i* .<^'% > 4 o ,/"-^ r ,^ .0^ <5^ "o^o^ o,^ o " ° « ♦'^ - W !? o Q do' i e-»- w . OCJ . I »-•. . * * to * i-i to ts ►^ CO CO h-4 00 en ^ en to o o en t o 9 o ,en CO o o •q «© CO ^co "co en • CO CO >• O t-^ CX) s -^ CO Oi CO o e-h W r^ GO a^ CO -q O O l>9 en ;d ^ 00 Si? to "J-l 00 00 en CO to o <1 CO •q CO 00 •q O) CO o CO Oi <• *« 00 M o 'co HA en 91 ►P^ o I-* to to CO M o CO tJ^ M The Immediate Causes of the War 125 You will notice that in 1850 Germany produced only about 15 per cent., considerably less than one- sixth of the amount of iron and steel then pro- duced by England. In half a century Germany increased her production of iron and steel to such an extent that she ran England a neck-and-neck race for the world-championship in that line of production. And only twelve years later her production of iron and steel was fully twice that of England. And those of you who have followed the development of international relations during the last quarter-century will undoubtedly have noticed that the crucial point in the change from a peaceful to a warlike attitude came towards the end of the last century; that is about the time when Germany was catching up with England in the production of iron and steel. Since then Ger- many has been far in advance of the rest of the world in the production of iron and steel, and sim- ultaneously the war-spirit which has been de- veloping throughout the world has been making particularly rapid strides in Germany. But in order that you may not get a one-sided view of this war, I intend to go into some detail as to its immediate causes; touching, incidentally, upon some contributing causes to which I pre- viously alluded. And first of all, it is well to re- 126 Socialism and War member that the present European conflict is really two wars rolled into one. We all know that there are two theatres of war, an eastern and a western one, with Germany-Austria between them. But this division of the conflict is not merely geographical ; it is also historical. It is not merely that there are two fields of operations, but actually two separate wars, each having its own separate cause and its own character, historically considered. The war of Russia and Servia against Austria and Germany in the East belongs to an entirely different historical epoch, when con- sidered from the point of view of the development of capitalism, than the war of Germany against France and England in the West. And so it happens that Germany is not only the geograph- ical connecting link between the two theatres of the war, but also the historical connecting link between the two wars and their different char- acters. You will doubtless recall what I said about the two warlike epochs of capitalism, separated by an era of peace. Now, the two wars being waged in Europe may be distingushed, generally speaking, by a reference to the characteristics of the wars of those two epochs of capitalism. The war now being waged in the east of Europe belongs to the The Immediate Causes of the War 127 first warlike period of capitalism, the purely Natonalistic period, at least as far as Germany's opponents are concerned; while the war waging on the western war-theatre belongs to the second, Imperialistic, period of capitalist development. The principle characteristic of the wars of the first hstorical epoch here in question, is, as I have already stated, that it is part of an attempt to get to the sea, — the march to the sea, as I called it. Now, most European countries reached the sea early. Those are the countries in which the modern national states were rounded out early, and which attained very early a comparatively high degree of commercial or industrial development. Such were England, Spain, France. These are countries either entirely surrounded by sea, or hav- ing natural boundaries on the landside, in the shape of huge mountain chains, separating them from their neighbors. But there was the great plain of central and eastern Europe, inhabited by Germanic and Slavonic tribes, with admixtures of such foreign elements as the Hungarians, and Finns, and Turks, wherein there were no mountain chains to delimit the places of habitation of the different races and to give each a well- defined course towards the sea. The result was great confusion. A sort of modern migration of 128 Socialism and War the nations. A migration in which "the nations" in the primary sense, that is the peoples themselves, did not, indeed, move about very much, but in which "the nations" in the political sense did con- siderable stretching and moving of their limbs in an effort to reach the sea. This was particularly true of Russia, which was originally entirely cut off from the sea. A primitive pastoral or agricultural country can very well be satisfied to remain an entirely inland state. Not so a country which has started on the road of commercial and industrial development, or one which intends to do so. The entire history of Russia during the past two hundred years is therefore nothing but one great struggle to get to the sea. It was Peter the Great who turned Russia's face towards the West and Capitalism — or at least he symbolizes that turning point in Russian history — and it was the same Peter the Great who started Russia definitely on her march to the sea. She is still on that march ; for she has bad a long road to travel, and many battles to fight before she could get there. She is therefore still in the first warlike period of capitalism, trying to establish herself as a rounded out, self-sufficient economic unit with free access to the outside world for an exchange of products. And until she gets The Immediate Causes of the War 129 there her economic development along capitalistic lines will be thwarted and her growth stunted, so that no matter what her extent of territory and military power, she will remain virtually a colony of her western neighbors, an object of economic exploitation. Now, when Peter the Great decided to start Russia on the road of capitalistic development he cast about him for an opening into the wide world for his "lines of communication", and he saw the Caspian and the Black Seas to the South and the Baltic to the North. He started on the move in both directions; and his successors have kept to the warpath ever since, with the result that Russia now completely controls the Caspian, con- trols a very large part of the Black Sea, and has a firm footing on the Baltic. "But the Caspian is nothing but a big inland lake. It is important for some parts of the Asiatic trade; but it does not lead into the wide open world. The same is true of the Black and Baltic Seas. With this all-impor- tant modification, however: while they are both practically inland seas, each has an outlet into the open sea; from the Baltic there is a road leading into the North Sea, while from the Black Sea there is a passage into the Mediterranean. But both of those avenues into the open sea are controlled by 130 Socialism and War others: the road from the Baltic is practically controlled by Germany; while the door which leads from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean is kept shut tight by the Turk, who guards, like Cerberus of old, the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, so that Russia may not get through. Of late you have been told a good deal about Russia's ardent and long-cherished ambition to possess Constantinople. And you have no doubt been told a great deal about the reasons for it; its being the imperial city of the Byzantine Em- perors, to whose Empire the Russian Czars are supposed to have succeeded; and the mother-city of the Greek Catholic Church, the official Russian Church, of which the Czar is the official head ; of the religious traditions connected with St. Sophia ; and a lot of similar stuff. All of which is good- enough filigree ; the substance which it covers be- ing, that Constantinople is the lock on the door opening from the Black Sea into the Mediterran- ean, and the great Ocean beyond. For the posses- sion of this lock, Russia has fought a century-long fight with the Turk, a fight that cannot cease until the lock is in her possession or until it is removed and the door left open. The peculiar thing about the struggle for Constantinople is that Russia would have been in possession of that historic The Immediate Causes of the War 131 city long ago, the Turk being entirely too in- adequate as a guard of this all-important point, if it were not for the fact that other and more powerful opponents of Russia kept the "Sick Man of Europe" in his place, in order to keep Russia out. Considerable has been written by those who deal in destinies, about Russia's alleged "destiny" in the Far East, that is. Eastern Asia. These wise- acres were particularly loquacious immediately before the Russo-Japanese War, when it seemed as if Russia had all but forgotten about the Near East (which, by the way, means the West to Russia, to embark upon great schemes in the Far East. According to these dispensers of "destinies" Russia was really an Asiatic State, and her future lay in her Eastern interests. In short, the "destiny" of the Russian people required them to face East. The truth is that Russia's policy in Asia — aside from the general characteristic of acquisi- tiveness, which she shares with all other capital- istic countries in her stage of development — has been dictated by her general desire to get to the sea, as modified by the policy of her western neigh- bors to keep the western passages barred before her. Finding the way into the North Sea and into 132 Socialism and War the Mediterranean barred, the Russian statesmen have hit upon the idea of reaching the Ocean by- pushing eastward instead of westward. Russia has attempted to do what Columbus set out to do, only reversing the direction : Columbus wanted to reach the East by sailing west; while Russia wanted to reach the West by going east. Colum- bus would have got there had he not found America lying in his way. Columbus was obliged to turn back ; the way to the East had to be found by sailing south ; and only now, after four hundred years has Columbus' original design been accomplished through the cutting of the Panama Canal. Russia would have accomplished her purpose had she not found the Jap lying in her way. Japan barred Russia's way as effectively as did America that of Columbus. The Russo-Jap- anese War put an end, for the time being at least, to Russia's attempts to get to the West by way of the East. This reopened and made acute the Near Eastern — that is, the Balkan — question. Having been foiled in the East, Russia was bound to try the West again; steering, like Columbus's succes- sors, a southern course. The Balkan question has two aspects: the relation of the Christian popula- tion of the Balkan Peninsula to their former The Immediate Causes of the War 133 overlord, the Turk, and the conflicts between the different groups into which this population is broken up, on the one hand ; and, on the other, the relation betwen Russia and Austria, both of whom want to fish in troubled waters. Latterly, the latter aspects of the Balkan question have become com- plicated by Germany's design upon the Balkan Peninsula as part of her imperialistic or Pan-Ger- manistic schemes. In order to understand the different interests and antagonisms which enter into the Balkan question, as. well as their bearing on the larger political interests and antagonisms engendered by Modern Imperialsm, it will repay us to examine the geographical and economico-historical bear- ings of the Balkans a little more in detail. A glance at the map will show that in some respects the Balkan peninsula resembles the Spanish peninsula. Each forms by its southern extremity a passage-way into the Mediterranean Sea, separating Europe from other parts of the world. The Strait of Gibraltar, which forms the gateway from the Western Ocean into the Medi- terranean Sea separates Europe from Africa; while the Bosporus and Dardanelles, forming the passage-way from the Black Sea into the Medi- terranean, divide Europe from Asia. The import- 134 Socialism and War ance of the Strait of Gibraltar from a commercial, and therefore, from a strategic point of view is universally recognized as of the first magni- tude. The Bosporus and Dardanelles may not be quite as important in one way, as they do not connect with the ocean. But in other ways their importance may even surpass that of Gib- raltar. In the first place the Strait of Gibraltar is not easily controlled. Notwithstanding the natural strength of Gibraltar, no power could effectually control the Strait by land fortifications alone, against a strong naval power ; while the Bosporus and the Dardanelles can be controlled against the greatest odds, owing to the extreme narrowness of these channels. The Bosporus is, in this respect, the most remarkable channel in the world. In its narrowest part it is hardly half a mile wide. The Dardanelles channel is not much wider. And the two together, with the Sea of Marmora between them, permit of such a combination of land and sea defenses as to make it absolutely impregnable under ordinary circumstances. But the Bosporus is even more important for peaceful pursuits than as a military stronghold. The Strait of Gibraltar separates Europe from Africa, and separates them most effectively. This gulf cannot possibly The Immediate Causes of the War 135 be bridged. At least not in the present state of science. But the Bosporus can be bridged as easily as any ordinary river or rivulet, and trains can be sent across it from Europe to Asia without any difficulty whatsoever. While it forms a passage-way uniting the East with the West by water, it also forms a passage-way running North and South on land uniting Europe with Asia in a most effective and most convenient manner. Another important feature of Balkan geography must be noted. Unlike its Western counterpart, the Balkan peninsula turns its widest side towards the continent, and has no mountain-range frontier forming a barrier be- tween itself and the continent, such as the Pyre- nees. On the other hand, it is itself broken up into several divisions by mountain-chains running across it. The result was that while the Balkan Peninsula always formed one of the most coveted corners of the earth, it was naturally in a very un- favorable position for the formation of a big Bal- kan Nation. To this should be added, that about the time when the development of capitalism was forming strong consolidated nations in the west of Europe, the Balkan Peninsula was the principal seat of power of the Turkish invader of Europe, 136 Socialism and War lying prostrate in his iron grasp for several cen- turies. We are often told that the Balkans are in- habited by a mixture of nations forming no racial unit, thus accounting for the continued strife among the different elements of the population of that peninsula. To my mind that is merely an- other way of saying that the Balkan Peninsula is still in a primitive stage of development. A close examination into historical facts would probably show that the ethnic elements on the Balkan Pen- insula are not more diversified than those which went into the composition of many a great nation which is now looked upon as a racial and national unit. The "diversity of races" on the Balkan Peninsula is not an ethnographical, but a historico-geo graphical fact. Whether the geo- graphical or the purely historical element has con- tributed more to this result is now hard to tell. But it may be asserted without fear of contradiction that the historic process of economic development has surmounted greater heights than the Balkan Mountains, and that these mountain ranges can- not stand permanently in the way of the organ- ization of one Balkan Nation, if the Mstorico-eco- nomical process should favor the formation of such an entity. The Immediate Causes of the War 137 For the present, the Balkan territory is broken up into a group of struggling, wriggling national- ities, with Turkey in possession of its southern base and in control of the all-important Bosporus- Dardanelles passage. This gives color and direction to the Balkan Question. The "Question" is two-fold: On the one hand it is the question of "How long shall the Unspeakable Turk be per- mitted to remain in Europe ?" And on the other it reads : "Who shall inherit the Kingdom of Turkey in Europe when the Turk shall have been driven therefrom?" And the latter question has itself a double aspect. It may mean : How shall the terri- tory of the Balkan Peninsula be divided among the different "nationalities" now inhabiting it? And it may also mean : What outside Power shall succeed to the political influence over the Balkans which was once the Turk's? Of the great European Powers there are two that come into consideration directly in con- nection with the last query: Russia and Austria. Both of these Empires abut in territory on the Balkan Peninsula, and they have for a long time been in almost continual struggle for influence therein. Russia's interest in the Balkans is plain. It is part of her March to the Sea. She needs 138 Socialism and War Constantinople, and has been trying to get it for more than two centuries. But she couldn't get there except by marching her armies south through the Peninsula, expelling the Turk from Europe on the way. Politically this has assumed the form of a policy of "liberation" towards the Balkan Slavs. Russia asserted a right and duty of protecting her "younger brothers", the Southern Slavs, against oppression by other nations, and of "liberating" them from the "foreign yoke" whenever that was deemed necessary by her to save them from oppression. And she has "liberated" the Balkan Slavs to a very large extent. The existence of the present kingdoms of Roumania, Bulgaria, Servia, and Montenegro, is largely due to her efforts. But as the "liberation" of the Slavs was merely a means to an end, and that end — the possession of Constantinople — has not been achieved, she could not rest on her "liberation" laurels and leave the Balkans to the Balkan nations. In fact, this end made Russia's work of "liberation" in the Balkans of a peculiar kind. She wanted the Balkan Slavs freed from the Turk, but she did not want them united and strong. A strong Balkan nation or federation of nations might form just as strong an obstacle to her acquisition The Immediate Causes of the War 139 of Constantinople as the Turk himself, — or even a stronger. For Turkey is in a process of decay, while a united Balkan nation would be likely to constantly grow in power. In this effort to keep the Balkan Nations weak and dependent on their neighbors, Russia had the full sympathy and co-operation of her great rival on the Peninsula, Austria-Hungary. The Dual Empire has reached the sea; but her position on the sea is a very precarious one. Her two sea-ports, Trieste and Fiume, are both practically Italian cities, and her loss of both may be only a question of time. But even with both of these ports, she considers her position on the sea unfavorable so long as she is confined to the upper corner of the Adriatic, and other powers are in control of the outlet from the Adriatic into the Mediterranean. She has therefore been cast- ing very longing glances upon the western coast line of the Balkan Peninsula, as well as upon the northern coast-line of the Aegean. In addition to this, and quite independent of her appetite for additional coast line, Austria is very anxious that the western coast line of the Balkan Peninsula should not fall to Servia, who is very anxious to get it, and to whom it would naturally belong if the Balkan nations were per- 140 Socialism and War mitted to develop independently. As Servia is situated to-day, without an outlet on the sea, she is to all intents and purposes an Austrian colony, being economically subject to Austria, through whose territory alone her exports can reach the outside world. This is particularly unfortunate for Servia, because her exports come in direct competition with the exports of the Hungarian agrarians, and the Austro-Hungarian tariff policy is naturally shaped so as to put her at a dis- advantage. The impulse to march to the sea which is ever-present in countries with a capitalistic development is, therefore, particularly keen in Servia just now. But Austria, naturally, does not care to lose such an object of trade exploitation as Servia in her present condition presents to her. There are, also, purely political reasons why Austria does not want Servia to come into possession of the western coast line of the Balkan Peninsula, or of any part of it. Servia with an outlet to the sea means a strong and prosperous Servia. Such a Servia would naturally present a centre of attraction to the many millions of Serbs dwelling within the Dual Empire, and to all the other Slavs who are suffering under Magyar dom- ination in the Hungarian part of the Empire. This might tend to break up the entire Empire. For The Immediate Causes of the War 141 the great love which the Magyars now bear the Dual Empire — in such striking contrast to their separatist tendencies of two generations ago — is due entirely to the fact that the Empire permits them to keep their Slav population under subjection. Hence Austria's general policy of keeping the Balkan nations from forming an in- dependent confederation strong enough to expel the Turk and withstand all outside influences. The result of this sympathetic bond of common interest between Russia and Austria to keep the Balkan nations from controlling the Balkan country has been the seething caldron of jealousies, animosities, and armed conflicts which make up the recent history of the Balkan Pen- insula. Each of these two powers has sought by intrigue to accomplish the double purpose of keep- ing the Balkan peoples disunited, and of increasing her own influence at the expense of the other, so as to be in direct line of succession to the Turk, when "The Sick Man of Europe'' finally breathes his last. Such was the Balkan situation when Germany discovered that she, too, had an interest in that part of Europe. But here we must pause a little to examine Germany's situation generally. Germany occupies a very anomalous position 142 Socialism and War among the great national states. The Germans have not yet accomplished the task which the other great peoples of Europe have accomplished — that of forming a national state. The German Empire is not such a state. On the one hand it includes many elements that are not German, and on the other hand is does not include many im- portant portions of Germany proper. Let me illustrate. If you go to any part of France you may be sure that French is spoken there. The same is true of England. But not of Germany: There are many parts of Germany where the Ger- man language is a foreign tongue, and where the population must be coerced into speaking it against their will. Again, if you want to look for the centre of English culture, you will naturally look to London, and for the centre of French culture to Paris. But if you want to look for the centre of German culture you might look either to Berlin or to Vienna, although the latter is not part of official Germany. And the fact that there may be large centres of English culture outside of England proper — using "England" here as synonymous with the United Kingdom — does not alter the situation. New York or Boston might be centres of English culture. But their position is utterly different from that of Vienna. The Immediate Causes of the War 143 They are offshoots of the old trunk; parts of a colony in the Greek sense of the word. A child begotten of the mother-country, but big enough to lead an independent existence, and actually leading an independent existence notwithstand- ing sameness of language and affinity of culture. Not so with Vienna. It is not an offshot of Ger- many. It is not part of a German country at all. It is the capital of an Empire mostly Slav and predominantly non-German. This incongruity of Vienna being non-German is enhanced by the fact that it is nothing else. It is not "Austrian" in the national sense — as Boston is American, for instance, notwithstanding its English speech — because there is no such nationality, Austria being merely a politico-geographical designation. The truth is that from a national point of view Germany is not yet. The same is true of Germany when viewed from an economic point of view. It is true that Ger- many has reached the sea. But it has reached it only partly. A glance at the map will show that from any national-economic point of view Holland belongs with Germany, and the Dutch sea-coast is the natural western boundary of the German Empire; and the same is true to some extent at least of Belgium. 144 Socialism and War Germany is, therefore, still in the first warlike period of capitalism, — the formative period, the period when great national states are forming by absorbing all kindred groups and marching to the sea. As such it should be Germany's natural and legitimate ambition to include German-Austria within her boundaries; and it may be equally natural for her, though not as legitimate, to desire to absorb Holland too and part of Belgium, and to make them part of the German Empire. And there is no doubt that until recently such was the ambition of all good German patriots. A united Germany was the ideal, also, of all revolutionary and radical Germans. It is well- known that the best men in Germany con- sidered Bismarck's policy, which excluded Ger- man-Austria from the German Empire, little short of criminal; and they fervently hoped for the day when this crime would be atoned for by the organization of a German Republic which should include all German lands. Those who had an eye more to the economic than the cultural questions involved, undoubtedly hoped that Hol- land, which is racially near kin to the people of Germany, would be glad to come in of her own free will in such an efficient and highly cultural state as a United German Republic would un- The Immediate Causes of the War 145 doubtedly be. The organization of such a state pre-supposes, of course, the break-up of the Austrian Empire. But what good German cared for the existence of that Empire, — that "political monstrosity", that crazy-quilt of a state, the creation of outworn political ideas, political in- trigue, and the political crimes of a by-gone age? Then came the new spirit, — the spirit of the Era of Imperialism, and all this changed. The dream of a United Germany was forgotten before it was realized. And Germans suddenly discovered that they had a vital interest in the continued existence of the Austrian Empire which makes a United Germany impossible. As is frequently the case with countries which came late into the whirlpool of capitalistic development, Germany's economic development during the last half -century or so has been proceeding hot-house fashion. With the result that the different periods of capitalist development — which in older countries have lasted through many generations, and therefore have had a chance fully to develop their special characteristics — here crowd one another, so that these characteristics become blurred and obli- terated or do not develop at all. So the textile- peace period has been "skipped" by Germany, and she walked into the Imperialistic era before she 146 Socialism and War was out of the first, the formative, warlike era of Capitalism. And the place of honor which United Germany for a while occupied in German political thought is now occupied by Pan- Germanism, Pan-Germanism is the political expression of Germany's economic aspirations. And here it is well to note that the expression is somewhat mis- leading. It does not mean what its etymology would indicate. It does not mean a union of all German peoples. And it is, therefore, entirely different from Pan-Slavism, for instance, which means the union of all Slav peoples. As an ab- stract proposition it is merely another expression for the sentiment Deutschland uber alles — Ger- many (should be put) above every other country. It is the dream of world-empire, with the old Roman Empire as a model. A world-empire presided over and ruled by Germany, with the assistance of its legions, as Rome ruled her dominions. It is for this hideous dream of a mili- tary world-empire that Germans have given up their cherished hope of a United Germany. It is for this that they are willing to let some fifteen millions of Germans and the oldest center of German culture remain outside of Germany. For The Immediate Causes of the War 147 such are the dictates of Pan-Germanism when translated into practice. As a practical proposition, Pan-Germanism — in so far at least as it has assumed definite prac- tical forms as a political project — means the creation of a world-empire the main element of which shall be a continuous body of territory con- taining the principal parts of the mainland of Europe and Asia and stretching from ocean to ocean. Roughly outlined this body of territory would begin at the Atlantic Ocean, having the coast line from the Strait of Dover to the Scan- dinavian mainland as its Northwestern boundary ; it would then run in a general Southeasterly direction, and include Belgium and Holland, Ger- many and Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, and India, reaching the Pacific at the Indian Ocean, which would form its Southeasterly boundary. Of course, there would be trimmings and outlets on all sides and in all directions as befits such a giant body. But above all, in order to insure its being an economic entity as well as a political one, it would be welded together with an iron ring of railroad lines run- ning through its entire length and having the necessary ramifications. Of course, this requires considerable recon- 148 Socialism and War struction of the present map of the world. It requires the snuffing out of the breath of life of some independent states, whose people may be stupid enough to prefer independent existence in a ridiculously small way to being part and parcel of such a wonderful world-empire. But no matter : we have our professors to explain to them the superior beauties of German Culture, and we have our bayonets to enforce their arguments in a most convincing manner. On the other hand, we shall have to keep alive, for a time at least, some mori- bund political bodies by artificial stimulants. In this, too, our great scientists and our great army — the most wonderful military machine the world has ever seen — will undoubtedly succeed. That we have a right to do all this goes without saying. The very fact that we have the power to do it shows that we have the right to do it. In fact, we are bidden by our Destiny to do it. For we must have it done. Otherwise, we shall fail in our mission of making Germany dominate the world, and having German Culture obliterate and take the place of every other form of civilization. Antwerp and Rotterdam are absolutely essen- tial to the scheme. Germany wants its "natural" ocean front, which includes the Belgian and Dutch coast lines, as a glance at the map will show. As The Immediate Causes of the War 149 it is, these two little countries levy toll on German commerce. Antwerp and Rotterdam have grown immensely rich because of it. There are probably no two other cities in the world, certainly not in Europe, which have grown so rich in so short a time as have Rotterdam and Antwerp in the past fifty years. But it is the German hinterland that has made them grow so fast. Between them these two cities control the avenues which lead from the Rhineland and South Germany to the ocean and into the wide world. It is the height of absurdity that a great empire like the present Germany should permit the mouth of its "national river", the river which not only bears a large portion of its commerce, but most of its legends and tradi- tions, to be controlled by a handful of recalcitrant Germans who imagine themselves to be a separate nation and refuse to come into the Empire out of stupidity or greed. With this empire turned into a world-empire this anomalous situation, then ab- solutely unbearable, will simply have to cease. The Balkans, too, are indispensable to this scheme. The great strategic and commercial importance of the Bosporus-Dardanelles has al- ready been explained. Its importance is decisive in this world-empire scheme, whose chief econo- mic weapon is to be the creation of the fastest 150 Socialism and War route from the Atlantic to the Pacific, tapping the richest Asiatic countries on the way. The Bal- kan Peninsula — through which the road which is to span the Bosporus must run — is peopled mostly by Slavs. Hence the necessity of keeping alive the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which forms the political connecting link between the German Em- pire and the Slavs of Southeastern Europe. Hence, also, the necessity of supporting Austria in her Balkan policy, which includes two points essential to the success of the Pan-Germanistic scheme: Keep Russia from Constantinople, and keep the Slavic principalities on the peninsula weak enough so that they can not offer any re- sistance to the German-Austrian plans. Austria is simply Germany's outpost, — the political means by which the German Race is to control the Southeastern Slavs. With the Balkans dominated by Austria, there is practically no further obstacle to the carrying out of the great scheme of Pan-Germanism. It is true that Turkey is still in possesion of Constant- inople, and of Asia Minor and Mesopotamia. But "The Sick Man of Europe" has long ago been con- vinced that unless he casts his lot with Germany his lease of life is likely to be cut very short. There is, therefore, very little difficulty to be ap- The Immediate Causes of the War 151 prehended from Turkey,— if the Sultan and his advisers were permitted to follow their own in- clinations. Unfortunately, the Sultan is not mas- ter of his own destinies. He is not strong enough to stand on his own legs. And the question is: Will the other powers, particularly England, stand by and permit this great scheme to be car- ried out without a fight? The realization of this scheme would change the commercial routes of the world ; it would probably destroy England's carrier-trade by sea and de- prive her of India. Incidentally, it would make England contribute to the expense of building those very railways whose chief object is to put her out of business. England must, therefore, fight. And the great problem, from the Pan- German point of view, is to make her fight under circumstances that will insure her defeat. This can be accomplished by isolating her. A- lone she would, of course, be no match for the Austro-German-Turkish combination. But these very schemes compel England to abandon her tra- tional policy of "splendid isolation", and join hands with her traditional enemy across the chan- nel, and even with her great rival in Asia, the Russian Bear. Politics make strange bedfellows : this applies particularly to world-politics. Eng- 152 Socialism and War land and France have never been known to be great friends. The Hundred Years' War is, of course, a matter of ancient history. The wars of the Age of Louis XIV and the Seven Years' War which culimated in the cession of France's Amer- ican possesions to England, may, perhaps, also be considered too ancient to be a living influence. But the Napoleonic wars are of comparatively recent date, and the Fashoda incident happened but yesterday. English and- Russian rivalry in Asia is not only century-old, but has been con- tinuous and persistent. England has been chiefly responsible for the thwarting of Russia's designs on Constantinople. To-day England is united with France and Russia in the so-called Entente Cor- diale, and the ancient enemies are fighting shoulder to shoulder one of the greatest fights that the world has ever witnessed. I have already intimated that England was forced out of her "splendid isolation" and into the Entente Cordiale by the schemes of Pan-German- ism which threaten her present position as an in- dustrial and commercial nation. I may add here that the beginnings of the Entente Cordiale can be traced directly to the first practical step in the realization, or attempted realization, of the Pan- Germanistic dream — the Bagdad Railway. The The Immediate Causes of the War 153 Bagdad Railway was, in my opinion, such an im- portant factor in bringing about this war, and its history illustrates so well what I have said about the economic causes of modern imperialism, that I think it worth while to give it a few moments of our time, so as to examine it in outline at least. Some time in the eighties of the last century, about the time when Germany started her imperi- alistic carreer, a group of German capitalists and promoters obtained from the Sultan a concession to build a railroad which was to extend, ultimately, from Constantinople, through Asia Minor and Mesopotamia, to Bagdad, and from there to the Persian Gulf. Building on some sections of this territory began not long afterwards; but very little progress was made until well into this cen- tury, owing to difficulties of a financial as well as of a political nature. When the project was first given to the world it was hailed as one of the greatest cultural under- takings as well as one of the most promising from an economic point of view. This railroad would not only connect the Mediterranean with the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, but would traverse regions which were at one time the seats of the highest civilizations of their day, — 154 Socialism and War regions whose natural capacity to support a busy and thriving population has already been demonstrated. Some of the territory was at one time accounted among the most fruitful in the world. It was in Mesopotamia, now to be tapped by this railroad, that the Biblical paradise was located, according to tradition. It is true that large portions of this territory have since turned waste. But with the new culture that the rail- road was to bring into this part of the world, its fruitfullness and great economic value would re- turn, — that is, after a time and after the expen- diture of some capital for irrigation works and similar permanent improvements. Nevertheless, the problem of building the rail- road was not a simple one, even from the purely financial point of view. You certainly cannot lure capital into a railway enterprise by the prospect of "redeeming'* Nineveh and Babylon. Nor can you get the necessary capital for such an enter- prise when the prospect of large dividends which are to accompany the redeeming of old cultures, or the propagation of new ones, is too distant to be comfortable. Capital is proverbially "timid". So that, notwithstanding the great economic prospects of this railroad — perhaps the finest of their kind in the world — "capital" wouldn't The Immediate Causes of the War 155 bite. That is to say, on the strength of the "prospects" alone. But capital, or at least capitalists were very anxious to bite, if the road was to be built on the terms which I have mentioned in a preceding lecture as the proper terms for railroad building of the "redeeming" and "civilizing** kind. The German Government, therefore, bestirred itself on behalf of its culture- bearing railroad-builders, with the result that the Turkish Government agreed to subsidize the enter- prise to such an extent that, as far as the German capitalists were concerned, the fruitf ulness of the country and profitableness of the enterprise were to become immediate and assured. But that was not the end of the matter. "The Sick Man of Europe" is not exactly his own master. His health is under the supervision of a committee of doctors known as the Great Powers. Turkey is so heavily indebted to foreign capital- ists that her revenues were many years ago placed under the supervision of an international commission representing the great European Powers, who see to it that no part of these revenues are applied to other purposes than those agreed upon, — current expenses and the payment of interest. The duties which Turkey can levy on imports is prescribed for her by 156 Socialism and War the same Great Powers, and she has no right to increase her revenues by increasing these duties, without their consent. And as an increase of duties on imports was practically the only source out of which Turkey could pay the subsidy to the Bagdad Railway, the financing of that railway became largely a matter of international politics. The increase of duties on imports in order to provide a subsidy for the Bagdad Railway was manifestly to the disadvantage of those powers who were not directly interested in that enter- prise: their merchants who exported to Turkey would actually be bearing the cost of the building of that railway, the profits of which would be reaped by the German entrepreneurs. And as England was doing the largest export business to Turkey, England vetoed the plan of paying the subsidy out of increased import duties, and there- by endangered the entire enterprise. But this was not the only source of difficulty. At first Russia and then England had other objections to the Bagdad Railway scheme, besides the purely financial ones just mentioned. Russia's objections were mostly of a military-strategic nature, and they were obviated by shifting some- what the line of the road. England was at first rather favorable to the plan, and even helped the The Immediate Causes of the War 157 German concessionaires at the initial stages of the enterprise with her influence at the Porte, which was then very strong. This was at the time when England was still dreaming pacific dreams, and was making Germany gifts of such strategic positions as Heligoland. But by the time the project began to be realized and assume its true proportions, England was herself in the throes of Imperialism, and she assumed an attitude of unalterable hostility. This hostility led to what is known as the "Koweit Incident". As I have already stated, the Bagdad Railway was not to stop at Bagdad, but was to run on to the Persian Gulf. Its terminus on the Gulf was to be Koweit, the very best, if not the only possible terminus for such a railroad. The principal objection to the entire scheme, from the English point of view, was this very feature, — its terminating on the Gulf, which also made it so important from the Pan-Germanistic point of view. England was therefore resolved to pre- vent this at all costs. And she did, — for the time being at least. When it became evident that Germany was reaping great "diplomatic" victories at Stamboul, and that the Sultan was irrevocably committed to Germany's plans, England dis- covered that Turkey's title to suzerainty over the 158 Socialism and War Province of Koweit was of doubtful character, and that her interests demanded that she take a hand in the quarrels of some native chieftains with a view to eliminating the Sultan from the situation. One fine morning an English man-of- war appeared in the harbor of Koweit, and Koweit was declared an independent principality, care being taken that its "independent" ruler should look upon the Bagdad Railway scheme from the English point of view. The Koweit incident stopped the progress of the Bagdad Railway. Work continued on different sections of the road, but it was quite apparent that the original scheme, with those features of it which were so important from the "world-politics" point of view, would have to be abandoned, unless Germany could score some more "diplomatic" victories and compel England to abandon her opposition. But after many vicissitudes German diplomacy was decisively defeated by the rap- prochement between France and England, and the "Entente Cordiale" which followed it. This defeat was formally acknowledged by Germany in the agreement made in 1911,— the year, it will be recalled, of the Agadir Incident, in which Ger- many's diplomacy suffered another signal defeat at the hands of the "Entente Cordiale". By that The Immediate Causes of the War 159 agreement Germany practically gave up the Per- sian Gulf end of the enterprise, in return for England's formal approval of the remainder of the plan. This makes the road end nowhere, and robs it of its great importance as a part of the "Ocean to Ocean" world-empire scheme. In the meantime history was being made on another part of the great field of operations en- compassed in the Pan-Germanistic scheme. As we have already seen the Balkans form an indispensable link in the same scheme of Pan-Ger- manism, of which the Bagdad Railway is so im- portant a factor. And this railway itself loses its entire importance, as a part of the Pan-German- istic scheme, if it cannot be joined to a trans-con- tinental European railway under the complete domination of Germany. Such a railway must, of course, run through the Balkan peninsula. The fight for the Bagdad Railway was therefore carried on simultaneously on both sides of the Bosporus. And it was the fight on the European side that first led to a resort to arms, and led directly to the present war. It may be said truthfully that the present war was declared not on August 1st, 1914, but on October 7th, 1908, when Austria announced that she had annexed 160 Socialism and War Bosnia and Herzegovina, two Balkan provinces populated mainly by Serbs. In 1878, after the Russo-Turkish War which led to a re-arrangement of Balkan affairs, these two provinces, which formed part of Turkey in Europe, were placed under Austrian adminis- tration, although they nominally remained Turk- ish dependencies. These two provinces, together with the little patch of land known as the Sanjak of Novibazar, immediately adjoining these pro- vinces to the south, and similarly placed under Austrian control in 1878, formed the chief and im- mediate bone of contention between Austria and Servia; a contention which received world-wide importance through the Pan-Germanistic scheme. We shall, therefore, consider these Provinces from their local as well as their general aspects, so that we may form an opinion of their role in the specifically Balkan complications as well as in the war which is now waging. Bosnia and Herzegovina have a population of nearly two millions, mainly of Servian stock. The Sanjak of Novibazar has a population of less than two hundred thousand, about three-fourths of which is Serb. The first two provinces are im- portant in themselves, at least from the Servian point of view, as an addition to the present King- The Immediate Causes of the War 161 dom of Servia of the territory of these two pro- vinces with nearly two million population would mean a great increase of its power. The im- portance of Novibazar is chiefly strategic. And the three together possess particularly great value from the Pan-Germanistic point of view. The Sanjak of Novibazar is a small, and in it- self unimportant territory. Its importance lay in the fact that it was shoved in like a wedge between Servia and Montenegro. It separated these two racially related Kingdoms, and kept the more important of them, Servia, from the sea- coast which it would get by a union of the two. On the other hand it connected the Ausro-Hun- garian Empire, through Bosnia-Herzegovina, to the North of it, with the Turkish Empire to the South. Bosnia and Herzegovina lie immediately to the north of Novibazar, bounded by Austria- Hungary, Servia, and Montenegro, except at the point where the Sanjak separated these two King- doms, where it formed the boundary of Bosnia- Herzegovina. From the local, or Austro-Servian point of view, the importance of these territories lay in this: The possession of the Sanjak of Novibazar by Servia would permit the union of Servia and Mon- tenegro, uniting their divided strength and 162 Socialism and War presenting a solid front against Austria in case of trouble. The possession by Servia of Bosnia- Herzegovina would mean an enormous accession of power for Servia, besides tending to unite Servia with Montenegro, and the creation of a great Slavic centre immediately to the South of the Dual Empire, a centre to which the Slavs of that Empire, and particularly the Servians, of whom there are many in that Empire, would naturally gravitate. But most important of all, — the possession of either Bosnia-Herzegovina or the Sanjak of Novibazar by Servia or Servia-Mon- tenegro would form an impassible barrier be- tween Austria-Hungary and the lower Balkans. That is, it would exclude the Dual Monarchy from participation in the division of the Turkish Dominions in Europe when the time came for such division, thereby forever checking her designs on the lower Adriatic and the Aegean Sea. From the larger, Pan-Germanistic point of view, the possession by Servia or Servia-Montenegro of either Bosnia-Herzegovina or Novibazar would stop the march of the German Empire southward to the Bosporus, and would break the great Ger- man chain which is to unite the Atlantic with the Pacific in one world-empire. The Immediate Causes of the War 163 In 1908 Germany and Austria thought the time opportune to check Servians ambitions and to approach the final realization of the Balkan end of the World-empire scheme (and, incident- ally, of the Bagdad Railway project) , by formally annexing Bosnia-Herzegovina. The time was deemed opportune because Russia, who had been weakened by the Japanese War, was too weak to offer any opposition alone, and France, her only ally, had neither sufficient power nor sufficient in- terest in the subject-matter of the quarrel to risk a war with Germany. In order to further weaken Russia, and prevent any union of the Balkan nations in opposition to the grab, Bulgaria was won over to the plan, her remuneration being complete independence from Turkey, who up to then had a formal suzerainty over the principality. And so, on October 7, 1908, the simultaneous announcements were made, by Austria, that she had annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina; and by Bul- garia, that she no longer recognized the Sultan's overlordship, and that Prince Ferdinand had assumed the title of Czar of Bulgaria. The coup succeeded. Nobody dared do anything in opposition to the German-Austrian schemes, and they seemed on the way towards complete realization. But there followed unlooked for con- 164 Socialism and War sequences: The Dual Alliance between Russia and France became the Triple Entente, with England as the third member; the two Balkan Wars — the second practically the direct result of Austrian intervention, carrying out the policy which indicated the annexation — with the defeat of Bulgaria by Servia ; followed by a strong Serb national movement culminating in the Serajevo shooting. Some of these events were not only unlooked for, but almost unbelievable. That England should abandon her century-old policy of oppo- sition to Russia was amazing. That Servia should defeat Bulgaria was contrary to the best military opinion. The net result of these events was a distinct weakening of the international position of the Austro-German combination, particularly with respect to its Balkan Peninsula-Bagdad Rail- way interests; at least as viewed from the Pan- German view-point. We have already mentioned the fact that in 1911 Germany was compelled to accept defeat and abandon the Bagdad-Persian Gulf extension of the Bagdad Railway in so far as its political control was concerned. The same year saw the German diplomatic defeat in Morocco, following the Agadir Incident. The The Immediate Causes of the War 165 situation on the Balkan peninsula after the con- clusion of the Second Balkan War was anything but satisfactory. It is true that the German powers had succeeded in arresting Servians march to the sea by the creation of the Albanian King- dom. But the new Kingdom was evidently still- born and destined to fall a prey to Servia or a Serbo-Greek combination. Turkey was eliminated from the Balkan situation, except at the Bosporus- Dardanelles Strait. But most important of all, the Vienna-Constantinople-Bagdad chain was broken. Unless, therefore, Servia was reduced to an Austrian dependency, she would interpose an insurmountable barrier to the ambitions of Austria, and the abandonment of the entire scheme of Pan-Germanism seemed only a matter of time. Something had to be done, and done at once: Before Servia gathered sufficient strength to fight her way to the sea. Before Russia completed the reorganization of her military forces, in which she was busily engaged. Before the influence of the Triple Entente, which was evidently growing, had grown much further, and had broken the awe in which Germany's power was held. While the Triple Alliance, whose bonds were perceptibly loosening, owing to the acuteness of the Balkan 166 Socialism and War situation in which the interests of Austria and Italy were irreconcilable, had not yet completely broken down. While Turkey — now completely under the thumb of Germany, but whose actions could not be foretold a few years in advance — still remained dependable. It was evident that if Pan- Germanism was to be realized it had to be fought for with arms, — as diplomacy had completely failed. And it was equally evident that if it was to be fought for, the sooner the better. Germany had failed diplomatically, but as an armed force she was at the height of her power, while her opponents were unready and as yet disorganized. At this juncture came the Serajevo shooting. This made the crisis inevitable. Again speaking from the Pan-Germanist point of view: On the one hand, it furnished an excuse for war that could perhaps never be duplicated. And on the other, a failure to act now would be such a diplo- matic defeat as would make all future attempts to gain anything in that way impossible, and would compel the definite abandonment of all thoughts of world-dominion for a considerable time to come at least, if not forever. It meant the abandonment of the attempt to dominate the Bal- kans by means of Austria, and with it the beauti- ful vision of a German world-empire, with the The Immediate Causes of the War 167 unlimited possibilities of railroad building in the Balkans, Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Arabia, India ; not to mention the deflection of the principle trade route to the East from the Suez Canal and into German-controlled territory, thus driving Eng- land out of the world's carrying trade. So the blow was struck. In the interest of German railroad building, ship building, and of the export of German capital generally for the permanent improvement of "unimproved" countries; under the stimulus of an enormous production of iron and steel, but in the name of German Culture and of Germany's Destiny. And the blow was struck back in the name of liberty and independence, but really to protect the great material interests which the different nations have at stake. England and France have their own railroad and ship-builders to protect, their own iron and steel to sell ; and these would be in grave danger if Germany were permitted to carry out her world-empire schemes. And not only would these particular interests suffer, but owing to the development of modern production and in the inter-industrial distribution already mentioned, their entire economic life might be endangered if the development of these industries were arti- ficially interfered with. Russia and Servia, on the 168 Socialism and War other hand, are seeking the extension of their territory in an effort to reach the sea, which is an imperative law of capitalistic development en- joined upon all countries which desire to develop an absolutely independent capitalistic economy. Belgium wants to keep for her own capitalists the lucrative trade of Antwerp which Germany would fain transfer to German capitalists. V. THE WAR AND THE SOCIALISTS In the preceding lecture I have attempted to treat the present war as a scientific prob- lem only, as a question of cause and effect pure and simple. This is in accordance with what I believe to be the spirit not only of true scientific method, but also of Socialist philosophy. Now there are people who believe that because a phe- nomenon is treated scientifically, as a problem of cause and effect, it excludes the "human" element so-called,— the questions of judgment and sympathy. These people believe that when we have stated that a certain historical phenomenon. is the result of certain economic or social forces, we have thereby foreclosed ourselves of all right to approve or disapprove. That we have thereby eliminated the element of individual or group responsibility, because we have reduced the humans involved therein to mere automatons devoid of any will-power and therefore not morally responsible for their acts. 170 Socialism and War The question of the relation between the general forces, social, economic, or otherwise, which determine the general course of historic events, and the human beings who are the actors in those events is a very important and intensely interest- ing philosophic problem. This is not, however, either the time or the place to enter upon a dis- cussion of that problem. Suffice it to say, that we who consider ourselves the followers of the philo- sophic teachings of Marx, which are generally known under the name of the Materialistic Con- ception of History, believe in the moral respon- sibility of the individual for his actions while par- ticipating in the historic process; although we believe that the general course of history is deter- mined by social and economic forces beyond the control of the individual. There is, therefore, in our way of looking at the historical process, room not only for the scientific investigation of cause and effect, but also room for our sympathy and the passing of moral judgment. And since the human beings who are "making history" are not mere automatons but may profoundly in- fluence the process, there is also the possibility of "learning a lesson". It is with these latter "human" and "practical" aspects of our problem The War and the Socialists 171 that we shall concern ourselves in this and the next lecture. The first question that presents itself to us when we come to consider the war as the result of human conduct, instead of that of blind econo- mic forces, is: Was the war justifiable? And the answer that naturally suggests itself to us, in view of the awful carnage and devastation, the incalculable waste of human life and treasure, is that it was not. Nothing, it seems, could justify the killing and maiming of hundreds of thousands, nay, millions, of human beings, the flower of the human race intellectually as well as physically. Nor, it seems, could any possible advantage to be gained by war be sufficient to recompense for the enormous waste of property, the accumulations of the toil, the industry, and the intellectual genius and artistic inspiration of the race during many generations past. I said this answer naturally suggests itself to us. Because it is only natural that we who are look at it from the purely humanitarian point of view. This point of view is particularly not directly interested in the conflict, whose passions have not been inflamed thereby, should natural to us Socialists who profess to be lovers 172 Socialism and War of peace, and claim to be the only real social force making for peace. And yet, I must state at the outset that this is not my point of view. I do not deprecate the humanitarian point of view. In fact I recognize its legitimacy when viewed purely as a psycholog- ical phenomenon. But I cannot recognize its cogency as a guide to action. Now, I do not want to be misunderstood; and I therefore want to differentiate my point of view not only from the purely humanitarian but also from that of the militarists. The militarists' point of view is best exemplified by that oft-quoted saying attributed to Von Moltke : "Perpetual peace is a dream, and not even a beautiful dream at that." To the mili- tarist war is therefore beautiful in itself, "the finest expression of human personality", — as one of our own militarists recently put it. In absolute contrast to this stands the purely humanitarian point of view which sees in war nothing but hideous butchery and criminal waste. As distinguished from both of these points of view I hold to the belief that war, while abhorrent in itself, may nevertheless become an engine of human progress. In fact, in the past it frequently has been so. Whether or not it can still be so is a matter to be carefully inquired into. The The War and the Socialists 173 present war is therefore not merely a matter to be abhorred, but also one to be studied and under- stood. And studied and understood not merely as a scientific problem, but as a matter throbbing with the interest of a life-problem awaiting solution at our hands. To my mind this world is not a place to play in, but a place to work in. And it is so peculiarly arranged that we can only work to a purpose by making great sacrifices. Whether or not the time will ever come when we can work without sacrifices is a matter that can- not be inquired into here. One thing is certain: that time is not here yet. We cannot therefore give up the work that we may deem our task here because it may involve some sacrifice, even if that sacrifice be that of human life and individual human happiness. I am not a believer in the theory that human progress is possible only at the expense of the lives or welfare of millions of people, either in peace or war. But it is undeniable that in the past at least some progress has come through wars. The point of view that this war, like other wars, might be a necessary engine of human progress is, therefore, at least a permissible point of view. In fact it is the proper point of view as long as it retains the "might" in -^ 174 Socialism and War it. And you cannot dispose of it by the purely humanitarian argument of the awfulness of war. You might as well argue against the continued existence of the race because of the awful pains of childbirth. We must therefore put our human- itarian sentiments aside, and try to grasp the meaning of this great historic event as a factor of social progress or reaction. Sentiment has of course its place in our life, but it should not be permitted to run away with our judgment. And when you have put aside your sentiment, and try to examine the question dispassionately, you will find that the question of the justifiability of the war is not easily answered. In fact, the answer will depend entirely on the views you hold with respect to the question of races and national- ities and their function as agents of human progress. That is, it will depend on whether or not you accept the ordinary Nationalist and Modern Imperialist position as to the historical progress of the Race and the Nation. Once you have accepted the Nationalist point of view that a nation is an entity used in the his- torical process as a medium of progress, neces- sarily having interests separate from other nations but common to all of its members, his position be- comes impregnable. You may still argue with The War and the Socialists 175 him as to what is the wisest policy for a certain nation to pursue under certain given con- ditions in order to preserve or advance its nation- al interests. But you must admit that whenever war becomes necessary in order to preserve or advance these interests, war should be resorted to. The question of war then ceases to be a question of principle, and becomes a question of policy. War ceases to be a wrong per se. Each war must then be judged on its own merits. And in judging it you cannot be guided by purely humanitarian considerations; nor by considerations of abstract principles of justice which are applicable to inter- national relations, no more than there are any abstract principles of justice between the different cpecies of animals or between the animal and the vegetable kingdoms. The most just of men and the most kind — men who scrupulously refrain from doing an injustice to their neighbors and who wouldn't **hurt a fly" — ^think nothing of kill- ing inoffensive animals in order to obtain the food that they think is good for themselves or which may simply serve to tickle their palates. We think nothing of killing, maiming, enslaving or tortur- ing those belonging to a "foreign" species of ani- mals whenever such a course is necessary for the "progress" of the human race, which we identify 176 Socialism and War with the "progress" of the world. The struggle between species, we say, is the law of ani- mal existence — the law by which the animal world "progresses". Similarly, struggle between races and nations is the law of existence — the law of "progress" — within the human world, according to the nation- alist point of view. A nation's duty is only to- wards itself. It has no duties towards other na- tions ; except such as it voluntarily assumes in order to further its own interests, and which cease to have any meaning when that interest ceases, which is the case in war. Hence the old maxim : inter arma silent leges. At most there may be a self-imposed duty not to commit wanton, that is unnecessary and unprofitable, waste ; a duty which may be enforced by a nationalistic Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Humans. The rest is mere matter of policy. As to the so-called inferior races which cannot offer any effective resistance and are therefore at our mercy, it may be good economy to follow a wise conservation policy, to have "closed seasons" when hunting is forbidden, and generally to avoid what Germans call "raub- wirtschaft" — that is, that excessive greediness which kills the goose that lays the golden eggs. A war may therefore be wise or unwise, but never The War and the Socialists 177 right or wrong; never "criminal", except in the sense that an action may be "criminally foolish", — the "crime" being against your own national interest, not against the other nation. In other words, a war is "wrong" when it leads to failure, does not justify the expense in life and treasure necessitated by it; it is "criminally wrong" or "foolish" — these being convertible terms — when it not only fails of its object but reacts in a disastrous way. Success is the supreme and only test of the rights and wrongs of war. If you are an "enlightened" Nationalist and not an ordinary jingo, then you will use the term "success" in the broadest sense, taking a "long view" of the sub- ject, and counting the cost as well as the results achieved. But the question is still one of success. These considerations lead to a certain corollary : We all know that hindsight is easier than fore- sight. It is easy to tell after the event what wars were wise and what unwise. But some of these wars, even some which may after the event seem "criminally foolish", presented quite difficult prob- lems before the event, — problems with many unknown factors and therefore difficult of solution in advance. The "statesmen" who guide the "des- tinies of nations" must solve these problems in advance of the event. Risks must therefore be 178 Socialism and War taken. Of course, a wise statesman will not take any unnecessary risks, nor any big risks when the object to be achieved is of small consequence. But great objects — "great" from the national- istic point of view, which means the achievement by the nation of great advantages over other na- tions — justify great risks. War is therefore justifiable not only as a means to be resorted to in exceptional cases but as a policy. Take the present war as an instance. And first the eastern end of it. Look at it from the point of view of the Russian or Servian nationalist. The march to the sea is, as I have already explained, the necessary concomitant of the fight for inde- pendent economic existence on the part of both Russia and Servia, particularly the latter, in a capitalistic world. But independent economic existence is indispensable to independent national life generally There can be no political indepen- dence without economic independence. Nor can there be any independent intellectual and spiritual life without independent economic existence. This is apparent in the case of Servia. But it is also true of Russia, though the idea of Russian depen- dence, particularly political dependence, may strike us as rather strange on first presentation. Russian inefficiency, the "feet of clay" of the great The War and the Socialists 179 giant, even in military matters, is simply one of the expressions of Russia's economic backward- ness, a backwardness which she cannot overcome as long as she is not complete master of her own economic destinies, — ^that is as long as she has no free and adequate access to the open sea and the world beyond. To put it in the phraseology of Russo-Serbian nationalistic idealogy : The free and untrammelled development of Russian and Serbian "Nationality" — with all that that implies in the way of national "genius", national "cul- ture", etc. — requires "freedom from foreign dom- ination." Is it not clear that a war which would be the means of achieving such an object is perfectly justifiable, and that engaging in a war which makes the achievement of such a great national object possible is taking a "legitimate risk"? Again, look at this war from the Pan-Germanist point of view, and you will find that not only the war as such is perfectly justifiable, but that every- thing Germany has done and would like to do in this war is justified by the "higher morality" which must guide the conduct of nations, — the law of self-interest. In justifying the invasion of Belgium, which must be admitted to be "wrong" — that is, without provocation on the part of Belgium — the Imperial Chancellor said that 180 Socialism and War "necessity knows no law", and this was considered as covering the case by all good German national- ists. And a German Socialist editor in comment- ing upon the same incident said: "The violation of Belgium's internationally guaranteed neutral- ity was an invasion of a legal right, but morally it was justifiable'' — the justification being that Germany needed it. This may sound cynical to us. But the Socialist writer in question deliberately waived all attempts to find cheap excuses for this action in the alleged actions of other nations, designed to cover the naked truth so that it should not shock the Mrs. Grundies of international law and morality. He proclaims boldly that the entire scheme of inter- national law and international regulations is non- sensical, for the only law which a nation can rec- ognize is the higher law of its own sense of duty, — which is, of course, to fulfil its mission, march boldly on the road of its manifest destiny, and so forth. That this man means what he says, and believes that Germany did what was unquestion- ably right, is beyond doubt. The argument from the Belgian or neutral point of view sounds to him as ridiculous as the argument of the anti-vivisec- tionist sounds to the scientific worker who believes he has a mission and is working for "progress". The War and the Socialists 181 To the "humanitarian" scientist, working for the amelioration of the condition of his kind, the inci- dental sufferings of the poor "brutes" on whom he experiments is at most a disagreeable detail. Most people will agree with the scientist. And all nationalists must agree with our Pan-German- ist. For, once you admit that the progress of humanity is effected by means of the development of different nations, having different, individual and independent cultures; each nation represent- ing a certain individual culture which has a char- acter of its own and is not merely a part of a com- mon or general civilization; that each nation has the task and duty of protecting and developing its culture ; — then you must admit that the protec- tion of your culture can not possibly be left to in- ternational law, a code formulated, at best, by peoples alien to the spirit and real meaning of your national culture, and at worst, by its deadly enemies. This is exactly the meaning of the old maxim that questions of sovereignty cannot be arbitrated. And when you take the logical step from the basic nationalist position to that of the modern Imperialist position, and assume that your culture is the culture par excellence, and that it is therefore the mission of your nation to spread its culture everywhere in order to help it to the 182 Socialism and War dominance of the world, — you will find that it is perfectly justifiable for you to do it by all means possible, for you would really be working for the improvement of the entire human race, the per- fection of the world at large, and the realization of the designs of the Creator. To the mind of the honest German Imperialist of the idealistic turn of mind this is exactly what Germany is engaged in doing in this war. Can any work be more noble ? And can any such petty considerations as the breach of a man-made paper-treaty about the neutrality of Belgium, or even the complete destruction of the nondescript Belgian "nation" — a country and a people mani- festly of no "historic destiny" whatsoever — be permitted to stand in the way of its accomplish- ment? And if this reasoning somehow fails to convince us, if we still feel that the invasion of Belgium was an outrage, and the prospective greatness of Ger- man culture leaves us unmoved, it can only be due to the fact that we do not accept the Pan-Ger- man's premise, and not because there is any flaw in his reasoning. Now, our non-acceptance of the German nationalistic premise may be due to one of two reasons : Either we reject the entire Race-National theory; or we simply deny the as- The War and the Socialists 183 sertion that the German race or nation is the chosen one. The latter is the position of the non- German nationalists. Their reasoning is exactly that of the German nationalists, except that where the latter says "German" they say "French" or "English" or some other national name. Of course, viewed from the outside it seems utterly absurd for one set of nationalists to complain of the "utter disregard of the rights of other na- tions" by another set of nationalists, since dis- regard of the rights of other nations is of the essence of nationalism; and the complain- ing nationalists would unhesitatingly approve of the acts complained of if they were committed by or in the interests of their own nation. But it is of the very essence of nationalism that its de- votees cannot look at things from any outside, or extra-national point of view. As a German writer recently put it : Nationalism is a disease, the principle symptom of which is the inability to see the other man's point of view. The position of the Socialists is totally different from the position of the nationalists. We reject entirely the nationalist ideas with respect to the role of races and nations in the development of the human species and its civilization and culture. But before proceeding to discuss what I consider 184 Socialism and War to be the Socialist view of the subject, we must dwell a while longer on the nationalist point of view, — ^which I believe to be the general bour- geois point of view. In trying to get at the point of view of those engaged in the present war, I presented what I believe to be the extreme expression of militant nationalism, the point of view of the Pan-German- ist, which is, however, merely typical of the point of view of modern Imperialism. This is the atti- tude of aggressive nationalism. But not all na- tionalists are aggressive. Some of them are peace-loving, and abhor war and its horrors. That does not mean, however, that the peace-lov- ing nationalists repudiate the basic principles of the bellicose nationalists as to the essential unity of interest of all those belonging to one nation against the rest of the world, which interest is to be protected at all hazards and by all means. It simply means that some nationalists differ from others as to what are the best means of preserv- ing or promoting the national interest, which both agree to be paramount to any other consideration. When an English pacifist says he is opposed to the present war, he does not mean to intimate that he is indifferent to England's national interests. What he says, in effect, is that England's interests The War and the Socialists 185 would have been better preserved if she had stayed out of this war ; that it did not pay her to go into this war. Your confirmed pacifist is nevertheless a good patriot and wants his country to win whenever it does engage in war, as it could not be to its interest to lose in war. The task of the bourgeois pacifist is therefore simple: As long as there is no war he works for peace, and after the war has broken out he works for its speedy termination. But so long as the war con- tinues he "does his duty by his country" by rang- ing himself on the side of his nation and helping it to win. And even while working for the term- ination of the war he does his work with a view to his country's interest, and with a view to help it conclude a peace wih honor and profit. The question of justice to other nations — not as a policy that pays, but as a right — is no more part of the peace- loving patriot's creed than it is of the militarist's. For the simple reason that according to good nationalistic-patriotic doctrine the interests of one's own country or nation are the Supreme Good, and therefore the highest jus- tice. This is well expressed in the famous dictum, which is taught to our children in the public schools in this non-militarist nation as the highest expression of noble sentiment : "My country 186 Socialism and War may it ever be right, but right or wrong, my country /" Now, what is the position of the Socialists on this fundamental question of nationalism-patriot- ism? I said a while ago that the Socialists reject the nationalist's point of view in toto. I must say- now that that was an over-statement, if taken literally at least. What I meant to say was not that they actually, in point of fact do so, but merely that they ought to do so if they followed out logically and to the uttermost consequences what I beileve to be the true fundamentals of the Socialist philosophy. And I may add that until this war broke out many, if not most, people believed that what I consider to be the proper Socialist position was their actual position. It is largely due to this belief, equally prevalent among Socialists and non-Socialists, that there was a general expectation that the Socialists would pre- vent the war by refusing to engage in it. And it is largely due to this belief, that the seeming readi- ness with which the European Socialists entered into this war was felt to be a base betrayal of principle. A careful examination, however, of the litera- ture of the subject will prove conclusively that whatever may be the offense of the European The War and the Socialists 187 Socialists, or some of them, in failing to draw the proper conclusions from the fundamental ideas underlying their philosophy, they have not vio- lated any prescribed rules of conduct, except one which will be discussed further below. The truth is that neither on the subject of nationalism nor on that of war and peace were there any estab- lished doctrines or any well-recognized canons of conduct. The views of many of the leading Socialists on this subject are utterly irreconcila- ble. But what is worse: most leading Socialists never clearly defined their position at all, and no Socialist congress ever attempted to deal with the subject adequately. There is, indeed, an impression current that ab- solute opposition to war, at all times and under all circumstances, is one of the cardinal principles of Socialism. And it must be conceded that "the man in the street" was absolutely justified in his assumption that absolute pacifism was one of the chief tenets of Socialism, as their most important leaders were untiring workers in the cause of peace and their popular orators, when voicing their opposition to war, were not always careful to point out the distinction between opposition to war under certain given conditions and absolute opposition to it under all and any circumstances. 188 Socialism and War There can be no doubt, however, that the Socialists, particularly those of the Marxian School, the predominant school among present- day Socialists, are not absolute pacifists. Indeed, the cast of mind and mode of thought which would lead to absolute pacifism is utterly alien to them. They are not sentimentalists, and therefore could not be opposed to war on purely sentimental grounds. And they are rather close students of history, and are therefore aware of the important role of war in the past, a part which they could not always deprecate in view of the revolutionary character of their own doctrine. That force and bloodshed are not, as such, repugnant to the spirit of their teachings is well known. Marx himself assigned to force a very important place in the historical process. And most Socialists are enthu- siastic admirers of the French Revolution and the Paris Commune, notwithstanding their bloodshed. It is also well known that these sympathies are not limited to internal "revolutions", but extend to wars proper whenever they have a "revolu- tionary" or progressive character, such as the wars of the French Revolution and the American Civil War. In fact they consider war a legitimate and sometimes unavoidable accompaniment of the revolution which they preach and advocate. The War and the Socialists 189 Furthermore, their approval of war is not nec- essarily limited to revolutionary wars properly so- called, but applies to all wars which they consider in the line of human progress. Marx is in this re- spect typical of the revolutionary Socialists gener- ally. To him the question of war and peace was never an abstract question to be decided on ab- stract principles, but a question of policy to be de- cided according to the circumstances of each case. The causes which brought about the war, the pur- poses for which it was carried on, and the results which were likely to follow from it, were the de- termining considerations when he was called upon to judge of any war. Was the war making for hu- man progress ? If so, he was for it ; if not, he was against it. And he not only approved of some wars when they came, but actually did all he could to bring at least one of them about. His relation to the Crimean War is character- istic of his general attitude on the subject. As a result of the general political situation in Europe at that time, and the part which Russia played in the suppression of the revolts of 1848, Marx came to the conclusion that a war against Russia and a defeat of Russia by the western European powers was absolutely necessary in the interest of a demo- cratic reorganization of Europe. When, there- 190 Socialism and War fore, Russia picked a quarrel with Turkey in 1853 and marched her troops in what was then known as the Danube Principalities, now Roumania, he demanded that England intervene in the war. England was then in her pacific era. Her most representative ideologist in the political arena was John Bright. Like the true representative of tex- tiles and Manchesterism that he was, Mr. John Bright used his great eloquence for the propa- ganda of peace and profits. To offset the influence of Manchesterian pacifism Marx endeavored to arouse the English working-men to a support of his war-policy. And when the revolutionary working-men of England, under the leadership of the old Chartists, responded to the call, he ex-, pressed his exultation in a letter published in the New York Tribune of July 25, 1853, in which he says : "While the English Queen is, at this moment, feasting Russian Princesses ; while an enlightened English aristocracy and bourgeoisie lie prostrate before the barbarian Autocrat, — the English proletariat alone protests against the impotency and degradation of the ruling classes. On the 7th of July the Manchester School held a great Peace meeting in the Odd Fellows* Hall, at Halifax. Crossley, M. P. for Halifax, and all the other The War and the Socialists 191 'great men' of the School had especially flocked to the meeting from Town'. The hall was crowd- ed and many thousands could obtain no admit- tance. Ernst Jones was at the time at Durham. The Chartists of Halifax summoned him by elec- tric telegraph, and he appeared just in time for the meeting. Already the gentlemen of the Man- chester School believed they would carry their resolution, and would be able to bring home the support of the manufacturing districts to their good Aberdeen, when Ernst Jones rose and put in an amendment pledging the people to war, and de- claring that before liberty was established peace -z.as a crime. There ensued a most violent dis- cussion, but the amendment of Ernst Jones was carried by an immense majority." Of course, Marx did not expect for a moment that England would, if she went to war with Russia, carry on a revolutionary war, in the So- cialist sense of the word. He knew full well that if he succeeded in getting England to intervene in this war, she would do so for the benefit and in the interest of her bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, he was in favor of that war, because in his opinion, it was in line with general political and economic progress, and therefore in the interest of the working class. We may therefore consider as 192 Socialism and War conclusively established, that, far from being ab- solute opponents of all wars, Socialists are in favor of all revolutionary wars, and also of those wars whose necessary net result would be a strengthening of the forces making for progress, and, therefore, in the interests of the working class. At least that was the position of Socialists fifty or sixty years ago. Since then the position of Socialists on the sub- ject of war has undergone a great change. The vast majority of Socialists of the present genera- tion have completely abandoned the bellicoseness of Marx even against Russia and have become thorough pacifists. This is not due however to any change of opinion on the matter of principle involved, but to a change of the political condi- tions of Europe, which lead the Socialists to be- lieve that the interests of human progress gene- rally, and of the fight of the working class for its emancipation in particular, require continued peace as a policy. The change of conditions which led to the adoption of a general peace policy by the Socialists may be summarized as follows : At the time Marx summoned Western Europe to a crusade against Russia, the latter was still a medieval state, whose great military strength and consequent political preponderance in Europe The War and the Socialists 193 were a source of great danger to the bourgeois- democratic development of Western civilization. It should be remembered that at that time Russia had neither an industrial bourgeoisie nor a mo- dern working class. Her agrarian economy was based on a polity of personal servitude. Her government, which was sometime afterward de- scribed as "a despotism tempered by assassina- tion" had at that time not developed as yet its "tempering" element, and was therefore a despot- ism pure and unalloyed. Moreover, it was a despotism of an aggressive kind, supporting by its military power every despot in Christendom. In Western Europe the bourgeoisie was then just getting on its feet, so to say, and if not interfered with from without was likely to gain the upper hand over the absolute-feudalist combination which opposed it. It had already gotten the upper hand in England, and to a considerable extent in France. The fight in Germany seemed to depend largely on whether the Western powers or Russia would lead the Concert of Europe. The bour- geoisie which was fighting the old feudal-abso- lutist order was in a revolutionary frame of mind, fighting for democratic political institutions. The working class had not yet achieved its majority, and had not, as yet, developed any political power 194 Socialism and War of its own, — its future, for the moment at least, hanging on the fortunes of the bourgeoisie. Under these circumstances it seemed the imper- ative duty of the hour to crush the reactionary- power in the East of Europe in order to permit the orderly development of Europe towards in- dustrialism and political 'democracy, — the fere- requisite to the emancipation of the working class and the inauguration of economic freedom and equality. Hence Marx's call to arms. But during the half-century that has elapsed between the Crimean and the Russo-Japanese Wars all this changed. To begin with, the Russia of the Twentieth Century is not the Russia of the middle of the Nineteenth, either internally or as to her position as a world-power. The oversha- dowing predominance of Russia in European af- fairs which followed the Napoleonic Wars was rudely shaken in the Crimean War, and was com- pletely destroyed by the Russo-Japanese War. At the same time she has been completely revo- lutionized internally. The freeing of the Serfs, which was one of the results of the defeat which she suffered in the Crimean War, set Russia de- finitely and irrevocably on the high-road of cap- italist industrial development which trans- formed the stagnant medieval state of 1853 into The War and the Socialists 195 a rapidly-developing modern state, with a strong bourgeoisie and a revolutionary working class. Not only was the "tempering" influence of assas- sination introduced into her political system dur- ing the last quarter of the Nineteenth Century, but a real revolution occurred early in the Twen- tieth. This revolution, although it failed of ac- complishing its entire purpose, has nevertheless proved two things: First, that the old poli- tical order is as dead in Russia as is the old econ- omic order. And second, that the Russian people can very well take care of themselves without any outside assistance. Russia not only ceased to be a menace to the democratic development of the rest of Europe, but her own absolutism, hard-pressed, is in need of outside help ; while large sections of her people are among the foremost carriers of democratic ideals and disseminators of revo- lutionary principles the world over. At the same time Western Europe has been changing too, — changing in the opposite direction. The bourgeoisie of Western Europe has succeeded in the years following the Crimean War in estab- lishing its supremacy. But this has been accom- panied by a complete abandonment of its revolu- tionary ideals, and a willingness to betray its dem- ocratic principles whenever such a course seemed 196 Socialism and War necessary in order to achieve or maintain that supremacy. This new spirit which has come over the bourgeosie manifests itself particularly in Germany, which, as I have already pointed out, passed from one warlike period into another with- out the intervening peaceful period under the dominance of bourgeois-democratic ideas. The German bourgeoisie, coming upon the historic stage later than its more western neighbors, shamefully capitulated before autocracy and com- promised with the remnants of feudalism in order to be in a better position to fight its capitalistic rivals of other countries on the one hand and the working class of its own country on the other. The time when the bourgeoisie could go to war for liberty and progress is past, never to return. The guardianship of democratic ideas and ideals has passed to the working class, the only social class which seems to have an abiding interest in their realization and preservation. But while this class has grown immensely in power since the days of the Crimean War, it is still very far from controlling the politics of any country, and is therefore not in any position to impose its policies at home even, where it is stronger, — let alone im- posing them on any foreign nation. Besides, this class, or at least its intellectual leaders, have The War and the Socialists 197 heeded the lesson of history, which is to the effect that so-called "wars of liberation" are a snare and a delusion. If the elements of progress working for the reformation of a people's institutions are absent from its life, all attempts to reform or re- volutionize its institutions by the use of force from without will prove futile. Each people must be left to itself, to work out its own salvation as best it can. The conditions for a war in the interest of progress are therefore entirely absent from our modern life, and the chances of their ever recur- ring are so remote as to be negligible. Hence the pacific mood of the present-day Socialists. But this pacifism evidently does not exhaust the subject. Not being the result of principle, but merely a matter of policy, dictated by conditions, it leaves open a number of very important quest- ions. To begin with, the changes which I have described as having taken place since the days when Marx called for a crusade against Russia militate only against any aggressive warlike pol- icy on the part of Socialists. They should not desire any war. But what should they do when they are confronted with the actual fact of war? Is there anything in their principles which pro- hibits them from following their natural im- 198 Socialism and War pulses and fighting for their nation? Is a Socialist debarred from being a patriot? And if so, on what principle? This question becomes even more complicated when the socialist happens to belong to a nation which is being attacked by an- other nation. In such a case the requirements of justice seem to unite with the natural impulse in urging the Socialist to a defense of "home and country". How should a Socialist act in such an emergency? Are there any distinctively Socialist principles covering the subject, upon which a Socialist rule of action could be based? Of all these perplexing questions only one can be answered definitely: It is the consensus of opinion of all Socialists, or at least was until the outbreak of the present war, that a Socialist could not be a "patriot" in the ordinary sense of the word, that he could not subscribe to the principle of "my country, right or wrong". The opposition to this principle proceeded, however, not from any radical dissent from the nationalist position on the role of nationalities as a cultural factor, but from a loftier moral sense than that of the ordinary patriot. It simply amounted to a declaration that a Socialist can engage only in a "just war", — "tempering patriotism with justice", so to say. But what is a just war? The War and the Socialists 199 Proceeding upon the assumption that no war could now be carried on in the interests of prog- ress, and thtat the engaging in war aggressively is therefore necessarily wrong, August Bebel, the great German Socialist leader, announced the true rule to be that all wars of aggression are unjust, while all defensive wars are just. Socialists should refuse to join in the first, but should do their duty cheerfully for "home and country" whenever these are attacked. This rule of conduct was probably the most generally accepted among Socialists up to the outbreak of the present war. But it by no means received their unanimous ap- probation. Among those who were opposed to it was Karl Kautsky, the leading theoretical writer of the international Socialist movement of the pre- sent day. At the Congress of the German Social- ist Party held at Essen in 1907, Bebel and Kautsky debated this subject at some length. Kautsky's main objection to the rule advocated by Bebel was that it was not a safe guide to go by, in prac- tice, as a government could easily fool its socialists into participating in a war of aggression by mak- ing it appear to be a purely defensive war. To which Bebel retorted that if the working class and its leaders can be fooled in a matter like that no rule could save them from error. 200 Socialism and War The events of August, 1914, demonstrated that Bebel's neatly turned oratorial phrase was no ade- quate answer to Kautsky's objection. Although the element of "fooling" was perhaps unduly em- phasized by Kautsky. The real trouble lies much deeper. The fact is that it is very often really im- possible to tell, even with the knowledge of all the facts, and with perfect good faith, as to who is the real aggressor in a given war. But even if we should always be able unerringly, and at the very outbreak of the war, to detect the aggressor, the distinction between aggressive and defensive wars is entirely too technical and formal, and can- not be relied upon always to conform to the de- mands of that higher morality which is supposed to distinguish the action of the Socialist from that of the ordinary patriot. Let me illustrate: In 1911 Italy declared war on Turkey for the purpose of despoiling her of Tripoli. Here was a clear case of aggression — aggression for the purpose of robbery. Accord- ing to the rule laid down by Bebel the duty of the Socialists in the two countries at war was clear : The Italian Socialists were in duty bound to op- pose the war, while the Turkish Socialists were bound to defend their country against Italian ag- gression. Now suppose that a year or two after The War and the Socialists 201 the conclusion of the war, — Italy having success- fully carried off the prize which was the object of the war — a turn in the international situation should make it seem likely that Turkey could re- gain the lost province by making war on Italy, and that Turkey should grasp at the opportunity. What would then be the duty of the Socialists? If the rule were strictly adhered to, the Italian Socia- lists would now be bound to go to war in order to "defend" their country, — defend it in the posses- sion of the ill-gotten gains of the war which only a short while ago it was their duty to oppose. Evi- dently the fact that a war is a "defensive" one does not necessarily mean that it is a just one. It would seem that while Bebel permitted just- ice to "temper" his patriotism when his country was about to commit an act of injustice, his patri- otism got the better of his sense of justice when his country's misdeeds brought forth the inevit- able consequences and her "safety" was threat- ened. The reason for this rather contradictory posi- tion with respect to the relation of justice to "pa- triotic duty" is to be found in the fact that the basis of BebeFs position, the point of departure from which the train of his thoughts on this sub- 202 Socialism and War ject starts, is the bourgeois theory of nationality. In common with the ordinary bourgeois national- ists Bebel believed that the "nation" was not merely an incident of historical evolution, but that each nation was a vessel especially designed for the purpose of carrying a certain brand of "cul- ture" necessary for human progress, which cul- ture would be lost to humanity if the nation ceased to exist or its independence were destroyed. He re- jected the modern outgrowth of nationalist theory according to which each nation is to strive for world-dominion, but he believed that each nation was the carrier of a national culture and repre- sented an entity which must be preserved under all circumstances. Granting his premises, his con- clusion is perfectly correct : The fact that a nation may be wrong in a certain quarrel with another nation is certainly no adequate reason for permit- ting such an important factor of progress to perish or even its influence to be diminished. And in so far as there was any Socialist theory at all on the subject it granted the nationalistic premises, at least in the Bebel formulation. It is true that there were heard some dissenting voices, but they were neither numerous nor very authoritative ; for they usually lost themselves in generalities — and negative generalities at that — The War and the Socialists 203 without attempting to build up a solid theoretical structure which could replace the well-constructed nationalist theory. That does not mean that no work whatever had been done towards building up such a theory. On the contrary, as I shall endeavor to prove in my next lecture, the found- ations for such a theory were laid long ago by the founders of what we Socialists are pleased to call "Scientific Socialism", and the materials for the entire structure were there, but they were in frag- mentary form scattered throughout the length and breadth of the literature of Socialism, and had never been used to actually build the edifice. In the debate between Bebel and Kautsky at the Essen Congress which I have already adverted to, Kautsky indicated the lines along which such a theory is to be constructed, when he insisted that the needs of the working class should be the only guide for Socialists to follow in matters of war and peace. By this declaration Kautsky took a position squarely in opposition to all nationalistic theories, including the pacific nationalism of Bebel. The logical implications of this declara- tion were that the interests of the working class may sometimes, at least, become fundamentally antagonistic to those of the "nation," and that in such an event the interests of the working class 204 Socialism and War should take precedence. In other words, that So- cialists are bound to go to war, if at all, only in defence of the interests of the working class, and not in the interests of their "nation." Unfortunately, Kautsky merely indicated but never elaborated his Socialist theory of peace and war, and never developed a Socialist theory on the subject of race and nation, which is the only basis upon which a Socialist theory of peace and war can securely rest. Another attempt to lay down a Socialist rule of action on the subject of war which should be fundamentally different from the nationalistic position on the subject, is contained in the con- cluding clause of the resolution adopted by the International Socialist Congress at Stuttgart (1907) and incorporated in the resolutions adop- ted at the International Socialist Congress at Copenhagen (1910) and at the Extraordinary In- ternational Socialist Congress at Basle (1912). This clause reads as follows ; "In the event that war should break notwith- standing the efforts of the Socialists to prevent it, then it becomes the duty of the Socialists to work for its speedy termination, and to use all the power at their command, utilizing the political and eco- nomic crises produced by the war, in an effort to The War and the Socialists 205 arouse the discontent of the people so as to hasten the abolition of the rule of the capitalist class" This resolution contains the same unpatriotic implications as the Kautsky declaration, which, by the way, was made only a few weeks after the adoption of this resolution at the Stuttgart Con- gress. The same emphasis on the working class interest; and the same utter disregard for the defence of nation and country. Instead of being in duty bound to come to the defence of his country, it is made the paramount duty of the Socialist to exert himself on behalf of the interests of the working class in the abolition of capitalist class rule. Instead of uniting with the other classes of his nation in defence of his country, he is to arouse the discontent of the people, presumably irrespective of what the consequences might be as to the "defence". This resolution has the ad- vantage over the Kautsky declaration in that it prescribes a definite course of action, instead of merely laying down a principle the application of which might depend upon the interpretation of what is meant by "the interest of the working class." But it shares with the Kautsky declaration the unfortunate situation of not having any solid, well-recognized theoretical position on the under- lying subject of race and nationality. Not being 206 Socialism and War founded on any such fully elaborated and well- recognized theory, and having among its sponsors such men as Bebel, who stood firmly on the basic nationalistic principle, it was liable either to be misinterpreted or to be regarded merely as a sop thrown out to Gustave Herve and other anti-patriots, as a compromise, and having really no organic connection with the general position of the Socialists on the subject. Such was the condition of Socialist theory at the outbreak of the great European conflict. Now let us turn for a moment to the practice. A survey of the actions of the European Socialists immedi- ately prior to and since the beginning of the war will show conclusively that with few exceptions, they have all acted on the principle of nationalism, — a pacific nationalism, but nationalism neverthe- less. By this I do not mean to intimate that I dis- approve equally of all the Socialists who went into this war. I will anticipate my next lecture here sufficiently to say that the action of some of the Socialists who went into this war might be justified on correct Socialist principle. Only it is my belief that as a matter of fact they were not guided in so doing by correct Socialist principle, but by ordinary bourgeois-nationalistic consider- ations. The War and the Socialists 207 Let me illustrate what I mean, and at the same time offer proof of my assertion. In my opinion the positions of the Socialists in Germany and Bel- gium, respectively, were fundamentally different from one another, so that while the action of the German Socialists was utterly indefensible from what I consider to be the Socialist point of view, the action of the Belgian Socialists in coming to the defense of their country was perfectly consist- ent with Socialist principle. And yet, I cannot acquit the Belgian Socialists, or at least some of them, of the charge of having acted on non-Social- ist principles in what they did. And for the fol- lowing reason: During his stay in this country Vandervelde was asked what he thought of the conduct of the German Socialists. To which he replied substantially as follows : We (that is the Belgian Socialists) have no complaints to make against the German socialists. Until the outbreak of hostilities they did all they could to prevent the war; and after the outbreak of hostilities they were in a very difficult position, with Republican France on one front and the Czar of Russia on the other, and had we been in their position we would have in all probability acted the way they did. As we have no right to assume that Vandervelde would have made so serious a statement merely 208 Socialism and War out of international courtesy, we must adjudge him to be particeps criminis with the German Socialists in whatever they did, as an eccessory after the fact, — ^which can only be due to a com- munity of views. And here I must tarry a while in order to dispose of a disturbing element in the situation — the Russian Czar, You will have noticed that Vandervelde refers to the Russian Czar as the jus- tification or excuse for the German Socialists' con- duct in supporting the German Government at the outbreak of the war. The German Socialists themselves asserted at the beginning of the war that the Czar was the real reason for their conduct with respect to the war, and they have called upon the shades of Marx and Engels to justify their action. I must say frankly that this attempt to make the poor Czar the scapegoat for the sins of the German Socialists is extremely dis- ingenuous and not in accord with the known facts of the case; and the appeal to Marx and Engels smacks somewhat of the hypocritical, at least in the mouth of some of those making it. I have already pointed out that the cir- cumstances under which Marx called upon West- ern Europe to war on Russia were entirely dif- ferent from those which prevailed at the outbreak The War and the Socialigts 209 of the present war. I may add here that these dif- ferences had been repeatedly pointed out long be- fore the present crisis arose and were well-known to all Socialists, particularly to German Socialists. Those German Socialists, therefore, who had al- ways been upholders of the Marxian theories, doctrines, and policies refused to be caught by this bait thrown out by the German Government and warned their comrades against it. So the Vor- waerts, the central organ of the German Socialist Party and for years the rallying point of what might be considered the simon-pure Marxists in Germany, published a leading article on August 3rd, only one day before the fateful session of the Reichstag when the Socialist Parliamentary group joined in voting the war credits, protesting most emphatically against the attempt to use the Czar as an excuse for drawing the German work- ing class into this war. As a result, we were there- fore confronted with the curious spectacle of the alleged authority of Marx and Engels in favor of the war being invoked by that portion of the So- cialist movement in Germany which ordinarily cared least about the opinions and example of the "revolutionary fathers", and being denied by the most revolutionary and consistently Marxist por- tion of that movement. This alone should be suf- 210 Socialism and War ficient to prove the vulnerability of the Czar as a shield for Socialist warlike operations. But there is more direct proof of the fact that the Czar had practically nothing to do with the conduct of the German Socialists in the present war. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. Had the German Socialists gone into this war because it was, or they thought that it was, a war against Czarism, they would have stayed in it only as long as the idea that this was a war pri- marily against Russian Czarism was actually entertained by them. Their support of the govern- ment would of necessity have been with- drawn the moment it became evident that this war was directed primarily against the Western Powers. But the pretense that this was a war mainly against Russia did not last longer than Jonah's leaf. Not only in the purely military operations, but in the avowed purposes of the war the German Government and the German Press, as well as all other organs of public opinion, set their face westward practically from the second week of the war. And yet the Socialists stayed on. After the first excitement was over, the entire bourgeois and governmental press declared in one voice that England was the enemy. Russia was practically forgotten. And yet the Socialists not The War and the Socialists 211 only stayed on, but actually joined the chorus of execration against England and announced their intention of staying in the war until this mortal enemy was completely vanquished. It is therefore clear beyond peradventure of a doubt that the Russian Czar was not a determin- ing factor in the support which the German Social- ists have given to this war. By this I do not mean to say that a few individuals may not have gone in- to this war solely on account of the Russian Czar. But such individuals must have been very few, and they must have pulled out as soon as the true character of the war became apparent. Nor do I mean to say that the vast majority of German Socialists who stayed on, warring as enthusiast- ically against England as they did against Russia, were necessarily hypocrites when they declared, at the beginning of the war, that the Czar was the cause of their patriotism. That there were some hypocrites at work may be — probably is — ^the fact. But the great bulk of them were certainly sincere in their belief, as great masses always are. The explanation is simple enough, — although ex- tremely interesting to the investigator of the re- lations existing between economics, psychology, and ideology: They went into this war for the same reason that other Germans went into it, just 212 Socialism and War because they felt and thought like Germans. Being also Socialists in their secondary character they honestly tried to square their Nationalism with their Socialism, and for a while at least were able to do so, thanks to the Czar. Some may still cling to him in a desperate effort to save their Socialist conscience. When this becomes impossible by the trend of events, which accentuate with ever-grow- ing decisiveness the Imperialistic and anti-English character of the war, they will begin to revise their Socialism so as to bring it into grater con- formity with their Nationalism. The process has already begun; when and where it will end it is difficult now to foretell. VI. SOCIALIST VS. BOURGEOIS THEORIES. I STATED in my last lecture that, rightly under- stood, the basic theories of Socialism contain within themselves a theory of race and national- ity, and therefore a theory of peace and war, which is totally different from and opposed to the current bourgeois or nationalistic theories on the same subject. And at the same time I stated that such theory had never been clearly elaborated, nor any definite rules of conduct based thereon estab- lished, and that when the war came the vast ma- jority of Socialists acted not on any Socialist the- ory but on the current nationalistic theory just as if there had been no Socialist theory. It would seem, on the one hand, somewhat presumptuous in one man to assert that he is in possession of the true interpretation of the principles of Socialism, which escaped the notice of the vast ma- jority of Socialists and their intellectual leaders. 214 Socialism and War even if he should admit a few other individuals into a sort of qualified partnership with himself in the possession of this precious truth. On the other hand, such a truth would of necessity seem to be of rather doubtful character : a truth that is neither clearly understood nor acted upon is cer- tainly far from being a living truth, the kind of truth worthy of the name. In answer to the first objection to the acceptance of what I have stated I will say that truth and the knowledge of truth — which is really one and the same thing, as truth only lives by its recognition and has no existence outside of it — grow as part of the general development of the human species and their growth depends entirely on the circum- stances and conditions of that development. Not only are new ideas, new modes of thought — ^what we call new truths — ^the result of new social de- velopments; but all the implications of radically new modes of thought only come to the surface, at least so as to become generally cognizable, with the development of particular conditions and the occurence of the particular facts of life to which they are to be applied and which serve to accen- tuate them. The Socialist theories of race and nationality, war and peace, very naturally only developed slowly as the conditions of life called for Socialist vs. Bourgeois Theories 215 their application, except perhaps in the minds of some theoreticians and there only fragmentarily. The full scope and import of these theories can only be studied and understood now, under the enlightening influence of the present war. And there can be no doubt but that the present war will bring forth an enormous amount of Socialist literature which will serve to bring this phase of Socialist theory into clear relief, — ^these lectures being part of a general effort now undoubtedly making in all parts of the world. As to the second objection, I may say that I can safely take my appeal from formal statements and resolutions to the general, I might almost say instinctive belief, current everywhere before the war, among Socialists and non-Socialists alike, that the Socialists would somehow or other prevent the war, or at least would not willingly participate in it. This almost universal expectation — and the feeling of surprise, disappointment and indigna- tion which followed its failure of realization — must have had some basis of fact, some uncon- scious or half -conscious evaluation of the Socialist movement and its theory which was dimly present in the minds of all, even though it never reached the stage of full articulation. There must have been something which made the world put a dif- 216 Socialism and War ferent valuation on the Socialist declarations in favor of peace, from the valuation it placed on similar declarations emanating from the bourgeois pacifists. It is this which gives point to the sneers levelled at the Socialists shooting at their "com- rades" while no one would think of sneering at the Christians for shooting at their "brothers in Christ" and getting "infidels" to help them in the shooting. By an almost universal consensus of opinion the Socialists' professions of peace were regarded as something more than a mere pious wish or an outward coat of veneer, meant only for dress-parade and of no account in the actual "busi- ness of life." They were supposed to mean real business, to be an integral part of the actuality of the Socialist labor movement. |J[he basis of this universal belief in the sincerity and the actuality-quality of the Socialist peace pro- gram is to be found in the Class Struggle which is both the theory and the practice of the modern labor movement. The theory of the class struggle is in absolute and irreconcilable opposition to the nationalistic theory of patriotism, — ^while its practice makes the practice of the patriotic virtues utterly impossible^ The theory of the Class Struggle is not merely a statement of fact as to the division of our pre- Socialist vs. Bourgeois Theories 217 sent society into hostile classes struggling with one another for the good things in life and for the control of the institutions of organized society which control the distribution of these things. It is primarily a historical theory, an attempt to explain the progress of mankind and the means whereby this progress is brought about. As such it denies the role ascribed to race and na- tionality as factors of human progress by the na- tionalistic theory, and considers these entities mere incidents in the evolution of mankind, brought forth at a certain stage of this evolution bound to disappear with it. Briefly stated, the position of those who believe in the Class-struggle theory of progress — which is my position, and, I believe, the position of all true Socialists — is this: In the first place, there is no such a thing as a Superior or an Inferior race. All races are alike, with respect to their essential qualities, — that is in their capability to develop along those lines that we call civilization. Different races may at any given time be at dif- ferent stages of this development, but they are all equally capable of achieving the highest point of this process of evolution. In other words the dif- ferences between them are of the degree of development and not those of essential kind or 218 Socialism and War substantive quality, so to say. It follows logically from this, (although this logical correlation has not always been recognized), that there are no separate national cultures, but only one human Civilization; that the so-called differences of na- tional culture among nations at the same stage of civilization, are mere differences of local color, unessential and unenduring in character, and bound to disappear with the disappearance of the particular mode of life which has produced them. This position is not exactly novel. It is in fact a further development and consolidation (to use an expression that has become familiar since the beginning of this war) of the theoretical position achieved during the peaceful epoch of capitalism of which I spoke in one of the earlier lectures. This is one of the instances when we Socialists stand for the achievements of bourgeois-capitalist civil- ization — achievements of the vigorous "classic" age of that order of things and accompanying ideology — as against the reactionary tendencies of its own later and more decrepit age. But we Socialists are never stand-patters. And so we do not simply stand pat on the achievements of ca- pitalist civilization at its best, but are ready to develop them further to their logical conclusions and in consonance with the general trend of evo- Socialist vs. Bourgeois Theories 219 lution. We do not, therefore, merely take our stand on the essential equality of all races and nations, and the absence of any distinctive cul- tures; different in kind and therefore liable to differ in quality. We go a step further and say that while civilization is common to all mankind, this civilization is improving in qualty and reaches hgher levels as mankind surmounts the inherited difficulties of historic differences and approaches a common type superior to all localisms. Our goal is, therefore, not cosmopolitanism, sl state when different cultures merely dwell side by side, but true internationalism, when all national cul- tural differences will be merged in a higher, pan- human, culture. Now, I realize that I am treading here on ex- tremely dangerous ground, for I am now bucking up not only against the nationalistic prejudice but also against the dread of many good souls in our midst against so-called "levelling". It is curious how even people who can see the utter absurdity of the "levelling" charge when brought against the economic and social aspects of Socialism, will still consider it a valid objection to a common, non- local, and non-national, culture. Somehow they cannot divest themselves of the absurd notion that a common, non-national, culture, means a less 220 Socialism and War varied, monotonous, poor kind of culture, at least from the artistic point of view. As a matter of fact such fears are utterly groundless, and we need not resort to hypothetical speculations as to a future state in order to convince ourselves of this. It is sufficient to examine intelligently the well- authenticated facts of the historic past. And we need not delve far into history either; it is suffi- cient to study the epoch of European history which closed but yesterday. As I pointed out in an earlier lecture, the face of Europe was not so very long ago covered by a mul- titude of tribes, each having its own character- istics of speech, dress, and manner, which marked it off and set it apart from all other tribes. These tribes have now disappeared and their place has been taken by a few great nations. Will any one say that European culture, its literature, its art, have become poorer on that account? Or, perhaps your fancy cannot carry you so far back so as to make the comparison. Take, then, the Germany of yesterday as an illustration. After emerging from the tribal state Germany still con- tinued broken up into a number of fragments: Prussians, Bavarians, Saxons, Hessians, Hanover- ians, etc., etc., and not merely in the sense that politically these sub-divisions of the German Socialist vs. Bourgeois Theories 221 people were independent of each other, but in the sense that there existed many particular patriot- isms as a concomitant of these separate political entities. This condition continued until within the memory of living men. And their consolidation was opposed much on the same grounds, as the consolidation of all nations into a common, nation-less, humanity is being opposed now, that is to say, for "cultural" reasons. The Bavarian and the Saxon, the Swab and the Hessian, and the rest, were afraid that the culture of the world would grow poorer by the disappearance of the distinctive individuality of the three dozen different Germanic "cultures" and their merger into one "levelling" German culture. Have these fears been justified? Has German culture grown poorer, or has the world at large lost any valuable cultural element by the dis- appearance of the duodez cultures of Hanover and Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, or even of the largest unit of them all ? Ask the world of art and letters. Nay, ask these same former duodez particular- ists. Ask any one of the present day shouters for German Kultur, whether Germany has lost in culture since the particular culture of the shouter's fatherland of fifty years ago, be it Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria, or Saxe-Meiningen, 222 Socialism and War has been merged in the general culture of Ger- many. These examples prove two things : First, that it is utterly absurd to assume an intimate relation between certain political boundaries, which may be the result of historic accident, even if they coincide with some particular twist of the tongue, and human culture. Second, that the amalga- mation of smaller units into larger ones is a means of progress and does not in any way retard or otherwise injuriously affect human culture. That, on the contrary, such amalgamations tend to broaden the vision and quicken the intellect, which of necessity results in a richer life and therefore in a richer culture. To that extent nations have been the means of advancing culture. But to that extent only. Having reached the nation-stage, to insist on remaining at it is not merely to refuse to go forward but it in- evitably means an attempt to go backward. Nationalism is as reactionary now, even from a purely cultural point of view, as was German par- ticularism two generations ago. But Socialist theory does not stop merely denying the nationalistic theory of progress. We have a theory of progress of our own, which we substitute for the national theory. The sub- Socialist vs. Bourgeois Theories 223 stance of our theory — which is a part of the theory of the class-struggle — consists in the claim that social classes and the struggle between them are a means of furthering the general progress of humanity. We believe that the fundamental di- vision of the human species is not along racial or national lines, but along class lines, and that the great struggles which led to those social trans- formations which we call human progress were struggles along the class line of division. There is such wide-spread misconception of the Class Struggle theory that I think it worth while to spend a few minutes in giving you a general out- line of this theory, as a clear understanding of this theory is necessary to an understanding of what I believe to be the true Socialist position on the problem of peace and war. As commonly understood the theory of the Class Struggle "teaches" that Society is divided into two classes — the capitalist class and the working class — and that these two classes are, or should be, in a life-and-death struggle with each other. This notion of the Class Struggle theory may be considered a fairly correct approximation of one element in that theory. But it does not exhaust its meaning by far. Indeed, as so stated, it leaves out its most essential feature. 224 Socialism and War For this theory is not merely a statement of things as they are in our society, but a general- ization of all past history, a theory of historical progress, a philosophy of history. This philosophy may be thus summarized: Ever since human society has been based on private property, which means practically ever since there has been any written history recording the progress of mankind, this society has been divided into classes, the upper classes always re- presenting a certain social economy, and being in control of the principal instruments of production and distribution of that economy. These different social classes are in an continual struggle among themselves ; not merely the upper classes with the lower, but the upper classes among themselves, each one of them struggling to make its economy the dominant economy of the community or nation and make every other economy subservient to it. In this struggle for economic supremacy each class endeavors to gain control of the political power of the community in order to use the en- tire collective power of the social organism to fur- ther its own cause. More than that : each class tries to give the social organism such an organization stitutions — as best suits the economic order — that is, it tries to establish such political in- Socialist vs. Bourgeois Theories 225 which it represents. Each class therefore repre- sents a distinct economic and political order of things, which implies also a distinct moral and intellectual outlook upon the world. In other words, — a distinct phase of civilization or culture. The important classes, representing as they do, different social economies, appear on the historical arena successively. The appearance of a new class upon the arena of human history therefore means not only a new struggle but the beginning of a new epoch, a new advance, in our civilization. At first blush there seems to be a striking analogy between this theory and the nationalistic theory. The same idea of advance by struggle be- tween different cultures or phases of civilization. The same idea of a certain part of the human species being the carrier of a certain culture or phase of civilization, and the necessity of that par- ticular portion of mankind obtaining political dominion over the rest of mankind in order to permit the entire human race to take a step further on the road of progress by giving this particular culture or form of civilization the upper hand in the struggle of ideas and points of view. It would seem in fact that all that we Socialists did, in our boasted advance upon the 226 Socialism and War nationalistic point of view, was to substitute the class for the nation. But upon a closer examin- ation of the subject we shall find that the sub- stitution of the class for the nation as the carrier of progress involves a fundamental change of view in the outlook upon the world and its meaning, and has a most far-reaching effect upon the decision of all practical problems with which we are confronted in our daily life, both as individuals and as members of an organized community, in- cluding the great problem just now engrossing the attention of the entire civilized world, — the problem of peace and war. In the first place, the nationalist theory is a conservative one, if not actually reactionary; while the Class Struggle theory is evolutionary and progressive. The Nationalist looks upon the world through the naive eyes of the author of the Book of Genesis, as the same was understood before any attempts were made to square its story of Creation with the results of modern science: The Creator, in his wisdom, created a number of nationalities, and endowed each of them with cer- tain characteristics and capabilities; some were intended to serve and others to rule; the ruling nationalities were each made the carrier of a cer- tain brand of culture; and these nationalities are Socialist vs. Bourgeois Theories 227 therefore by the law of their creation and exist- ence to carry on a struggle for the supremacy of particular cultures. The Class Struggle theory does not look to Genesis but to Darwin and Science for an ex- planation of the existence of races and nations and their different endowments and character- istics. It believes in the theory of evolution and applies it to social phenomena. Races are the result of the natural conditions of the existence of the human race in different natural environ- ments, and nations are the result of these "natural" conditions plus the social conditions under which the different groups of the human family live and work. Neither is a permanent entity. Both are subject to change and trans- formation when the conditions of their existence change. And these conditions, particularly the social conditions, do constantly change. But not only are race and nation changeable entities, the class, likewise, is a changing entity; its existence being the result of social evolution and its character constantly undergoing a process of evo- lution. This difference in the point of view as to the origin and character of the divisions existing in the human family has a direct bearing upon the 228 Socialism and War subject which is uppermost in our minds to-day: the nationalist theory is warlike, while the Class Struggle theory is peaceful. We have seen that the basic idea of nationalism is that the Creator has created different nation- alities, carriers of different cultures, and set them to fight each other. The idea of one Chosen People, the carrier of the Culture, is not only the logical corollary of this basic idea, but is practically in- separable from it. And the idea of a Chosen People is inseparable from the ideas of war, con- quest, dominion. The Chosen People of Genesis and what follows it are a warlike, ferocious, con- quering, exterminating, people. Their God is the conquering Lord of Hosts, — the cruel, ruthless War Lord. And properly so : The Culture can be established only on the ruins of the inferior cul- tures contesting its supremacy. It must exter- minate them root and branch. What matters it, if in the process some, or even many, human lives are destroyed? Destruction is the law of life, and the progress of the species is worth any sacrifice. Particularly if the sacrifice is of inferior human beings and it rebounds to the welfare of the superior race, the Chosen People. And the modern adepts of the Chosen People idea, with its cultural mission, have shown in theory and practice the Socialist vs. Bourgeois Theories 229 acceptance of the idea that the War Lord and his ways are still the proper, if not the only, means of carrying out this cultural mission. The Class Struggle theory stands in absolute contrast to this. Not only are there no inferior races or nations : there are no inherently inferior classes. The class representing the old and anti- quated order of things, the class against whom the new and progressive class is fighting, does not consist of inferior individuals, individuals in themselves less useful or less worthy members of the social organism. It is only their social position within a certain social order that makes the rising class fight them. The fight can, there' fore, never be directed against them as individuals, there can be no personal hatred against them, and therefore no desire to encompass their destruction. The fight is merely against their social position; and that not with a view of sup^ planting them, but for the purpose of abolishing that position itself and place them in a position of equality with the members of the attacking class. The class struggle is, therefore, from the point of view of the attacking force, not a fight for superiority but for equality. Furthermore, even as a class the class attacked is not supposed to be an inferior class, in the eyes 230 Socialism and War of the attacking class ; — hut merely a super- annuated class, a class that has outlived its use- fulness. As was already pointed out, the Class Struggle theory, when rightly understood, ascribes to each class an important historical part, a cultural mission. And while each succeeding class represents a higher phase of civilization, it does not mean that the earlier one was of less importance in the general development of human civilization. Its domination is to be abolished, but it is to be neither hated nor despised. And this brings us to the most important difference between the national and the class point of view with respect to the "enemy culture". We have already seen that the nationalist superior culture fights to destroy its opponents. That is perfectly proper from its point of view, because the enemy culture is an utterly alien and antagonistic entity. Not so with class culture. From the point of view of the Class Struggle theory, the new culture, represented by the rising class is not something utterly alien to nor some- thing entirely independent of, the culture of the class which it is fighting. On the contrary, it is intimately connected with it, being merely a further step in the same process of development. With all its enmity to the order to be abolished, Socialist vs. Bourgeois Theories 231 is does not mean to destroy it entirely, only certain of its attributes. The good that it has brought, the real cultural advances that it has made are to be retained and made permanent. The enemy class is to be fought and its social dominion abolished, but its cultural work is not to be destroyed. In fact its cultural mission is to be helped along, whenever it needs our assistance in order to accomplish this task. And whenever the enemy class should prove false to its own ideals and cul- tural mission, and abandon its historical task in the advancement of civilization, it becomes our mission to accomplish this task and finish the work thus left undone. But there is another important distinction between the historico-cultural conceptions of Nationalism on the one hand, and the Class- Struggle theory, adopted by Socialism, on the other. A distinction which colors the entire out- look upon the world and its doings, and therefore of the greatest practical importance. It is this : According to the Nationalist-Imperialist idea of historical progress, races and nations have not only always existed, but will always exist. This is the only possible modus vivendi of the human species. The nations were put there not merely to 232 Socialism and War fight for supremacy, but also to preserve their identity. And this applies to superior and inferior races alike, to conquering as well as vanquished nations. The super-race or super-nation is to im- pose its will and culture upon the other races and nations, but it must not assimilate them, absorb them into its own body, on pain of itself degene- rating and losing that position in the world for which it was intended by the act of Creation. I have already mentioned the fact that according to the nationalistic theory the chosen race or nation is the only carrier of its particular culture. The in- ferior races and nations may accept it by submit- ting to it and live under its beneficient rule, but they can never become its living carriers and pro- pagators. Purity of race is itself a sign of super- iority, while "mongrel" races are necessarily in- ferior. The maintenance of the chosen race or nation in its pristine purity is therefore the first commandment in the nationalist code. The practical ideal of the nationalist philosophy is the perpetuation of races and nationalities with their existing divisions into superior and inferior, ruling and servile; the perpetuation of strife among them in its double aspect of an attempt by all the so-called superior nations to enslave the inferior ones, and of the struggle of the alleged Socialist vs. Bourgeois Theories 233 superior nations among themselves for first place, for domination of the entire world. In other words — the perpetuation of war. Not so the Socialist theory of the Class Struggle. The class is not an essential and immutable ele- ment of progress in this theory in the same sense that the Nation is in the nationalist theory. I have already pointed out the fact that according to our theory classes are not eternal, but that each class is destined to occupy the historical arena only for a given time, accomplishing its historical mission, which is only a temporary phase of the evolution of the entire species, and then disappearing with- in the bowels of the human race which gave it birth. I must now call your attention to another important feature of our theory: Not only is each class merely a passing phenomenon of human evo- lution, but progress-by-means-of-the-class-strug- gle is itself only a phase of human evolution, the class struggle being the means of human progress only during a certain epoch of the history of the species, — the epoch in which private property is the basis of the social-economic order. There were epochs of human history when society was not divided into classes, and when human progress was therefore effected without the intervention of the class struggle. And we are looking forward 234 Socialism and War to a time when classes will again disappear, and when human progress will be effected by other and more peaceful means than the struggle of the clas- ses. Instead of preaching or teaching a perpetual struggle of the classes, the most essential feature, the cardinal doctrine, of the Class-Struggle theory- is the abolition of classes and of the class struggle. Applying these theoretical distinctions to prac- tical problems we find the following differences of policy between the Nationalists and the Socialists : The Nationalist is a reactionary or conservative, while the Socialist is a progressive. The Nation- alist does not merely look backward for the pur- pose of discovering the origin of races and nations in the act of Creation, but also to discover his ideal of the future. His future lies in the past. It is in the past that the race or nation existed in unquestioned purity. It was then that its true characteristics, its essential qualities, its true spirit, manifested themselves — in its old and time- honored institutions. It is therefore his manifest duty to strive to preserve these institutions; and the older the institution the greater the duty of preservation. To conserve the past, with its out- lived and outworn institutions, is the practical program of Nationalism. And wherever the old and hoary institutions have been encroached upon Socialist vs. Bourgeois Theories 235 and their efficiency impaired by recent in- novations, this program includes not merely con- servation of what is, but also a retracing of steps in order to regain what was. Conservatism is fol- lowed logically by reaction, A glance at the world around us, and a look into the history of the past fifty years, will prove the correctness of this assertion. I stated in one of the preceding lectures that the republican-demo- cratic form of government was an essential ele- ment of bourgeois-capitalistic philosophy during its peaceful-cosmopolitan epoch, when that philo- sophy reached its highest cultural level. During the fifty years or so that have passed since, there has been considerable filling and backing, and considerable retracing of steps in that particular. Instead of forging forward towards a realization of its ideals, the bourgeoisie, under the influence of the Imperialistic trend, has entirely abandoned its demand for a republican form of government, not only as a practical program but as an ideal. At no time within the past century and a half were monarchical institutions so popular among the "educated classes" as at the present time. This is particularly true of those parts of Western Europe where republicanism was strongest half-a-century ago. 236 Socialism and War Some of us old-fashioned Americans who have failed to read the signs of the times may have been rather surprised to hear Prof. Munsterberg of Harvard tell us soon after the outbreak of the present war that in Germany they considered a republic "reactionary"; that not only did they (that is, the German educated classes) not aspire towards a republic, but that they would consider the introduction of the republican form of govern- ment as a relapse into a lower cultural level. Per- haps some of us even jumped to the conclusion that the learned Professor was libelling his countrymen. But to those who are familiar with the latest fruits and flowers of Imperialistic culture, there was nothing new or startling in the gentleman's declaration. His was the true voice of the new trend. A new trend which is not peculiar to Germany, but is common to all up-to- date Europe. And while this trend is stronger in Germany than elsewhere, the difference is merely one of degree and not of kind. As the foremost representative of the modern Imperialistic spirit, as the principal expounder of the race-national- istic theories which form its base, Germany naturally leads in this march backwards. But the others follow, and not so very far behind either. The only ones that have refused to follow were Socialist vs. Bourgeois Theories 237 those portions of the working class who, following the leadership of the Socialist theorists, accepted the doctrines of the Class Struggle philosophy and the practical program dictated thereby. Facing forward, they care very little for the cast-off clothes of the past ; nor have they any particular attachment for present-day institutions either be- cause of their age or supposed connection with a particular national spirit or so-called genius of the race. Furthermore, believing in a steady forward march of the human race as a whole, they do be- lieve in the achievements of the entire human race, including certain forms of social and economic life, which we ought to maintain and develop fur- ther. Among these are republican and democra- tic forms of government. The Socialist part of the working class therefore considers itself in duty bound to cherish the ideal of, and carry on the struggle for, republicanism and democracy wher- ever and whenever the bourgeoisie, the class whose mission it was to introduce these forms of government into modern society, has gone back on them. And here I must stop for a moment in order to explain what, according to the Class Struggle theory, was the historic mission of the capitalist class — in the broader meaning of those words 238 Socialism and War which makes them co-terminous with the word bourgeoisie — as that has an intimate relation with our position on the war question as I under- stand it. Briefly speaking, the historic mission of the capitalist class was to establish political liberty and freedom of economic intercourse. I do not want to be misunderstood : I do not use the word "mission" in the same sense as the nationalistic theorists use that word, — in a teleologic sense. What I want to say is this: In order to fully develop those economic forces which gave birth to and attained their development during the epoch known as the capitalistic era, two things were necessary: personal, and economic freedom. The capitalist class needed these two things in order to overthrow the political rule of the feudal class, which preceded it in the rulership of society, and abolish the economic order known as feudal- ism. These two things therefore became the essential features of its ideology, — its way of look- ing upon the world. Driven by its economic interests, and its ideals born of those interests, it strove to accomplish these two purposes, which, when accomplished, constituted an absolute and permanent gain for human civilization. By "economic freedom" I mean here freedom of Socialist vs. Bourgeois Theories 239 economic intercourse, which must be reckoned among the great achievements of capitalism, along with political liberty. For freedom of eco- nomic intercourse, both within the nation and between nations, is absolutely necessary for a full and rational development of all the economic forces latent within our social system. Unfortun- ately, the capitalist class fully accomplished these achievements only in theory, and not in practice. For a short time and in a limited area it came near accomplishing it fully, when it suddenly halted and turned back upon itself. The working class, which considers itself the heir to all of the cultural achievements of the past, which it must use as a foundation in building its own cultural edifice in the future, therefore finds that the two cultural ideals of capitalism have been placed by fate in its keeping. Besides doing its own work proper it must carry to a finish the task left unfinished by the capitalist class, as well as protect against all attack whatever has already been accomplished. Now, what is the application of the theoretical positions of those who accept the Class-Struggle Theory of evolution to the subject of war? It is self-evident that those who accept the theory of the Class Struggle cannot possibly be for 240 Socialism and War war in the same sense and for the same reasons that the Nationalists may be, and usually are, for war. War is, at best, carried on by a nation for national purposes. Denying as the Socialists of that school do the importance or legitimacy of the national purposes, they cannot, of course, favor such wars. Whatever valid argument the Nation- alist may advance on behalf of war, applies, from the Class Struggle point of view, only to "the war of the classes", but not to war among nations. They cannot, therefore, have any valid reason for the awful destruction of life and property which war occasions, and must therefore be opposed to war for purely humanitarian reasons. The human- itarian point of view is in itself a perfectly legiti- mate one, and is the only one naturally taken by us when there are no reasons sufficient to out- weigh it. The nationalistic philosophy presents such outweighing reasons in the "national in- terest". Take away the validity of the "national interest" reason from our feeling and our judg- ment, and we are thrown back on our common humanity, supported by our personal interest which is nearly always against war because of the great sacrifices which it brings with it. lam speak- ing, of course, of really popular wars, in which the number of those who go into the war either Socialist vs. Bourgeois Theories 241 because of an excess of "fighting blood" or because of actual pecuniary interest must be a negligible quantity But the Socialists who accept the Class Struggle theory of progress must be opposed to war for other than purely humanitarian reasons. In fact, all the valid reasons which the nationalist ad- vances in favor of war are to the Socialist so many reasons why he should be opposed to it. Nay, all the reasons which the nationalist can advance in favor of the peaceful acquisition of power by his nation, whenever peaceful acqui- sition of power is possible, are to the Socialist so many additional reasons why he should be opposed to war. I have already stated that whatever valid reasons the nationalists may advance in favor of war apply, from the Socialist point of view, only to "the war of the classes". It goes therefore without saying that whatever valid ground there may be, from the nationalistic point of view, for the desire to increase the power and extend the influence of one's nation by "peaceful" means, that is all means short of actual wholesale destruction of lives and property, are, from the Socialist point of view, so many grounds for the desire to in- crease the power and extend the influence of one's 242 Socialism and War class. From the Class Struggle point of view the class does in fact occupy, for the time being, that is as long as society is divided into classes, the same place that the nation does in the most ultra- nationalistic philosophy. The welfare of his class is a "good citizen's" chief concern. The good class-patriot will therefore labor incessantly for the increase of the power and the extension of the influence of his class. Paraphrasing the national-patriot he says : "My class may it ever be right, but right or wrong my class'\ And when it comes to the choice of means in order to further the cause of his class, he again follows the lead of the good national-patriot and says: "I shall use peaceful means if I can, but any means that will serve the purpose if I musf\ The class-interest is paramount to him to any other consideration, just as the national interest is paramount to any other consideration from the standpoint of the national patriot. But national wars are always opposed to the class-interests of those engaged in the class- struggle from below, wherever "the war of the classes" is in progress. Just as the class-war is opposed to the national interest when a national war is in progress. The divisions along class lines on the one hand and national lines on the other are Socialist vs. Bourgeois Theories 243 fundamentally antagonistic to each other. It may be stated as a general proposition, to which only few, if any, exceptions can be found, that their interests are in deadly antagonism, in the sense that whatever intensifies one line of demarcation — strengthens one line of division — necessarily impairs and weakens the other line of division. War conducted along one line of division neces- sarily crosses, and therefore impedes, war con- ducted along the other line of division. When the present war broke out, the national interests which dictated and directed it im- mediately demanded a cessation of the class war as detrimental to the prosecution of the national war. And those who accepted the nationalistic point of view in this war agreed to suspend the class-war, as a subordinate struggle, in view of the presence of the national war, which they con- sider the paramount struggle. And, assuming the paramountcy of the division along national lines over the division along class lines, and therefore of the national interest over the class interest, this action was absolutely correct. The "Burg- frieden", as the suspension of hostilities along class lines is called in Germany, is an official acknowledgment of two things : first, that the two struggles — national struggle and class struggle 244 Socialism and War — cross each other's path, interfere with each other, are inimical one to another; and, second, that the national struggle is recognized as of basic importance, besides which the class strug- gle is a mere family squabble. And just as the Burgfrieden — inter class peace — is the logical position for those who believe in the paramountcy of the national struggle and therefore of national interests, so is international peace the only possible position of those who acknowledge the paramountcy of the division along class lines, and therefore of the class strug- gle and of class interests. Just as the national interest demands the sus- pension of the class struggle in order to effect the unity of the nation, which it considers not only necessary to actual success in the national war but the only basis for a real national war ; so the class interest demands the absolute suspension of all national hostilities, the unity of the class ir- respective of conflicting national interests, as the only basis upon which the class struggle can be conducted either logically or successfully. It is because of this that the call "Workers of the World Unite!" has become the battle-cry of the working class when it consciously entered upon Socialist vs. Bourgeois Theories 245 the warpath in the class struggle now waging in our society. Active, unrelentless opposition to war, irre- spective of the demands of so-called "national in- terests", is therefore the "natural state" of the Socialist who accepts the Class Struggle theory. Believing as he does that the basic division of mankind is along class lines, and that it is that division which counts principally in all questions affecting the progress of humanity, the so-called "national interests" seem to him a snare and a delusion. A snare, because instead of promoting progress Ihe division which is the foundation of these interests lies across its path and interferes with the prosecution of the struggle which really does promote progress, — ^the class struggle. And a delusion, because there is in reality no such thing as a "national interest", in the sense of an inter- est which affects equally the entire nation and the preservation of which is equally important to all classes within the nation. Under certain exceptional circumstances all the classes within a nation may have a common interest in a certain result, which each may con- sider desirable from its own point of view. But such common interest is not therefore or neces- sarily a truly national interest, that is an interest 246 Socialism and War which reposes in or adheres to the nation qua nation. And, therefore even when working for such a common end, the class point of view which makes this end desirable for the members of each class must never be lost sight of. If the class point of view is lost sight of, and the national point of view adopted in such a case, infinite harm is likely to result to the under-class struggling for supremacy and therefore interested in pushing the class fight. Let me give you an illustration: Supposing the carnage of the war in the Western battle area had caused the plague to appear in Belgium and Northern France. The civil pop- ulation of Belgium as well as the German army of invasion now occupying Belgium, would be in- terested in stopping the ravages of the plague. These inimical parts of the present population of Belgium would then have the common object of exterminating the plague germ, or whatever else has to be done in order to stop the further pro- gress of the scourge. But it is evident that this would neither unite the inimical portions of the present population of Belgium into one har- monious whole, nor would it turn this community of interest into an identity or solidarity of in- terest. And don't imagine that this is a distinction Socialist vs. Bourgeois Theories 247 without a difference. On the contrary, the dif- ference is a deep-rooted one and likely to have very important practical results. Supposing it were discovered that the surest and most effective way of combatting the plague would be for the German army to withdraw from Belgium, a real identity of interests would of course make the German army withdraw at once, but a mere community of interest in fighting the plague wouldn't. Again, suppose that the ravages of the plague were particularly strong in the army camps, so that there was danger of the army be- coming so weakened as to be compelled to with- draw into Germany. A real identity of interest would evidently dictate to the Belgians an entirely different policy from the mere community of in- terest in fighting a common enemy. Woe to the side that would mistake community for identity of interests! You may be sure the German army wouldn't. The upper-dog never does. In the foregoing I have attempted to give the Socialist position on war generally and uninflu- enced by local conditions ; the Socialist position as it would be in a case where the issue between na- tional struggle and class struggle would be squarely presented by the absence of complicating circumstances. But in the actual world of fact 248 Socialism and War issues are very seldom presented in a simple form. In most cases issues are obscured by extraneous matter, and complicated by secondary issues. As far as the subject which we are now discussing is concerned the issue may be complicated, prin- cipally, by three kinds of facts or considerations : (1) Facts relating to the stage of development of the countries coming into question in any partic- ular war, and the influence that the war may have on the development of those liberties which, as I have pointed out before, we Socialists regard as the cultural achievement of the capitalist epoch to be cherished and preserved for the future in the countries affected by the war. (2) Facts re- lating to the condition and development of na- tionalistic tendencies, and the manner in which they would be affected by the war, or by a partic- ular manner of its termination. (3) General con- siderations of justice, and the influence that the war may have on the general development of the principles of liberty. To take up the last class of facts first: As I have already stated, the Socialists do not believe in any superior and inferior races. They there- fore cannot see an?/ reason for the subjection of one race or nation by another. On the other hand their ideal looks towards a time when there will Socialist vs. Bourgeois Theories 249 be no struggle and no subjection of any kind of one part of the human race by another. They even want to abdicate the predominance of their own class after it shall have achieved supremacy in order to accomplish this result. Any kind of subjection, and for whatever cause, be it sex, race, color, religion, or "previous condition of servitude", is equally abhorrent to them. They therefore believe in national freedom, in the right of each nation to be master of its own destinies, so long as nations do exist. This includes political, economic, as well as spiritual and intellectual freedom. And they are ready to go to war for it when ne- cessary. That is why the Socialists have always been in sympathy with all "wars of liberation", although they well knew that a "war of libera- tion" always meant to the great masses of the people the liberation from a "foreign yoke" so that they might be exploited by their own ruling class. It must be stated, however, that by rea- son of this latter fact, which made the "liberty" in question a pure fiction, the Socialists* enthu- siasm for a "war of liberation" always depended largely on whether or not it accorded with the development of liberal institutions generally, and the requirements of the class struggle. To the 250 Socialism and War same category, although somewhat exceptional in its facts, belongs our Civil War, which was on the part of the North a "War of Liberation" for the Negro race in its results at least. It therefore evoked the enthusiastic support of Karl Marx, who did much to uphold the cause of the North by mar- shalling on its behalf the advanced portion of the English working class, at a time when the ruling classes of England were favoring the South, and although the immediate interests of the English workingmen were on the same side. Such wars are now, however, practically a thing of the past; at least until the dawn of a new revolutionary epoch. A fair example of the first class of cases re- ferred to by me above is the situation in Europe as it existed immediately prior to and at the time of the Crimean War, when Marx was in favor of a war by the Western European powers against Russia. As I have already stated in my last lecture the differences in the economic development be- tween Russia and the West of Europe, and their international balance of power as it then was, seemed to Marx to demand a war by a Western European coalition against Russia, as a means of insuring the unhindered development of free institutions in Western Europe. I have already Socialist vs. Bourgeois Theories 251 pointed out, in the same lecture, that European conditions have changed so much since the Crim- ean War, that a war against Russia is now in no way different from a war against any other "civil- ized" nation. And I may add here that the general situation the world over is now such that no war could be planned that would serve to advance the cause of free institutions either in any of the war- ring countries or anywhere else in the world. On the contrary, the most probable, if not the in- evitable result, of any war waged at this time would be a considerable strengthening of the powers of reaction everywhere, and almost of all naturally in the warring countries. The present war has already furnished abundant proof of the correctness of this assertion. And I venture to assert that we have not seen the end of it yet, nor the worst of it. The present war also furnishes indisputable proof, if any proof were indeed necessary, that every war serves to accentuate national divisions, intensifies national animosities wherever they existed before and creates new ones where none existed before, and generally gives new life and impetus to the nationalistic spirit; and, cor- respondingly, lowers the vitality of the forces 252 Socialism and War carrying on the class struggle on behalf of the working class. It may therefore be confidently asserted that no matter what causes Socialists may have had for desiring war in the past, — in our own day and generation, at least, no combination of circum- stances is at all likely to arise which could out- weigh the great objections which Socialists must have to war. The present-day policy of Social- ism must therefore be unalterable opposition to all wars of aggression. And not only before war has broken out, but all the time. And now as to defensive wars. I have already stated that up to the present war the rule of action most widely accepted among Socialists was based on the distinction between wars of ag- gression and defensive wars. Its greatest cham- pion was Bebel, and it found its classic expression in his announcement, that — "Wenn wir werden angegriffen dann wehren wir uns", — if we are attacked we shall defend ourselves. I have also mentioned already the criticism which Kautsky passed on the distinction between aggressive and defensive war as a rule of action. Since the commencement of the present war it has been re- peatedly stated that this war has conclusively Socialist vs. Bourgeois Theories 253 demonstrated the untenableness of that distinc- tion. These statements, usually made by the apol- ogists of Germany and of the conduct of the Ger- man Socialists in this war, must not be confused with Kautsky*s criticism of BebeFs position at the Jena Congress. Kautsky's contention was that BebeFs distinc- tion was an unserviceable one in practice, because of the fact that if we adhered strictly to the policy that "if we are attacked we shall defend our- selves" it lies easily within the power of any government, particularly such a government as the German Government which can back up its lies by a forcible suppression of the truth, to make an aggressive war appear to the majority of the working class as a defensive one, and thus drag us into an aggressive war. He therefore sought for a rule of conduct which would leave us our liberty of action even in case of a defensive war. The present German apologists do exactly the reverse. Asserting that the present war has demonstrated the lack of all distinction between wars of aggres- sion and defensive wars, they proceed to disclaim any obligation on the part of Socialists to refrain from engaging in any kind of war. In other words, they dwell on Kautsky's criticism of the distinction between aggressive and defensive wars 254 Socialism and War not for the purpose of emancipating ourselves from a doctrinaire rule of action which might in practice turn us over bound hand and foot to our enemies, the militarists; but for the purpose of throwing aside all restraint of Socialist principle or policy, so that we may join in the militarist re- vels even to the extent of joining in avowedly ag- gressive wars. We know that the devil can quote Scripture. Socialist opportunists who chafe under the restraints imposed upon their conduct by So- cialist principles are past masters in quoting Marx, Engels, and other Socialist authorities, to cover up their — from a Socialist point of view — thoroughly disrepubtable conduct. As a matter of fact, far from proving that there is really no difference between aggressive and de- fensive war, the present war has proven just the contrary. There can be no doubt but that the decidedly unfriendly feeling against Germany which now prevails all over the world is due in a measure at least to the fact that the world believes Germany to have been the aggressor in the pre- sent war. And the strong feeling of resentment prevalent among Socialists the world over against the German Socialists over their conduct in this war, a feeling which pervades circles hitherto most friendly to the German Soci^lJstSi is due al- Socialist vs. Bourgeois Theories 255 most entirely to the fact that they are believed to have engaged in aggressive war. All the protest- ations of Germany and of German Socialists that this is a defensive war on Germany's part could not affect the world's judgment, arrived at with- out great difficulty, on the question of fact as to who is the aggressor in this war. Nor could any specious arguments to the effect that there really is no difference between aggressive and defensive war affect our instinctive feeling to the contrary and the consequent judgment of the world at large, including the Socialists, on the moral questions in- volved. That does not mean, however, that from a So- cialist point of view every defensive war is right, — ^that we can subscribe to the rule that "if we are attacked we shall defend ourselves". And quite aside from the fact that this rule may be impracti- able as a guide to action, as pointed out by Kauts- ky. The real trouble with this rule is that it is wrong in principle. It is based on the nationalistic principle that the "nation" or "country" must be preserved in all its vigor and power; any attack upon it must therefore be repelled, as it is likely to diminish that power. But once you cast the na- tionalist principle aside, and substitute class- in- terest for national interest as the basic principle 256 Socialism and War determining conduct, why should the members of the working class go to war with other members of the working class in order to defend the power of their respective "nations". Marx said that the working man has no country. Nor has it any nation. In the sense in which the words "country" and "nation" are used by nationalistic patriots, — that is to say in the sense that their "power" is his power, which it is in his interest to defend. Why, for instance, should English workingmen go to the defence of "their country" if the United States were to attack England for the purpose of taking away Canada ? What interest has the Eng- lish working class in the "power" of the British Empire which expresses itself in the possession of Canada, Egypt, South Africa, or India, — ^that would not only be worth the sacrifices which a great war entails upon the working class of the country engaged in war, but also the weakening of the working class generally by a war among its different local divisions, which is equivalent to "civil war'' in the domain of national interests? Similarly, why should French workingmen go to the defence of "their country" in order to pre- serve their "national power" which expresses it- self in the possession of Algiers, Morocco, or Tunis, — if France should be attacked by some Socialist vs. Bourgeois Theories 257 power coveting the same? And why should the German working class rush to the defence of Germany if that "country" should be attacked by Japan for the purpose of wresting from it Kiau- chau, or by England for the purpose of dispos- sessing it from Southwest or Southeast Africa, or even by Russia for the purpose of despoiling it of the Polish Province of Posen? What interest have German workingmen in "Ger- many's" possession of Posen, even though it has been part of Prussia and therefore of "Germany" for more than a hundred years ? In general what interest has the working class of any country in the so-called "power" or "great- ness" of that "nation" or that "country", which would make it worth — to paraphrase a famous saying of Bismarck — the bones of a single workingman ? Evidently the fact that "we" are attacked does not at all impose upon us the duty of defending "ourselves". As a matter of fact, we, that is the working class, are never attacked, in any war, for we have nothing worth taking; and we never defend ourselves, nor anything belonging to tis. Does that mean that the members of the work- ing class have no interest whatever in their country, and that they need not, or should not, 258 Socialism and War defend it under any circumstances? Not at all. But it does mean that they have no interest in the ordinary sense to preserve; no such material interest as the capitalists or members of the middle class have, nor such spiritual interests as the nationalists profess to have. His interest is a broadly human one, although it is dictated by his class interests and the necessities and re- quirements of the class struggle. I have already pointed out that, broadly speaking, the interests of the working class engaged in the class struggle and the interests of humanity and progress are identical. Identical, not in the Pickwickian or Nietzschean sense of the nationalists, according to which it is to the interest of humanity that the vast majoriy of humankind should be de- graded into an enormous pedestal upon which a Super-man or Super-nation could stand up in his or its glory, but in a real human and common- sense way. The human ideal of those engaged in the class struggle on the side of the working class therefore abhors all and any kind of subjec- tion and exploitation of man by his fellow-men, including the subjection and exploitation of one race or nation by another. Furthermore, any inequality among human beings and the subjection of any part of the Socialist vs. Bourgeois Theories 259 human family by another interferes in a very real and practical sense with the successful prosecution of the class struggle. Such subjections and in- equalities lead to struggles which cross the path and tend to obscure, hamper and delay, the class struggle of the working class and its successful issue. As long as nations do exist in fact and in the consciousness of people, the class struggle can only be carried on successfully within free nations. A nation, or part of a nation, subject to the en- forced dominion of an alien nation is unfit for the class struggle, because that struggle is obscured and complicated by the national struggle which is inevitable in such a case. The working class of any nation or country is therefore vitally interested, in 'preserving the freedom from alien dominion of that nation or country. And the Socialist is ready to go to war in order to defend that freedom. His readiness to go to war in defence of his country is however strictly limited by his desire to preserve this national freedom. The words "nation" and "country" therefore have for him a different meaning from that currently given to them. To begin with he draws a distinction between his nation or country and its government. An attack upon the armed force of "his" government is not 260 Socialism and War necessarily an attack upon his nation or country. Nor is an invasion of his "national territory" as the same is shown on the map necessarily an attack upon his nation or country. The invasion by the United States of Canada, for instance, would not, from his point of view be an attack upon the English Nation nor the invasion of an English- man's country. Nor would the invasion by Russia of the German Province of Posen inhabited by Poles be an attack upon the German Nation or the invasion of a German's country. But there is another and even more important aspect of the class-conscious workingman's readi- ness to come to the defence of his country which must not be overlooked. When he does come to the defence of his country, it is not because it is his. He is not actuated by the narrow and sel- fish motives of your nationalistic patriot, but by the broad "humanistic" motive that a part of the human race is threatened with subjection, and that another obstacle is being placed in the path of the final emancipation of the entire human race from the inequalities, degradations, and miseries incident to class-society. And this, again, is not a mere metaphysical dis- tinction without any real, practical difference. The difference is both practical and far-reaching. Socialist vs. Bourgeois Theories 261 The theory of nationalism and "national inter- ests" in whose behalf wars are to be fought, has its logical complement in the theory of neutrality. We go to war when our "national interests" de- mand it. But when we have no "national in- terests" to preserve, we don't care what becomes of the human race. We are not our brother's keeper. We are neutral. So any nation may rob, pillage, destroy or subjugate any other nation without it being the least of our concerns, so long as our national interests are not in any way in- juriously affected thereby. The Socialists reject this doctrine as a monu- mental monstrosity, — the acme of selfishness, con- ceived, nurtured, and reared in the atmosphere of nationalism, an atmosphere surcharged with sel- fishness and deadening to all sense of justice and the higher impulses of humanity. In its place we substitute the doctrine of international solidar- ity. The human race is one family, in a real sense of the term. An injury to one is the concern of all. When, therefore, war is upon us, and its conditions are such that the working class of any warring nation is properly called upon to defend that nation, or any part of it, from subjugation and domination by another nation, the working class of the entire world has an interest in the 262 Socialism and War defense of the nation whose independence and liberty are attacked, and it should rally to prevent the outrage. That does not mean that in every such case the workijngmen of all "neutral" countries should rush their governments to war. Like practical people we must always count the cost. Not, in- deed, selfishly, — ^the cost to our nation or our working class, in the old nationalistic way. But the cost to the international working class, the cost to the world and its future progress. Every war, as has already been pointed out, has an in- jurious effect upon general progress and affects most disastrously the class struggle of the work- ing class, — the hope of humanity. Every exten- sion of the war usually and almost necessarily means an increase of these injurious effects. These must be carefully weighed as against the injury that is desired to be averted, to which should be added the salutary effect which true international action, based not on a chance com- munity of interest of the different nations but on the identity of interest of the proletariat of all the nations, must have on the class- struggle, and which may compensate in whole or in part for the increased national hatreds en- gendered by the extension of the war. Socialist vs. Bourgeois Theories 263 These things should be carefully weighed, and no decision, particularly no decision in favor of war, lightly made. Where chances are to be taken we should take the chance of erring on the side of opposition to war rather than in favoring it. But whatever the decision, it must be con- trolled exclusively by considerations of its results upon the international working class and its struggle for emancipation. Indeed, the consid- erations leading to the action taken may, nay, will, have much to do with the results flowing there- from as far as the working class is concerned. The same action may have different, or largely differing, results according to the motives which actuated it. Any action taken in a honest en- deavor to act in accordance with, and in the in- terest of, international solidarity, and with a total exclusion of selfish national interest — no matter what the action is — ^must by reason of the very fact that it was intended to further the cause of internationalism, further the struggle of the working class, and give an impetus to its upward march, with all that that implies for the progress and regeneration of the entire human race. The considerations which limit the occasions when Socialists may give their support to war, also prescribe the manner in which that support 264 Socialism and War may be given. Socialists engagaing in war ar*^ still Socialists, — that is to say, provided the?> enter into the war from Socialist and not frorii nationalist considerations. The reasons which ac- tuated them in entering the war will therefore control their actions and shape their policies dur- ing the war. To begin with, they will give the war their sup- port only as long as that is necessary for the pur- pose of achieving the object which made the war a proper one from their point of view, and they will withdraw their support the moment that ob- ject is achieved. And while they are giving the war their support they will insist that it be con- ducted in a manner that would insure the pur- suit of this object and no other. A defensive war may easily turn into an aggressive one. They must therefore be on their guard that they should not by their action inadvertently help in a war of con- quest. Before giving their support to the war they must therefore exact from their government proper guarantees that the war will under no cir- cumstances be turned into one of aggression. And while the war lasts, they must watch the manner in which it is conducted with that end in view, and keep their government to a strict ac- countability in that respect. In addition to that Socialist vs. Bourgeois Theories 265 it is their duty to carry on an educational pro- ,,aganda which would make the turning of the war from one of defence into one of aggression im- possible should the government ever be tempted to break its promises. At the same time they must carry on their reg- ular Socialist work, in so far as their energies are not taken up with the special propaganda against any war of conquest. Or, rather, they should make the propaganda against a war of conquest part of their regular work in furtherance of the class-struggle, making a special effort to show the general connection between war and capitalism, and teaching the Socialist principles of inter- nationalism which would make all wars impos- sible. For the class struggle and the propaganda of the principles and policies of the class struggle, must be kept up. The belief that the class struggle interferes with the successful carrying on of war is true enough, if war is to be carried on for nationalistic purposes, that is for the acquisition of power. But it is utterly false in so far as purely defensive war is concerned, — using the word defensive in the limited and circumscribed sense mentioned above. And for that very reason the carrying on of the class struggle is the best means of preserving the defensive character of the 266 Socialism and War war. Besides, — ^the support of the war being it- self only permissible as a means of furthering the class struggle, it would, of course, be utterly absurd to suspend the class struggle in order the better to carry on the war. But this is not all. The same principles that de- fine and limit for the Socialist the meaning of "country" and of "defensive war" also define and limit for him the meaning of the word "enemy". The Socialist supporting a war must always bear in mind that the "enemy" against whom he is ar- rayed is not a certain nation or country, but a certain government, representing at most the gov- erning class of that nation or country. Bear- ing this in mind will have most important prac- tical results. It will prevent atrocities, for one. It will prevent the passions of war venting them- selves on the members of the enemy nation as such either in speech or in deed. This will make it pos- sible for the war to terminate the moment it be- comes apparent that the aggressor's lust of con- quest is not likely to succeed, thereby preventing useless sacrifice of life and property on both sides. And, most important of all, it will make possible the conclusion of a real peace. Of a peace that will not merely be a cessation of armed com- bat, but a real cessation of all hostilities, a resump- Socialist vs. Bourgeois Theories 267 tion of neighborly and friendly relations between the members of the erstwhile "enemies", and a co-operation between them in those peaceful pur- suits on which alone can be built the happiness of the human race. H t-,-n V»^^ J ^^IMiiiia^^ o •? ^ 6 %^^ * WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATIO^ ^iii!^^ * -^ ^^ % oH/j' 111 Thomson Park Drive A -tr >«!^«*\'^ ♦- <;^ * ^ Cranberry Township, PA 16066 <'> <^v '..s .G ^. "° <724\ 779-2111 * ^^^% '^ Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process A^v Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide V ^^1^ Treatment Date: j^^y 2001 Preservationlechnologies