, 
silencing the adverse promptings of a father's 
heart, made himself the " noblest Roman of them 
all;" and those statesmen at the North to whom I 
allude, who had the nerve, in the crisis just passed, 
to stand up and vindicate the right, under the 
circumstances in which they were placed, give 
to the world an instance of the moral sublime in 
human action never surpassed before. Our his- 
tory furnishes no parallel with it. They bore 
the brunt of the fight. To them the preservation 
of the Republic is due; and if our Republic proves 
not to be ungrateful, they will receive patriots' 
rewards — more to be desired than monuments 
of brass or marble — honored names while living, 
and honored memories when dead. 

But eulogy is not my object at this time. I 
have to speak of principles on this occasion — not 
men; and I intend to speak particularly of the 
principles of the Kansas bill. This I do, because 
many affect not to understand them, and some 
say that different constructions arc put upon them 
by different people. This, sir, is the case with 
almost every act of legislation. The Constitu- 
tion itself is not free from the charge of admit- 
ting different constructions; but whatever differ- 
ence in construction may exist in reference to the 
Kansas bill, this difference arises not so much 
from the words of the bill as from the Constitu- 
tion. The gentleman from Kentucky to whom I 
alluded [Mr. H. Marshall] said he would have 
voted for it with one construction, and against it % 
with another. That the bill and its principles, 
with whatever construction, has been sustained 



6 



i by the elections, he and all must admit. The 
i question of repeal has been put to rest. . 
1/ Now, then, as to the nature, character, objects, 

effects, and principles of the bill. What does it 
do, and what was it intended to accomplish ? On 
this point I affirm and maintain that it did but 
carry out in good faith the principles and policy 
of the territorial acts of 1850, upon the subject 
of slavery— the New Mexico and Utah bills for 
winch that gentleman voted, and for the main- 
tenance of which both he and I were pledged, 
and for the maintenance of which both the old 
Whig and Democratic parties were most sol- 
emnly pledged. The gentleman admits that he 
stood pledged to carry out the principles of the 
New Mexico and Utah bills upon the subject of 
slavery. This is what I maintain the Kansas 
bill did, and that it is subject legitimately to the 
same construction upon the subject of slavery as 
those bills are, and none other. I have the bills 
all before me. Let us then compare them in all 
the essential particulars, so far as the vexed 
question of slavery is concerned. 

But before doing so, let me premise by restating 
what all must admit, that the basis of the policy 
adopted in 1850 was the abandonment of the 
"Wilmot proviso "—another name for congres- 
sional restriction, and the establishment of the 
principle of " non-intervention" by Congress, 
either for or against slavery in the Territories. 
The object was to stay the aggressive hand of 
this Government, and to quiet sectional agitation, 
by removing this cause of excitement from the 
halls of Congress, and leavirig the question, as to 
their domestic institutions, to be settled by the 
people to be affected by them at the proper time, 
and in the proper manner, under the Constitution 
of the United States; and that it should be no 
objection to the admission of any new State into 
this Union, because of its constitution recognizing 
or tolerating slavery. The principle of a division 
of the Territory proposed in 1820, having been 
repudiated by the North, a return to original 
principles was found to be the only safe solution 
of the question. With this view and object the 
New Mexico bill contains these clauses: 

"Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That all that portion 
of the territory of the United States bounded as follows » 
&c, &c, &c, " be, and the same is hereby, erected into'a 
temporary government, by the name of the Territory of 
NowMexico: Provided," &c, &c: " And provided further, 
lhat when admitted as a State, the said Territory, or any 
portion of the same, shall be received into the Union, with 
or without slavery, as their constitution may prescribe at 
the time ol admission." 

"Sec. 7. And be it further enacted, That the legislative 
power of the Territory shall extend to all rightful suhj, ,r< 
of legislation consistent with the Constitution of the United 
States and the provisions of this act." 

" Sec. 17. Jind be it further enacted, That the Constitu- 
tion and laws of the United States which are not locally 
inapplicable shall have the same force and effect within 
the said Territory of New Mexico as elsewhere within the 
United States." 

These are all the essential clauses in the New 
*?ex ico bl " upon the subject. Those in the Utah 
bill I need not read; for if not identical in words, 
they are in substance. I will now read the pro- 
visions of the Kansas bill on the same subject: 

"Sec. 19. Jlnd be it further enacted, That all that part of 
ine territory of the United States included witbin the fol- 



lowing limits," &c, &c, "be, and the same is herebv. 
created into a temporary government, by the name of the 
I erntory of Kansas ; and when admitted as a State or 
States, the said Territory, or any portion of the same, shall 
be received into the Union, with or without slavery as their 
constitution may prescribe at the time of their admission " 
Sec. 24. And be it further enacted, That the legislative 
power of the Territory shall extend to all rightful subjects 
Of legislation consistent with the Constitution of the United 
States, and the provisions of this act." 

" Sec 32. And be it further enacted," * * * « t i, a t 
the Constitution and all laws of the United States which 
are not locally inapplicable, shall have the same force and 
effect within the said Territory of Kansas as elsewhere 
within the United States, except the eighth section of the 
act preparatory to the admission of Missouri into the Union 
approved March 6, 1820, which being inconsistent with the 
principle of non-intervention by Congress with slaverv in 
r ,oin tes and T( ; rritori es, as recognized by the legislation 
of 18.J0, commonly called the compromise measures, is 
hereby declared inoperative and void ; it being the true in- 
tent and meaning of this act, not to legislate slavery into 
any Territory or State, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to 
eave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate 
their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only 
to the Constitution of the United States : Provided, That 
nothing herein contained shall be construed to revive or 
put in force any law or regulation which may have existed 
prior to the act of 6th of March, 1820, either protecting, 
establishing, prohibiting, or abolishing slavery." 

From this expose it will be seen how clearly 
the policy, marked out in the New Mexico and 
Utah bills in 1850, was followed in the Kansas 
and Nebraska bill in 1854. The clauses in that 
portion of the bill relating to Nebraska are iden- 
tical in substance with those I have read concern- 
ing Kansas. The second section of the* New 
Mexico bill is identical in substance with th* 
nineteenth section of the Kansas bill. The sev- 
enth section of the New Mexico bill, which con- 
fers power— and all the power possessed by th« 
Territorial Legislature under that bill— is identical 
in substance with the twenty-fourth section of 
the Kansas bill, conferring like powers upon the 
Territorial Legislature there. In both the power 
is granted to legislate upon all rightful subjects of 
legislation consistent with the Constitution of tlu 
United States, and the provisions of the organic 
act. All the powers the Legislature of New- 
Mexico holds, it possesses by virtue of the grant 
in the seventh section; and all the powers the 
Legislature of Kansas holds, is by virtue of a 
similar grant in the twenty-fourth section of the 
Kansas bill. If the Territorial Legislature, in 
the one case, .can rightfully exclude slavery, then 
11 can m the other; and if it cannot in New 
Mexico, then it cannot in Kansas; for the thirty- 
second section of the Kansas bill, about which 
so much has been said, on account of its repeal 
of the Missouri restriction, and its " squatter sov- 
ereignty" construction, confers no additional 
grant of power. This is so clear that argument 
to elucidate it is unnecessary. Then, why was 
it inserted? some have asked. This, it is said, 
is what has given rise to all the agitation. This, 
it is said, is what kindled anew the sectional 
strife, settled and quieted in 1850. This is what 
has been called the mischievous work of design- 
ing demagogues to promote their selfish purposes 
rivr ob J ects - Tilis is what a gentleman from Ohio 
[Mr. Sherman] said the other day was the " in- 
dignity" offered to the North, which conserva- 
tive men of that section, who stood upon the 
settlement of 1850, could not brook; and which 



£ave rise to that sectional, anti-slavery, and abo- 
lition organization, which has lately been so 
signally rebuked. Not so, Mr. Speaker. It may 
be that it was the occasion, but it was not the 
cause, of this agitation. That sprung from the 
.. till living anti-slavery opposition to the territorial 
rolicy adopted in 1850; for before these words 
in relation to the Missouri restriction were in the 
bill the agitation was commenced. 

These words, it will be remembered, were not 
in the original bill as it was reported to the Sen- 
ate; they were put in afterwards by way of 
amendment; and before the amendment was of- 
fered, and while the bill stood almost identically 
in words, certainly so in substance, with the 
New Mexico and Utah bills, so far as slavery 
is concerned, abolition denunciations against its 
provisions were commenced. The blood-hounds 
of fanaticism were already unleashed, and were 
heard in full cry on the track of those whose only 
and sole object was in good faith to carry out the 
territorial policy of 1850. This 1 say in vin- 
dication of the truth of history, as well as in 
defense of those whose motives, conduct, and 
patriotism have been so bitterly assailed by the 
Abolition leaders at the North, who were no less 
hostile to the New Mexico and Utah bills of 1850, 
than they were to the Kansas bill of 1854, and 
who denounced, abused, vilified, and aspersed 
the characters of those who advocated and de- 
fended the measures of 1850, as rancorously as 
they did those who voted for and sustained this 
particular clause of the Kansas bill in 1854. 

Why then, sir, were these words put in the 
thirty-second section of the bill? I will tell you. 
They were necessary and essential to carry out the 
policy of 1850. That had to be done in good 
faith, in spite of clamor, coming from whatever 
quarter it might. In the seventeenth section of 
the New Mexico bill, the Constitution and laws\ 
of the United States not locally inapplicable, were 
extended to that Territory. By the thirty-second 
section of the Kansas bill, the Constitution and 
laics of the United States not locally inapplicable, 
were, in the same way, extended to that Terri- 
tory. But in doing this it became absolutely 
necessary to except the eighth section of the act of 
1820. That section was a prohibition of slavery by i 
Congress in the Territory. It was the " Wilmot 
proviso" in effect. It was /oca/?!/ applicable to 
Kansas and Nebraska, for they were part of the 
Louisiana purchase to which that prohibition of 
slavery north of 36° 30' applied. Hence, if all 
the laws of the United States, not locally inap- 
plicable, had been extended to these Territories, 
it would have been a reenactment or reaffirm- 
ancc of congressional restriction, an abandon- 
ment of which was the basis of the territorial 
legislation of 1850. There was no such anterior 
law of the United States applicable to New Mex- 
ico and Utah, requiring an exception in those 
bills. The exception, therefore, in the Kansas 
bill, became absolutely necessary to maintain the 
Fame policy. The words used were the'proper 
ones for the occasion. They are, "except the 
eighth section of the act," &c, "which being 
inconsistent with the principle of non-intervention 
by Congress," &c, " as recognized by the legis- 



lation of 1850, commonly called the compromi?e 
measures, is hereby declared inoperative and 
void." The words that follow this exception 
are but explanatory of the effect of the exception 
itself, which was to leave the question of slavery 
in the Territories to the people, to manage, con- 
trol, and settle for themselves, subject to no 
restrictions but that of the Constitution of the 
United States. It removed the subject of slavery 
from the action of this Government, and left it 
where the bills of 1850 left it. This was the 
object, and this is the effect of the words. They 
give no additional power to the Territorial Legis- 
lature. This bill, therefore, does nothing but 
carry out the policy of 1850. And how any man 
who is in favor of the acts o/ 1850 can complain 
of, or be opposed to, the act of 1854, I cannot 
conceive. The Democratic party, as I have said , 
pledged themselves in 1852 to the maintenance 
of those acts. I have the resolutions of their con- 
vention before me. The Whig party, at Balti- 
more, did the same thing. They planted them- 
selves upon the territorial policy of 1850, as " a 
final settlement, in principle and in substance, of the 
subjects" to which the acts related; holding this 
policy to be " essential to the nationality of the 
Whig party, and the integrity of the Union," and 
they pledged themselves " to discountenance all 
attempts to continue or renew such agitation" — 
that is, slavery agitation on the territorial policy ' 
adopted in those bills — " whenever, wkerever, or 
however made." 

Now, sir, was a redemption of this pledge, to 
abide by the settlement " in principle and sub- 
stance," a renewal of the agitation? Was its 
redemption its own violation? Was the pledge 
intended to be redeemed, or was it but a mockery ? 
And here permit me to say, I do not treat this 
subject as a partisan. My object is not to build 
up one party, or to put down another, merely for 
party's sake. There are objects with me, I trust, 
higher and worthier, and more permanent, than 
the building up of any organization in the coun- 
try barely to hold office, or to " share the spoils," 
as they are termed. Parties I have little regard 
for, except so far as they, in my judgment, sub- 
serve, secure, and promote the best interests of 
die country. But what avail was the settlement 
of 1850, as a final one, and the principles then 
established, if they were not to be carried out in 
future legislation ? Sir, consistency , to say nothing 
of duty and patriotism, required it to be done. 
This is what was done; and this is what the late 
popular verdict requires shall be done in all future 
territorial bills. And if the gentleman from Ken- 
tucky, in fancy or otherwise, sees " squatter sov- 
ereignty," as he calls it, or the " power" of the 
Territorial Legislature to exclude slavery (as he 
defines that term to mean) in the Kansas bill, 
then he must see the same power and the same 
"squatter sovereignty" in the New Mexico and 
Utah bills, for which he voted, and which he still 
approves. If it is in the one, it is in the others. 
But he admits that, by his own construction, 
the Kinsas bill does not contain it. It is only 
to.be found, according to his opinion, in the con- 
struction of others. Well, whatever construction 
can be put upon the Kansas bill in this particu'- 



8 



lar, may be put upon the New Mexico and Utah 
bills; and the same men who do put this con- 
struction upon it put the same upon the others 
also. The gentleman, I imagine, cannot point 
to a single man in Congress, or out of Congress, 
who applies it to the one and not to the others. 
The doctrines they now hold in reference to the 
Kansas bill they held in 1850, and still hold in 
reference to the others. Their construction did 
not drive or prevent the gentleman from Ken- 
tucky [Mr. H. Marshall] then from voting for 
and sustaining those measures; nor will it drive 
or prevent me now from sustaining and defend- 
ing this one. In addition to this I may say, that 
most of those who hold the doctrine that the 
Territorial Legislatures can exclude slavery, do 
not derive the power to do so from the territorial 
bills at all; but they maintain it as an inherent, 
independent, and sovereign right of the people, 
not derived in any way from Congress. This is 
the essence of the doctrine of " squatter sove- 
reignty," about which we have heard so much 
lately, and about which gentlemen seem to have 
such indistinct ideas. 

The true import of this word can be best under- 
stood by recurring to its origin. It sprang from 
the idea advocated by some, that the people of a 
Territory were endowed with sovereign powers, 
inherently and independently of any action of 
Congress. This, it was said, would be recog- 
nizing sovereignty in the intruders and squatters 
upon the 'public domain. Hence, .the doctrine 
was dubbed "squatter sovereignty." No such 
doctrine is to be found either in the Kansas, 
Utah, or New Mexico bills. All the powers they 
can exercise they derive directly from this Gov- 
ernment, in their organic acts. All their machin- 
ery of government proceeds from us. They hold 
it by grant, and not by sovereign right. They 
hold from us, and through us, and not independ- 
ently of us. Their temporary governments were 
created or erected by us. Their legislative powers 
are exercised by permission — " ex gratia," not 
"ex debitojustitioz." All the rights and powers of 
government possessed by Congress over the Ter- 
ritories are granted to the people there — conferred 
upon them in the bills organizing their territorial 
government, and all the governmental power over 
them was thus granted; but the power to restrain, 
restrict, or prohibit slavery, or to prevent the 
immigration and diffusion of any class of Amer- 
ican population, is not, in my judgment, amongst 
those thus granted, for Congress does not possess 
this power to grant it. 

This, sir, is a Government of limited powers. 
All the powers it can rightfully exercise or confer, 
are such as are expressly delegated in the Con- 
stitution, and such as may be necessary to carry- 
out those which are expressly named. The 
power to govern the Territories, or to provide 
governments for them, is itself not one of those 
expressly granted. It is but an incident merely 
to some -of the expressly granted powers, and 
cannot go beyond the necessities attending the ex- 
ecution of the express powers in carrying out the 
specified objects for winch they were granted. The 
exclusion or restraining of slavery in the Territo- 
ries, or the permission of the immigration of one 



class to the exclusion of another, whether white 
or black, bond or free, was not amongst any of 
those objects, and is not a necessary incident in 
carrying any of them out. Nor is the exclusion of 
slavery included amongst the " rightful subjects" 
of legislation granted to the Territories, while 
the right to legislate on the subject may be; for 
the right to exclude is not embraced in the power 
to legislate upon the subject. To protect prop- 
erty is the duty of Government, and the power 
to do this does not include the power or right to 
destroy it; and to protect it may be a rightful 
subject of legislation, consistent with the Consti- 
tution of the United States, but not to destroy it. 
The people in the Territories have this right or 
power to regulate and protect, but not the other; 
for Congress, under the limitations of the Consti- 
tution, did not have that to give them. There is 
no such thing as sovereignty — absolute political 
sovereignty I mean — in the people of the Terri- 
tories, either by inherent right or by grant from 
Congress. There is no such sovereignty over 
the Territories even in Congress, or all the 
departments of the General Government com- 
bined. This resides in the peopfe of the separate 
States, as part of that residuum of powers not 
delegated by them in the Constitution, and which 
in that instrument are expressly reserved " to 
the States respectively or the people;" and 
passes out of them only in the mode provided 
for in the Constitution, which is on the admis- 
sion of new States. The public domain belongs 
to the people of all the States, as common 
property; and so long as it is under territorial 
government, should be subject only to such 
" needful rules and regulations," in its disposi- 
tion, as may be necessary for its free and equal 
use and enjoyment by all alike, and for its colo- 
nization and settlement by all alike, without any 
unjust discrimination against any, either by Con- 
gress or any territorial government they may 
institute, until the number of inhabitants may 
justify their admission into the Union as a State; 
and then, by the express terms of the Constitu- 
tion, they may be admitted, with as absolute 
sovereignty within their jurisdiction, as the other 
members of the Confederacy. Then, and in 
this way, the otherwise undelegated sovereignty 
of the whole people of the States respectively 
passes from them into the new State, upon her 
recognition and admission as a coequal in the 
Union. 

But I am asked: " Is not the Government of 
the United States sovereign ?" and " whether it 
is not the representative of the sovereignty of 
the people of the United States over the Terri- 
tories? In reply, I state, that the Government 
of the United States, in my judgment, is clothed 
with certain sovereign powers; but these powers 
are limited to specified objects. In the legitimate 
and proper exercise of these powers, to the ex- 
tent of their grant, it may be considered as sov- 
ereign or supreme as any other Government, jUst 
as sovereign as the Autocrat of Russia, in whom 
is concentrated all power; but these powers with 
which it is clothed, extend only to such subjects 
as are covered by the grant delegating them. 
Over all others, it has no power or authority to 



i) 



act at all. So far from being sovereign as to 
these, it is' perfectly impotent. It cannot right- 
fully exercise any authority whatever upon any 
matter not committed to its charge by grant from 
the people of the States respectively, and it can 
wield the sovereign powers of the people thus 
delegated to it only over such subjects, and to 
accomplish such objects, as the people have au- 
thorized it to exercise authority upon. To this 
extent it is the representative, or rather Jhe active 
and living embodiment of the sovereignty of the 
people. It is, in other words, the organ, or con- 
stitutes the channels through which their sover- 
eignty afts on the subjects specified in the grant 
of its powers. But the appropriation of the pub- 
lic domain to one class of citizens, to the exclu- 
sion of another, is not to be found in the scope 
of these powers, or the objects for which they 
were conferred. 

And as to its being the representative of the 
sovereignty of the people, in connection with the 
subject under consideration, I have but a word 
further in reply. Let me illustrate. The cor- 
porate authorities of any town or city are the 
representatives, to a certain extent, of those who 
belong to the municipality. They are the rep- 
resentatives to the extent of the powers conferred 
on them by their charter. Now, suppose adja- 
cent lands should become in any way the property 
of the corporation — the common property of 
all — in which every one in the town or city had 
an equal interest; and suppose that the charter 
(whence the authorities derive all their powers) 
conferred upon them no power to dispose of this 
comm'on property, except to make " needful rules 
and regulations concerning it, for the equal 
benefit of all: would any man maintain that 
the authorities in this case could appropriate the 
whole of it to one class of the citizens to the ex- 
clusion of another? or that they could empower 
any portion of the tenants in common getting 
upon it to exclude others ? I use this illustra- 
tion barely to show the character in which the 
General Government may be considered a rep- 
resentative of the sovereignty of the people of 
the United States over the common Territories. 
And for this purpose the analogy is good. The 
General Government holds the common property 
in the Territories as a trustee. The people of all 
the States are the " cestui que trust," and no act 
of the trustee, or those acting under the authority 
of the trustee, can rightfully exclude any, so long 
as the paramount authority, or absolute political 
sovereignty over the Territory, is in abeyance. 

But why pursue an argument to prove that the 
construction by some upon the Kansas bill, to 
which the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. H. 
Marshall] alluded, is wrong, and not legitimate? 
He admits it himself. But he said that, with 
the " squatter sovereignty" construction, or that 
which authorizes the Territorial Legislature to 
exclude slavery, the Kansas bill is no better to 
the South, practically, than the old Missouri re- 
striction which it took off; and with this con- 
struction he would not, for all practical purposes, 
so far as the rights of the South are concerned, 
give " the toss of a copper" between it and the 
positive congressional exclusion aimed at by those 



calling themselves Republicans. In this, sir, I 
am far from agreeing with him; for even with 
this construction — erroneous as I have shown it 
to be — the South has an equal chance, but before 
they had none; and under anti-slavery rule, such 
as that purty would subject us to, we would have 
none. 

But the practical point, looking to the probable 
prospect of any of these Territories becoming 
slave States, dwindles into perfect insignificance 
in view of the principle involved. That principle 
is one of constitutional right and equality, lis 
surrender carries with it submission to unjust and 
unconstitutional legislation, the sole object ot 
which would be to array this Government, which 
claims our allegiance, in direct hostility, not only 
to our interests, but the very frame work of our 
political organizations. Who looked to the prac 
tical importance of the " Wilmot proviso" to the 
South in 1850, when it was attempted to be fixed 
upon New Mexico and Utah, with half so much 
interest as they did to the principle upon which it 
was founded ? It was the principle that was so 
unyieldingly resisted then. It was this princi- 
ple, or the threatened action of Congress based 
upon it, which the whole South, with a voice 
almost unanimous, including the gentleman him- 
self, then said " They woiild not and ought not 
to submit to!" Principles, sir, are not only out- 
posts, but the bulwarks of all constitutional lib- 
erty; and, if these be yielded, or taken by superior 
force, the citadel will soon follow. A people who 
would maintain their rights must look to princi- 
ples much more than to practical results. The 
independence of the United States was declared 
and established in the vindication of an abstract 
principle. M r - Webster never uttered a great 
truth in simpler language — for which he was so 
much distinguished — than when he said, " The 
American Revolution was fought on a preamble." 
It was not the amount of the tax on tea, but the 
assertion (in the preamble of the bill taking off 
the tax) of the right in the British Parliament to 
tax the Colonies, without representation, that our 
fathers resisted; and it was the principle of unjust 
and unconstitutional congressional action against 
the institutions of all the southern States of this 
Union, that we, in 1850, resisted by our votes, 
and would have resisted by our arms if the wrong 
had been perpetrated. Those from the South 
who supported the New Mexico and Utah bills, 
did so because this principle of congressional 
restriction was abandoned in them. It was not 
from any confidence, in a practical point of view, 
that these Territories ever would be slave States. 
The great constitutional and essential right to be 
so if they chose was secured to them. That 
was the main point. This, at least, was the case 
with myself; for, when I looked out upon our vast 
Territories of the West and Northwest,! did not 
then, nor do I now, consider that there was or is 
much prospect of many of them, particularly the 
latter, becoming slave States. Besides the laws 
of climate, soil, and productions, there is another 
law not unobserved by me, which seemed to be 
quite as efficient in its prospective operations to 
giving a different character to their institutions, 
J. and that is the law of population. There were, 



10 



at the last census, near twenty millions of whites 
in the United States, and only a fraction over 
three millions of blacks, or slaves. The stock 
from which the population of the latter class 
must spring, is two small to keep pace in diffu- 
sion, expansion, and settlement with the former. 
The ratio is not much greater than one to seven, 
to say nothing of foreign immigration, and the 
known facts in relation to the tardiness with 
which slave population is pushed into new coun- 
tries and frontier settlements. Hence the greater 
importance to the South of a rigid adherence to 
principles on this subject vital to them. If the 
slightest encroachments of power are permitted 
or submitted to in the Territories, they may 
reach the States ultimately. And although I 
looked, and still look, .upon the probabilities 
of Kansas being a slave State, as greater than I 
did New Mexico and Utah, yet I voted for the 
bill of 1854, with the view of maintaining the 
principle much more than I did to such practical 
results. As a southern man, considering the re- 
lation which the African bears to the white race 
in the southern States, as the very best condition 
for the greatest good of both; and as a national 
man, looking to the best interests of the country, 
the peace and harmony of the whole by a preser- 
vation of the balance of power, as far as can be 
(for after.all, the surest check to encroachments 
is the inability to make them,) I should prefer to 
see Kansas come into the Union as a slave state; 
but it was not with the view or purpose of effect- 
ing that result that I voted for the Kansas bill, 
any more than it was with the view or purpose 
of accomplishing similar results as to New Mex- 
ico and Utah that I supported the measures of 
1850. It was to secure the right to come in as a 
slave State, if the people there so wished, and to 
maintain a principle, which I then thought, and 
still think, essential to the peace of the country 
and the ultimate security of the rights of the 
South. 

But it has been said, if this was the principle 
aimed at in the repeal of the Missouri restriction, 
why was it not extended to Minnesota and other 
Territories over which that restriction extended? 
Why was it taken off Kansas and Nebraska and 
not Minnesota? All I have to say in reply to 
this is, that the bill of 1854 did take it off when- 
ever the bill of 1820 put it on. The thirty-second 
section of the Kansas bill, which I have read, for 
the reasons therein stated, declares the eighth 
section of the act of 1820 to be inoperative and 
Toid; and wherever that eighth section extended, 
this "inoperative and void" is written upon it. 
Wherever it received acknowledgment before, it 
received its death-blow, if you please, by this 
thirty-second section; and if it extended overMin- 
nesota, it was repealed there as fully and com- 
pletely as it was over Kansas. 

Mr. CAMPBELL, of Ohio. I perhaps mis- 
understood the gentleman, and I desire to make 
an inquiry for information. Do I understand the 
gentleman from Georgia to take the ground that 
the Kansas-Nebraska act removes the restriction 
against slavery over Minnesota, and the other 
Territories belonging to the General Government? 

Mr. STEPHENS. I said that that restriction 



was declared null and void wherever it extended. 
That is the effect of the language of the act. 

Mr. CAMPBELL, of Ohio. Then I would 
ask him whether he understands that that repeal- 
ing clause extends beyond the territorial limits of 
Kansas and Nebraska? 

Mr. STEPHENS. I understand it to be a 
declaration, that the restriction of 1820, being in- 
consistent with the principle established in 1850, 
is null and void. It is not confined to one place 
more than to another. I understand it rather to 
be declaratory than otherwise. I understand it 
as being put in there to prevent a contrary con- 
struction. 

Mr. CAMPBELL, of Ohio. I want to kno\r 
the gentleman's own opinion as to its legal effect 
on other Territories. 

Mr. STEPHENS. My opinion is that it had 
no legal effect at all. [Laughter.] I am inclined 
to think that, on a strict construction of the Con- 
stitution, the restriction was null and void from 
the beginning. - 

Mr. CAMPBELL, of Ohio. I ask the gentle- 
man whether he has not recently changed his 
opinion ? 

Mr. STEPHENS. Never on this subject. 

Mr. CAMPBELL, of Ohio. I understood the 
gentleman, in a debate not very long since, to 
have avowed a different opinion. 

Mr. STEPHENS. If the gentleman will turn 
to the report of that debate, he will see what I 
then said to him on this point. 

Mr. CAMPBELL, of Ohio. I recollect it very 
well. The first question which I put, the gen- 
tleman declined to answer; but as I unde'rstood 
in that debate to which he has referred — I may 
be mistaken, but the record can be easily pro- 
duced — while he declined to give an opinion on 
the question of power, he took the ground that 
the exercise of it would be such an act of usurpa- 
tion as would justify his section of the country 
in a dissolution of the Union. 

Mr. STEPHENS. The gentleman might have 
understood me to say that, on the principle of a 
just division, under that clause of the Constitu- 
tion which empowers Congress to make " need- 
ful rules and regulations," Congress might, for 
the sake of peace and harmony, make a fair 
division of the common lands as property; but 
when the principle of division was set aside, then 
the attempt to make it was null and void; and 
that any act of Congress appropriating the whole 
of the common property in the Territories to one 
class, to the exclusion of another, would be an 
abuse of a power tantamount to a usurpation, 
which would justify resistance. 

Mr. CAMPBELL, of Ohio. I should be very 
happy to have the gentleman explain that prin- 
ciple of division. 

Mr. STEPHENS. I am discussing another 
principle now. For my views on that point I refer 
him to the former debate. I am not surprised 
that the gentleman should wish to divert attention, 
or should take very little interest in this debate, 
on the line I was pursuing, for I think it was he 
who, at the beginning of the last session of the 
last Congress, spoke with such exulting feelings 
of what the Kansas-Nebraska bill had done with 



11 



its advocates at the North, and made such great 
boasts of the ultimate triumph of the enemies of 
•the principles of that bill. Now he comes into 
the House at this session, after the issue has been 
made and decided against him, and commences 
the debate himself; but when he sees he can make 
nothing out of it when confined to the merits of 
the question raised by himself, he is forgoing off 
on something elsg. . Why, sir, he said two years 
ago (while admitting that he was no prophet, nor 
the son of a prophet, yet seeming to be moved by 
the inspiration of prophesy) that there never 
would be another Kansas majority on this floor. 
He and his friends appealed to the people. Well, 
the people have decided against them. And now 
he comes to this House and reopens the question, 
and I am not surprised, as the debate progresses, 
he should desire to get on other points. I think 
the position of the gentleman, in reopening a de- 
bate on the Kansas question this session, upon 
the whole, is very much like that of a man 1 once 
heard of — a lawyer in court. After the decision 
of the judge, he commenced speaking again; the 
judge told him he did not allow any arguing of a 
question in his court after a case was decided. 
The lawyer said, " Sir, I was not arguing the 
case; I was only cursing the decision," [laughter.] 
I think the object of the gentleman [Mr. Camp- 
bell] now, in reopening this debate, was not a 
wish to reargue the question, so much as to in- 
dulge in a little cursing of the decision which 
has been against him. 

Mr. CAMPBELL, of Ohio. I suppose that 
in that case, as in this, there had been false tes- 
timony. One set of witnesses came and swore 
on one side of the line that the Kansas-Nebraska 
bill meant nothing; and another swore on another 
side that it meant something; and but for them 
I should have returned here with the same ex- 
ultant feelings with which I came at the opening 
of this Congress. 

Mr. STEPHENS. I believe,- Mr. Speaker, 
that the gentleman himself was one of the wit- 
nesses, [laughter,] and it seems that the people 
of his own section decided against the testimony. 
[Laughter.] 

Now, Mr. Speaker, as I said before, my opinion 
is, that there never was an issue so fairly made 
and so fairly presented to the American people 
by both parties, North and South, as was the 
issue on this Kansas bill at the late election — an 
election which excited the feelings and aroused 
the popular interests to an unusual degree, not 
only in this country, but in countries on other con- 
tinents. I think it probable that there were some 
on both sides of the question and on both sides of 
Mason and Dixon's line who attempted to mis- 
represent the principles of this Kansas-Nebraska 
bill. It is possible that there were some of those 
defending it on one side of the line who said that 
the policy was to make Kansas a free State, and 
some of those assailing it on the other side who 
said that it was worse for the South than the 
•* Wilmot proviso itself." This is possible, but 
those who made such attempts were well under- 
stood. They deceived nobody. Such men figure 
in all political contests, but they mislead very 
few: the truth makes its way over them. 



But I suspect that most of what has been called 
dodging the issues in the late canvass, has been 
only a denying that the issues were such as they 
were represented to be by some of the opposite 
party. It is very possible that the gentleman from 
Ohio, [Mr. Campbell,] or some of those who 
acted with him at the North, said in their speeches 
about the Kansas bill, that its object was to make 
Kansas a slave State; and that one of the issues 
before the American people was, whether Kansas 
should be a slave State, or a free State. The 
friends of freedom, or every man who was not 
himself in favor of slavery, it may be, was called 
on to vote for the " Free-Soil," " free Kansas," 
and Fremont ticket. If this be so, I think it 
very possible, and even highly probable, that the 
friends and defenders of the Kansas bill at the 
North, said this was not the issue — that the 
object of the bill was not to make Kansas either 
a free State, or a slave State, but to leave that 
matter to the people of Kansas to settle for them- 
selves, at the proper time, under the Constitu- 
tion of the United States; and that she might be 
admitted as a slave State, or a free State, as her 
people may determine for themselves at the proper 
time. Some may have said the proper time was 
in their Territorial Legislature; others, when 
they come to form a State constitution; but all 
were agreed that it was to be done by the people 
of Kansas, at the proper time; and if there was 
any difficulty as to the proper time, that was a 
judicial question arising under the Constitution, 
which could only be settled by the courts. All 
were agreed that it was to be settled by those 
whom it concerned, and not by Congress, or the 
people of the United States outside of Kansas, 
who had no business to meddle with it. 

This class of men , I think it probable , said that 
the true issue on this point was to let the people 
of Kansas take care of their own interests and 
business, and to let other people attend to theirs; 
that whether slavery was right or wrong, Con- 
gress had no rightful authority to interfere against 
it, either in the States or Territories. This, I 
think it very probable, was said by many. Thia 
is what has been called dodging the issue. But 
I should have said the same thing if I had been 
there. The object of the bill was not to make 
Kansas either a slave State or free State; but just 
what I have stated. Its passage was not a triumph 
of the South over the North, further than a re- 
moval of an Unjust discrimination against her 
people, and a restoration of her constitutional 
equality, may be considered a triumph. To this 
extent it was a triumph; but no sectional tri- 
umph. It was a triumph of the Constitution. 
It was a triumph that enhanced the value of the 
Union in the estimation of the people of the South. 
The restriction of 1820 had been for many years 
in the body-politic as "a thorn in the flesh, pro- 
ducing irritation at every touch. On the prin- 
ciples upon which it was adopted, (reluctantly 
accepted as an alternative at the time by them,) 
the South would have been, and was, willing to 
acquiesce in and adhere to it in 1850. But it was 
then repudiated, again and again, by the North, 
as was shown by me in this House on a former 
occasion. The idea of its having been a saered 



12 



compact, or being in any way binding, was 
scouted at and ridiculed by those who have raised 
such a clamor on that score since. Tkis thorn 
was removed in 1850. The whole country seemed 
to be relieved by it. It would have been com- 
pletely relieved by it, but for the late attempt 
to thrust back this thorn. This attempt has 
been signally rebuked. And may we not now 
look to the future with hopes— well-grounded 
hopes— of permanent repose? Repose is what 
we want. With the principle now established, 
that each State and separate political community 
Jii our complicated system is to attend to its 
own affairs, without meddling with those of 1 
their neighbors, and that the General Govern- 
ment is to give its care and attention only to such 
matters as are committed to its charge, relal 
the general welfare, peace, and harmony of the 
whole, what is there to darken or obscure the 
prospect of a great and prosperous career before 
us? Men on all sides speak of the Union and its 
preservation as objects of their desire; and some 
speak of its dissolution as impossible— an event 
mat will not be allowed under any circumstances 
To such let me say, that this Union can on ]y \„'. 
preserved by conforming to the laws of i 
istence. When these laws are violated, like 
all other organisms, cither political or physical, 



vegetable or animal, dissolution will be inevi- 
j | table. The laws of this political organism-the 

union of these States-arc well defined in the 
I Constitution. Prom this springs our life as a 

e P nsT e - T th T r '"' ^^Pofial death "as? 

I ensue. The Union can never be preserred by 
forte, or by one section attempting to rule the 

\\JSm ? r T- pl %a^ this SPr(i <™l control 
established in 1850, carried out in 1854, and 
affirmed by the people in 1856, I consider Air 
• peaker, as worth the Union itself, , m .ch as I 
am devoted to it, so long as it is devoted to the 
objects for winch it was form, d. And in devotion 
to it, so Ion- as tl, se objects are aimed at, 1 yield 
to no one. To maintain its integrity_to promote 
its advancement, development, erowth, power 
aml renown, rn ac< iplishing tnose objSts is' 

my most earnest wish and desil | , ul in 

aoing this is my highest ambition. These are 
fhe impulses of that patriotism with which I am 

imbued; and with me— £ 

"All thoughts, all passions, an delights 
Whatever stin thu mortal ftaine, ' 
-■■ but minister* ol i m 

To R i .i tali - „ ,, ,i n , 

But the constitutional rights and equality of 
the btat's must be preservi d. 



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