b'\nClass uQ fcg. \nBook A\xc2\xa3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nABSTRACT \n\n\n\nOF \n\n\n\nAIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION \n\n\n\nBY \n\nHON. CHAS. E. HUGHES \n\nAND \n\nTHE ATTORNEY GENERAL \n\n\n\nWITH \n\nSUBJECT INDEX AND REFERENCES TO HUGHES \n\nINVESTIGATION AND SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE \n\nINVESTIGATION HELD IN 1918 \n\n\n\n\nWASHINGTON \n\nGOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE \n\n1919 \n\n\n\n//y \n\n\n\no." of P\xc2\xbb \n\nSEF 2 1919 \n\n\n\nt^ll . \n\n\n\nA 4" \nGENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. \n\n\n\n[Figures following entries refer to volume and page numbers.] \n\nAIRPLANE COMPANIES: \n\nCurtiss Airplane & Motor Co., Buffalo, N. Y \xe2\x80\x94 \nAdvances and payments by Government \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nFour million dollars advanced by Government. (H 4, 338.) Buck. \n\n(See H 15, 371; T 1, 501, 502.) \nTen million dollars advanced by Government. (H 7, 367. )> \n\nPotter. (See H 24, 447.) \nFour million dollars through Col. Montgomery. (H 5, 453.) \n\nBorglum. \nStatement of disposition of Government advances. (H 15, 544.) \n\nMoss. \nContracts \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nContract for 3,000 Spads ; 500 Caproni ; 1,400 JN 4 D\'s, September \n\n19, 1917. (H 3, 449.) Morgan. \nContract for 2,000 Bristols, at $13,500,000, not started in April, \n\n1918. (H 5, 208.) Hall. \nToying with contracts. (H 5, 409.) Borglum. \nDisloyalty and sabotage \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nSubtle influence to retard things. (H 7, 160.) Butts. \n\nSabotage. (H 7, 182.) Butts. ( See H 10, 421 ; H 15, 12 ; H 17, \n\n697, 706; H 18, 415.) \nDisloyalty. (H 15, 44, 48.) West. (See H 16, 35, 36; H 17, 120, \n\n134, 141; H 17, 426.) \nGermans in plant cheered victories of Germany. (H 16, 371.) \n\nO\'Connell. (See H 17, 247-311; H 17, 643-659.) \nInefficiency \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nFifty-five per cent efficient. (H 3, 47.) Miles. (See H 17, 108; \n\nH 17, 359.) \nBristol delay due to engineer department mistakes. (H 5, 241.) \n\nHall. (See T 1, 98-99.) \nMen asleep under desks. (H 15, 40.) West. (See H 16, 11-14.) \nMan did only three days\' work in three months. (H 15, 41.) \n\nWest. (See H 15, 720; H 16, 46-77 ; T 1, 149.) \nDefective workmanship. (H 15, 59-70.) Coburn. (See H 15, \n\n202; H 16, 33.) \nSufficient material scrapped to build 550 planes. (H 15, 123.) \n\nCoburn. \nStop order went no further than engineer department. (H 15, \n\n124. ) Coburn. \nTwenty men inspected a plane, yet there were four serious defects. \n\n(H 15, 150-155.) Rohlfs. (See H 17, 342.) \nGovernment paid for material three or four times. (H 15, 215.) \n\nWinterbottom. (See H 15, 248.) \nExcessive cancellations. (H 15, 410.) Moss. \nInaccuracy caused Navy work to be charged to Army. (H 15, \n\n703.) Mulholland. \nNo work but put in overtime. (H 15, 734.) Donovan. (See \n\nH 15, 735 ; H 15, 746 ; H 16, 38 ; H 16, 160 ; H 16, 495 ; H 16, 635.) \nFurnaces burned all day \xe2\x80\x94 nothing in them. (H 15, 734.) Dono- \nvan. (See H 15, 740.) \n\n3 \n\n\n\n4 GENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. \n\nAirplane companies \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nCurtiss Airplane & Motor Co., Buffalo, N. Y. \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \nInefficiency \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nGovernment inspects only 30 per cent of material. (H 16, 751.) \n\nCole. (See H 17, 87; H 21, 562-563.) \nForty-nine thousand seven hundred obsolete parts. (H 17, 154.) \n\nWeller. \nStatement by British expert as to unnecessary changes. (H 17, \n\n229-246.) Feberry. (See H 17, 358.) \nBuilt one plane as per S. C. drawings \xe2\x80\x94 would not go together. \n\n(H 17, 480.) Mueller. (See H 19, 50.) \nOne continuous change down to cancellation. (H 17, 620.) \n\nKepperley. \nFifty per cent off on chemical analysis. (H 7, 691.) MacGregor. \n\n(See H 7, 695; H 20, 519, 521, 525, 527; H 21, 510.) \nS. C. directed production of machine for three months that should \n\nhave been discarded. (H 15, 197.) Rohlfs. \nProduction \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nNo combat planes built up to March 1, 1918. (H 3, 612.) Morgan. \n\n(See T 1, 107.) \nAcreage and man power to turn out 565 planes a day. (H 5, 410.) \n\nBorglum. \nProduction methods very bad. (H 13, 501.) Rose. \nModel received in August. Only 25 produced in next four months. \n\n(H 15, 59.) Coburn. \nTwo thousand five hundred and fiftv-three training planes shipped \n\nup to June, 1918. (H 15, SO.) Coburn. (See H 15, 563.) \nInstead of 500 parts would make 5,000. (H 15, 126.) Coburn. \nGreat many shop changes held up production. (H 15, 718.) \n\nDarget. \nTried to keep busy on scrapped materials. (H 16, 98.) Harris. \nPlant instructed by Deeds to get out 25 Bristols regardless of \n\ncost and system. (H 16, 412.) Cole. \nProduction superintendent not even engineer or mechanic. (H \n\n16, 718.) Dargert. \nSeventy-five per cent ahead on Navy schedule. (H 17, 43.) \n\nSanderson. \nBristol could have been made to carry Liberty within four weeks. \n\n(H 17, 585.) Mueller. \nMiscellaneous \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nRemarkable confusion. (H 3, 2.) Miles. (See H 7, 280; H 11, \n\n146.) \nFirst Bristol tried January, 1918; would not fly. (H 3, 5.) Miles. \nBlue prints incomplete; whittled out 25 Bristols. (H 3, 25.) \n\nMiles. \nGovernment would not use Curtiss machinery. (H 3, 48.) Miles. \nBuilding thousands of machines for British Government. (H 3, \n\n425. ) Kirkman. \nPlant for Government business cost $5,500,000. (H 3, 489.) \n\nMorgan. \nBristol tested April 1, 1918; unsatisfactory. (H 3, 600.) Morgan. \nHad trouble getting metal parts because they did not meet bills. \n\n(H4, 232.) Bahr. (See H 11, 142 ; T 1, 147.) \nOne million dollars monthly earnings. (H 6, 143.) Stagers. (See \n\nH 7, 367.) \nBought material below grade. (H 7, 166.) Butts. (See H 7, \n\n168; H 17, 461). \nDemoralized condition. (H 15, 6.) West. (See H 15, 37; H 15, \n\n287; H 16, 57-74; H 17, 163-168.) \nMachines caught fire several times. (H 15, 70-75.) Coburn. \nGreat number of falls in planes. (H 15, 99-100.) Coburn. \nDefective wood used because Government inspected and they not \n\nresponsible. (H 15, 108.) Coburn. \nNot one good thing came out of Washington. (H 15, 191.) Rohlfs. \nGovernment obligated to amount of $2,500,000 on Bristol. (H 15, \n\n408. ) Moss. \nFinancial statement. (H 15, 501.) Moss. ( See H 15, 552-556. ) \n\n\n\nGENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 5 \n\nAirplane companies \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nCurtiss Airplane & Motor Co., Buffalo. N. Y. \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \nMiscellaneous \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nBogey price on Bristol originally $6,750. (H 15, 507.) Moss. \n\nNavy pays profit of $1,625 per plane. (H 15, 566.) Moss. \n\nNavy rejections greater than Army. (H 15, 583.) Moss. \n\nCompany exhibits. (H 15, 591-632.) Moss. \n\nDetails of accounting system. (H 15, 659-670.) Daily. (See H \n\n15, 690 ; H 16, 720. ) \n\nExplains time-keeping system. (H 15, 726.) Anderson. \n\nSeemed to employees Government had lots of money it wanted to \n\ndispose of. (H 15, 756.) Donovan. (See H 16. 30.) \nBarbers, bartenders, etc., employed. (H 16, 50.) Harris. \nEmployees made clock stands, jewelry boxes, etc. (H 16, 74.) \n\n96. ) " Harris. \nEmployees sold passes for $1 apiece. (H 16, 88.) Harris. \n" Crime the way Government had it put over on them." (H 16, \n\n96) Harris. \nLoad of 2 by 4s, 8 to 10 feet long, sold as scrap for 50 cents. H 16, \n\n104.) Harris. (See all the testimony of Chester A. Harris. \n\nH 16, 45. ) \nRequests by politicians to put men in plant though not needed. \n\n(H 16, 310.) Nutt. \nReason cost of production unnecessarily high. (H 16, 316.) Reed. \nMethod of approving vendors\' invoices. (H 16, 438.) G. A. \n\nThomas. \nReport of scrap disposed of or sold. (H 16, 600-615.) O\'Connell. \nPay roll for May, 1918, $1,031,000. Productive labor $50,000. (H \n\n16, 685-690.) Sparks. \n\nSalvage department run by plant, not Government. (H 16, 786.) \n\nSessions. (See H 17, 26.) \nBritish captain had impression Bristol not intended to be success- \nful. (H 17, 119.) Rogers. \nDemanded $75,000 for plans of JN 4. (H 18, 436.) Jordan. \nCharges a disposition to accommodate Curtiss Co. (H 19, 243.) \n\nRyan. ( See H 19, 245. ) \nCol. Mixter does not recall whether he has Curtiss stock. (H 20, \n\n374.) Mixter. (See H 20, 375.) \nUsed silver solder at expense of Government. (PI 21, 579.) \n\nOakes. \nDayton-Wright Airplane Co., Dayton, Ohio \xe2\x80\x94 \nAdvances and payments by Government \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nOne million dollars advanced by War Credits Board. (H. 1, 431.) \n\nNewman. (See H 9, 378.) \nContracts \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nFour thousand battle planes at $12,000 each. (H 2, 309.) Borglum. \nDisloyalty and sabotage \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nDeharbor, secretary-treasurer, German spy, interned. (H 5, 430.) \n\nBorglum. \nNo indication of disloyalty. (H 7, 527.) Mixter. (See T 1, 280.) \nInefficiency \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nSeventy-five to 80 per cent efficient. (H 3, 46.) Miles. \nUtterly incompetent. (H 5, 411.) Borglum. (See H 20, 326.) \nPlane sent to France, but no one could fight with it. (H 10, 390.) \n\nSchoonmaker. \nOverhead \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nGovernment paid overhead. (H 1, 434.) Newman. \n\nWanted Government to pay for tennis courts, baseball suits, etc. \n\n(H 8, 211.) Brown. \nTraveling expense of president paid by Government. (H 8, 493.) \n\nNewman. (See H 8, 498 ; H 9, 625 ; H 10, 56 ; H 10, 470.) \nTelephone service paid by Government. (H 8, 507.) Newman. \nAlso welfare, garage, and general office expense. (H 8, 509-515.) \n\nNewman. ( See H 10, 62 ; H 10, 57. ) \nExperimental costs" charged to Government. (H 9, 597.) SmarL \n\n(See H 9, 624; H 10, 9.) \nGovernment paid for temporary buildings which eventually will be \n\npart of plant. (H 10, 32.) Howell. \n\n\n\n6 GENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. \n\nAirplane companies \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nDayton-Wright Airplane Co., Dayton, Ohio \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \nOverhead \xe2\x80\x94 Continued., \n\nForty-one thousand, eight hundred and eighty-three dollars paid \nby Government as depreciation up to June 1, 1918. (H 10, 48.) \nHowell. \n\nEverything to be paid by Government. (H 10. 63.) Howell. \n\nTwo hundred and fifty-five thousand, two hundred and fifty-five \ndollar voucher paid by Government without audit. (H 10, 65.) \nHowell. \n\nPayroll padding. (H 10, 456.) Hiller. \n\nChauffeurs, oil, gasolene on free list to company officials (H 10, \n457.) Hiller. \nProduction \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nNo shipments before January 1, 1918. (H 1, 437.) Newman. \n\nSplendid production basis. (H 3, 24.) Miles. \n\nShipped 5 De Havilands a day March, 1918. (H 3, 28.) Miles. \n\nCapacity not utilized on April 1. 1918. (H 3, 74.) Colvin. \n\nShipped planes overseas without flying them. (H 21, 609.) Ar- \nnold. \nSalaries \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nOne hundred thousand dollars divided as salary between three \nofficials. (H 1, 403.) Newman. \n\nEighteen thousand dollars paid Orville Wright as salary. (H 1, \n411.) Newman. \n\nSalaries allowed through oversight. (H 8, 191.) Brown. \n\nSchedule of salaries. (H 8, 465.) Newman. \n\nSalary of $35,000 paid Kettering by company. (H 9, 145.) Smith. \nMiscellaneous- \nCompany always given preference. (H 2, 322.) Borglum. \n\nScrapped 90 per cent of spruce. (H 3, 25.) Miles. \n\nDeeds a stockholder. (H 3, 40.) Miles. \n\nTalbotts and Kettering real heads. (H 4, SO.) Miller. \n\nLongacre of approvals section refused admittance by Talbott, jr. \n(H 4, 104.) Miller. \n\nBarlow to inspect Liberty but unable to gain objective.. (H 4, \n501.) Barlow. \n\nAlbert Barlow sold company cotton for linen. (H 5, 430.) Borg- \nlum. \n\nH. E. Talbott, jr., vice president, formerly Deed\'s secretary in \nWashington. (H 5, 459.) Borglum. \n\nMontgomery orders broad viewpoint in passing vouchers. (H 8, \n520. ) Newman. \n\nContract excuses company from testing their product. (H 10, \n66. ) Howell. \n\nGovernment authorization came from Deeds. (H 10, 69.) Sherer. \n\nTelegrams. (H 10, S4-176.) \n\nTried for six months to get information from Signal Corps to fin- \nish drawings. (H 10, 358.) Schoonmaker. (See H 19, 33.) \n\nH. E. Talbott, sr., testifies in re organization of company. (H 10, \n^ 488. ) \n\nCharles F. Kettering testifies in re organization of company. (H \n10, 665.) \n\nH. E. Talbott, jr., testifies in re organization of company. (H 10, \n721.) \n\nFour million dollars profit on De Havilands and spares. (H 10, \n751.) \n\nCompelled to sign cross license agreement. (T 1, 291.) Ketter- \ning (See T 1, 302.) \nFisher Body Corporation, Detroit, Mich. \xe2\x80\x94 \nAdvances and payments by Government \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nPaid $250,000 by Government. (H 1, 391.) Newman. \n\nThree million sixty thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight dollars \nin vouchers paid. (H 11, 221-22.) Holmes. (See H 11, 534.) \n\nTwo million dollars advanced by Government. (H 11, 493.) Louis \nMendelsohn. (See H 11, 539.) \n\nThree million twenty-three thousand four hundred and forty-nine \ndollars paid by Government. (H 11, 568.) Scott. \n\n\n\nGENEKAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 7 \n\nAirplane companies \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nFisher Body Corporation, Detroit, Mich. \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \nContracts \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nContracts to Metal Products Co. influenced by Talbotts. (H 11, \n\n356-357.) Fred J. Fisher. \nRefused contract with British Government. (H 11, 412.) Fred \n\nJ. Fisher. \nThree million two hundred thousand dollars paid by Government \non contracts. (H 11, 529.) Westcoat. \nDisloyalty and sabotage \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nFishers not Germans for several generations. (H 11, 47.) Heas- \nlett. (H 11, 537.) \nInefficiency \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nFinest plant ever in. (H 11, 185.) Patterson. \nNo one experienced in airplane production. (H 11, 473.) Simp- \nson. \nOverhead \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nChart of depreciation. (H. 11, 567.) Scott. \nProduction \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nIdle waiting for information. (H 11, 14.) Heaslett. (See \n\nH 11, 20; Hll, 420.) \nThree months behind Davton-Wright because information held up \nlonger. (H 11, 30.) Heaslett. (See H 11, 42 ; T 1, 244; H 11, \n479.) \nNever promised to deliver 1,500 De Havilands by end of July, \n\n1918. (H 11, 437.) C. T. Fisher. \nProbably ship 25 planes in July instead of 250. (H 11, 447-448.) \nC. T. Fisher. \nSalaries \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nStatement of salaries. (H 11, 226-227.) Holmes. \nMiscellaneous \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nBogy cost $630, too high. (H 7, 708.) Downey. (See H 11, 237.) \nSix Fisher brothers and five Mendelsohns in firm. (H 11, 290-291.) \n\nF. J. Fisher. \nPrice of $6,500 for plane. (H 11, 300.) F. J. Fisher. \nDeeds and Waldon request Fisher place contract with Dayton- \nWright. (H 11, 334.) F. J. Fisher. \nNo control over National Cash Register situation. (H 11, 335.) \n\nF. J. Fisher. (See H 11, 364.) \nTalbotts in on all conferences with Deeds and Waldon in Wash- \nington. (H 11, 344.) F. J. Fisher. \nStatement of corporation. (H 11, 515.) Aaron Mendelsohn. \nEugene Meyer has an interest in firm. (H 20, 168.) Meyer, jr. \nMetz Co., Waltham, Mass. \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nMr. Byng, German born, forman of sheet-metal department. (H. 4, \n\n525.) Lee Mason. (See H 4, 552.) \nOut of stock; no attempt to get more. (H 4, 527.) Lee Mason. \nMen sat around, smoked, read, and spent hours in toilet. (H 4, 528.) \n\nLee Mason. \nMason paid 30 cents per hour ; good Germans got 37, 371, or 40 cents. \n\n(H 4, 532.) Lee Mason. \nOnly three American\'s in plant. (H 4, 532.) Lee Mason. \nSuperintendent of plant German. (H 4, 533.) Lee Mason. \nOlder Metz born in German. (H 4, 533.) Lee Mason. \nBlue prints laid around; anyone could take them. (H 4, 534.) Lee \n\nMason. (See H 4, 556.) \nThree Signal Corps officers there. (H 4, 539.) Lee Mason. \nProduction manager German. (H 4, 539.) Lee Mason. \nPro-German put on Government work. (H 4, 555.) Luther Mason. \nWould close factory rather than produce munitions. (H 6, 149.) \nStagers. \nStandard Aero Co., Elizabeth, N. J. \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nBuilt several machines for Japanese Government. (H 13, 292.) \n\nMingle. \nFifteen per cent profit, later 12 per cent. (H 13, 421.) Meenan, jr. \nSeventy-three thousand six hundred and forty-nine dollars profit on \nspares for J-l. (H 13, 423.) Meenan, jr. \n\n\n\n8 GENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. \n\nAirplane companies \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nStandard Aero Co., Elizabeth, N. J. \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nFive thousand three hundred dollars fixed price for 100 J planes. \n\n(H 13, 428.) Meenan, jr. \nMaterial scrapped here which was passed at other plants. (H 13, \n\n444.) (H 13, 446^147.) Sullivan. \nThirty per cent delay due to Government inspectors. (H 13, 476.) \n\nWaterhouse. \nProducing machine not tested with Liberty motor. (T 1, 351.) \n\nMengle. \nMuch material bought and then contract canceled. (T 1, 367-369.) \n\nMengle. \nNavy negotiations satisfactory. (T 1, 381.) Mengle. \nRequisitions sent to jobbing concern. (H 20, 222.) L. H. MacLaughlin. \n(See H 20, 228.) \nStandard Aircraft Corporation, Elizabeth, N. J. \xe2\x80\x94 \nAdvances and payment by Government \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nGovernment paid for idle employees. (H 3, 45.) Miles. \n\nFour million two hundred and sixty-two thousand nine hundred \n\nand one dollars paid by Government. (H 13, 279.) Mingle. \nStatement of cash from War Department. (H 13, 374.) Finkle- \n\nstein. \nStatement of money paid firm under contracts. (H 13, 588-589.) \nConaty. \nContracts \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nOrder cut from $120,000 to $35,000. (H 3, 672.) Lewis.. \nContract totals $9,000,000. (H 7, 555.) Mixter. \nOrder received for 500 De Haviland 9s. (H 13, 16.) Day. \nSignal Corps used bad judgment in placing order for only 500 \nplanes. (H 13, 551.) Cookson. \nDisloyalty and sabotage \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nGraft on part of Government inspector. (H 4, 137.) Daych., \nThought Government representatives pro-German. (H 13, 417.) \nFinklestein. \nInefficiency \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nHaphazard; extremely disorganized (H 4, 110.) Daych. \nSignal Corps never gave valuable information. (H 13, 78.) Day. \n\nDefective material furnished by Dayton Metal Products Co. (H \n\n13, 488.) Dean., (See H 13, 518.) \nPlant does not justify larger order. (H 13, 125.) Rose. \nNo two files of prints alike. (H 13, 533.) Cookson. \nProduction \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nFive motors shipped Japan direct August 20, 1917. (H 4, 156.) \n\nDaych. (See H 4, 159; T 1, 347.) \nNo production by late March, 1918, because of lack of drawings. \n(H 13, 26.) Day. (See H 13. 506 ; H 13, 547 ; T 1, 357-58 ; T\'l, \n529.) \nTen machines a day within five months if on De Haviland 4. (H \n13, 54) Day. \nSalaries \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nMingle\'s salary, $62,000. (H 5, 460.) Borgium. (See H 6, 411; \n\nH 7, 295; T 1, 514-16.) \nStatement of salaries and amounts allowed. (H 13, 330.) Finkle- \nstein., \nMiscellaneous \xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nGreat confusion. (H 3, 44.) Miles. (See H 7, 292; H 7, 553.) \nManipulation by Mingle of Government finances. (H 4, 113.) \n\nDaych. \nUnder control of Mitsui Co., agents of Japanese Government. (H \n4, 124.) Daych. ( See H 8, 203 ; H 13, 120 ; H 13, 135 ; T 1, 340.) \nFinancial statement., (H. 4, 140.) Daych. \nMengle general counsel for Mitsui Co. (H 4, 155.) Daych. \nMachine cost company $2,354; cost Government over $6,000. (H \n\n4, 157.) Daych. \nCoffin did not know planes were condemned. (H 7, 25.) Coffin. \nMengle denied owning stock to Deeds. (H 7, 292.) Potter. \nGovernment furnished 53 accountants., (H 8, 200.) Brown. \nSucceeded Sloane & Co. (H 13, 3.) Day. \n\n\n\nGENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. V \n\nAirplane companies \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nStandard Aircraft Corporation \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \nMiscellaneous \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nDesigned Standard J plane. (H 13, 6.) Day- \nSignal Corps made changes without consulting designers. (H \n\n13-14. ) Day. \nDiscrimination in inspection as compared with Dayton Wright. \n\n(H 13, 35, 36.) Day. \nTold Navy work more important than Army work. ( H 13, 57. ) Day. \nInstalling Liberty did away with superior qualities of Bristol. (H \n\n13, 88. ) Day. \nCapital increased to $10,000,000 Julv 24, 1918. (H 13, 135.) Mingle. \n\n(See H 4, 139.) \nAero Corporation leases to Aircraft at big profit. (H 13, 139.) \n\nMingle. \nCorrespondence between company and Signal Corps. (H 13, 177- \n\n251.) (See H 13, 306.) \nFive hundred thousand feet of spruce purchased for orders which \n\ndid not materialize. (H 13, 335.) Mingle. \nDifficulty because heads of company are not manufacturers. (H \n\n13, 507.) Rose. \nWright-Martin Corporation, New Brunswick, N. J. : \nAdvances and payments bv Government \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nAdvanced $12,000,000. (H 4, 338.) Buck. \n\nNo advances from Government. (H 14, 82.) Houston. \n\nExpect $7,500 000 through War Credits Board. ( H 14, 82. ) Houston. \n\nSeventy-five thousand dollars paid by Government for machinery \n\non contract later canceled. (H 14, 136.) Houston. \nStatement showing amount paid by Government. (H 14, 322.) \n\nBenstead. \nContracts \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nCost-plus contract of 42 to 50 million dollars, 1917-18. (H 1, 806.) \n\nByllesby. \nCol. Byllesby says contract " most extraordinary ever heard of." \n\n(H 1, 811.) \nContract for 3,000 Hispano-Suiza motors explained. (H 14, 7.) \n\nHouston. \nOther contracts. (H 14, 1 ), 11, 12, 13, 15.) Houston. \nFour hundred and fifty motors for French Government. (H 14, \n\n75.) Houston. \nOne hundred and twenty million dollars too small a contract on \n\nfixed price. (H 14, 123.) \nPaid $1,000 additional for planes in Los Angeles plant. (T 2, 718.) \n\nJordan. (See T 2, 720.) \nInefficiency \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nThousands of dollars a month spent in expressage and messenger \n\nservice. (H 14, 60.) Houston. \nProduction \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nProduced Hispano-Suiza motors for foreign Governments. (H 3, \n\n59. ) Miles. \nTwo thousand five hundred Hispano-Suiza motors made from July, \n\n1917, to July, 1918. (H 14, 84.) Houston. \nDiscontinue Sunday work in heaviest production. (H 14, 370.) De \n\nBelleuse. \nSalaries, $150,000 a year for Goethals & Co.\'s supervision. (H 14, \n\n143.) Houston. \nMiscellaneous \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nCol. W. B. Thompson, part owner. (H 6, 312.) Lockhart. \nCapitalization outlined. (H 14, 4.) Houston. \nIncrease in wages adds $280 per motor. (H 14, 52.) Houston. \nCorrespondence with Aircraft Board. (H 14, 61, 72.) Houston. \nHispano-Suiza foremost motor in France. (H 14, 107.) Houston. \nOver $2,000,000 in profit on 2 contracts. (H 14, 142.) Houston. \nCorrespondence with Signal Corps. (H 14, 160.) Houston. \nNo interference by Government an advantage in building Hispano. \n\n(H 14, 258.) Crane. \nSignal Corps failed to send details. (T 1, 307.) Hand. (See T \n\n1, 320.) \n\n\n\n10 GENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. \n\nAppropriation : \n\nFour million dollars left June 1 out of $750,000,000 for year 1917-18. \n\n(H 1, 2.) Wolff. (See T 2, 1152, 1155.) \nOne billion one hundred and thirty-seven million dollars asked of Congress \n\nfor 1918-19. (H 1, 4.) Wolff. \nNever over $2,500,000 up to end of fiscal year 1916. (H 1, 10.) Wolff. \nPresidential order No. 7 makes allotment of $750,000,000. (HI, 78.) Wolff. \nTwenty million dollars allotted March 14, 1918. (H 2, 23.) Edgar. \nSix hundred and forty million dollars, summer of 1917. (H 3, 370.) \n\nMcConaughy. \nStatement showing distribution of appropriations. (H 18, 667.) Col. Jones. \nAVIATION FIELDS : \nCarlstrom field \xe2\x80\x94 - \n\nCost $799,212. (H 2, 34.) Edgar. \nDorr field \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nCost $674,206. (H 2, 34.) Edgar. \nLangley field \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nBuildings 100 feet high and 150 long impossible to operate. (H 2, 35.) \n\nEdgar. \nWill cost $15,000,000. (H 2, 36.) Edgar. \nMcCook field- \nEstimated cost, $1,059,052. (H 2, 104.) Bennington. \nFlooded. (T 2, 746.) Col. Arnold. \n\nCol. Vincent instrumental in getting this field. (H 22, 145.) Vincent. \nCol. Deeds directed Col. Edgar to acquire this field. (H 22, 382.) \n\nEdgar. \nLeased from Dayton Metal Products Co. (H 22, 464.) Edgar. (See \n\nH 22, 469.) \nDeeds and Kettering owned 120 acres of this field. ( H 22, 487. ) Deeds. \nMorrison field, Virginia \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nEstimated cost $1,892,000. (H 2, 36.) Edgar. \nWilbur Wright field- \nContract cost, $2,922,061. (H 2, 74.) Edgar. (See T 2, 748; \n\nH 22, 444. ) \nExtremely expensive. (H 0, 36.) Allen. \n\nEighteen thousand dollars in unclaimed wages. (H 2, 107.) Ben- \nnington. \nRumored Talbott identified with contract. (H 2, 232.) Grannis. \nLumber put through several hands to raise price. (H 2, 469.) Sligh. \nFlood possibilities. (H 7, 196, 216.) Edgar. (See 22, 378.) \nAbandoned as flying school. (H 18, 246.) Col. Jones. \nNo military need for over 2,000 acres. (H 20, 683.) Waldon. (H 20, \n\n679; H 22, 369.) \nPart of field swampy. (H 22, 447.) Edgar. \nBaker, Hon. Newton D. : \n\nRefused to furnish mechanics. (H 7, 78.) Coffin. \n\nLengthy discussion on Council of National Defense. (H 21, 354.) \n\nLengthy discussion on Aircraft Production Board. (H 21, 359.) \n\nDoes not recall being told Deeds, Squire, or Montgomery were unfit. (H 21, \n\n383.) \nLetter to President in re production not referred to Baker. (H 21, 383.) \n\nBaker. \nDid not know Deeds was responsible for production. (H 21, 391.) (See \n\nH 21, 393, 395.) \nNever saw programs regarding production of planes. (H 21, 403, 404.) \n\n(See H 21, 407.) \nBaker personally approved voucher of $861,000 for General Vehicle Co., \nreal estate. (H 24, 592.) Montgomery. \nCoffin, Howard E. : \n\nSelected civilian members of Aircraft Board. (H 6, 422.) Coffin. \nSelected Waldon, Deeds, and Montgomery. (H 6, 423.) Coffin. \nContracts : \n\nForeign contracts made by Gen. Foulois. (H 1, 4.) Wolff. \n\nContract with French to equip 30 squadrons. (H 1, 5.) Wolff. \n\nContract with British to assemble planes. (H 1, 5.) Wolff. \n\nTwelve million dollar contract for material let in September, 1917. \n\n(H 1, 7-8.) Wolff. \nDepreciation of plants element of cost in contracts. (H 1, 17.) Wolff. \n\n\n\nGENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 11 \n\n\'Contracts \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nCost determined after work was done. (H 1, 25.) Wolff. \n\nContracts provided advancement of money for additions, raw material, etc. \n\n(HI, 100.) Wolff. \nNo provision for damages in case of delays. (H 1, 106.) Wolff. \nNo time limit. (H 1, 105.) Wolff. \n\nConfidential experimental work let at 12\xc2\xa3 per cent profit. (H 1, 106.) \nForty million dollar contract with concern having no buildings. (H 1, 191.) \n\nJones. \nDepreciation covered cost of buildings. (H 1, 223.) Wolff. \nTen million dollar contract with White Co. for construction of Langley \n\nField. (HI, 814.) Jones. \nCol. Jones criticizes Langley Field contract. (H 1, 824.) Jones. \nLowest bidder did not get contract. (H 1, 827.) Jones. \nUnauthorized contracts let at 10 per cent instead of 7 per cent. (H 2, 24.) \n\nEdgar. \nOne million dollars for acetone. ( H 2, 26. ) Edgar. \nAlways above estimate. (H 2, 47.) Edgar. \nNo limit as to cost. (H 2, 47.) Edgar. \n\nTwo million dollars paid for the Wilbur Wright Field. (H 2, 91.) Ben- \nnington. \nEight dollars per acre for 1,200 acres of coral and swamp land in Florida. \n\n(H 2, 140.) Jones. \nCapt. Sloan made unauthorized contract at Langley Field. (H 2, 160.) \n\nSmith. \nContracts let for castor oil though not used. (H 2, 186.) Edgar. \nList of castor-bean contractors by Col. Jones. (H 2, 211.) \nFour thousand battle planes at $12,000 by Dayton Wright Co. (H 2, 309.) \n\nBorglum. \nBid of $3,000 by Lewis Co., but not allowed to bid if under $5,500. \n\n(H 2, 339.) Borglum. \nContract by Col. Disque " huge joke." (H 2, 391.) Sligh. \nNo contract let for propellers late in November, 1917. (H 2, 422.) Sligh. \n\n(See T 2, 829-839.) \nGrand Rapids Airplane Co. thought to get contract through congressional \n\ninfluence. (H 2, 595.) Fletcher. \nFirm bid 75 cents ; contract let for $1.05. (H 3, 92.) Colvin. \nLegal department, Signal Corps, originated cost-plus system. (H 6, 543.) \n\nCoffin. \nCould not obtain fixed-price contracts. (H 7, 96.) Coffin. \nTwenty-five per cent saving below bogey cost went to contractor. (H 7, \n\n101.) Coffin. \nOverhead included income tax, etc. (H 8, 323.) Brown. \nFirst contract let to firm without buildings. (H 11, 81.) Heaslet. \nFowler with no factory received order. "Miraculous." (H 11, 164.) \n\nPatterson. (See H 11, 169a.) \nList of cost-plus contractors. (H 11, 219.) Holmes. \nCross license : \n\nLawyer Hill makes statement on cross license. (H 21, 1.) \n\nManufacturers pooled their patent interests. (H 21, 6.) Hill. \n\nFour million dollars to be paid by Government contracts. (H 21, 8.) \n\nHill. \nGovernment pays royalties on cost-plus contracts. (H 21, 10.) Hill. \nInventors had to submit to this manufacturers\' association. (H 21, 13.) \n\nHill. (See H 21, 17-18.) \nGovernment will yet have to pay damages. (H 21, 24.) Hill. \nMaj. Downey fought cross license. (H 7, 717.) (See H 7, 718-734; \n\nT 2, 720-723-729.) \nDeeds, Col. E. A. : \n\nDisloyalty and irregularities \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nAdmits being German and sympathies with Germany. (H 2, 532.) \n\nBorglum. \nAppointed many Germans. (H 2, 534.) Borglum. \n\nDirects no inspection of materials from his firm. (H 5, 398.) Borglum. \nBoasted ability to name 80 officers. (H 5, 412.) Borglum. \nReference to "Deeds" for " Dietz." (H 5, 426.) Borglum. \nThirty seaplanes built on verbal order of Deeds. (H 5, 427.) Borglum. \n\n\n\n12 GENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. \n\nDeeds, Col. E. A. \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nDisloyalty and irregularities \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\n" Deeds is a crook." (H 5, 431.) Borgluni. \n\nBlocked production of lenses. (H 5, 483.) Borglum. \n\nProtecting partners in their delay by holding other plants back. \n\n(H 5, 490.) Borglum. \nArrangements for confidential telegrams to Talbot. (H 10, 596.) Tal- \nbot. (See H 23, 86.) \nFord Co. profited through Deeds. (H 12, 224.) Wills. \nInfluenced Waldon in contracting with Dayton-Wright. (H 20, 670 ) \n\nWaldon. (See H. 20, 679.) \nCertified voucher for $104,500 to Packard Co. (H 23, 97.) Deeds. \nOther interests \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nInterested in Dayton Metal Products Co. (H 2, 289.) Borglum. \nDelco system is Deeds\'s. (H 2, 542.) Borglum. (See H 22, 355.) \nOwner of McCook experimental field, Dayton. (H 5, 352.) Borglum \n\n(See H 22, 148; H 22, 365.) \nPart owner of buildings, Dayton-Wright Co. (H 5, 354.) Borglum. \n\n(See H 9, S3.) \nList of firms in which Deeds is stockholder. ( H 5, 379. ) Borglum. \nDelco system on Liberty is Deeds\'s work. (H 5, 394.) Borglum. \nVaucain, associated with Deeds, should be investigated. Borglum. \nOwns 55 per cent of Bijou Electric Co.(H 5, 467.) Borglum. (See \n\nT 2, 875. ) \nTransfer of Deeds\'s stock. (H 9, 36, 79.) Smith. \nRecord of stocks. (H 9, 273.) Smith. \n\nConnected with Talbot, of Dayton Lumber Co. (T 1, 37.) Edgar. \nDeeds owns south field individually. (H 22, 673.) Deeds. \nHeavy beneficiary in contracts, increases one. (H 5, 373.) Borglum. \n(See H 5, 399.) \nMiscellaneous \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nAuthorized statement of February 21, 1918, in re production. (H S r \n\n348.) McConaughy. (See H 23, 137.) \nInforms Curtiss Co. they must cancel $30,000,000 Spad contract. (H 3, \n\n528. ) Morgan. \nStated planes on way across February 10, 1918. (H 3. 637.) Sweetzer. \nTold Senator Hitchock $10,000 set aside for Martin. (H 4, 511.) Bar- \nlow. \nIndicted; under sentence. (H 5, 359.) Borglum. \nSought place on Aircraft Production Board. (H 5, 367.) Borglum. \nTied up $320,000,000 available for plane production. (H. 5, 373.) Bor- \nglum. \nBorglum is investigated. (H 5, 426.) Borglum. \nCongressman Howard had interesting experience with Deeds. (H 5, \n\n439. ) Borglum. \nStatement in re Deeds\'s administration. (H 6, 508.) Coffin. \nDid nol have requisite information. (H 7, 248.) Potter. \nResponsible for delay in engineering decisions. (H 7, 513.) Mixter. \nMr. King, president of Dayton Lumber & Manufacturing Co., cites \n\nbusiness relations. (H 10, 612.) King. \nAlbree-Piclgeon Co. refuses to deal with Deeds. (H 12, 34.) Albree. \nBrainiest man ever in contact with. (H 12, 36.) Albree. \nWaldon and Deeds strongly opposed to contracts on Pacific coast. \n\n(H. 18, 427.) Jordan. . (See H 18, 428.) \nCorrections 4n previous testimony. (H 24, 90.) Deeds. \nSquier did not authorize Deeds to certify $104,500 voucher. (H 24, \n328. ) Squier. \nDisque, Col. Brice P. : \n\nImpressed by Disque. (H 7, 469.) Howe. \nContract officer on Pacific coast. (H 8, 244.) Ryan. \nResponsible for all moneys, etc. (T 1, 19.) Edgar. \nExpenditures \xe2\x80\x94 Domestic : \n\nLarge amount spent in devolpment of plants. (H 1, 52.) Wolff. \nOvercontracted $11,000,000. (H 1, 96.) Wolff. \nStatement of advances to companies. (H 1, 103.) Wolff. \nReimbursed Carl Fisher for unauthorized aviation field in Florida on au- \nthority of Col. Deeds. (H 1, 125.) Jones. (See T 1, 60 ; T 1, 50.) \n\n\n\nGENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 13 \n\nExpenditures \xe2\x80\x94 Domestic \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nFisher not reimbursed to extent of $40,000. (H 1, 132.) Jones. \n\nNine hundred and seven million dollars spent or obligated. (H 1, 171.) \n\nJones. \nTwo hundred and fifty thousand dollars paid Fisher Body Corporation. \n\n(H 1, 391.) Newman. \nEighteen thousand dollars paid Orville Wright as salary, 1917-18. (H 1, \n\n411. ) Newman. \nOne million dollars advanced Dayton-Wright Co., 1917-18. (H 1, 431.) \n\nNewman. \nFifty thousand dollars paid Glen Martin for planes. 1917-18. (H 1, 455.) \n\nBarlow. \nOne hundred and ninety-one million nine hundred and six thousand five \n\nhundred and eighty-four dollars beyond allotment. (H 1, 514.) Lehman. \nTen million dollars for Langley field. (H 1, 814.) Jones. \nOne million fifty-nine thousand and fifty-two dollars for McCook field. \n\n(H 2, 104.) Bennington. \nTwo million dollars paid on Wilbur Wright field. (H 2, 91.) Bennington. \nOne million eight hundred and seventy-three thousand three hundred and \n\nninety-four dollars paid up to June 1, 1918, on Morrison field. (H 2, 36.) \n\nEdgar. \nSeven hundred and ninety-nine thousand two hundred and twelve dollars \n\npaid for Carlstrom field. (H 2, 34.) Edgar. \nSix hundred and seventy-four thousand two hundred and six dollars paid \n\nfor Door field. (H. 2, 34.) Edgar. \nEight hundred and four thousand two hundred and nine dollars at Pains- \n\nville and West Point. (H 2, 26.) Edgar. \nFive million dollars for castor bean. (H 2, 31.) Jones. \nOne hundred thousand dollars on Miami gunnery field. (H 2, 203.) Edgar. \nPaid bonus of $750,000, (H 2, 344.) Borglum. \nOne million dollars spent on spruce plant. (H 2, 394.) Sligh. \nUnnecessary expenditure of money. (H, 4, 94.) Miller. \nBeautifying of grounds came under overhead. (H 4, 101.) Miller. \nOne hundred and forty-five million dollars advanced for new companies. \n\n(H 4, 337.) Buck. \nTwo million five hundred thousand dollars advanced Willys-Overland. \n\n(H 8, 151.) Sloan. \nThirty-four thousand one hundred and thirty dollars and fifty-three cents \n\noverhead salaries for November. (H 8, 348.) Haag. \nStatement of estimate of cost of all projects. (T 1, 19.) Edgar. (See \n\nT 1, 21, 22, 23.) \nAvoidable waste of money at all fields. (T 1, 28.) Edgar. \nOne million dollars cost of acetone plants should have been $60,000. (T 1, \n\n51. ) Edgar. \nFour million five hundred thousand dollars in original cross-license agree- \nment. (T 1, 475, 476.) Downey. \nOne billion dollars expended, only small number of planes abroad. (T2, \n\n939.) Kenley. \nRecord of expenses. (T 2, 1189.) Ryan. \nForty thousand dollars on firm having $20,000 contract. (H 20, 447.) \n\nLandon. \nEight million nine hundred and thirty-eight thousand eight hundred and \n\ntwenty-five dollars to White Corporation for materials. (H 21, 463.) \n\nChilson. \nExpenditures \xe2\x80\x94 Foreign : \n\nAppropriated $47,000,000 in 1917-18. (H 1, 5.) Wolff. \n\nObligations, 1917-18, of $300,000,000. (H 1, 6.) Wolff. \n\nObligations cabled by Pershing contradictory. (H 1, 76.) Wolff. \n\nError of $38,000,000 in one cablegram. (H 1, 88.) Wolff. \n\nCommitments over appropriation 1917-18 of $173,307,012. (H 1, 89.) \n\nWolff. \nOne hundred million dollars beyond amount given by Congress, 1917-18. \n\n(H 1, 94.) Wolff. \nFifteen million one hundred thousand dollars appropriated by Signal Corps \n\nfor foreign contracts, 1917-18. (H 1, 533.) Lehman. \nSix hundred and forty-two thousand four hundred and ninety-one dollars \n\nfor aviation fields in May, 1918. (H 2, 44.) Edgar. \n\n\n\n14 GENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. \n\nExpenditures \xe2\x80\x94 Foreign \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nTwenty million dollars on overseas items to June 1, 1918. (H 2, 28 > \n\nEdgar. \nNine million five hundred thousand dollar order on hand for field hangars \n\n(H2, 29.) Edgar. \nOne hundred million dollars for aircraft. (H 4, 596.) Marmon. \nStatement of construction abroad. (T 1, 23.) Edgar. \nExpenditures \xe2\x80\x94 how controlled : \n\nAccounts audited in field, then scrutinized. (H 1, 11.) Wolff. \nFive hundred auditors; three traveling supervisors. (H 1, 11.) Wolff. \nForeign service: \n\nUnsatisfactory results by cable. (H 1, 80.) Wolff. \n\nRequest no accounting until end of war. (H 1, 271.) Wolff. \n\nRolls-Royce the best engine. (H 4, 589.) Marmon. \n\nEnglish planes made by women, no experience. (H 5, 101.) Owen Thomas. \n\nFrench to deliver 5,000 planes before July 1, 1918. (H 6, 4.) Addas. \n\nBritish to deliver 20 squadrons of machines. (H 6, 6.) Addas. \n\nFrench annul contract because raw material delayed from this country. \n\n(H 6, 31.) Addas. ( See H 8, 36 ; H 19, 158 ; H 20, 579 ; H 21, 415. ) \nFour hundred cadets without training planes. (H 6, 33.) Addas. (See \n\nT 1, 660; H 19, 160.) \nLack of planes at training centers. (H 6, 39.) Addas. (See H 20, \n\n541 ; H 21, 432. ) \nCol. Boiling is superseded by Gen. Foulois. (H 6, 47.) Addas. \nLack of cooperation from America. (H 6, 52.) \nCould purchase Fiat machines but did not. (H 6, 64.) Addas. \nMen at head of departments too young. (H 6, 88.) Addas. \nResigns because of deplorable conditions. (H 6, 92.) Addas. \nBritish Government led to believe they would have thousands of planes. \n\n(H 6, 166.) Workman. \nAmerican Handley-Paige one-third as efficient as British machine. (H 6, \n\n169.) Workman. (See T 2, 753; H 6, 243.) \nBritish erect building and furnish men, but no parts came. (H 6, 206, \n\n208.) Workman. (See H 7, 277.) \nPart of delay due to French methods. (H 6, 322.) Lockhart. (See \n\nH7, 81.) \nSecretary Baker refused to send mechanics. (H 7, 78.) Coffin. \nBristol used extensively in England. (H 7, 273.) Potter. \nFoulois did not send specific list of requirements. (H 7, 584.) Mixter. \nNo American planes in France in March, 1918. (H 8, 31.) Diffin. (See \n\nT 2, 750, 752. ) \nPlane destruction on front close to 100 per cent a month. (H 8, 35.) \n\nDiffin. \nGermany kept up with plane production. (H 8, 41.) Diffin. \nHispano-Suiza foremost motor in France. (H 14, 107.) Houston. \nDifficulty in dealing with France. (H 18, 356.) Lieut. H. Emmons. \nDuties of Boiling Commission outlined. (H 18, 506.) Col. Clark. \nNo De Haviland 4\'s received August 15, 1918. (H 18, 544.) Col. Clark. \nOne million dollars\' worth of material shipped abroad, but only 240 planes \n\nmade. (H 19, 23.) Col. Horner. \nConditions acute in October, 1917. (H 19, 161, 162.) Churchill. \nOne thousand two hundred cadets awaited training for three months. \n\n(H 19, 208.) Hoffman. \nSubmits copy of contract with French Government. (H 19, 386.) Kenley. \n\nLiberty engine just reached France June, 1918. (T 1, 609.) Douglas. \nAmericans all equipped with British machines. (T 1, 617.) Rice. (See \n\nT 1, 647.) \nAmericans had to use discarded French machines. (T 2, 862.) Jones. \nExchange of information chaotic. (H 20, 655.) Waldon. \nForestry : \n\nOnly one mahogany plant furnished bond. (H 1, 294.) Otis. \n\nEmbargo placed on battle-plane wood. (H 1, 299.) Otis. \n\nMahogany men accused by Otis of trying to handle whole thing. (H 1, 303.) \n\nTwo hundred and fifteen dollar offer for aeroplane lumber refused. (H 1, \n\n306.) Otis. \n\n\n\nGENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 15 \n\nForestry \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nWalnut and mahogany not absolutely necessary. (H 2, 434.) Sligh. \n\nPaid $300 for walnut worth $160. (H 2, 434.) Sligh. \n\nDayton-Wright Co. scrapped 90 per cent on spruce. (H 3, 25.) Miles. \n\nLots of spruce should not have left the coast. (H 3, 81.) Colvin. \n\nCol. Disque let spruce contracts. (H 6, 325; H 7, 326.) Lockhart, jr. \n\nMahogany contract price, $320. (H 6, 336.) \n\nRequirements balance of year, 21,000,000 feet. (H 6, 344.) Lockhart, jr. \n\nFederal Trade Commission not consulted in re prices. (H 6, 370; H 6, \n\n375.) Lockhart, jr. \nEndeavored to ascertain fair profit. (H 6, 389.) Lockhart, jr. \nHeard 60 per cent of spruce rejected. (H 7, 284.) Potter. \nChicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul contract. (H 7, 298-319 ; H 7, 494.) Potter. \nQuantity of spruce so great not worth much. (H 7, 328.) Potter. \nNine to twelve thousand military men at work. (H 7, 333.) Potter. \nMahogany men formed association. (H 7, 399.) Williams. \nThirteen per cent a thousand, profit of Otis Co. (H 7, 431.) Williams. \nThree million one hundred thousand feet from Africa. (H 7, 435.) Wil- \nliams. \nTwenty-six million seven hundred and three thousand total purchases \n\nup to June 27, 1918. (H 7, 446.) Williams. \nWilliams will not state cause of Otis\'s discharge. (H 7, 462.) Williams. \nCut-up plant advisable. (H 7, 472.) Howe. \nLarge supply hinged on building railroad. (H 8, 240.) Ryan. \nNo limitation on profit. (PI 8, 255.) Ryan. \nContractors financed by Government. (H 8, 262.) Ryan. \nLittle trees in Germany make plane material. (H 8, 268.) Ryan. \nSeventy-five miles additional railroads. (H 8, 269.) Ryan. \nControversy in re African mahogany. (H, 19, 277-279-282; H 19, 321; \n\nH 19, 326; H 21, 349.) Ryerson, jr. \nReport covering all mahogany matters. (H 19, 511.) Ryerson, jr. \nNavy would not use African mahogany. (H 19, 344 ; H 19, 346 ; H 19, 352 ; \n\nH 19, 511.) Homer Hoyt. \nThree million four hundred and twenty-five thousand six hundred and \n\ntwenty-five dollars cost of African mahogany. (H 19, 424; H 19, 451; \n\nH 19, 455. ) Lieut. Sack. \nCuban mahogany only $160. (H 19, 466.) Weber. \nWilcox was told he had no chance to sell outside "Big 11." (H 20, 252; \n\nH 20, 258-290.) Wilcox. \nMr. Wickliffe receiving salary from other sources while on Government \n\nboard. (H 23, 406.) Wickliffe. \nMr. Siemms cites contract arrangement for spruce and railroad. (H 23, \n\n552; H 23, 689.) \n" Senator Chamberlain will cancel contract." (H 23, 654.) Siemms. \nInefficiency : \n\nOne thousand men at stations with no accommodations. (H 1, 143.) \n\n1917-18. Jones, \nContracts with British and French confused. (H 1, 7.) Wolff. \nSquier and Deeds tried to block use of flying torpedo. (H 1, 563.) \n\nBarlow. \nCol. Edgar complains to Squier. (HI, 821.) Jones. \nChanged heads of Air Division 12 times. (H 1, 822.) Jones. \nCol. Wolff charged with irregular and unbusinesslike methods. (H 1, 824.) \nAlso J. G. White Corporation. (H 1, 828.) Jones. \nUnauthorized construction work. (H 2, 18-19.) Edgar. \nSchools without tools. (H 2, 51.) Edgar. \n\nOn order of 97 articles only 1 shipped in six weeks. (H 2, 53.) Edgar. \nNo organization or discipline in divisions. (H 2, 55-57.) Edgar. \nPay rolls at Wright field untrustworthy. (H 2, 120.) Bennington. \nIncreased acreage after use of substitute for castor oil. (H 2, 129.) \n\nJones. \nTerrible confusion and irregularity. (H 2, 308.) Borglum. (See Borg- \n\nlum.) \nSelf-interest interfering with air program. (H 2, 313.) Borglum. \nSix to eight months\' time wasted. (H 2, 327.) Borglum. \nAllen knew nothing about lumber, placed in charge of spruce. (H 2, 368.) \n\nSligh. \n\n\n\n16 GENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. \n\nInefficiency \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nMen inspecting who never had a board rule in their hands. (H 2 439 ) \n\nSligh. \'\' \n\nMachine fell and break struck at principle of its construction. (H 2, 505.) \n\nBorglum. \nFifty per cent of delay due to changes. (H 2, 601.) Trego. \nScrap 50 to 75 per cent in Trego plant. (H 2, 613.) Trego. \nTremendous inefficiency. (H 3, 46.) Miles. \nPlane would not go together. (H 3, 78.) Colvin. (T-l-105.) \nIll-advised inspection. (H 3, 82.) Colvin. \nPaid $415 for gauge that should cost $35. (H 3, 88.) Colvin. \nNot much else done for months except watching changes. (H 3, 715.) \n\nTaylor. \nFour hundred thousand dollars wasted on Handley-Page plane. (H 6, \n\n163. ) Workman. \nKnew parts were wrong, yet continued making them. (H 7, 157.) Butts. \nLengthy discussion on Col. Clark\'s inefficiency. (H 7, 271-72.) Potter. \nVigorous charge of wasted time. (H 7, 687.) MacGregor. \nSix months in furnishing information to Dayton-Wright Co. (H 10, 358.) \n\nSchoonmaker. \nGun-sight information requested October 9 not given until February 13. \n\n(H 10, 387.) Schoonmaker. \nThree hundred and twenty-one changes on De Haviland plane in 12 days. \n\n(H 10, 652.) Schoonmaker. \nFifteen drawings for same part, yet all different. (H 11, 160.) Patterson. \nSignal Corps made promises; no means to carry them out. (H 11, 442.) \n\nFisher. \nRed tape in priorities cause long delays. (H 12, 192.) Wills. \nNever given information of value by Signal Corps. ( H 13, 78. ) Day. \nGovernment-inspected material found defective at Standard Co. (H 13, \n\n369). Day. \nNot one good thing came out of Washington. (H 15, 191.) Rohlfs. \nSignal Corps drawings not accurate. (H 16, 130.) Brooks. \nThree weeks before machine that would not fly is investigated. (H 3, 5.) \n\nMiles. \nTwo thousand Bristols ordered January 11, but no go-ahead order till \n\nApril, 1918. (H 3, 35.) Miles. \nKellogg placed order for 1,300 radiators already condemned. (H 18, 10.) \n\nBudd Gray. \nMany firms charge Signal Corps failed to supply drawings. (H 18, 120.) \n\nHughes. \nPadded pay roll involving thousands of dollars. (H 18. 227, 228.) Col. \n\nJones. \nMany "rejected" tags found under "accepted" tag. (H 18, 267.) Col. \n\nJones. \nDrawings not received from Signal Corps until after expiration of con- \ntract. (H 18, 434.) Jordan. \nMaterial condemned by chief chemist later accepted. (H 19. 128.) Car- \n\ndullu. \nNo better off June 25, 1918, than six months prior. (T 1, 452.) Workman. \nPlanes valued at $500,000 ruined for lack of care. (T 1, 569.) Parish. \nSix million dollars\' loss on Hall-Scott motor. (T 2, 929.) Kenlay. \nLiberty motor : \n\nRolls-Royce replaced by Liberty. (H 3, 55.) Miles. \n\n" Thoroughly splendid." (H 3, 55.) Miles. (See T 2, 11-94.) \' \n\nBogey price $6,000. (H 3, 291.) Blackall. \n\n" Frightful risk " taken in attempt to develop motor. (H 3, 224.) Blackall. \n\nDeeds against magneto system on motor. (H 3, 231.) Curtiss. \n\nMotor more efficient with magneto system. (H 3, 232.) Curtiss. \n\nNot good for combat plane. (H 1, 495.) Barlow. \n\nEight-cylinder obsolete. (H 3, 522.) Morgan. \n\nDelay because everything was tied up in Liberty motor. (H 3, 622.) \n\nMorgan. \nSpad contract canceled because it was not adapted to Liberty motor. (H 3, \n\n622. ) Morgan. \nLiberty 8 test not satisfactory. (H 4, 27.) Dickinson. \nLiberty 12 satisfactory. (H 4, 38.) Dickinson. \n\n\n\nGENEKAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 17 \n\nLiberty motor \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nPossibly all right for bombing plane. (H 4, 77.) Holmes. \n\nCan not use magnetic system. (H 4, 271.) Martens. \n\nPerfect engine. (H 4, 274; H 8, 76.) Martens. \n\nKettering one of three leading men in designing. (H 4, 376; H 4, 381.) \n\nLeland. \nOne thousand changes between September 1 and February 15, 1918. (H 4, \n\n479. ) Leland. \nChange in design caused three months\' delay. (H 4, 484.) Leland. \nRolls-Royce or Sunbeam better engines. (H 4, 519.) Barlow. \nSunbeam already through experimental stage. (H 4, 520.) Barlow. \nAbsolutely good motor. (H 4, 621.) Marmon. \nCommander Briggs, of England, approves ignition system. (H 4, 631.) \n\nMarmon. \nDelay due to design not being complete. (H 5, 14.) * Joy. \nMain difference between Liberty and Mercedes is lubrication. (H 5, 82.) \n\nOwen Thomas. \nPerfecting motor should have been done in six months. (H 5, 145.) Hall. \nShipped abroad in dangerous condition. (H 5, 171; H 14, 276.) Hall. \nEstimated cost, $2,400. (H 5, 177 ; H 7, 705 ; H 11, 282.) Hall. \nOverhead 200 per cent, entire cost would be $4,800. (H 5, 193.) Hall. \nLowest consumption of gas and oil. (H 5, 313.) Hall. \nForeign criticism. (H 6, 58.) Addas. \nExplanation of bogey cost. (H 7, 703.) Downey. \nNo Liberties in England in March, 1918. (H 8, 33.) Diffin. \nProfit on cost, 33.6 per ceent. (H 8, 93, 94.) Smith. (See Exhibit H 8, \n\n101.) \nProfit on cost of La Rhone, 92.8 per cent. (H 8, 105.) Smith. (See Ex- \nhibit H 8, 105.) \nOne hundred to one hundred and fifty hours\' life of Liberty. (H 11, 107.) \n\nHeaslet. \nQuestion whether Hall and Vincent had control of motor. (H 11, 118.) \n\nHeaslet. \nChief engineer Packard Co. gives reason for use of Delco. (H 12, 5.) \n\nHunt. \nActual cost, $3,960.43. (H 12, 68.) Robinson. \n\nFord says " it is a very fine motor." Hard to make. (JEE 12, 275.) Ford. \nProgress as good as if foreign engine had been used. (H 12, 283.) Ford. \nSeven hundred pounds heavier than the Hispano Suiza. (H 13, 116.) \n\nDay. \nBest motor of its type in the world. (H 14, 282.) Crane. \nToo heavy for Bristol. (H 15, 56.) Coburn. \nContracts for production before experiments are completed. (T 1, 196.) \n\nJandron. \nDefective material in valves. (H 20, 494, 495.) Beans. \nMiscellaneous : \n\nBond furnished by only one contractor. (H 1, 293.) Otis. \n\nEmbargo placed on battle-plane wood. (H 1, 299.) Otis. \n\nOne hundred thousand dollars divided between three officials of Dayton \n\nWright Co. (H 1, 403.) Newman. \nUnauthorized construction. (H 2, 24.) Edgar. \nMiami, Fla., selected as gunnery school because girls and dancing were \n\navailable. (H 2, 182.) Edgar. \nWant to abandon Miami field after spending $100,000. (H 2, 202.) Edgar. \nReceipts from material men, but goods not paid for. (H 2, 243.) Grannis. \nNot informed castor oil not used; increases acreage. (H 2, 259-270.) \n\nCarrington. \nBorglum refused data. (H 2, 289.) Borglum. \nBristol success in Europe. (H 2, 329.) Borglum. \n\nMaj. Sligh\'s dismissal caused by lumber interests. (H 2, 373.) Sligh. \nMaj. Leadbetter tries to bribe Sligh. (H 2, 412.) Sligh. \nLumber handled by several people to raise price. (H 2, 469.) Sligh. \nDiscrimination between Curtiss and Dayton plants. (H 3, 34.) Miles. \nSignal Corps afraid of congressional investigation. (H 3, 496.) Morgan. \nMr. Lewis is not aware his company was instructed to raise its bid $3,000. \n\n(H 3, 698-701.) Lewis. \n\n130687\xe2\x80\x9419 2 \n\n\n\n18 GENEKAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. \n\nMiscellaneous \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nNot much else done for months except. to watch for changes. (H 3, 715.) \n\nTaylor. \nAutomobile crowd seemed to decide things. (H 3, 741.) Thomas. \nGermans using all-steel planes. (H 4, 165. ) Greer. \nFiat Co.\'s facilities offered to Government. (H 4, 199.) Gormully. \nBorglum presents record of order of Delco system for 20,000 motors. (H 4, \n\n244. ) Borglum. \nSunbeam engine most favorable in Europe. (H4. 304.) Homer. (H4, 312.) \nRussia standardizing Hall Scott. (H 5, 112.) Hall. \nBureau of Standards inexperienced. (H 5, 152.) Hall. \nLewis machine gun only a rifle. (H 5, 298.) Hall. \nFirm advised to raise their bid. (H 5, 456.) Borglum. \nLieut. Lufkin too honest; dismissed. (H 5, 471.) Borglum. \nMilitary organization dropped initiative, due to investigations. (H 6, 505.) \n\nCoffin. \nCalled for resignation of Green and Butts. (H 7, 361-363.) Potter. \nCost per plane should not exceed $3,525. (H 8, 109.) Smith. \nMemorandum of fair cost of De Haviland 4. (H 8, 114-115-116.) Smith. \nOne hundred and fifty dollar bonus paid, though contract not lived up to. \n\n(H 8, 146.) Sloan. \nPresident King, of Dayton Lumber & Manufacturing Co., asked to produce \n\nmissing ledger pages. (H 10, 632.) \nGovernment paid subcontractor for Dayton-Wright. (H 11, 241.) Holmes. \nCrowell refers to " automobile gang." (H 12, 35.) Albree. \nTest of plane called unfair. (H 12, 59.) Albree. \nWonderful preparations in Germany. (H 12, 468.) Leland. \nKettering one of greatest mechanics in the world. (H 12, 475.) Leland. \nMen asleep under desks in daytime at Curtiss plant. (H 15, 40.) West. \nMueller, engineer, Curtiss Co., appointed by Deeds, Potter & Coffin. (H 18, \n\n167.) Budd Gray. \nTalbott interested in Dayton Lumber & Engineering Co. (H 18, 229.) \n\nCol. Jones. \nAttempt to get contract described. (H 19, 175.) Loughead. (H 19, 196.) \nCable in re African mahogany. (H 19, 271.) Ryerson, jr. \nFirms signed cross license almost under duress. (T 1, 477.) Downey. (T \n\n2, 818. ) \nOfficers at field very incompetent. (T 1, 548.) Davis. \nBad conditions at Gerstner Field. (T 1, 560.) Davis. \nWaldron exposes confidential contract to Curtiss Co. (T 2, 721.) Jordan. \n\n(T 2, 723.) \nLetter to President on aircraft production. (H 20, 460.) Stratton. (H 20, \n\n480; H20, 483.) \nStatement of General Vehicle Co. contract. (H 21, 39.) Col. Thompson. \n\n(H 21, 60 ; H 21, 179 ; H 21, 258.) \nMontgomery does not know why contract was not given Singer Co. (H 21, \n\n289.) Montgomery. (H 21, 400.) \nGen. Saltzman cites cases where Signal Corps men had contract with manu- \nfacturing concerns. (H 22, 305.) \n" Chaps in Signal Corps carrying on system of graft." (H 22, 390.) Wild. \nSignal Corps approved of Mengle Co. paying Wickliffe a salary. (H 24, \n518.) Hucldleson. \nMOTOR COMPANIES : \n\nBuick Co., Detroit, Mich. \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nFour hundred and sixteen thousand six hundred and sixty-nine dollars \npaid by Government up to July 6, 1918. (H 11, 277.) \nCadillac Co., Detroit, Mich. \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nOne million fifty-six thousand six hundred and ninety-six dollars paid \n\nby Government up to July 6, 1918. (H 11, 277.) Capt. Holmes. \nOwned by General Motors Co. (H 12, 370.) R.H.Collins. \nNo advances. (H 12, 379.) R. H. Collins. \nBogey price never over $5,000. (H 12, 382.) R. H. Collins. \nNo charges for preliminary work. (H 12, 405.) Kinnee. \nDepreciation part of overhead. (H 12, 416.) Kinnee. \nExpended $2,521,782. (H 12, 421.) Kinnee. \nTotal of $63,000 not allowed by Government. (H 12, 423.) Kinnee. \n\n\n\nGENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 19 \n\nMotor companies \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nFord Motor Co., Detroit, Mich. \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nAdvances and payments by Government \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nOne million three hundred and twenty-five thousand and forty-three \ndollars paid by Government up to July 6, 1918. (H 11, 276.) \nHolmes. (H 12, 297.) \nReceived no advances nor sought any. (H 12, 297.) Norlin. \nContracts \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nContract let in November ; not tooled up July 16, 1918. (H 11, 73.) \n\nHeaslet. (H 12, 159.) \nDetails arranged in September ; contract let in November, 1917. \n(H 12, 163.) Lee. \nDislovaltv and sabotage \xe2\x80\x94 . \n\nReference to disloyalty. (H 12, 174.) Lee. (H 12, 178-179; \n\nH 12, 230-233 ; H 12, 304-308. ) \nDefective spark plugs from Champion Co. (H 12, 237.) Wills. \nDistrict attorney would not act. (H 12, 239.) Wills. (H 12, \n\n303-311.) \nMilitary Intelligence Bureau takes no action. (H 12, 318.) \nClemett. \nProduction \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nNot producing latter part of March, 1918. (H 3, 64.) Colvin. \n\n(H 12, 164.) \nProduce tools for Liberty 8, but it was abandoned.. (H 5, 149.) \n\nHall. \nFell down badly on estimate. (H 11, 66.) Heaslet. (H 22, 112.) \nCould have advanced production two months except for changes. \n(H 12, 199.) Wills. \n\nReference to salaries. (H 12, 212.) Wills. \n\nGovernment forbids charging salaries direct. (H 12, 254.) Leister. \n\n(H 12, 256-258.) \nNo salaries allowed on experimental work. (H 12, 292.) Norlin. \nMiscellaneous \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nThree million two hundred and fifty thousand dollars profit on 5,000 \n\nLiberties. (H 7, 127.) Coffin. (H 12, 222.) \nFuel Administrator denies coal to crankshaft ueople. (H 12, 194.) \n\nWills. (H 12, 195.) \nFirst 70 motors cost about $37,000 apiece. (H 12, 205. ) Wills. \nCompany profited through Deeds. (H 12, 224.) Wills. \nOne million dollars cost of machinerv loaned to aircraft work. (H \n\n12, 252.) Leister. \nMr. Ford knew bogey price of $6,087 was high. (H 12, 271.) Ford. \nNo trouble with Signal Corps in re decisions. (H 12, 282.) Ford. \nGeneral Motors, Detroit, Mich. \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nContracts total $14,000,000. (H 5, 216.) Hall. \nContract for 2,000 Liberties. (H 12, 371.) R. H. Collins. \nLincoln Motor Co.. Detroit, Mich. \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nAdvances and payments by Government \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nFour million dollars paid by Government up to June 1, 1918. (H 4, \n\n389.) Lei and. (T 1, 526.) \nOne payment of $4,000,000 by Government in December, 1917. (H 4 r \n\n402.) Leland. \nEight million four hundred and twenty-three thousand nine hundred \nand sixtv-six dollars paid by Government. (H 4, 410.) Leland. \n(H 11, 276; H 12, 547.) \nContracts- \nFirst contract calls for 6,000 motors. (H4, 392.) Leland. \nCost-plus contract plus 15 per cent. (H 4, 408.) Leland. \nOnly two contracts from Government. (H 4,408.) Leland. \nCoffin does not recall order for 6,000 parts at $5,950,000. (H 7, 120. ) \nCoffin. \nOverhead \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nCost of testing plant allowed. (H 4, 396(b).) Leland. \nFortv per cent depreciation provision. (H 12, 559.) Nash. (H 12 f \n563.) \n\n\n\n20 GENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. \n\nMotor companies \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nLincoln Motor Co., Detroit, Mich.\xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \nProduction \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nProduced 1,000 engines, shipped 400 overseas bv January, 1918. \n\n(H 3, 56.) Miles. \nProduction was 5 or 6 a day ; should be 70. (H 3. 67.) Colvin. \nChanges in Liberty caused three months\' delay. (H 4, 484.) \n\nLeland. \nEvidence of production being retarded. (H 11, 45.) Heaslet. \n\n(Hll, 124-127.) \nProduced 763 motors up to July 15, 1918. (H 11, 91.) Heaslet. \nDelays because of changes. (H 12, 428-430 (b), 431. 432, 433 442.) \nEllis. \nSalaries \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nSalary of officials. (H 4, 420.) Leland. (H 12, 554.) \n\nMr. Leland and father each paid $25,000 salary bv Government. \n\n(H 4, 479.) Leland. \nNo executive salary paid. (H 8, 372.) Haag. \n\nExecutive salaries charged to Government back to July, 1917. II 12, \n570.) F. C. Thompson. \nMiscellaneous \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nNine hundred and thirteen dollars and five cents profit on each \n\nmotor. (H 4, 397.) Leland. \nBogey cost $6,087. then $5,000. (H. 4, 398.) Leland. \nTotal expenditures $6,200,000. (II 4, 401.) Leland. \nDelay in getting blue print. (H 4. 431.) Leland. (T 1, 231.) \nFive million dollars clear profit. (H 4, 478.) Leland. (117,120.) \nExpected to pay 80 per cent of profit in taxes. (114,491.) Leland. \nOne hundred per cent on capital within a year. (H 7, 123.) Coffin. \nEnormous return on capital. (H 7, 382.) Potter. \nList of 89 shops producing tools. (H 12. 450.) Ellis. \nNinety-one thousand eighty-seven special tools built. (H. 12, 464.) \n\nEllis. \nCapital stock $1,500,000. (H 12, 508.) Henry M. Leland. \nDayton Metal Products Co. owns $100,000 of stock. (H 12, 509.) \n\nLeland. \nCol. Montgomery advises $6,087 too high. (H 12, 517.) W. C. \n\nLeland. \nFinancial record clean. (H 12, 574.) F. C. Thompson. \nNordyke Marmon Co., Indianapolis \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n" Wonderfully fine factory." (H 3. 57.) Miles. \n\nJust coming into production July 15, 1918. (H 11. 95.) Heaslet. \n\nContract for 3,000 Liberties dated August, 1917 ; 24 delivered August 15, \n\n1918. (H 18, 363.) Lieut. Emmons. \nFixed-price contract of $2,366 an engine. (H 23. 496. ) Marmon. (H 23, \n\n553.) \nContract for 3,000 Liberty motors September 28, 1917. (H 23, 531.) \n\nMarmon. \nOne million dollars by Government for machinery in plant. (H 23, 547.) \n\nMarmon. \nPay 5 per cent on $2,000,000 advanced by Government. (H 23, 594.) \n\nMarmon. \nReal estate included in depreciation. (H 23, 596.) Marmon. (H 23, \n\n601.) \nChief Engineer Jeffers explains delays. (H 23, 636.) \nPackard Motor Car Co., Detroit, Mich. \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nAdvances and payments by Government \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nSecures advance of $2,500,000. (H 4, 397b.) Leland. \nSeven million four hundred and thirty-seven thousand six hundred \nand eightv-one dollars paid by Government up to July 6, 1918. \n(H 11, 274.) Holmes. (H 11, 639.) \nOverhead \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nDepreciation figures explained. (H 12, 77.) Robinson. \nProduction \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nTwo months\' start on tools when called off. (H 11, 592.) \n\nMacauley. \nSchedule of shipments made. (H 11, 612.) Macauley. \nCould have produced Hispano quicker than Liberty. (H 11, 674.) \nMacauley. \n\n\n\nGENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 21 \n\nMotor companies \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nPackard Motor Car Co., Detroit, Mich. \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \nSalaries \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nSalaries in bogey cost. (H 7, 706.) Downey. \nSalary distribution in August; no contract until September. (H \n12, 143.) Williams. \nMiscellaneous \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nLieut. Col. Joy largest holder of securities. (H 5, 2.) Joy. \nLiberty outgrowth of Packard Co. (H 5, 4.) Joy. (T 1, 162; \n\nT 1, 169.) \nShipped some motors not up to standard to appease public demand. \n\n(H 5, 40.) Joy. \nLiberty motor "life-saver." (H 5, 180.) Hall. \nFive million four hundred thousand dollars\' profit on 6,000 motors. \n\n(H 7, 113.) Coffin. (H 12, 103.) \nSubstituted magneto for Delco system Liberty. (H 11, 578.) \n\nMacauley. \nDecided to offer their facilities to Government May, 1917. (H 11, \n\n588. ) Macauley. \nAgreed to sink their identity with Liberty. (H 11, 590.) Ma- \ncauley. \nOne hundred and sixty-two Government men in plant at a time^ \n\n(H 11, 631.) Macauley. \nMontgomery & Deeds named bogey price of $6,087. (H 11, 643.)\' \n\nMacauley. \nCapital of firm, $20,000,000. (H 11, 654.) Macauley. \nEleven million eight hundred and eight thousand four hundred and \n\nfour dollars devoted to aircraft. (H 11, 656.) Macauley. \nHughes refers to vouchers. (H 12, 100; H 22, 325 and 334; H 24, \n\n159.) \nOne engine billed to Government for $25,000. (H. 12, 127.) Robin- \nson. \nNo information covering items under check for $104,500. (H 12, \n\n129.) Albree. \nCost arrived at in a secretive way. (H 12, 149.) Williams. \nNo record of contract involving $250,000. (H 24, 198.) Ewing. \nWillys-Overland Co., Elyria \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nDelivered 4,072 motors up to July 1, 1918. (H 8, 301.) Brown. \nOne hundred and fifty dollars\' bonus paid ; the contract not lived up to. \n(T 1, 471.) Downey. \nPershing : \n\nCaused order of 4,000 geared motors to be placed. (H 14, 101.) Houston. \nObligations cabled by Pershing contradictory. (H 1, 76.) Wolff. (T 2> \n\n945.) \nCables- \nCablegrams in re finance. (H 1, 83-87.) Wolff. \nCables from Pershing landed in hands unfamiliar with subject. (H 18, \n\n192.) Budd Gray. \nCable not to build 5,000 Gnome engines, October 12, 1918. (H 18, \n\n334.) Lieut. H. Emmons. \nCable recommends no single seater be built. (H 18, 612.) Col. Clark. \n\n(H 18, 614; T 2, 936.) \nCable in re training for pilots. (H 20, 50-54.) Harmon. \nCable relating to propeller wood. (H 20, 235.) Parker. \nCables increasing and decreasing production of Spad. (H 20, 607- \n609-614.) Waldon. \nProduction : \n\nFour hundred and fifty thousand bombs under production May 31, 1918. \n\n(H 1, 551.) Barlow. \nNo synchronizer in production May 31, 1918. (H 1, 792.) Barlow. \nStatement of planes shipped to embarkation points up to June 4, 1918. \n\n(H 2, 221.) Jones. \nOne hundred and ten thousand acres castor beans. (H 2, 126-129.) Jones. \nNo spruce purchased until August, 1918. (H 2, 352.) Sligh. \nFive De Havilands a day at Dayton-Wright, March, 1918. (H 3, 2,8.) \n\nMiles. \nThree thousand Spads ordered January 19, 1917, but called off. (H 3, \n35.) Miles. \n\n\n\n22 GENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. \n\nProduction \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nFive hundred bombing planes ordered September 19, 1917. (H 3, 36.) \n\nMiles. \nNo battle planes built here before war. (H 3, 60.) Miles. \nFord Co. not producing latter part of March, 1918. (H 3, 64.) Colvin. \nProduction at Lincoln plant, 5 or 6 a day, should be 70. (H 3, 67.) \n\nColvin. \nDelayed because of changes. (H 3, 73.) Colvin. \nDelayed because of unnecessary details. (H 3, 79-80.) Colvin. \nPlanes on time had we used foreign model. (H 3, 221.) Blackall. \nSplitdorf Electric Co. main source of supplies for allies. (H 3, 227.) \n\nCurtis. \nProgress hampered by too many people butting in. (H 3, 285.) Mason. \nTwo thousand sis hundred Spad drawings nearly complete, then canceled. \n\n(H 3, 532.) Morgan. \nNo combat planes built by Curtiss plant up to March 1, 1918. (H 3, 612.) \n\nMorgan. \nFive thousand Sunbeam engines could have been completed in two months. \n\n(H 3, 734.) Thomas. \nProduction held up because location of tack was changed one-eighth of an \n\ninch. (H 4, 131.) Daych. \nProduction delayed because Signal Corps did not pay bills. (H 4, 231.) \n\nBahr. \nFngle Co. well up in production when order is canceled. (H 4, 290.) \n\nBaker. \nNo bombing machines made in this country up to June 1, 1918, except ex- \nperimental work on Handley-Paige. (H 4, 515. )* Barlow. \nFive or six months to get Mercedes motor into production. (H 5, 68.) \n\nOwen Thomas. \nPlanes could have been turned out last fall. (H 5, 84.) Owen Thomas. \nWith breakdown test Ford and Packard could have produced 10 motors each \n\ndaily in January. (H 5, 169.) Hall. \nRadical variance in production scale. (H 5, 272.) Hall. \nOould have had machines on front in 90 days. (H 6, 165.) Workman. \nDoes not believe Signal Corps wanted to produce Handley-Paige. (H 6, \n\n213, ) Workman. \nWorkmen could have had 5,000 Handley-Paiges across now, June 20, 1918. \n\n(H 6, 256.) Workman. \nSubmits number of planes delivered by each company. (H 6, 292.) Cham- \nberlain. \nNo American scout planes on front. (H 7, 62.) Coffin. \nFiat engine had best chance for production. (H 7, 70.) Coffin. \nFirst De Haviland shipped from factory late March, 191S. (H 7, 243.) \n\nPotter. (H 7, 244.) \nFirst training plane delivered October 1, 1918. (H 7, 518.) Mixter. \nFifty Bristols may be scrapped. (H 7, 537.) Mixter. \nNo reason for planes not being in production in 1917. (H 8, 49.) Diffin. \n\n(T 2, 910-912.) \nForeign engines could have been produced. (H 8, 57.) Diffin. \nPossible to get into production on Liberty quicker than on foreign motor. \n\n(H 8, 79.) \nNinety per cent of production at Dayton-Wright in November, 1917. (H 10, \n\n324. ) Schoonmaker. \nChief engineer Dayton-Wright Co. cites reasons for delay. (H 10, 326-337.) \n\nSchoonmaker. \nNo shipments abroad between February 4 and April 3, 1918. (H 10, 393.) \n\nSchoonmaker. \nFirst bona fide schedule from Signal Corps on April 9, 1918. (H 10, 395.) \n\nSchoonmaker. \nList of motors from date to date at Packard. (H 11, 58.) Heaslet. (H \n\n11,59.) \nCadillac and Buick could have handled larger orders. ( H 11, 72. ) Heaslet. \nTwo regiments of mechanics held idle in camp. (H 11, 83-85.) Heaslet. \nSeven hundred and fourteen motors produced out of 1,950 contemplated. \n\n(H 11, 100.) Heaslet. \nOnly 1,625 engines instead of 4,620 estimated. (H 11, 134.) Heaslet. \n\n\n\nGENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 23 \n\nProduction \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nHeaslet Exhibit 6, July 16, 1918, shows total production. (H 11, 137.) \nEarlier production by using existing motor. (H 12, 503. ) Henry M. Leland. \nIf handled different, could have had all planes needed. (H 13, 76.) Day. \nProduction impossible because of so many changes. ( T 1, 485-487. ) Adams. \nSufficient material in United States to complete program in 12 months. (T \n\n1, 678.) Woodhouse. \nPurchases : \n\nGovernment bought General Vehicle Co.\'s plant, Long Island City, leased to \n\nWright-Martin Co. (H 1, 61.) Wolff. \nPaid Curtiss Co. $1,500,000 for machinery. (H 1, 239. ) Wolff. (H 3, 517.) \nDepartment of Justice requests New York Legislature pass bill so as to per- \nmit Government to acquire land. (H 3, 493.) Morgan. \nHistory of negotiations in purchase of General Vehicle Co. (H 24, 560.) \n\nMontgomery. (H 24, 575 ; H 24, 578.) \nSales : \n\nSalvaged material sold to public. (H 1, 63.) \n\nOne hundred and sixty-three million dollars expected from sale of material. \n\n(H 1, 90.) \nEight hundred thousand dollars worth of material sold to Standard Co. \n\n(H 8, 197.) Brown. \nSignal Corps (organization) : \n\nCapt. Preston and Lieut. Small in charge of money advanced since February \n\n1,1918. (HI, 101.) Lieut. Col. Wolff. \nAdvances passed by Finance Department and War Credits Board. (H 1, \n\n101.) Lieut. Col. Wolff. (H 4, 338.) \nSupervision of cost by officer at plant. (H 1, 106.) Lieut. Col. Wolff. \nMaterial section passes on requests for construction. (H 1, 113.) Lieut. \n\nCol. Jones. \nChaotic conditions. (H 1, 124.) Lieut. Col. Jones. (T 2, 785.) Lieut. \n\nCol. Jones. \nPolicy to start something and then drop it. (H 1, 133.) Lieut. Col. Jones. \nBills from railroad audited by Supply Division. (H 1, 161.) Lieut. Col. \n\nJones. \nAccounting controlled by Lybrant, Ross Bros. & Montgomery. (H 1, 407.) \n\nNewman. \nCriticism of Squier or Deeds disastrous. (H 1, 456.) Barlow. \nDeeds German and in summer of 1917 admits sympathy with Germany. (H \n\n2, 532.) Borglum. \n\nDeeds appointed many Germans. (H 2, 534.) Borglum. \n\nInspectors unintelligent, too rigorous. (H 3, 422.) Kirkman. (H 5, 202; \n\nH 5, 203 ; H 5, 212 ; H 7, 360 ; H 10, 415 ; T 1, 437-447 ; T 1, 630 ; T 2, 10-17. ) \nLetter from office of Chief Signal Officer says program is very thoroughly \n\ncovered. (H 3, 428.) Kirkman. \nNames of those ordering changes would make long list. (H 3, 598.) = \n\nMorgan. \nChanges and specifications by Col. Clark. (H 3, 600.) Morgan. \nIncompetent, perhaps malicious intent. (H 4, 161.) Greer. \nMen of inaction, mathematical moles, not fitted to act. (H 4, 172.) Greer. \nExpediting section could not get information. (H 4, 235.) Bahr. \nWeak on engineering end. (H 5, 107.) Owen Thomas. (H 7, 154; H 7, \n\n260-262 ; H 7, 510 ; H 22, 136 ; T 2, 842. ) \nNobody responsible for delays. (H, 5, 202.) Hall. \nProduction Board purchased different design each day. (H 5, 241.) Hall. \n\n(T 2, 763.) \nRulings Board passed on salaries. (H 6, 414.) Langnmir. \nAircraft Production Board. (H 6, 440.) Coffin. (H 6, 470, 473, 474, 482, \n\n483, 540 ; H 21, 359 ; T 2, 761. ) \nWaldon, Deeds & Montgomery produced bogey cost of $6,087. (H 7, 97.) \n\nCoffin. \nNo program.- (H 7, 224.) Potter. (H 7, 238-241.) \nUnderorsranized, needed production man. (H 7, 491.) Howe. (H 20, \n\n195.) \nOpinion 99 out of 100 organizations will be failure under Kellogg. (H 7, \n\n580. ) Mixter. \nCol. Hall " star performer." (H 7, 606.) McClelland. \n\n\n\n24 GENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. \n\nSignal Corps (organization) \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nLengthy criticism on engineering department. (H 7, 612.) McClelland. \n\nMilitary supervision delayed program. (H 8, 44.) Diffin. \n\nLack of knowledge and organization. (H 11, 623.) Macauley. (T 2, \n\n853, 859-860.) \nNo criticism by Ford. (H 12, 281-282.) Ford. \nNot much trouble getting decisions from engineering department. (H 12, \n\n541.) Abbott. \nNo knowledge of military equipment. (H 13, 20.) Day. \nBritish captain states high officers did not want information. (H 17, 108.) \n\nRogers. \nChanges by Curtiss plant not gone over by Signal Corps. (H IT, 351.) \n\nMaj. Moore. (H 17, 478.) \nHad no efficient engineering organization. (H 18, 95.) Budd Gray. (H \n\n18, 98.) \n\nSerious situation, reflecting ou United States military administration. (H \n\n19, 161.) Churchill. \n\nFour agencies controlling production cause duplication. (T 1, 531.) \nSignal Corps ridiculed statement there was waterproof glue. (H 20, 362.) \n\nMix. \nImproper influence on Advisory Board. (H 21, 68.) Col. Thompson. \nChief signal officer advises tests not necessary. (H 21, 590.) Arnold. (H \n\n21, 600-602.) \nSquier : \n\nAdvises Coffin to say very little before Senate investigating committee. \n\n(H 1, 488.) Barlow. \nLeased 1,200 acres unsuitable land in Florida. (H 2, 140.) Jones. \nStates charges on Senate floor were German propaganda. (H 3, 396.) \n\nPew. \nStates ISO battle planes delivered in France in February, 1918. (H 3, \n\n405. ) Pew. \nStates Sunbeam engine first ray of hope. (H 4. 308.) Horner. (All of \n\n308). \nSaid if Germany was using Barlow aerial torpedoes they could wipe out \n\nLondon and Paris in one night. (H 4. 513.) Barlow. \nEstimates cost of campaign at $1,000,000,000. (H 4, 514.) Barlow. \nMade only one report to Borglum. (H 5, 4S8.) Borglum. \nSent meD over with no provisions. (H 19, 171.) Churchill. \nAbsolutely satisfied with Col. Deeds. (H 22, 302.) Salzman. \nHad no executive duties in Signal Corps. (H 24, 272.) Squier. \n\'Did not give authority to anyone to disburse the $250,000. (H 24, 330.) \n\nSquier. (H 24, 635.) \nDid not know Vincent was Packard stockholder. (H 24, 333.) Squier. \nDoes not recollect calling Senate charges German propaganda. (H 24, \n\n392.) Squier. \nWhite, J. G., Engineering Corporation : \n\n. Langley Field construction unsatisfactory. (H 2, 34.) Edgar. \nCleaned out company twice; no graft. (H 2, 34.) Edgar. \nWent beyond estimate more than others. (H 2, 4S.) Edgar. \nDelay of raw materials fault of White Co. (H 6, 319.) Lockhart, jr. \nContract satisfactorily filled. (H 7, 353.) Potter. \nThis firm selected by Aircraft Production Board. (T 1, 36.) Edgar. \nOver 1,000.000 pounds of material at embarkation point 300 days. (H 21, \n\' 457.) Chilson. \n\n$8,938,825 paid by the Government for material. (H 21. 463.) Chilson. \nSubmits report on materials shipped by J. G. White Co. (H 24, 673-676.) \n\nCampbell. \n\n\n\nNAME INDEX. \n\n\n\nVolume. Page . \n\nAbbott, Paul W. , chief inspector Lincoln Motor Co H 12 541 \n\nAddas, Charles M. , employee foreign air service H 6 3 \n\nAlbree, George, president Albree Pidgeon Co H 12 26 \n\nAllen, Kenneth B . , civil engineer H 35 \n\nAnderson, C . H. , assistant timekeeper Curtiss Co H 15 726 \n\nAnderson, James H. , vice president Wright-Martin Co H 14 292 \n\nAnsell, Brig, Gen. Samuel T., Office of Judge Advocate General H 22 430 \n\nArnold, Col. Henry E., assistant to chief Department Military Aero- \nnautics H 21 132 \n\nH 21 588 \n\nAtterby, Edward, investigator, Curtiss Co H 16 763\' \n\nBahr, Frederick C, finance division, Signal Corps H 4 218 \n\nBaker, Harry E . , manufacturer, of Cleveland H 4 284 \n\nBaker, Hon. Newton D., Secretary of War _ H 21 351 \n\nBaldwin, Abraham T., manufacturer and contractor, Signal Corps H 20 80 \n\nBaldwin, Mrs. Abraham T., vice president Precision Instruction Co. . H 20 136 \n\nBarlow, Lester P., engineer H 1 447 \n\nH 4 501 \n\nH 22 418 \n\nBeans, Dr. H. T., chemical laboratory, Signal Corps H 20 490 \n\nBennington, Maj. Harold, in charge of accounts. Construction Division. H 2 82 \n\nBenstead, Horace M., accountant, Wright-Martin Co H 14 320 \n\nBenton, Maj. C. S., in charge of traffic section, Supply Division H 1 194 \n\nH 1 278 \n\nBettman, Alfred, Department of Justice H 24 191 \n\nBlackall, Frederick S . , general manager Taft-Pierce Co H 3 195 \n\nBorglum, Gutzon J. Del., sculptor from Stamford, Conn H 2 271 \n\nH 4 244 \n\nH 5 327 \n\nBrooks, Frederick A., designing department, Curtiss Co H 16 120 \n\nBrown, Maj . Hiram S . , finance department, Signal Corps H 8 185 \n\nH 8 294 \nBuck, Dr. Frederick W., airplane, torpedoes, and gasoline engine \n\nmanufacturer H 4 329 \n\nButts, Edward P . , manager of engineering, Signal Corps H 7 137 \n\nByllesby, Lieut. Col. Henry M., Administrative Division, Signal \n\nCorps H 1 795 \n\nCampbell, Douglas, lawyer H 24 672 \n\nCardullu, Forest E., test engineer, Curtiss Co H 19 116 \n\nCarrington, John S., secretary and manager, San Antonio Chamber of \n\nCommerce H 2 250 \n\nCawthra, Ernest H., assistant to chief engineer, Curtiss Co H 17 1 \n\nChamberlain, Capt. Robert L., planning section, Signal Corps H 6 285 \n\nChilson, Edw. N., purchase manager, J. G. White Engine Co H 21 441 \n\nChurchill, Col. Marborough, chief military intelligence H 19 152 \n\nChurgay, Louis H., Hungarian-born employee, Curtiss Co H 17 148 \n\nH 17 209 \n\nClark, third, Lieut. Edw. W., aid to Col. Wolff * H 6 297 \n\nClark, Lieut. Col. Virginius E H 18 488 \n\nClarke, Capt. Elmer J., lumber inspector H 18 644 \n\nH 21 667 \n\nClemett, Edwin F., educational department, Ford Co H 12 315 \n\nCoburn, Cyril R. , inspector, Curtiss Co H 15 52 \n\nH 17 722 \n25 \n\n\n\n26 GENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. \n\nVolume. Page. \n\nCoffin, Howard E., chairman Aircraft Production Board H 6 418 \n\nH 7\' 1 \n\nCole, John E., Government employee, Curtiss Co H 16 384 \n\nH 16 720 \n\nH 16 762 \n\nColeman, Maj . Earnest A. , accountant H 24 630 \n\nCollins, George R. , stockholder, Giant Furniture Co H 3 436 \n\nCollins, Richard H.\', president and general manager Cadillac Motor Co. H 12 370 \n\nColvin, Fred H . , editor American Machinist : H 3 62 \n\nConaty, Walter J. , Government accountant H 13 587 \n\nCookson, Leighton A. , Government inspector H 13 526 \n\nCraighead, Charles A., secretary Dayton- Wright Co H 10 177 \n\nCrane, Henry M., vice president and chief engineer Wright-Martin Co. H 14 228 \n\nCriqui, Charles A., president and general manager Sterling Engine Co. H 2 487 \n\nCummin, Edith P., law clerk and stenographer, Craighead-Dowden . . H 9 238 \n\nCurrier, Edw. P., formerly with City National Bank, Dayton, Ohio.. H 24 597 \n\nCurtiss, Carlos W. , manager Splitdorf Electrical Co H 3 226 \n\nDaily, Robert, factory accountant, Curtiss Co H 15 655 \n\nDargert, Henry, employee, Curtiss Co H 16 533 \n\nH 16 703 \n\nDarget, Wm. F., assistant foreman, sheet-metal department, Curtiss Co. H 15 717 \n\nDavidson, Walter G., cashier City National Bank, Dayton, Ohio H \' 22 \n\nDay, Charles H., vice president and general manager Standard Co H 13 1 \n\nH 13 362 \n\nDaych, Herman C. , assistant to Mr. Mingle. Standard Co H 4 110 \n\nDean, Fred E. . purchasing, agent Standard Co H 13 488 \n\nDeBelleuSe. Albert J. C, Duesenberg Motor Co H 14 359 \n\nDeeds, Col. E. A., chief, Equipment Division, Signal Corps H 22 471 \n\nH 23 1 \n\nH 24 90 \n\nDeLaittre, Karl K., planning and suggestions. Shipping Board H 19 507 \n\nDeLeeuw, Adolph L., mechanical engineer, Singer Manufacturing Co . \' H 19 547 \n\nDevine, Mary E., bookkeeper and secretary to Mr. Talbott, sr H 9\xc2\xbb 184 \n\nH 9 245 \n\nH 10 228 \n\nDibble, Fred L., dispatching department, Curtiss Co H 16 31 \n\nDickinson, Dr. H. C, physicist. Bureau of Standards H 4 1 \n\nDiffin, Frank G. , assistant to Landon, Chief of Production H 8 23 \n\nDisandro, Severino, employee, Curtiss Co H 17 696 \n\nDonovan, Frank J., employee, Curtiss Col H 15 733 \n\nDowney, Maj. A. C, Aircraft Production Board H 7 697 \n\nDowney, Lieut. Col. A. C H 24 663 \n\nDrexel, Maj . John A. , flyer, French Flying Corps H 18 673 \n\nDurant, Dr. Wm. F., chairman National Advisory Committee, for \n\nAeronautics H 20 294 \n\nEdgar, Col. Clinton G., in charge of construction division H 2 1 \n\nH 2 172 \n\nH 7 196 \n\nH 7 592 \n\nH 22 359 \n\nH 22 440 \n\nElliott, Maj. Howard, disbursing officer. Signal Corps H 24 158 \n\nEllis, Horace T. , tool superintendent, Lincoln Co H 12 424 \n\nEmmons, Lieut. Harold H., United States Navy H 18 193 \n\nH 18 290 \n\nEwing, Capt. Oscar R., contract secretary Bureau Aircraft Production. H 24 197 \n\nFable, Edward R. . chief veoman. Curtiss Co H 16 6 \n\nFeberry, Thomas M., British expert H 17 229 \n\nFinkbinder, Eber W., with Houghton Co H 20 228 \n\nFinklestein, Max J., vice president Standard Co H 13 373 \n\nFisher, Charles T. . vice president Fisher Body Co H 11 443 \n\nFisher, Fred J., president and general manager Fisher Body Co. .... . H 11 290 \n\n\n\nGENEKAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 27 \n\nVolume. Page. \nFletcher. John B., assistant to manager, Handley-Paige department, \n\nStandard Co H 2 550 \n\nFlint, Albert H., manufacturer \' H 20 3 \n\nFord, Capt. yplement R., assistant to Col. Horner H 6 293 \n\nFord, Henry, president Ford Co H 12 269 \n\nFouhy, Charles E. , employment manager, Curtiss Co H 17 247 \n\nGeorge, Col. Edwin S. , procurement. Motor Transport H 4 325 \n\nGormully, Alfred R. , representing Fiat Co H 4 185 \n\nGrannis, James K., superintendent of construction, Dayton, Ohio H 2 227 \n\nGray, Budd B\\, former chief, inspection of raw material, Signal Corps. H 18 8 \n\nGreer, M. W., mechanical engineer H 3 665 \n\nH 4 161 \n\nHaag, Capt. Francis E., Finance Division, Aircraft Production Board. H 8 342 \nHall, Lieut. Col. Elbert J., in charge engineering, Bristol and De Havi- \n\nland H 5 109 \n\nHarmon, jr., Maj. Miller, overseas officer v . H 20 37 \n\nHarris, Chester A., chief., company police, Curtiss Co H 16 45 \n\nH 17 163 \n\nHart, DeMerle E., employee. Curtiss Co H 16 476 \n\nHawkins, Ensign Mason I., Curtiss Co H 16 617 \n\nH 17 19 \n\nHeaslet. Maj. James G., inspection service, Signal Corps H 11 1 \n\nHill, Thomas A., lawyer, New York City H 21 1 \n\nHiller, Augustus, plant accounting officer H 10 427 \n\nHoffman, Julius H.. German-born employee, Curtiss Co H 16 559 \n\nHoffman, Capt. W. Wickham, in Air Service. H 19 202 \n\nHolden, Maj. James S., Construction Division, Signal Corps H 24 1 \n\nHolmes, Charles W., Inspection Section. Signal Corps H 4 51 \n\nHolmes, Capt. Hall B. , district accounting officer H 11 217 \n\nHomer, Arthur P., naval architect and marine engineer H 4 302 \n\nHorner. Lieut. Col. Leonard S., Ordnance and Instrument Section, \n\nSignal Corps H 19 1 \n\nHouston, George H., president and general manager Wright Martin Co. H 14 1 \n\nH 14 143 \n\nHowe, Richard F.,. member, Aircraft Production Board H 7 468 \n\nHowell, Harley M. , auditor, Dayton-Wright Co \'. H 10 1 \n\nHoyt, Homer, economist, War Trade Board H 19 320 \n\nHuddleson, Roderick S., president, Huddleston-Marsh Mahogany Co. H 24 479 \n\nHunt, Ormund E., chief engineer, Packard Co \xe2\x80\xa2 H 12 1 \n\nIkirk, Burchell C, formerly with Aircraft Production Board H 19 579 \n\nIsenberg, Hans O. C, assistant factory manager, Wright-Martin Co H 14 395 \n\nJandron, Francis L., assistant secretary, Packard Co H 12 134 \n\nJeffers, Clarence E., chief engineer, Nordyke-Marmon Co H 23 631 \n\nJennings, Herbert, general manager, United Eastern Aircraft Corpo- \nration H 2 622 \n\nJones, Lieut. Col. E. Lester, assistant and executive to Col. Edgar H 1 112 \n\nH 2 126 \n\nH 2 207 \n\nH 2 545 \n\nH 18 223 \n\nH 18 663 \n\nJordan, John A., general manager, Liberty Iron Works H 18 426 \n\nJoy, Lieut. Col. Henry B., recruiting, Signal Corps H 5 1 \n\nH 6 128 \n\nJuergesen, Rudolph, German-born employee, Curtiss Co H 16 356 \n\nKenley, Maj. Gen. William B., Director Military Aeronautics H 19 385 \n\nKennerson, Harry V., accountant, Curtis Co H 17 93 \n\nKepperley, James E., vice president and general manager, Curtis Co. . H 17" 608 \n\nKettering, Chas. F., vice president, Dayton-Wright Co H 10 665 \n\nKiefer, Clarence, vice president, City National Bank, Dayton, Ohio.. HO 16 \n\nKiernan, Agnes, employee Curtiss Co H 17 402 \n\n\n\n28 GENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. \n\nVolume. Page. \n\nKing, Sidney S., president, Dayton Lumber & Manufacturing Co H 10 612 \n\nKinnee, Herman M., comptroller, Cadillac Co H 12 402 \n\nKirkman, J. E., president, Giant Furniture Co., Highpoint, N. C H 3 409 \n\nKladv, Chas. A. , payroll auditor, Curtiss Co H 16 481 \n\n; H 16 625 \n\nKuhns, Ezra M. , secretary Miama conservancy district H 10 633 \n\nKyte, Emmet S., plant protection, Wright-Martin Co H 14 297 \n\nLangmuir, Maj . Dean, accountant, Signal Corps H 6 404 \n\nH 8 124 \n\nH 8 437 \nLake, Harry W., secretary Technical Joint Army and Navy Aircraft \n\nBoard H 20 412 \n\nLandon, Archer A., chief of production of aircraft H 20 413 \n\nLariviere, Albert, clerk, Appropriations Bureau, Aircraft Production. H 24 605 \n\nLee, John Randolph, manufacturing department, Ford Co H 12 159 \n\nLehman, Capt. Harold M. , appropriations section I H 1 501 \n\nLeigh, Edmund, in charge plant protection, Military Intelligence H 18 373 \n\nH 18 659 \n\nH 19 150 \n\nLeister, Herbert L., auditor, Ford Co H 12 249 \n\nLeland, Henry M., president, Lincoln Motor Co H 12 466 \n\nLeland, Wilfred C, vice president and general manager, Lincoln Motor \n\nCo H 4 342 \n\nH 12 512 \n\nLeonard, Guv, supervisor of construction of chemical plants H 19 136 \n\nLewis, Fred H. , manufacturer of aeroplane parts H 3 668 \n\nLockhart, Henry, jr., Bureau of Aircraft Production, Signal Corps H 6 308 \n\nLockwood, Stephen T. , United States district attorney H 17 709 \n\nLoughead, Victor, mechanical engineer H 19 172 \n\nLovas, Paul, employee, Curtiss Co H 16 526 \n\nLueneke, Louis C, aeronautical engineer, Dayton- Wright Co H 10 477 \n\nMcCann, Benjamin F. , counsel for Deeds & Kettering H 9 560 \n\nMcCartney, James L. , draft clerk, Wright-Martin Co H 14 355 \n\nMcClelland, James F., material specifications, Signal Corps H 7 597 \n\nMcConaughy, John W., director Division of News, Committee on Pub- \nlic Information H 3 344 \n\nH 3 658 \n\nMcCnllough, John E., superintendent George D. Emery Co H 24 544 \n\nMcGlue, W. R., employee Curtsis Co H 16 146 \n\nMcGregor, James S. , inspection section, Signal Corps H 7 654 \n\nMcGuire, William F. , vice president Wright-Martin Co H 14 347 \n\nMcKinney, Alexander, jr. , Naval Intelligence H 8 1 \n\nMacauley, Alvan, president Packard Co H 11 569 \n\nMacGregor, Prof. J. S H 7 654 \n\nH 20 488 \n\nH 21 346 \n\nMacLaughlin, Lewis H., assistant to vice president, Houghton Co H 20 220 \n\nMarmon, Maj. Howard C, member of Boiling Commission H 4 572 \n\nMarmon, Walter C, president Nordyke & Marmon Co H 23 495 \n\nMartens, Conrad C, foreman, testing department, Lincoln Co H 4 245 \n\nMartin, Ernest D . , auditor Dayton Metal Products Co H 9 418 \n\nH 9 690 \nMartin, James V., master mariner, engineering department, Signal \n\nCorps H 22 240 \n\nMarquis, Doctor, educational department, Ford Co , H 12 361 \n\nMarshall, Nelson W., inspector machinery operation, Curtiss Co H 16 278 \n\nMason, Carl T. , chief engineer, Splitdorf Electric Co H 3 247 \n\nMason, Lee, employee, Metz Co H 4 523 \n\nMason, Luther, employee, Metz Co H 4 544 \n\nMason, Robt. B.. pay-roll department, Curtiss Co H 17 313 \n\nMeenan, Daniel L., jr., treasurer, Standard Co H 13 419 \n\nMendelsohn, Aaron, secretary, Fisher Body Co H 11 513 \n\nH 18 1 \n\nMendelsohn, Louis, treasurer, Fisher Body Co H 11 492 \n\nMeyer, Eugene, jr. , director, War Finance Corporation H 20 166 \n\n\n\nGENEKAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 29 \n\nVolume. Page. \nMiles, Herbert E., chairman, Committee on Training Factory Wdrkers \n\nfor War Production H 3 1 \n\nMiller, Lieut. Tom B., property officer at Dayton H 3 717 \n\nH 4 85 \n\nMingle, Harry B., president, Standard Co H 13 117 \n\nH 13 262 \n\nMix, Melville W., president, Dodge Manufacturing Co H 20 321 \n\nMix, Kenyon, son of Melville Mix H 20 354 \n\nMixter, Lieut. Col. George W.. in charge inspection department, Sig- \nnal Corps H 7 506 \n\nH 20 371 \n\nMontgomerv, Col. Robt. L H 21 258 \n\nH 22 1 \n\nH 24 208 \n\nMontgompry, William W. , jr. , Bureau Aircraft Production H 24 554 \n\nMoore, Maj. Edward S., district manager of production, Curtiss Co . . . H 17 340 \n\nH 17 450 \n\nMorgan, William A., vice president and general manager, Curtiss Co. . H 3 449 \n\nMoss, William W., vice president and comptroller, Curtiss Co H 15 369 \n\nH 15 545 \n\nH 20 59 \n\nMueller, George H. , chief engineer, Curtiss Co H 17 470 \n\nMulholland, Stuart L., in charge factorv accounts, Curtiss Co H 15 689 \n\nH 16 525 \n\nMuskovics, Fred E., vice president Nordyke & Marmon Co H 23 650 \n\nNash, William T., secretary-treasurer, Lincoln Co H 12 546 \n\nNewman, Capt. James J., accounting work, Fisher Body Co H 1 390 \n\nH 8 439 \n\nNorlin, Lieut. Charles E. , accountant, Ford Co \xe2\x96\xa0 H 12 290 \n\nNutt, Phillip N., employment department, Curtiss Co H 16 289 \n\nOakes, Earl T., chemist, laboratorv, Signal Corps H 21 508 \n\nO\'Connell, Matthew F., U. S. Navy-Curtiss Co H 16 365 \n\nH 16 589 \n\nOhmer, Wilfred I., president, Recording & Computing Manufacturers H 2 448 \n\nOleman, Ernst, German-born employee, Curtiss Co H 16 380 \n\nO\'Neill, Victor M., employee, Curtiss Co H 16 151 \n\nOtis, Joseph S., in charge of mahogany and hardwood H 1 293 \n\nOtt, O. W., chemical section, Bureau of Aircraft Production H 19 145 \n\nParker, Lieut. J. B. B., office Chief of Staff H 20 235 \n\nPatterson, Capt. J. Neil, Inspection Department, Signal Corps H 11 138 \n\nPenniwell, Edward E., vice president and general manager, Standard \n\nCo H 13 252 \n\nPew, Marlen E., News Division, Committee on Public Information H 3 375 \n\nH 3 664 \n\nPotter, William C, chief of Equipment Division, Signal Corps H 7 217 \n\nQuinn, James A., agent, military police, Curtiss Co H 17 718 \n\nRead, Ensign Merle C, United States Navy, labor distribution, Cur- \ntiss Co H 16 182 \n\nH 16 316 \n\nH 17 33 \n\nRichardson, Commander H. C, Curtiss Co H 17 459 \n\nRidenour, Orland J. , employee, Wright-Martin Co H 14 423 \n\nRobinson, Frederick R., accountant, Packard Co H 12 64 \n\nRogers, Capt. Alfred B., British Army H 17 106 \n\nRohlfs, Charles, Government inspector of wood, Curtiss Co H 15 141 \n\nH 17 441 \n\nRose, Maj. Charles B., inspector H 13 496 \n\nRyan, John D., director, Bureau of Aircraft Production H 8 228 \n\nII 19 211 \n\nRyerson, Capt. Edward L., jr., in charge propeller work H 19 253 \n\nH 19 471 \n\nH 20 72 \n\n\n\n30 GENERAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. \n\nVolume. Page. \n\nSack, Lieut. Isadore, finance division, Bureau of Aircraft Production. H 19 422" \n\nSakin, Charles R., in charge spare sales, Wright-Martin Co II 14 444 \n\nSaltzman, Brig. Gen. C. M., Signal Corps. H 22 296 \n\nSanderson, Ensign John, Navy accountant, Curtiss Co H 17 43 \n\nSchott, William H., Lewis Spring & Axles Co H 8 152 \n\nSchoonmaker, James M., chief engineer, Dayton Wright Co H 10 317 \n\nH 10 647 \n\nScott, H. H.; auditor Fisher Body Co H 11 550 \n\nSessions, Charles C, salvage department, Curtiss Co H 16 777 \n\nShedley, Thomas H., superintendent of foundry, Wright Martin Co. . . H 14 393 \nSherer, Carl. J., treasurer Dayton Metal Products Co., Dayton Wright \n\nCo. and Wright Field Co H 9 330 \n\nH 9 631 \n\nH 9 682 \n\nH 10 69 \n\nShull, Daniel W., employee, Curtiss Co H 16 1 \n\nSiemms, Chester P., president and treasurer Siemms-Carey-Ker- \n\nbauch Co H 23 652 \n\nSimon, Charles J., accountant, Curtiss Co H 17 179 \n\nSimpson, E. Glenn, chief engineer, Fisher Body Co H 11 472 \n\nSlaght, W. A., employee, Curtiss Co H 17 322 \n\nSligh, Maj. Charles R., in charge of wood purchasing, Signal Corps ... H 2 350 \n\nSloan, Lieut. John E., specifications section, Signal Corps H 8 125 \n\nSmart, Allen R., consulting accountant, Dayton Wright Co H 9 427 \n\nH 9 581 \n\nH 9 701 \n\nHO 45 \n\nSmith, Maj. Frank E., Finance Division, Signal Corps H 8 91 \n\nSmith, George B., confidential representative to Deeds & Kettering. . H 9 1 \n\nH 9 271 \n\nH 9 528 \n\nH 10 215 \n\nSmith, John H., in charge construction, Langley field H 2 156 \n\nSowers, David W., president Sowers Manufacturing Co H 23 195 \n\nSparks, Dale M., accountant, Curtiss Co H 16 682 \n\nStagers, John W., lawver representing Borglum H 6 147 \n\nStratton, Dr. S. W., director, Bureau of Standards H 20 451 \n\nStroop, William, president Citv NationalBank, Dayton H 1 \n\nSquire, Maj . Gen. George O., Chief Signal Officer H 24 234 \n\nSullivan, Louis H., works manager, Standard Co H 13 430 \n\nSweeney, William M., fire police commissioner, Curtiss Co H 17 406 \n\nSweetser, Capt. Arthur, historical writer for Deeds H 3 626 \n\nH 4 47 \n\nTalbott, H. E., sr., president Dayton Metal Products Co H 10 488 \n\nTalbott, H. E., jr., with Dayton Metal Products Co H 10 721 \n\nTaylor, Howard S., engineer, Dayton Wright Co H 10 281 \n\nTaylor, William P., factory manager, Lewis Spring & Axles Co H 3 705 \n\nTerrell, Louis M., auditor, Ford Co H 12 248 \n\nThomas, George A., Government employee, Curtiss Co H 16 437 \n\nThomas, Owen, purchase and supplies H 5 62 \n\nThomas, Ulysses S., part owner, Sterling Engine Co H 3 721 \n\nThompson, F. C, Government accountant, Lincoln Co H 12 568 \n\nThompson, Col. Melville W., president War Credits Board H 21 38 \n\nH 24 442 \n\nTingle, Alfred J. , manufacturing engineer, Dayton Wright Co H 10 655 \n\nTrego, Frank N., vice president, Trego Motor Co. , New Haven H 2 596 \n\nVincent, Lieut. Col. J. G., former vice president, Packard Co H 22 11 \n\nH 22 325 \n\nVrooman, Lieut. Samuel B., jr., mahogany inspector, Signal Corps H 24 31 \n\nWaldon, Col. Sidney D., original member Aircraft Board , H 20 577 \n\nWaterhouse, William J., assistant chief engineer, Standard Co H 13 454 \n\nWebber, William H., forester H 19 431 \n\n\n\nGENEKAL INDEX AND SYNOPSIS. 31 \n\nVolume. Page. \n\nWeller, Joseph F., chief of inspection, Curtiss Co H 17 154 \n\nH 17 443 \n\nWescoat, Pvt. Leon S., accountant, Fisher Body Co H 11 528 \n\nWest, Jalma, Military Intelligence, Curtiss Co H 15 1 \n\nWickliffe, John C, production expert Bureau Aircraft Production H 23 341 \n\nWilcox, Albert L., lumber business in Panama H 20 242 \n\nWild, Horace B., aeronautical engineer H 22 385 \n\nWilliams, Henry K. S., assistant to Mr. Lockhart H 7 398 \n\nWilliams, Lieut. Walter D., plant accountant, Packard Co H 12 137 \n\nWills, C. Harold, factory manager, Ford Co H 12 184 \n\nWilson, Charles E., assistant to general manager, Curtiss Co H 17 730 \n\nWilson, John A., employee, Aircraft Board H 4 561 \n\nWinterbottom, Charles, inspector, Curtiss Co H 15 200 \n\nWittemann, Chas. K., aeroplane manufacturer H 3 289 \n\nWolff, Leiut. Col. S. E., in charge finance department, Signal Corps. .HI 1 \n\nH 1 217 \n\nWoods, Lieut. Col. Arthur, field inspection, Signal Corps H 18 412 \n\nH 20 1 \n\nWorkman, William H., representative Handley-Paige Co., England. . H 6 154 \n\nWright, Orville H 23 175 \n\nZacharias, t)apt. Allen H., planning department, Signal Corps H 6 93 \n\nH 6 259 \n\nH 6 395 \n\n\n\nDIGEST \n\n\n\nOF THE \n\nTESTIMONY OF WITNESSES IN THE \nHUGHES AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION \n\nMay to October, 1918 \n\n130687\xe2\x80\x9419 3 32a \n\n\n\nWilliam Stkoop (Dayton, Ohio, June 11, 1918; Book 0). \n\nPrincipal business is representing the American Cigar Co. in \nOhio. 1. \n\nIs vice president of Dayton Power & Light Co. and president of \nthe City National Bank. 1. \n\nGives names of directors of bank. 1. \n\nBecame president of the City National Bank in March, 1918. 1. \n\nHis predecessor was Mr. H. E. Talbott. 1. \n\nGovernment Secret Service man asked him about certain trans- \nactions in the bank in regard to financing of contractors who \nhad the contract for the Dayton Wright Aviation Field, who \nwas S. S. King. 2. \n\nMr. Talbott called a meeting one day and said he thought it \nwould be a good thing if 13 would finance Mr. King to the \nextent of $10,000 each; and for doing that Mr. King would \ntake over the Eouzer Co., which owed the bank some $60,000 \nor $70,000. \n\nMr. Talbott claimed he went to Florida for his health, but wit- \nness does not think so. Has heard it said it was in connection \nwith another Government contract. 3. \n\nMr. Talbott called witness to his office and told him a building \ncost $1,000,000 or more would have to be put up at Moraine \nCity and was very anxious that his (witness) company should \nhave that building. After the engineer had left Mr. Talbott \nsaid to me to " Let no one know anything about this until I tell \nyou to go to Washington to see about closing the contract." 5. \n\nThe million-dollar building was never built. Troubles came on. \n12. \nClarence Kiefer (Dayton, Ohio, June 11, 1918; Book 0). \n\nVice president of City National Bank. Has held this office for \n21 months. 16. \n\nQuestioned as to the financing of Mr. King or the Dayton Lum- \nber Co. in connection with Government contract which he \nhad. 17. \nWalter George Davidson (Dayton, Ohio, June 11, 1918; Book 0). \n\nCashier of City National Bank. 22. \n\nHas been connected with bank for 16 years. 22. \n\nMr. King never banked with them previous to this loan. 23. \n\nMr. Carl Scherer requested to remain at bank one Saturday \nafternoon in October, 1917, when some very large checks \npassed. 25. \n\n33 \n\n\n\n34 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nWalter George Davidson \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nMr. Scherer is treasurer or assistant treasurer of the Dayton \nMetal Products Co., and is also connected with Dayton Wright \nAirplane Co. 26. \n\nFunds transferred totaled about a million dollars or more. 27. \n\nThis transaction took place December 1, 1917, at about 2 o\'clock \nin the afternoon. 28. \nKenneth B. Allen (Dayton, Ohio, June 12, 1918; Book 0). \n\nHas been a civil engineer for 10 years. 35. \n\nWas employed by the Dayton Lumber Co. on work on Wright \nAviation Field. 35. \n\nThere was a great deal of incompetency and the work was ex- \ntreme^ expensive. 36. \n\nWitness was engineer in charge, but his advice was not followed. \n40. \nAllen K. Smart (Dayton, Ohio, June 12, 1918; Book 0). \n\nMember of firm of Barrow, Wade, Guthrie & Co., Chicago, 111. \n45. \n\nQuestioned as to the capital stock of the Dayton Metal Products \nCo. and how it was paid for. 46. \n\nSupervised the adjustments between Col. Deeds and his as- \nsociates. 48. \n\nHis firm retained bv the Davton Metal Products Co. bv the day. \n52. \n\n" In making an audit last winter I went through the minute \nbook to see if there was anything in the minutes affecting the \naccounts, and I struck that minute (minute in the meeting of \ndirectors of May 21, 1917, of Dayton Metal Products Co.) off \nbecause it did not belong there." 55. \nLieut. Col. S. E. Wolff (Washington, D. C, May 27, 1919; Book 1). \n\nCharge of finance department, Signal Corps. 1. \n\nUnable to procure clear statement of obligations under appro- \npriations from overseas forces. 1. \n\nContracts abroad made under direction Gen. Foulois. 4. \n\nBalance of $4,000,000 out of $750,000,000 to run to end of year. 2. \n\nTweleve thousand planes under contract. 3. \n\nTwenty thousand engines under contract, 3. \n\nCongress asked for $1,137,000,000 for next fiscal year. 4. \n\nContract with French Government to equip 30 squadrons \xe2\x80\x94 ap- \nproximately 1,500 planes. 5. \n\nContract with British Government to assemble planes in Eng- \nland. 5. \n\nGive authorities to purchase abroad for $47,000,000. 5. \n\nObligations incurred abroad of possibly $300,000,000. 5. \n\nDisallowed certain requests from abroad, but authorities abroad \nmade obligations for these larger amounts. 7. \n\nAdvised by cable revision of contracts with French Government \ninvolved more than $30,000,000 in new obligations. 7. \n\nOut of touch with situation \xe2\x80\x94 one of reasons for desiring to go \nover there. 7. \n\nCertain contracts with French and British Governments con- \nfused. 7. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 35 \n\nLieut. Col. S. E. Wolff \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nLet contract in September for purchase of $10,000,000 or \n$12,000,000 of material incident to contract with French man- \nufacturers through French Government; this material to be \nsent abroad part raw, part semifinished, and part entirely \nfinished to complete certain number of planes and engines. \nOne item was 3,000 Gnome engines. 7, 8. \n\nTwo hundred and odd cases of material in France ; two hundred \nand odd cases on docks at Hoboken; additional quantity still \nin factories. 8. \n\nAbove contract canceled end of April. Unable to find out \nreason. 8. \n\nRequired that report be made on extent and terms of all con- \ntracts abroad, but this had not been done. 8. \n\nRelieved of command finance department on May 14. 9. \n\nMaj. H. S. Brown now in charge. 9. Formerlv executive offi- \ncer. 10. \n\nAppropriation for Signal Corps up to end of fiscal year, June \n30, 1916, had never exceeded $2,500,000. 10. \n\nAccounts audited in field ; sent to department for administrative \nscrutiny and then paid. 11. \n\nFive hundred men in various factories auditing accounts. 11. \n\nThree traveling supervisors. 11. \n\nFinance department represented in each factory have a cost- \nplus contract. \n\nEmployed accounting firm of Lybrant, Ross Bros. & Mont- \ngomery, of Philadelphia and New York, until own force could \nbe organized. 13. \n\nMost of employees of this firm relieved about April 15. 13. \n\nOrganized accounting force from enlisted men and civil-service \nemployees. 13, 14. \n\nIn charge of Maj. Dean Langmuir until succeeded by Capt. \nHaag. 14. \n\nStill retained some employees of Lybrant, Ross Bros. & Mont- \ngomery. 16. \n\nDepreciation of plants figured as an element of cost. IT. \n\nTwo sections of finance department represented in each factory \nhaving cost-plus contract \xe2\x80\x94 accounts section and approvals \nsection. 12. \n\nAccounts section makes up estimates of cost from contractors\' \nbooks and supervises his method of accounting and finally \npasses vouchers for payment. 12. \n\nApprovals section passes on proposed expenditures by con- \ntractors under cost-plus contract. If proposal not disallowed \nwithin stated number of days, may be included as reasonable \nitem of cost in final claim. 12. \n\nCapt. Haag head of accounts section. Formerly a general aud- \nitor, member of firm of Henry F. Walbridge & Co., New York, \nwho were public-utility operators and investment bankers. 14. \n\nApprovals section in charge of Maj. Frank E. Smith. Organ- \nized entirely from governmental forces, commissioned officers, \ncivilians, and enlisted men. 16. \n\n\n\n36 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". \n\nLieut. Col. S. E. Wolff \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nTentative payments made to contractors account depreciation of \nplants; these payments subject to revision at the conclusion of \ncontracts. 17. \n\nMonthly return made to Auditor for War Department called an \naccounts current, together with a statement of the amount \nthey had at 1st of month, amount they drew, and the balance, \nalso vouchers received. 19, 20. \n\nFinance department represented by 40 men at Curtiss plant. 21. \n\nIn certain cases determination of cost on cost-plus contract made \nafter work is done rather than concurrently with its doing. 25. \n\nFrance department has representatives in six districts \xe2\x80\x94 New \nYork district, Pittsburgh district, Dayton district, Detroit \ndistrict, Buffalo district, Chicago district \xe2\x80\x94 each district being \nin charge of an officer. 26. \n\nCapt. E. V. Lozier, in charge of New York district, was for- \nmerly a manufacturer of automobile parts, an engineer, and \nformerly with the Timken Detroit Co. 27. \n\nMr. E. D. Cole, in charge of Buffalo district, was an accountant, \nformerly with Lybrant, Ross Bros. & Montgomery. 27. \n\nMaj. M. J. Butler, in charge of Dayton district, is a retired \nCanadian officer. 27. \n\nCapt. Paul B. Holes, in charge of Detroit district, was an ac- \ncountant for the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. 27. \n\nThese men calculate amount to be allowed for overhead. 27. \n\nData on file as to costs in each plant. Difficult to set standards, \nso data compiled from day to day and week to week. 33. \n\nOn training-plane program, planes made at Fisher Body Cor- \nporation, Curtiss Co., Dayton- Wright Co., Standard Aero Co., \nSpringfield Aircraft Corporation, St. Louis Aircraft Co., \nWright-Martin Co. at its Pacific coast plant, California Avia- \ntion Co. 34. \n\nDe Haviland bombing planes made at Dayton- Wright Co. 34. \n\nDe Haviland bombing planes made at Fisher Body Corporation \nand the Standard Aero Co. 34. \n\nBristol planes were made at the Curtiss Co. 34. \n\nFigures in some contracts for training planes were $4,125. 35. \n\nComparative data of costs statement kept on file to show where \nthere was efficiency and where there was a lack of it. 35. \n\nData collated from reports by plant accountants. 36. \n\nCapt. Frank E. Haag has charge of making comparative state- \nments. 36. \n\nCost has varied frequently. 36. \n\nComparative statements of overhead charges at different plants \nkept in form of a weekly report. 37. \n\nSalaries of executives figured in overhead in a cost-plus con- \ntract. 38. \n\nNothing on file to show at a glance how much money paid to \nCurtiss Co. and when they got it. 39. \n\nRecord of each contract kept on separate card. 39. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 37 \n\nLieut. Col. S. E. Wolff \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nGeneral principles of estimating depreciation and overhead laid \ndown in printed instructions to accountants. These are sup- \nplemented by rulings of ruling board, composed of Maj. Smith, \nCapt. Haag, and Capt. Rottschafer. 43. \n\nGeneral rulings apply to all contracts and special rulings to \nparticular contracts. 45. \n\nRulings kept in loose-leaf binders. 45. \n\nA good deal of money spent in development of plants. 52. \n\nStatement kept in accounts section showing amount reported \nexpended by a particular company in construction and equip- \nment. 59. \n\nPurchased plant of General Vehicle Co., Long Island City, and \nleased it to Wright-Martin Co. 61. \n\nContractor allowed for material abandoned account change in \ncontract. 62. \n\nSalvaged material sold to public, if no other use for it. 63. \n\nWas an accountant or clerk from 1890 to 1902. 65. \n\nGot into executive work about 1907. 65. \n\nAssociated with firm of Hodenpyl, Hardy & Co., 14 Wall Street, \nNew York City, investment bankers and financiers. Was in \ndepartment having to do with the management rather than \nfinancial work. 65. \n\nConnected with above company until commissioned. 66. \n\nOnly two manufacturers \xe2\x80\x94 Packard Co. and Fisher Body Cor- \nporation \xe2\x80\x94 had an efficient and sufficient cost-accounting sys- \ntem. 68 and 70. \n\nWar Department warrants issued in cases where they were not \nadvised of exact state of commitments abroad. 72. \n\nCabled statements from Gen. Pershing do not agree as to extent \nof obligations in France and England. 76. \n\nPresidential Order No. 7 provides for allotment of funds, obli- \ngations involving $750,000,000, to three separate organizations : \nThe Signal Corps, Department of Military Aeronautics, and \nBureau of Aircraft Production. 78. \n\nDoes not know whether existing appropriations have been ex- \nhausted, but thinks there may be a margin. 79. \n\nUnable to get satisfactory results by cabling. 80. \n\nCables from Pershing relative to financial condition abroad. 83, \n84, 85, 86, 87. \n\nTotal obligations as shown by cablegrams $101,010,000, but addi- \ntion of items enumerated in cablegrams is $139,510,000. 88. \n\nStatement of Signal Corps under date of May 9, 1918, shows \ncommitments over appropriation of $640,000,000 of $173,307,- \n012.38. 89. \n\nOne hundred and sixty-three million dollars expected to be real- \nized by sale of material to contractors; also to other depart- \nments of Government and allied Governments, as well as to \nuse some of materials for repairs and renewals. 90. \n\nExcess of $11,322,002.97 over total appropriation of $640,000,000 \ndue to estimates of cost. 92. \n\n\n\n38 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nLieut. Col. S. E. Wolff \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nIf Gen. Pershing\'s cable is correct, showing obligations overseas \nof approximately $139,000,000, for which authorization has \nbeen given only to the extent of $47,000,000, it would mean \n$100,000,000 worth of contracts would have to be canceled in \norder to reduce obligations to an amount not in excess of \namount appropriated by Congress. 94. \n\nOvercontracted on this side to extent of $11,000,000. 96. \n\nCancellation of contracts will delay program from 30 to 60 days \non account of time consumed in making renewals. 97. \n\nContractors advanced money to make additions to plant or his \nworking capital, for raw material, machinery, or otherwise. \n100. m \n\nInterviewing and preparation of application of applicants for \nadvances carried on by Capt. Lewis B. Preston and First \nLieut. Sidney E. Small. 101. \n\nApplication passed upon by finance department and final action \ntaken by War Credits Board. 101. \n\nMemorandum kept in administration section showing basis for \nadvances, etc. 102. \n\nStatement showing advances made various companies. 103. \n\nIn cost-plus contracts no provision made by which companies \nwould be compelled to pay damages or lose a part of agreed \nprice in case of delay. 104. \n\nNo requirements with respect to time of performance, the breach \nof which would expose contractor to any damage. 105. \n\nOnly protection Government had under these contracts in case \na plant was inefficiently managed and there were unnecessary \ndelay was the taking over of plant or cancellation of con- \ntract. 105. \n\nContracts for experimental work of a confidential nature let to \nDayton- Wright Co. and Dayton Metal Products Co. on a cost- \nplus basis, allowing 12J per cent profit. 106. \n\nDetailed vouchers not always kept on work of this character. \n106. \n\nThe supervision of cost was carried on by an officer at plant \nwho would check vouchers and send a memorandum voucher \nof the total number of amount for payment. 106. \n\nFirst Lieut. George Weir, employed by Col. Thompson in civil \nlife, was detailed for this work. 107. \nLieut. Col. E. Lester Jones (Washington, D. C, May 28, 1918; \nBookl). \n\nAssistant and executive to head of Department of Military Aero- \nnautics, Col. Clinton Goodloe Edgar. 112. \n\nMateriel section passes on all requisitions for construction. 113. \n\nEquipment puts requests through and pay for them. 113. \n\nCol. Jones with Coast and Geodetic Survey before receiving com- \nmission February 28, 1918. 118, 119. \n\nLooked into question of how many planes had been shipped \nabroad and why more had not been shipped. 120. \n\nGot information from transportation department. 121. \n\nTestified before Senate committee and was questioned as to Creel \nstatement as to program. Stated only one plane had been \nshipped overseas. 122. \n\n\n\nABSTEACT OF AIKCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 39 \n\nLieut. Col. E. Lester Jones \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nChaotic condition existed. Unable to improve service. 124. \n\nCivilian, representing Col. Deeds, without authority authorized \na Mr. Carl Fisher to construct an aviation field on his own \nland. Was reimbursed by Government for expenditure. 125. \n\nMr. Fisher also directed to lay out flying course, costing $40,000. \nNever reimbursed by Government. 132. \n\nPolicy is to start something and then drop it, forgetting obliga- \ntions to individuals. 133. \n\nDozen cases where a thousand men were sent to places where \nthere were no accommodations for them. 143. \n\nCommercial bill of lading used rather than Government bill of \nlading in purchasing by J. G. White Corporation, thereby net- \nting this concern an additional income. 148. \n\nExplains Government bill of lading. 156. \n\nJ. G. White Corporation only company authorized to purchase \nand handle shipments direct. 158. \n\nTransportation section has information as to rates for ship- \nping. 161. \n\nBills from railroad go to supply division for audit. 161. \n\nOfficers tried to sidetrack Col. Byllsby. 166. \n\nStatement on expenditure of money prepared by Gen. Squier and \nMr. Potter in error. 170. \n\nAll money appropriated and considerably more already provided \nfor in contracts. 170. \n\nNine hundred and seven million dollars spent or obligated. 171. \n\nChief Signal Officer can redistribute allotments. 180. \n\nCertain items in statement submitted by Lieut. Col. Wolff in \nerror. 181. \n\nStatement as to estimated cost of certain flying fields. 187. \n\nContract signed with manufacturing concern having no buildings \ninvolving $40,000,000 on a cost-plus basis, plus 15 per cent. \n191. \nMaj. C. S. Benton (Washington, D. C, May 28, 1918; Book 1). \n\nCommissioned June 27, 1917. 194. \n\nFormerly traffic manager for W. H. Edgar & Sons, Detroit, Mich. \n194. \n\nIn charge of traffic section of the supply division. 194. \n\nIssues Government bills of lading on shipments for Signal Corps, \narrange for placing of cars and getting shipments to destina- \ntion. 194, 195. \n\nDescribes Government bill of lading and usage. 196. \n\nQuestioned as to J. G. White Corporation. 199. \n\nJ. G. White Corporation receives commission on money paid \n\nrailroads covering freight shipments from Government. 209. \n\nLieut. Col. S. E. Wolff (Washington, D. C, May 28, 1918; Book 1). \n\nGovernment bill of lading only procurable through Quarter- \nmaster Department. 217. \n\nQuestioned as to cost-plus contract form. 219. \n\nGovernment was to either purchase new buildings or contractor \nwas to furnish them and have them depreciate over the life of \nthe contract. 223. \n\n\n\n40 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nLieut. Col. S. E. Wolff \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nAmount allowed by Government on increased facilities is not \nfigured part of cost of contract in arriving at percentage of \nprofit. 228. \n\nBought a million and a half dollars\' worth of machinery for \nCurtiss Co., which Government owns. 230. \n\nControlling ledger, trial balances, and subsidiary ledgers all \nkept at plant. 232. \n\nCost plus contracts included in flat price contracts for reason \nthat authorities were issued by outside contract officers. 234. \n\nCol. Disque authorized to expend for spruce what would be \nrecouped on sale of spruce. 235. \n\nAll authorities issued overseas are included in fixed priced \ncolumn. 236. \n\nMany contracts for construction of fields were on a cost plus \nbasis but carried in wrong column. 242. \n\nAuthorities overseas request to be relieved of keeping any ac- \ncounts by allotments, and given authority for blank million \ndollars with no accounting for it until after war is over. 271. \n\nWith respect to obligations abroad, puts minimum at $75,000.- \n000, and maximum at $200,000,000. \n\nInterrogated quite extensively as to reasons for desiring to \nmake trip overseas on temporary duty. \nMaj. C. 8. Benton (Washington, D. C., May 29, 1918; Book 1). \n\nReferring to contract with J. G. White Corporation, Justice \nHughes points out that under Item B cost of delivery to re- \nquired points should not be considered in figuring percentage \nof profit to contractor. 278, 279. \n\nVouchers do not show that commission on freight charges was \npaid by Government. 283. \n\nIn conversation with officials of AVhite Co. was led to believe \nthev were receiving commission. 281. \nJoseph S." Otis (Washington, D. C, May 30, 1918; Book 1). \n\nAssociate general manager of Otis Manufacturing Co., New \nOrleans, La. Importing and manufacturing mahogany lum- \nber. 287. \n\nLeft company December 31 but still retained stock. 288. \n\nOffered services to Government free of charge. 291. \n\nWas assigned to work in equipment division, propeller section, \nin charge of mahogany and hardwood. 293. \n\nSaw one contract he thought was of any value, which was with \na firm in Philadelphia that did not even own its own mill. \n293. \n\nNone of concerns having contracts, except one, Louis Thompson, \nhad put up a bond. This is concern referred to above. 294. \n\nOne of concerns having $300,000 contract was rated at $3,000, \nand poor pay. 294. \n\nMaj. Sligh, of Grand Rapids, Mich., had let contracts. 295. \n\nLouis Thompson & Co. only concern which had delivered lum- \nber under these contracts. 296. \n\nEmbargo placed on shipment of wood for battleplane propel- \nlers. 299. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 41 \n\nJoseph S. Otis \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nMade up set of figures for purchase of propeller lumber and \nmade prices such as he thought the poorest-equipped manu- \nfacturer \xe2\x80\x94 . 303. \n\nWas told by a Mr. Wycliff that they were too low, and that \nmahogany business had changed greatly since he had left \xe2\x80\x94 \ntwo weeks previous. 303. \n\nHis opinion mahogany men were working through Mr. Lock- \nheart, of raw materials department, Signal Corps, with a \nview to getting mahogany men in their department to handle \nthe whole thing. 303. \n\nOn October 1 or 2 Otis Manufacturing Co. offered to sell 3,000,- \n000 feet of suitable aeroplane lumber of a very strict grading \nat $215. Was not accepted. 306. \n\nLouis Thompson & Co.\'s offer of $200 was accepted. 306. \n\nBids of other companies for same amount were accepted but \nbonds were not put up, and deliveries were not made. 307. \n\nPurchased 300,000 feet from Cobbett & Co.\'s representative be- \nlow $300 a thousand. 309. \n\nMr. Wycliff figured on $350 for selects (firsts and seconds, air- \nplane), and $280 for No. 1 common. Maintained No. 1 com- \nmon not an economical grade for Government to buy. Ma- \nhogany alliance insisted that Government should also take \nwhat he classed as rejects and pay an enormously high price \nfor them. 309, 310. \n\nBritish Government paying Otis Manufacturing Co. $395 on \nlogs coming out of Belize, British Honduras. 311. \n\nAverage pripe on airplane lumber of Otis Co. for 1917 was \n$200 a thousand, and company made $200,000 at those prices. \n3.11. \n\nConditions had not changed since that time, but labor had \npossibly gone up 5 per cent. 311. \n\nWas relieved from duty, and given commendatory letter for \nservices rendered. 312, 313. \n\nMr. Wycliff made an assistant buyer. 314. \n\nInterrogated as to cost of mahogany logs to manufacturer, price \npaid by Government, and profit. 320, 366. \nCapt. James J. Newman (Washington, D. C, May 30, 1918; Book 1). \n\nCommissioned September 28, 1917. 385. \n\nAssigned to Fisher Body Corporation of Detroit. 390. \n\nCompany clamoring for money. 390. \n\nDayton- Wright Co. approved voucher for approximated $250,- \n000. 391. \n\nHad not turned out any produce for Government up to this time. \n392. \n\nVoucher was for materia], labor, and overhead. 392. \n\nOverhead accounts amounting to about $90,000 not verified. 393. \n\nContract was for 400 J-l machines, 1,000 De Haviland 4s, and \n3,000 De Haviland 9s. 396. \n\nThree officials of concern to divide $100,000 as salary during \nterm of contract. 403. \n\n\n\n42 ABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nCapt. James J. Newman \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nR. A. Perry of Lybrant, Eoss Bros. & Montgomery stated any- \nthing he approved would be paid by the Government whether \nor not o. k.\'d by Capt. Newman. 404. \n\nMr. Perry in direct charge of accounting work at plant. 406. \n\nAt that time whole of accounts end of finance department prac- \ntically controlled by men of firm of Lybrant, Ross Bros. & \nMontgomery. 407. \n\nCol. Thompson of Signal Corps kept very private file. 408. \n\nWrote letter to ascertain if salaries of officials should be included \non voucher and paid, but did not receive any reply. 409. \n\nPut salaries on voucher and they were paid. 410. \n\nOrville Wright paid a salarv of $18,000 a year by this concern. \n411. \n\nConsulting engineer. Other people on officers\' pay roll, but \nwere not officers of company. 413. \n\nAddressed letter to Maj. Langinuir asking if it was his duty to \ninvestigate as to who was to share profits as contract states \nthat no Member of Congress or other persons should partici- \npate in profits of contract. 413. \n\nWas advised that it was not; that that clause was practically \nextinct. 413. \n\nEngle Aircraft Co. had contract for $2,500,000 for J. N. 4 \nspares. 420. \n\nLvbrant, Ross Bros. & Montgomery had 12 to 18 men at Dayton- \n"Wright plant, 423. \n\n$1,000,000 advanced by War Credits Board to Davton- Wright \nCo. 431. \n\nAll overhead expenses allowable under Dayton- Wright contract, \n434. \n\nFirst shipment of planes (10) was made by Dayton-Wright Co. \nafter 1st of January. 437. \n\n40 J-ls shipped up to\'lst of May. 437. \n\nDuring April approximately 90 planes shipped. 437. \n\n300 training planes shipped prior to 1st of April. 437. \n\nSignal Corps agreed not to have further changes in next 1,000 \nplanes. 439. \n\nCol. Montgomery proposed $7,000 as bogie price for De Havi- \nland planes. 443. \nLester P. Barlow (Washington, D. C, May 30, 1918; Book 1). \n\nAn engineer. \n\nDeveloped present type of shell United States Government has \naccepted as their official munitions. The Barlow heavy drop \nbomb. 447. \n\nBomb could have been manufactured over a year ago, but Gov- \nernment did not place order until January of this year. 449. \n\nGlen Martin only had order for six experimental machines. To \nbe paid $50,000 apiece for them without engines. 454, 455. \n\nMr. Martin had to raise $2,500,000 private capital and $2,000,000 \nof that was withdrawn owing to uncertainty of Government \nnegotiations. 455. \n\nTo say anything to Col. Deeds or Gen. Squier on methods they \nhave pursued would have meant disaster for Mr. Martin. 456. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 43 \n\nLester P. Barlow \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nUp until a few months before war was declared more hours had \nbeen flown by United States Army in Martin\'s machines than \nall other machines combined in the service. 456. \n\nPlant adaptable to making J. N. and De Haviland machines. \n456. \n\nHas not had backing of Government. 457. \n\nPurchased two machines equipped with 100 horsepower Gnome \nengine from Mr. Heinrich at $15,000 apiece. 457. \n\nGave Mr. Heinrich contract for scout machines at fourteen thou- \nsand some hundred dollars each, without motors. 457. \n\nEngineers given something to do to keep their mouths shut. \n458. \n\nCol. Deeds negotiated contract. 459. \n\nHeinrich plane could have been built for $2,000 to $3,000 with- \nout motors. 460. \n\nMartin could have produced planes rapidly had Signal Corps \nbacked him. 462. \n\nEquipped with Hispano-Suiza engine. Arranged with Gen. \nSquier to develop his aerial torpedo, but nothing ever came of \nit as Signal Corps failed to advance money or make contract. \n480, 481. \n\nCol. Deeds intimated no more newspaper publicity desirable if \nBarlow was to get contract. 484. \n\nGen. Squier told Mr. Coffin to tell Senate committee investigat- \ning aircraft production as little as possible. 488. \n\nLiberty motor not high order of combat engine. 495. \nCapt. Harold M. Lehman (Washington, D. C, May 31, 1918; \nBook 1). \n\nWith finance department, equipment division. 501. \n\nAssigned to appropriations section. 403. \n\nDuty to see that amounts allotted and amounts charged against \nallotments were properly entered. 505. \n\nSupervised making up of weekly statement as to condition of \nappropriation. 506. \n\nHad not been notified by anyone as to error in statement of \nMay 9. 508. \n\nOverobligation appears in allotments of construction division, \namounting to $13,632,259.50. 570. \n\nExcess over allotted appropriation in equipment division stated \nto be $191,906,584. 511. \n\nAmount of excess obligations actually incurred in equipment di- \nvision over and above allotted appropriation, $37,940,901.38. \n513. \n\nAuthority issued to disbursing officer abroad for $15,100,000 to \npay foreign contracts. 533. \nLester P. Barlow (Washington, D. C, May 31, 1918; Book 1). \n\nCol. Deeds advises about middle of February not ready to take \nup bomb dropping or bombs yet. 542. \n\nNo planes for carrying these bombs. 543. \n\nSaw Government experimenting with bomb traps in December \nat Langley Field. 544. \n\nPromised contract July 2, 1917, for 10,000 bombs and 1,000 \ntraps. 546. \n\n\n\n44 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nLester P. Barlow \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nOrder given on January 1, 1918, for bombs, but not for traps. \n\n546. \nIt is necessary to take plane into consideration in designing of \n\nbomb traps. 550. \nFour hundred and fifty thousand bombs under production on \n\nMay 31, 1918. 551. \nBombs manufactured will lie idle until used by Allies or by us \n\nin planes obtained from Allies. 552. \nNo bombing planes of our own. 552. \n\nNo bombing planes being constructed except Handley-Paige be- \ning experimentally produced. 553. \nBomb trap designed by Ordnance Department could not be used \n\nuniversally in our bombing program. 556. \nBarlow bomb can stand sleet, snow, and mud, and is practically \n\nfool proof. 559. \nEecords will show Gen. Squier and Col. Deeds tried to block use \n\nof flying torpedo. 563. \nFlying torpedo held up four months. 565. \nHad traps, bombs, and planes for training of men. 566. \nGovernment accepts his trap and is to take 500. 566. \nWould train men gratis on own field. 568. \nSpoke to Col. Horner about synchronizing aircraft gun, but he \n\ndid not seem to be interested. 579. \nMarlin gun and synchronizer was 150 shots faster than Marlin \n\ngun and synchronizer ordered by Government from National \n\nPneumatic Co. 784. \n(In numbering 200 pages skipped in volume.) \nSeven synchronizers built by National Pneumatic Co. accepted \n\nby Government, but proved unsatisfactor}^. 790. \nMr. Nelson, technical expert in employ of Government, develops \n\nvery satisfactory synchronizer. 791. \nNo definite synchronizer under production yet. 792. \nTakes several months to complete 20,000 synchronizers. 792. \nLieut. Col. Henry Marison Byllesby (Washington, D. C, Mav 31 r \n\n1918; Book 1). \nOriginal commission dates November 15, 1917. 795. \nPast 16 years president of H. M. Byllesby Co., of Chicago and \n\nNew York, operating public utilities. 796, 795. \nFirst assigned to recruiting service for Signal Corps. 797. \nLater transferred to administrative division of the Signal Corps. \n\n797. \nGenerally administering special matters. 797. \nServed six weeks on special committee endeavoring to point out \n\nmost obvious losses of time and money in War Department\'s \n\nconduct of affairs in city of Washington. 798. \nWas cabled for by Gen. Pershing and ordered overseas shortly \n\nafter taking up above work. 798. \nGoing across to assist Brig. Gen. George H. Harries, a business \n\npartner in civil life. 799. \nWith reference to his observation of organization of Aviation \n\nDepartment, Signal Corps, impression he formed was not \n\nwhat it was desired he should. 799. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 45 \n\nLieut. Col. Henry Marison Byllesby \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nImpossible to secure information worth while in reply to in- \nquiries. Officers in charge of Production Department did not \ndesire to take up time to confer with him on subjects brought \nup. Col. Montgomery one officer mentioned. 799. \n\nDesired to take up with Col. Montgomery the question of manu- \nfacture and construction in program for building airplanes, \nprogress of program, and general engineering details. 800. \n\nEndeavored to arrange meetings at convenient time for Col. \nMontgomery without result. 800. \n\nSimilar results with other men prominent in Signal Corps. 801. \n\nCol. Deeds always kindly and complimentary ^ but talks with \nhim never resulted in getting information desired. 802. \n\nYoung men promised commissions as first lieutenants in Air \nService after qualifying as flyers, but Government issued com- \nmissions as second lieutenants, causing much complaint. 803. \n\nReceived no complaints in regard to aircraft production that had \ncome to other parties. 804. \n\nEstimated Wright-Martin Co. cost-plus contract would total \n$42,000,000, but due to rise in cost of labor and material, and \nit possibly would reach $50,000,000. 806. \n\nEstimated two years required to fill contract, which was for \nmanufacture of two sizes of Hispano-Suiza engines. 706. \n\nWright-Martin Co. turned into Government every month state- \nment of their entire expenses, labor, material, and overhead of \nevery description, to which was added 15 per cent, and prob- \nably received a settlement therefor. 807. \n\nEvery dollar of cost defrayed by Government. 807. \n\nNo reason why Government should have given a contract bear- \ning so large a percentage. 809. \n\nStock of Wright-Martin Co. before war was looked upon on \nStreet as a " skyrocket " proposition (prior to our entry into \nwar) . 810. \n\nRegarded contract as most extraordinary one ever heard of, \nfrom any standpoint. 811. \n\nEngineering company of which Maj. Starrat was head did large \namount of constructing of barracks and cantonments and \nroads and waterworks. 813. \nLieut. Col. E. Lester Jones (Washington, D. C, May 31. 1918, \nBook 1). \n\nIn re J. G. White Engineering Corporation contract for Lang- \nley Field, definite construction already made amounts to \n$3,785,000, and on that project an expenditure of probably \n$10,000,000 will be necessary. 814. \n\nCol. Edgar in better position to talk intelligently with regard \nto contracts. 816. \n\nContracts referred to all over $1,000,000. 816. \n\nGreat delay in filling requisitions, due to red tape. 817. \n\nCol. Edgar complained in writing to Chief Signal Officer re- \ngarding delay and seriousness of condition. 821. \n\nChanged heads of Air Division twelve times since aircraft pro- \ngram was started. 822. \n\nCharges Lieut. Col. Wolff with irregular, unbusinesslike meth- \nods. 824. \n\n\n\n46 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nLieut. Col. E. Lester Jones \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nLangley Field contract would bear criticism. 824. \n\nContract was broad, loosely drawn, and very susceptible to any \ninterpretation contractor might put on it. 825. \n\nPartiality shown \xe2\x80\x94 lowest bidder did not get contract. 827. \n\nAllowed concern to submit bid after bids were closed. 827. \n\nAccused J. G. White Engineering Corporation of unbusiness- \nlike methods. 828. \n\nSome of J. G. White\'s former employees in Signal Corps. 829. \nCol. Clinton Goodloe Edgar (Washington, June 1, 1918; Book 2). \n\nAt this time head of what was the Supply Division of the Signal \nCorps. 1. \n\nDuties consisted of viseing requisitions drawn up by Air Divi- \nsion for Supplies. 2. \n\nTraffic Division had charge of transportation of all aircraft \nmaterial. \n\nConstruction Division was created on May 21, 1917. 4. \n\nHad charge of all construction work of Signal Corps. 4. \n\nAlbert Kahn, Detroit, was advisory architect. 5. \n\nCol. Starratt selected contractors for Government work. Com- \nmenced in June. Under National Council of Defense. 5. \n\nDr. Walcott, of Smithsonian Institute; Dr. Stratton, of Bureau \nof Standards; and Mr. Durancl, of Cornell, constituted ad- \nvisory committee on aeronautics. 6. \n\nEarly in May, 1917, finished plans for aviation training camp. 8. \n\nCol. Edgar, together with Gen. Foulois, submitted a report to \nChief Signal Officer recommending fields be put at Dayton, \nMount Clemens, and near Champlain. 9. \n\nAttorney Whaley, of Council of National Defense, develops \nplan of contract on cost-plus basis for construction work. \nAdopted. Has not copy then of contract. 14. \n\nForm of contract. 15. \n\nHad no supervision at Dayton-Wright or Lincoln Motor Co. \nplant. 18. \n\nOriginal order re control of all construction work again brought \nup. 19. \n\nUnauthorized construction work. 18 and 19. \n\nAcetone plants \xe2\x80\x94 Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Missouri. 20. \n\nAdditional allotment made March 14; amount, $20,000,000. 23. \n\nInformation as to items of unauthorized construction. 24. \n\n(These contracts let on 10 per cent basis, whereas old ones \nlet at 7 per cent, Government thereby losing 3 per cent by \nhandling this way.) \n\nAcetone proposition ran somewhere around $1,000,000. 26. \n\nContract form modified by making it 7 per cent for $100,000, \nand from that down. 26. \n\nNew form of contract in effect at Painville and West Point, \nMiss. Have spent $804,209 to date on that at maximum of 7 \nper cent. 26. \n\nSubmits memorandum to Mr. Potter, of Equipment Division, \non making contracts with maximum of 10 per cent, limited to \n$100,000. Attached sheet showing percentages. 27. \n\nIn ignorance of terms of the airplane contracts. 27. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 47 \n\nCol. Clinton Goodloe Edgar \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nCame here to confer with Col. H. H. Hutton and Col. Waldon; \nspent so far this year (June 1, 1918) $48,000,000 on organiza- \ntion of his own proposition. Shows original copy of moneys \nspent; total, $48,334,349.28. 28. \n\nThis for construction work in United States and overseas, \naltogether $20,000,000 on overseas items. 28. \n\nAmount overseas charged against allotment by Equipment Di- \nvision. He had nothing to do with payment. 28. \n\nMentions notification from Equipment Division that France had \ncalled for $9,000,000 worth of their funds for construction \nabroad. Reduces their surplus of $5,000,000 to $6,000,000 to \na deficit. Have on hand order for $9,500,000 field hangars for \noverseas. 29. \n\nIn case of construction overseas they are simply notified on piece \nof paper that so much money has been called for, and it is \nthen taken out of their allotment. They are given no esti- \nmates. 29. \n\nExcept an item of $1,082,000, all work done in this country, \namounting to about $28,000,000 up to now, has been done on \na basis of cost-plus, the percentages shown in the standard \nform of contract, as modified last spring in the way stated. \n29. \n\nStated contracts made under the basis of these percentages \ncould have been shaved more. 30. \n\nThrough orders of Secretary of War they took such contractors \nas Maj. Starratt sent, he in each case sending an alternate also \nfor their final choice. 31. \n\nSome of the contractors furnished were good and some bad. \nThe United Construction Co. of St. Louis, for instance; dila- \ntory and poor work and not sufficient funds to float the \nwork. 32. \n\nJ. G. White Engineering Corporation, who had Langley Field, \nunsatisfactory on that job. Also built Morrison, Va., and \nthey did a good job there. 34. \n\nBuilt camp at Carlstrom Field \xe2\x80\x94 cost, $799,212.01 \xe2\x80\x94 and camp at \nDoor Field \xe2\x80\x94 cost, $674,206.21. These considered very cheap \naviation fields. 34. \n\nCleaned out organization of J. G. White Engineering Co. twice ; \ncould not detect any graft. Maj. Harold Bennington in his \noffice, trained auditor, watched this job at Langley, but could \nnot nail down the place where something had been done \nwrong. 34. \n\nLangley Field, a large contract, laid out by Gen. Squier and \nMaj. Souder and the Aircraft Production Board. 35. \n\nBuilt buildings 100 feet high and 150 feet in length, which were \nimpossible to operate. 35. \n\nEstimated cost of Morrison Field was $1,892,000.60, of which \n$1,873,394.82 has now been paid. 36. \n\nLangley Field was estimated to cost $3,785,000, but if finished \non original plan will cost $15,000,000. 36. \n\nCan not explain discrepancy, as he had nothing to do with plans \nof these tremendous buildings. Did not make estimates. \nWere under what they should have been. 36. \n130687\xe2\x80\x9419 4 \n\n\n\n48 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nCol. Clinton Goodloe Edgar \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nEstimates made by Capt. Stieger, Coast Artillery, and Capt. \nSloan, of Signal Keserve Corps. Forest had to be cut down, \nexpensive drainage laid out, concrete road built to railroad, \netc. 37. \n\nContract for construction of Langley Field was placed with the \nJ. G. White Co. 41. \n\nJ. G. White Co. also made purchases of materials for the Gov- \nernment overseas. 44. \n\nIn May, Secretary of War started building aviation fields \nabroad. Sent in an order, for which J. G. White was retained \non job on 3 per cent basis, to purchase and assemble in New \nYork all material necessary for aviation training camp. This \nwas furnished for $642,491.06. 44. \n\nPlans are laid out to do something, and it is a continual in- \ncrease. This without exception. More buildings have been \nadded, and contracts have gone right on. 46. \n\nThe Quartermaster General draws a line and says on such a day \nthe contract ceases and then lets a new contract. 47. \n\nWhite Co. heard of this and brought contract down to them, \nsaying they had reached the limit, wanted old contract closed \nand new one given them so that they could procure a larger \nfee. 46. \n\nNo limit was placed on amount of cost that could be incurred \nunder these contracts. 47. \n\nEvery contract has exceeded its estimate, J. G. White Co.\'s \noverrunning more than any. 48. \n\nWas asked if he had completed the audit of the work up to the \npresent and could say that there was nothing irregular in what \nhad heretofore taken place. 48. \n\nStates funds were wasted ; gives reasons. 49. \n\nWith reference to facilities for schools to house Canadian \nunit. 27. \n\nIn the way of planes, engines, etc., has correspondence showing \nthat first fields were finished and there were not enough \nplanes, and after planes got there there were not enough spare \nparts. Found schools where they did not have monkey \nwrenches and screw drivers, some of which were coming from \nanywhere. 51. \n\nThe requisition order reaching the Equipment Division on De- \ncember 11 was followed on January 24 by another, in which \ntime only one article on the entire list of 97 items had been \nshipped. \n\nThis condition considered typical. 53. \n\nDescribes memorandum of data secured on methods of Equip- \nment Division, showing what happened to an order after it \nreached there. 53. \n\nAfter much trouble with officials in Equipment Division, suc- \nceeded in getting authority for all fields to expend $300 a \nday. 55. \n\nSpecifically states there was no organization and discipline in \nany of the divisions with which he was connected. 55-57. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 49 \n\nCol. Clinton Goodloe Edgar \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nShows lack of judgment in orders, stating Equipment Division \nbought training planes at a terrific rate, but no spares or other \nnecessaries, which kept these planes from flying. 58. \n\nCol. Montgomery, when he was division chief in Equipment \nDivision, almost impossible to see. Often waited three quar- \nters of an hour for interview, then nobody would see him. 59. \n\nDrew their attention to the fact that the man who spent the \nmoney should not have control of the payments. The system \nthere was to give them money and let them spend it. 59-60. \n\nGive facts relating to flying course from Eantoul to Dayton. \nCol. Deeds was responsible for this venture, as also buying \nflying field at Miami, for which they now have to get money \nto pay for it. 61. \n\nEelates experience of having 500 or 1,000 men dropped in on \nthem at the fields and no place to house them. 63. \n\nStates one camp called Palo Alto, in California, was stopped in \nthe midst of construction. 64. \n\nS. S. King was president of the Dayton Lumber & Manufactur- \ning Co., which company had the contract for construction of \nbuildings at Wilbur Wright Field. Poor contractor; no ex- \nperience. Recommended by Col. Deeds. 66. \n\nCol. Deeds\'s position at this time was civilian advisor, a member \nof Aircraft Production Board. 67. \n\nCol. Deeds had some position or office with the Miami Con- \nservancy Commission, which owned the ground the Wilbur \nWright Field was constructed on. 69. \n\nAlso the two Talbotts, senior and junior, were interested in this \ndeal. Procured money for them when they could not get their \naccounts straightened out. The Talbotts are in the Dayton- \nWright Airplane Co. and the Dayton Products Co. Were \nfinancing King, the contractor, who was writing to the trade \nthat the Government was holding up his payments. 70. \n\nContract for Wilbur Wright Field was $2,922,061.80. 74. \n\nQ. What other matters have you that I should be informed \nupon ? 78. - \n\nThe instruction of commanding officers and others; expenditure \nof Government money through disbursing officers at these \ncamps and fields without authority, which became of great \nworry and trouble. 78. \n\nTalking about the Air Division. Commanding officer goes out \nand gets money for maintenance of his fields, spends it on a \nclubhouse or something else that suits him. 79. \n\nAlso commanding officer comes to a field and without authority \ntakes, for instance, a machine shop, tears out partitions, and \nmakes other changes involving large sums of money to turn \nit into a carpenters\' shop. 79. \nMaj. Harold Bennington (Washington, June 4, 1918; Book 2). \n\nBeen in Army since June of last year, coming from civil life. 81. \n\nPublic accountant, in partnership with Ernest Eeckreutt in Chi- \ncago about 12 years. Came from England. 81. \n\n\n\n50 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nMaj. Harold Bennington \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nCame to Washington after war broke out and took charge of the \naccounting for Construction Division in the Signal Corps. 82. \n\nAudited all accounts relating to bills having to do with costs of \nconstruction of various aviation camps. 82. \n\nJ. G. White Co., who had the contract for Langley Field, came to \nhim about contract entered into by Maj. Stieger. Had made \ncontract with Hampton Roads Construction Co. for roads and \ntemporary buildings. J. G. White Co. stated this was an \nirregular company scrambled together for the purpose of get- \ning said contract. 84. \n\nStore at Langley Field very loosely supervised. 87. \n\nNot possible to make comparison of estimates of excesses com- \ning up, as they were not what would be called engineering esti- \nmates, only drawn up in rough way. 88. \n\nAudited work of Supply Division exclusively. 89. \n\nMentions Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio. 90." \n\nContractor, Dayton Lumber & Manufacturing Co., S. S. King- \npresident. 90. \n\nOver $2,000,000 paid on Wright Field contract with Dayton \nLumber & Manufacturing Co. 91. \n\nMr. Grannis was employed as superintendent of building opera- \ntions of the Signal Corps in Dayton. 96. \n\nNo provision in contracts where contractor was liable to any \npenalty for failure to complete work within stated time. 98. \n\nDescribes dragging along of work at Dayton. 99. \n\nMr. Grannis eventually taking charge of this work. 99. \n\nKing utterly spineless and others had to make his decisions for \nhim. 99. \n\nDayton Lumber & Manufacturing Co. were financed by their \nbankers in Dayton, of which Mr. Talbott is president. Also \nfinanced through an attorney at Dayton. 100. \n\nMr. Smith exclusively engaged in supervising the engineering \nmatters in connection with Langley Field. 101. \n\nVouchers were made payable to the contractor himself. 103. \n\nMr. King kept an active bank account in bank of which Mr. Tal- \nbott was president. 103. \n\nTotal amount of payments made to Dayton Lumber & Manufac- \nturing Co. is over $2,000,000 for Wilbur Wright Field alone. \n103. \n\nDayton Lumber & Manufacturing Co. had a contract to do con- \nstruction work in connection with McCook Field; estimated \ncost to be on May 24, $1,059,052. 104. \n\nSame inefficiency in management, and weak personnel. 105. \n\nQ. Was there in connection with this McCook Field con- \ntract an attempt made from time to time to get money on re- \nceipts where money had not been paid by the contractor? 105. \n\nRelates one very grave instance. 105. \n\nUnclaimed wages amounting to $18,000 in connection with \nWilbur Wright Field. 107. \n\nStates item of $18,000 could not have normally been paid out. \n111. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 51 \n\nMaj. Harold Bennington \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nPay rolls were acknowledged untrustworthy, and it was a fair \ninference that somebody actually paid out amounts in excess \nof the money they really earned. 112. \n\nName of attorney at Dayton, in connection with Wilbur Wright \nField is O. F. Davisson, and the bank the City National Bank. \n116. \n\nManner of checking up pay rolls. 118-119. \n\nAgrees that pay rolls were untrustworthy. 120. \n\nWhere you find records never agreeing you have an organiza- \ntion that is inefficient. 122. \n\nCites one instance in particular of man who got away with four \njobs in collusion with the timekeeper at Mineola. 123. \n\nDid not believe there had been any intentional effort on the part \nof anybody, either in the service or out of it, to retard the work \nin aircraft production. 124. \nLieut. Col. E. Lester Jones (Washington, June 4, 1919; Book 2). \n\nAuthority is given for the planting of approximately 94,000 \nacres of castor beans. Subsequently it was shown that the oil \nwould not be needed, already had castor oil on hand that they \nwere not using, but still further orders were placed. Govern- \nment agreed to pay farmers $3.50 a bushel. 126. \n\nHad made no provision for plants to extract the oil from the \nbeans. 127. \n\nContract were made by officers in the castor-oil section of Equip- \nment Division. Civilians before this country entered the war. \n128. \n\nGives Col. Edgar as authority for the statement that contracts \nwere still being made with the farmers for additional acreage \nto be planted after the discovery of the substitute for castor \noil. 129. \n\nCastor-bean item, apart from the expense of reduction, would \naggregate in neighborhood of $5,000,000. 131. \n\nEeduction plants located at great distances from where they \nmade the plantings. 131. \n\nAerial gunnery school at Miami, Fla. 132. \n\nBoard\'s report evidenced a great outlay of money that could \nhave been saved in selecting another location. 13t. \n\nSecond board sent down to report on Miami. 138. \n\nCol. Edgar recommended if anything were done to start on a \nsmall scale. Chief Signal Officer went ahead and leased 1,200 \nacres on his own recommendation, cost to be $8 an acre, annu- \nally. 140. \n\n$300,000 authorized for construction of buildings, filling in, etc., \nWhole thing formed of coral, impossible to dig through. 140. \n\nCites instance of plane which had to be pulled out of the mud \nby a mule, the mule afterwards having to be pulled out by \nmud hooks. 141-142. \n\nThinks one man leased, or obligated himself, to a lot of small \nfarmers for the planting of castor beans. Thought there were \nwritten contracts with certain parties agreeing to take these \nbeans. 150. \n\n\n\n52 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nLieut. Col. E. Lester Jones \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nMr. Hughes brings up the matter again of the going on of mak- \ning contracts for the planting of castor beans after it had been \nlearned that they would not be needed. 152. \n\nFailure to provide reduction plants, assuming even that the cas- \ntor oil would be needed. 153. \n\nGen. Squier reported that 286 planes had flown to a point of \nembarkation. No facilities there to receive planes arriving by \nflight. 154. \nJohn Henry Smith (Washington, June 4, 1918; Book 2). \n\nResides in Washington, D. C. \n\nCame here from Youngstown, Ohio, where was with the Truscon \nSteel Co., manager of the railroad department. 156. \n\nRequested by Col. Edgar to take charge of construction of Lang- \nley Field. \n\nAlbert Kahn, of Detroit, Mich., consulting architect. 157. \n\nSupervised the purchase of all material that goes into the field, \nand the personnel of the field. 158. \n\nIrregularities brought to his attention. Case of the Hampton \nRoads Engineering & Construction Co. Capt. Sloan made \nthis contract without permission or authority from anyone. \n159. \n\nCapt. Sloan was from Front Royal, Va. 160. \n\nThis case was investigated by Capt. Castell, who found that \nthe firm were capitalized at $5,000. They were a group of \nlocal men at Newport News. One a lumber man, another a \nbarber, etc. 161. \n\nProfit under this contract. 10 per cent. 162. \n\nThe J. G. White Engineering Corporation, already on the \nground, should have done the work, which would have saved \none profit. 163. \n\nMinor irregularities in purchasing. Things bought at the last \nminute, and on a spot market. 167. \n\nCapt. Sloan is in France now. 170. \nCol. Clinton Goodloe Edgae (Washington, June 5, 1918; Book 2). \n\nThe gunnery school at Miami, Fla. 172. \n\nMeeting in "the Air Division to discuss this proposition. 174. \n\nSecond board sent down. 174. \n\nChief Signal Officer asks for estimate on small scale. 176. \n\nKissimee, Fla.. stated to have been better location in every way \nfor a field than Miami. Believes reason for putting location \nat Miami was because of local attractions for officers and avia- \ntors. All that was asked in regard to the situation of these \naviation camps was with reference to young ladies and danc- \ning, etc. 182. \n\nCastor-oil situation. 184. \n\nEvidence of further contracts being made for castor-oil plant- \nings after advices had been received that no more would be \nneeded. 186. \n\nCites memorandum calling attention to the fact that contracts \nfor two acetone plants had been placed by the Equipment \nDivision at a profit of 10 per cent for the work. 188. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 53 \n\nCol. Clinton Goodloe Edgar \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nContracts were let at a 10 per cent basis to people who would have \n\ntaken it on the 7 per cent basis, but were not informed that \n\nthey would have to by the Equipment Division. 190. \nSubmits memorandum recommending the abandoning of Miami \n\nas gunnery field. 202. \nBetween $75,000 and $100,000 had already been spent there, \n\nand would still need at least $66,000 more, and at best would \n\nonly be a patched-up affair. 203. \nField at Lake Kissimee would have cost around $250,000. Miami \n\nbefore it is finished will run over $400,000. 206. \nCol. E. Lester Jones (Washington, June 5, 1918; Book 2). \n\nGives names of E. F. Sewell, and Frank B. Shutts, of Miami, \n\nas two business men Avho prevailed upon the Chief Signal \n\nOfficer to establish gunnery school at Miami. 207. \nPresents memorandum showing acreage secured for cultivation \n\nof castor beans, with cities to be shipped to. 209. \nList of castor-bean contractors. 211. \nHistory of castor beans. 213-218. \nStatement referring to number of planes that have been shipped \n\nto points of embarkation for overseas. 221. \nNumbers of and dates of shipment. 223-225. \nJames Kidwell Grannis (Washington, June 5, 1918; Book 2). \n\nSuperintendent of construction in Signal Corps, in operations \n\nat Dayton, Ohio, and vicinity, under Col. Edgar. 227. \nEmployed since last August, and as subordinate 30 days prior \n\nto that time. \nFormerly in civil emplovment as superintendent of construc- \ntion. 228. \nRepeated rumor of Mr. Talbott being identified with the con- \ntract for the Wilbur Wright Field. 232. \nCriticizes methods employed in construction of Wilbur Wright \n\nField. 237. \nLabor conditions at Wilbur Wright Field. 241. \nPractice of getting receipts from material men when, in fact, \n\nthe goods had not been paid for. 243-244. \nJohn S. Carrington (Washington, June 5, 1918; Book 2). \n\nAs secretary and manager of the Chamber of Commerce of San \n\nAntonio, Tex., gives details of the part Texas played in the \n\nraising of castor beans. 250-258. \nTells about going ahead and increasing acreage, as Signal Corps \n\ndid not inform him of the fact that no more castor beans \n\nwould be needed. 259-270. \nGutzon John De Lemothe Borglum (Washington, June 6, 1918; \nBook 2). \n\nSculptor from Stamford, Conn. 271. \n\nWill I. Ohmer, Dayton, Ohio. 284. \n\nMr. Borglum could never get any data; was being interfered \n\nwith. 289. \nCould not get permits to visit the factories. 285. \nMr. Ohmer misses Borglum and runs across King, who tells him \n\nthat if he gives any information to Ohmer he will do so at his \n\nperil. 286. \n\n\n\n54 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nGutzon John De Lemothe Borgltjm \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nReceives note to appear before Aircraft Board. 288. \n\nLearns from this interview that Col. Deeds was interested in \nthe Dayton Metal Products Co., and was a partner with Tal- \nbott. 289. \n\nMr. Carpenter had legal information in respect to Deeds\'s rela- \ntionship in this business. 291. \n\nMr. Nichols, Mr. Witteman. and Mr. Miles reported to him about \nvarious factories. 293. \n\nVisited The Standard, Fisher Body Corporation, Lincoln Motor \nCos., The Curtiss, and Fisher Body Corporation. 295. \n\nReports submitted to President. 299. \n\nReport " Exhibit 1 " states general situation ; indicates a ter- \nrible state of confusion and irregularity, due to self-interest \nand intrigue. 308. \n\nTalbott tells him they are asked to leave bridge building and \nbuild aeroplanes ; that they did not know a " damn " thing \nabout it, any of them. Twelve thousand dollars apiece for \nthe battle planes, and to build 4,000 of them. 309. \n\nAll contracts cost plus. So-called bogey, or constant cost, put \nin contract. 310. \n\nMr. Talbott said he had been promised $72,000,000 worth. 312. \n\nSelf-interest interfering with the aircraft program. 313. \n\nThe ability of the Curtiss interests to have handled the entire \nprogram. 319. \n\nDayton is always given preference. Battle-plane side of produc- \ntion always landed there. 322. \n\nCurtiss plant held back in interests of the development of the \nLiberty motor. 322. \n\nLieut. Emmons. 323. \n\nMaj. Gray, of Dayton. 324. \n\nDeeds claimed to have been one of the inventors of the Liberty \nmotors. 325. \n\nBristol fighter; could have built a plant in 60 days, instead \nsix to eight months of time were wasted. 327. \n\nThere was nothing related to the Bristol fighter that could have \nprevented them in November from delivering 500 of those \nplanes, 150-horsepower engines, by the 1st of April. 328. \n\nTrying to put Liberty motors in Bristol fighter. 329. \n\nBristol fighter success in Europe. 329. \n\nDelay in blue prints. 333. \n\nMaj.* Gray, Dayton. 334. \n\nMore evidences of self-interest and intrigue. 337. \n\nLewis Co. offers to produce Liberty motors for $3,000 apiece. \n339. \n\nFurther evidence of intrigue. Price fixed for so many thousand \nCurtiss training planes at $1,950. 343. \n\nBonus of $750,000 promised. 344. \n\nStated to be paid to them as reimbursement for new machinery \nthey had to purchase. New machinery actually $40,000. 345. \n\nMaj. Downey interested in helping finance the Curtiss factory. \n346. (Means, seemingly, Col. Montgomery.) \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCKAFT INVESTIGATION. 55 \n\nMaj. Charles R. Sligh (Washington, June 6, 1918; Book 2). \nPresident of Sligh Furniture Co., Grand Rapids, Mich. 349. \nPlaced in charge of purchase of wood for aircraft purposes. \n\n350. \nCame to Washington in June. 350. \nUrges establishment of airplane grade of spruce. 351. \nNot a dollar\'s worth of spruce bought in name of the Government \n\nuntil August. 352. \nInternational committee convened in July. 353. \nAsked permission to buy 6,000,000 feet of spruce. 353. \nArrived at estimate by United States having program for \n\nbuilding 20,000 machines, based on war to end 1917. 355. \nCould not get authority until 10th of August. 10. \nPrecise relation of proposition to buy so much timber to the \n\nprogress of the aircraft program. 360. \nAttended meeting in Aircraft Production Board, Gen. Squier\'s \n\noffice. \nMinutes of the meeting of the Aircraft Board. 363. \nGeorge S. Long, representative of lumber people. 366. \nLumber committee, subsidiary committee of the Council of Na- \ntional Defense. 367. \nMr. Allen, knew nothing about lumber, was asked to take charge \n\nof the spruce matter by Mr. Coffin. 368. \nMr. Wernicke recommended by Mr. Sligh to go to coast to take \n\ncharge there. Mr. Allen sent instead. 371. \xe2\x96\xa0 \nMr. Allen disgrace to service all the way out. 372. \nMr. Allen asked to resign middle of September. 373. \nLumber interests caused Mr. Sligh\'s dismissal. 373. \nCol. Disque. 375. \nCol. Disque selected to take charge of spruce matters on Pacific \n\ncoast. 378. \nRussell Hawkins finally appointed. 379. \nCol. Disque goes out to take charge. Supply decreases. 380. \nStatement presented to Mr. Coffin regarding this, giving figures. \n\n380. \nExplanation of his assuming charge after Hawkins had been \n\nappointed. 381. \nHis character was such that when he was given chance to go to \n\nFrance in a position that could come but once in a lifetime, \n\nhe worked day and night to get an appointment 7,000 miles \n\nfrom firing line. 382. \nCol. Disque issues statement that 30,000,000 feet a month will \n\nbe required, when 10,000,000 feet are proved sufficient. 385. \nCol. Disque parcels out Pacific coast to three contractors, giving \n\nthem absolute authority to do all logging of spruce. Contract \n\nhuge joke. 391. \nGoes through Vancouver plant established by Col. Disque. 392. \nOne of the most extravagant and unnecessary proceedings in- \naugurated in lumber proposition. 393. \nA million already spent on plant, and this only a small portion \n\nof what had been squandered. 394. \nGovernment order in which one man had shipped $289,000 worth \n\nof lumber and made a profit of $89,000. 396. \n\n\n\n56 . ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nMaj. Charles R. Sligh \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nMaj. Leadbetter instrumental in having Col. Disque appointed. \nMaj. Leadbetter owned old abandoned sawmill on 20 acres \nadjoining mill established by Col. Disque there. 409. \n\nRaises price from $35,000 to $150,000, telling prospective cus- \ntomer he could sell his property to the Vancouver plant. 409. \n\nMaj. Leadbetter tries to bribe Sligh. 412. \n\nLeadbetter bribes Sligh\'s assistant, gets him commission. 413. \n\nPurchase of propellers. 417. \n\nMentions to Gen. Squier latter part of November no contracts \nlet for propellers. 422. \n\nCombat planes which were expected to have been built in Janu- \nary. 425. \n\nMaj. Sheppler in charge of Plant Production Section. 425. \n\nJoseph S. Otis, Otis Manufacturing Co., New Orleans. 427. \n\nMr. Wycliffe, of C. C. Mengel Bros. Co., Louisville, Ky. 431. \n\nWalnut and mahogany are not absolute necessities. Refused to \nbuy it at prices of $300. Afterwards secured propeller wood \nat $150 a thousand. 434. \n\nThrough reason of not ordering earlier paying $300 for stock \nthat is worth $160. 434. \n\nSending inspectors of wood who never had a board rule in their \nhands. 439. \n\nAnother rejects, through ignorance, the best and takes the poor- \nest. \xe2\x96\xa0 440. " \n\nSends man to South Bend about propeller stock. Drunk all the \ntime. Asks inspection department to have him removed. \nNothing done. Gives details of mess of his work. 442. \n\nMaj. George Henry, from Illinois, head of the inspection depart- \nment. 443. \nWilfred I. Ohmer (Washington, June 6, 1918; Book 2). \n\nResidence: Dayton, Ohio. 448. \n\nPresident Recording & Computing Manufacturers of time fuzes, \noptical instruments. 448. \n\nMachines Co. stockholder and depositor in City National Bank \nat Dayton. 452. \n\nMr. Talbott retired from presidency of bank. 453. \n\nConnected with stock brokers\' establishment. 453. \n\nOffers plant to Government. 450. (Without dollar of profit.) \n\nOrders given to other people who did not make a good fuze. 456. \n\nSends protest to Gen. Crozier. Suggests engineers to point out \ndefects of those being ordered. No answer. 457. \n\nSees Senator Pomerene. Gets appointment with Secretary of \nWar. 457. \n\nNothing comes of it; they did not have time to go into matters \nof that kind. 458. \n\nMr. Deeds and Mr. Talbott on fuse committee. 458. \n\nLater Deeds and Talbott go to New York, consult attorney, and \ntry to throw Mr. Ohmer into the hands of a receiver and then \ntake over the plant themselves. 459. \n\nMr. Talbott makes remark that Ohmer would get no orders, as \nhe was on the fuse committee. 460. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 57 \n\nWilfred I. Ohmer \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nStarts tearing down plant. 461. \n\nOther charges against Talbott in Dayton. 463. \n\nMr. George B. Smith, secretary to Deeds and secretary of the \nDelco Co. \n\xe2\x80\xa2 Clarence Kiefer, cashier of the City National Bank. 466. \n\nMr. William Strupe, president City National Bank. 468. \n\nLumber sold through more than one person in order to reach \nWright Field at a high price. 469. \n\nCapt. Geraghty, Government inspector in Ordnance Department. \n477. \n\nP. J. Connelly, president of P. M. Harmon Co. and director in \nCity National Bank. 477. \n\nCol. F. T. Huffman, president of Davis Sewing Machine Co. 478. \n\nO. B. Brown, attorney, of Dayton, and legal officer of Citv Na- \ntional Bank. 480. \nCharles A. Cruqtti (Washington, June 6, 1918; Book 2). \n\nPresident and general manager of Sterling Engine Co., Buffalo. \n487. \n\nBuilder of marine engines; best builder of high-class motors in \ncountry. 487. \nGutzon John de Lemothe Borglum (Washington, June 6, 1918; \nBook 2). \n\nLawrence Driggs. 500. \n\nRefers to machine that fell at Mineola, due to a break that struck \nat the principle of its construction. 505. \n\nAircraft Board did not hesitate to advance money to interests \nwhere member or members were connected with them. 51. \n\nFisher Body Corporation\'s connections. Fuselage that would \nkill the first man that went up in it. 522. \n\nEugene Meyer financed them and is connected here with the \nGovernment. 524. \n\nDeeds admits he is a German, and his sympathies are with Ger- \nmany. 532. \n\nHis name was Dietz, changed to Deeds. 533. \n\nDeeds appointed many Germans ; Dayton a German town ; under- \nstood secretary of Dayton- Wright Co. was a German ; confined \nin Atlanta at this time. 534. \n\nReports from workmen that there was sabotage at the Curtiss \nCo., at the Dayton- Wright Co., and the Standard Co. 535. \n\nBuilt cylinders so that the magneto system could not be used. \n539. \n\nDelco ignition system was Deeds\'s. 542. \n\nBureau of Standards stated no tests had been made. They would \nnot let the Bureau of Standards make one. 542. \n\nMemorandum of intervieAV with Lieut. Col. E. Lester Jones \n(Washington, June 7, 1918; Book 2). \n\nReads letter concerning arbitrary prices charged by the Signal \nCorps to those who are fixed-price constructors for Navy sea- \nplanes. 545. \n\nReads letter drawing attention to ascending scale of prices for \nspruce lumber supplied through the Signal Corps on Navy \norder. 547. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n58 ABSTKACT OF AIKCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nJohn Benner Fletcher (Washington, June 7, 1918; Book 2). \n\nNo. 50 Cathedral Parkway, New York City. 550. \n\nAt present assistant to manager of the Handley-Paige depart- \nment of Standard Aircraft Corporation. 550. \n\nOld Dominion Co. 555. \n\nOrganized to build airplanes. In existence since this country \nentered the war. 555. \n\nLieut. Farwell, assistant to Mr. Coffin. 556. \n\nRejected Old Dominion Co. because they could only build 300 \nplanes a year. 556. \n\nHad all the tools necessary to produce all the most difficult parts \nof airplanes. 557. \n\nMr. Swindell, attorney for the Southern Aircraft Co. and also \nattorney practicing in Washington. 560. \n\nMr. David Pelton Moore, Real Estate Trust Building, in Wash- \nington. 562. \n\nSouthern Aircraft Co. 559. \n\nFletcher chosen to act as chief engineer. 561. \n\nLetter to Giant Furniture Co., High Point, N. C. 565. \n\nManufacturers\' Aircraft Association. 566. \n\nFormed partly by the Standard, the Curtiss, and, he thought, \nthe Wright-Martin. 567. \n\nThis association developed the cross-license agreement. 567. \n\nMentions subcontract idea, as put forth by Maj. Shepler, to \nhelp out the Standard. 570. \n\nMr. Mengle, president of Standard Aero Corporation. 571. \n\nStated would be glad to let them have contracts to build the \nmachines, but they were all up in the air, did not know what \nGovernment wanted, and there would not be any motors to \nput in them if they built them. 571-572. \n\nMr. Fletcher makes arrangement to get output of Dusenberg \nplant. 572. \n\nArranged meeting with Mengle and sales manager of Dusenberg \nCo. in Washington. 572. \n\nMengle tries to take over the Dusenberg contract. 573. \n\nMaj. Shepler declared the Dusenberg motors would not be sat- \nisfactory. 574. \n\nFurther efforts to be able to use the Dusenberg. 582. \n\nTries to introduce the Farman machine. 583. \n\nCapital stock Old Dominion Co., $1,000,000. 591. \n\nCapital stock Southern Aircraft Co., $200,000. 591. \n\nGrand Rapids Airplane Co., Grand Rapids, Mich. 592. \n\nReceived contracts from Maj. Shepler at the time Southern Air- \ncraft people were trying to get contracts. 593. \n\nStates they got the contracts through political influence; were \nrepresented to Maj. Shepler by their Senators and Repre- \nsentatives. 595. \nFrank N. Trego (Washington, June 7, 1918; Book 2). \n\nManaging vice president of Trego Motor Co., at New Haven, \nConn. 596. \n\nOrganized on 20th March, 1917. 596. \n\nInterview with Mr. Deeds. 598. \n\nStated changes in design responsible for 50 per cent of the delay \nin turning out engines. 601. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 59 \n\nFrank N. Trego \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nRelates experience with ignition system in Liberty motor as com- \npared with Delco ignition. 603, 604. \n\nSunbeam contract moved from Elmira to Toronto. 610. \n\nScrap in their plant ran from 50 to 75 per cent. 613. \n\nCost of work that has been rejected has been paid for by Gov- \nernment. 614. \n\nGovernment has paid his company a little over $600,000 to date. \nBogey price fixed in their price. 616. \n\nLiberty motors and the 50-hour test. 617. \nHerbert Jennings (Washington, June 7, 1918; Book 2). \n\nResides at Mount Vernon, N. Y. 622. \n\nGeneral manager of the United Eastern Airplane Corporation. \n622. \n\n\xe2\x96\xba Organized in 1915 to build airplanes. 622. \n\nReasons for being connected with United Eastern Airplane Cor- \nporation. 623. \n\nMade application to the Aviation Corps in August, 1917, to \nobtain contracts. 626. \n\nReport by inspector on United Eastern Aeroplane Corporation. \n629. \n\nStates they were told no contracts would be let because of lack \nof appropriations. 633. \n\nWhen in Washington assured by draftsmen there were plans \nto be forwarded to them. 639. \n\nMentions another letter in which orders were assured them. \n642. \n\nCapital of the company, $1,000,000. Large plant idle, with five \nor six men going only. 643. \n\nThis field especially adapted for airplane manufacture. 644. \n\nNo estimate made by Government as to their efficiency in build- \ning planes. Had plenty of financial backing that could have \nbeen availed of. 647. \n\nPlant idle a year. 648. \nHerbert Edwin Miles (Washington, D. C, June 7 to 10, 1918; \nBook 3). \n\nMr. Miles, of Racine, Wis., retired manufacturer; now chairman \nof committee Council of National Defense on training factory \nworkers for war production. 1. \n\nVisited Standard Aircraft Corporation at Elizabeth, N. J. ; \nWright-Martin Co., New Brunswick, N. J. ; Curtiss Co., Buf- \nfalo; Lincoln Motor Co., Detroit; Dayton-Wright Co., Day- \nton ; Nordyke Marmon plant, Indianapolis. 2. \n\nFound remarkable confusion at Curtiss plant in November. \nGreat number of idle people. Work done in a remarkably \namateurish way. 2. Acting manager states : " Can not get \norders from Washington." 3. \n\nGot order for 2,000 Bristol fighting planes, says manager, but \nordered not to make them until specifications were completed. \n" Specifications do not come." 3. Release from Washington \ndid not come for months. 4. \n\nFirst Bristol tried in January. " Would not fly." 4. Three \n\nP weeks later experts came to investigate why machine would \n\nnot fly. 5. \n\n\n\n60 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nHerbert Edwin Miles \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nJust before January 22 order came to make 25 planes out of \n2,000. 5. \n\nInformed by Kepperley, toward 1st of April \xe2\x80\x94 " still waiting for \nchanges." 8. \n\nApproximately 15,000 employed in five plants at Buffalo on first \nvisit. Below training room were seen a hundred idle em- \nployees. This condition corrected by 1st of April, largely. 11. \n\nIdleness existed because they expected orders at any moment and \nwould then need employees. 12. \n\nMiles did not make inquiry of Signal Corps officers as to why \norders or specifications were not furnished. 14. \n\nDid not have blue prints for months at Curtiss plant. 16. \n\nMr. Hughes. "What blue prints were vou successful in get- \nting? "\xe2\x80\x94A. " We did not get any." 17-18. \n\nMiles personally tried to get blue prints through Maj. Shepler \nand others in Washington. No prints. 19. \n\nMr. Mengel, president Standard Aircraft Corporation, promised \nseveral times to furnish blue prints. Would either get them \nfrom Washington or Curtiss Co. 20. \n\nIn asking for blue prints Maj. Shepler replied, " I think you \nought to have them." But was referred to Col. Montgomery. \n22. \n\nMr. Hughes. "How did Curtiss make Bristol fighters with- \nout blue prints?" \xe2\x80\x94 A. "Did not have complete set; sort of \nwhittled out 25." 22. \n\nVisited Dayton- Wright Co. " Splendid production basis " in \nMarch. In November had just moved in. No production. \nMaking De Haviland and training planes. Had similar \ntrouble with specifications as Curtiss people. 24. \n\nHad to throw away 90 per cent of spruce. "Used considerable \njudgment in reading orders from Washington," savs official of \nWright Co. 25. \n\nPiano factories hundreds of miles around making small pieces \nfor plane. Put together at Dayton. 25-26. \n\nShipping about five De Havilands a day in March. 28. \n\nLetter bv Miles on March 13, praising production methods and \nspeed at Dayton Wright Co. 29-30. \n\nMen laid off at Dayton for want of specifications or orders and \npartly lack of material \xe2\x80\x94 " waiting for Washington." 31. \n\nHad trouble because of changes from time to time. 32. \n\nMiles alludes to discrimination between Curtiss plant and Day- \nton plant. Possibly due to different machine. 34. \n\nDe Haviland was accepted model, Bristol not, by Washington. \nCurtiss people had no orders for De Haviland. 34. \n\nOrder to Curtiss Co. for 2,000 Bristol January 11, 1918. But \ndid not have " go-ahead " orders till March or April. \n\nOrder for 3,000 Spad planes January 19. 1917. But were called \noff. 35. \n\nOrder for 500 heavy bombing planes September 19, 1917. Miles \nhas no knowledge about them. 36. \n\nCurtiss plant " trifling along on Army hydroplanes." 36. \n\nAll these machines were to have Liberty motor. Motor was in \nsame position. 37. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 61 \n\nHerbert Edwin Miles \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nTraining planes were to have motors made by another Willys \nCo. 38. \n\nCould not understand why they did not have an order to go \nahead and make them. 38. \n\nCurtiss plant had organization and facilities to produce same as \nDayton plant. 39. \n\nDid not get orders to do anything at Curtiss plant, 39. \n\nMr. Deeds stockholder in Dayton Co. Did not know Deeds had \ntransferred interests. 40. \n\nDayton-Wright Co. assemblers, not makers. 44. \n\nVisited Standard Aircraft Corporation, Elizabeth, N. J. Same \nconfusion as at Buffalo. Mr. Mengle president of this com- \npany. This visit in November. 44. \n\nScrap thrown away when orders were changed. Little salvage \npracticed in Buffalo. \n\nCost plus, terms of contract. \n\nGovernment bore cost of idle employees. \n\nRejected wood at Dayton- Wright Co. cut into small parts when \npracticable. Very great percentage would be sheer waste. \nVery little salvage possible in plane. 45. \n\nGovernment paid for rejected material. 45-46. \n\nFive thousand six hundred employees at Standard plant. Num- \nber increased. 46. \n\nDuring five visits there was little idleness, but there was tre- \nmendous amount of inefficiency. Efficiency estimated at from \n40 to 50 per cent among workers. At Dayton- Wright effi- \nciency was 75 to 80 per cent. 46. \n\nAt Curtiss plant approximately 55 per cent. 47. \n\nAt Curtiss and Standard they were cutting pieces of steel by \nhand at a cost of from 80 cents to $1; would cost but a few \ncents to buy a machine. \n\nHad heavy machines, costing a lot of money, but no little fixtures \nto put on those machines so they would work. 47. \n\nCurtiss plant did rig up machines for heavy production, but \nGovernment told them they did not want any of those ma- \nchines. 48. \n\n" Did not have orders to run us a week." 48. \n\nOrder for 650 planes of same type. 49. \n\nOne thousand one hundred to one thousand five hundred changes \nin these planes while in process. 49. \n\nTo speed up production concentration should be on one thing, \nas Ford has done. This is done at the Canadian factory. Not \nin America. Not one American factory can run 50 per cent \nefficient unless it is done. 50. \n\nMr. Mengle asked for 150 planes. 51. \n\n" Idiocy to have one plant making a number of different types \nof planes." 52. \n\nOn several occasions orders were given not to proceed. 54. \n\nRolls-Royce engine replaced by Liberty motor. In test Liberty \nrequired 62 minutes and Rolls-Royce 72. 55. \n\nLiberty motor " thoroughly splendid." 55. \n\nLincoln Motor Co. made a thousand engines and had shipped \n400 beyond the water. 56. \n\n\n\n62 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". \n\nHerbert Edwin Miles \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nNordyke & Marmon Co. " wonderfully fine factory." No criti- \ncism to be made. " That does not necessarily mean the ma- \nchine is good." 57. \n\nHispano- Suiza motors being turned out by Wright-Martin plant \nat Brunswick, N. J., for foreign governments. 59. \n\nCross-examination by Attorney General: No battle plane \nbuilt in this country prior to the war. 60. \nFred H. Colvix (Washington, D. C, June 7 and 10, 1918; Book 3). \n\nResidence in East Orange, N. J. Editor of American Machinists \nsince about January. With paper 11 years. Prior to that in \npublishing business, and prior to that 10 years in a shop as \nmechanic. An observer of manufacturing ever since. 62. \n\nVisited Ford motor, Packard motor, Lincoln motor, and Dayton- \nWright plane plant ; also Curtiss plant. 64. \n\nFord plant latter part of March not producing motors. 64. \n\nLincoln plant put through six on the 29th of March. Expected \nsame number next day. 64-65. \n\nDelays was reason for visit. Found delay due to changes in \ndesign and orders. First order specified 8-cylinder motors, \nbut before they got into production a change was made to 12- \ncylinder, necessitating new machinery. 65. \n\nOther changes also made. 66. \n\nProduction five or six a day. Expected to increase. Original \nplan called for 70 a day. 67. \n\nMotor was tested and accepted. 68. \n\nPackard plant completed 50 that week. Great many cylinders \nheld up on account of connecting rods. 69. \n\nOfficial of plant felt that if they quit making changes production \nwould get under way. 71. \n\nMr. Wells, member of President\'s committee of three on investi- \ngation, informed him 700 planes had positively been ordered \nwithout any further changes. 72. \n\nMotors coming faster than planes, " but not all right." 72. \n\nProduction delayed because of these many changes. 73. \n\nIntended article in Machinist " killed " because they were doing \nwhat the article would try to accomplish. 73. \n\nVisited Dayton-Wright on April 1 and observed they had a \ncapacity which they were not utilizing. " Waiting, in other \nwords." 74. \n\nWaiting for orders from Washington. 74. \n\nThirty planes could be shipped on very short notice providing \nthey would stop making changes. 74. \n\n" Signal Corps would change bottom sights ; change location of \ndifferent instruments, and so on. They had one machine \nthere wired off in a cage, which they called the goat, on which \nthey made these changes, one after the other." 75. \n\nPlant ready to complete De Haviland planes on order to com- \nplete. 75, 76. \n\nTraining planes had been delivered into the thousands. Diffi- \nculty was with De Havilands and Bristols. 76. \n\nMr. Mueller, chief engineer of Curtiss plant, states they had been \nentirely ignored. Built more machines than anyone else, yet \nnot asked for advice or anything else. 77. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 63 \n\nFred H. Colvin \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nAttempted to assemble Bristol plane from Signal Corps draw- \nings, but it did not look much like a modern aeroplane. 78. \n\nBuilt one plane and found it would not go together. Was modi- \nfied so it would go together, but burned up. 78. \n\nNo fighting plane had been in the air. 78. \n\nDelay due to changes. " Same story I got everywhere." " 79. \n\n\'"A great many changes appeared absolutely unnecessary " to this \nmechanic. 79. \n\n" Mr. Mueller told me that they came up there and took some car- \nriage bolts and tested them for tensile strength and made \nmicrophotographs of the metal, and so on, and all the carriage \nbolts did was to hold slats in place on a seat, and a shingle nail \nwould hold it just exactly as well. Details on that kind con- \nstantly coming up." 79. \n\n" Unnecessary details, and at times things which interfered seri- \nously with production, because you could not exactly meet \nspecifications which were unnecessary specifications," would \ncome up. 79-80. \n\n" It is simply foolish specifications demanding the same high \ngrade of material for stream lining a tube as though the \nstrength did depend on it. 80. \n\nLack of appreciation of particular need to be served. This was \nnoticeable all through in everything. 80. \n\nLots of spruce should never have left the coast ; it should have \nbeen rejected there. 81. \n\nRejection was very high by Day ton- Wright plant. 81. \n\nRejected because the holes varied a thirty-second of an inch in \ntheir regular spacing by Signal Corps inspector. 81. \n\nIll-advised inspection. 82. \n\nAbsolute inability to discriminate between vital needs and non- \nessentials. 82. \n\nSame was true at Curtiss plant. \n\nMilitary arm had taken to itself a considerable civilian arm. 82. \n\nSignal Corps blamed for inefficiency; nobody seemed to know \nwho the individual was. 82. \n\nCurtiss plants had not shipped a plane. No go-ahead orders. \nBut they were praying for them. Plants not in full operation \nby any means. 83. \n\nFifty per cent in operation. Working on Navy stuff. 84. \n\nShops appeared pretty empty, except over in Navy side. 84. \n\nDelay comes under two words \xe2\x80\x94 " constant changes." Was told \nthis at every plant. 85. \n\nFord man told him they had 700 connecting rods which were \nordered scrapped. 85. \n\nGovernment inspection unnecessarily rigid where it did not mat- \nter. 87. \n\nPlant would make other parts in place of those rejected and \nwould be paid for them. 88. \n\nChanges would mean a loss to the Government. 88. \n\nA number of gauge makers declared a certain gauge should not \ncost more than $35. Cost at plant was $415. 88. \n\n" That is only one of a dozen things of that kind that they \nshowed me." \n130687\xe2\x80\x9419 5 \n\n\n\n64 ABSTEACT OF AIECKAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nFeed H. Colvin \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nDoes not think Government had anything to do with subcon- \ntractor. 91. \n\nInformed board selects contractors acceptable to Government. \n91. \n\nOne firm made a price of 75 cents apiece for a bolt, but contract \nwas given to a concern at $1.05. 92. \n\nPlants did not suffer because of excessive price paid to subcon- \ntractor. 93. \n\nExhibit covering a diagram was left by the witness. 94. \n\n(An error occurred in the page numbering of the transcript \nat this point, going from 94 to 194.) \nFrederick Steele Beackall ( Washington, D. G, June 7, 1918: \nBook 3). \n\nResidence in New York City. General manager Taft-Pierce \nManufacturing Co., Woonsocket, R. I. Produce precision \nmachinery and tools. An engineer. With company 15 vears. \n195-196. \n\nThis plant secured a contract and manufactured 300 Gnome \nengines for Aircraft Manufacturing Co., of England. 196. \n\nChairman of a committee appointed by the Signal Corps to \npass on reasonableness of upset prices quoted by concerns on \na cost plus basis. That is a bogy cost for estimates. 198. \n\nThirty million dollar contract for Le Rhone engines. 199. \n\nDetermined price by inspection of drawings and of engine. \nNot advised of changes subsequent!} 7 made. 202. \n\nWas of the conclusion that the Bogaci engine could not be made \nfor several months. Had opportunity to figure on this, but \n" threw up his hands." 204. \n\nDusenberg people had an engine they were making themselves \nwhich could have been adapted to aeroplane work. 204. \n\nShortage of men would make it difficult to make delivery of \nengines on order given for Hispano-Suiza motors in May \nor June before the end of the year. 205. \n\nReads from a statement in which he recommended that the \nengineers at the Bureau of Standards should be allowed all \nthe time needed for perfection of design. Also that while \nengine was being perfected we should follow foreign designs \nthat we know are right, and that manufacturing should not \nremain dormant while experimental work was in process. \n(This pamphlet is known as Blackall Exhibit No. 1.) 209. \n\nEngine drawings were being constantly modified. 210. \n\nCondemns scheme of development of an engine that is hatched \nin five days. 211. \n\nArgues that it would have been better to have adopted a foreign \nengine, and brought Mr. Snook, managing director of Air- \ncraft Manufacturing Co., of England, to help in this scheme. \n213. \nThree hundred foreign Gnome engines were built by the General \nVehicle Co., of Long Island. They were a success \xe2\x80\x94 the best \nthat had ever been made. These were for the British Gov- \nernment. 214. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 65 \n\nFrederick Steele Black all \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nOne hundred Gnome engines subsequently ordered by the Signal \n\nCorps. Cites this as to what could have been done had we built \n\nforeign engines. 214. \nKegards the Gnome as the limit of difficult manufacture. 215. \nNo opportunity to become informed as to the development of \n\nthe Liberty motor. 215-216. \nRolls-Royce engines being built by Stearns or Peerless Co. in \n\nAmerica. 216. \nApproximately 1,000 have been built. 216. \nSlow progress laid to difficulty of getting skilled men, not in \n\nmaking that engine in this country. 217. \nThinks it the height of absurdity to put Liberty motor in pro- \nduction until perfection has been ascertained. This Avould. \n\nalso refer to any other machine. 217. \nContract for 300* Gnome engines was let about August, 1915\', \n\nand completed the beginning of 1917. 218. \nDeliverv was started within six months after contract was let. \n\n218-219. \nBogy price for Liberty motor was $6,000. 219. \nPlanes would have been in the air on time if we had brought \n\nfrom England and France one engine and plane of each \n\ntype, together with men and under Government direction \n\nmade Chinese copies, with no glory for anybody on this side \n\nof the water. 221. \nDeclares that if engines and planes would have been brought \n\nover quantity production could have been had within 18 \n\nmonths. 222-223. \n"A frightful risk" was taken in attempting to make a new \n\nmotor. (Liberty.) 224. \nUnder this plan quantity production would have been expected \n\nby the end of 1918. 223. \nIt is brought out that Liberty motor, if satisfactory, will be \n\non quantity production about the same time as if foreign \n\nmodels had been brought here. 224. \nCarlos W. Curtis (June 7, 1918; Book 3). \n\nDirector and general manager Splitdorf Electrical Co., Newark, \n\nN. J. Manufactures magnetos and spark plugs. 226. \nThis company was the main source of supply for magnetos of \n\nthe allied governments. 227. \nSold between 800,000 and 100,000 magnetos to Italian Govern- \nment; 50,000 to British; 10,000 to 20,000 to French and Rus- \nsian companies. 228. \nThis company\'s magnetos used by Wright-Martin Co. for the \n\nHispano-Suiza motors; the Wills-Morrow Co. and the Curtiss \n\nCo. for their Curtiss OX5 and 6 motors. 228. \nAlso by the Hall- Scott Co., etc. \nSupply magnetos for all motors except the Liberty motor, \n\nalthough ignition system can be used on Liberty. 224. \nIn a test on 12-cylinder Liberty 12 to 20 more horsepower was \n\ndeveloped than with the other ignition system, which was the- \n\nDelco svstem. 229. \n\n\n\n66 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nCarlos W. Curtis \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nNever invited to develop the system of ignition for Liberty. \nSeveral attempts to no avail. Then went to see Col. Deeds per- \nsonally in October. (Splitdorf system standardized for all \n8-cylinder motors in aviation in the Signal Corps just re- \ncently.) 231. \n\nWas told by Col. Deeds that they had decided to use battery \nsystem on the advice of Mr. Kettering. Curtiss suggested \nthat it might have been better to have inquired from a magneto \nmanufacturer, and Col. Deeds admitted the contention was \nprobably right. 231. \n\nA magneto installation was worked out and a test showed the \nmotor to be more efficient than with the ignition used at that \ntime. Unable to get further than a preliminary test, how- \never. 232. \n\nCol. Deeds stated that magneto system could not be used on the \n12-cylinder motor. 233. \n\nAdvised by censor that no mention could be made of anything in \nconnection with the Liberty motor. 234. \n\nInterview with Col. Deeds after being referred from one to an- \nother. This in re censorship. 234-235. \n\nLetter from Col. Arnold. (Ex. Curtis No. 1.) 236. \n\nArticle filed known as Exhibit Curtis No. 2. 237. \n\nNo reason for this secrecy or censorship. 238. \n\nDouble supply of current in magneto system, therefore it was \npreferable to battery system. 239. \n\nMagneto system used almost exclusively abroad. 240. \n\nWith battery S3 r stem in looping the loop the fluid would spill \nout and the system go dead. 243. \n\nRepresentatives of foreign Governments contend magneto sys- \ntem is superior. 244. \n\nDel co System owned by the United Motors. General Motors \nowned United Motors. 245. \n\nMr. Vincent asked the engineers of the Splitdorf Co. to develop \na 12-cylinder magneto, as he had much trouble with the Delco \nsystem and was willing to pay the additional cost. After be- \ning called to Washington he seemed to have no further interest \nin the magneto ignition. (Mr. Vincent is with the Packard \nCo.) 246. \nCarl Thomas Mason (June 7, 1918; Book 3). \n\nResidence in East Orange, N. J. Chief engineer of the Split- \ndorf Electrical Co. With company since they took on the \nDixie magneto. 247. \n\nCalled to Washington in regard to getting magneto equipment \non Liberty engine. 248. \n\nLetter from Signal Corps asking for assistance to remount mag- \nnetos on 8-cylinder to 12-cylinder. 250. \n\nCorrespondence back and forth. 251-259. \n\nPreliminary test not applied to Liberty. 266. \n\nMr. Upton stayed at Dayton " practically for months for the \nsimple reason that we would get excuse after excuse " (for test- \ning purposes). 266. \n\nExhibit Mason No. 8 was filed. 21. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 67 \n\nCarl Thomas Mason \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nLetters written in regard to test and no answer. 270. \nSubstantiates Mr. Curtiss\'s statement that magneto system is \n\nsuperior to battery system. 281. \nBlue print filed, marked " Exhibit Mason No. 15." 282. \nMaj. Vincent, at Detroit, complains: "So many damned people \n\nbutting in on this thing that they would never get anywhere." \n\n285. \nSpecially mounted bracket, etc., for mounting magneto fur- \nnished by company, but nothing has been done to this time. \n\n286. \nCharles K. Wittemann (June 8, 1918; Book 3). \n\nResidence in Jersey City, N. J. Building aeroplanes since 1906. \n\nConstructed about 300 machines. 289. \nConstructed one machine which was put to a severe test, with the \n\nresult that it outclassed Army machines on adjoining fields. \n\nHowever^ this machine was practically condemned by Capt. \n\nMartin. 308-309. \nFour training machines offered to Government, but were advised \n\nthe Curtiss was the standard machine. 309. \nConsistent effort to get Government to accept this plane seemed \n\nwithout avail. 310. \nWere able to contract for and deliver 600 machines in the first \n\n12 months and 100 machines per month thereafter. 311. (This \n\npage out of place.) \nPart of a letter read, marked " Exhibit Wittemann, No. 1." 314. \nPlane referred to on page 308-309 rejected because of color, and \n\nalso because of light radiator. 314. \nAnd because of a flaw in steel of exhaust manifold. Also be- \ncause a bolt was curved to conform to the curve of the fuselage. \n\n315. \nSee list of men testing machine. 315. \nTold by Aircraft Production Board that the Custiss JN4 and \n\nStandard training tractor had been standardized. 316. \nNegotiations with Aircraft Production Board since its start \n\noffering developed training planes. 317. \nIn making offer of facilities, was referred from man to man. \n\n318. \nTo make spare parts for Signal Corps they would have to enter \n\ninto a contract with Curtiss Co. 322-323. \nAgreement provided that Wittemann Co. would have to pay \n\nroyalty on their own design. Attempted to amend the con- \ntract, but were unsuccessful. 324. \nOrganization declared in excellent shape for the production of \n\naircraft. 325. \nWittemann director of Aeronautical Society four years. 328. \nWittemann plant first on list in case of further appropriation, \n\nbut never received an order. 328. \nOrders offered to manufacturers who could not take any more. \n\n329. \nStatement of number of machines that could be turned out sub- \nmitted to Col. Deeds. 331. \nCurtiss plant visited and looked very disorganized. 333-334. \nVisited Canadian Airplane Co. and "Fisher Body Co. 335. \n\n\n\n68 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nCharles K. Wittemann \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nTold by man in Fisher Body Co. it was not necessary to have an \nexperienced aeronautical man. 336. \n\nVisited Ford plant and was told they were held back on account \nof " enormous lot of changes." 336. \n\nFord disgusted. 336. \n\nMotors shipped out, but not satisfactory. 337. \n\nFord stated that a part of engine was designed so no other \nignition system except Delco could be used. 338. \n\n"According to him, it seems it was deliberately done, so it would \nbe impossible to put anv other ignition svstem on there except \nDelco." 338. \n\nDiversion of machinery. 340. \nJohn William McConaughy (June 8, 1918 ; Book 3) : \n\nResidence, Washington, D. C. Employee of Committee on \nPublic Information. Director of the Division of News. Pre- \npared or collected from department officers matters of public \ninformation for the press of the country. 344. \n\nStatement issued for morning papers of Thursday, February \n21, 1918, produced and marked " Exhibit McConaughy No. \n1." 3-15. \n\nThis statement was changed. Corrected copy produced and \nmarked " Exhibit McConaughy No. 2." 346. \n\nFirst part of the statement of Exhibit 2 was gotten from Col. \nDeeds. (Second paragraph.) \n\nBeads statement as he personally got it from Deeds. 348. \n\nThis statement given out around 10th of February. 349. \n\nStatement taken to Secretary of War. 350. \n\nWas informed at Bureau of Standards that Liberty 8 was in \nbad shape, but was later told that the Liberty 8 was not being \nproduced any more, efforts being directed to the Liberty 12. \n353-355. \n\nInterview with Col. Deeds. 355-357. \n\nStatement submitted to Col. Deeds and Secretary of War for \ntheir approval. 360, 361. \n\nExhibit 3 approved by Secretary of War. 362. \n\nStatement held up several days by Secretary of War, as he \nwanted to refer it to Gen. Squier. 363. \n\nCol. Deeds did not inform McConaughy there was any inac- \ncuracy in statement. 364. \n\nInterview with Secretary of War with respect to inaccuracy \nof statement. 366. \n\n" Good deal of big league lying all through this business." See \nall of page 367. \n\nExhibit McConaughy No. 4 introduced. 367. \n\nGens. Salzman and Squier had to do with this statement. 369. \n\nExhibit McConaughy No. 5 was introduced. 369. \n\n$640,000,000 appropriated in the middle of the summer and it \ndisappeared from public view. 370. \n\nMcConaughy Exhibit No. 6 introduced. 371. \n\nGot all information from Col. Deeds at that time. 372. \n\nUnderstood that whatever Deeds and Salzman did had the ap- \nproval of Gen. Squier. \n\nMcConaughy Exhibit No. 7 introduced. 374. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 69 \n\nMaelen E. Pew (June 8, 1918; Book 3). \n\nEmployed with the Committee on Public Information in the \nnews division since November 4, 1917. Later went into the \nWar Department to represent the Secretary of War for the \nCommittee on Public Information. Had charge of publicity \nmatters in the War Department. 375. \n\nRecognized McConaughv Exhibit No. 2 as authorized by Col. \nDeeds. 376. \n\nWere not enjoying candor in the Signal Corps. 377. \n\nInterview with Col. Deeds. 378, 379. \n\nRefers to original manuscript of Capt. Sweetser. 382. \n\nInterview with Col. Deeds continued. 382-384. \n\nRefer to paragraph which was pasted on. 38G. \n\nCol. Deeds read story as written up and made certain correc- \ntions. 386. \n\nCol. Deeds authorizes statement. 388. \n\nRecognizes McConaughv Exhibit No. 3. 389. \n\nTook McConaughv Exhibit No. 3 to Secretarv of War and was \ntold to publish it. 390-392. \n\nRefers to charges made in United States Senate. 393. \n\nRecites interview in Secretary Bakers office after charges were \nmade in Senate, 394. \n\nInterview with Col. Deeds \xe2\x80\x94 shows him statement in the Star, \nover which he became very much excited. 394-395. \n\nInterview with Col. Deeds continued. 396. \n\nGen. Squier enters and declares charges made on Senate floor \nwas German propaganda and paid for with German money. \n396. \n\nGen. Squier produces advertisement pertaining to Rolls-Royce \nmotor and declared that was some more of the German \nmoney. 397. \n\nLot of vague and rambling statements. 397. \n\nRefers to interview with Dr. Keppel with regard to false state- \nment which was issued. 399. \n\nInterprets notes taken at the interview with Gen. Squier, Gen. \nSalzman, and Col. Deeds. 403. \n\nSquier is quoted as follows : " I paced the floor perfectly wild \nbecause I could not get training planes, then they came with a \nrush, and I got so many I did not know what to do with them, \nand we think it will be the same thing with combat planes. \n404. \n\nContinues quoting these men as to Signal Corps appropriation. \n405. \n\nGen. Squier quoted as follows : " One hundred and eighty battle \nplanes have been delivered in France." 405. \n\nContinues interpretation of notes taken at this interview. 406, \n407. \nJ. E. Kirkman (June 8, 1918; Book 3). \n\nResidence, High Point, N. C. President Giant Furniture Co. \n409. \n\nGiant Furniture Co. contemplating turning over its property \nto Southern Aircraft Co. 409. \n\n\n\n70 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nJ. E. Kirkman \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nCame to Washington to take up with officials the production of \naeroplanes by the Southern Aircraft Co. 410. \n\nThis visit was " possibly a little more than a year ago." 410. \n\nStates briefly facilities of his company. 411. \n\nIs referred to Curtiss plant in Buffalo for observation. 412. \n\nMaj. Sheppler had statement of plant conditions and pro- \nnounced them good. 413. \n\nReport of inspectors not good. 414. \n\n" I did not see anything much but scrap," referring to trip \nthrough Cutler Desk Co. 418. \n\nRefers to a very large amount of rejected material. 420. \n\nInspection by Government , inspectors " unintelligent "\xe2\x80\x94too \nrigorous. 422. \n\nTold by Maj. Sheppler at Washington that they could not give \nthe Cut Giant Furniture Co. a contract to build planes com- \nplete, "but they needed what we had at High Point." 423. \n\nTold to go to the Standard people and Curtiss people, and in- \nformed they had large contracts with the Government. On \narriving at Curtiss plant found only 350 machines contracted \nfor. 424,425. \n\nWere building for the British Government thousands of ma- \nchines and did not care whether he built for the United \nStates or not. 425. \n\n" Identically the same way at Plainsfield." 425. \n\nLetter written from the office of the Chief Signal Officer, seating \nin part : " Our program is very thoroughly covered * * *." \n428. (This was marked "Exhibit, Kirkman, No. 1.") \n\nRecites conversation which took place in Senator Swanson\'s \noffice. 430. \n\nMaj. Sheppler quoted as saying: "Kirkman, I just want to tell \nyou that our facilities will get out more parts for making \nplanes than the United States will want for 25 years. Your \nfacilities are too immense for us to consider." \n\nMr. Burman Asch charges there is a combine. 433. \n\nContract finally let for 500 propellers at $85 each. 435. This \ncontract let about February. 435. \nGeorge R. Collins (June 8, 1918; Book 3). \n\nResidence, Saulsbury, N. O. Stockholder in Giant Furniture \nCo. Also interested in formation of the Southern Aircraft \nCo. if they could secure any business from Washington. 436. \n\nAgrees with Mr. Kirkman as to his recollection of interviews \nwith Maj. Sheppler. 436. \n\nReferring to Kirkman Exhibit No. 1 and the inspection made \nSeptember 24, states he could get no information from Maj. \nSheppler as to whether the plant was accepted or rejected. \n437. \n\nLieut. Farwell states that " it would not be right to start any new \npeople into the manufacture of airplanes as long as they did \nnot have enough airplane business for the plants that were al- \nready going." 438, 439. (This on October 5.) \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 71 \n\nGeorge R. Collins \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nWas referred by Howard Coffin to Maj. Slieppler again with re- \ngard to contract work, but on seeing the major got the same \n\nresults as on his previous visits. 439, MO. \nMr. Coffin again states " program is fully covered.\'\' 441. \nContract agreement, Exhibit Collins No. 1, produced and filed. \n\n442. \nRecites part of contract. 443. \nWilliam Arthur Morgan (June 10, 1918; Book 3). \n\nResidence, Buffalo, N. Y. At one time (July 16, 1917, until \n\nMarch 1, 1918) vice president and general manager of Curtiss \n\nCo. 449. \nContract let Curtiss Co. for 3,000 Spad machines and 500 Ca- \n\nproni or other type, and a contract for 1,400 J N 4 D training \n\nplanes, dated September 19, 1917. Was told on November 7 by \n\nCol. Deeds that Spad and Caproni contracts would have to be \n\ncanceled. 449, 450. \nAsked Col. Deeds what should be done about large plant erected \n\nfor this contract. Was told something would have to be done, \n\nas it was not the fault of the company. 450. \nCol. Waldon informed Curtiss people they would want a 3,000 \n\ncontract. Few days later Signal Corps engineers stated Spad \n\nmachine would have to be done away with. Finally came can- \ncellation of entire program. 451. \nRecites meeting with Mr. Coffin, Col. Montgomery, Col. Deeds, \n\nand Col. Waldon. 452, 453. \nProduces letter of Col. Waldon confirming entire conversation^ \n\nExhibit Morgan 1. 455. (This letter given in transcript.) \nProduces his reply to above letter marked " Exhibit Morgan No. \n\n2." 465. (This letter given in transcript.) \nProduces reply to last above marked " Exhibit Morgan No. 2.\'* \n\n467. (This letter also given in record.) \nProduces reply to letter last above dated July 28, 1917. 468. \n\n(This letter also given.) \nProduces reply of office of Chief Signal Officer to letter last \n\nabove, marked "Exhibit Morgan 6." 485. (This letter also \n\nquoted in record.) \nThoroughly of the understanding they won Id want plant to \n\nhandle every machine they could. 488. \nUnder that understanding a building was practicallv completed \n\nat a cost of $5,500,000. 489. \nAt a later conference a request by Wright-Martin representative \n\nfor one or two million dollars to put into buildings was denied. \n\n490. \nMorgan then informs board it was his understanding they should \n\nhave an advance. 490. \nInforms board that if advance would not be made he would have \n\nto wire Curtiss plant and stop all work, but was told not to, \n\n491. \nMorgan was turned over to a brother of Col. Montgomery, an \n\nattorney for the board, and with other men outlined a contract \n\nwhereby the Government was to pay for buildings, land, and \n\nequipment. 492. \n\n\n\n72 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT IXYESTIGATIOX. \n\nWilliam Arthur Morgan \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nWire sent by head of the Department of Justice requesting that \nthe New York Legislature pass a bill which would permit the \nGoA T ernment to acquire land. 493. \n\nIt was the understanding that the above contract would be \nsigned, but were finally informed it could not be carried out : \nthat they had no authority to purchase land or buildings and \ncould not get a satisfactory answer from Secretary Baker. 493. \n\nWhole proposition "kicked" over. 494. (See page 494 for de- \ntail of conversation.) \n\nAnother conference on September 8. (See all of page 496.) \n\nThe} T kept saving " thev were afraid of a congressional investiga- \ntion." 490. \n\nLetter produced, marked :i Exhibit Morgan 7," containing \nnew suggestions. 498. (Letter read into record.) \n\nAnother letter produced, marked ** Exhibit Morgan 8." ad- \ndressed to Chairman Coffin. National Council of Defense. \n(This letter read into record in full on page 503.) \n\nEeads (Mr. Hushes) from minutes of Aircraft Production \nBoard. 508. \n\nReads from minutes of the next meeting on September 14. 1917. \n513. \n\nBoard decides to give out a contract. 514. \n\nMorgan, on ottering to personally negotiate loan to pay for plant, \nwas embraced by Gen. Squier. 515. \n\nContract signed on September 19 for 500 Capronis or other type \nof bombing plane. Government to pay for the machinery and \nequipment, amounting to approximately a million and a half \ndollars or option of adA T ancing money. 517. \n\nContract called for deliverv of 3,000 Spads between January 1, \n1918, and July 1* 1918. 519. \n\n" They said the eight-cylinder Liberty motor was obsolete." 522. \n\nThree changes made. 524. \n\nChanged from the Tickers gun to Marlin and then changed back \nto Vickers. 524. \n\nOnly part of order Curtiss people were permitted to go ahead \nwith was for 750 Spads. 525. \n\nWired Lieut. Emmons on October 31 for definite go-ahead order \nfor production, but did not get it. 527. \n\nCol. Deeds informs Morgan thev would have to cancel the Spad \ncontract and all of that $30,000,000 contract. 528. \n\nGovernment had not reimbursed Curtiss Co. for all work done \non Spad planes under contract up to the time Morgan left the \nfirm. 529. \n\nPractically all the 2,600 drawings necessary for the 750 Spads \nwere completed when order was stopped. 532. \n\nSeven hundred and fiftv Spads could have been completed in \nMarch. 533. \n\nMr. Hughes reads resolution of Aircraft Board at meeting of \nOctober 30. 534. \n\nLess than a hundred behind on the contract of 2,000 or more at \nthe end of the year. 541. \n\nAfter test of plane an order of 600 was received. 544. \n\nGreat many changes to be made. 545. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 73 \n\nWilliam Arthur Morgan \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nLetter produced, marked " Exhibit Morgan No. 9." 553. \nLetter produced, marked " Exhibit Morgan No. 11." 558. \nMorgan does not believe women were sitting around knitting in \n\nhis plant, as was stated by a previous witness. 580. \nDoes not think pay roll covering men held in readiness was paid \n\nby the Government. 583. \nRecites conference on November 23 with Mr. Coffin and Col. \n\nDeeds. 584. \nLetter covering conference directed to Mr. Coffin produced and \n\nmarked " Exhibit Morgan 12." 586. \nRecites conversation with Gen. Squier in Buffalo. 590. \nAircraft Board agreed to finance Curtiss Co. 591. \nMinutes of meeting held in Mr. Coffin\'s office on December 6, \n\n1917. 592. \nSample Bristol Fighter received in December. Very incomplete ; \n\nno motor or radiator. 596. \nWould take a long list of names to enumerate those who ordered \n\nchanges. 598. \nBristol Fighter made by Curtiss Co. tested around the 1st of \n\nApril. Some trouble with oiling system and exhaust. It went \n\nup and caught fire and burned up. 600. \nChanges and specifications to be followed in production usually \n\ncame from Col. Clark\'s department at Dayton. 600. \nRecites different persons who ordered changes to be followed in \n\nproduction. 601. \nDoes not think there was a head as to just what should be con- \nstructed on a plane. 603. \nReads minutes of a meeting of the Aircraft Board of December 7. \n\n604. \nReads resolution of Aircraft Board of December 13, 1917. 609. \nNo planes (combat) had been built up to the time Morgan left. \n\n612. \nReads minutes of Aircraft Board of December 27, 1917. 613. \nProduction program submitted by Col. Deeds is read. 617. \nMorgan states Signal Corps men would come to Buffalo and say, \n\n" We will release everything," and the next day it was all up in \n\nthe air again. 618. \nDesign of Bristol Fighter never settled. 618. \nA statement of payments shows Government paid Curtiss Co. on \n\nan estimated cost of $4,800,000 for 800 planes, the amount of \n\n$4,776,046, etc. 621. \nMorgan\'s conclusion as to the cause of the delay was that " every- \nthing was tied up in Liberty motor. 622. \nThat Spad contract was canceled because the Liberty motor was \n\nnot adapted to it. 622. \nSpeed of Spad and Bristol in a flight were practically the same. \n\n622. \nArthur Sweetser (June 10, 1918; Book 3). \n\nCaptain in the Army since September 5, 1917. Prior to that Asso- \nciated Press correspondent in Washington. 625. \nFirst duties were gathering historical data in Signal Corps, then \n\non work in connection with recruiting, and on January 1 went \n\nto Equipment Division to make historv for Col. Deeds." 626. \n\n\n\n74 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nArthur Saveetser \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nCollected data about the sending of cadets to France, England. \nItaly, and Canada. 626. \n\nData collected as original documents, of which some were lost, \nbringing on an investigation showing Sweetser had no written \nauthority and was transferred. When retransferred back to \nthis work sought papers covering this data and was told by Col. \nArnold that " they had all dissipated through the files," 627. \n\n" There were not records kept," referring to Equipment Division. \n628. \n\nGot onlv three pages as a report from the Plane Production Sec- \ntion. \'628. \n\nSubmitted a report about February 1. 630. \n\nRefers to a " control board." 632. \' \n\nRecites work of statistical section. 633. \n\nRecognizes McConaughy Exhibit No. 2. 636. \n\nMisleading publicity coming from Congress. 637. \n\nCol. Deeds stated planes were on their way across about February \n10. 637. \n\nRecites an interview with Col. Deeds. 638. \n\nAcknowledges authorship of McConaughy Exhibit 2. 641. \n\nInterpreted Col. Deed\'s statement to say that planes were en route. \n642. \n\nAdmits that the statement, " The first American-built battle \nplanes are to-day en route to the front in France * * * " \nwas submitted to Col. Deeds. 645. \n\nAdmits "One hundred of the first American-built battle planes \nare to-day en route to the front in France " was the headline in \nmost of the papers throughout the country. 650. \n\nLieut. Grant, second in charge of plane production, " whispered \nin my ear with extreme confidence and considerable alarm that \nstory was incorrect." 651. \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nIn speaking of shipment of one plane thinks reference was to \nshipment from Dayton. 653. \n\nCharges a " perversion in spirit of the whole point and purpose \nof the story " by the Associated Press. 655. \n\nHas prepared a chronology of the Bristol and DeHaviland bat- \ntle planes. 656. \nJ. W. McConaghy (June 10, 1918; Book 3). \n\nProduces further papers and recites circumstances in the prepa- \nration of the statement. 658. \n\nRecital shows attitude of\' Gen. Squier as to making a report to \nthe public as to the progress of production and expenditure \nof money. \n\nExhibit McConaghy No. 8 and Exhibit McConaghy No. 9. 661. \n\nStates in substance where he got data for Exhibit 9. 662. \nMarlen E. Pew (June 10, 1918; Book 3). \n\nStates that his testimony stands unchanged. 684. \nM. W. Greer (June 10, 1918; Book 3). \n\nMechanical engineer, graduating from Massachusetts Institute \nof Technology, Boston. 665. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 75 \n\nM. W. Greer \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nStudent of aeronautics since 1907. 665. \n\nRecites details at the time he was seeking employment with the \nGovernment. 666. \nFred H. Lewis (June 10, 1918; Book 3). \n\nResidence, Jackson, Mich. Manufacturer of aeroplane parts \nand formerly automobile parts. Began the manufacturing \nof plane parts just after we entered the war. 668. \n\nRecites incidents leading up to contract with Curtiss people for \nthe manufacturing of plane parts. 670. \n\nEntered into a contract with the Government direct. Government \nto supply the Standard Aircraft Co. Original order about \n$120,000. Arbitrary change on part of Government cut order \ndown to about $35,000. 672, 673. \n\nStates there were continuous changes in specifications and were \nnever " sure of our blue prints being right at any time." Con- \ntinues explanation of delays. 674-677. \n\nDelay in filling order will be about 60 days. 682. \n\nComplete prints on another large order were to have been fur- \nnished by February 1, but have not as yet. 683. \n\nOriginal Bristol was not designed for Liberty motor, necessi- \ntating a great many changes, " and they have been changing \nit continually ever since." 686. \n\nSignal Corps and Curtiss Co. continually making changes every \nweek. 686. \n\nChanges made everything obsolete that " we had manufactured." \n687. \n\nRequested set of samples, and when second set came were not \nmuch good because they had changed machine. 688. \n\nOut of 1,700 prints changes were made in about 900. 688. \n\nWhen changes were made " we had to dig up the information \nourselves." 689. \n\nDoes not know anything about a rumor that their company was \nadvised to raise their bid of $3,000 on each Liberty motor to \n$6,000, which was the amount that had been determined on. \n698. \nAlso denies any knowledge of Maj. Sheppler having informed \nthat Lewis Co. would have to raise their price about $1,500 \non a couple of items in order to conform with others of that \nnature. 701. \nWilliam P. Taylor (June 10, 1918; Book 3). \n\nResidence, Chelsea, Mich. Factory manager of Lewis Spring \n& Axle Co. since August 1, 1917/ 705. \n\nStates Mr. Lewis\'s testimony is in accord with his recollection, \nbut adds a few facts. 706, 708. \n\nStates that it is his opinion the Bristol plane could have been \nused and produced as it was and that he knew they were using \nthe machine effectively abroad. 709. \n\nSome changes that were being made were necessary in order to \ninstall the Liberty motor in Bristol plane, but does not think \nall changes were necessary. 711. \n\n" Lot of changes that would not effect an improvement in the \nmachine." \n\n\n\n7b ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nWilliam P. Taylor \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nWas told the Bristol was used by England just as it was. 715. \n\nWhen asked to describe a certain change ansAvers that there were \nso many hundreds of them that it was difficult to do so. \n\n"Practically all we have been doing for months, just watching \nthese changes." 715, 716. \nLieut. Tom B. Miller (June 10, 1918; Book 3). \n\nSecond lieutenant, Aviation Section, Signal Reserve Corps, since \nDecember 28, 1917. Property officer at Dayton- Wright aero- \nplane factory. Prior to commission was chief \'accountant^ \ndepartment of insurance and banking, State of Texas. 717. \n\nDuties at Dayton involves checking incoming material, and \nplanes when completed. 719. \nUlysses S. Thomas (June 10, 1918; Book 3). \n\nResidence, Buffalo. Lawyer in Buffalo for 22 years. Is a part \nowner of the Sterling Engine Co., which has a license to \nmanufacture Sunbeam engines. 721. \n\nRecites attempts at getting contract from Maj. Squier in 1915, \netc. 722-726. \n\nOn page 727 Gen. Squier cancels order placed for the Sun- \nbeam engine. \n\nAssured, however, about August, 1917, that Mitzui, one of the \nbiggest Japanese houses in the world, wanted full capacity of \nplant for the Sunbeam engine, they having a market with a \nBritish ally. 729-731. \n\nContradicting statement of Mr. Waldon. 732-735. \n\nSunbeam tested by Government and accepted. 736. \n\nCould have completed an order for 5,000 machines within a \ncouple of months. 734. \n\nCould have completed 1,500 Sunbeam engines of 350 horsepower \nby January, 1918. 740. \n\nSunbeam engine was driving Bristol plane and used exclusively \nin Handley-Paige. 741. \n\nSeemed like automobile crowd was deciding things for them- \nselves. 741. \n\nMr. Stettinius gives as his reason for the Sunbeam being thrown \nout of the program that it was not satisfactory, but machine \nwas nevertheless flying in many thousands of machines. 742. \n\nReads minutes of Aircraft Board of October 17, 1917. 745. \n\n" Mr. Willys is now building a thousand Sunbeam motors." 749. \n\nStates why he felt there was favoritism in letting contracts for \nmotors. 751. \n\nExpected to lower cost of engine below $10,000. 757. \n\nWould have made a proposition with Government for the pro- \nduction of 12-cylincler Sunbeam at between eight and nine \nthousand dollars. 758. \n\nQuarter of a million loss on the Sunbeam proposition. 761. \n\nPromised production of Liberty motors if not Sunbeam. 765. \nDr. H. C. Dickinson (Washington,\'\' June 12, 1918; Book 4). \n\nConnected with the Bureau of Standards in capacity of physicist \nnearly 15 years. 1. \n\nTested various engines among them the Hispano-Suiza. 2. \n\nConsidered one of the "most typical" engines obtainable for \nresearch work. 4. \n\n\n\nABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 77 \n\nDr. H. C. Dickinson \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nConsiderable changes were necessary in adapting the French \nmodel to American practice. 5. \n\nHad a perfect Wright-Martin model. 6. \n\nModel was in shape to have been used in quantity production. 7. \n\nWright-Martin factory was already making more than 100 mo- \ntors a month for the French Government of the American \nmethod. 7. \n\nDid not think facilities could have been provided to manufac- \nture Hispano-Suiza motors in other plants in less than a year. \n10. \n\nWright-Martin Co. had actually been engaged in perfecting its \nfacilities for the manufacturing of the Hispano-Suiza motor \nsome time prior to the entry of United States in the war. 12. \n\nCould have produced 50 engines a day if pressure had been \nbrought to bear on the work. 14. \n\nTested Liberty 8 and results not satisfactory. 27. \n\nStates Liberty motors of the 12-cylinder type were subjected to \nthe 50-hour test. 30. \n\nDid not test the motor at the bureau on 50-hour test, as they were \nnot requested to. 32. \n\nConsiders Liberty 12 a satisfactory and successful engine. 38. \n\nCould not state positively that Liberty motor had been tested \nin long hour flights. 39. \n\nStates what he knows between the merits of the magneto and \nbattery systems of ignition. 40. \n\nTests put to the Liberty 12. 43-44. \nCapt, Arthur Sweeter (Washington, June 11, 1918; Book 4). \n\nProduce historical record referee! to heretofore. 47. \n\nThis to be a record or complete summary of the battle plane \nsituation. 49. \nCharles Wesley Holmes (Washington, June 11, 1918; Book 4). \n\nGeneral manager of Motor Compressor Co. 51. \n\nWas inspector of the inspection section, inspector of airplanes \nand airplane engines of Signal Corps. 51. \n\nFirst assignment Bureau of Standards. 52. \n\nNever any tests of Liberty motor made during his stay there. \n53. \n\nOne Liberty motor brought to Bureau of Standards, he and \nanother inspector were refused permission to see it, although \nin possession of cards of authority signed by Maj. Souder. 54. \n\nFirst test he saw was at Dayton, Ohio, at McCook Field labora- \ntory, by Mr. Wahl. 55. \n\nMade at request of Splitdorf Electrical Co. 55. \n\nWas only allowed to watch the inspection for three or four \nminutes when requested to leave laboratory by Mr. Wahl. 56. \n\nLieut. Testoni, Italian Special Military Commission and Lieut. \nMezzatisti, Italian Military Aeronautical Commission at later \ndate stated they thought magneto ignition far superior to bat- \ntery ignition. 57, 58. \n\nRelates further experience with Delco ignition system in which \ndifficulties were encountered. 59. \n\nRelates faults of Liberty motor as witnessed by him. 62. \n\n\n\n78 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nCharles Wesley Holmes \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nAeronautical testing laboratory \xe2\x80\x94 testing of a Liberty motor. \n65. \n\nLubricating system not sufficient. 67. \n\nThis remedied, but as much trouble as ever. 68. \n\nExplains danger of having motor in actual flight which was \nnot sufficiently cooled. 70. \n\nLiberty motor for test purposes used means not possible to use \nif in air. 73. \n\nStatement from Lieut. Testoni. 74. \n\nLieut. Taylor present when motor referred to blew up. 76. \n\nPossible all right for bombing machines. 77. \n\nCapt. Marmon, was with the Nordyke-Marmon Co. at India- \nnapolis. 78. \n\nCould not get a test for their aeroplane starters. 78. \n\nUse a hand crank for Liberty motors. 81. \nTom B. Miller (Washington, June 11, 1918; Book 4). \n\nKelates visit to Dayton Wright Aeroplane factory. 85. \n\nThe Talbotts and Mr. Kettering the real heads. 86. \n\nScrapped material. 91. \n\nGovernment did not take over any material unsuitable for use. \n92. \n\nStuff called " dope " an overbuy. 92. \n\nUnnecessary expenditure of money. 94. \n\nTarget practice for guards. 95. \n\nGas masks for the guards. 96. \n\nThe Dayton-Wright, the Delco, and the Davton Metal Products \ncalled the " Triangle." 99. \n\nExpenses of beautifying the grounds comes under overhead \nexpenses. 101. \n\nSignal Corps refuses to pay for this. 101. \n\nTrying to get rid of approvals section, because they objected \nto expenses. 103. \n\nL. V. Bedell not allowed to work any. H. E. Talbott told them \nnot to allow any more purchasing orders to come to him for \napproval. 103. \n\nMaj. Frank E. Smith, in charge of approvals section in Wash- \nington. Overrules Mr. Talbott. 104. \n\nMr. Longacre, sent out by approvals section to look into lumber \nconditions, refused admittance by Mr. Talbott, jr. 104, 106. \n\nLybrant, Ross Bros. & Montgomery. 106. \n\nLieut. Ong. 107. \n\nPromoted out of factory ; did not want him there. 108. \nHerman C. Daych (Washington, June 11, 1918; Book 4). \n\nWith the McCready Publishing Co., Cranford, N. J. 109. \n\nAssociated with Standard Aircraft Co. one year. 109. \n\nAssistant to Mr. Mingle, president. 110. \n\nEverything haphazard, extremely disorganized. 110. \n\nPlant at Plainfield, N. J. \n\nTook over the Elizabeth, N. J., plant. 112. \n\nTechnical name of the Standard Co. There are two corpora- \ntions, one the Standard Aircraft Corporation and the other \nthe Standard Aero Corporation. 113. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 79 \n\nHerman C. Daycii \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nInstance of manipulation by Mr. Mingle of Government finances. \n113. \n\nBenefits from adding subsidiarv to Standard Aero Corporation. \n117. \n\nSalaries of officers of Standard Aero Corporation. 122. \n\nIncreases in these salaries. 122. \n\nCorporation entirelv owned and controlled by Mitsui & Co. 124. \n\nThis a dangerous situation. 125. \n\nEeports rendered to Mitsui by Mr. Mingle Thursdav of everv \nweek. 126. \n\nUnger Bros., contractor for the Standard. 129. \n\nNext-door neighbor to Mr. Mingle. 129. \n\nMaj. Arnold. 130. \n\nChange tack one-eighth of an inch, and thereby hold everything \nup. 131. \n\nNo particular irregularities noticed in the course of production, \nexcepting general disorganization of place. 135. \n\nMen working overtime, Sundays. 135. \n\nCase of graft by Government inspector; that is, holding up \nproduction. 137. \n\nMethods of inspection department tending to retard production \nmerelv through ignorance. 138. \n\nCapitalization of Standard Aircraft Co., $5,000,000. 139. \n\nProduces papers marked " Daych Exhibit 1, June 11, 1918," \nwhich he had kept, showing financial statement of the com- \npany, a statement of which was refused the Government. 140. \n\nStatement exposes Mitsui\'s connection with Standard. 140. \n\nBought only Hall-Scott motors. 142. \n\nResigns from Standard. 147. \n\nMr. Mingle kept his bank account (one of them) at Broadway \nTrust Co., in Woolworth Building. 149. \n\nMingle interested in building operations covering several hun- \ndred thousand dollars for the new plant for which Mitsui \nfurnished the money to purchase the property. 152. \n\nGeneral antagonism to Government interests, done in ignorance, \nthough private ownership of plants. 153. \n\nProduces, among others, exhibit marked " Daych Exhibit 4, \nJune 11, 1918," which was filed away. This is a life history \nof Mr. Mingle, dictated by himself, in which he says he is \ngeneral counsel for Mitsui & Co. 155. \n\nPreduces statement, filed and marked, " Daych Exhibit 6, June \n11, 1918," being day-to-day production sheets. 155. \n\nProduces statement, filed and marked, " Daych Exhibit 6, June \n11, 1918," showing that on August 20, 1917, five motors were \nshipped to Japan direct from California. 156. \n\nPresents name of man who was connected with Mingle during \nthe early part of the company\'s history, who can give a great \ndeal of information about manipulations then. (This paper \nfiled and marked " Daych Exhibit 7, June 11, 1918.") 156. \n\nPresents two cards of high Japanese officials who called to see \nthe plant. Others also, lieutenants and generals, one in Im- \nperial Japanese Navy. These filed and marked u Daycii \nExhibits Nos. 8 and 9, June 11, 1918." 157. \n130687\xe2\x80\x9419\xe2\x80\x946 \n\n\n\n80 ABSTllACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nHerman C. Daych \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nShows paper setting forth cost of machine to the company and \ncost to the Government. Cost to company, $2,354.17; to \nGovernment, over $6,000, besides to this is added overhead \ncharges. 157. \n\nPresents paper showing approximate cost of the new additions \nto the plant. 159. \n\nPresents another statement showing another machine destined \nfor Japan. 159. \nM. W. Greer (Washington. June 11, 1918; book 4). \n\nFacts in case will show incompetency, with perhaps malicious \nintent. 161. \n\nNot a Dayton man. 161. \n\nLetters read showing Mr. Greer\'s status as an aeronautical en- \ngineer, and urging the use of metal in pl\'anes. 162-164. \n\nGermans using all-steel planes. 165. \n\nLetter submitted to Director Aircraft Production urging all- \nmetal planes, citing two " Lufberry and Potter," which have \njust come down in flames. 168. \n\nReply. 169. \n\nSubmits further letter showing reasons for all-metal planes. \n171. \n\nMen of inaction, \'\xe2\x96\xa0 mathematical moles " men not fitted to act \nsent to service in this great emergency of the world. 172. \n\nWas asked by Mr. Durance for a written proposition in Sep- \ntember of the year before for making tests. 172. \n\nNever received an answer. 173. \n\nShows performance of persons who are set to serve in positions \nbevoncl their experience and capacity. 177-178. \n\nMr. W. B. Stout. 178. \n\nLater learns they are trying to develop an all-steel framework \nby the Empire Art Metal Co., of Brooklyn, N. Y., College \nPark. 182. \n\nMr. Diffin, who had made numerous promises to test the sample,, \nhas a brother in New York who goes to the Conger office. 183. \n\nHis plane tested at Bureau of Standards, which test was con- \nvincing to every engineer without exception, except this group \nof men in the Government. 183. \nAlfred Robert Gormully (Washington, June 10, 1918; book 4). \n\nFormer business automobile and sugar machinery, New York. \n185. \n\nComes to Washington to represent the Fiat Co., of Italy. 186. \n\nAn American corporation of the Fiat Co., Mr. Josephs, presi- \ndent. 187. \n\nIn use on the Italian and French fronts. 188. \n\nBeen in actual use in battle planes for several years. 189. \n\nHorsepower raised from 325 to 360 by continual improvements. \n189. \n\nQ,. Have any steps been taken to have that engine used for \nplanes in the United States for our forces? \xe2\x80\x94 A. I was here \nfor that purpose, but did not accomplish anything. 189. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 81 \n\nAlfred Robert Gormully \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nTried to present a proposition that the Fiat engines should be \n\nused until American production came along. 190. \nPresented to many of the representatives of the American Gov- \nernment, including Mr. Baker. 190. \nWhen he first came connected himself with the equipment divi- \nsion. 190. \nCol. Waldon. 190. \nFiat Co. had done business with the American Government in \n\nParis. 191. \nWas never able to talk to but one man about the United States \n\nplacing orders for the Fiat engine. 193. \nCalled upon him 30 or 40 times, but could never see him. Tried \nto make an appointment with him a dozen times, but always \nfailed. 193. \n\nHad already made a statement of his mission. 193. \n\nAgain told by Mr. Baker, as did all others, to see Col. Deeds and \nalso talk with Gen. Squier. 194. \n\nHas interview with Col. Montgomery. Told him Fiat Co. \nwere capable of much greater production; that the engine \nwas accepted and recognized as the primary motor of the \nworld, etc. 196. \n\nPlant at Turin, Italy, 38,000 employees, financially independent, \ndid not need any help from America. 196. \n\nFiat Co. from the very beginning could have turned out several \nhundred a month. - 199. \n\nSaw Mr. Coffin, he referred him as everybody else did to Col. \nDeeds. 201. \n\nMr. Atkins, of the Navy, was enthusiastic, took up the matter \nwith the board, as he needed the engines badly. Finally he \ntold Mr. Gormully he had been " blocked " and could not get \nit through. 202. \n\nSees Mr. Daniels. 203. \n\nPlan was to bring 10 engines over here and try them in boats \nthey had, and if by that time the Liberties were not coming \nthrough, ship our boats over and put these engines in them. \n206. \n\nFiat engine tested in this country. 211. \n\nTests at Langley Field with De Haviland planes. 211. \n\nLieut. Emmons tells him to go back to New York. 213. \nFrederick C. Bahr (Washington, June 10, 1918; book 4). \n\nFormerly in security business in Detroit, Mich. 218. \n\nMorcron & Co. 218. \n\nAssigned to finance division of Signal Corps. 219. \n\nAsked to put in follow-up system for Signal Corps. 220. \n\nThis was developed in fall of 1917. 221. \n\nThis system was described to succeeding executors of that divi- \nsion and is on file in equipment division. 221. \n\nSpecification section was a part of the inspection division. 224. \n\nMaj. Gray at the head of this section. 224. \n\n\n\n82 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nFrederic k C. Bahr \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nSays there is historical account in files of Signal Corps which \nwould show actual state of production under the cost-plus \ncontracts 1 \n\nSpeaking of his own section which is the follow-up, or expedit- \ning department. 225. \n\nQ. How could there be an expediting department or fol- \nlow-up section which, if in successful operation, did not have \nr 11 the ir formation of changes in specification relative to cost- \nplus contracts? 225. \n\nNo production had come through up to the time he left Wash- \nington. 226. \n\nThe follow-up section did seek to find out why, and amongst \na thousand orders difficult to remember answers, but in a gen- \neral way never got any answers. 22 T. \n\nChanges always in the departments higher up. 228. \n\nHad met Col. Deeds and Col. Waldon. 229. \n\nDid not think all information they needed was available, or if \nit was, was not given to them for reasons which those higher \nup knew better. 230. \n\nWas informed that so far as cost-plus contracts were concerned \nthe administrative work was being done by the district man- \nagers of equipment. 230. . \n\nMuch delay in Signal Corps on account of not paying their bills. \n231. \n\nCurtiss Co. having trouble in getting metal parts, as they were \nnot meeting their bills. 232. \n\nCurtiss Co. dilatory in production with respect to planes con- \ntracted for under cost-plus contracts. 233. \n\nExpediting section could not get information with regard to \nproduction of planes and engines that were being made on \na cost-plus basis. 235. \n\nHeads of divisions did not seem to be aware of this expediting \ndepartment, as they tried to start another department entirely \nopposed to this one in some respects. 23G. \n\nToo aggressive in trying to get information, ordered to Detroit. \n237. \n\nWas getting in control of all such things as goods for export. \nKnew by night from a report on his desk how many tons of \nfreight and its cubic volume was ready to be moved to any \npart of the country and where it was located. 238. \n\nSent to Detroit hj Col. Horner and Lieut. Col. Horner. 239. \n\nAsked to have an organization put in the field as it was neces- \nsary to control the situation. After submitting this report he* \nwas sent away. 240. \nGutzox John Delemotte Borglum (Washington, June 11. 1918; \nBook 4). \n\nPresents records covering ordering of the Delco system for \n20,000 motors. 244. \nCoxRAn Charles Martens (Washington, June 12, 1918; Book 4). \n\nHighland Park, Mich. 245. \n\nForeman of testing department of Lincoln Motor Co. 245. \n\nWas with Cadillac Car Co. in similar position. 245. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 83 \n\nConrad Charles Martens \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nBegan assembling and testing marine motors about 18 years \n\nbefore. 24:6. \nGoes to Pacific coast to Hall- Scott Motor Co. to get acquainted \n\nwith their methods of building airplane engines. 247. \nLooks up tools required in their department for building the \n\nengines. 248. \nChanges in horsepower. 251. \nThe testing was very satisfactory, as they learned a great deal \n\nabout tools. 254. \nChanging to a heavier crank shaft. 255. \nDid not have any motor to work on. 257. \nGovernment had no perfected motor they could hand to the \n\nmanufacturers and say to build that one. 257. \nAfter engine tested, make some changes in the locks in the oil \n\npump and the water pump. At first not secured by a lock of \n\nany kind. 267. \nNo report of any endurance test in the air has ever been sent to* \n\nthe factory. 267. \nThinks the trouble with overheating as much the trouble of the \n\naviator as with the engine. 269. \nStates Delco system can be used on Liberty engines. 271. \nCan not use the magnetic ignition. 271. \nSays since change in connecting rod it has turned out to be a \n\nperfect engine. 274. \nMr. Martens is shown something which came from a Liberty \n\nmotor. 275. \nAdmits that it looks flimsy and that at one time he thought it \n\nlooked serious. 275. \nIf it should break a man would lose his oil. 276. \nShows he does not entirely approve of it. 277. \nEelative to the 50-hour test. 279. \n\nAfter strengthening it Signal Corps did not feel it was neces- \nsary to subject it to 50-hour test, as the new rod had been \n\ntested at different plants. 281. \nWanted to test it on his own initiative, as had never been satis- \nfied. 282. \nHarry E. B. Baker (Washington, June 12, 1918; Book 4). \nBusiness man and manufacturer of Cleveland. 284. \nOrganized the Engel Aircraft Co. 284. \nWas president and general manager. 284. \nHad a contract with the Government for supplying standard \n\nparts. 285. \nRecites contracts that were placed with the company and after- \nwards canceled. 285-286. \nThese contracts reinstated. 288. \nMaj. Grav head of Engineering Division of Aircraft Board. \n\n290. \nWere fairly well up in production at time of cancellation of \n\norders. 290. \nStates reasons of his withdrawal from Engel Co. and reason for \n\ncancellation of orders. 292. \n\n\n\n84 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". \n\nArthur P. Homer (Washington, D. C., June 12, 1918; Book 4). \n\nNaval architect and marine engineer. 302. \n\nRepresented Pierce Oil Corporation, Lloyd\'s Register of Ship- \nping, Valentine & Co., the Odorless Refrigerator Co., and \nSterling Engine Co. 302. \n\nGoes to Europe in 1915, in September, to investigate the air- \ncraft engine situation for them. 302. \n\nRelates result of visit to Great Britain, in which Sunbeam is \ncalled most favorably to his attention of all other engines. \n304. \n\nSails again for Europe in January, 1916, where contracts are \ncompleted with Sunbeam Co. 306. \n\nBritish Admiralty refuse at first to let the Sunbeam Co. make \nthe contract as they considered Sunbeam a Government secret. \n307. \n\nFinally returns to this country with Sunbeam engine, with \nplans, specifications, etc. 307. \n\nThese drawings had to be changed into American figures. 307. \n\nUnder Mr. Souther\'s orders they accepted preliminary order for \ntwo engines. 308. \n\nIn June, 1917, tested the first Sunbeam engine and presented \nresults of test to United States Navy Department and Maj. \nSouther. Also reported test to Gen. Squier, who stated that \nit was the first ray of hope he had seen. 308. \n\nTry to see Mr. Walton and appear before the Aircraft Produc- \ntion Board. They refused to see them. 308. \n\nArrange in June to get large plant in Buffalo after consultation \nwith Maj Souther. 309. \n\nIn July Maj. Souther asks to be informed what production the \nSterling Co. could give on Sunbeams. 309. \n\nCould arrange production at any amount they required. 309. \n\nGet option on King Sewing Machine Co. 309. \n\nMaj. Souther changes his plans and tells them to build Liberty \nmotors. 310. \n\nHaving been promised an order and then to have this order \nchanged in face of all the things that could be promised them, \nthey would not buy the plant contracted for. 310. \n\nTries to secure from Sterling Engine Co. at actual cost to them, \nfor the Sunbeam license, and offering same to the United \nStates Government which would have placed the United \nStates Government in a position of having engines of an ac- \ncepted type. 312. \n\nOffer was turned down on strength of statement by Col. Boiling \nin August and no investigation as to worth of the Sunbeam \nwas made in any way. 312. \n\nIn the meantime, the Marling-Rockwell Co. sent representatives \nto Europe to investigate aircraft situation and are informed \nthat the Sunbeam engine is the best engine in Europe for \nadaption to American methods. Was of highest type. 312. \n\nMr. John Willys also was informed by his representative that \nthe Sunbeam was the best type of machine then existing. 312. \n\nWillys endeavored to secure a license, but could not. 313. \n\n\n\n\n\n\nABSTEACT OF AIRCKAFT INVESTIGATION. 85 \n\nArthur P. Homer \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nMr. Willys offered the Navy Department to go into production \non Sunbeam engines within four months on a large scale if it \nwere desired. 313. \n\nEeports interview with Maj. Vincent and Capt. Marmon just \nreturned from Europe with regard to Sunbeam. 316-317. \n\nNo changes could have been made in motor that would have \nretarded production here as it had already passed the break- \nclown test in Europe, which took seven months. 319. \n\xe2\x82\xacol. Edwin S. George (Washington, D. C, June 12, 1918; Book 4). \n\nLieutenant colonel, Signal Corps. 325. \n\nDuty, procurement of the motor transport equipment for the \nSignal Corps. 325. \n\nHas nothing to do with the production of aircraft. 326. \n\nVelie Motor Corporation, at Moline, Kelly Springfield Co., at \nSpringfield, Ohio, Federal Motor Truck Co., at Detroit, etc., \nfurnish the heavy aviation trucks. 327. \nDr. Frederick W. Buck (Washington, June 12, 1918; Book 4). \n\nMaker of airplanes, torpedoes, and gas engines, Pueblo, Colo. \n329. \n\nThe Buck Aircraft & Munitions Co. 329. \n\nOrganized January, 1917. Could have built airplanes a year \nago if they could have gotten the order. 330. \n\nBrought out an all-metal airplane. 330. \n\nWrote to Washington; no results. 331. \n\nGave him as their reason for refusal to consider metal planes \nthere was so much head resistance. 333. \n\nCompany incorporated for $3,000,000. 334. \n\nAircraft Production Board state in letters they have already \nadvanced $145,000,000 for new companies. 337. \n\nUnderstood that they had advanced four million to Curtiss, some \ntwelve million dollars to the Wright-Martin Co. 338. \n\nDid not understand that War Credits Board had been organ- \nized for purpose of determining amount of advances that were \nmade. 338. \n\nCan not secure an engine to put in their model. 340-341. \nWilfred C. Leland (Washington, June 12, 1918; Book 4). \n\nManufacturer, Detroit, Mich. 342. \n\nVice president and general manager of Lincoln Motor Co. 342. \n\nLooks to securing of plant for manufacture. 346. \n\nFails, consults with authorities at Washington. 346. \n\nSee Mr. Vandervort, Col. S. D. Waldon, and Mr. Deeds. 356. \n\nTurn in resignations at Cadillac Co. on strength of assurance \nthat their high-grade work would naturally put them in a \nposition to receive contracts, and relying on honesty of pur- \npose and desire to get only the best. 347. \n\nHave further interviews in the meantime with members of the \nAircraft Board with respect to the contracts to be allotted. \n349. \n\nNo definite motor in mind ; would build whatever was decided to \nbe best, 351. \n\nMr. Charles F. Kettering, of the company, came with them. 351. \n\nBelonged to Dayton, Ohio, Delco Ignition Co. 351. \n\n\n\n86 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nWilfked C. Leland \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nHelped to bring out self-starter for car called the Delco starter r \nor the Delco ignition system. 352. \n\nCadillac owned no interest in Delco Co. 352. \n\nDelco system was pioneer system. 354. \n\nMr. Ernest E. Sweet, consulting engineer of Cadillac Co. 356. \n\nMr. D, T. Conley, engineer with Cadillac Co. 356. \n\nMr. Frank Johnson, motor engineer, Cadillac Co. 356. \n\nHas some stock in United Motors. 358. \n\nKnew United Motors owned the Delco. 359. \n\nLincoln Motor Co. incorporated in August, but in meantime had \nto get another company out which had same name. 359. \n\nGives list of stockholders. 360. \n\nDayton Metal Products Co. had $100,000. 361. \n\nMr. Kettering\'s stock comes in Dayton Metal Products. 363. \n\nHad met H.^E. Talbott. sr., and his son, Mr. Talbott, jr.. and \nMr. McCann. 364. \n\nDesigned the plant for postwar production. 366. \n\nGen. Squier\'s name on list of those thev consulted in Washing- \nton. 367. \n\nDiscuss in general way Rolls-Royce, Sunbeam, and Gnome as \ntype of motors to build. 369. \n\nMr. Kettering had been with Cash Register people. 371. \n\nSee Gen. Squier. 372. \n\nNever been financially connected with Mr. Kettering or Mr. \nDeeds. 374. \n\nMr. Kettering was one of the three leading engineers in design- \ning the Liberty motor. He was chosen to handle the ignition \nsvstem for the Liberty motor. 376. \n\nMi\\ Vincent, of the Packard Co., and Mr. Hall, of the Hajl-Scott \nCo., were also selected to design the Liberty motor. 377. \n\nCadillac Co. built connecting rods for first 10 Liberty motors. \n378. \n\nMr. Hall comes to Cadillac Co. and tells of progress in design- \ning Liberty motor, and reasons for believing it was adapted \nto American methods. 380. \n\nMr. Kettering called up to work out ignition system for Liberty \nmotor. 381. \n\nAssured by Government authorities if plan worked out well Lin- \ncoln Motor Co. would be called upon to furnish 20 motors a \nday. 383. \n\nWhen further assurance held out proceeded to buy plant. \n385-386. \n\nBuy Holden Avenue plant, costing $20,000 or $30,000. 386. \n\nApproximately $4,000,000 been paid to Lincoln Motor Co. to \ndate. 389. \n\nMr. Nabel is property officer of Government, 391. \n\nContract with Lincoln Motor Co. on cost-plus basis. 392. \n\nFirst contract calls for 6,000 motors. 392. \n\nWar Department now decides they will need to have 100 a day \nturned out of eight-cylinder type instead of 20. 393. \n\nGo to Detroit to seek new plant for enlarging purposes. 393. \n\nDecide they will have to erect buildings. See their bankers in \nDetroit First National and Peoples\' State Bank. 393b. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 87 \n\nWilfred C. Leland \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \nAgreement reached. 894. \nMr William H. Murphy and Mr. David Boyer and Mr. Lei and \n\nindorse paper so that $4,000,000 may be available. 394. \nResolution of Aircraft Board read giving terms of order placed \n\nwith Lincoln Motor Co. for 6,000, etc., engines at a price to \n\nequal the cost thereof plus $913.05 as a fixed profit for each \n\nmotor so ordered, plus 25 per cent of any sum by which the \n\nestimated cost, of each motor, fixed at $6,087 per motor, shall \n\nexceed the actual cost. 397. \nBogy cost first fixed at $6,087, but later* changed to $5,000. 398. \nGives reasons for setting it originally at $6,087. 398. \nReads further resolutions of Aircraft Board. 393b. \nReads minutes of meeting of Aircraft Board further in refer- \nence to estimated cost of $5,000 for each engine, fixing profit at \n\n12J per cent on each engine. 395b. \nThat the Government make an allowance for depreciation of \n\ncompany\'s heat treating plant. 396b. \nThat the cost of the company\'s testing plant be allowed as part \n\nof the production cost of the engines to be manufactured. \n\n396b. \nThat an advance payment of $4,000,000 be made to the company \n\non account of the contract. 396b. \nPackard Co. secures an advance of $2,500,000 on its contract. \n\n397-398b. \n(As you will notice, paper incorrectly numbered here, as pages \n\ngo to 398 and then start in again on 390.) \nLelancl not interested in Packard Co. at all. 398b. \nTotal expenditure of plant $6,200,000. 401. \nGet the $4,000,000 from the Government in one payment early \n\nin December. 402. \nFive per cent interest on first advance. 405. \nAlso two other loans from banks in neighborhood of $1,750,000 \n\nor $2,000,000. 406. \nA second contract with the Government for spare parts. 406. \nNo additional contract for motors. 406. \nReads minutes of Aircraft Board recommending this contract \n\nwith Lincoln Motor Co at cost-plus profit of 15 per cent and \n\nproviding for depreciation clause. 408. \nThe first contract for 6,000 motors for the Government and this \n\nlast-mentioned contract only two Lincoln Motor Co. ever had \n\nwith Government. 408. \nEstimated cost of the 6,000 Liberty engines. 409. \nEstimate by Government that the spares to be produced would \n\ncost $6,000,000. 410. \nPossibly $40,000,000 involved in the two orders. 410. \nStatement is produced showing sum of $8,423,966.38 paid by \n\nGovernment to Lincoln Motor Co. 410. \nIn March two more advances made by Government, bringing \n\ntotal up to $6,500,000. 411. \nLei and Exhibit No. 2 shows payments amounting to $4,177,076.75 \n\nfrom the Government to Lincoln Motor Co. exclusive of ad- \nvances. 411. \n\n\n\n88 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nWilfred C. Leland \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nCan not seem to state what method, if any, had been employed \nto determine cost of making of these motors. 414\xe2\x80\x94415. \n\nMr. Leland\'s attorney states accounting system not built up yet \nwhen started production, and that it was laid for determining \ncost in lots of 800 motors, which is not yet reached. 417-418. \n\nMr. F. C. Thompson was Government accountant in charge. 419. \n\nChief accountant for Lincoln Motor Co. William T. Nash. 419. \n\nFurnishes salaries of officials of company. 420. \n\nIncreases in force. 421. \n\nExplains delays in production. 422. \n\nChange made from 8 C3 T linder to 12. 423. \n\nQuestion is asked what reason there Avas for failure to get any \nengines at all because they were going to try for increased \nhorsepower. 424. \n\nAt time orders were received to change had not completed tools \nfor motors they were then planning to build. 425. \n\nLater finish making of these tools to use up stock on hand. 426. \n\nOne hundred and sixty-nine motors are finished with lighter \nconnecting rod. 430. \n\nSome delays in getting blue prints. 431. \n\nGo along for six week or two months experimenting on connect- \ning rod. 431. \n\nIn February find they will need heavier connecting rods. 432. \n\nChange in a particular part many times affects 10 or 50 or 100 \nother parts. 434. \n\nTool-making establishments not adequate for work throwfci \nupon them. 437. \n\nIn many instances seem to have been motives for holding up, \n\nwillfully holding up the making of the tools. 438. \n. Gave a list of these tool-making concerns in Detroit to Depart- \nment of Justice. 438. \n\nUnderstanding is given that Signal Corps follow a policy to \nstandardize entire output of motors; not put into production \ndifferent types of motors, but to have one type which is finally \nreached as a result of all the work of development. 441. \n\nDid not have full supply of labor. 443. \n\nShortage of aluminum castings. 443. \n\nGovernment pays cost of all scrapped material. 455. \n\nAmount would be large, although would not state even ap- \nproximately. 456. \n\nFactory tests to which motors are subjected. 458. \n\nConnecting rod change, in February, last important change. \n460. \n\nCould not state that the Liberty motor was vet standardized. \n462. \n\nBuy the Delco ignition system and install it when they make \nan engine. 463. \n\nAll special tools that apply particularly to Liberty motor are \ncharged to this motor. Amount for special tools runs possibly \na million and a quarter. 464. \n\nIn case of special tool account, the tools will be the property of \nthe Government, but in the case of machinery and equipment \nthe same will belong to the company. 467, \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 89 \n\nWilfred C. Lelaxd \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nCan not recall debit balance against Government under their \n\nsystem at end of April. 472. \nGovernment pays all the salaries of officers and employees of \nthe company of every kind. 477. \n\nThe company itself, during the time this contract is being car- \nried out, bears absolutely no expense except whatever interest \nit pays on borrowed money. 477. \nContract contemplated this order would be completed in 10 \nmonths. 478. \n\n$5,000,000 clear profit for the company under contract, 478. \n\nIn addition, Mr. Leland and father each getting salary of $25,000 \nfrom the Government. 479. \n\nStatement says that between the 1st of September and the mid- \ndle of February over a thousand changes made in the Liberty \nmotor. 479. \n\nAcknowledges probably only 10 per cent in some years, perhaps \n20 in others, was written off on machinery and equipment in \nthe Cadillac Co. at end of year when inventory taken. 481. \n\nChanges in design of Liberty motor have caused three months\' \ndelay. 484. \n\nIn spite of all these delays that have occurred, company still \nsafe with respect to the limit, 484. \n\nNo estimate made of what they could produce in 1918. 487-488. \n\nHad never heard of an estimate by Signal Corps figuring that \nthe Packard, Lincoln, and Ford Cos. would produce a total \nof 32,626 Liberty motors. 488. \n\nCan not recollect any estimate ever being given to Signal Corps \nin Februarv that thev could turn out 9,850 motors in the vear \n1918. 489." \n\nGeneral Motors owns the Cadillac Co. 490. \n\nFigured that if contracts were to be closed out for 6,000 engines \nand the spare parts, thev would have a debt on their hands of \n$4,000,000. 491. \n\nExpected to pay about 80 per cent of the $5,000,000 profit in \ntaxes. 491. \n\nThis constituted the $4,000,000 of indebtedness to the Govern- \nment, 493. \nLester P. Barlow (Washington, June 13, 1918; Book 4). \n\nWhen last testifying stated he expected to go to Dayton for pur- \npose of examining workings of Liberty motor. 501. \n\nWas sent by instruction of Col. Bane, or technical division of \nDepartment of Military Aeronautics. 501. \n\nTwo hours getting a pass to hangars. 501. \n\nSent him to another field, when they had three motors at the \nfield he could have used. 502. \n\nReturns to Washington with nothing accomplished. 504. \n\nIs told by Col. Bane to return and all will be fixed up all right, \nWires Col. Hall to be allowed to use motor at Bureau of \nStandards. 505. \n\nDrops whole thing. 506. \n\nGets plane with motor, so that he can conduct test in actual \nflight. 506. \n\n\n\n90 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". \n\nLester P. Barlow \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nGives details of L. W. F. machine. 507. \n\n" W J\' stands for Willard, " F " is for Fowler, and " L " the old \n\noriginal company. Lawrence. Known as L. W. F. Co., of Loiw \n\nIsland City. 508. \nBuilt a number of training machines for the Government. 509. \nEngines turned out by Government could have had this system of \n\nradiation attached to them without difficulty. 509. \nCol. Deeds tells Senator Hitchcock that $10,000 had been set \n\naside authorizing Martin to expend that sum on drawings. \n\n511. \nReceived letter from Director of Military Aeronautics inform- \ning him that that section did not at that time desire to test \n\nsuch an arrangement. 511. \nNot one man on the board qualified to make such a statement. \n\n512. \nDid not call him to explain the device ; they had no blue prints \n\nto look at; could not have possibly given it any consideration. \n\n512. \nAll prominent men connected with aeronautics said it should be \n\ntried out, 512. \nGen. Squier stating that if Germany were using it they could \n\npractically destroy and drive the people out of both London \n\nand Paris in a single night, 513. \nGen. Squier thought the cost of this campaign would probably \n\nbe a billion dollars. 514. \nPracticability of \'the device could have been determined for \n\n$150,000. \'514. \nNo bombing machines being made in this country excepting some \n\nexperimental work on Handley-Paige. 515. \nIs asked while at Dayton if he had any simplified trap in mind, \n\nas the one they had was very complicated. 515. \nTo get the most efficiency out of a machine, bombs should be de- \ntermined before the plane is built, 516. \nNo machines being built by the Government to carry the accepted \n\ntype of bombs. 516. \nOrdnance Department stops work on certain type of bomb, \n\nwhich throws 70,000 practically finished ones into junk. 517. \nBelieves Liberty motor has reached point of development or use \n\nin military aeronautics for combat purposes, but not as bomb- \ning machine. 518. \nConsiders that either the Rolls-Royce or Sunbeam motors are \n\nbetter engines. 519. \nLiberty motor may in time prove equal to them, but as to these \n\nmotors thev were certain, as they had been in active service. \n\n520. \nPrincipal thing against the Liberty motor was throwing the \n\neggs all in one basket right in the middle of the war. 520. \nSunbeam would not have had to go through an experimental \n\nstage. 520. \nLee Mason (Washington, June 13, 1918; Book 4). \nLives at 1414 B Street NW., Washington. 523. \nFollowed the automobile trade and electrical trade. 523. \nMetz one of the companies he has worked for. 523. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 91 \n\nLee Mason \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nMakers of airplane parts. 524. \n\nFactory at Waltham, Mass. 524. \n\nHad contracts with the Government. Make all the wooden \nparts and all metal parts except the motor. 524. \n\nGoes to Metz factory to work, working in sheet-metal depart- \nment, and finds he is working under a German-born foreman. \n525. \n\nName was Byng, and did not think he was naturalized. 525. \n\nReported twice a week to the police. 526. \n\nRan a standing ad in Boston local paper every day for 50 sheet- \nmetal workers. 527. \n\nOut of stock and did not seem to try to get any. 527. \n\nMen sit around and loaf; he was told not to go home; read a \nnewspaper or anything ; go to the toilet and sj^end a few hours, \nor anywhere, but not to go home. 528. \n\nGoes home, and then goes back to go to work. Same condition \nof affairs. Told he might have to lay around for a month, but \nnot to go home. Did not know when thev would get stock. \n528. \n\nHe received 30 cents an hour. 531. \n\nGood Germans got 37, 37J, or 40. 532. \n\nHe with about two others were the only Americans around. 532. \n\nThe Germans never talked with him; always seemed to meet in \ngroups so far out he could never reach them. 532. \n\nSuperintendent of the plant was a German. 533. \n\nUnderstood that older Mr. Metz was born in Germany. 533. \n\nBlue prints were allowed to lay around on benches so that any- \none could have taken them home at night and return them in \nthe morning. 534. \n\nWoodworkers\' department running same way. Men idle, but \nad running in Boston papers for 100 woodworkers. 535. \n\nAsked to " just stall around." 536. \n\nEnormous office force. 537. \n\nThree Signal Corps officers there. 539. \n\nProduction manager, Mr. Schauffler, was a German. 539. \n\nHolding up airplane work by finishing off automobiles. 541. \n\nThese men Were skilled to do airplane work, but they would not \nput them on it. Bring in some old clodhopper or stonemason \nand put him on filing parts down assembling. 542. \nLuther Mason (Washington, June 13, 1918; Book 4). \n\nLives at 1414 V Street. 544. \n\nBeen living in Waltham, Mass. 544. \n\nWas in the automobile assembling at Metz factory. 546. \n\nFinally gets in airplane department, but is immediately taken \nback to helping on automobiles, and green hands put on air- \nplane work. 547-548. \n\nGot in lumber by carloads, but never turned out any parts. 549. \n\nOfficial of the company told him the reason thev did not accom- \nplish more was because they were always getting a new out- \nfit of blue prints. 552. \n\nMr. Pickens, business manager of the company. 552. \n\nStates Mr. Byng Avas unnaturalized German. Police had his \npicture and finger prints. 552. \n\n\n\n92 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nLuther Mason \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nLieut. Boehm represented the Government at the plant, 553. \n\nMan making pro-German remarks was given work in depart- \nment doing Government work. 555. \n\nMentions idle office force, and blue prints lying around. 556. \n\nCites instances of sabotage at plant of Sturtevants, near Wal- \ntham. 558. \nJohn A. Wilson (Washington, June IT, 1918: Book 4). \n\nBesides Franklin, Pa. 561. \n\nIn the oil business. 561. \n\nWorking for the Aircraft Board. 561. \n\nGentleman calls to see him with stabilizing machine. 562. \n\nEvery step opposed by colonel in charge of the Signal Corps. \n562. \n\nMake demonstration at Mineola of a perfect stabilizer. 563. \n\nThe Macey Engineering Co., at Franklin. 566. \n\nHave contract with Government. 566. \n\nCol. Deeds makes the contract for the Equipment Division. \n567. \xe2\x96\xa0 \n\nWaiting for the motors. 568. \nMaj. Howard C. Marmon (Washington, June IT, 1918; Book 4). \n\nMajor, Signal Corps. 572. \n\nPrior to this, civilian. 5T2. \n\nWith Xordyke & Marmon. \n\nWent to Europe to study aircraft with Col. Gorrell, Col. Boil- \ning, Col. Clark. 5T3. \n\nKeport turned in to Secretary Baker (Sept. 1). 5T4. \n\nCalled the Boiling Commission. 5T4. \n\nExamined Rolls-Boyce, Sunbeam, etc, 5T6. \n\nSunbeam criticized by fliers at the front, 5TT. \n\nTwo or three thousand Sunbeams in use over there. 5T8. \n\nFound the Rolls-Bovce the only engine that at that time was \nreally filling the bill. 589. \n\nDid not think there had been a fundamental change in the Lib- \nerty engine. 591. \n\nLhiderstood when over there that American machines would \nnot be over until July, and in the meantime our forces would \nbe supplied by European manufacturers. 595. \n\nThat was their excuse for oblioatino- the United States for \n$100,000,000 spent for aircraft while over there. 596. \n\nThought it was unnecessary to put into production a foreign \nengine to meet an immediate need, as thought there was \nplenty of time to develop the Liberty. 596. \n\nBoiling Commission went abroad again in June; found over \nthere that it was desired that the American Government \nshould devote its attention to high-power engines. 604. \n\nChanging rod on Liberty delayed them about two weeks. 606. \n\nTrouble with respect to lubrication caused two or three weeks\' \ndelay. 606. \n\nCol. Vincent was at head of engine design section of the Signal \nCorps, which made the drawings for the Liberty motor. 607. \n\nCablegram from Gen. Pershing on March 15 asking for revised \nestimate schedule of motor production by months, etc, 608. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 93 \n\nMaj. Howard C. Maemon \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nAmerican Government asked to have motors shipped to other \n\nside, where they could be tested. 612. \nStates that outside of changes in connecting rods there has been \n\nno delays in production of Liberty motors. 614. \nLast October or November the Government had a set of draw- \nings for the Liberty that were at least 99 per cent complete. \n\n616. \nNo lack of blue prints that would cause delay in production. \n\n617. \nEveryone having a contract should have gotten started into \n\nproduction in October, 1918. 619. \nThink it an absolutely good motor. 621. \nIs of opinion there will be less difficulty with the Liberty engine \n\nthan the Allies have had with any of their engines. 625. \nCommander Briggs, in charge of engine-building work for \n\nEngland, thinks this a thoroughly satisfactory ignition. 631. \nPart of delay in the Liberty engine output ascribed to severe \n\nspecifications and inspection requirements. 640. \nMaj. Haizlett in charge of Government office at Detroit. \nLieut. Col. Henry B. Joy (Washington, D. C, June IT, 1918; \nBook 5). \n\nPrevious to connection with Signal Corps actively engaged with \n\nPackard Motor Car Co. 1. \nBecame associated with Signal Corps in October. 1. \nNow is largest individual owner of Packard Motor Car Co. \n\nsecurities. 2. \nAssigned to duty in connection with raising 12,000 to 15,000 \n\nindustrial trops for service in France. 2. \nAcquainted with development of Liberty motor. 3. \nLibertv motor outgrowth of work of Packard Motor Car \n\nCo. 4. \nObtained from Ralph de Palma the German Mercedes airplane \n\nmotor. 4. \nPackard Co. developed a 300-horsepower and plus motor and \n\nnotified Government such a motor was ready to show them \n\nabout time war was declared. 6. \nWork on this motor was all done prior to April, 1917. 6. \nEnglish and French officers thought motor behind times be- \ncause more power -and lighter motor desired. 8. \nLiberty motor evolved from sketches made by Mr. Vincent and \n\non experimental work conducted by Packard Co. 9. \nFeeling in August or September that eight-cylinder motor was \n\nmost important. 13. \nTrend of opinion toward hio-her power. Does not know whether \n\nany eights were contracted for. 13. \nReason for delay in production of Liberty -motor is because \n\ndesign was not completely and satisfactorily finished and \n\nO. K\'d in all details before it was turned over to factory for \n\nproduction. 14. \nHave been changing design of motor all the time. 15. \nGreat difficulty in spark plugs. Power and ability of motor \n\nto-day is limited to spark plugs. 18. \n\n\n\n94 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nLieut. Col. Henry B. Joy\xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\n-Changes in jmotor while under production causes a lairgo \namount of scrappage of material and wasted money. 18. \n\nLiberty motor changed with respect to bearings, lubrication, and \nconnecting rods. 22. \n\nThought Packard Co. going ahead too fast. 23. \n\nPrivate manufacturers could not do it. Can only do it with \nGovernment\'s till behind you. 23. \n\nThought Deled ignition system best. 27. \n\nDid not think air program of having 3,500 planes on battle \nfront in spring could be lived up to, but for expressing his \nopinion was called pessimistic. 37. \n\nPackard Co. shipped some motors in December to appease pub- \nlic demand, which were not up to standard. 40. \nOwen Thomas (Washington, D. C, June 17, 1918; Book 5). \n\nEngaged in Government work under Gen. Johnson in Depart- \nment of Purchase and Supplies. 62. \n\nIn charge of collecting drawings, engineering data, and speci- \nfications of all Government equipment. 62. \n\nPreviously a consulting engineer. 62. \n\nBeen two years in England and Canada on war work for \nEnglish Army. 63. \n\nWas a lieutenant colonel in British Army. \n\nW r as consulting engineer of Mercedes Co., a German concern, \nprevious to war. 64. \n\nPractical to build motors of Mercedes type from Mercedes \nmotor Packard Co. had. 68. \n\nTaken about five or six months to get into production. 68. \n\nMercedes type of forced-speed lubrication better than any- \nthing else. 70. \n\nBritish copied Mercedes motor in Rolls-Royce. 73. \n\nMercedes motor was built in Germany with American tools. 77. \n\nGermans beneficiaries to-day of American experience in manu- \nfacturing of Mercedes engine. 78. \n\nMain difference in Mercedes motor and Liberty motor was in \nlubrication. 82. \n\nNo question but what planes in quantity could have been turned \nout last fall in both 6 and 12 types. *84. \n\nDiscussion on change in lubrication system of Liberty motor \ntook months rather than weeks. 85: \n\nWas at front until January, 1917, making study of engineer- \ning matters for British Army. 86. \n\nCommendatory letter from Lieut. Gen. Hughes inserted in \nrecord. 87. \n\nOffered services to Council of National Defense, but was ad- \nvised under date of May 2, 1917, by Mr. Coffin that did not \nthink situation warranted his making the sacrifice. 88. \n\nEnglish nationality objected to. 90. \n\nFound Delco ignition system good., 94. \n\nMercedes is not handmade design like other European motors. \n100. \n\nEnglish planes made by women labor who had not had any ex- \nperience previous to war. 101. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 95 \n\nOwen Thomas \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nServices accepted by General Staff as stated in telegram of \nNovember 23. 103. \n\nVery familiar with production of planes in Europe, but had \nvery little to do with it in this country. 104. \n\nNatural difficulties in manufacturing planes augmented by lot \nof experimentation not warranted. 105. \n\nConsiders Liberty motor on light side of safety, due to sac- \nrificing strength to lightness. 105. \n\nThought it was possible to obtain production of De Haviland \nplanes before 1st of January. 106. \n\nDoes not think Hispano- Suiza engine a practical American \nmanufacturing design. 106. \n\nSignal Corps weak on engineering end. 107. \nLieut. Col. Elbert John Hall (Washington, D. C, June 18, 1919 ; \nBook 5). \n\nCharge of production engineering on Bristol and De Haviland \nfighting planes at all factories. 109. \n\nBeen on that assignment about 90 days. 109. \n\nPrevious to that was consulting engineer on Production Board. \n109. \n\nDuty was to organize all factories, help organize them to build \nthe Liberty motor, and clean up design of motor itself. 110. \n\nPrevious to entering service was vice president and general man- \nager of Hall-Scott Co., on Pacific coast. 110. \n\nHas had about 20 years of gas-engine designing. Has probably \ndesigned 100 different types and about 13 different types of \naviation motors. 111. \n\nAll aviation motors known as Hall-Scott motors. 111. \n\nRussia standardized on Hall-Scott motors during war. 112. \n\nUp until war was declared United States Government had about \n200 of their motors. 112. \n\nSince entering war has about 3,000 training motors. 113. \n\nFamiliar with every type of motor that exists. 113. \n\nKnew more about what was going on in Germany with respect to \nmotors than our own Government. 114. \n\nCol. Vincent and himself designed Liberty motor. 114. \n\nCame to Washington for interview upon receipt of telegram from \nCol. Deeds. 115. \n\nKnew Col. Deeds through business connections. 116. \n\nBought Delco starting equipment for railway motor cars, which \nhe built, from Col. Deeds and sold him original 8-cylinder auto- \nmobile which he built and Cadillac used for their first experi- \nments. 116. \n\nNever had met Col. Vincent. 118. \n\nCol. Vincent had come to Washington to make arrangements with \nGovernment to purchase engine designed by Packard people. \n118. \n\nMotor was impracticable for aviation. 119. \n\nWent to Willard Hotel with Col. Vincent to design new motor. \n119. \n\nConferred with English and French mission as to what was \ndesired in way of motor. 121. \n\n130687\xe2\x80\x9419 7 \n\n\n\n96 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nLieut. Col. Elbert John Hall \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nArmy and Navy Technical Board appropriated $250,000 to com- \nplete six engines of each type (8 and 12) of design accepted. \n123. \n\nFour-cylinder motor was about 375 pounds and would develop \n120 horsepower. Six-cylinder motor about 480 pounds and \nwould develop 220 horsepower. Eight-cylinder was to weigh \n600 pounds and develop 270 horsepower. Twelve-cylinder mo- \ntor was to weigh about 780 pounds and develop 380 horsepower. \n124, 125. \n\nMercedes engine owned by Packard Co. not suitable for aviation \nand was only used by Germans in experimental work. 162. \n\nNever thought it possible to develop or build up an engine from \nthat motor which could be used for aviation work in high \npowers. 127. \n\nLiberty motor is same type as German Mercedes. 129, 130. \n\nThought Hall-Scott lubricating system best, but was changed be- \ncause of mission coining from abroad and the Rolls-Royce en- \ngineer coming over and selling his system. 131. \n\nDoes not approve present lubricating system on Libertv motor. \n132. \n\nAside from Liberty motor, Rolls-Royce engine regarded better \nthan any other. 134. \n\nHas had no trouble in cooling Liberty engine. 136. \n\nOnly got radiator suitable to Liberty motor within last couple \nof weeks. 137. \n\nNow uses same t} r pe of radiator used abroad by French and Eng- \nlish. 138. \n\nOther battery systems that could be used on Liberty motor. 143. \n\nPerfecting of motor should have been done in three months. 145. \n\nDelay in production due to lack of machinery. 146. \n\nReal production has not begun yet. 147. \n\nCol. Vincent in charge of perfecting motor during his absence. \n148. \n\nFord Co. had gone ahead producing tools for the manufacture \nof 8-cylinder Liberty and were building 5,000, when it was \nabandoned. 149. \n\nBureau of Standards inexperienced and not capable of making \ngood block test of motors. 152. \n\nMotor w T as not air tested sufficiently. 152. \n\nDelay of probably three months in preliminary production, be- \ncause instead of perfecting design went ahead on production \nand testing products in air, and not sufficiently at that. 153. \n\nDelay in larger production due to lack of equipment and tool- \nmakers and to manufacturers miscalculating. 154. \n\nReport of breakdown tests marked "Hall Exhibit 1, June 18, \n1918." 156. \n\nPart of report inserted in record. 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162. \n\nInstead of giving first experimental engines breakdown tests, \nwere sidetracked for exhibition flying and show purposes. \n\nHad to redraw a great many of drawings and practically rewrote \nall specifications. 164. \n\nContinued down to February. 165. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 97 \n\nLieut. Col. Elbert John Hall \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nBad feature was manufacturing limits set, which also caused \n\nwaste. 165. \nTried to make machine like watch \xe2\x80\x94 impossible. 166. \nWould have been possible to have run breakdown tests on all \n\nmotors between June and September. 167. \nIf breakdown tests had been made before manufacturers started \n\nto make tools, it would have been much easier, as then they \n\nwould not have had to make changes in tools. 168. \nPackard plant and Ford could have been turning out 10 motors \n\neach daily in January if breakdown tests had been made. 169. \nFirst 1,000 engines faulty by reason of having light crank shafts, \n\nlight connecting rods, and light bearings. 170, 171. \nDangerous condition, but motors were shipped abroad. \nLife of motors in service will probably average 50 to 75 hours, \n\nwhen it should be 300 hours. 171. \nAlways against cost-plus contracts. 176. \nDo not create initiative to go ahead. 176. \n\nEstimated cost of Liberty motor $2,400, without overhead. 177. \nThis price included manufacturing losses, such as parts spoiled \n\nand rejected. \nManufacturing concern like Packard Motor Co. would incur no \n\nrisks whatever in making Liberty motor under contract. It \n\nwould have been a wonderful contract to get. 179. \nThinks Liberty motor was a life-saver for Packard Co. 180. \nUp to two months previous Hall-Scott Co. built more motors \n\nthan anybody else in this country. 182. \nWas offered contract for 1,000 Liberty 12\'s by Navy, but plant \n\ncould not handle it. 182, 183. \nUnder cost-plus contracts seems to be a tendency to use too many \n\npeople to do a certain thing. 187. \nLooks to him as though some plants were loading up on machin- \nery. 189. \nEngine manufacturers were claiming his figures were too low \n\n($2,400). 190. \nBasing overhead at 100 per cent, entire cost of engine would be \n\n$3,600. 192. \nWith overhead 200 per cent, it would make entire cost $4,800. \n\n193. \nPlant using Taylor or similar system would probably have 200 \n\nper cent overhead. 193. \nWould not build Liberty motor himself on a bogey price under \n\n$10,000 for two or three hundred motors. His price of $2,400 \n\nwas for a large production. 194. \nFive thousand motors would justify his price of $4,000, which \n\nincludes overhead, for cost of a Liberty motor. 194. \nMentioned this price ($4,000) to Col. Montgomery and Col. \n\nDeeds. Was told by them that manufacturers thought he was \n\ntoo low. 195. \nWas given full responsibility to get production in any way he \n\ncould get it. 196. \nGot into production end through a meeting held in Maj. Gray\'s \n\noffice, who had charge of production engineering. 197. \n\n\n\n98 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". \n\nLieut. Col. Elbert John Haul \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nOnly 75 per cent of drawings ready for machines because there \nwas nobody who could complete the job. 199. \n\nMade model machines for each of plants, finishing Dayton- \nWright model first, as they were only people who could com- \nplete job at this time. \n\nMachine guns and necessary mounting of them, method of put- \nting in ammunition boxes, the radio and method of putting it \ninto plane, photographic apparatus, and all other necessary \napparatus was information lacking, and was holding back \ncompletion of planes. 200. \n\nDifficulty to get information accountable to lack of organization. \n200. \n\nGreat deal of prejudice at Day ton- Wright plant to overcome. \nPeople in plant engineering organization and production men \ndo not like an outsider to come in. 201. \n\nSignal Corps puts their men in plant and actually taught men \nhow to do the work. 202. \n\nInspection Department of Signal Corps very poor. 202. \n\nWay it was lined up would hold up production, and there was \nnobody actually responsible. 202. \n\nFirst machine produced was sent abroad without any equip- \nment. Probably put it on over there. Anybody who knows \nbusiness can put on equipment in two or three da} r s. 202. \n\nSupposed to be shipped complete. 202. \n\nGovernment inspectors did not inspect during assembling of \nmachine, but waited until it was complete. They then gen- \nerally found 50 or 100 things wrong. 203. \n\nDayton- Wright people had done a great deal to try to get infor- \nmation and necessary equipment. 201. \n\nNo one connected with Equipment Division who knew business \nwell enough to coordinate all that stuff. 201. \n\nHad to get appropriation to buy $195,000 worth of stuff which \nOrdnance Department should have furnished. Also helped \nOrdnance people to redesign their bomb-dropping apparatus. \n205. \n\nConcentrating on De Havilands first. 206. \n\nTook up Bristol job about April 11. 206. \n\nCurtiss Co. had contract for 2,000 Bristol planes, at estimated \ncost of $13,500,000, and had not started work on them in \nApril. 208. \n\nThey would have stayed in that same position for weeks and \nmonths if somebody had not taken it up. 208. \n\nHad made an effort to make headway, but practically all they \ndid was to get in a row so that when he went there everybody \nwas damning everybody else. 209. \n\nCurtiss Co. have not gotten into production of Bristol planes vet \n(June 18, 1918.) 209. \n\nBuilt two machines for testing purposes; break-down test; but \ntwo boys got killed because of failure of cloth. Grade A linen, \nspecified by Specification Department of Signal Corps, is not \nstrong enough. 210. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 99 \n\nLieut. Col. Elbert John Hall \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nDoes not know whether this fact was known before specification \nwas made. 210. \n\nConsidered original linen used (50 threads per inch) much bet- \nter than linen called for in the specifications (98 threads per \ninch). 211. \n\nThe linen was lower in quality than it should have been and \nshould not have been passed by inspectors. 212. \n\nQ. " How did it happen that linen of that unsatisfactory \nquality was ordered?" \xe2\x80\x94 A. "From a laboratory standpoint \nthey think is is the best. From a cloth-quality standpoint any- \nbody would say it was the best. But the engineers, who have \nbeen in the airplane game from the practical side of it, think \nit is poor. We object to lots of things which the Signal Corps \nspecify, just as we do in regard to the engines." 214. \n\nEngineers at work on specifications had no experience witli air- \nplanes. 215. \n\nThinks Orville Wright knows more about aerodynamics and \nairplanes than any other man in this country. 215. \n\nBelieves there will be a shortage of motors. 216. \n\nContracts with General Motors, of December 28, for 1,000 United \nStates, 12; March 29, 1,000 United States, 12; April 1, 1,000 \nspares, at a fixed price of $2,000,000 for spares, and an esti- \nmated cost on the cost-plus basis aggregating nearlv $14,000,- \n000 for the engines. 216, 217. \n\nJobs handled under Government inspection are doubly difficult. \n217. \n\nDoes not like Government system of inspection. Should have a \nman in the plant who is big enough to have a very small force \nand merely check the factory\'s inspection force. 218. \n\nGradually turning his work at Dayton-Wright plant over to a \nMr. Shepler, put there by the Government. 219. \n\nThe average life of an engine (time beyond which it is not advis- \nable to repair) would be about 300 hours or 30,000 miles in the \nair. 221. \n\nProduction on OX-t engine is more than necessarv for program. \n222. \n\nAvailability of Le Khone rotary engine more than can be used. \nMade all drawings, specifications, and everything for that en- \ngine, and tried to keep them from building it; feeling it was \ntoo expensive, but foreign representatives impressed on them \nthe necessity of building it. 222. \n\nNo reason for maintaining the manufacture of rotary engines \nfor airplanes in this country. Good secondary training en- \ngine, but cost is awfully high. 223. \n\nHispano-Suiza engines available for practically secondary train- \ning and single-plane fighters. 224. \n\nCurtiss Co. just started making an English single-seater fighter \nSE-5. 224. \n\nSE-5 is very small machine, while Bristol is a two-seater fighter \nand more of a reconnoissance plane. 224. \n\nPractically all Fiat parts, such as crank shafts, connecting rods, \nand valves are made in this country. 227, 228. \n\n\n\n100 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION.- \n\nLieut. Col. Elbert John Hall \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nEeferring to plan to developing an all- American motor, minutes \nof the Aircraft Production Board of May 31, 1917, contain \nthe following : " It is not intended that this plan should inter- \nfere in any way with the present production of training ma- \nchines or the plan to bring designs of French motors here at \nonce for production." 228. \n\nQ. " Do you recall any reason why foreign engines that had \nstood satisfactory tests in the actual conduct of the war \nshould not have been put in production here in 1917 ? " \nA. " Well, there were no motors, as I understand, which \nactually gave any real service, except the rotaries, at that \ntime to my knowledge." The Navy was practically using \nthe Rolls-Royce. 231. \n\nGermans had come out with a 6-cylinder, 160-horsepower \nMercedes and maintained it ever since the war, and it is still \nin use in combat planes. 231. \n\nCondition at Curtiss\'s plant with respect to production of Bristol \nlighter on March 18 was a job-shop condition rather than a \nmanufacturing condition. 235. \n\nInstead of redesigning Bristol plane to receive Liberty motor, \nshould have ended it by stating plane was not suited to motor. \n237. \n\nGovernment engineers at that time were not very practical, but \nmore or less green. 238. \n\nOne of the mistakes of the Production Board to insist upon \nBristol. 239. \n\nBad selection of engineering talent, given as explanation of de- \nlay. 240. \n\nDelay in production of Bristol fighters at Curtiss\'s plant due to \nmistakes of Engineering Department. 241. \n\nOne day the French would go to the Production Board and sell \nthem one of their designs, next day the English would sell \nthem their design, next day the Italians, and the next day the \nRussians, and that made it very difficult for anyone over here, \nwho did not know, to be advised. 241, 242. \n\nPractically rebuilt Bristol plane from one end to other but still \ncalled Bristol fighter. 242. \n\nReleased 400 and intends to release 800 of old Bristol plane to \nhold Curtiss organization together. Can be used for secondary \ntraining. 243. \n\nMr. Marlin brought back synchronizer from England in unde- \nveloped state last September but practically nothing was done \non it. 245. \n\nPlane program held up work on synchronizers and vice versa. \n246. \n\nMcCook Field organized for experimental work first and mak- \ning all installations and changes. 248. \n\nLincoln Motor Co.\'s contract for Liberty motors very advan- \ntageous to them. 252. \n\nReason for waiting for the development of a new plant for the \nmanufacture of Liberty motors was Mr. Leland\'s reputation \nas a manufacturer of high-class articles. 253. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 101 \n\nLieut. Col. Elbert John Hall \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nPolicy of Ford plant not to manufacture anything until they \nknow just exactly what they are going to do, and are sure of \ntheir ground. 256. \n\nExpect to get 1,500 motors this month, but he does not believe \nthey will get a thousand. 256. \n\nPackard Co. promised 700 engines for month of June, Lincoln \n650, Ford 500, and the Buick and Cadillac 300, but from what \nhe knows of their estimates, he has cut them all on an average \nof 50 per cent, but thinks he can gamble more on Ford\'s pro- \nduction of motors than anybody else. 257. \n\nIt takes one and a half motors per plane. 261. \n\nDo not ship planes abroad without extra motors. 261. \n\nPresent program for Liberty motors something like 150 motors \na day. 262. \n\nQ. "What is being produced, or will be so in 30 days? \'\' \xe2\x80\x94 \nA. " Thirty days from now not over 60 or 70 a day." 262. \n\nThinks Dayton- Wright Co. would increase their production of \nplanes to 40 a dav within 90 days if enough pressure was \nused. 264. \n\nProgram for De Haviland planes overestimated. 266. \n\nWas in charge of getting production speeded up in the Dayton- \nWright, Fisher Body Co., and Curtiss plants since February. \n270. \n\nWould not have been any production unless he had been doing \nthis work. 270. \n\nNever furnished Planning Department any information which \nwould justify them in making an estimate of production as \nappears to have been made under date of March 18, 1918. \n271. \n\nPaper referred to was filed and marked " Hall Exhibit 4, June \n18, 1918." 271. \n\nProgram of Planning Department that total in view of De \nHaviland 4\'s on August 2, 1917, was 8,000; on August 10 it \nwas 7,500; on August 22 it was 5,000; August 24 it was 6,000; \nand on August 25 it became 15,000 ; six days later, August 31, \nit was reduced to 6,000; on September 4 it was increased to \n15,000; on October 17 it fell to 250; on October 29 it was in- \ncreased to 1,000; on January 18 increased to 2,600; on Feb- \nruary to 4,500; and on February 19 to 8,000, at which it re- \nmained. 272. \n\nDoes not know of any reason why a program should change so. \n273. \n\nMinutes of meeting of Aircraft Board on April 18, 1918, shows \nFord Motor Co. and General Motors Co. were encouraged to \nprepare for production 150 motors a day, without regard \nto the size of their outstanding contracts, and with Govern- \nment\'s assurance of protection in the necessary investments. \n274. \n\nLetter from Capt. Rowe setting forth reasons for necessitated \ndelay in producing present DE^-r machines over time which \nmight have been required to reproduce the English machine. \n283. \n\n\n\n102 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nLieut. Col. Elbert John Hall \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nIn order to get planes out, it was necessary to have some of \nthem made in more or less of a crude form rather than made \nfrom tools. Could not wait to make up dies. 289. \n\nConsiders job was getting worse every day up to the time he \nwent on it due to lack of coordination. 294. \n\nDoes not know why Dayton- Wright Co. did not go ahead on \nCol. Deeds\'s order for 250 planes. 295. \n\nThinks it would have been advisable to go ahead with manu- \nfacture of these planes in October. 296. \n\nLewis gun only being used on single-seater fighters by British. \n297. \n\nLewis gun is nothing more than a rifle. It is not really a ma- \nchine gun. 298. \n\nManufacture of a bullet-proof gas tank is a considerable job. \n299. \n\nWould say there have been 2,500 corrections in last 60 days on \nD H 4\'s. 301. \n\nThinks they had a great deal more training planes than were \nnecessary. 302. \n\nFisher Body Co. to build Caproni planes in addition to De Havi- \nlands. 303. \n\nParts for Caproni\'s planes being made by a lot of small furni- \nture concerns in Michigan. 305. \n\nJN planes made at Standard Co. withdrawn from service. 306. \n\nBelieves he could have accelerated production, if he had had op- \nportunity. 309. \n\nMade as high as 453 horsepower for seven hours with Liberty \nengine. 310. \n\nAverage horsepower of Liberty was 420. 311. \n\nLiberty motor has lowest consumption of gas and oil of any \nmotor ever built, except possiblv special stationary engines. \n313. \n\nConsiders Liberty most economical engine to-day. 314. \n\nPropaganda at Day ton- Wright plant that Signal Corps was a \npretty rotten organization. 315. \n\nDid not blame them for this propaganda in a way, because it \nwas really brought about by the general organization scheme \nthat existed of the Signal Corps. 315. \n\nUnder date of February 9 Col. Deeds directs the taking the DH 9 \nout of production for Vincent to change design. 316. \n\nTwelve-cylinder Liberty motor is faster than the Rolls-Royce. \n317. \n\nGives names and uses of various aviation fields near Davton- \nWright plant, 318, 319, 320, 321. \n\nEngineering department could have been located at field ad- \njoining Day ton- Wright plant. 321. \n\nNow uses McCook Field, which is used entirely for this class of \nwork. 320. \n\nA million dollars invested in McCook Field. 323. \xe2\x80\xa2 \nGutzon John Lemothe Borgltjm \xe2\x80\x94 Recalled. (Washington, D. C, \nJune 18, 1918; Book 5.) \n\nLetters from President to Mr. Borglum regarding his investiga- \ntion. 327 to 348, inclusive. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 103 \n\nGtttzon John Lemothe Borglum \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nCol. Deeds one of the owners of Dayton Metal Products Co. \n350. \n\nCol. Deeds owner of McCook\'s Experimental Field at Dayton, \nupon which the Government is spending considerable money. \n352. \n\nStates Col. Deeds is part owner of the buildings and properties \noccupied by Dayton-Wright Airplane Co., with which he \nplaced Government contracts for over $50,000,000. 354. \n\nCol. Deeds, as managing vice president of National Cash Reg- \nister Co., was indicted and convicted, with a jail sentence, etc. \n359. \n\nCol. Deeds, as chairman of subcommittee on fuses and detonators \nof Council of National Defense, had committee pass a resolu- \ntion allotting fuses only to companies that had made Russian \nfuses. 365. \n\nDayton Metal Products Co. was only company that had made \nsuch fuses. 365. \n\nCol. Deeds sought and secured a place on Aircraft Board. 367. \n(Aircraft Production Board.) \n\nCol. Deeds made statement to witness that he would tie up \n$320,000,000 available for plane production before week\'s end. \n373. \n\nPreliminary report of Mr. Borglum states: "He further (sup- \nported by documentary evidence and witnesses) to be a heavy \nbeneficiary in contracts and directs that there shall be no \ninspection of materials from his company. He increases in a \npencil stroke a contract for his ignition system from 15,000 \nto 20,000, and excludes this item from further consideration \nand forbids competition bv other makers. This item alone \nappears to run into something near four millions." He \xe2\x80\x94 re- \nferring to Col. Deeds. 373, 374. \n\nWitness questioned as to evidence he has to substantiate above. \n374, 375, 376. \n\nLetter from Col. Deeds to Aircraft Production Board finder \ndate of August 28, 1917, setting forth his corporate interests. \n377, 378, 379. \n\nWitness questioned as to truth of statements in this letter and \nhis reasons for believing them not correct. 380, 381, 382, 383, \n384, 385, 386, 387. \n\nCol. Deeds was a stockholder and officer in the following : \nUnited States Motors Corporation, of New York. \nDayton Engineering Laboratories Co., of Dayton. \nDayton Metal Products Co., of Dayton. \nDomestic Building Co. of Dayton. 378. \nAn incorporator of Dayton-Wright Airplane Co. \nPresident and large stockholder in Domestic Engineering \n\nCo., of Dayton. 379. \nOwns ground embraced in Moraine Experimental Flying \nField, near Dayton, used for aviation purposes. 379. \n\nHas severed connection with first four of above-named corpora- \ntions. 378. \n\nUnited States Motor Corporation has order for 2,000 motors. \n388. \n\n\n\n104 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nGutzon John Lemothe Bqrgltjm \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nCol. Deeds and Mr. Kettering, made three and a half million \napiece on transfer of stock to United States Motor Corpora- \ntion. 389. \n\nHas no other documentary evidence than typewritten statement \nby a Mr. Ohmer. 393. \n\nUse of Delco ignition system in connection with Liberty motor \nall a part of Deeds\'s work. 394. \n\nCol. Deeds was allowing Splitdorf people to go to great expense \nin experimenting with system for application of magneto igni- \ntion system to Liberty motor when he had already ordered \n20,000 of those systems on 20,000 motors. 395. \n\nNo tests had been made of Delco ignition system. 396. \n\nLieut. Sloane of accounts section gave him information. 397. \n\nCol. Deeds "directs that there shall be no inspection of materials \nfrom his company" (the Delco Ignition Co.). 398. \n\nDeeds increased order from 15,000 to 20,000 by pencil stroke. 399. \n\nDeeds left room and had order signed by some one else. 400. \n\nFord says that Kettering stated \xe2\x80\x94 either Kettering or Vincent \xe2\x80\x94 \nthat they literally placed cylinders so that no other system \ncould go in there. 401. \n\nDeeds, Waldon, Montgomery, and Coffin created cost-plus form \nof contract. 403. \n\nCost-plus system has " been the agent for more general dissatis- \nfaction, waste of money, excessive overcharges, and establish- \nment of an unnatural, if not corrupt, relationship between the \nboard and contractors than all other conditions prevailing." \n404. \n\nQ. " Have you any information that in the actual working \nout of the cost-plus contract there has been any corruption \nanywhere ? " 404. \n\n" I mean by that an intentional inflation of costs, laxity in \nthe sense of intentional looseness in inspection in order to per- \nmit an undue allowance by the Government, computing of \npay rolls, or anything at all which would give you a basis for \na charge of corruption in the execution of the cost-plus con- \ntract." 405. \n\nA. " There are wagon loads of that." 405. \n\nCites Trego factory as an instance. 405. \n\nDoes not know what Mr. Talbott\'s salary was before he started \nin, but he is now getting $30,000 or $35,000 a year, his son the \nsame, and possiblv Mr. Kettering the same. 406. \n\nMingle, president of the Standard Co., got $62,000 a year. 406. \n\nTrego got contract for three and a half million dollars, went to \nNew York and borrowed a million five hundred thousand dol- \nlars from bank, stating he would make that amount on his \ncontract. 407. \n\nHas used up six or seven hundred and odd thousand dollars and \n75 per cent of it wasted. 407. \n\nCurtiss plant has been carrying 13,000 to 14,000 people on its \npay rolls under a cost-plus contract and has been suffering from \n60 to 70 per cent id]eness; it has been toying with our con- \ntracts and yielding us nothing. 409. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 105 \n\n<xutzon John Lemotiie Borglum \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nCurtiss plant has acreage and man power enough to turn oat 565 \nplanes a day if it were put into the hands of a good organi- \nzation and were allowed to go forward. 410. \n\nDay ton- Wright plant utterly incompetent, 411. \n\nNever could satisfy himself why the Fisher Body Corporation \ngot any order. 414. \n\nEugene Mayer financed the Fisher Body Corporation. 414. \nJune 19, 1919 : \n\nCol. Deeds soon after his entrance on the aircraft work boasted \nability to name 80 \'officers in the Signal Corps. 412. \n\nAlbert Badlow sold the Dayton-Wright Co. cotton for linen. \n422. \n\nLieut. E. C. Charles Comston, an appointee of Deeds, assisted \nHavward to prepare a report for the Senate investigation re- \nport. 423. \n\nCapt. A. W. Corndorf knows of connection of Deeds with fuze \ncommittee. 424. \n\nCapt. Christy, Production Department, Signal Corps, appointee \nof Deeds/ 425. \n\nDr. Orlando Ducker, examining physician of the Signal Corps, \nknew a family in northern Maryland by the name of Dietz, \nwho had a cousin by the name of Dietz, who changed his name \nto Deeds, that lived in Ohio. 426. \n\nHalph M. Easley, Metropolitan Tower, a Gevernment agent, in- \nvestigated Mr. Borglum. 426, 427. \n\nFlint L. W. F. Co., College Point, claimed to have built 30 sea- \nplanes on verbal order of Deeds. 427. \n\nMix stated that Deharbor, secretary and treasurer of the Dayton- \nWright Aeroplane Co., was a German spy and had been ar- \nrested as such and interned in the Federal Prison at Atlanta. \n430. \n\nQuoting Mix, " Deeds is a crook." 431. \n\nLieut. Harly, private secretary of Deeds. 438. \n\n"" Congressman William Schley Howard had some very interest- \ning experience with Deeds and the board in trying to get them \nto accept a plane that was invented by one of his constituency. \nHoward\'s people were to build this plane at no cost to the \nGovernment." 439. \n\nDeeds appears to be interested in J. G. White Co. 450. \n\nLieut. Ryerson, in charge of propellers, appointee of Deeds. \n450. \n\nWas told that Col. Montgomery obtained a loan of $4,000,000 \nfor Curtiss people and got it through his own financial con- \nnections, but does not implicate him. 453. \n\nLoan was afterwards taken up by Government loaning them \nmoney and the loans finally amounted to something like eight \nor nine million dollars. 453, 454. \n\nMaj . Charles Sligh had charge of spruce for Aircraft Board ; was \nassociated with Deeds in the early part of activities. 454. \n\nWilliam H. Schlott well posted on Deeds and board\'s activities. \nWas told by Vincent to raise his price on figure submitted. \nVincent told him to base his figures at $25 per horsepower. \n455. \n\n\n\n108 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nGtjtzon John Lemothe Borglum \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nEefers to contract of Lewis Spring & Axle Co. on Liberty \nmotors. Stated would make any number for $3,000 and make \na great deal of money out of it. 455. \n\nDid not get an engine order. 455. \n\nMr. Harris, of Contract Department, with reference to a bid of \nLewis Spring & Axle Co. for spare parts, stated, " You had \nbetter raise your figure $500. We are going before the Mili- \ntary Committee and we do not want to show any discrepancy." \n456. \n\nAwarded contract for 400 sets of spares for Bristol fighters at a \nfixed price of $1,890,000 under date of February 4, 1918. 457. \n\nH. E. Talbott, jr., vice president of Dayton-Wright Co., at sal- \nary of $30,000 a year, was Deeds\'s private secretary when he \nfirst came to Washington. 459. \n\nVauclain, associated with Deeds in fuse contracts; should be \ninvestigated. 459. \n\nCapt. Marmon was under Deeds\'s control. 463. \n\nCol. Deeds reported to own 55 per cent of the stock of the Bijou \nElectric Co., of Jersey City. 467. \n\nMade a mistake in stating yesterday that United Motors had a \ncontract with Government ; should have been General Motors. \n470. \n\nLieut. Lufkin, formerly at the testing laboratory of the Signal \nCorps at the Navy Department, too honest and was sent away. \n471. \n\nCol. Deeds " Blocked the production of lenses in America and \nsucceeded in ordering their estoppal while under manufacture \nin a rival company in Dayton, so that now the metal parts of \nthe range finders are completed without the lenses \xe2\x80\x94 therefore \nrendered useless. 483. \n\nGen. Squier only made one report to him. First report was \ngood and useful. " Then I began to meet obstacles every- \nwhere." 488. \n\nLieutenant assigned to him as stenographer. 489. . \n\n" Owing to almost complete failure of Deeds\'s immediate asso- \nciates and partners in Dayton to deliver standard machines, \nhe is protecting them, it is believed, by holding back produc- \ntion in other companies." 490. \n\nReferring to Mr. Coffin, " He has, however, issued and is daily \ncausing to be issued, statements hostile, untrue, unfounded, \ndeceiving our own people, excepting those who understand, but \nnot deceiving allies or enemies." 496. \n\nRefers to article in Saturday Evening Post. 496. \n\nHas quite a little stuff that corroborates what he has gone into. \n502. \nCharles M. Addas (June 20, 1918; Book 6). \n\nResidence, Highland Avenue, Newark, N. J. Employed as \nservice manager with New York Lubricating Oil Co. in 1915. \nOn French front and later connected with American Air \nService. Services consisted of collecting and classifying vari- \nous papers, confidential documents in connection with the- \nFrench Government. 3. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIKCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 107 \n\nCharles M. Addas \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nSpeaks of a contract for five or six thousand planes from French \nGovernment to be delivered before July 1, this year. 4. \n\nUnderstanding that United States was to supply raw materials \nand necessary machine tools. 5. \n\nArrangement with British Government to deliver 20 squadrons \nof machines. 6. \n\nKnows that shipment of raw material and machine tools had \nbeen greatly delayed. 8. \n\nNo deliveries made at all up to the time he left for tour of \ninspection, January 26, 1918. 8. \nReferring to machines. \n\nMr. Hughes read statement of airplanes and engines ordered in \nFrance. 8. \n\nGoes into detail about tour of inspection. 12. \n\n(Recital of inspection trip continues to page 27.) \n\nEstimates the total number of planes delivered under the con- \ntract on the completion of his tour to be about 900. 28. \n\nFrench Government directly influenced in annulling the con- \ntract of August 30 through the delay in sending raw material \nfrom this country. 31. \n\nFour hundred cadets without training planes at Saint Traxient \ndue to failure of French Government to supply training \nplanes. 33. \n\nCharges that failure of French Government to make delivery \nwas due to lack of foresight on the part of the American Ex- \npeditionary Forces. 33. \n\nLack of planes at training centers. 39. \n\nResigned position with Air Service because of these bad condi- \ntions. 45. \n\nCol. Boiling lost his administrative power on the arrival of \nGen. Foulois in France. 17-48. \n\nWrites letter to John D. Ryan stating that he would like to \ninform him of conditions in France. 48. \n\nu Necessary cooperation from America seemed to be lacking." \n52. \n\nLack of personnel; took weeks to answer an important cable- \ngram regarding production, 53. \n\nThings wanted over there did not seem to arrive from America. \n54. \n\nCites foreign criticism on Liberty motor. 58. \n\n(This evidently pertains to the first lot of motors.) \n\nGen. Foulois did not seem to approve of inspection trip by Maj. \nGreene in Italy. 60. \n\nAfraid this information might be used against Foulois, 60. \n\nHad opportunity of purchasing Fiat Co. Scia machines (2,000), \n" but for some reason no action was taken." 64. \n\nMr. Hughes reads minutes of Aircraft Board. 66. \n\nUnable to discover a contract for Scia machines, although that \nshould have been a part of the record. 71. \n\n(Many papers that could not be found. Files in poor condi- \ntion. 72. \n\nMr. Hughes reads from minutes of Aircraft Board. 77. \n\n\n\n108 ABSTKACT OF AIRCKAFT INVESTIGATION-. \n\nCharles M. Addas \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nLost on an average of two men a day at one of the French camps, \ndue to accidents. 84. \n\n(At this point there is a page missing in the record.) \n\nConsiders the men at the head of different departments were \ntoo young. 88. \n\nBecause there was a change in the head, Gen. Foulois taking \ncharge, Col. Boiling\'s personnel and Maj. Greene\'s personnel \nhad nothing to do for several weeks. 90-91. \n\nFoulois took charge, and the work that Col. Boiling had been \ndoing was duplicated, throwing Boiling\'s personnel out of \nwork, and they did nothing. 91. \n\nAddas gives as his reason, on cross-examination, for resign- \ning, that his department was thrown out of work and soldiers \nnot being protected by proper airplane service. \nCapt. Allen H. Zacharias (June 20, 1918; Book 6). \n\nResidence Detroit. Occupation before commission in Signal \nCorps was that of a manufacturer, buicler and designer of \nhouses. Was placed in charge of planning department of \nthe Signal Corps, and is also liaison officer in Gen. Johnson\'s \noffice. 93-95. \n\nJudge Hughes : " Have you any original data in your office \nwhich will show how it happened that on August 21 it was \ncontemplated that there would be 6,000 De Haviland 1\'s, and \non August 25, 15,000, and on August 31 it is back to 6,000. \nand on September 1 it is up to 15,000, and on October 17 it is \ndown to 250?"\xe2\x80\x94 A. " I have not." 101. \n\nAsked further as to similar variations, 103. \n\nStates that shifting of program was due to optimism. 111. \n\nIs asked to show data setting forth that there was any reason- \nable expectation by anyone in the Signal Corps that these \nplanes would be delivered in accordance with expectation. \n113. \n\nExhibit Zacharias No. 3 produced. 116. \n\nExhibit Zacharias No. 1 produced. 117. \n\nExhibit Zacharias No. 5 produced. 118. \n\nIn making up programs of production he would go to his ex- \necutive officer, Col. Horner, to have them approved. Also to \nCol. Montgomeiy. 119. \nCol. Henry B. Joy (June 20, 1918; Book 6). \n\nLetter written by Col. Joy to Mr. Hughes filed and marked \nExhibit Joy No. 1, June 20, 1918. 128. \n\nHistory of Liberty Motor, with photographs, filed and marked \nExhibit Joy No. 7, June 20. 128. \n\nQuotes from notebook in which he said no product would \nbe forthcoming until well after the first of the year. \n\nOffers explanation of testimony on a previous day when he \nstated that the reason why the motor was made so light was \nbecause the French engineers pressed for it. 130. \n\nExplains how the Packard Co. acquired through Ralph de Palma \nthe Mercedes motor, due to the fact that de Palma could not \nget any more parts from Germany. 136. \n\nDid not make any estimate of the cost of the Liberty motor, 12 \ncylinder in its development. 137. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 109 \n\nJohn W. Stagers (June 20, 1918; Book 6). \n\nThis consists of a description of papers produced by Mr. Stagers. \n110. \n\nA pamphlet was produced which showed the earnings of the \nCurtiss Co. to be $1,000,000 monthly. 143. \n\nA weekly market letter covering the Curtiss Aeroplane Co. is \nfiled. 144. \n\nResidence, Washington and New York. Member of the Wash- \nington Bar. Also Missouri, Colorado, and the Supreme Court \nof the United States. Represents Gutzon Borglum. 147. \n\nRecites statement of Mr. Metz, of the Metz Motor Co., that he is \n" a German through and through, and I would close my fac- \ntory before I would allow munitions of war to be manufactured \nto be shot at my own people," this statement being made a \nconsiderable time before the United States entered the war. \n149. \n\nThe information that the Metz Motor Co. was manufacturing \ndepth bombs and other war work " struck me like a dagger," \nsays Mr. Staggers. 150. \n\nMade a report to the Department of Justice in November. 151. \n\nCites a case where a manufacturer with several hundred thou- \nsand feet of spruce ready to build aeroplanes was somewhat \ndiscourteously " turned down " when he applied for a con- \ntract. 151. \nWilliam Harold Workman (June 20, 1918; Book 6). \n\nTemporary residence, Hotel Biltmore, New York. Lived in \nEngland for past six or seven years. Home is in Cleveland, \nand is an American citizen. Since May 4 of last year has \nbeen in this country representing Mr. Handley-Paige, of \nHandley-Paige Aircraft Co. of England. 154. \n\nStates Handley-Paige machine is in the course of production \nand that the first machine will be flying in about three weeks\' \ntime. Machine produced at the Standard Aircraft Corpora- \ntion. 155. \n\nStandard Co. only corporation assembling the machine, but \nabout 20 other concerns are making different parts. 155. \n\nTold by Mr. Waldon and Mr. Deeds last May that there would \nbe no bombing planes in the program. 156. \n\nOffers to sell the rights of Handley-Paige Co. in United States. \n156. \n\n(Goes into lengthy recital.) \n\nFound that everything that had been done would have to be cor- \nrected and that about $400,000 had been wasted. 163. \n\nCites a considerable agreement increase in wages of six men from \nEngland which had already been stipulated before coming to \nUnited States. 164. \n\nThese six men taken from under the supervision of Mr. Work- \nman \xe2\x80\x94 " should not communicate with me whatsoever on any \nsubject." These men, however, were brought here by Mr. \nWorkman as his staff. 165. \n\n\n\n110 ABSTKACT OF AIRCKAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nWilliam Harold Workman \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nClaims he could have had machines on the western front with- \nin 90 days, but that the Signal Corps even in January and \nFebruary and up to the middle of March 50 per cent of the \nparts for the production of this machine had not been con- \ntracted for. 165. \n\nBritish Government led to believe they were going to have thou- \nsands of airplanes to assemble and made arrangement to do \nso. 166. \n\nSchedule was drawn up months before that calling for at least \n50 sets of Handley-Paige parts by the 1st of May. 167. \n\nSeveral officers came back from England in an endeavor to \nspeed up program, but states " I have only seen one of them \nfor a few hours since I got here Tuesday morning." \n\nChanges made against Mr. Chamberlin\'s recommendations, even \nthough he was the chief of the staff of six men. 169. \n\nThe cruising radius of the American-built Handley-Paige had \nbeen reduced and the American machine was 33^ efficient \ncompared with plane turned out in England. 169. \n\nProduced a copy of offer made on Mav 31. 1917. Marked \n" Workman Exhibit 1, June 20, 1918.\'\' \n\nGen. Cormack arrived here with certain drawings. 172. \n\nRecites details of attempt to get drawings. 173. \n\nDeclares if they had any intention of making the machine they \nshould have come to him first. 180. \n\nDeclares they were showing hostility toward every effort that \nhe was making. 181. \n\nStates they did not want to make the Handley-Paige plane or \nmake it a success. 182. \n\nSignal Corps did not seem to contemplate making parts ap- \npropriate to the Handley-Paige and sending them to the\xc2\xbb \nother side for assembly. 183. \n\nExhibit Workman No. 2 produced, which is an agreement be- \ntween United States Government and Workman. 186. \n\nHandley-Paige machine United States is now trying to produce \nis obsolete. British put new machine in air four weeks ago. \n189. \n\nReiterates the statement that within 90 days he would have been \nmaking at least 100 machines a week. 193. \n\nWould use either Rolls-Royce or Sunbeam engine. 193. \n\nWas not his idea Rolls-Royce engine could be put into pro- \nduction in 90 days in this country. 193. \n\nGerman Gotha plane is a reproduction of Handley-Paige. 199. \n\nWere using Sunbeam engine satisfactorily in England. 199. \n\nReiterates that due to the Signal Corps officers not having proper \ndrawings there was a loss of approximately $400,000 in wasted \nwork and materials. 200. \n\nReads from minutes of Aircraft Board of January 17, 1918. \n201. \n\nBritish Government, acting under the impression that the Sig- \nnal Corps was going to produce 1,500 Handley-Paige ma- \nchines, sent men abroad to get the assembly plant ready. 205. \n\nThis building has been standing since the 1st of May and are \nwaiting now to get the parts. 208. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. Ill \n\nWilliam Harold Workman \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nMr. Hughes gives it as his understanding that the production \nof these 1,500 Handley-Paige machines was going on with in- \ncomplete drawings when Workman returned to the United \nStates in December, 1917, and that the work had to be done \nall over again. And Mr. Workman states that is correct. 211. \n\nDoes not believe the Signal Corps intended producing any \nHandley-Paige planes, because they ignored technical advice, \nhelp, and assistance of Handley-Paige in person. 213. \n\nMr. Hughes reads letter from office of Chief Signal Officer \nto Col. Blomfield, Air Division. 216. \n\nMr. Hughes reads extracts from minutes of several meetings of \nthe Aircraft Board. 220-222. \n\nLetter from chief of Mr. Workman\'s mechanical staff is pro- \nduced. 226. \n\nMr. Workman is unable to account for the fact that the salary \nof the men of his mechanical staff was increased by the Signal \nCorps and that they were notified not to have anything to do \nwith him. 230. \n\nMr. Workman is told by Col. Montgomery that he had nothing \nto do with the construction of the Handley-Paige machine. \n233. \n\nProvision in contract that salary of men was to be paid to Mr. \nWorkman was not carried out. 235. \n\nLikens driving a bombing plane with a high speed motor, such \nas the Liberty, to driving a 5-ton truck with racing car engine. \n237. \n\nReport by Mr. Chamberlain covering present state of production \nat Standard Works produced. 238. . \n\nIn the production of Handley-Paige machine they have ignored \nmature advice from England. Result is, machine is heavy and \ndead. 243. \n\nCites comparative test of Liberty motor and Matabele motor. \n251. \n\nStates he could have had 5,000 Handley-Paige planes " over \nthere " by this time. 256. \n\nMakes a final statement that Signal Corps can not know as much \nabout a foreign machine as those who produce it and that they \nshould take into consultation the original designers of the \nHandley-Paige plane. 257. \nCapt. Allen H. Zacharias (June 21, 1918; Book 6). \n\nCertain program schedules produced. 259. \nCapt. Robert Lewis Chamberlain (June 21, 1918; Book 6). \n\nHolds rank of captain in Signal Corps. Duties since first of \nyear that of keeping production record of the planning sec- \ntion. 285. \n\nQuotes from book contemplated production from month to month \nand states this information came from Capt. Zacharias. 289. \n\nThis book will show exactly the number that have been delivered \nby any company. 292. \n\n130687\xe2\x80\x9419 8 \n\n\n\n112 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nCapt. Clement R. Ford (June 21, 1918; Book 6). \n\nHolds rank of captain in Aviation Section. Is assistant to CoL \nHorner, chief of executive staff. In this position about 10 \nweeks. Duties ; general office administration. 293. \nLieut. Edward W. Clark, 3d (June 21, 1918; Book 6). \n\nWorked in Approvals Section, finance department of Equipment \nDivision, in charge of property officers. Since March 1, acted \nas aid to Col. Wolff, in the Finance Department. 297. \n\nLater duties were to take charge of property officers at the \nvarious plants. 300. \nHenry Lockhart, Jr. (June 21, 1918; Book 6). \n\nResidence, New York (city). "New York, Rye." In charge \nof materials department in Bureau of Aircraft Production of \nSignal Corps. Duties of the department are to procure ma- \nterials necessary in production of airplanes, except motors and \ninstruments. In this work since January 31. 308. \n\nFiles Lockhart Exhibit No. 1, which shows history of activities \nof his department, 308. \n\nPresident of Goodrich Lockhart Co., New York. 310. At one \ntime president of Wright-Martin Co. 311. \n\nCol. W. B. Thompson and others own the Wright-Martin Co. \nto-day. 312. \n\nHas no connections with any company doing business with Gov- \nernment. 313. \n\nInstructed to furnish raAv materials abroad. 315. \n\nShipped British, French, and Italians their requirements regu- \nlarly. 316. \n\nIn certain instances made discrimination between materials \nneeded by these countries for either their own production and \nthat of the United States forces. 316. \n\nStates that in his opinion the fault lies with the J. G. White \nCo. in delays to provide raw materials for production of planes \nin France. 319-320. \n\nNot the slightest reason, in his mind, why raw materials should \nnot have been provided. 320. \n\nClaims that part of the delay was due to the French methods \nbeing slow. 322. \n\nSays Col. Disque (under Gen. Squier direct), had to do with the \nletting of spruce contracts. 325. \n\nStates how he got into relation with the Signal Corps. 326. \n\nAlso has to do with the purchase of propeller woods. 327. \n\nCites method of purchasing hardwoods. 329. \n\nFiled Lockhart Exhibit No. 3. 332. \n\nAlso cites discussion which took place at a meeting called in \nWashington to take up the mahogany situation. 335. \n\nContract price about $320 per thousand feet. 336. \n\nManufacturers submitted statements to him showing their cost \nof operation. 338. \n\nExplains how it is that the price at the higher figure per thou- \nsand feet of cost is no greater than previously. 341. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 113 \n\nHenry Lockhart, Jr. \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nStates they will use substitutes. Oak. 343. \n\nStates requirements for balance of year will be about 21,000,000 \n\nfeet, excluding England. (There is a large discrepancy in \n\nfigures at the bottom of this page.) 344. \nThis amount should take care of about 140,000 propellers. 345. \nThirty thousand planes would be supplied with this amount of \n\npropellers. 346. \nFiles Lockhart Exhibit No. 4 showing complete list of contracts. \n\n347. \nReads amount of woods under contract at this time. 353. \nStates supply depends a great deal on the ships that will be \n\nallotted them by the Shipping Board. 361. \nBoats taken out of charter that had been chartered for the work \n\nof carrying food to the natives producing the wood. 365. \nTwenty million feet required this year yet to be shipped from \n\nforeign ports. 370. \nHas not consulted Federal Trade Commission in regard to estab- \nlishing cost. 372. \nHas not been to Federal Trade Commission on any woods, but \n\nhas gone to War Industries Board. 370. \nMr. Legge or Mr. Chamberlain, of War Industries Board, \n\npassed on costs of this material. 375. \nFiles in Lockhart\'s office would show data with respect to con- \ntract for mahogany. 377. \nReads minutes of Aircraft Board of March 7. 381. \nRecites accident the other day due to quality of linen, or supposed \n\nlinen. 382. \nIt was claimed cloth had been reduced to a tensile strength of \n\nonly 3,0 pounds. 383. \nNever had any dealings with Joseph S. Otis except on two occa- \nsions, one with regard to work and another with regard to \n\nstatement by Otis that Lockhart was connected with some \n\nhardwood company. 385. \nHas no memory of any communications from Otis regarding \n\nprice of mahogany or that it was exorbitant, 387. \nEndeavored to ascertain a fair price giving a reasonable profit. \n\n389. \nCites shortage of linen and hardwood lumber for propeller-blade \n\nstock. 392. \nCapt. Allen H. Zacharias (June 21, 1918; Book 6). \n\nFiles report (weekly) marked " Exhibit Zacharias No. 38." 395. \nStates different classes of information at his office which are \n\navailable. 396. \nFiles schedule for February 8, Exhibit Zacharias 39. 398. \nStatement of promised and actual deliveries of orders placed \n\nin France of planes and engines marked " Exhibit Zacharias \n\nNo. 40, June 21." 399. \nTranslates pages 7 and 8 of Exhibit 44. 400. \n\n\n\n114 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nMaj. Dean Langmuir (June 21, 1918; Book 6). \n\nHolds rank of major, Aviation Section, Signal Corps, since \n\nAugust 29. In civilian life was an accountant. Up to March \n\n29 had charge of all accounts in connection with production \n\nof airplanes and engines. Since March 20 has been waiting \n\nto go to Europe. 401. \nFor past few weeks has been absolutely idle. 405. \nVouchers coming in from plants submitted to accounts section. \n\n406. \nIs somewhat evasive when questioned as to what should go \n\nin as salaries. 407-408. \nActed under orders from Col. Wolff with respect to salaries. \n\n410. \nSalarv of Mr. Mengel, president of Standard Aircraft Co., \n\n$62^,000 a year. 411. \nHowever, salary has never been allowed, although Maj. Lang- \nmuir passed the voucher. 413. \nAll salaries came before rulings board, whose duty it was to \n\nconsider the salary paid. 414. \nHowaed E. Coffin (June 24, 1918; Book 6). \n\nMr. Hughes reads resolution of Council of National Defense \n\ncreating Aircraft Production Board. 418. \nMr. Coffin was left at liberty to select the civilian members of \n\nthe Aircraft Production Board, but does " not think " he was \n\nas regards official personnel. 422. \nWaldon, Deeds, and Montgomery were designated by Mr. \n\nCoffin! 423. \nCol. Montgomery knew nothing of aircraft or aeronautics be- \nfore his connection with this board. 424. \nDiscussion of the selection of men continued up to page 436. \nCites the origin of the production program. 437. \nTells what Production Board had to do with organization of \n\nSignal Corps for securing production. 440. \nStates how work was divided between Deeds, Montgomery, \n\nand Waldon. 446. \nGen. Squier was Col. Deeds\'s immediate superior. 446. \nMakes a brief statement up to Mr. Potter\'s coming in. 448. \nNow continues statement from the time Potter came in. 459. \nMakes statement as to information and supervision of aircraft \n\nproduction. 468. \nStates that board did nothing as interference was resented by \n\nthe Army, particularly coming from a civilian quarter. 470. \nKept in touch with existing conditions, that is, as to rapidity of \n\nwork, designs, etc., only in a general way. 473. \nBoard relied practically entirely upon the information given by \n\nrepresentatives of Army and Navy. 473, 474. \nUnderstood work was going forward satisfactorily. 474. \nVisited several plants. 476. \nStates that manufacturers hesitated to talk to him as chairman \n\nof the Aircraft Board when their accountability was to the \n\nmilitary department. 476. \nDid not think he should go thoroughly into the question of a \n\nconcern\'s production on his visits. 480. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 115 \n\nHoward E. Coffin \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nDid not regard it the duty of the Aircraft Board to see that \nproduction was brought along in accordance with the pro- \ngram. 482. \n\nMr. Hughes enters on the record an order regarding the func- \ntions of the Aircraft Board signed by Gen. Squier and ap- \nproved by Secretary Baker. 483. \n\nUnderstood that the equipment division was responsible with \nrespect to the performance of contracts. 490. \n\nMr. Hughes asks what possible value the recommendation of \nthe Aircraft Board could have. 497. \n\nStates situation with regard to the anticipation of the success- \nful carrying out of the program. 499. \n\nEeads minutes of Aircraft Board of January 3, 1918. 501. \n\nWas informed by Signal Corps that 1,900 combat planes would \nbe ready by July 1, and which was the testimony given to \nSenate committee. 502. \n\nThinks military organization dropped their initiative due to \ninvestigations. 505. \n\nThere seems to be a break in the testimony at this point. (See \npp. 506, 507.) \n\nThinks the injection of Potter, Fletcher, and Kellogg was an \nadvantage. 508. \n\nMakes a statement in re Col. Deeds\'s administration. 508. \n\nMade no serious inquiries into equipment division. 509. \n\nQuestioned as to whether any inquiry was made as to whether \nthe equipment division would accomplish its results. 512. \n\nTells whole history of article which appeared in the Saturday \nEvening Post on January 5, 1918, written by Mr. Coffin. 513. \n\nKnows nothing of the picture which headed his article illus- \ntrating a certain make of aeroplane. \n\nDoes not recall supplying any specific facts in connection with \nthis article. 518. \n\nMr. Hughes refers to minutes of Aircraft Board of December \n13 referring to an article in the Saturday Evening Post of \nJanuary 19, 1918. 519. \n\nMr. Hughes further reads minutes of Aircraft Board under \ndate of December 5, 1917, pertaining to publicity. 521. \n\nHad nothing to do with preparation of Zacharias Exhibit No. \n1, pertaining to a program of De Haviland 4\'s. 523. \n\nConversant with program contained in Zacharias Exhibit No. 5, \nwhich states that 2,000 machines would be delivered by the \nend of June. 531. \n\nAdmits that statement of McConaghy Exhibit No. 9, was mis- \nleading. 538. \n\nInformed substantially to the same effect by Col. Deeds. 538. \n\nExplains the fact that efforts on the part of Aircraft Board \nwas regarded as butting in. 540. \n\nLegal department of Signal Corps originated cost-plus system \nof contracting. 543. \n\nExplains how he got the so-called bogey cost. 544. \n\nMr. Hughes reads minutes of board on August 24, 1917. 545. \n\n\n\n116 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nHoward E. Coffin \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nAlso of minutes of Aircraft Board on August 31, 1917. 516. \nAbove minutes pertain to cost of motors and a set profit of \n$913.05. 518. \n\nSavs he urged a larger number of sources of supply. 550. \nHoward E. Coffin (June 25, 1918; Book 7). \n\nGoes on citing his attempts to develop the source of supply, sub- \nmitting the names of various companies to the Signal \nCorps. 1. \n\nStates that Eugene Meyer, representative of the Secretary of \nWar disapproved of having too many companies engaged. 2. \n\nCites, however, reasons which would probably have some weight \nagainst having a large number of small concerns. 1. \n\nDoes not know of a recent order condemning planes, turned out \nby the Standard Aero Co. 25. \n\nStates there was no other course at the beginning but to intro- \nduce foreign engines. 26. \n\nAsked by Mr. Hughes to take up each engine (foreign) and fol- \nlow it through. 27. \n\nDuring this recital Mr. Hughes reads several excerpts from min- \nutes of the board. 30-31. \n\nContinues recital of Sunbeam motor on page 36* \n\nAsked to explain why a big change in the delivery of Hispano- \nSuizas took place. 43. \n\nStates that 180 Hispanos are in quantity production and had been \ndelivered this month. 52. \n\nQuestioned by Mr. Hughes as to whether it was not understood \nthat there would be a continual development in planes so that \nalmost any plane which was selected would be varied and \nmodified, and Mr. Coffin admits there was. 57-58. \n\nA patent difficulty existed with respect to Hispano-Suiza mo- \ntor. 59. \n\nIs asked why it would take longer to produce the Hispano \nSuiza motor than to produce Liberty Motor. Admits it would \ntake about the same length of time. 60. \n\nNo scout planes manufactured in the United States that are now \nin use on the front. 62. \n\nAdmits if Army had settled upon a plan for planes and the \n180 Hispano-Suiza engine last August scout planes would now \nbe in use on the front, 62, \n\nMr. Hughes reads minutes of Aircraft Board, quoting cable- \ngram from Col. Boiling. 61. \n\nGives history of Sunbeam engine. 66. \n\nStates in his opinion the Fiat engine had the best chance for \nquantity production in this country. 70. \n\nThinks Navy had to do with nonadoption of that engine. 70. \n\nCites difficulty of producing foreign engine. 72. \n\nSays representations of French were the} r could easily take care \nof all of our needs in aviation. 71. \n\nStates he has never seen any chart showing foreign production. \nMakes lengthy statement. 76. \n\nSavs Secretarv Baker refused to send mechanics. 78. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 117 \n\nHoward E. Coffin \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nSays cause of nonfulfillment of French contract was due partly \nto the French administration and partly to the Signal Corps. \n81. \n\nCites knowledge of orders given to the Italian Government. 82. \n\nAdmits Owen Thomas, of the Ministry of Munitions and the \nImperial Munitions Board of Canada brought to his attention \nThomas\'s experience with the Mercedes motor. 89. \n\nMakes confidential statement regarding Mr. Thomas to show \nwhy his offer of his services were not favorably looked upon. \n92. \n\nStates they could not obtain bids from contractors on a fixed \nprice basis, and therefore the cost-plus system was used. 96. \n\nSignal Corps seemed to think a price of $20 to $30 per horse- \npower was about right. 97. \n\nThinks Montgomery, Walclon, and Deeds were in charge of ne- \ngotiations which brought about the bogey cost of $6,087. 97. \n\nThinks bogey cost in the Ford Co. was $5,000. 98. \n\nContract originally made November 22, 1917, was on a bogey \ncost of $6,087. 99. Later reduced. 99, \n\nStates exactly what happened in the case of the Lincoln Motor \nCo., where, in consideration of assistance bv the Government, \nthe bogey cost was reduced from $6,087 to $5,000. 99. \n\nIn case the cost was less than the bogey costs the manufacturer \nreceived 25 per cent of the saving. If the cost exceeded the \nbogey cost, there was no penalty. 101. \n\nMr. Hughes cites abstract of terms of Packard contract. 103. \n\nAgreement or rule laid down that profits of manufacturers in \nthis field were permitted to vary 10 or 15 per cent. 108. \n\nCites where fixed profit was $913 per motor for $6,087 motor, \nand where it was reduced to $625 when bogev price was reduced \nto $5,000. \n\nFive million four hundred thousand dollars would be profit to \nPackard Motor Co. at a profit of $913 per motor on a contract \nof 6,000 motors. 113. \n\nGoes into provisions of contract as to depreciation, etc. 115. \n\nMr. Hughes reads into record resolution of Aircraft Board cover- \ning contract with Lincoln Motor Co. 117. \n\nMr. Hughes goes into detail about depreciation clause. 118. \n\nAsked if he recalls contract with Lincoln Motor Co. for 6,000 \nspare parts at $5,950,000 he answers in the negative. 120. \n\nHid not know that if Lincoln Motor Co. complies with its con- \ntracts it would make at the end of the year 1918 approximately \n$5,000,000. 120-121. \n\nAdmits it would appear that these concerns could realize 100 per \ncent on their capital within a year. 123. \n\nAdmits Mr. Ford\'s contract for 5.000 United States Liberties pro- \nvides a profit of $3,250,000. 127. \n\nDoes not know what brought about such contracts. \n\nMr. Coffin states his knowledge of the Delco system. 130. \n\nWas not aware there was a limitation as to the type of ignition to \nbe used. 131. \n\n\n\n118 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nHoward E. Coffin \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nThinks there are good reasons why the cost of Liberty should be \nfour or five times as much as the highest grade of automobile \nmotor. 133. \n\nThinks outlay for new equipment by the Packard Motor Co. \nwould be great, due to the difference in the size of their motor \nand the Libertv. \nEdward P. Butts (June 25, 1918 ; Book 7) . \n\nEesidence, Springfield, Mass. ; office in Buffalo. Manager of the \nFerguson Shipbuilding interests. Also employed by the Gov- \nernment as manager of engineering in the Signal Corps on the \nproduction of battle planes from early December until 20th of \nApril. 137. \n\nTrained in engineering at Pennsylvania State College. 138. \n\nGave careful study of situation and offers to outline the causes of \ndelay, which he does beginning on page 139. \n\nMaj. Shepler never recognized the Signal Corps organization in \nBuffalo ; would never go into the office of the district manager. \n147. \n\nHere continues narrative about production at Curtiss plant. 149. \n\nStates engineering plan was very cumbersome. 154. \n\n" Mr. Webber\'s influence there has continually interfered with \nproduction in that plant." 155. \n\nCharges that men knew parts were of wrong dimensions, and yet \nthey went on making them. 157. \n\nThese instances were quite common. 159. \n\nMr. Webber never able to give a direct answer. 160. \n\nHad positive sensation of there existing some subtle influence in \nthe Curtiss plant to retard things. 160. \n\nOne hundred and eighty orders placed not in conformity with \nSignal Corps specifications. 162. \n\nGovernment would pay for rejected parts under certain condi- \ntions. 165. \n\nCharges that Curtiss Co. repeatedly bought material of a lower \ngrade than required by Signal Corps in the hope it might pass \ninspection. 166. \n\nCharges there was an order issued under which material not in \naccord with Signal Corps specifications would actually be used \nwith the assent of the Government for the manufacture of \nplanes. 168. \n\nFound various fittings on machines that had holes drilled in them. \n174. \n\nDoes not know of actual sabotage at Curtiss plant, outside of cases \n" I have cited." 182. \n\nCites cause of bad conditions at Curtiss plant. 184. \n\nGives his reasons for leaving the Signal Corps. 189. \n\nFinally stated reason was lack of confidence in the organization of \nSignal Corps. 190. \n\nGoes into lengthy explanation of what he means by management, \nas relates to " lack of confidence in the organizing of the op- \nerating management." 190. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 119 \n\nCol. Clinton Goodloe Edgar (June 26, 1918; Book 7). \n\nStates that he returned yesterday from a trip to Dayton. 196. \n\nIs asked to state conditions of Wilbur Wright field. 196. \n\nOutlines possibilities of floods. 196, 197. \n\nStates that majority of field (1,200 acres) would be under 10 \nfeet of water in case of 1913 flood. 203. \n\nHere produces several papers as exhibits. 205. \n\nGives results of investigation of supplies. 208, 210. \n\nContinues recital of investigation, up to page 216. \nWilliam C. Potter (June 26,^ 1918; Book 7). \n\nResidence, New York City. Before being employed by the \nGovernment was a member of the firm \xe2\x80\x94 Guggenheim Bros. \xe2\x80\x94 \nwho are copper people, miners. Appointed as chief of Equip- \nment Division of Signal Corps on February 20. Brought \nhere by a number of suggestions by Col. Montgomery and Mr. \nStettinius. 217, 218. \n\nPerformed miscellaneous duties in Equipment Division unoffi- \ncially between early January and February 20. 219. \n\nContinued as chief of Equipment Division until it was abolished \nunder the Overman bill. 220. \n\nOn the entrance of his duties in Equipment Division he found \nno program at all. 224. \n\nReviews with Mr. Hughes exhibits of programs. 224-230. \n\nOutlines what he found situation to be after coming to the con- \nclusion organization was not according to correct lines. \n230, 231. \n\nShows the duties of various heads. 232-236. \n\nRedesigning of De Haviland done by Dayton-Wright Co. with \nassistance of Signal Corps. 237. \n\nGives his reasons for lack of production, which includes " Lack \nof knowledge * * * of design, lack of experience in con- \nstruction of airplanes, the immaturity of the Liberty motor." \n238-241. \n\nApproximate date first De Haviland 4\'s were shipped from fac- \ntory was late in March. 243. \n\nFound certain things were not right with these planes, however. \n244. \n\nThinks planes with " proper complement of equipment " were \ncompleted in April. 244. \n\nLack of theoretical knowledge and experience cause of delay. \n245. \n\nFinds it difficult to explain why this knowledge was not gained \nearlier. 246. \n\nCol. Deeds did not have requisite information. 248. \n\nMuch information and personal help from England. 249. \n\nDe Haviland plane was built at Day ton- Wright as early as \nOctober 29, 1917, and " was supposed to be satisfactory." 251. \n\nKnows it to be a fact that a redesign of gun mount was ordered \nafter it was in production. 252. \n\nPrepared to believe that several changes causing delays were \nmade. 253. \n\nTakes four to five months after first design to get into produc- \ntion, according to foreign information. 254. \n\n\n\n120 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". \n\nWilliam C. Potter \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nWithout delays in equipment quantity production could have \n\nbeen had perhaps in February. 255-256. \nThinks gun chute should have been completed last fall. 258. \nHad engineers, but did not know much about this subject. 260. \nMr. Hughes referring to engineers : " They might know as much \n\nas those who knew nothing? " Answer by Mr. Potter: "Abso- \nlutely." Not much effort made to get the best men. 260. \nCites qualifications of Col. Hall. 261. \nAlso other men. 261-262. \nOutside of foreign representatives engineers did not know more \n\nabout putting on a machine gun than a man who might be in \n\nthe hardware business. 262. \nWhen Potter took charge, immediately secured Commander \n\nBriggs, of British Navy. 263. \nIn spite of lack of knowledge in this country, Commander \n\nBriggs went ahead, and the result was planes began to be \n\nproduced. 264. \nTells what he knows about synchronizer delays. 265. \nCites causes of delay on gun sights. 266. \nDelay in camera and camera mounts taken up. 268. \nAlso pertaining to oxygen apparatus. 269, \nEecalls delay in furnishing radio equipment. 269. \nDelay in Bristol worse than in De Haviland. 271. \nAsked for transfer of Lient. Col. Clark, because of inefficiency. \n\n271. \nGoes into lengthy discussion on Clark\'s deficiency. 272. \nGoes into detail about Bristol plane. 272. \nCites failure of Bristol machine. 273. \nBristol plane used extensively in England. 273-274. \nReason we can not use ^Bristol is because of engine. 274. \nBristol program will have to be discarded and substitute De \n\nHavilands until time comes when we can make Bristols. 274. \nDefect in Bristol has killed two men and smashed one plane. \n\n275. \nTakes up construction of Caproni plane. \n\nContradicting orders about the production of Capronis. 276. \nSpeaks of Handley-Paige and contract with England for the \n\nassembling, building of plant, and furnishing of bricklayers. \n\n277. \nIs questioned about the men coining from England under Mr. \n\nWorkman to assist in the building of the Handlev-Paige. \n\n278-279. \nExamined conditions at Curtiss plant and found them " a little \n\nchaotic." Goes on citing conditions in Curtiss plant. 280-281. \nGives records of Mr. Mueller, Mr. Webber, and Mr. Schwebel. \n\n282. \nTraining-plane production at Curtiss factory had S\'one very \n\nwell. 283. \nSpeaks of scrapped materials. 283-284. \nHas heard that 60 per cent of spruce was rejected. 284. \nSince establishment of cut-up plant, quality better. 285. \nGoes into a further statement about delays of planes and im- \nmaturity of Liberty motor. 285, 286. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 121 \n\nWilliam C. Potter \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nEecites difficulty with Hispano motor. 287-288. \n\nSets forth contradicting orders by Gen. Pershing relative to \n\nthe building of single seaters. 290. \nExamined conditions at Standard Co. and found conditions bad, \n\ndue to incompetent management and insufficient finances. 292. \nMr. Mengel denied to Mr. Potter that he owned any stock in \n\nStandard Co. 292. \nHe seemed to have reference to actual ownership, however, or \n\nto the point as to whose name it stood in on the books. 292. \nGives reasons for the discarding of Standard J. Planes. 293. \nDisposition of overhead charges is taken up, and the question \n\nof salaries. 294. \nMr. Mengel\'s salary is being held up. 295. \nGives Maj. Gray\'s reasons for leaving Signal Corps. 296. \nDiscusses report of Capt. Preston on the spruce situation, in \n\nwhich cut-up plant is criticized. 298-299. \nContinues discussion up to page 319, which includes Chicago, \n\nMilwaukee & St. Paul Kailway proposition. \nMr. Hughes asks for copy of railroad contract. 322. \nMr. Hughes quotes from contract with Siems, Carey-H. S. \n\nKerbaugh Corporation providing for the sale of 250,000,000 \n\nfeet spruce-lumber flitches. 322. \nEach airplane requires about 2,000 feet of first-class spruce. 323. \nTwenty-eight million feet of spruce per month required for \n\nAmerica and the Allies. 325. \nNot familiar with protests due to the appointment of Mr. Blodell \n\nor Mr. Long. 325-326. \nCol. Disque had charge of price fixing. 326. \nSo much spruce that it is not worth much and stumpage question \n\nis not serious, according to Pacific coast claims. 328. \nMr. Hughes reads letter from Aero-Marine Plane & Motor Co. \n\nwith regard to price of spruce. 329. \nHigh cost of spruce from cut-up plant is due to the cost of the \n\ncut-up plant. 330. \nNine thousand to twelve thousand military men in spruce pro- \nduction on west coast. 333. \nInadequate supply of spruce during June, July, August, and \n\nSeptember expected. 336. \nGives actual production of spruce and fir per month. 338. \nMr. Hughes reads further from Capt. Preston\'s letter. 341. \nMr. Potter thinks probablv Capt. Preston\'s report is exaggerated. \n\n343. \nShould have approximately 8,000 De Haviland 4\'s by the end of \n\nthis year, but they will not all be on the front. 345-346. \nLiberty motor now in a fairly satisfactory state of development. \n\nTestifies as to what is being done with regard to pursuit planes. \n\n350. \nUnderstands contract by J. G. White was quite satisfactorily \n\nfilled. 353. \nOught not to rely on the French to fill out our complement of \n\nplanes this year. \n\n\n\n122 ABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". \n\nWilliam C. Potter \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nGoing to send Hispano-Suiza 180 engine, starting in July. 358. \n\nEecites facts in connection with accounting department. 359. \n\n"We started out with a lot of bad inspectors, but they have \ngotten better now." 360. \n\nInspectors had very little knowledge of their work. 360. \n\nRegarded it as necessarv to call for the resignation of Mr. Heat- \nley Green. 361. \n\nThe same is also true of Mr. Butts. 363. \n\nCites friction between Maj. Shepler and Messrs. Webber, Butts> \nand Green. 364. \n\nExplains why he overruled Maj. Shepler \'s recommendation that \nwhat Mueller and Webber said should control. 365. \n\nTen million dollar advance to Curtiss Co. explained. 367. \n\nMr. Hughes reads market letter with respect to Curtiss Co. : \n"Earnings now running at the rate of $1,000,000 monthly." \n367-368. \n\nDid not know of systematic effort on part of Curtiss plant to \nbuy material of poor quality. 369. \n\nFinds difficulty in connection with Standard Aero Co. that does \nnot exist in other plants. 371. \n\nMr. Frier son asks for correct information as to the number of \nairplanes and engines now under contract. 372 ; also, 373-377. \n\nQuestioned as to whether 12J to 15 per cent net profit is in accord \nwith general practice. 378. \n\nLincoln Motor Co. " is getting an enormous return on its capital." \n382. \n\nMr. Potter goes into an explanation of these profits. 382-383. \n\nThinks if manufacturers had been induced to take contracts at \na lower percentage it might have lessened their enthusiasm. \n383. \n\nMr. Hughes quotes from Lincoln Motor Co. contract. 388. \n\nFive million dollars is total profit of Lincoln Motor Co. 390. \n\nKeady turning over of the capital ought to be taken into con- \nsideration. 393. \n\nWas never familiar with a cost-plus contract until he came to \nWashington. 393-394. \n\nKnows of no reason why Packard plant should need a greater \ncapital than the Lincoln Motor Co. 394. \n\nWorking capital being supplied by Government. 395. \n\nFord\'s profit being $3,125,000, together with allowance for de- \npreciation, is admitted by Mr. Potter not to be a serious risk. \n396. \nHenry K. S. Williams (June 27, 1918; Book 7). \n\nResidence, White Plains, N. Y. Retired for over six years. \nPrior to that was a member of the lumber firm of Ichabod T. \nWilliams & Sons, dealing in " native woods, mahogany, and \nforeign woods/\' That firm is still very large importer of ma- \nhogany. Mr. Williams, however, has no connection with anv \nlumber firms. 397-398. \n\nBecame connected with Signal Corps 5th clay of February, 1918. \nEngaged by Mr. Lockhart. 398. \n\nThinks mahogany interests formed into an association about that \ntime. 399. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 123 \n\nHenry K. S. Williams \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nProduces memorandum of consultations with committee of ma- \nhogany men. 399. \n\nContinues outlining his early activities with Signal Corps. 402. \n\nTells what contracts were made. 403. \n\nSpeaks of arrangement with British merchants. 404. \n\nAsked for average prices, quotes I. T. Williams & Sons, contract \nwas at $300 for the firsts and $220 for the seconds. 406. Con- \ntinues quoting contracts. 406-407. \n\nStates Maj. Mixter drew up specifications for propellers. 410. \n\nProceeds with statement as to the way in which prices were de- \ntermined. 412. \n\nContracted on the basis of $350 for firsts and $280 for No. 1 com- \nmon. 413. \n\nSpeaks of Mr. Wyckliff as being the most able man he had come \nacross. 419. \n\nRefused to consider a price of $400 a thousand. 421. \n\nGoes into much detail from page to page relating to price and \ncontract. \n\nOtis Co. will make 13 per cent a thousand on their cost on this \nmahogany. 431. \n\nThree million one hundred thousand feet minimum comes from \nAfrica. 435. \n\nAll manufacturers paid about the same price. 436. \n\nStates difficulty of getting boats to bring out this wood. 442. \n\nSeven million five hundred thousand under African mahogany \ncontract. 443. \n\nWalnut production increased through the assistance of the Boy \nScouts. 443. \n\nRelates affiliation with Boy Scouts. 444-445. \n\nTwenty-six million seven hundred and three thousand total pur- \nchases to date. 446. \n\nMr. Hughes reads Mr. Ryerson\'s statement. 447. \n\nPurchasing for all the Allies except the British. 452. \n\nNo arrangement by Signal Corps to establish whether or not a \n\nfair basis is used. 453. \n\nQuestioned as to whether there is not a way of being absolutely \nsure in respect to the cost of a log to the manufacturer. 454. \n\nCites why Government should pay more for logs in 1918 than \nthey did in 1917. 456. \n\nReads from minutes of Aircraft Board pertaining to the letting \nof mahogany contracts. 457. \n\nMr. Wycliff, secretary of Mengel Co. was here in consultation \non prices. 461. \n\nDoes not want to state why Joseph Otis was discharged. 462. \n\nCites facts in regard to Mr. Wycliff; what led to his appoint- \nment and his duties. 463. \n\nImpossible to figure out profit until deliveries are made. 465. \nRichard F. Howe (June 27, 1918; Book 7). \n\nMember of Aircraft Board November 14. Prior to that a manu- \nfacturer in harvesting machinery. Has not had any experi- \nence in aeronautics. 468. \n\nBoard was purely advisory and not an executive board. 468. \n\n\n\n124 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nRichard F. Howe \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nWas sent to the Pacific coast in January with reference to spruce \nproduction. 469. \n\nWas considerably impressed by Col. Disque. 469. \n\nGives personnel of commission named to assist Col. Disque. 470.. \n\nSeveral members of committee interested in lumber business. \n471. \n\nCut-up plant seemed advisable. 472. \n\nVisited Dayton, Detroit, and Buffalo plants. 473. \n\nStates delay at Dayton- Wright was due to getting accessories. \n474. \n\nHad a general knowledge of the form of contracts. 477. \n\nVisits to factories was before members of Aircraft Board were \nadvised not to hold communication with the manufacturers. \n479. \n\nAircraft Board, in initiating proposals for contracts, acted upen \nproposals presented by the members representing the Army \nand Navy. 481. \n\nIndependent investigations made at times by Aircraft Board. \nOne of these covered the Liberty motor by Engineer Creigh. \n482. \n\nEelied entirely upon the Army as to requirements for wood r \nmetal, engines, and different types of planes. 483. Likewise \npertaining to the Navy. 483. \n\nMr. Hughes reads from minutes of Aircraft Board covering a \nforecast of production of United States, 12 engines. 484. \n\nDid not get program of production from Signal Corps regu- \nlarly. 487. \n\nExplains why three civilians, including Mr. Howe, should at- \ntempt to secure facts for presentation to the General Staff. \n488. \n\nStates Signal Corps was underorganized and recommended a \nproduction man. Produces letter. 491. \n\nRecommendation by Aircraft Board on the acquisition of the \nGeneral Vehicle Co. 493. \n\nDiscussion with respect to contracts for the building of a rail- \nroad in the State of Washington. 494. \n\nMr. Hughes reads letter from Mr. Howe to Mr. Coffin. 496. \n\nMr. Hughes asks if it was understood that railroad development \nadded greatly to the value of timberlands. 498. \n\nReads resolution of board in re the building of railroad. 499. \n\nDiscusses cross-license matter. 501. \n\nHad no opportunity to take part in the formulating of cost-plus \ncontracts. 503. \nLieut. Col. George W. Mixter (June 27, 1918; Book 7). \n\nConnected with the Army since July 10, 1917. Received his com- \nmission about August 15. Formerly vice president of Deere \n& Co., manufacturers of agricultural machinery. Engaged in \nthat work about 20 years. 505. \n\nWas placed in charge of the inspection department of the Signal \nCorps. 506. \n\nInspection related purely to purchases. 507. \n\nTook position as production manager about May 1. 508. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 125 \n\nLieut. Col. George W. Mixtee \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nCites distinction between inspection department and the depart- \nment of district offices. 509. \n\nVisited Dayton-Wright factory, producing the De Haviland \nplanes. 510. \n\nFound delay primarily due to lack of engineering decision. 510. \n\nUnder impression that after January 1, through efforts of pro- \nduction engineering department, created about that time, engi- \nneering decisions were reached as rapidly as possible. 511. \n\nResponsibility for a lack of engineering decision before January \n1 laid to Col. Deeds as chief of division. 513. \n\nGives facts which led him to think delay at Dayton was due to \nlack of engineering decision. 514. \n\nTook three months to get certain difficulties in production \ncleaned up. 515. \n\nSix hundred changes necessary in the production of J-l train- \ning plane. 515, 516. \n\nTrouble at Dayton due to defects in drawings furnished by \nStandard Aero Co. 516. \n\nFirst training plane delivered\' by Dayton- Wright Co. approxi- \nmately October 1. 518. \n\nNo further production, however, between October 6 and 25, due \nto change in landing gear and gasoline supply. 518. Also \nfailure to get metal parts. \n\nNational Cash Register Co. slowed up on production of parts \nto get out a new cash register. 519. \n\nChart produced showing very slow progress in the completion \nof planes by Dayton-Wright Co. 520. \n\nThese planes not satisfactory in the field. 521. \n\nRecent order withdrawing about 1,600 Standard planes. 521. \n\nLast above represents an investment by the Government of ap- \nproximately $10,000,000. 521. \n\nThinks withdrawal was due to number numerous accidents with \nthis plane. 521. Trouble with Hall-Scott engine. 521. \n\nNature of engine trouble was such that it would mean a com- \nplete tearing down. 522. \n\nGives his opinion as to nature of engine trouble. 522. \n\nFour hundred planes made by Dayton-Wright and those made \nby Fisher also subject to withdrawal for same reason. 523. \n\nNo indications of disloyalty at Dayton plant. 527. \n\nGives reasons for delay in the training plane at Curtiss plant. \n528. _ \n\nDelay in fighting planes at Curtiss plant clue to failure to fur- \nnish anything definite to produce. 528. \n\nGives course of production of Bristol Fighter. 529. \n\nMatter taken out of the hands of the Government at one time \nand put into the hands of Curtiss people. 532. \n\nNo cooperation between Green-Butts combination and Maj. \nSheppler. 533. \n\nMany branches of Government operating directly on the plant. \n534. < \n\nStates it is pretty nearly true to say that the job was undefined \non the Bristol Fighter from November 1 up to date. 537. \n\n\n\n126 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nLieut. Col. George W. Mixter \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nSerious question as to whether 50 Bristol Fighters practically \n\ncomplete at this time will not have to be scrapped. 537. \nGives his opinion of Mr. Butts. 539. Also of morale of work- \ning force. \nLarge number of employees working only part time. 540. \nDescribes two cases of sabotage. 541. \nTrouble with Bristol Fighter the last month is whether it is a \n\nflying machine or not. 542. \nExplains how neglect can be attributed to the Curtiss Co. itself. \n\n545. \nFisher plant best run plant. 549. \nVery bad organization at Standard plant. 553. \nMain trouble is Mr. Mengel. 553. \nGoes into ownership of Standard Co. 554. \nContract let to this company amounts to over $9,000,000. 555. \nStates who passes on the letting of contracts. 556. \nSelection of manufacturer is left practically to the production \n\nmanager, who is Mr. Kellogg. 559. \nPrice is fixed by Mr. Fletcher. 559. \nMengePs salary over $60,000. 562. \nSpeaks of contract recently given. 562, 563. \nTwo hundred and fifty thousand dollars fixed price on four \n\nCaproni planes. 564. \nSignal Corps has no engineering organization to stand the \n\nstrain. 565. \nGives engineering organization of Signal Corps and says it is \n\nnot efficient because it is disorganized. 566. \nVery serious and fatal lack. 568. \nWorse shape to-day (production engineering) than on March 1. \n\n570. \nOpinion is shared by 99 out of 100 that under the leadership of \n\nMr. Kellogg organization will not be efficient. 580. \nRefers to elements of destruction existing. 580. \nAsked to state how it is that difficulties have been overcome in \n\nthe production of engines and not in planes. 582. \nThinks decision could have been reached with regard to gun \n\nchutes, shell chutes, etc. 583. \nGen. Foulois did not send specific list of requirements. 584. \nGoes into " training-plane list." 589. \nCol. Clinton Goodloe Edgar (June 28, 1918; Book 7). \n\nProduces statement showing number of training planes shipped \n\nweek by week. 592. \nJames Farley McClelland (June 28, 1918; Book 7). \n\nA mining engineer. Received training at Columbia and also \n\ntaught at Columbia in mining branch. Was editor in chief of \n\nspecification section of engineering department of equipment \n\ndivision. Covered both planes and engines. 595, 596. \nHad charge of material specifications, etc. 597. \nDescribes condition of department as " fine." 598. \nDoes not think conditions were as bad prior to reorganization \n\nunder Overman bill as they are now. 604. \nDescribes Col. Hall as " a star performer." 606. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 127 \n\nJames Farley McClelland \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nEngineering department not interested in the planes which were \nthen being produced. 610. \n\nNot adequate engineering attention given to development of \nplanes. 612. \n\nDelay of two weeks in getting reply to a request for a decision. \n615. \n\nClaim by Dayton- Wright that they did not get certain informa- \ntion u is a quibble." 621. \n\nMan named Sergt. Klemin one of the parties relied on to make \ndecisions. 623. \n\nEngineering decisions would have caused more rapid progress. \n625. \n\nDelays due to lack of knowledge. 626. \n\nOverheard discussion as to what instruments should go on a \nplane. 629. \n\nMr. Hughes questions about a request for synchronizing device \nin November which was not billed February 14. 633. \n\nMaj. Barr, of Ordnance Department, appeared with a bombing \ngear in January. 640. \n\nGives understanding as to why Col. Hall was put in charge. 642. \n\nGoes into reasons for delay in production of Bristol Fighter. \n642. \n\nGives reason why the taking away of De Havilands from his \nsection would demoralize his section. 650. \nJames S. MacGregor (June 28, 1918 ; Book 7) . \n\nEesidence, Pelham Manor, N. Y. With Signal Corps since Sep- \ntember 1. In inspection section. Had occasion to observe \nproduction. 654. \n\nStates function of his department. 654. \n\nStates what he thinks contributed to the delay of the De Havi- \nland 4\'s. 655. Continues to page 675. \n\nKnows Sergt. Klemin to be a very young man. 676. \n\nGives his idea as to why Standard J planes were withdrawn. \n682. \n\nSpeaks of efforts made to get material for plants. 68^ \n\nMakes vigorous charge of wasted time. 687. \n\nCites difficulty in furnishing stress sheets. 689. \n\nIs questioned further by Mr. Hughes as to training and experi- \nence. 690. \n\nCurtiss plant 50 per cent off in its chemical analysis. 691. \n\nGreat many spurious specifications. 695. \nMaj. A. C. Downey (June 28, 1918 ; Book 7). \n\nMajor in Signal Corps. Previous to that in the office of the \nAuditor of the War Department. Prior to that in the office of \nthe Comptroller of the Treasury. Assigned to Aircraft Pro- \nduction Board as contracting officer and disbursing officer. \n697, 698. \n\nExplains duties. 698. \n\nStates what he actually done with respect to contracts that have \nbeen let. 699. \n\nExplains variation in terms of contract. 701. \n\nGives names of those who conducted negotiations. 702. \n\n130687\xe2\x80\x9419 9 \n\n\n\n128 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nMaj. A. C. Downey \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nExplains how bogey cost of $6,087 on Liberty motor was reached. \n\n703. \nTells what led to reduction of bogey cost to $5,000, saying in \n\npart that it was ridiculously high. 704. \nEstimated cost of Liberty motor $3,200. 705. \nBogey price includes part of salaries at Packard plant. 706. \nCites bogey cost by other plants. 707. \nBogey cost $630 too high at Fisher Body Co. 708. \nSalaries at Fisher Body Co. covered in bogey price. 708. \nMr. Mengal\'s efforts in the way of financing the company. 709. \nStates who developed the cost-plus contract. 709. \nNo provision of penalties covering delivery. 711. \nSpeaks of Fowler Co. on Pacific coast. 712. \nStates why provision for liquidated damages was not in large \n\ncontracts. 713. \nInducement to manufacturers in saving which could be made \n\non bogey cost. 714. \nSpeaks of " a sharing of the excess cost." 714. \nGives names of those who made negotiations. 715. \nStates why contract was recently let to Standard Co. 716. \n" Fought agreement " of cross license. 717. \nStates substance of cross-license agreement. 718. \nContinues this in much detail up to page 734. \nAlexander McKinney, Jr. (Washington, D. C, July 1, 1918 ; Book \n\n8 )- \n\nSpecial agent for Office of Naval Intelligence. 1. \n\nBeen on duty there one year. 1. \n\nHas investigated Aeromarine Plane & Motor Co. 1. \n\nContract given to Aeromarine Plane & Motor Co. by Navy De- \npartment signed October 30, 1917. 2. \n\nItem 1 is for 200 seaplanes at $6,750 each. 2. \n\nItem 2 is for 200 power plants for same, without engines, start- \ning machines, and thermometers to be furnished by Govern- \nment, each at $1,000. \n\nItem 4 is for 20 spare radiators at $85 each. 2. \n\nItem 5 is for 20 gasoline tanks at $80 each. 2. \n\nItem 6 is for 40 groups of seaplane parts at $7,900 each. 2. \n\nThe contract in total amounted to $1,869,300. 2. \n\nTestimony of this witness relates solely to the Navv. \nFrank G. Diffin (Washington, D. C, July 1, 1918; Book 8). \n\nAssistant to A. A. Landon, chief of production. 23. \n\nIn charge of entire production of aircraft. 23. \n\nPrincipal duty of witness is to determine the matter in regard to \ncrank-shaft failures on engines; to eliminate failures and \nbring about a greater percentage of acceptable crank shafts \nfor use in the Liberty engines. 27. \n\nPrevious to this had charge of the standardization work. 28. \n\nAttended meeting in London early in February as representa- \ntive of United States, which had to do with the standardiza- \ntion of aircraft specifications among the Allies. 28, 29. \n\nNo American planes in France when he was across in February \n! and March. 31. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 129 \n\nFrank G. Diffin \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nKeported it was absolutely imperative that we supply the Allies, \nprimarily England, with engines. 31. \n\nWeek before he left, England shipped 762 machines to the front. \n31. \n\nOn or about February 25, on his recommendation, England \nplaced order with United States for 3,000 Liberty engines, \ncalling for 1,300 to be delivered in July and increasing \nmonthly thereafter. 31. \n\nLiberty motors had not begun to arrive in England when he \nleft. Only had three sample engines. 33. \n\nWe had 56 \'second-rate machines at front about March 18 ob- \ntained from France. 34. \n\nFrance and England at that time would not deliver planes to \nus unless we were occupying a big percentage of the front, \nbecause the destruction at that time was enormous. 34. \n\nDestruction very close to 100 per cent a month. 35. \n\nQ. " Did you ascertain the causes for the nondelivery of \nplanes by the French Government in accordance with their \ncontract? " \xe2\x80\x94 A. U I could not answer that definitely. My im- \npression was that we had failed to make good on our own con- \ntracts with the French Government." \n\nQ. " In what respect? "\xe2\x80\x94A. " Raw materials." 36. \n\nFrench specifications impossible of fulfillment. 36. \n\nMaterial being furnished French Government now under J. G. \nWhite contract. 37. \n\nFrance practically scraped cleam of raw materials. Practically \nimpossible to get keg of nails over there. 38. \n\nFrench did not plan abandoning their own requirements in our \nfavor. 38. \n\nEngland\'s total minimum requirements for spruce from Febru- \nary 1, 1918, to February 1, 1919, is 120,000,000 feet. 40. \n\nOn March 14 England had less than a 30 days\' supply of spruce \non hand and unless instant steps were taken by United States \nto supply England with spruce it would mean that produc- \ntion must stop. \n\nUpon return to this country secured a million feet for imme- \ndiate shipment to England ; a percentage of spruce which was \ngoing to our own factories was largely diverted to England. \nAllies were getting 50 per cent of spruce and we were getting \n50 per cent. 41. \n\nGermany is keeping up with the airplane production. 41. \n\nGermany uses other kinds of wood. 41. \n\nWe now have metal under development and will shortly go into \nthe production of metal to take the place of spruce in the \nspars and ribs. 42. \n\n" If there is any one thing that has delayed production, it has \nbeen the military supervision of it, and I think we have suc- \nceeded in spite of the military supervision instead of with it." \n44. \n\nToo much red tape. 45. \n\nGreat number of men with great deal of ability hedged in by \nauthority and rules and regulations. 45. 46. \n\n\n\n130 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nFrank G. Diffin \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nHis contention we should always produce airplanes in quan- \ntity irrespective of quality. 48. \n\nNo reason why combat planes could not have been put in pro- \nduction during year 1917. 49. \n\nDayton- Wright plant produced a satisfactory plane at end of \nOctober, 1917. \n\nCould have put that into production in December without un- \nnecessary supervision. 54. \n\nFrom his observation on both sides, a quick decision as to \nequipment and the putting of those planes into production \nwould have resulted in serviceable planes which could have \nbeen used satisfactorily on the front as early as last April. \n55. \n\nQ. "From your observation abroad, were there engines \nwhich could have been put into production in the United \nStates, pending the development of the Liberty engine ? " \xe2\x80\x94 \nA. " Yes, sir." 57. \n\nDuring the winter months conditions were almost absolutely \nprohibitive in this country as to production and also the \nsupply of manufactured products, due to embargoes of every \npossible kind. Had to meet them on every hand to get \npriorities over what we termed negligible stuff. 60. \n\nCondition as to priorities actually affected the production of \neither planes or engines. 61. \n\nPretty well mixed up during the winter months as to what con- \nstituted real priority. 61. \n\nThey had so many priority orders they did not stop to read \nthem. 61. \n\nThe reason for such a situation existing was due to the railroads \nbeing taken over by the Government, our War Industries \nBoard getting into operation, and all the various boards here \nstarting to function in Washington, some of them to varying \ndegrees of efficiency. 62. \n\nHolds no brief for the Day ton- Wright Co., although thinks they \nare an admirable manufacturing organization. 63. \n\nSomething like 800 changes have been made on Bristol machines \nsince they went into production. The majority of them would \ninterfere with production. 65. \n\nDoes not regard Bristol as being developed as a practical serv- \niceable machine. 65. \n\nThey are trying to put a 400-horsepower motor into a machine \noriginally designed for a 180-horsepower engine. 65. \n\nIf it is true that a satisfactory De Haviland 4 had actually been \nbuilt as a sample machine at the Day ton- Wright plant by the \nend of October, they would have been in production within 60 \ndays after that. 65, 66. \n\nThe only practicable Handley-Paige built to-day is the Handley- \nPaige we are at present starting to build in this country. 66. \n\nWas not practicable last year to put Handley-Paige into pro- \nduction in this country. 66. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 131 \n\nFrank G. Diffin \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nDoes not believe in Sunbeam engine. England uses them as a \nlast resort now. 67. \n\nSunbeam engine, as designed in England, is not a commercial \nengine, to our methods of production. 67. \n\nCame to Washington a little over a year ago from Meadville, Pa. \nStarted building aircraft parts in Pennsylvania, which he sold \nout before he came down here. 67. \n\nTwenty-one or twenty-two years\' experience as a manufacturer \nand engineer. \n\nReason for not letting contracts on a fixed-price basis was due \nto fact that manufacturers in this country did not know what \nthey were required to produce. In many cases entire heats of \nsteel have been lost, due to the fact that we had to reject them \nas not being up to aeronautical requirements. 68. \n\nWould not, as a manufacturer, have undertaken the manufacture \nof the Liberty motor on a fixed-price basis, 68. \n\nAll depends on honesty of individuals to contract as to what \nconstituted a reasonable or unreasonable profit. Ten per cent \nplus cost can be worked so it would be cost plus 100, if you \nwant to work it that way. 69. \n\nIf the entire cost is borne by the Government and all financial \nobligations \xe2\x80\x94 the Government advanced capital on it \xe2\x80\x94 the per- \ncentage of profit ought to be a fixed one. 71. \n\nSynchronizer had not been adopted July 1. 75. \n\nBomb-dropping devices were in use, 75. \n\nQ. (By Attorney General.) " What would be your judgment \nin a general way as to whether, in the matter of production, \nsay, which was started on July 1 of last year, it was desirable \nto impede production by adopting these more important \nchanges as have come along, or whether it would have been \nbetter, possibly, to have proceeded with the construction in \naccordance with the plans in existence July 1 and to put into \nsubsequent planes the improvements which were developed. \nWhich, in your judgment, would have been the better \npolicy? " \xe2\x80\x94 A. " My personal judgment is that the better policy \nwould have been to put into production a given type or model \nor design of equipment and any improvements made thereon \nbe put into subsequent machines. That is simply good com- \nmercial practice." 75, 76. \n\nThinks Liberty motor best engine built to-day. 76. \n\nPCan not ordinarily use it for training planes ; it is too big a motor. \nThe 12 is the only one in production to-day. 77. \nThe purpose was not the development of an American engine, \nbut was the development of an engine that could be made in \nAmerica. 78. \n\nk Cylinder is essentially a copy of the Mercedes cylinder. 78. \nGot into production on Liberty engine quicker than they could \nhave on the foreign engines. 79. \nMost successful battleplane used abroad was probably the Sup- \nwroth. 79. \n\n\n\n132 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nFrank G. Diffin \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nCould have put that plane into production in America. 79. \n\nQ. " What was the best foreign engine on July 1, 1917, used \non the battle front at that time that, in your judgment, could \nhave been produced in this country ? " \xe2\x80\x94 A. " Two engines there, \neach in a class by itself \xe2\x80\x94 the Rolls-Royce and the Hispano- \nSuiza." 79, 80a. \n\nIn one of the Rolls-Royce factories in England it took -10,000 \noperators to produce 46 engines in the last week there. 80. \n\nHandwork feature enters into the production of any foreign \nengine. 81. \n\nUp until the time of this war England had relatively few auto- \nmatic machines in the entire country, where we have thousands \nand thousands of them here. All of our work is done on auto- \nmatics. England did not have them. They did not exist. \nTheir work is almost entirely handwork; certainly 95 per cent \nof it. That is the reason for our production here that they do \nnot get there, and never will, until they adopt American meth- \nods of manufacture. Their labor guilds and labor organiza- \ntions will not let that kind of machinery go into their plants. \n82, 81. \n\nMachine-made parts are interchangeable and hand-made parts are \nnot. 81. \n\nPretty well along in the fall before synchronizers wore really \ncommercially practicable. 86. \n\nPlanes we are now sending over all contain synchronizers. 86. \n\nThe Handley-Paige in the Curtiss is designed for both the Rolls- \nRoyce and the Liberty. 89. \nMaj. Frank E. Smith (Washington, D. C, July 1, 1918; Book 8). \n\nIn charge of the field forces of the finance division of Bureau of \nAircraft Production and also have charge of the approvals and \nappraisals department of the finance division. 91. \n\nBeen engaged in this work since early last October. 1917. 91. \n\nHas had long experience in manufacturing, particularly in auto- \nmobiles. 91. \n\nBeen connected with several companies and also been receiver for \nseveral motor companies at different times. 91. \n\nSome time prior to his going into Signal Corps was in Ordnance, \nfinding producers of munitions. 92. \n\nHas received estimate on cost of manufacturing Libertv motor. \n92. \n\nCosts are surveys made by our men in the field in the Detroit \ndistrict, 93. \' \n\nHad a complete survey of the Packard Co. 93. \n\nSurvey shows, first, that the cost is divided between material, \n$1,300 ; labor, $500 ; and the overhead expense of 200 per cent \nof the productive labor, amounting to $1,000; or a total shop \ncost of $2,800 per motor. Added to this is the miscellaneous \ncost of shop tools and equipment, amounting to $125 per \nmotor, and various contingencies estimated, including the \nprobable cost of specification changes, amounting to $275 per \nmotor, or a total estimated miscellaneous cost of $400 per \nmotor, making a grand total cost per motor, in accordance \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 133 \n\nMaj. Frank E. Smith \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nwith this survey, of $3,200 each. The fixed profit under the \ncontract is $625 per motor, and the contractor\'s share of the \nsaving effected between the cost of $3,200 per motor and the \nbogy cost of $5,000 per motor, or 25 per cent on $1,800 per \nmotor, is $450 per motor, thus making the total profit to the \ncontractor, based on the cost of $3,200 per motor, $1,075, or \n33.6 per cent profit on the cost. 93, 94. \n\nThis would make total profit on 5,000 motors ordered of the \nPackard Co. of over $5,000,000. 94. \n\nQ. "Have you any reason to believe the cost is greater or \nless in any of the other plants making the Liberty motors ? " \xe2\x80\x94 \nA. " The Packard Co. was really the first company to get into \nproduction on the Liberty motor, and we will have in the very \nnear future costs at all the plants, and my opinion is that the \ncost will be under this figure. I think this is a liberal figure, \nand it is predicated on a small production." 94, 95. \n\nThis cost included an analysis of the motor, taking it part by \npart, and figuring out the total productive cost, material and \nlabor, and overhead expense. 95. \n\nFigure based upon a small production. 95. \n\nAlways at the start of a new job a considerable time is taken \nin experimentation and getting under way, and all that experi- \nmentation cost in preparing and getting ready for this job is \nincluded in the estimated production, and it makes the earlier \ncost quite high. 95. \n\nIt takes the cost of experimentation and spreads it over all the \nmotors manufactured up to that date. 95. \n\nQ. " Have you any rough estimate of the amount to which \nyou think the cost per motor will finally come when it is \nspread over the entire production of 5,000 motors?" \xe2\x80\x94 A. \n" My own judgment in the matter has been that the cost would \nbe around or a little less than $3,000 per motor." 96. \n\nQ. " What amount would that give for overhead expenses \nin the Packard plant on the entire 5,000 engines? " 98. A. \n" It would give, about $5,000,000." 98. \n\nQ. " What would be embraced in the overhead cost thus esti- \nmated ? " 98. A. " It would take in all of the nonproductive \nexpenses, all of the operation of the Packard plant, including \nadministration, shop foremen, superintendence, power, heat, \nlight, and everything that is not productive in the manufac- \nture of those motors." 98. \n\nDistrict manager of finance in the Detroit district, Capt. Holmes, \nsubmitted estimate. 100. \n\nPackard Co., has not seen it to his knowledge. 100. \n\nDoes not know whether it accords with Packard estimates, as \nhe has no knowledge of what they figured. 100. \n\nStatement of cost referred to was marked " Frank E. Smith, \nExhibit 1, July 1, 1918." 101. \n\nHas no estimates made at Lincoln Motor Co. 101. \n\nHis opinion that cost should be less at Lincoln Motor Co. than \nat Packard Co. 102. \n\nThinks it also would be much less in the case of the Ford Co. \n102. \n\n\n\n134 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nMaj. Frank E. Smith \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nHas made survey of cost of La Khone 9-cylinder rotary motor. \n\n103. \nA recent survey made at the plant of the Union Switch & Signal \n\nCo. 104. ; \n\nLa Khone motor contract was let with the Union Switch & Signal \nCo. for 2,500 motors on the basis of a bogy of $5,500 per motor. \nA cost survey made at this plant came to him under date of \nJune 21. 104. \n\nThis was a cost-plus contract. 104. \n\n"The cost survev showed that the direct cost of material was \n$432.07; direct labor, $379.67; the overhead expense 200 per \ncent of the productive labor, amounting to $759.34, or a total \nshop cost of $1,571.08, added to which is the miscellaneous \ncost, consisting of special tools and equipment amounting to \n$160 per motor, a liberal estimate of depreciation on special \nbuildings amounting to $120 per motor, making a total esti- \nmated miscellaneous cost per motor of $180, or a grand total \ncost per motor, as per this survey, of $1,761.08. The profit for \nthis motor, fixed under the contract, was $687.58 per motor, \nin addition to which the contractor is entitled to 25 per cent \nof the saving effected between the bogy price of $5,500 and the \ncost per motor of $1,751.08, or 25 per cent of a total of \n$3,748.92, amounting to $937.23, making a total estimated \nprofit under this survey of $1,624.73 per motor, or 92.8 per cent \nprofit on the cost." 105. \n\nPaper containing summarv of these figures marked " Frank E. \nSmith Exhibit No. 2, July 1, 1918." \n\nUnion Switch & Signal Co. only concern in this country making \nthe La Rhone engine. 105. \n\nThe survey of the La Rhone cost is under date of June 21, 1918, \nand 46 motors had been completed up to that time. 106. \n\nThe cost submitted is very liberal, and when company gets into \nproduction it should be greatly reduced. 106. \n\nHave had a good deal to do latterly with the De Haviland 4 \nplane. 107. \n\nDay ton- Wright Airplane Co., Fisher Body Corporation, and \nthe Standard Airplane Co. were given contracts for construc- \ntion of this plane on the basis of a bogy price of $7,000. 107 \n\nHad a committee appointed to go to Dayton and take all the \navailable parts and by a comparison between those parts and \nparts of other airplanes arrive at some reasonable figure in \nthe way of determining the cost, which was completed in Feb- \nruary. 108. \n\nFigures submitted are on a basis of 15 of these planes per day. \nThe total cost, including direct labor, material, and overhead, \nwith a profit of 15 per cent, would not exceed $3,525. 109. \n\nDoes not include overhead as it was actually being incurred by \nthe Dayton-Wright Co. because they were operating very in- \nefficiently at that time; it included a smaller percentage of \noverhead, such as was thought would be fair. They had a \nlarge nonproductive force and a large number of clerks, fore- \nmen, and all that sort of overhead running on without any \nproduction in the factory. 109. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCKAFT INVESTIGATION. 135 \n\nMaj. Frank E. Smith \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nWas not a necessary force, but expense of it included in the cost \nthe (government was paying. 110. \n\nCondition in all the three large airplane factories has been any- \nthing but efficient up to date \xe2\x80\x94 the Curtiss, the Standard, and \nthe E^ton-Wright. Last survey made showed the Dayton- \nWright Co. had twice as many, in dollars and cents, of non- \nproducers as the Fisher Body Corporation. 110. \n\nCommittee which investigated costs was composed of a man \nnamed Bourne, of the accounts section; an engineer from the \napprovals section named Randolph; a representative of the \nproduction department named Kehoe ; an outside industrial \nengineer, who had made a specialty of airplane investigation, \nnamed Mead. \n\nMr. Henry E. Mead has been quite a number of months with \nLybrant, Ross Bros. & Montgomery, investigating the cost in \nCanadian aircraft corporations and other plants, and was well \nqualified for such an investigation as this. Ill, 112. \n\nHe is what is called an industrial financial engineer. 112. \n\nCost of De Hayiland plane as estimated by Dayton-Wright Co. \nprior to fixing of bogy, $6,900. 112. \n\nMemorandum by Maj. Smith, setting forth in detail what should \nconstitute cost of De Haviland 1 airplanes minus motor. 114, \n115, 116. \n\nOverhead in case of planes figured at 100 per cent, and 200 per \ncent in the case of motors. 116. \n\nDayton- Wright factory is more an assembly proposition. 117. \nQ. " Do you know whether there is any other plant owned \nby the Dayton-Wright Co. as a separate corporation which \nmakes anything ? " \xe2\x80\x94 A. " Yes, sir ; they have a plant in Mi- \namisburg and they have the Dayton Metal Products in Dayton, \nand I do not know what others. I have those in mind." 118. \n\nDayton Metal Products makes principally metal fittings for \nDayton-Wright Co. 118. \n\nGreater part of scrap losses confined to lumber. The percent- \nage saved of lumber is very small. In some cases it has \nnot exceeded 3 per cent of the cost of the lumber that came \ninto the plant. 119. \n\nSeparate account kept of scrapped material at each plant and \nthe amounts, if any, of the saving effected. 119. \n\nLoss at practically all the airplane factories is mainly due to \nthe fact that the spruce delivered is not up to specifications. \nPeople who are producing and shipping spruce do not seem \nto have the same idea of what is needed as the people who are \nusing it. In other words, the inspection department at both \nends of the line did not seem to do that work exactly the \nsame. 121. \nMaj. Dean Langmuir (Washington, D. C, July 1, 1918; Book 8). \n\n" My problem was organization almost entirely. Dealing with ac- \ntual figures was left with the plant accountants, and had to be. \nIn other words, I had a terrible problem in building up a force \nof 400 men out of nothing at all, getting the organization to- \ngether and prescribing its functions, and things of that kind, \n\n\n\n136 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nMaj. Dean Langmuir \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nso I am not very familiar with those figures." Witness was \nasked whether all the provisions with respect to depreciation \nin the various plane contracts were substantially the same. \n124. \nLieut. John Eyre Sloan (Washington, D. C, July 1, 1918; Book 8). \n\nFor four or five years was building airplanes and gas engines \nand just prior to entering the Army was with the Guaranty \nTrust Co., in the trust department. 125. \n\nWas owner and operator of Sloan Manufacturing Co., Plain- \nfield, N. J., which was organized in 1915. 125. \n\nMade biplanes for exhibition purposes and some military-type \nmachines. 126. \n\nThe Standard Co. was successor to his company. 126. \n\nSold the Sloan Co. to Mitzui \'& Co. 127. \n\nThey first formed the Standard Areo Corporation of New York, \nand then the Standard Aircraft Co., but whether they dis- \nsolved the Sloan Manufacturing or not unable to state." 127. \n\nWhen war broke out was given a position in the equipment \ndivision, Signal Corps. 127. \n\nWas assigned to the specifications section. 127. \n\nWrote specifications for the materials, etc., for going into air- \nplanes, motors, and other equipment. \n\nCarl Zimmerschied was head of section. 128. \n\nLater transferred to approvals section, Finance Department. \n128. \n\nHad supervision of all work Maj. Smith did not handle per- \nsonally. 128. \n\nAcquainted with original specifications made for Liberty motor. \n124. \n\nQ. "Will you state how the various accessories were ar- \nrived at?" \xe2\x80\x94 A. "Why, I was writing the specifications, I \nguess it was about the end of October, probably, and I was \ntold to draw specifications for various parts and told to put \nin on the bottom of the specifications that inasmuch as cer- \ntain parts had been used in the experimental motor and found \nsatisfactory they would be used on the first 20,000 motors." \n124. \n\nAt the time he was told to draw up specifications a number of \npapers were handed to him as authority for doing that by \nMaj. Gray. 124. \n\nParts referred to were the ball bearings, gaskets, carbureter, \nhigh and low tension cables, valves, spark plugs, spark plug \nterminals, battery ignition apparatus. 130. \n\nDid not put memorandum on specifications, as they were not \ncompleted when he left specifications section. 130. \n\nRecognized Borglum Exhibit 23-A as a memorandum prepared \nfor the signature of the chief of the equipment division. 131. \n\nCol. Deeds refused to sign it; Delco ignition was there. 131. \n\nMemorandum was then turned over to Lieut. Emmons to obtain \nhis opinion as to whether these parts should be used on the \nfirst quantity of motors. 131, 132. \n\nAttention was called to Borglum Exhibit 23-C relative to chang- \ning to number of motors orders from 15,000 to 20,000. 132. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTICxATION. 137 \n\nLieut. John Eyre Sloan \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nHad alteration on when given to him. 132. \n\nDid not make statement, that he can remember, that Col. Deeds \nhad signed that paper. 132. \n\nBorglum Exhibit 23-E was recognized as being one of the papers \nhanded him. 133. \n\nDuplicate of Borglum Exhibit 23-A with numerals opposite \nthe various accessories, apparently indicating the order in \nwhich they were to be placed, was identified. 133. \n\nDoes not know significance of the arrangement. 133. \n\nBorglum Exhibit 23-E was also with papers handed him with \nregard to specifications. 134. \n\nThis exhibit was a suggestion to advise the motor manufacturers \nsent to Lieut. Emmons by Maj. Gray. \n\nQ. " Do you know whether Maj. Gray got any instructions \nwith respect to that?" \xe2\x80\x94 A. "Well, there was another sheet \nwith these papers." 134. \n\nThis sheet was identified as Borglum Exhibit 23-D, which was \na memorandum from Lieut. Harvey to Lieut. Emmons. 134. \n\nLieut. Harvey was secretary to Col. Deeds. 135. \n\nMaj. Gray told him Col. Deeds had refused to sign what is \nknown as Borglum Exhibit 23-C. 136. \n\nLieut. Harvey did no other work except as secret arv to Col. \nDeeds. 136. \n\nQ. " Note the arrangements of the dates, or the order of \ndates ; that under date of October 6 we had a memorandum for \nCol. Waldron; then, under date of October T, a memorandum \nfor specifications section, with the number changed from 15.- \n000 to 20,000, drawn apparently for the signature of colonel. \nSignal Corps. Then, under date of October 8, a memorandum \nas follows : \' What do you think of the attached ? Is it O. K. V \n\'(Signed) Harvey,\' apparently addressed to Maj. Gray, with \nthe words \' L. K. Emmons \' ; and last, under date of October \n13, that is five days later than the one of October 8, the state- \nment : c Would it not be well to advise manufacturers of the \nLiberty motor of the decision to use only certain accessories on \nthe first 20,000? Specifications will be prepared or revised, \nas the case may be, within the next few days; but advance \ninformation to avoid mistakes in the placing of orders seems \ndesirable.\' * * *." 137. \n\nMemorandum of October 6 was prepared for Col. Waldron bv \nMaj. Gray. 138. # \n\nCol. Waldron had just ceased to be chief of equipment division. \n138. \n\nHad no information as to what consultations preceded the sug- \ngestions that particular accessories should be put in the speci- \nfication. 141. \n\nContract offered Willys-Overland for supplying the Curtiss Co. \nwith OX-t engines called for $1,950 a motor with a bonus of \n$150 a motor. - 141. \n\nLater changed to two deliverv dates, one at $1,950 and one at \n$2,100. 142. \n\n\n\n138 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nLieut. John Eyre Sloan \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nChanged because contracting officers refused to sign it as first \n\ndrawn, as he did not think it was proper to pay a bonus for \nmaking the delivery that they had agreed to make. 142. \nResolution of Aircraft Board relative to matter. 143. \nDeliveries not made on schedule, and Aircraft Board made \n\nrecommendation to Chief Signal Officer that $150 bonus be \n\nstill paid to insure Government against destruction against \n\none source of supply. 146. \nTo do this would cost $750,000, while duplicate set of tools \n\nwould cost about $40,000 or $50,000. 147. \nAircraft Board adopted resolution recommending that $2,500,000 \n\nbe advanced to Willys-Overland Co. on account of this con- \ntract. 151. \nUnderstands no payment of $750,000 was ever made. 154. \nWilliam Hency Schott (Washington, D. C, July 1, 1918; Book 8). \nEngineer and contractor. 156. \nAt present time engaged at Lewis Spring & Axle Co., Jackson, \n\nMich. 156. \nA year ago came to Washington, called at office of Board to \n\nascertain requirements to qualify on contract for either engines \n\nor planes. 156. \nGot one of first sets of drawings on Libertv 8-cylinder engine. \n\n157. \nBid on 1,525 at either $5,000 or $5,500 or would meet any other \n\nprice fixed as being fair. 158. \nPrice fixed on delivering all of them before Julv 1 of this vear. \n\n159. \nNo contract awarded. Could never find out reason. 159. \nHad built 6,000 or 7,000 engines at Chelsea plant and had every \n\nfacility for building 8-cylinder engine. 161. \nOffered to build any kind of airplane on either a fixed price or \n\ncost-plus basis. Could start deliveries in 90 days and give \n\nthem five a day. 163. \nMr. Lewis very familiar with airplanes. 163. \nNever got contract for planes. 164. \nWas given part of Handley-Paige program in September or \n\nOctober, but was not given go ahead until 8th dav of May. \n\n164. \nContract was not written up for above until April 13, 1918. \n\n165. \nContract was for wings, fuselage, and all that sort of thing. \n\n167. \nIn excellent shape to produce DeHavilands. Now making a \n\nvery large number of parts for DeHaviland as a subcontractor. \n\n172. \nCan take DeHaviland or any of machines and in 90 days\' time \n\ngive them five a day. 173. \nCould have done that during the winter. 173. \nTwenty-four or 25 Government inspectors at his plant. Over- \ninspected. 180. \nGovernment has not made any advances; furnishing own capi- \ntal. 180. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 139 \n\nMaj. Hiram Stanton Brown (Washington, D. C, July 1, 1918; \nBook 8). \n\nCommissioned October 31, 1917. 185. \n\nFormerly in public utility business for over 13 years, last 7 years \nas a member of firm of H. D. Walbridge & Co., 4 Wall Street, \nNew York City. 185. \n\nWas associated with Lieut. Col. Wolff as an employee in same \nfirm. \n\nSent for by Wolff and accepted commission. 186. \n\nWas connected with management and organization of appro- \npriations section of finance department. 186. \n\nPromoted to executive officer of the finance department. 187. \n\nAsked to explain methods he has at present time with respect to \nvouchering claims of contracts for overhead expenses, par- \nticularly with regard to the claims for salaries. 187. \n\nSalaries of officials of Dayton- Wright plant allowed from Sep- \ntember to either March or April through an oversight. 191, \n193. \n\nGot Capt. Frank E. Haag to come in and displace Maj. Lang- \nmuir, wholly from inefficiency. 194. \n\nFamiliar from a financial standpoint of conditions at Standard \nplant. 196. \n\nSignal Corps has right, under act of October 6, 1917, to purchase \nmaterials used in aircraft manufacture and sell same at not \nless than cost to airplane manufacturers. 197. \n\nSold Standard Aircraft Corporation $800,000 worth of material \nand Mr. Mingle stated he was surprised when he was called \nupon six or eight weeks ago to reimburse Government for \nlarge amount advanced. 197. \n\nReceived frequent requests from commercial vendors to expedite \nStandard Aircraft Corporation\'s payments to them. 198. \n\nCredit of this concern was very poor. 198. \n\nExplained to Mr. Mingle Government had 53 representatives in \nhis plant checking up vouchers, doing accounting work for \nhim, when he ought to have an organization doing it himself. \n200. \n\nHad great deal of trouble with Mr. Mingle, of Standard Air- \ncraft Corporation, from a financial standpoint. 201. \n\nMr. Mingle has referred to the fact repeatedly that the Mitzui \nare back of him. 203. \n\nMr. Mingle\'s company not successful in getting together an ef- \nficient accounting organization. 203. \n\nSubmits vouchers to them with wrong extensions, with high \nprices. Did not catch them in first instance. 205. \n\nDayton- Wright Co. insisted on Government paying for welfare \nwork, baseball uniforms and tennis courts, and expenditures \nof that character, shotguns and shells for guards to practice \nwith, etc. 211. \n\nNo such thing as account for commitments abroad for the pur- \nchase of planes and engines. 215. \n\nCabled abroad asking permission to send Maj. Wolff and Maj. \nLangmuir to straighten out finances. 217. \n\nHas total amount of commitments fairly well ascertained now. \n214. \n\n\n\n140 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nMaj. Hiram Stanton Brown \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nProduction Department of Bureau of Aircraft Production \nshould be able to inform committee relating to the perform- \nance and nonperformance of contract. 225. \n\nFrench Government only delivered 250 planes out of several \nthousand, due to our failure to supply raw material. 226. \nJohn D. Ryan (Washington, D. C, July 2, 1918; Book 8). \n\nTook charge of Bureau of Aircraft Production morning of 26th \nof April. 228. \n\nMade Director of Bureau of Aircraft Production by order of \nPresident, under so-called Overman Act, and order was issued \non May 20. 229. \n\nExplains conditions with reference to organization at time he \ntook charge. 224, 225. \n\nStates Mr. Potter\'s duties. 231. \n\nMr. Landon has been made chief of production division. 231. \n\nMr. Landon was formerly vice president of American Kadiator \nCo., being in general charge of production. 233. \n\nMr. Kellogg in charge of production engineering. 235. \n\nHave just selected Mr. Hunt, formerly chief engineer of the \nPackard Co., to be in charge of the Liberty engineering. 237. \n\nWhole question of large supply of airplane wood seemed to \nhinge upon building a railroad into the Clallam County \nspruce tract on Olympic Peninsula in Washington. 240. \n\nCol. Disque made contract with Siem, Care}^ \xe2\x80\x94 H. S. Kerbaugh \n(Inc.), to get out a maximum of 300,000,000 feet. 241. \n\nCorporation was formed to take over this particular business. \n242. \n\nCol. Disque was contracting officer of Signal Corps on Pacific \ncoast. 244. \n\nApproved this contract without reference to Washington. 244. \n\nStated he was director of Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Rail- \nway Co. and member of executive committee, and could have \nno part in negotiations. 248. \n\nMr. Stettinus negotiated with railroad and was unable to get \nthem to build. 249. \n\nDid not think Government properly safeguarded with spruce \ncontract. 251. \n\nProvision in contract that Government would increase price \npaid to these contractors if prices generally of lumber prod- \nucts in Northwest increased during period that they were in \nproduction. 253. \n\nGovernment had no control over price contractor might pay \nfor stumpage and he could have that included in his cost if \nhe saw fit to take advantage of clause in contract, providing \nthat he could ask for a cost-plus basis if he was losing money \non contract. 254. \n\nNo limitation of profit in this contract. 255. \n\nAgreed contractor should have 7 per cent in any event. 255, 256. \n\nIf contractor would do certain things, agreed to waive right to \nfix their profits. 257. \n\nEstimated production of spruce to be obtained under this con- \ntract was 300,000,000 feet. 261. \n\nContractors financed by Government. Needed $6,000,000. 262. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 141 \n\nJohn D. Rfan \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nMore favorable a contract is to Government, more difficult it is \nto get advances from War Credits Board. 264. \n\nFeels contractor is taking a great deal of risk and his chance for \nprofit is practically limited to 7 per cent. 265. \n\nConsidering the use of substitute woods. 266. \n\nLittle trees in Germany make airplane material because they \nhave been planted carefully and grown carefully. 268. \n\nGermany much better provided than any of Allies in matter of \nwoods. 268. \n\nThinks Carey-Kerbaugh will have to build 65 or 75 miles of \nlogging railroad in addition to one to be built for Govern- \nment. 269. \n\nThat will be their own railroad. Will be paid for as part of \ncost by Government. 269. \n\nHe will be able to hold the railroad, unless the Government \nwants to fix the profit, limit his profit to 15 per cent. 269. \n\nA number of owners control the acreage of timber in that sec- \ntion, but the great bulk of area is controlled by three or four \nlarge concerns. 284. \n\nQ. " How will the contractor and the owners of the timber- \nland be left when this contract operation is concluded? You \nhave said that the contractor would have the railroad, would \nhave the mill, assuming, of course, that the Government had \nnot taken it over, and the timber people would have a better \noutlet to market?" \xe2\x80\x94 A. " But it all depends on what kind of a \ntrade we make with the owners, or what we do under our \nauthority to commandeer the stumpage. * * *." 286. \n\nDoes not think Government has got a right to make any part \nof the profit on something that it does not need. 287. \n\nWhole country will be opened up through this operation. 288. \n\nDoes not think contractors had any advance information as to \nplan of Government to open up this tract. 288. \n\nAs far as he knows, there has been no syndicate or organization \ntaking advantage of situation. 289. \n\nLiberty engine production last month was about 1,200. 290. \n\nIn negotiation with a man who is best fitted man in world to \ntake particular charge of inspection. 291. \n\nAny interest paid by contract or any advance from the War \n\nCredits Board would be considered as a part of his cost, 291. \n\nMaj. Hiram S. Brown (Washington, D. C, July 2, 1918; Book 8). \n\nWillys-Overland Co. have delivered to date 4,072 motors; 2,400 \nhave been paid for at $2,100. 294. \n\nPremium of $150 per motor paid to them in March on 700 \nmotors. 301. \n\nWhen Aircraft Board determined that cost-plus contracts were \ndesirable, it was realized immediately that the Government \nwould need a corps of accountants to administer them, and \ndetermined to employ firm of Lybrant, Ross Bros. & Mont- \ngomery. 303. \n\nIt started on an original authorization of around $10,000, and \non Mav 15 volume of expenditures had exceeded over $30.- \n000. 303. \n\n\n\n142 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nMaj. Hiram S. Brown \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nCol. Thompson, first chief of finance department, created Gov- \nernment organization to displace Lybrant organization. 304. \n\nCalled to his aid some members of his own firm, of whom Maj. \nLangmuir was one; his most intimate personal friend, S. E. \nWolff, now Col. Wolff; and Col. Wolff wrote for him. 304. \n\nWeakest point was accounting department. 305. \n\nOn May 15 completely displaced Lybrant organization. 307. \nInterdepartmental costs committee formed. 310. \n\nQuestion of allowance of executive salaries referred to that \ncommittee. 311. \n\nCommittee did not act, so he urged that finance division shoulder \nresponsibility. 311. \n\nHad not allowed salaries to executives except in case of Day- \ntoil- Wright Co. 312. \n\nHas no evidence to show that voucher is other than an adjust- \nment of expenditures made by Dayton- Wright Co. 314. \n\nDayton- Wright Co. had proceeded with work in anticipation \nof formal contract under verbal instructions or assurances \nof Col. Deeds. \n\nThe contractors had gone ahead expending money, making \nexperiments and tests, merely on their confidence in Col. \nDeeds and their friendship for him. 316. \n\nOverhead expenses to include interest, rent, and such taxes as \nincome taxes and excess-profits taxes imposed by Govern- \nment. 323. \n\nCol. Waldon informed Capt. Coleman he did not know who in \nthe United States approved a list of property and the speci- \nfications therefor, and we have not been able to obtain such \na list and specifications. 332. \n\nKnows Mr. Tilson, purchasing agent for J. G. White, quite in- \ntimately. 332. \n\nHave placed an officer or representative in J. G. White & Co.\'s \noffice. 334. \n\nNo check as to the property itself other than J. G. White & \nCo.\'s. 334. \n\nNo one representing the Government undertook to ascertain \nwhether J. G. White & Co. had bought the material desired \nor not. 335. \n\nCol. Thompson at present is chairman of War Credits Board. \n339. \n\nCol. Thompson\'s business has been that of fine lawyer and \naccountant. 340. \n\nHe assisted in drafting- nearly all of cost-plus contracts. 340. \nCapt. Francis E. Haag (Washington, D. C, July 2,1918; Book 8). \n\nChief of Accounts Department, Finance Division of the Air- \ncraft Production Board. 342. \n\nHeld position since March 21, 1918. \n\nPrior to that time had charge of field forces, acting as super- \nvisor at different plants, to determine questions of accounting \nthat arose. 342. \n\nFirst three months was really getting acquainted with work \nand practically did nothing but assist Mr. Sweet to lay down \nrules. 342. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 143 \n\nCapt. Francis E. Haag \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nAsked to produce certain vouchers on file which relate to pay- \nment of executive salaries at Dayton-Wright plant. 343. \n\nCan not explain why voucher covers period from April 1 to \nAugust 31. 343. \n\nAllowed 75 per cent of each item. 343. \n\nOverhead expense of Dayton-Wright Co. in voucher referred \nto amounted to $76,452.40; allowed $57,339.30. 344. \n\nDeducts 25 per cent as factor of safety. 345. \n\nVoucher No. 10 contains expenditures for overhead to October \n31, 1917, amounting to $325,610. 347, 348. \n\nVoucher No. 12 shows overhead salaries for month of November \nof $34,130.53. 348. \n\nItemized statement of executive salaries for month of Novem- \nber. 349. \n\nCertain payments made for executive salaries in case of Fisher \nBody Corporation, Standard Aero Corporation, and Wright- \nMartin Aircraft Corporation. 353. \n\nIn number of cases salaries have not been paid at all. 354. \n\nPractice of office not to pay any salaries since May 3. 354, 355. \n\nWas no practice prior to May 3. 355. \n\nHas a man making special report on corporate relations of \nStandard Aircraft Corporation to the Standard Aero Corpora- \ntion and H. B. Mingle. 364. \n\nCharges made on books against H. B. Mingle Co. which are \nbeing investigated. 365. \n\nStandard only company having an adjustment of salaries. 369 3 \n370. \n\nNo executive salaries paid to Lincoln Motor Co. 372. \n\nNatural thing for other companies to do would have been to \npresent vouchers for general overhead, and have them allowed \nto the extent of a percentage as the Dayton-Wright Co. did, \nand the fact that they did not do that leads to the natural \ninference that somebody must have suggested that it would \nbe better to wait. 382. \n\nDay ton- Wright voucher No. 1, including $76,452.40 for overhead \nexpenses, not thoroughly audited before payment. 382. \n\nDuty of accountant before certifying, to verify and make a test \ncheck of the amount shown by contractor\'s books. 384. \n\nVoucher No. 1 does not bear evidence of anyone having been \nover it and checked anything on it. 386. \n\nNo indication that voucher was checked at plant. 386. \n\nVouchers marked Haag Exhibits 1 and 2, July 2, 1918. 387. \n\nTotal overpaid of $54,960.17. 388. \n\nNo other adjustment except with the Standard. 391. \n\nSalary allowed president of Standard was $15,000 and presi- \ndent of Dayton-Wright Co. $35,000. 392. \n\nLieut. Eeik in charge of vouchers in accounts department. 394. \n\nHas nothing from Dayton-Wright Airplane Co. indicating that \nit did not consider it what it purported to be, an adjustment \nas to these prior vouchers. 399. \n\nQ. " I simply want to know what reason there is, if you know \nof any, why there should have been an adjustment in May, \n130687\xe2\x80\x9419 10 \n\n\n\n144 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nCapt. Francis E. Haag \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\n1918, or any other time, of the overhead expense of the Dayton- \nWright Airplane Co. for the period from April to October \n31, 1917, while it appears that in the case of no other com- \npany has there been an adjustment of overhead for the period \nantedating October 31, 1917, and the amount, as adjusted, \nallowed at 100 per cent. Can you give any reason for it ? " \n401. \n\nVoucher No. 30, of May 18, 1918, marked Haag Exhibit No. 3, \nJuly 2, 1918. 406. \n\nPolicy from May 3 to hold up all vouchers for executive sala- \nries until approved by approvals section. 411. \n\nVouchers taken up with Capt. Eotshafer in contract section. \n417. \n\nExperimental contract with Dayton Metal Products Co. under \nwhich executive salaries were allowed. 424. \n\nQuotation from letter addressed to Capt. Haag from Lieut. \nWeir referring to contract with Dayton Metal Products Co., \n"The amount representing costs of Packard truck as shown \nin my previous letter was erroneous and should have read \n\' $3,574.62,\' which is the Government price plus the tax. This \nwe will handle after getting further advice from Col. Edward \nA. Deeds, as per Maj. C. M. Hall\'s conference last Saturdav." \n428. \n\nExperimental contract supposed to be of such a nature that no \none excepting Maj. Hall and possibly Col. Deeds knew what \nwork they were doing. 429. \n\nMaj. Hall is same man who is now Col. Hall. 429. \n\nMaj. Hall is Signal Corps engineer who is out in Dayton and \nunder whose direction this secret experimental work is being \nconducted. 429. \nMaj. Dean Langmuir (Washington. D. C. July 2, 1918: Book 8). \n\nData concerning payments for executive salaries of Standard \nAero Corporation was marked " Langmuir Exhibit 1. Julv \n2, 1918." \n\nData concerning general method and procedure of paying exec- \nutive salaries marked " Langmuir Exhibit 3. July 2, 1918." \n\nData concerning payments for executive salaries of Dayton- \nWright Airplane Co. marked "Langmuir Exhibit 2. Julv 2, \n1918." \nCapt. James J. Newman, Washington. D. C. July 3. 1918: book 8. \n\nRecalls that on or about October 31 he asked for a ruling on the \nquestion whether or not the company should be reimbursed \nfor the expenses of executive officers. 439. \n\nAlso requested a ruling as to whether rent of offices would be \nallowed. 440. \n\nWas told that Dayton-Wright Co. were going to make a re- \nquest for this allowance. 444. \n\nVoucher for office rent, etc was presented to him,\' but he held \nit awaiting a decision or ruling from Washington. No ruling \never made up to time he left. May 13. 445. \n\nMr. Hiller succeeded him at Dayton-Wright Co. and Maj. But- \nler in the district. 446. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 145 \n\nCapt. James J. Newman \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nObjected to payment of voucher as he thought offices were not \nnecessary in connection with production of airplanes. 450. \n\nContract with Dayton-Wright Co. excludes rent as an item of \ncost. 451. \n\nCol. Deeds and his personal secretary had offices in same build- \ning. 452. \n\nClean-up voucher of May 13, 1918, marked " Newman Exhibit \n6," was finally adjusted for period from April to October 31, \n\n1917, and the salaries of Mr. Talbott, sr., at rate of $35,000 \na year; Mr. Kettering, at rate of $35,000 a year; Mr. Talbott, \njr., at rate of $30,000 a year; and Mr. Orville Wright, at rate \nof $18,000 a year were included as amounts to be paid for the \nperiod from August 1, 1917, to October 31, 1917. 465, 466. \n\nSupporting vouchers prepared by Lybrant, Ross Bros. & Mont- \ngomery. 467. \n\nSalaries were passed, subject to the determination by the Rul- \nings Board as to what was to be done with them. 468. \n\nQ. " Will you explain how it happened that this amount was \nallowed for salaries in this clean-up voucher of May 13, \n\n1918, when no ruling had yet been made with respect to the \namounts to be allowed for executive salaries ? " 464. \n\nA. "We were informed when the first salaries were paid that \nthey would be paid and we should continue to pass them \nuntil we were told otherwise ; until a ruling had been made." \n470. \n\nMr. Sherer had asked him when he was going to pay any exec- \nutive salaries. They were very short of money during this \nperiod. 471. \n\nAccountant in charge put it through and he decided to let it \ngo to Washington. 471. \n\nAllowed executive salaries to go through in November, but \nwrote letter with voucher stating he had gotten no FBffiftonse \nto previous request on subject. 475. \n\nHad had interview with Maj. Langmuir, Lieut. Col. Wolif, Col. \nThompson, Maj. Smith, and Capt. Haag, also Capt, Trax, \nregarding this matter. 476. \n\nMr. R. A. Perry was replaced at plant bv a Mr. A. A. Vaughn. \n481. \n\nAll expenses incurred by president of Dayton- Wright Co., trav- \neling on company business, to be paid by Government, even \nin June, 1917, before they had any contract at all. 49S. \n\nThat period very hazy to him and most of those who were on \nduty. 493. \n\nFirst contract company had is under date of September 7, 1917. \n\nTraveling expenses of $4,648.60, all antedating August 31, \n1917, were allowed. 498. \n\nTalbotts, Kettering, and Orville Wright, with possible excep- \ntion of Mr. Orville Wright, are the only stockholders of the \nDayton- Wright Air Plane Co., and salaries mentioned are for \na part of their time only, they being affiliated with several \nother companies, from which thev also drew salaries. 502. \n\n\n\n146 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nCapt. James J. Newman \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nAlso with Dayton Metal Products & Domestic Engineering Co. \n503. \n\nQ. " On what possible basis was the telephone service for April, \n1917, allowed to the Dayton-Wright Airplane Co ? " \xe2\x80\x94 A. \n"I do not remember any particular circumstance in connec- \ntion with it. The items in question are so small in connec- \ntion with the general total that we probably did not give \nthem the attention we might have." \n\nQ. " They are very small items, but they are very significant \nitems." 507. \n\nTried not to include anything relating to the expenses of getting \nthe contract. 508. \n\nWelfare account commences with August 18, 1917. 509. \n\nGeneral office expense items aggregating $3,957.71, attributable \nto period prior to October 31, 1917, allowed in final clean-up \nvoucher. 512. \n\nGarage expense down to October 31, 1917, a total of $2,232.65 \nallowed in final clean-up voucher. 515. \n\nTook figures of Lybrant, Ross Bros. & Montgomery. 519. \n\nWas told by Col. Montgomery in November to use as broad a \nviewpoint as possible in passing vouchers for any of these \ncompanies and to avoid looking at things narrowly that might \ntend to create friction between the Signal Corps and the con- \ntractors. 520. \n\nContract refers back to certain expenses prior to its being made \nand says they shall be reimbursable. 527. \nGeorge Banckoft Smith (Dayton, Ohio, July 8, 1918; Book 9). \n\nResides at 635 Salem Avenue, Dayton, Ohio. 1. \n\nPersonal and confidential representative of Col. E. A. Deeds and \nMr. C. F. Kettering. 1. \n\nMr. Deeds\'s interest in Delco Co. 2. \n\nMr. Deeds held 38 shares of $100 par value in Delco Co. 3. \n\nSold preferred stock to Mr. Kettering. 4. \n\nRepeats conversation in which Col. Deeds stated that such stocks \nas were owned by him in corporations that would be engaged \nin filling contracts for the Government should be disposed \nof. 9. \n\nSpecially mentioned the Delco stock. 14. \n\nMr. Kettering gets stocks at par value. 16. \n\nCircumstances of the transfer of this stock over to Mr. Ketter- \ning. 26. \n\nNo charge against Kettering for the Delco stock. 27. \n\nDeeds disposes of all his common stock in the Delco Co. to United \nMotors Corporation. 33. \n\nMr. Deeds held 30,000 shares in United Motors Co. 33. \n\nSells part of this stock in 1916. 44. \n\nFinal 17,500 given to Col. Deeds\'s wife as gift. 35. \n\n(Pages "36 to 79, inclusive, give detailed information concerning \ntransfer of Deeds\'s stocks.) \n\nDomestic Building Co.\'s stock did not reach books until De- \ncember, 1917. 80. \n\nCol. Deeds never a stockholder or director of the Dayton-Wright \nAirplane Co. 83. \n\n\n\n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 147 \n\nGeorge Bancroft Smith \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nSold stock of Dayton Metal Products Co. on May 22. 84. \n\nCertain details handled at this period by Mr. Allen K. Smart, a \nchartered public accountant. 86. \n\nProduces memorandum compiled by Smart. 87. \n\nConsideration for Deeds\'s stock in Dayton Metal Products Co. \nwas to be determined as the result of Mr. Smart\'s examina- \ntion of the accounts and determination of the book value. 95. \n\nDid not think there was ever any written agreement for the sale \nof the stock in the Dayton Metal Products Co. by Mr. Deeds to \nTalbott, sr., Talbott, jr., and Mr. Kettering. 109. , \n\nNo bill of sale or memorandum of sale. 109. \n\nPoints to Deeds\'s ledger showing personal account with Ketter- \ning. 110. \n\nJoint transactions in which Mr. Kettering and Mr. Deeds are \nengaged in in a general way. 113. \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nHow long Col. Deeds and Mr. Kettering have been associated in \nenterprises. 114. \n\nNotes given for Dayton Metal Products stock by Kettering and \nthe Talbotts were not paid or renewed. 116. \n\nDomestic Building Co. built building now used by the Dayton- \nWright Airplane Co. 116. \n\nOriginal stockholders of Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. 117. \n\nStockholders of the company at the present time. 118. \n\nEntire stock, with certain exception, is held by the Davton \nMetal Products Co. 118. \n\nProduces paper showing adjustment of the accounts between \nthe Talbotts, Mr. Kettering, and Col. Deeds. 119. \n\nAgreement with respect to Dayton Metal Products Co. 122. \n\nH. E. Talbott, C. F. Kettering, and H. E. Talbott, jr., have \njoint account. 125. \n\nOnly way to finance the Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. to enable \nit to take the Government airplane contracts was through the \nDayton Metal Products Co. 131. \n\nMr. Kettering gets salary of $35,000 a year from Davton- \nWright Airplane Co. 145. \n\nProduces memorandum relating to closing up Domestic Build- \ning Co. transaction and fixing of the adjustment, marked \n" George B. Smith Exhibit 22." 148-149. \n\nProduces letter to Mr. Deeds. 150. \n\nHis attention is called to a letter from Office of the Chief Sig- \nnal Office to Day ton- Wright Airplane Co., Dayton. " Sub- \nject, Erection of temporary buildings." 162. \n\nCol. Deeds at present a director, stockholder, and an officer in \nDomestic Building Co. 166. \n\nNash Motors Co. stock was sold by Col. Deeds to Mr. Kettering. \n\n168. 8 \n\nMr. Deeds sold his stock in National Cash Register Co. to Mr. \n\nKettering. 169. \nNo written agreement or memorandum of understanding or any \n\npaper relating to Nash Motors Co. stock. 171. \nDeposit "tickets of the City National Bank of the Davton- \nWright Airplane Co., Dayton Metal Products Co., and H. E. \nTalbott, C. F. Kettering, and H. E. Talbott, jr. 171. \n\n\n\n148 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nGeorge Bancroft Smith \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nLand of McCook Field originally purchased by E. A. Deeds \nand C. F. Kettering. 174. \n\nCol. Deeds sells his holdings to Mr. Kettering, Mr. Kettering \nsubsequently selling his interest to the Dayton Metal Products \nCo. 175. \n\nAuditors sent to audit the books of the Domestic Building Co. \nand these figures used by Mr. Smart. 175. \n\nLetter from Mr. Deeds to Mr. Kettering, " George B. Smith \nExhibit No. 25, July 8, 1918." \n\nUnited Motors Corporation. 178. \n\nProduce letter written by Mr. Smith to Mr. Deeds. 178. \n\nIn this letter he tells Deeds that National Cash Kegister stock, \nthe Nash Motors Co. stock, and United Motors Corporation \nstock is now all taken care of and stock records clear of Mr. \nDeeds\'s name. 181. . \nMary E. Devine (Dayton, Ohio, July 8, 1918; Book 9). \n\nResides at 15 Schantz Street, Dayton, Ohio. 184. \n\nBookkeeper, secretary to Mr. Talbott, sr. 184. \n\nSo employed eight years. 184. \n\nMr. Talbott is president of the Dayton Metal Products Co., is \nchairman of the board of the City National Bank. 184. \n\nPresident of the Dayton Metal Products Co. and the board of \ndirectors. 185. \n\nReceives $1,048 semimonthly from Dayton- Wright Airplane \nCo. 185. \n\nMr. Talbott, sr., receives $5,000 a month from the Dayton Metal \nProducts Co. 186. \n\nMr. Charles Craighead, secretary of the Dayton Metal Products \nCo. 187. \n\nMinutes of the meeting of the Dayton Metal Products Co., \nApril 7, 1917. 187. \n\nAnother minute read in which Mr. Deeds has explained to \nthem his call to Washington, and that he desired it that he \nmight act as uninterested, directly or indirectly, etc. 190. \n* Other minutes read in which the request of the Aircraft Pro- \nduction Board is set forth that they should make a report \nas to the facilities of the Dayton Metal Products Co. for \nthe manufacture of certain airplane parts. 192. \n\nAnother minute read in which meeting was called for discussion \nof buying entire capital stock of the Dayton- Wright Air- \nplane Co. 195. \n\nMinute relating to pledging of the shares of the stock of the \nDayton-Wright Airplane Co. as collateral security for the \nnotes of the Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. 197. \n\nAgreement entered into on November 28, 1917, between H. E. \nTalbott, C. F. Kettering, and H. E. Talbott, jr., parties of \nthe first part, and the Dayton Metal Products Co., party of \nthe second part. 197. \n\nAnother entry in which it is agreed that the capital stock of the \nDayton-Wright Airplane Co. be used as collateral security \nattached to the notes of the Day ton- Wright Airplane Co., \nsaid notes, $2,500,000, being payable to Secretary of War on \nbehalf of United States. 202. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 149 \n\nMary E. Devine \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nMr. Allen R. Smart present at some of the meetings. 206. \nTransactions with respect to the payment by Mr. Talbott of \n\nstock of Dayton-Wright Airplane Co. 211. \nMr. Sherer, the treasurer, has details of account of Mr. Talbott, \n\nMr. Kettering, and Mr. Talbott in reference to deposit slips \n\nin City National Bank, December 1, showing a deposit to \n\ncredit of Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. by Messrs. Talbott \n\nand Mr. Kettering of a million dollars. 212. \nMessrs. Talbott and Mr. Kettering give check on December 1 to \n\nthe Dayton Metal Products Co. for amount of $1,134,537.20 \n\nfor securities. 215. \nPoints to entry in Mr. Talbotts\'s account which shows his note \n\ngiven to Mr. Deeds for the Dayton Metal Products Co. stock. \n\n215. \nStock-certificate book of the Dayton Metal Products Co. 225. \nEdith P. Cummin (Dayton, Ohio, July 8, 1918; Book 9). \n\nLaw clerk and stenographer for Craighead & Dowden, attorneys, \n\nin Dayton, Ohio. 238. \nHave at times been engaged in connection with the work of \n\nkeeping the minute book of the Dayton Metal Products Co. \n\n238. \nWrote up all the original proceedings. 239. \nMr. Craighead\'s office represents the Dayton Metal Products \n\nCo. 243. \nMary E. Devine (Book 9). \n\nGoes over, in summary way, the companies in which Mr. Talbott \n\nis interested and salaries which he receives. 245. \nMr. Talbott, sr., in all companies in which he is interested seems \n\nto be able to assist them very greatly in the financial end of \n\nthe work. 247. \nMr. King. 251. \nMr. Talbott had small amount of stock in Dayton Lumber & \n\nManufacturing Co. 253. \nMiss Devine keeps contracts of the Dayton Metal Products \n\nCo. 255. \nAsked to bring all the contracts between the Dayton Metal \n\nProducts Co. and the Government. 256. \nKeads contracts upon the record. 257. \nAttention is called in contract of January 25, 1918, between the \n\nDayton Products Co. and the United States, represented by \n\nMaj. A. C. Downey, of Signal Corps, in which experimental \n\nwork is to be paid for in pursuance of the agreement. 261. \nTransaction regarding the purchase of the Miamisburg plant. \n\n261. \nMr. Craighead, trustee. 264. \nIs asked to produce certificates shown on investment ledger of \n\nDayton Metal Products Co. in an entry under the Lincoln \n\nMotor Co. of $100,000 stock taken by the syndicate from Day- \nton Metal Products Co. 268. \nGeorge Bancroft Smith (Book 9). \n\nAsked to state what companies, if any, Col. Deeds has been in \n\nreceipt of a salary since April 1, 1917. 271. \nBook of record of Col. Deeds\'s stocks. 273. \n\n\n\n1 50 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nGeorge Bancroft Smith \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nDomestic Building Co. became indebted to Col. Deeds for the \namount representing the value of his interest in the land \nknown as McCook Field. 286. \n\nStock of the Domestic Building Co. worth $1,000,000. 287. \n\nOwned principally by Col. E. A. Deeds and Mr. C. F. Ketter- \ning. 287. \n\nSettlement of the Domestic Building Co. arrived at on which \nnotes were finally given by the two Talbotts and Mr. Ketter- \ning to the Domestic Building Co. 289. \n\nAmong other items they received the tract of land known as the \nDayton- Wright Airplane Co.\'s field. 291. \n\nSouth Field owned by Col. Deeds. 294. \n\nAdjoining land belongs to John H. Patterson, formerly presi- \ndent of the National Cash Register Co. 294. \n\nAsked if it is not correct that when notes had been executed by \nMessrs. Talbott and Kettering to the Domestic Building Co. \nthe plant and property to which they became entitled were at \ntheir direction transferred directly to the Dayton- Wright Air- \nplane Co. and the consideration from the Dayton- Wright Air- \nplane Co. for that transfer was embraced in acquisition of the \nstock of the Dayton-Wright Airplane Co. by these gentle- \nmen. 298. \n\nMr. Blose, private secretary of Mr. Deeds. 299. \n\nStatement known as "Analysis of the transactions of the Domes- \ntic Building Co.," as of December 31, showing capital, stock, \nloans, interest, etc. 302. \n\nProduces books of Domestic Building Co. 322. \n\nMr. Deeds does not hold any stock in the Lincoln Motor. Co. \n320. \nCharles J. Sherer (Federal building, Dayton, Ohio, Julv 9, 1918; \nBook 9). \n\nTwenty-five Perrine Street. Dayton, Ohio. 330. \n\nTreasurer of Dayton Metal Products Co. 330. \n\nBeen with the company since May, 1915. 330. \n\nAlso treasurer of Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. 331. \n\nMr. Craighead, secretary of Day ton- Wright. 331. \n\nMr. A. B. Hilton, jr., secretary of Dayton Metal Products Co. \n331. \n\nAlso treasurer of Wright Field Co. 331. \n\nDayton- Wright Airplane Co., incorporated in April, 1917. 333. \n\nOriginal subscribers to the stock Mr. Talbott, Mr. Talbott, jr., \nMr. Kettering, Mr. Mead, and he thought Mr. Craighead. \n333. \n\nOriginal issue $500,000 common stock. 333. \n\nSubsequent issue $100,000 common and $400,000 preferred. 334. \n\nDayton Metal Products Co. subscribed for stock in the Dayton- \nWright Airplane Co. 335. \n\nDayton-Wright gave check for $955,071.25 to joint account for \npurchase of the building, the Moraine plant, and the Miamis- \nburg plant. 338. \n\nCheck of the Dayton Metal Products Co. for $183,459.55 to \ncredit of Messrs. Talbott and Kettering. 339. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 151 \n\nCharles J. Sherer \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nNine hundred and ninety-nine thousand five hundred dollars \nfrom Dayton Metal to the joint account. 353. \n\nDeposits a check of the joint account to the order of the Dayton- \nWright Airplane Co. for $1,000,000. 353. \n\nItem "E. A. Deeds, $150,000" represents a certain note of E. A. \nDeeds to the Dayton Metal Products Co. 357. \n\n" C. F. Kettering, $150,000 " ; same explanation. 357. \n\n"H. E. Talbott, jr., $45,000"; same explanation. 358. \n\nIs asked to get a statement from the books of the Dayton Metal \nProducts Co. showing what the items are that enter into this \nitem. "E. A. Deeds, $150,000; C. F. Kettering, $150,000; \nH. E. Talbott, jr., $40,000." 365. \n\nDayton Metal Products Co. has contract with the Government \nfor the production of 1,585,000 mark 2 detonating fuses. 366. \n\nFirst contract of Dayton Metal Products Co. with the Gov- \nernment was August of 1917. 367. \n\nDayton Metal Products Co. had experimental contract with the \nGovernment. 368. \n\nMr. McGee, assistant in the executive office of Dayton Metal \nProducts Co. 369. \n\nEntry of $999,500 relating to purchase of the stock of the \nDayton- Wright Airplane Co. 369. \n\nGovernment has paid all experimental charges that have been \nsubmitted. 375. \n\nC. E. Stacey Co. 376. \n\nExpenses in connection with Stacey & Co. are listed in the \nrecords of the Dayton-Wright Airplane Co. as an uncol- \nlectible item. 377. \n\nTotal amount paid by the Government to the Dayton-Wright \nAirplane Co., $10,000,000. 378. \n\nTwo million five hundred thousand dollars of this as advances \nby the Government. 378. \n\nThe Government holds as security for collateral the stock of \nthe Day ton- Wright Airplane Co., except the qualifying share, \non part of that they have certain personal indorsements. \n379. \n\nSalaries of the Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. 380-383. \n\nSalaries have been held for a couple of months ; up to that time \ncertain of these salaries allowed by the Signal Corps. 386. \n\nThe terms of the contract are such that any payments do not \noperate as final payments. 387. \n\nCheck of $1,136,537.20 for purchase of securities by joint ac- \ncount. 393. (Deposited in City National Bank on December \n1, 1917.) \n\nDayton Metal Products Co. purchase stock of Lincoln Motor Co. \non October 8. 395. \n\nAfterwards disposed of to Messrs. Talbott and Kettering. 396. \n\nThis stock again returns to Dayton Metal Products Co. 396. \n\nMessrs. Talbott and Kettering get securities from Dayton Metal \nCo. for that retransfer. 398. \n\nFinds records of the item " E. A. Deeds, $150,000 " referred to on \npage 357. 401. \n\n\n\n152 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nCharles J . Sherer \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nDayton- Wright Airplane Co. charged for experimental work of \nStacey & Co. (Stacey, an inventor supported by Kettering, \n409) in favor of Dayton Metal Products Co., and Dayton \nMetal Products Co. pay the money to C. F. Kettering to \nreimburse him. 409. \nErnest D. Martin (Dayton, Ohio, July 9, 1918; Book 9). \n\nAuditor for Dayton Metal Products Co. 418. \n\nAdjustment made as to the price to be paid for Mr. Deeds\'s \nstock in Dayton Metal Products Co., which was transferred \nto Messrs. Talbott and Kettering. 418. \n\nThe items " E. A. Deeds, $150,000," and " C. F. Kettering, \n$150,000 " are demand notes. 425. \nAllen Rich Smart (Washington, July 9, 1918; Book 9). \n\nResides in Chicago. 427. \n\nCertified public accountant. 427. \n\nAssociated with Barrow, Wade, Guthrie & Co. 127. \n\nConsulting accountant of the Day ton- Wright Airplane Co. 427. \n\nHave been the auditor of the Dayton Metal Products Co. 428. \n\nHas made an investigation of the Dayton Lumber & Manu- \nfacturing Co., for an attorney in town, Mr. Warren James. \n428. \n\nDirects his attention to the adjustment that was made at time of \ntaking over by Messrs. Talbott and Kettering of the plant \nwhich had been provided by the Domestic Building Co. 430. \n\nMr. Geo. Smith, representative of the Domestic Building Co. \n432. \n\nMiamisburg plant had been purchased by Mr. Talbott, si*., in- \ndividually. 434. \n\nTransferred to Dayton-Wright Airplane Co. 435. \n\nThe sum at which the Miamisburg plant was sold to the \nDayton- Wright Airplane Co., showed a profit of $67,202, for \nthe Messrs. Talbott and Kettering. \n\nGovernment had no hand in the appraisal of this property. 440. \n\nGovernment had no written statement that they could have this \nproperty at its real value, $60,000. 440. \n\nParticulars regarding purchase of Moraine plant which was \ndeemed to be suitable for Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. by \nMessrs. Talbott and Kettering and made over to that com- \npany. 450. \n\nSmith Exhibit 31 are the syndicate books, or Messrs. Talbott and \nKettering. 457. \n\nMoraine plant figured a total of $836,401.08. 458. \n\nMr. Talbott, sr., Mr. Kettering, and Mr. Talbott, jr., subscribed \nfor stock of Dayton-Wright Airplane Co. 466. \n\nOriginal amount of the stock $400,000 but now increased to a \nmillion. 466. \n\nThe syndicate subscribed for the $1,000,000, entire preferred \nstock as well as the entire common stock. 468. \n\nExplains construction of financial arrangement which permitted \nthe payment of these shares to be made without cash. 468. \n\nCharged the Domestic Building Co. with Col. Deeds and Ket- \nterings debts. 480. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCKAFT INVESTIGATION. 153 \n\nAllen Eich Smart \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nRefers to provision of the contract between the Dayton Metal \nProducts Co. and the Government regarding experimental \nwork. 494. \nCol. Deeds at end of settlement owed $79,963.17 to Domestic \nBuilding Co. 499. \n\nAsked if he made an examination of the books to ascertain book \nvalue of stocks of Dayton Metal Products Co. transferred by \nMr. Deeds to Messrs. Talbott and Kettering. 500. \n\nKnows nothing of the actual transfer. 502. \n\nMinutes of meeting wherein Col. Deeds offered for sale, etc., his \nstock in Dayton Metal Products Co., his entire holdings of \nstock at book value, less 15 per cent to cover costs and possible \nlosses. 503. \n\nExplains why he crossed this minute out. 506. \n\nAgreement of purchase by Dayton Metal Products Co. of the \nDayton- Wright Airplane Co.\'s stock. 516. \n\nCalls attention to agreement of November 28 wherein it is stated \nthat option be given to said parties of the first part to repur- \nchase ail of said stock, etc. 523. \nGeorge Bancroft Smith (July 9, 1918; Book 9). \n\nProduces trial balances of Domestic Building Co. 528. \n\nDomestic Building Co. had no transaction with the Government, \nbut has transaction with the Dayton-Wright Airplane Co. \n532. \n\nMoraine Development Co. 536. \n\nOfficers of the Moraine Development Co. 537. \n\nAsked to state as succinctly as possible the facts in connection \nwith the purchase of 97 acres of land by the Domestic Build- \ning Co., from the Moraine Development Co., and two sales of \nportions, with respect especially to those used for aviation \npurposes, who were the original owners, etc. 545. \n\nCol. Deeds was reimbursed for the moneys which he expended \nupon the improvements of North Field with respect to \nhangars, etc. 549. \n\nAnother field leased from Kettering which has been referred to \nas the Acceptance Field. 552. \n\nExplains way in which the word "Moraine " is used in com- \nmunity. 552. \n\nGives details regarding " Acceptance Field." 554. \n\nTen thousand dollars paid to C. E. Stacey in order to cover \nexpenses of his work, when book showed expenditure of only \n$9,000. \nBenjamin Franklin McCann (Dayton, July 10, 1918; Book 9). \n\nAttorney, practicing in Dayton, Ohio. 560. \n\nLocal, private counsel for Col. E. A. Deeds, and also for Mr. C. \nF. Kettering. 560. \n\nProduces letter addressed by Col. Deeds to Secretary of War. \n560. \n\nCol. Deeds\'s statement filed with Council of National Defense. \n563. \n\nMr. McCann goes over details connected with above papers. 566. \n\nLetter in which he hands in his resignation to Dayton Engineer- \ning Laboratories Co. 570. \n\n\n\n154 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nBenjamin Franklin McCann \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nResignation from United Motors Corporation. 572. \nAllen R. Smart (July 10, 1918; Book 9). \n\nProduces settlement sheet of December 1, which filed and marked \n" Smart Exhibit 1, July 10, 1918." 581. \n\nExplains how the different items for preliminary expenditures \non various fields, etc., figures in the ultimate adjustment, and \nhow these matters passed to the books of the Dayton- Wright \nAirplane Co. 582. \n\nStates what temporary buildings have been included in the sub- \nmissions to the Government. 589. \n\nThe expenses of the Research Division after the 1st of July, \n1917, and the expenses of the South Field after July 1, 1917, \nwere submitted to the Government. 593. \n\nHe is asked with whom the question had been raised, under the \ncontract of September 7, 1917, that there was any right on the \npart of the Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. to charge the Gov- \nernment with the items for experimental work and hangars. \n597. \n\nKnew there were discussions with reference to the bogy cost to \nbe fixed. 601. \n\nDayton Wright Airplane Co. had no complete cost system. 603. \n\nOn a trip to \'Washington was shown the terms of contract or \ngeneral form of contract which was proposed to be entered into \nwith the various concerns contracting with the Government \nfor aircraft. 610. \n\nAsked for modifications principally in regard to depreciation \nand amortization of the plant. 611. \n\nCompany\'s outlays in getting a contract satisfactory to itself \nwere included in the cost to the Government contemplated by \nthe contract. 624. \n\nFour thousand dollars for traveling expenses. 625. \n\nTake up experimental work on Standard J-4 planes on June 1, \nalthough the contract was dated considerably afterwards \xe2\x80\x94 \nAugust 1. 628. \n\nMr. Smart\'s attention is called to the computation he made for \nthe purpose of determining the amount to be paid to Mr. \nDeeds by Messrs. Talbott and Kettering for Deeds\'s stock in \nthe Dayton Metal Products Co. 635. \n\nPresents original figures. 639. \n\nTo Dayton Metal Products Co., research division. 660. \nCarl J. Sherer (Dayton, Ohio, July 10, 1918; Book 9). \n\nAsked to produce a file of the contracts of the Dayton- Wright \nAirplane Co. Asked to state on the record the contracts which \nthe Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. has had and now has with \nthe Government seriatim and chronologically. 631. \n\nAsked to give the substance of the advance contracts. 682. \nE. D. Martin (July 10, 1918; Book 9). \n\nAsked date of entry on folio 109 of journal of Dayton Metal \nProducts Co. 690. \n\nCalls attention to trial balance of June 30, in which entry has \nbeen made over an erased amount. 391. \n\n\n\n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 155 \n\nAllen R. Smart (Day ton- Wright Airplane Co. plant, Dayton, Ohio, \nJuly 11, 1918; Book 9). \n\nProduces book or ledger of the Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. \n\n701. \nTurns to accounts which show what items entered into the ad- \njustment in the fall of 1917 between the Messrs. Talbot and \n\nKettering and the Domestic Building Co. 701. \nTakes up balance sheet of December 29, 1917, " Smart Exhibit \n\n11." 716. \nProduces paper entitled " The Dayton- Wright Airplane Co., \n\nDayton, Ohio." Contents : Estimated valuation of J-l planes \n\nand J-l spares delivered, etc. 722. \nTo a final cost of $192.87 per plane is added 10 per cent on ma- \nterial for waste and floor loss. 727. \nStatement is noticed in one of the sheets of metal fittings sent to \n\nFisher Body Corporation. 731. \nExplains special manner of treating depreciation of the plant by \n\nMiamisburg plant. 733. \nBalance sheet of December 29, 1917, making total charges to the \n\nUnited States Government, contracts down to December 29, \n1917, of $1,950,800.32. 736. \nNext sheet shows estimated profit on Standard J airplanes \n\nshipped of $18,600. 736. \nDown to December 29, 1917, date of the balance sheet, the num- \nber of Standard J planes shown as having been shipped were \n\n32. 739. \nAsked with respect to 8.34 acres of land adjoining property of \n\ncompany on the north which was purchased after main plant. \n\n740. \nSchedule I covers the entire amount deemed by the company to \n\nbe chargeable to the Government under all its contracts down \n\nto May 31, 1918. 744. \xe2\x96\xa0 \nHarley M. Howell (Dayton- Wright Airplane Plant, Dayton, Ohio, \nJuly 11, 1918; Book 10). \n\nAuditor since 18th of June, 1917, with Davton-Wright Airplane \n\nCo. 1. \nFourth page of " Smart Exhibit No. 11," items under head of \n\n" Experimental." 1. \nOn what basis were these items made payable by Government \n\nbefore any contract had been made. 2. \nCharacter of the work which went into experimental voucher \n\npaid by Government. 5. \nHad a contract which called for the antedating of work \xe2\x80\x94 ex- \nperimental work \xe2\x80\x94 that had been performed previously up to \n\nthe time of the date of the contract. 9. \nWhat purpose was in view in treating these experimental \n\ncharges during the fall of 1917 as separate from the cost \n\nunder the main contract. 9. \nVoucher submitted under contract No. 2713 dated January 25, \n\n1918, is dated May 21, 1918, being submitted for experimental \n\nexpenses. 11. \nAsked to explain how they presented vouchers and received pay- \nment on vouchers under the main contract for work that did \n\nnot belong under that contract. 15. \n\n\n\n156 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nHarley M. Howell \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nProduces depreciation accounts in ledger. 22. \n\nTemporary buildings carried in ledger at cost value, no depre- \nciation. 25. \n\nDistinguisli between a temporary building and a permanent \nbuilding by the purpose for which it was intended. 26. \n\nEmployment building, the commissary building, and the Mo- \nraine hangars on South Field styled temporary buildings. 26. \n\n$7,611.33 expended on commissary building. 27. \n\nEmployment building, expended on it $2,159.31. 28. \n\nTesting building, $3,810.71. 28. \n\nProduces statement showing an analysis of permanent assets as \nof May 31, 1918. 29. \xe2\x96\xa0 \n\nOther temporary buildings. 30. \n\nNet result will be that at end of the contract they will have \nvery substantial building usable as part of the plant which \nGovernment will have paid for. 32. \n\nAsked why these are charged as temporary buildings to the \nGovernment when they are just as permanent as main plant. \n32. \n\nTemporary commissary building experimental work under the \ncontract of January 25, 1918. 34. \n\nWas passed by Government accountant. 31. \n\nExperimental motor and gun test building, $7,717.02. 31. \n\nContract calls for a completed plane, but nothing is said about \ntesting it. 36. \n\nSubmits voucher showing submission for depreciation. 41. \n\nThis was paid by the Government. 13. \n\nActually in the plant at work as early as August, 1917. 16. \n\nTotal of $11,883.75 been charged for depreciation to Mav 31, \n1918. 18. \n\nLedger accounts show that $51,252.35 has been expended for \noffice furniture and fixtures down to May 31, 1918. 19. \n\nAll this account at plant No. 1. 49. \n\nOffice furniture account at plant No. 2, Miamisburg. 50. \n\nOffice furniture account at Golden Street factory. 50. \n\nOffice furniture account at South Field experimental station. \n50. \n\nAsked to produce vouchers of outlays under administrative and \ngeneral expenses shown in balance sheet of December 2?, \n^ 1917. 51. \n\nTakes voucher and tells when, in the adjustment, the salaries \nwere allowed and paid. 53. \n\nTraveling expenses. 51. \n\nMr. Bourne, of Lybrant, Ross Bros., and Montgomery, repre- \nsented the Government in this matter. 55. \n\nAll traveling expenses of executive officers included in this ac- \ncount before the date of any of the contracts. 56. \n\nAll postage, telephone, and telegraph charges charged to the \nGovernment. 57. \n\nGovernment allowed full amount, $2,717.37, down to October \n31, 1917. 58. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 157 \n\nHarley M. Howell \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nWestern Union Telegraph bill of E. A. Deeds for May, $51.38. \n59 \n\n(As of May, 1917.) \n\nPrinciple of these charges. 60. \n\nNo special instructions from any one as to what should be sub- \nmitted to Government. 61. \n\nOffice furniture and fixtures submitted to Government under \noffice expenses instead of under the head of office furniture \nand fixtures. 62. \n\nThe plan they worked on was that everything they laid out from \nthe inception of the company, barring incorporation expenses, \nwas to be paid by the Government. 63. \n\nCapt. Jam\'es A. Newman, accounting officer, was assigned to \nthis plant and he acknowledged these matters. 61. \n\nVoucher of $255,255.85 allowed by Government without any \naudit. 65. \n\n(Keference, p. 4.) \n\nAnything not paid for in this voucher ultimately went into the \nclean-up voucher, No. 30, which was settled on May 3, 1918. \n66. \n\nGovernment contract with the Dayton-Wright Airplane Co. \ncontains provision which excuses them from the necessity of \ntesting anything they made or even being assured what they \nmade would do the work expected of it. 66. \n\nSee article 12, entitled " Protection against infringement." 67. \n\nThis the reason for the " Experimental work " contract. 67. \n\nAsked to produce memorandum with respect to amount expended \nin connection with the building of the first De Haviland \nplane. 69. \n\nAuthorization from the Government comes from Col. Deeds. 69. \n\nAsked when Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. obtained title to this \nplant 71. \n\nProduces copy of original authorization under which experi- \nmental work done prior to January 1, 1917, was submitted for \npayment. 73. \n\nExecutive salary list of voucher No. 2, 77. \n(Salaries put under certain numbers.) \n\nVarious matters held in abeyance for a considerable time be- \ntween the company and the Government. 81. \n\nProduces telegraph file of April, 1917. 84. \n(Pages 84 to 176 contain telegrams.) \nCharles A. Craighead (Federal Building, Dayton, Ohio, July 12, \n1918; Book 10). \n\nMember of the Ohio bar. 177. \n\nSecretary to Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. 177. \n\nAttorney and counsel to Dayton Metal Products Co. 178. \n\nName of his own firm, Craighead & Cowden. 179. \n\nAttorney for Mr. Talbott 20 years. 185. \n\nMinutes of meetings pasted not pasted in proper place. 18. \n\nDayton- Wright Airplane Co. purchases plant formerly owned \nby Enterprise Carriage Co. at Miamisburg. 198. \n\nCharles A. Craighead trustee of company. 199. \n\n\n\n158 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0Charles A. Craighead \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nAsked about acquiring it for $60,000 and turning it over for \n\n$127,202. 200. \nMoney seems to have been paid by Mr. Talbott. 203. \nTurned it eventually over to Dayton- Wright Airplane Co . 204. \nRecord shows property was turned over to Dayton- Wright Air- \nplane Co. for $127,202. 205. \nQuestions him about telegram from Deeds, of Equipment Divi- \nsion, to H. E. Talbott about having worked out a lease for the \nNorth Dayton field. 207. \nActed as trustee in this matter. 209. \nAsked to get details that will enable him to give a clear account \n\nof this transaction. 209-210. \nMinutes of November 28 state that property is held by Dayton- \nWright Co. from the Enterprise Carriage Co. 212. \nCteorge Bancroft Smith (July 12, 1918; Book 10). \n\nProduces correspondence of Col. Deeds from his file, one for \n1917 and one for 1918. 215. \n\n(Pages 216 to 227, inclusive, letters and telegrams.) \nSpecial attention called to one on page 223, in which reference \nis made to loan secured by an officer connected with McCook \nField. 224. \nMary E. Devine (Dayton, Ohio, July 12, 1918; Book 10). \n\nProduces Mr. Talbott\'s file of correspondence with Mr. Deeds. \n228. \n\n(Pages 229 to 280, inclusive, letters and telegrams.) \nHoward Smith Taylor (Dayton, Ohio, July 12, 1918; Book 10). \nEngineer with Day ton- Wright Airplane Co. 281. \nProduces certain correspondence, telegrams and letters, taken \nfrom the executive office file. 281. \n(Pages 282 to 316, inclusive.) \nJames M. Schoonmaker (Dayton, Ohio, July 12, 1918; Book 10). \n(Resides Pittsburgh, Pa.) \nChief engineer of Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. since June of \n\nlast year. 317. \nIn Ordnance Department at Washington before coming to Day- \nton. 317. \nHad been with the Talbott Co. previous to going to Washington. \n\n318. \nDescribes condition of affairs as he found them when he came to \n\nDayton- Wright Co. in 1917, about June. 318. \nDrawings for planes received early in July very incomplete. \n\n320. \nChief difficulty in connection with production of the Standard J \nplanes was in getting the material which had been made from \nthe Standard blue prints to assemble properly. 321. \nHad to make drawings from these and the model before they \ncould be released to the manufacturers. 322. \n. Factory was not then in shape to go ahead, because they could \nnot make the tools until they had received the drawings. 323. \nBegan to tool up on some parts in latter part of July, but some \nparts were not released to the factory until as late as Octo- \nber. 323. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 159 \n\nJames M. Schoonmaker \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nStandard J planes in 90 per cent production during November, \n\nbut had been held back by defects discovered. 324. \nFirst plane delivered on 8th of December. 325. \nProduction from then on averaged about eight planes per day. \n\n325. \nThe entire 400 called for by the contract 1st of August, 1917, \n\nwere delivered April 11, 1918. 325. \nChief reasons for delay. 326. \n\nTwo types of training planes, Curtiss and Standard. 329. \nAsked, if Curtiss was in quantity production, why they did not \n\ntake that up and make all the planes they needed from that \n\ntype. 329. \nTelegram to Col. Deeds from Dayton- Wright Airplane Co., giv- \ning schedule of deliveries to be counted on of the Standard J \n\nplanes. 331. \nExplanation of failure to make delivery of any Standard planes \n\nat all until two months later. 332-334. \nEngineer not consulted with respect to estimates set forth to \n\nCol. Deeds in telegram. 335. \nShortage of material principal cause for delay. 336. \nGives further and more complete reasons for delay. 337. \nCalls attention to letter from Col. Deeds of November 26, 1917, \n\nin which he makes mention that too much time has been wasted \n\nover Standard J changes. 338. \nAsked to produce files which would show these changes. 339. \nAttention drawn to telegram from Col. Deeds to Mr. Talbott \n\ncrowding production. 340. \nFrom December 5 were in condition to produce as fast as their} \n\ncapacity would permit. 341. \nShipments fall down to small quantity per day. 341. \nEngineering difficulties had even been solved up to about 90 \n\nper cent during the summer. 342. \nShipments held up by failure to deliver by subcontractors. 342* \nDayton- Wright Airplane Co. made all the wood parts, fixing of \n\nlinen for the wings, etc, 343. \nDayton Metal Products Co. made turnbuckles, perhaps a few \n\nbolts. 343. \nShown telegram from Col. Deeds addressed to Dayton-Wright \n\nAirplane Co. in which Standard J planes withdrawn. 344. \nDifficulty with the Hall-Scott motors. 345. \n\nFirst De Haviland 4 completed and flown October 29, 1917. 345. \nNo changes in design, excepting a few minor details which could \n\nnot delay production. 345. \nNecessary to redesign the De Haviland to take the Liberty \n\nmotor. 346. \nAttention called to telegram from Col. Deeds, August 5, 1917, \n\nstating sending De Haviland to Dayton. 346. \nTelegram from Col. Deeds stating sending drawings (dated \n\nAugust 14, 1917) of De Haviland 4. 347. \nAsked if apart from the adaptation of the plane to the Liberty \n\nmotor there was anything to delay production of the ma- \n. chine. 348. \n\n120687\xe2\x80\x9419 11 \n\n\n\n160 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nJames M. Schoonmaker \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nSome parts of the machine never made in this country before, \ntherefore experimental stage necessary. 348. \n\nLack of spruce would not account for any considerable delay. \n349. m \n\nHad Liberty motor in plenty of time. 351. \n\nAll through with engineering difficulties by October 29. 352. \n\nNo information could be obtained on the equipment. 355. \n\nWith the Standard J planes in shop also could not have gone \nahead on big production, but could have produced at least \n150 a month in December, January, and February; also \nMarch, if could have obtained equipment information. 356. \n\nReads part of history of De Haviland. 357. \n\nReads further part of history. 358. \n\nEndeavoring from October, 1917, to some time in April, 1918, \nto get statement of the equipment that was needed in order \nto finish the drawings. 358. \n\nConducted correspondence with Col. Vincent at McCook Field, \n358. \n\nGives summary of course of production of the De Haviland \nplane. 359. \n\nDid not reach definite results until April, 1918. 360. \n\nIn correspondence practically only with production engineering \ndepartment head, Maj. Gray. 361. \n\nStates as his testimony detailed course of the production of the \nDe Haviland plane. 361. (Pp. 362-374). \n\nDrawings for changes in the double gun mount and the rede- \nsign of the cartridge boxes furnished by the Signal Corps were \nnot correct and designs not satisfactory. 375. \n\nThinks that these delays have really been caused by honest \nmistakes. 378. \n\nRecites delays which have been occasioned by mistakes of Day- \nton-Wright Airplane Co. 379. \n\nDelay in furnishing information as to equipment in the par- \nticulars described cost this country three months in getting \nthe production which was achieved in April and from April \non. 381. \n\nAssumed they had knowledge as to equipment, as they did not \nknow whether equipment was to come, as they had never \nheard anything. 385. \n\nRequested information of Signal Corps October 9, 1917, as to \ngun sights, without which they could not make up any pro- \ngram for delivery, but no bill of particulars or drawings in \nconnection therewith was received until February 13. 387. \n\nEquipment of the first plane that went out from the factory in- \ncomplete. 398. (No gun that would work.) \n\nAsked how they could get along without a drawing of the gun \nthey were to use in making the first plane for it. 389. \n\nThis plane finished and sent to France, and yet it was incom- \nplete and no one could fight with it. 390. \n\nTelegram from Mr. Talbott to Col. Deeds asking for recall of \nfirst 100 planes. 391. \n\nThat first incomplete plane intended for the American Exgedi- \nL tionarv Forces in France. 392. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 161 \n\nJames M. Schoonmaker \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nNo shipments for the Expeditionary Forces between February \n4, 1918, and April 3, 1918. 393. \n\nProduces photographic exhibit of the program for the D. H. 4 \nfrom the Planning Department, Equipment Division, of the \nSignal Corps, marked "Zacharias Exhibit 1," purporting to \nshow program from August 2, 1917, to May 3, 1918, which \nbrings out admission that they had only one bona fide program \nbut lots of others that were not. 393. \n\nSchedule made up on April 9 first bona fide schedule based on \naccurate information. 395. \n\nThis schedule produced which shows they did not take into ac- \ncount what had been shipped prior to April 9, thereby making \nMay 2 as the date on which quantity production commenced. \n406. \n\nShipping planes in which nuts have been admitted in securing \nthe bolts. 413. \n\nBolts and schackles and cotter pins throughout the machines \nbadly fitted. 415. \n\nThirty or forty inspectors, but only 4 or 5 have had experience. \n415. \n\nJammed pulley wheels and bad joints at the landing gear struc- \nture. 416. \n\nFrom October to the present time inspectors and engineers and \nemployees all alike have been getting their experience in the \nproducing of airplanes. 418. \n\nThis does not in a considerable measure explain the delay. 419. \n\nDisloyalty on part of men working in the plant. 421. \nAugust Hiller (Dayton, Ohio, July 12, 1918; Book 10). \n\nPlant accounting officer, Bureau of Aircraft Production. 427. \n\nArrived at plant on April 11, Capt. Newman, his predecessor, \nwas working on the clean-up voucher No. 30. 428. \n\nCredit balances due the Government of approxihately $94,000. \n429. \n\nQuestion of traveling expenses. 433. \n\nVoucher No. 1 under which $255,255.85 was paid the contractor. \n434. \n\nPresent attitude of the Government accounting office with re- \nspect to salaries at this plant. 437. \n\nShifting sums from one contract to another. 438. \n\nAttitude of the Government with respect to temporary buildings \nand the allowance of, vouchers for temporary buildings. 445. \n\nOperation of a commissary an actual necessity. 448. \n\nDepreciation ratio of the cost of the Miamisburg plant. 449. \n\nAlways an effort on part of the contractor to get everything \nout of costs he can. 455. \n\nPadding the pay rolls. 456. \n\nPrivate chauffeurs carried on the pay rolls of the company. 456. \n\nThese chauffeurs entitled to get oil, cars, gasoline, etc., on free \nlist for use in running the private cars of all officers of the \ncompany to and from Dayton. 457. \n\nRuling issued on this June 8 from Washington that no more \nmoney shall be allowed for such purposes. 458. \n\n\n\n162 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nJames M. Sghoonmaker \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nProduces list of the officials, with signature of president of the \n\ncompany, who are supposed to be on free list for oil, gas, and \n\ntires. 458. \nMr. Butts, oil, gas, and tires ; Mr. Talbott, sr., gets oil, gas, and \n\ntires; Mr. Talbott, jr., also, etc., 465. \nExpense accounts sent in for railroad fare, moving of furniture, \n\netc., for employees. 467. \nBaseball nine maintained. 467. \nOfficers submit bills for traveling expenses to Washington and \n\notherwise, and then will not give details. 470. \nDifficulties encountered in trying to install a proper cost ac- \ncounting system. 471. \nOfficials of the company would not cooperate in helping anyone \n\nto put in adequate cost system. 472. \nScrapped material. 474. \n\nGetting at the cost of the airplanes shipped. 475. \nLouis Crist Lueneke (Dayton, Ohio, July 12, 1918; Book 10). \nEngineer, general aeronautical engineer. 477. \nWent with Dayton-Wright Co. in 1915. 479. \nStarted in with D. W. K. Airplane Co. on experimental work on \n\nMarch 1, 1917, at South Field, headquarters at the Delco. \n\n480. \nHeld position of airplane designing when this company was \n\nformed. 480. \nDesigned the F S, now at South field. 480. \nStarted on the construction of these the latter part of March. \n\n481. \nConnection with the Standard J. 481. \nNow assistant chief engineer. 482. \nFactory manager, Mr. Sutton. 482. \nMr. Williams, assistant to the president. 483. \nStates causes of delav in production of the Standard J 1 planes. \n\n484. \nChart shows number of planes in final test on July 12, 1918, as \n\n729, and number of planes shipped 654, while according to Mr. \n\nLueneke\'s statement only 632 had passed into final test. 486. \nHE. Talbott, Sr. (Dayton, Ohio, July 12, 1918; Book 10.) \n\nActively identified with Dayton Metal Products Co. and the \n\nDay ton- Wright Airplane Co. Also in the paper business and \n\nchairman of the board of directors of the City National Bank \n\nin Dayton. 488. \nPresident Dayton Metal Products Co. 488. \nDayton Metal Products Co. organized to carry out a contract for \n\nmaking detonating fuses for foreign Governments. 489. \nMr. Talbott, his son, Deeds, and Kettering were asked by the \n\nGovernment to take over construction of some trading ships. \n\n490. \nThinks they called themselves a company. 490. \nDayton- Wright Airplane Co. grew out of this. 491. \nThis matter of obtaining contracts from the Government was \n\nsuggested to them by Mr. Waldon, connected with Gen. Squier\'s \n\noffice, or with Howard Coffin\'s department of aircraft produc- \ntion.\' 491-492. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 163 \n\nH. E. Talbott, Sr. \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nIn spring of 1917 they were asked to take over the building of \n\nthe Domestic Engineering Co. 492. \nProbably suggested by Waldon and Coffin and Mr. Deeds. 492. \nDomestic Building Co. by Mr. Deeds and Kettering. 494. \nMr. Deeds and Mr. Kettering interested in Moraine Development \n\nCo. 494. \nAsked as to the situation with respect to Dayton-Wright Air- \nplane Co.\'s interest in this building during summer and fall \n\nof 1917. 495. \nHad no written statement or exchange of papers, but in this joint \n\nstatement it was agreed to provide Domestic Engineering Co. \n\nwith quarters. 497. \nDaj^ton- Wright Airplane Co. organized in April, 1917. 497. \nUnderstanding by Mr. Talbott, sr., Mr. Kettering, and Mr. Tal- \nbot t, jr., as to transfer ultimately of the Domestic Building \n\nCo. to Day ton- Wright Airplane Co. 499. \nStates when this matter of obtaining a contract for planes was \n\nfirst taken up on behalf of the Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. \n\n499. \nSome prior to the date of the contract that the order was given. \n\n501. \nAsked about telegram from Mr. Deeds under date of May 11, \n\n1917, saying, " Think your whole plan ideal." 501. \nFurther telegrams from Deeds. 502. \nMr. Kuhns is secretary of the conservancy board of directors. \n\n504. \nHad been an attorney or secretary at the National Cash Register \n\nCo. 504. \nTelegram from Deeds to Ezra M. Kuhns, " Option should be \n\nrushed in vicinity of a fir field, raising prices, if necessary. \n\n504. \nGives explanation of measure of which he asked approval of \n\nCol. Deeds in telegram of May 11, 1917. (Page 501.) 508. \nCol. Deeds stopped publicity in matter on account of increase in \n\nland which would have resulted had it become known Govern- \nment was going to purchase it. 509. \nMr. Talbott had an idea that expenses in connection with flying \n\nfield would be $150,000 or $200,000 in buildings. 510. \nDayton Lumber & Manufacturing Co. received contract for work \n\nto be done on this field, which has already run into several \n\nmillions of dollars. 511. \nS. S. King, one of leading stockholders in this company. 511. \nSecured the capital to invest in this company through the City \n\nNational Bank, $60,000. 512. \nAcquired most of the stock. 513. \nStates how he negotiated the contract for King in the name of \n\nthe company for this work. 513. \nReads telegram to Mr. Talbott from Mr. Deeds, under date of \n\nMay 25, regarding King\'s inability to take care of this con- \ntract alone. 515. \nFinds out he has recommended a man too small for the job. 516. \n\n\n\n164 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". \n\nH. E. Talbott, Sr. \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nTelegram from Deeds to Talbott, in which he asks his discretion \nin regard to making public a statement about King\'s con- \ntract. 517. \n\nAsked how Deeds anticipated criticism with regard to King\'s \nbeing given this contract if they were innocent of any conniv- \ning. 518. \n\nDayton Metal Products Co. loaned King several hundred thou- \nsand dollars, indorsed his paper, and introduced him to their \nbank in New York, the American Exchange. 519-520. \n\nSaid Dayton Metal Products Co. did not get any compensation \nfor its service to King. 521. \n\nExplains reason for carrying this big loan in New York. 522. \n\nLocal lumber man known to Ezra Kuhns recommended by Deeds \nas a person to whom should be handed contracts in connection \nwith this work. 526. \n\nTelegram from Mr. Talbott, sr., to Mr. Deeds, although he still \ninsists he was not interested in the contract. 523, 531. \n\nStill further interest displayed. 535. \n\nHis attention again called to telegram from Deeds, in which he \nsays, " Think your whole plan ideal," all this being 12 days \nbefore King got the contract. 538. \n\nCalls attention to telegram from Mr. Deeds, dated June 7, to Mr. \nTalbott, jr., mentioning purchase requisition for 500 planes \nthat had been started by Government. 540. \n\nTelegram asking Mr. Talbott to come to Washington for confer- \nence on form of contract. 542. \n\nConcerned over the article in the contract on depreciation. 545. \n\nTelegram from Talbott to Col. Deeds asking if it would be pos- \nsible to have Government officers come first of week to conclude \ncontract, this being on September 15. 547. \n\nTheir contract not the same as Curtiss Co. 549. \n\nThinks Col. Deeds transferred and sold his stock in the Dayton \nMetal Products Co. to him in May. 552. \n\nSettlement made by notes. 553. \n\nKeason of the two-fifths, two-fifths, and one-fifth arrangement. \n553. ; \n\nNo written agreement or any form of agreement to show that \nthere was an agreement. 556. \n\nBarrow, Wade & Guthrie to determine on the book value less 15 \nper cent. 557. \n\nArrangement in November, 1917, with respect to the Dayton- \nWright Airplane Co. stock when that was transferred to the \nDayton Metal Products Co. the D. M. P. Co. should only have \nthe profit on that stock to the extent of a certain percentage. \n557. \n\nAfter giving a certain percentage to the Dayton Metal Products \nCo. the rest divided in a proportion which gave Mr. Kettering \none-twentieth more than either of the tAvo Talbotts. 559. \n\nGoes over their salaries. 561. \n\nIs again shown note dated May 22, 1917 (see p. 555), and asked \nto state when it was delivered. 563. \n\nBy June 30, 1917, Mr. Talbott had through indorsements and \ndirect paper loaned $550,000. 566. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 165 \n\nH. E. Talbott, Sr. \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nLays conception of Wilbur Wright Field on Mr. Deeds. 567. \nIs again asked to fix the date of the delivery of the note mentioned \n\non page 555. 570. \nHold joint meeting to discuss disposal of Deeds\'s stock. 575. \nMinutes written up later. 577. \nHis attention is called to his personal ledger regarding this note \n\nof May 22, 1917, in which entry is made as of September 30, \n\n1917. 595. \nWas asked if he had a special arrangement for the receipt of tele- \ngram from Mr. Deeds. 596. \nAcquisition by the Dayton Metal Products of the Dayton- Wright \n\nAirplane Co. 597. \nPurchase of this stock was considered some time in the summer. \n\n599. \nNote to Deeds for $207,706 for 200 shares of his stock in Dayton \n\nMetal Products Co. overdue. Only $7,706 ever been paid on it. \n\n601. \nIn the arrangement for the sale of the Dayton- Wright Airplane \n\nCo. to the Dayton Metal Products Co. provision is made for \n\nrepurchase by the Messrs. Talbott and Mr. Kettering. 602. \nNo written agreement with Deeds on any subject. 604. \nNo memorandum regarding transfers of these different stocks \n\nwith reference to payment of the notes or the reacquisition of \n\nany interest as represented by these notes. 605. \nIs shown salary account of Dayton Metal Products Co. in which \n\nis entered salary for E. A. Deeds for June, 1917, as well as May \n\nand earlier months. 606. \nReasons for buying or paying $60,000 for Miamisburg plant and \n\nthen turning it over to himself practically again for greatly \n\nincreased valuation. 607. \nStated that Mr. Schoonmaker\'s testimony was in accordance with \n\nhis understanding of facts, but not complete. 610, 611. \nSidney Scott King (Dayton, Ohio, July 13, 1918; Book 10). \nLumber business. 612. \n\nPresident Dayton Lumber & Manufacturing Co. 612. \nFormed in 1894 ; been president about a year. 612. \nBecame principal owner in April, 1917. 613. \nAcquired 521 shares in April. 613. \nNo large contracts between 1908 and 1917. 615. \nOwned a planing mill and lumber yard ; also bought through Mr. \n\nH. E. Talbott\'s influence as president of the City National \n\nBank. 615. \nRecites the same feature as Mr. Talbott as one of the reasons for \n\nthis loan to him of $60,000 from Mr. Talbott. 615. \nThe first he heard of anv buildings to be erected at Wilbur \n\nWright Field was on May 16, 1917. 617. \nSigned this contract for this field on May 23. 619. \nWent to Mr. Deeds\'s office and Deeds took him to Col. Edgar. 621. \nContract signed on May 23 was just letter signed by Chief of the \n\nSignal Corps, Marshall, instructing them to proceed with the \n\nwork pending final contract. 633. \nExpected to get his capital from Mr. Talbott. 624. \n\n\n\n166 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nSidney Scott King \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nFirst pay roll was a thousand dollars a week; in four weeks it \nhad grown to $158,000 a week. 625. \n\nSaw Col. Deeds a great deal in Washington. 627. \n\nCost of aviation up to November 1, 1917. 629. \n\nDayton Metal Products Co. advanced him money on July 16. \n630. \n\nDayton Metal Products Co. advanced $825,000 down to October \n27. 631. \n\nAsked to produce missing sheets from ledger. 632. \nEzra M. Kuhns (Book 10). \n\nSecretary of the Miami conservancy district since Julv 7, 1915. \n633. \n\nThis district acquired Wilbur Wright Field practically all in \n1917. 633. \n\nWas advised 1st of April that Government was interested in this \ntract. 637. \n\nTerms of leasing to the Government. 644. \nJames M. Schoonmaker (July 13, 1918; Book 10). \n\nProduces file which shows the numerous changes in the Stand- \nard J-l. (Reference p. 339.) 647. \n\nComplete set of drawings ready for manufacture of De Havi- \nland 4 on January 5, 1918. 649. \n\nReads letter addressed to Mr. H. E. Talbott, in which he ex- \nplains to him how the engineering department had to drop \nwork on the DH-4 and start on the DH-9, and then even- \ntually go back again to the D-H4. 650. \n\nFirst 12 days in July they had 321 changes on the De Haviland \n\n. plane. 652. \nAlfred J. Tingle (Dayton, Ohio, July 13, 1918; Book 10). \n\nManufacturing engineer with Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. 655. \n\nProduces minutes of engineering data, containing record of the \nshipments of the J-l machine, also showing some of the causes \nof delay. 656. \n\nThis too technical, and is asked to make up a statement which \nwould be better understood, which he does. 659-664. \nCharles Franklin Kettering (Dayton, Ohio, July 13, 1918; \nBook 10). \n\nVice president Dayton-Wright Airplane Co. 665. \n\nVice president Dayton Metal Products Co. 665. \n\nFirst came to Dayton in July, 1904, and took a position at the \nNational Cash Register Co., and was a designer there then in \nthe engineering department. 666. \n\nCol. Deeds was then vice president. 666. \n\nWas the inventor of the Delco system. 667. \n\nShort history of the Delco system. 668. \n\nMade the development through corporation known as the Delco \nCo. \xe2\x80\x94 The Dayton Engineering Laboratories Co. 668. \n\nSold the stock of the Delco Co. to United Motors Co. in latter \npart of 1916. 670. \n\nPreferred stock not made over. 671. \n\nStill president of the Delco Co., at salary of $50,000. 672. \n\nRelates story in connection with his association with Mr. Deeds \nin Dayton Metal Products Co. 672. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIKCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 167 \n\nCharles Franklin Kettering \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nStill vice president of the Dayton Metal Products Co. at a salary \n\nof $20,000. 674. \nWhen the Delco Co. stock was transferred to United Motors in \n1916 Col. Deeds still continued as vice president of United \nMotors and also as president of the Delco. 674. \nIn the winter of 1915-16, along the first of the year, did their \nfirst worok at the South Field, in which were associated Mr. \nTalbott, Mr. Deeds, and Mr. Talbott, jr.; this afterwards \ndeveloping into the Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. 676. \nRelates visit of Col. Foulois and Mr. Howard Coffin and several \n\nothers to look over this field. 677. \nCan not recall the date when Col. Deeds approached him on \nthe subject of the transfer of his stock in the Dayton Metal \nCo. 680. \n\nNo memorandum or statement of any which would show the \ntransfer. 680. \n\nDoes not remember the time when Barrow, Wade & Guthrie com- \npleted their adjustment and made a statement. 682. \n\nNo records of any kind to show the way in which the transac- \ntion regarding the purchase by the Dayton Metal Products \nCo. of the Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. from Mr. Kettering \nand Mr. Talbott. 685. \n\nAsked about the arrangement of the proportion of two-fifths, \ntwo-fifths, and one-fifth. 686. \n\nAsked about the note of November, 1917, for $273,000, which \nhe gave to the Domestic Building Co., also Mr.- Talbott for \nsame amount, and Mr. Talbott, jr., for one-half the amount. \n689. \n\nDoes not know whether it has ever been paid or not. 691. \n\nDoes not know whether Mr. Talbott has ever paid his note or \nnot. 692. \n\nDoes not recall anything about giving a note to Col. Deeds for \n$206,706 for 200 shares of the Dayton Metal Products Co. \nstock. 692. \n\nCould not state if it had been delivered. Did not know it was \noverdue. 693. \n\nMr. Kettering\'s attention called to agreement of repurchase. \n694. \n\nAsked whv the note to Mr. Deeds for $207,706 has not been paid. \n696. \n\nSpeaks of the delays occasioned by changes in design, etc., men- \ntioned by Mr. Schoonmaker. 708. \n\nDefines the different purposes of the Wilbur Wright field, the \nNorth field, the McCook field, and the South field. 711. \n\nHis attention called to his note under date of May 22, 1917, for \n$207,706 payable to E. A. Deeds. 714. \n\nIs shown his bills-payable book, which shows this note entered \nafter the date of August 3, 1917. 715. \n\nHis attention called to ledger of the Dayton Metal Products Co., \nshowing minutes pasted in wrong places, also others; with- \ndrawn. 717. \n\n\n\n168 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nHarold E. T. Talbott, Jr. (Dayton, Ohio, July 13, 1918; Book 10). \n\nAfter occupying various positions, arrives in Dayton in Novem- \nber, 1914. 721. \n\nTook up work with Dayton Metal Products Co. 721. \n\nFirst took up matter of airplane construction early in spring \nof 1917. 722. \n\nHis work is confined entirely to personnel of the organization. \n724. \n\nStates what is embraced under head of personnel. 725. \n\nMr. Sherer has charge of the system of vouchering to the Gov- \nernment, 726. \n\nGives companies in which he is an officer, with salary. 720. \n\nHas some recollection of a date when he joined with Mr. Ket- \ntering and his father in the signing of a check for a million \ndollars to the Day ton- Wright Airplane Co., in payment of its \ncapital stock. 731. \n\nDoes not recall the actual cost of the land on which the Dayton- \nWright airplane plant is built. 735. \n\nHeard that " they " paid $60,000 for the Miamisburg plant. 735. \n\nAsked what accounts were taken into consideration in this trans- \naction. 736. \n\nGave his note approximately for $100,000 for his share of Mr. \nDeeds\'s stock in the Dayton Metal Products Co. 739. \n\nCan not state when he signed it or when it was delivered. 740- \n741. \n\nAsked for explanation of the two-fifths, two-fifths, one-fifth \nplan. 749. \n\nGives $4,000,000 as total profits on whole contract made out \nof De Havilands and spares. 751. \nMaj. James Goodrich Heaslet (Detroit, Mich., July 16, 1918; \nBook 11). \n\nMajor, Signal Corps, since last September. Prior to that was \nvice president of Studebaker Co. Had production engineer- \ning work of the Studebaker Corporation, 1-2. \n\nEmployed in inspection service. 2. \n\nStates what concerns he had jurisdiction over. 3. \n\nOutlines what he observed at Fisher body plant. 7. \n\nGives reason for delay at Fisher Body Co. 10. \n\n" I saw a very efficient organization standing around waiting for \ninformation." 14. \n\nWhen they were ready to take something up a change would \ncome. 15. \n\nConcerns making fittings for the Dayton-Wright Co. were in- \ncompetent. 16. \n\nStates why contract for parts was let through the Dayton- \nWright Co. instead of to the National Cash Register Co. \ndirect. 17. \n\nMr. Hughes quotes delivery contract and Maj. Heaslet testifies \nthat the Fisher Body Co. could have gotten this work out \npromptly if they had the necessary information. 20. \n\nSituation similar with De Haviland planes. 21. \n\nFisher Body Co. had their first De Haviland in the air about \nthree weeks ago. 21. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCKAFT INVESTIGATION. 169 \n\nMaj. James Goodrich Heaslet \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nDayton- Wright Co. switched from De Haviland 9 to De Havi- \nland 4. Took until April to get under way with 4s. 22. \n\nBelieves Fisher Body Co. proceeded as well as they could. 26. \n\nOutlines production of Fisher Body Co. 26. \n\nFisher Body Co. capable of producing 40 planes a day. 28. \n\nThere will be a shortage of motors. 29. \n\nFisher Body Co. three months behind Dayton-Wright Co. because \nhe thinks they did not receive information as quickly. 30. \n\nReceived up to date 61 motors. Seemed to be no lack of motors \nat Dayton-Wright plant. 34. \n\nWhen they were well into the tools a change would come and \nthey would have to start over again. 38. \n\nIs questioned as to the cause of this delay of many months at the \nFisher Body plant to which he answers that minor changes \nhave been made from time to time. 39. \n\nMr. Hughes states that he can not understand why the Fisher \nCo. had not produced a plane before July 1, and continues, \n" For I confess I do not understand your statement." 42. \n\nIs asked again what reason there can be why the Fisher Body \nCo. should not have gone ahead as rapidly as the Dayton- \nWright Co. \n\nAnswers it may be because the Engineering Department is lo- \ncated at Dayton and Fisher is "isolated up here, away off." \n43. \n\nSome evidence of retarding production at Lincoln plant. 45. \n\nAgain Maj. Heaslet states that Fisher Body Co. has not inten- \ntionally delayed the work. 46. \n\nStates Fishers themselves are not Germans for several genera- \ntions. 47. \n\nEstimates that four planes will be ready for shipment during \n" the present week." 57. \n\nGives number of Liberty motors produced from date to date by \nPackard Co. 58. \n\nAlso gives number of motors with respect to other plants. 59. \n\n" Labor condition frightful." 61. \n\nDue to lack of production of crank shafts will not have a thou- \nsand motors from Packard in August. 62. \n\nCites trouble with cam shaft housing which may delay produc- \ntion. 65. \n\nFord " has fallen down on his estimate badly." 66. \n\nCan not give any reason why well-equipped concerns like the \nGeneral Motors, Cadillac, and Buick got no orders before De- \ncember. 68. \n\nTooling up in six months " was a wonderful piece of work." 69. \n\nCadillac and Buick plants were in as good shape to make an air- \nplane motor as any other concern. 69. \n\nCould have handled larger orders. 72. \n\nOther companies got orders for 6,000 and they got orders for \nonly 2,000. 72. \n\nContract for 5,000 with Ford let in November, 1917; tooling up \nnot accomplished yet. 73. \n\nFord produced 97 motors up to date. 77. \n\n\n\n170 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nMaj. James Goodrich Heaslet \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nOptimism greater about Ford plant than Packard because Ford \n\nhas greater facilities. 79. \nAsked for an explanation as to the reason the first contract was \n\nlet to a concern that did not have a plant. 81. \nDescribes great scarcity of toolmakers and struggle with Adju- \ntant General\'s Office in getting 87 toolmakers out of Camp \n\nCuster. 83. \nTwo regiments of men were refused by the General Staff that \n\ncould have been used. (2,800 men.) 83. \nHeld in camp near to five months (motor mechanics) and " taken \n\naway from the factories in this country." 85. \nContinuous discussion of this matter up to page 88. 91. \nSending of these men to Detroit would have aided in getting \n\nplanes. 91. \nLincoln Motor Co. produced 763 motors up to July 15. 91. \nEstimate for August is 700. 92. \nAnd for December, 1,250. 92. \n\nNordyke Marmon plant just coming into production. 95. \nTheir contract was let in September, 1917. 96. \nHall- Scott contract had to be finished before Liberty motor \n\ncould be taken up. 97. \nSeven hundred and fourteen motors produced thus far in July \n\nout of a contemplated production of 1,950. 100. \nThinks they may get 2,500 in September. 101. \nOne hundred to one hundred and fifty hours is supposed to be \n\nabout the life of certain parts of the Liberty motor. 107. \nThinks a new engine can be produced with less men than it takes \n\nto repair one and therefore does not favor reestablishing an \n\nengine. 108-109. \nLife of a plane is not over 90 to 120 days, therefore requiring \n\nprobably three motors to the plane. 109. \nSpare parts holding them back from schedule. 110. \nMakes statement relative to Liberty motor. 112. \nHad motor been run as originally designed at 330 to 350 horse- \npower there would have been no serious change. 114. \nCol. Hall will state the scupper system was adequate. Col. Vin- \ncent will tell you we had to have pressure system. 115. \nPropeller head on crank shaft changed three times. 116. \nGreat deal of question during fall and winter as to whether Hal] \n\nor Vincent had control of the Liberty motor. 118. \nHazard an estimate that had no engineering changes occurred, \n\nwould not have had over 1,000 engines more than we have. \n\n118. \nHad 595 engines the 1st of May. 119. \nThinks manuf actnrers were misled by believing that this was an \n\nautomobile problem and not a totally different problem. 121. \nOnly saved twelve one-hundredths of a pound per horsepower in \n\norder to bring it up to 400. 124. \nThe heads of tool room at Lincoln plant apparently had banded \n\ntogether with certain subordinates, and thinks there was a \n\ndeliberate case of retarding tool work, which, of course, was \n\nthe important work. 124. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 171 \n\nMaj. James Goodrich Heaslet \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nBarrel dropped on a propeller one day and we never have dis- \ncovered where the barrel came from. 127. \n\nEnglish claim they can not get the results with the Zenith car- \nburetor that we supplv with the engine and they want the \nClotele. 130. \n\nAbout 1,200 engines shipped with light connecting rods. 133. \n\nEstimates on March 25 was that we would have 4,620 engines bv \nthe end of June. Only had 1,625. 134. \n\nHad counted on Ford for 1,200 and they really had not pro- \nduced anything. 135. \n\nJ. H. Walker Co. of Cleveland, fell down flat on cam-shaft hous- \ning. 136. \n\nGeneral Motors production sheet marked " Heaslett Exhibit 3, \nJuly 16, 1918." 136. \n\nFord production sheets marked " Heaslett Exhibit 4, July 16. \n1918." 136. \n\nLincoln Co. sheet marked "Heaslett Exhibit 5, July 15, 1918. \n136. \n\nSheet showing total production marked " Heaslett Exhibit 6, \nJuly 16, 1918." 137. \nCapt. J. Neil Patterson (Detroit, Mich., July 16, 1918; Book 11). \n\nHas been an officer of the Signal Corps about 10 months. 138. \n\nWent to Washington in middle of August and offered services. \nFinally succeeded in connecting up with motor production de- \npartment under Lieut. Emmons. Given rank as aeronautical \nmechanical engineer. 138. \n\nWas told to go to Buffalo and visit motor plants in district and \nfind out some means of hurrying up production of planes at \nCurtiss, Hammondsport, and Buffalo, and later at Elmira, \nN. Y. 139. \n\nHad been in Packard shops for nine months and then went with \nPackard deal in Pittsburgh on technical work. Later became \nsalesman for Packard dealer in Detroit. From there took \ncharge of Detroit factory branch of Lozier Motor Co. Had \nvarious other positions in connection with motor business. \n139, 140. \n\nFound companies that were not working on the Curtiss equip- \nment with the energy and capacity they could. The main \nreason being the Curtiss Co. did not pay their bills. 142. \n\nTransferred to inspection department, Signal Corps, and sent \nto San Francisco to be district manager of inspection there. \n143. \n\nAfter work completed there reported back to Washington and \nthen ordered to report to Maj. Heazlett, Detroit. 144. \n\nConditions at Curtiss plant at that time very chaotic. 146. \n\nThere was no one man there who was boss. 146. \n\nThey had enough men but not enough assistants in the executive \ndepartment. 150. \n\nMakes statement as to how conditions were remedied. 151. \n\nHad as many as 15 drawings up and down the State of Cali- \nfornia for the same parts that were all different. 160. \n\nFowler, in some miraculous way, received an order for training \nplanes. He did not have any organization and he did not \nhave any factory. 164. \n\n\n\n172 ABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nCapt. J. Neil Patterson \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \nHe had conversational capital. 165. \nPretty much handicapped through the Curtiss Co. not sending \n\ndrawings and drawings not checking with one another. 167. \nUnited States Aircraft Corporation was a body of men who had \n\na contract; they had had a plant and they were going to use \n\nthat if they could get somebody to put up the money to build \n\nairplanes. 168. \nThey found a man who would put up enough money if he could \n\ntake 51 per cent of the stock. 169a. \nFowler Co. finally closed its doors because of lack of finances. \n\n169a. \nCompany is now well financed and they are building a very good \n\nplane. 170. \nUnderstands Standard planes at different flying fields have been \n\nretired. 177. \nCalifornia Aviation Co. made spare parts. 178. \nCurtiss Co., with organization they had, did all they could to \n\nfurnish accurate drawings. 181. \nThe climate out West is such that they can work practically all \n\nthe year round. They needed no coal for factories, and you \n\ncould get a factory quick. 182. \nWestern fields needed equipment. 182. \nDid not believe anyone figured that there would be a tremendous \n\noverstocking of orders into the plants in the East that would \n\nsort of eliminate the little fellows. 183. \nAt Fisher Body Corporation he found one of the finest plants \n\nhe had ever been in for what he thought was the building of \n\nan airplane. 185. \nFisher Body Corporation working toward 40 planes a day. 189. \nBody of men in Washington controlling all deliveries of what \n\nthe Signal Corps furnish to the plane manufacturers. 195. \nCapt. Bayne controls the purchasing of that equipment. 195. \nAllotment is done in Washington and man in charge of that is \n\nMr. Hena, working in Col. Mixter\'s office. 196. \nFisher Body Corporation entirely out of synchronizers ; possibly \n\nout of navigation light equipment. 198. \nCharles Fisher knows most about finances of the company. 209. \nOnly Hall- Scott and Curtiss motor used on machines built in \n\nWest. 213. \nOnly Standard and Curtiss planes built in California. 213. \nLiberty Iron Works in Sacramento and Fowler Airplane Co. in \n\nSan Francisco are adequately equipped, financially and in \n\ntheir personnel, and in factory equipment, to carry out any \n\nreasonable orders and deliver the right kind of an article. \n\n214. \nWestern fields need 40 training planes a month. 214. \nFisher Body Corporation also supplying bodies to motor compa- \nnies. 215. \nCapt. Hall B. Holmes (Detroit, Mich., July 16, 1918; Book 11). \nEntered service October 1, 1917. 217. \n\nPrior occupation was auditor of American Telephone & Tele- \ngraph Co. 217. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 173 \n\nCapt. Hall B. Holmes \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nPrevious to that was on staff of Patterson, Teele & Dennis, certi- \nfied accountants. 218. \n\nSpent summer of 1907 in automobile plant. 218. \n\nAssigned as district accounting officer, Detroit, upon receiving a \ncommission. 218. \n\nHad charge of Government accounting in all plants operating \nunder cost-plus contracts. 219. \n\nPackard Motor Car Co., Ford Motor Co., Lincoln Motor Co., \nFisher Body Corporation, Lewis Spring & Axle Co., Wilson \nBody Corporation, Grand Eapids Airplane Co., Hays-Ionia \nCo. of Grand Eapids, Mich., and the General Motors Corpora- \ntion were all operating under cost-plus contracts. 219. \n\nLewis Spring & Axle Co. has contract to manufacture spare \nparts for Bristol fighter. 219, 220. \n\nWilson Body Co. make spares for De Haviland 4s. 220. \n\nGrand Eapids Airplane Co. manufacture wood parts for the \nHandley-Paige. 220. \n\nGrand Eapids Chair Co. is one of subsidiary companies of Grand \nEapids Airplane Co. 220. \n\nGrand Eapids Airplane Co. is an association of furniture manu- \nfacturers. 220. \n\nGot contract for 1,000 spare parts for Handley-Paige and par- \nceled out the performance of it. 221. \n\nUp to July 6 vouchers had been passed in field for payment to \nFisher Body Co. amounting to $3,060,968.42. 221, 222. \n\nPlant accounting officer, Leon S. Wescoat, supervises vouchers. \n223. \n\nWitness supervises accounting. 223. \n\nAny question on which the Government\'s attitude is not clear \nto plant accounting officer is referred to him and he rules upon \nit or forwards it to Washington, or he may rule upon it tenta- \ntively and forward it to Washington. 223. \n\nSalary payments have not been finally approved. 226. \n\nStatement of salaries paid by the Fisher Body Co. to its officers. \n226, 227. \n\nA portion of these salaries only is charged to the work under \nSignal Corps contract. 229. \n\nEnumerates just what salaries and percentage charged to Gov- \nernment. 229, 230. \n\nBeen informed by Washington that all salaries are subject to \napproval in Washington. 231. \n\nDispute at Fisher Co. as to costs and work done by Dayton- \nWright Airplane Co. for them on 400 J-l planes. 232. \n\nFisher Co. has a cost system in operation, but it has not produced \naccurate and reliable results. 233. \n\nFisher Co. claims a percentage of profits on parts made for Day- \nton-Wright. 235. \n\nDayton-Wright also claim a percentage of profit on parts made \nfor Fisher Co. 235. \n\nBogy in Fisher Body Co. for J-l Standard planes is $4,130. \n237. \n\nEoughly estimate cost of manufacture to be about $3,400 or \n$3,500. 237. \n\n\n\n174 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nCapt. Hall B. Holmes \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nFisher Body Co. get 15 per cent, or an equivalent amount of the \n\nsum of $4,130 fixed as the bogy cost for the Standard J plane. \n\n238. \nIn addition, it gets 25 per cent of saving effected. 238. \nFisher Body Co. supplied Dayton- Wright Co. with cowling on \n\nthe basis of cost plus 15 per cent, and that cost to Dayton- \nWright Co. went into its cost which Government was to pay. \n\n241. \nAllowed as part of cost by special ruling issued by the Rulings \n\nBoard in Washington. 241. \nEnumerates contracts Fisher Body Corporation has with the \n\nGovernment. 251, 252. \nWhen Fisher Body Co. submits vouchers for profits, they do not \n\nshow how much is due the Government on all advances and \n\nwhat should be retained to meet those advances. 257. \nSheet, dated July 6, 1918, giving a summary of the nature of \n\nexpenditures on 400 J-l planes marked " Holmes Exhibit 1, \n\nJuly 16, 1918." 258. \nLetter sent to Washington relative to salaries of officials at \n\nFisher plant. 267. \nPayment of executive salaries began with October 1, 1917. 269. \nDown to July 6, 1918, payments made to Packard Co. amounted \n\nto $7,437,861. 274. \nPayments per engine accepted amounted to $4,302. 276. \nPayments to Lincoln Motor Co. down to July 6, 1918, amounted \n\nto $5,711,204. 276. \nPayments per engine accepted amounted to $8,855. 276. \nCase of Ford Co. total payments down to July 6, 1918, amounted \n\nto $1,325,043. 276. \nPayments per engine amounted to $19,486. 277. \nTotal payment to Cadillac Co. down to July 6, 1918, amounted \n\nto $1,056,696. 277. \nPayment per engine accepted, $16,257. \nTotal payment to Buick Co. down to July 6, 1918, amounted to \n\n$416,669. 277. \nPayments per engine accepted, $4,190. 277. \nNumber of engines delivered takes no account of the application \n\nof cost that is included in payment to contractor. 279. \n\' Statement of " Estimated cost of Liberty motor, exclusive of \n\nprofit and bonus, March 22, 1918," made up by Lieut. Purdy. \n\n281, 282. \nLieut. Purdy on staff of witness as technical man. He is familiar \n\nwith automobile construction and efficiency. 282. \nFormerly with General Motors Corporation as a planning- \n\ndepartment man in connection with time studies, planning, \n\nproduction, and statistical plant accounting. 282. \nEstimated cost of Liberty motor, exclusive of profit and bonus, \n\nis $3,200. 284. \nFred J. Fisher (Detroit, Mich., July 17, 1918; Book 11). \n\nBeen connected with Fisher Body Corporation for 10 years. 290. \nPresident and manager. 290. \n\nSix brothers of Fisher family identified with company. 290. \nFive Mendelsohns in the organization. 291. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 175 \n\nFred J. Fisher \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nConcern engaged in building bodies for automobile trade at time \nwe entered the war. 291. \n\nAt time we entered the war had all the plants but the two taken \non since ; built one and took second plant on lease. 291. \n\nThe new plant is on an 11-acre site, covering practically the en- \ntire ground, and was completed in 48 days after work started. \n292. \n\nGovernment advanced money to build the building. 293. \n\nMr. Waldon first brought to his attention the idea of building \nairplanes for Government. 293. \n\nFirst contract was for 400 Standard J planes, dated about Au- \ngust 1. 299. \n\nSet-price contract of $6,500 for each training plane. 300. \n\nPrice was arrived at at meeting in Washington with Mr. Mingle, \nof Standard Aircraft Co., Mr. Deeds, Mr. Waldon, Mr. Tal- \nbott, Mr. Montgomery, Mr. Mendelsohn, and himself. 300. \n\nPrice was arrived at through figures mentioned by Mingle more \nthan anybody else. 301. \n\nContract was subsequently canceled. 301. \n\nNew contract, dated November 6, embraced 400 training planes \n(Standard J-l planes), 3,000 De Haviland 9\'s, and 1,000 \nfuselages complete for DH 9\'s and 1,500 sets of all fabricated \nparts. 303. \n\nNew contract was on cost-plus bais. 304. \n\nAt a meeting in Dayton, Ohio, about January 18 or 20, Maj. \nHall, Col. Vincent, the two Talbotts, Mr. \'Deeds, and Mr. \nSimpson being present, it was decided to be the policy to have \nFisher Body Corporation build a small lot of De Haviland 4\'s \ninstead of 9\'s, until 9 was properly designed and all changes \nincorporated to take new Liberty motor. 311, 312. \n\nNo change made in contract, but it was understood he would \nproceed on the DH 4\'s in same way contract provided for 9\'s. \n312. \n\nLetter from War Department relative to changing bogey price \non Standard J-l planes. 314. \n\nMr. Fisher\'s reply. 315. \n\nMade statement that if Government paid them 15 per cent (the \nFisher people) and the others 12^ per cent, their planes would \ncost less than the rest of them. 321. \n\n" We make our drawings all over. We work from nobody\'s \ndrawings." \n\nProduction retarded on first contract by failure to furnish him \ndrawings. 330. \n\nWas delayed getting into production through failure of con- \ntractor to deliver metal parts. 333. \n\nContracted for all-steel fitting for the entire plane. 333. \n\nMr. Waldon and Mr. Deeds told him Cash Eegister Co. was a \nwonderful organization and that they would be in a position \nto make these metal fittings very much better and quicker \nthan he would. 334. \n\nMr. Deeds and Mr. Waldon requested him to place contract for \nfittings with Dayton- Wright Co. 334. \n130687\xe2\x80\x9419 12 \n\n\n\n176 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nFeed J. Fisher \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nDayton- Wright had given Cash Register Co. contract to furnish \nfittings, and they thought it best to have fittings furnished \nthrough Dayton-Wright Co. He had no control of the fit- \ntings situation with the Cash Register Co. 335. \n\n" In all our early negotiations the Talbotts were always in on \nevery conference, practically, that we had in Washington \nwith Montgomery and Deeds." 344. \n\nReally inability to get fittings that delayed completion of con- \ntract for 400 Standard J planes. 350. \n\nMade contract with Dayton Metal Products Co. for turnbuckles. \n351. \n\nThe matter of giving contract to Dayton Metal Products Co. \nfirst suggested at conference in Washington with Talbotts, \nand later, when on inspection of plants connected with Day- \nton-Wright Co., accompanied by Mr. Talbott, Mr. Kettering, \nand Mr. Deeds. 356, 357. \n\nThe Fisher Body Corporation was to furnish certain materials \nto Day ton- Wright Airplane Co. 358. \n\nTerms were not discussed. 359. \n\nGovernment\'s man decided on what basis they were to build \nthese supplies. 359. \n\nThe amount of profit is still open. 362. \n\nWent to Cash Register Co. and took out the unfinished parts \nthey had on hand, in order to complete planes. 364. \n\nFile of correspondence between Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. \nand Fisher Body Co. with respect to these matters. 366-374. \n\nReport of meeting held at Dayton, July 8, relative to changes \nto be made in airplanes. 388, 392. \n\nOnly a few metal fittings for the DH 4\'s that can be used on \nDH 9\'s. 396. \n\nTold bv Mr. Deeds he was to wait and get drawings from \nDayton- Wright Airplane Co. 397. \n\nHad absolutely no work. 399. \n\nHad to let all help go when training plane contract was com- \npleted because could not build the De Haviland 4\'s. 402. \n\nEnglish Government said they wanted to make a contract with \nFisher Co., but he said no, to make a contract with the Ameri- \ncan Government. 412. \n\nOnly change in the DH 4 and DH 9 was in the cockpit and tak- \ning the gasoline tank and moving it forward or backward. \n415. \n\nWere questioning Mr. Deeds and Mr. Montgomery about the 9. \n416. \n\nKept. Messrs. Deeds and Montgomery informed that they were \nnot able to proceed with the DH 9. 417. \n\nStarted to tool up for production of De Haviland 4 in January, \n418. \n\nHave about 7,000 people on pay roll right along. 419. \n\nPlant was practically idle. 419. \n\nPlant was idle from some time in April, when first contract was \ncompleted, until within the last five of six weeks. 420. \n\n\n\n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 177 \n\nFred J. Fisher \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nHad an order, but it was a question of changes on parts and \nthings of that sort. 420. \n\nQ. " Is it not better to have manufacturers getting out \nplanes, even though some of the parts were obsoleted, than to \nhave no planes at all ? " \xe2\x80\x94 A. " That is the way we looked at it." \nQ. " Why did you not do it? " \xe2\x80\x94 A. " We were not permit- \nted to do it." 421. \n\n" They sent a De Haviland 4-plane up here from Dayton about \nsix weeks ago that was supposed to be an up-to-date plane, \nwith everything on it, but it was not, but a long ways from \nit." 428. \n\nDid not think it right to ship those planes across to the front in \nthat condition. 430. \n\nDid not feel like sending planes over that had light connecting \nrods. 431. \n\nKnew that planes going from Dayton-Wright were to a con- \nsiderable extent in an unsatisfactory condition. 433. \n\nDid not give Mr. Deeds or Mr. Waldron, or anyone else any \nprogram for the De Haviland 4\'s. 436. \n\nNever told Col. Deeds or Gen. Squier, Col. Waldon, Col. Mont- \ngomery, or anyone connected with the Government that he \nwould have 2,000 planes, or 1,500 planes delivered by the end \nof July, 1918, that is, De Haviland 4\'s. 437. \n\nUnder date of November 5, 1917, sent telegram to Col. Deeds ad- \nvising him that he was unable to get any information, draw- \nings, or specifications which would allow him to proceed with \nprogram mapped by board. 439. \n\nEeceived reply next day stating two DH engineers on way and \nthat some DH drawings had been forwarded on Saturday. \n440. \n\nNever saw the DH engineers referred to. 440. \n\nThey were making promises which they did not have means of \ncarrying out. 442. \nCharles T. Fisher (Detroit, Mich., July 17, 1918; Book 11). \n\nVice president of Fisher Body Corporation. 443. \n\nProduction manager. 443. \n\nWent into production on DH 4\'s as they could, according to the \nway they got information. 443. \n\nDates will be shown in diary. 444. \n\nThought they were going to ship 250 planes in July. Will \nprobably ship 25. 447, 448. \n\nIt was up to the Signal Corps to come in and pass on a plane \nand say, "Now, that is all right. Go ahead with it." 461. \n\nTakes four or five months from the time you get your informa- \ntion to produce the tools and produce complete planes. 465. \n\nIf we had gotten the information when we were through with \nthe training-plane drawings, and the engineering end was \nthrough with them, and had turned the engineering on battle \nplanes, and they had let us go right on, there would not have \nbeen any intermission between the production of training \nplanes and the battle planes." 468. \n\n\n\n178 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nE. Glexx Simpson (Detroit, Mich., July IT, 1918; Book 11). \n\nBeen connected with the Fisher Body Corporation about six \nyears. 472. \n\nNow chief engineer, airplane division. 472. \n\nHad never had any experience with airplane construction. 473. \n\nNo one connected with Fisher Body Corporation had had any ex- \nperience with airplane construction in the beginning. 473. \n\nGot an aeronautical engineer soon after they started. 473. \n\nName of engineer referred to is Verbile, and he was with the \nCurtiss people. 473. \n\nMr. Yerbile now in France, working under Mr. Besherow for \nthe Government, supposed to be the best aeronautical designer \nin the world. 474. \n\nFirst undertook to make De Haviland 4\'s about January 23. 475. \n\nHas not got complete drawings yet. 475. \n\nSimply running a shop proposition now. Put up a sample ship \nin shop and then follow that up with drawings. 478. \n\nExplains why they have not kept up with Day ton- Wright people \nin production. 479, 480. \n\nHad trouble on installation of bomb gear. 482. \n\nHad to change all ship in production because of later informa- \ntion as to bomb gear. 482. \n\nLack of information prevented them from going ahead with con- \nstruction of De Haviland 9\'s prior to January 23, when they \nwere told to switch to the 4\'s. Information was not in this \ncountry at that time. 485. \n\nNew bomb drop was received from Lieut. McCardis, of produc- \ntion engineering end at Washington. Drawings were dated \nMay 7, but they did not receive final changes until Lieut. \nMcCardis came on July 2. 490. \n\nUp to that time had been working on an entirely different in- \nstallation. 490. \n\nLieut. McCardis said they were all wrong and out of date and \nfurnished the new drawings. 490. \nLouis Mendelsohn (Detroit, Mich., July 17, 1918; Book 11). \n\nTreasurer of Fisher Body Corporation. 492. \n\nHeld that office nine and one-half years. 492. \n\nCapital of corporation is $5,000,000 of preferred stock and \n$20,000,000 of no par value stock. 492. \n\nPresent capitalization took place a year ago, when company was \nrefinanced and all small companies amalgamated. 492. \n\nGovernment advanced them $2,000,000 for specific purposes; \n$1,200,000 for units 2, 3, and 4 ; $800,000 to pay back the money \nthey had expended on unit 1. 493. \n\nGovernment really had title to this property. 494. \n\nPlants Nos. 10, 14, 17, and 18 are used in making planes for the \nGovernment. 495. \n\nPlant No. 10 is a new plant, a reinforced concrete building, \none-third of it being used for Government work. 495, 496. \n\nNo. 14 is old plant built about 25 or 30 years ago. 496. \n\nNo. 17 is a new plant used entirely for Government work, and \nleased from a man bv the name of Shiffman. 496. \n\n\n\nABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 179 \n\nLouis Mendelsohn \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nPlant 18 consists of units 1, 2, 3, 4. Units 2, 3, 4 cost between \n$1,000,000 and $1,200,000. Unit 1 cost a good deal more be- \ncause of power plant, water switch, etc. 497. \nBalance sheets of Fisher Body Corporation as of April 30, 1917, \nand 1918, were filed and marked "L, Mendelsohn Exhibits \nNos. 1 and 2, July 17, 1918." 500. \nTotal cost of plant 18 about $1,760,000. 505. \nPages in volume mixed here and testimony seems to be that of \n\nMr. Macauley, of the Packard Co., 509-512. \nUnderstood Mr. Vincent had authority to deal with experi- \nmental payments relating to a period during which he was \nconnected with the Packard Co. 511. \nMr. Vincent suspended from the Packard connection. 511. \nHis salary continued until August 10, the date of his resignation. \n\n511. \nSomebody at Washington approved Mr. Vincent\'s action in al- \nlowing these amounts. 511. \nAaron Mendelsohn (Detroit, Mich., July 17, 1918; Book 11). \nSecretary to Fisher Body Corporation. 513. \nStatement of Fisher Body Corporation, Aeroplane Division, \ninvestment in fixed assets, material, and labor, May 31, 1918. \n515-521. \nNet amount expended by Fisher Body Corporation in its air- \nplane division down to May 31, 1918, totaled sum of $2,443,- \n555.46. 524. \nPrivate Leon S. Wescoat (Detroit, Mich., July 17, 1918; Book 11). \nBeen engaged as plant accountant since April 25. 528. \nCame there in subordinate capacity. 528. \nPrior to that for one year was general manager of Horn & \n\nHardant Manufacturing Co. 528. \nPrior to that was appraiser of the Hoffman Co. 528. \nPrior to that was chief accountant of Felix Isman (Inc.) 529. \nGovernment has paid Fisher Body Co. on account of contracts, \n\nseparate from advances, approximately $3,200,000. 529. \nEstimates cost of Standard J plane at $3,400. 531. \nExecutive salaries allowed from 1st of October. 533. \nApparently dealt fairly with Government in presenting requests \n\nonly for amounts to which they were entitled. 534. \nVery clean record with respect to their vouchering. 534. \nHas not observed any intentional delay of production. 536. \nFishers and Mendelsohns impress him as being thoroughly loyal. \n\n537. \nGovernment has paid approximately $2,000,000 on account of \n\nDe Haviland 4s and has not got a plane yet. 539. \nA great deal of spruce rejected after it has been accepted as a \' \n\npart of the cost. 541. Approximately 60 per cent. 542. \nUnderstands there is an agreement in existence with the under- \nwriters of the present Fisher Body Co.\'s stock, by which the \nexecutive salaries shall not be increased during the period of \nunderwriting. 547. \nH. H. Scott (Detroit, Mich., July 17, 1918; Book 11). \nAuditor for Fisher Body Corporation. 550. \n\n\n\n180 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nH. H. Scott \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nExplains statement referred to in testimony of Aaron Mendel- \nsohn. 551. \n\nHas no completed costs on the Standard J-l planes. 563. \n\nHas kept a system of cost control in plant. 564. \n\nCharts showing depreciation to May 31 marked " Scott \xe2\x80\x94 \n" Exhibit 1, July 17, 1918." 567. \n" Exhibit 2, July 17, 1918." 567. \n" Exhibit 3, July 17, 1918." 567. \n"Exhibit 4, July 17, 1918." 568. \n" Exhibit 5, July 17, 1918." 568. \n\nStatement of vouchers submitted and amounts paid by the Gov- \nernment marked " Scott Exhibit 6, July 17, 1918." 568. \n\nShows $3,023,449.94 paid by Government and $638,431.10, in- \ncluding $75,000 for special tools, not paid. 568. \nAjlvan Macauley (Detroit, Mich., July 18, 1918; Book 11). \n\nPresident of the Packard Motor Car Co. 569. \n\nHas held that position for a little over two years. 569. \n\nFor six years was general manager and part of that time vice \npresident. 569. \n\nPrior to that general manager of Burroughs Adding Machine \nCo. 569. \n\nMakes statement in relation to what is known as the Liberty \nmotor. 570. \n\nAbout three years ago last November Packard Co. decided defi- \nnitely to go extensively into the development of air motors. \n570. \n\nDesigned approximately ten or a dozen motors and spent close \nto $400,000 in development work up to the time of the so-called \nLiberty production. 570. \n\nHad one of the Mercedes motors imported by Ralph De Palma. \n575. \n\nThoroughly familiar with the Mercedes as they knew very thor- \noughly every motor of prominence in the world. 575. \n\nHad used Delco ignition system in their regular product for \nnumber of years, having also used the magneto, and the Delco \nhad given much more satisfactory results. 576. \n\nSubstituted magneto for Delco ignition on experimental motor \non advice of such aeronautical authorities as our Government \nhad and of visitors from Europe familiar with aeronautical \nmatter. 578. \n\nWas not practicable, taking engine as it stood, to use magnetos \nunless you used two. 580. \n\nWould have required a good many changes in design to drive \nfour. 579. \n\nMotor 299 used by De Palma in making world\'s record. 588. \n\nMotor 905 used by William Rader in making world\'s record. \n581. \n\nThe 905 motor was seen by very many officers when exhibited at \nthe aeronautical show "in New York City in January, 1917. \n582. \n\nPamphlet regarding motor published at time was marked Ma- \ncauley Exhibit 1, July 18, 1918. 582. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIKCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 181 \n\nAlvan Macatjley \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\n905 motor, model 2, developed 267 horsepower at about 2,500 \nrevolutions per minute. 587. \n\n267 horsepower was obtained in July, 1917. 588. \n\nBy latter part of May, 1917, had so far accomplished in develop- \nment of their motor that at a Sunday morning conference on \nMay 27, 1917, it was decided that Mr. Vincent should go im- \nmediately to Washington with their prints, drawings, and \nphotographs and lay them before Government officials, and \nstate plan they had for manufacturing them in large quanti- \nties, etc. 588. \n\nMr. Vincent arrived in Washington May 28. Met Mr. Deeds and \nMr. Waldon, and others. 589. \n\nMr. Vincent told him over telephone on Monday or Tuesday \nauthorities in Washington were highly pleased with their ten- \nder of their development and facilities ; that they were gladly \naccepted and would be made the best possible use of. 599. \n\nWithin a few days Mr. Vincent told him it was considered by \nGovernment authorities to be highly desirable to increase \nhorsepower of motor, as designed by Packard Co., and get \nmore horsepower with lighter weight per horsepower. 589. \n\nHeard nothing more from him for several days. He finally told \nhim (witness) that he had made some sketches in conjunction \nwith Mr. E. J. Hall enlarging the motor and improving it \nin some respects. 590. \n\nAlso told him Packard Co. should sink their identity with motor \nbecause Congress would not be interested in appropriating \nhundreds of millions of dollars to build Packard motors, and \nthis was assented to. 590. \n\nMr. Vincent came back to Detroit with sketches made at Wash- \nington and asked them to build wooden model of motor, which \nwas done in three days. 591. \n\nAsked to build a full-size operative model, which was complied \nwith, and shipped it to Washington on the second, arriving \nthe third, and set it up in the Bureau of Standards on July 4. \n591. \n\nThis was an 8 cylinder engine. 591. \n\nEight-cylinder project abandoned within about 90 days. 592. \n\nHad about two months\' start on making tools for the 8 when \n\nthey were called off and told to make the 12. 592. \nCorrespondence of company relating to development of motor \nand Mr. Waldon\'s connections with Packard Motor Car Co. \n594-611. \nContract for Liberty 12\'s let to Packard Co. under date of \n\nSeptember 4, 1917, calling for 6,000 motors. 612. \nContract schedule called for 50 in November, 200 in December, \n500 in January, 800 in February, 1,000 in March, 1,200 in \nApril, 1,200 in May, and 1,050 in June. 612. \nOne motor shipped in November, 25 ready for shipment in De- \ncember, 43 in January, 96 in February, 153 in March, 314 in \nApril, 439 in May, 599 in June, and July to date 377. 612, \n613. \nExpect to finish 6,000 engines in November. 613. \n\n\n\n182 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nAlvan Macauley \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nSummary of statements made in letter to Mr. Frierson, Assistant \nAttorney General, under date of May 22, 1918, relative to \nobstacles encountered in bringing the Liberty motor up to \npoint of production. 614. \n\nDelay was occasioned by a great many things, a part of it by \nlack of drawings. 619. \n\nContract was made on September 4, 1917, before Government \nhad decided definitely just what it was to have made. 620. \n\nTrouble in Washington was lack of knowledge and lack of or- \nganization. 623. \n\nDelayed a good deal by lack of organization in Signal Corps. \n625. \n\nLack of legal authority to provide an organization to do any- \nthing that should be done in a business way in this matter. \n627. \n\nHave had as high as 162 Government men in plant at various \ntimes. 631. \n\nDelco equipment complete cost $117.45. 634. \n\nA total of $5,000,000 advanced to Packard Co. up to date\xe2\x80\x94 July \n18, 1918. 639. \n\nTotal of unpaid advances about a million dollars. 639. \n\nIn order to get motors ahead, had to run up an inventory of \n$23,000,000. 639. \n\nRefers to publication known as "Packard Inner Circle," issue \nof November 22, 1917, and statement therein relative to the \namount of motors assembled for Twin-Six motor carriages as \none reason for this tremendous inventory. 637, 640. \n\nBorrowed two and a half million dollars from Government in \nconnection with Liberty motor contract. 641. \n\nSomething over a million dollars still due on advances. 642. \n\nOriginal bogey cost of $6,087 had been arrived at when he \nreached Washington to negotiate contract. 643. \n\nCol. Montgomery, Col. Deeds, and he does not know who else, \narrived at this figure. 643. \n\nMatter of bogey cost had all been talked over with Lelands (by \nCol. Montgomery and Col. Deeds) before he got to Washing- \nton. 648. \n\nBogey cost was reduced to $5,000 by contract dated December \n12, 1917. 649. \n\nThere was also a reduction of the rate of fixed profit in this \ncontract. 649. \n\nCol. Montgomery and Mr. Harris came to Detroit and told him \nthat from later information they had reason to believe price \nestablished was too high ; that they had seen all the other con- \ntractors and that the other contractors had agreed to this re- \nduction, and so he agreed to it. 649. \n\nAn important change in engine in process now. 653. \n\nCapital of Packard Motor Car Co. approximated $20,000,000. \n654. \n\nHas an outstanding issue of debenture notes amounting to $7,- \n500,000. 654. \n\nOn June 1, 1918, company had issued common stock of $11,815,- \n930 and preferred stock of $8,000,000 ; had no bonded indebted- \nness, but had $7,500,000 in debenture notes at 5 per cent. 654. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 183 \n\nAlvan Macatjley \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nTwo million five hundred thousand dollars was an increase in \nthe issue of debenture notes issued in November, 1917, and \ndelivered to the Signal Corps as security for an advance. 655. \n\nEleven million eight hundred and eight thousand four and four \ndollars and forty-seven cents devoted to aircraft motor manu- \nfacture by Packard Co. 656. \n\nUnder date of January 29, 1918, had further advance of $2,- \n500,000, making total of $5,000,000 referred to previously. 662. \n\nAt the end of contract a committee of three shall value the heat- \ntreating building, having in mind its value to the Packard \nMotor Car Co. for its own business, and the difference between \nthat and the cost of it shall be treated as depreciation. 668. \n\nThe Government buys the equipment; it buys the test field and \neverything on it. 669. \n\nHis salary increased from $10,000 to $50,000. 672, \n\nSure he could have produced the 150-horsepower Hispano-Suiza \nengine. 671. \n\nCould probablv have produced it a little quicker than the Lib- \nerty. 671. \n\nWent ahead on experimental work totaling $219,159.10 on verbal \norders of Lieut. Col. Vincent. 691. \n\nThinks he discussed matter of allowance of this amount with \nMr. Vincent, 698. \n\nJudge Hughes stated that of the invoices, of which Mr. Rob- \ninson produced a list, which total $219,159.10, there appear to \nbe only two that antedate August 11, 1917, one of $2,500 for \n8-cylinder wood model and another for $25,000 for an 8- \ncylinder engine, making a total of $27,500. Bequests explana- \ntion as to how, prior to the other invoices, the amount of \n$101,500 was obtained from the Government, 703. \n\nUnderstood Mr. Vincent was passing these payments on some- \nbody\'s authority at Washington. 707. \nOrmund E. Hunt (Packard Motor Car Co., Detroit, Mich., July 18, \n1918; Book 12). \n\nChief engineer of the Packard Co. 1. \n\nLiberty motor: why 8-cylinder was selected as the type. 2. \n\nRelates reasons for adopting the magneto ignition for Model \nNo. 2, or 905 engine. 1. \n\nReasons for making the change to Delco. 5. \n\nFurther considerations in favor of the Delco. 6. \n\nMost of the magnetos had been imported from Germany, or \nmade in this country by German workmen under German pat- \nents. 7. \n\nAlso states that Packard, without any outside influence, would \nhave eventually used the Delco. 8. \n\nDate of discovery of the unfitness of the crank shaft and the \nconnecting rods for the 12-cylinder motor. 9. \n\nAsked for information about vouchers for $101,500 or total \namount of $219,000. 12, \n\nMakes general statement concerning these vouchers. 11. \n\nNot Packard experimental work, but developing of the Liberty \nmotor. 17. \n\n\n\n184 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nOrmund E. Hunt \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nAccumulated figures on overhead at the time order was closed \nwould indicate 110 per cent. 19. \n\nAsked how they could make such an arrangement with Mr. Vin- \ncent who was at that time in the employ of the Packard \nCo. 19. \n\nDid not care whether Mr. Vincent could give an order for the \nGovernment or not, work had to be done, trusted some one \nwould be square enough to pay them for it afterwards. 21. \n\nTalked with Col. Deeds over telephone. 21. \n\nVincent left the Packard Co. on May 27, but they paid his \nsalary until August 10. 23. \n\nDid they get this money ultimately through Mr. Vincent ex- \nclusively, or whether through Col. Deeds, and how. 23. \nGeorge Albree (Detroit, Mich., July 18, 1918; Book 12). \n\nResides Concord, Mass. 26. \n\nPresident of the Albree-Pidgeon Co. 26. \n\nInterested in the monoplanes which were ordered by the Gov- \nernment, one of which was delivered at Mineola field, and \nthe other branch of the business, the glue part of it. 27. \n\nHands over copy of concise statement of their investigations \nmade under suggestion of Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. \ndwell, marked "Albree Exhibit No. 1, July 18, 1918." 27. \n\nRelates experiences in dealing with the Government. 28-34. \n(All these experiences connected with Col. Deeds.) \n\nMr. Albree immediately sends statement to Mr. Crowell asking \nas one of four things that they would under no circumstances \nbe asked to have further dealings or conferences with Col. \nDeeds. 34. \n\nMr. Crowell assented to these propositions, and also refers to \nthe " automobile gang." 35. \n\nConsiders Col. Deeds one of the brainiest men he had ever done \nbusiness with; so it was no fault of his lack of intelligence \nthat things were not accomplished. 36. \n\nIs asked to meet officers of Advisory Committee on Aeronautics, \nbut none of them appear. 37. \n\nTheir glue has been a matter of investigation by the Government \nfor one year, and the investigation is not concluded yet. 37. \n\nHave had 20 years\' practical use of this glue. 37. \n\nCan produce letter over signature of Dr. Stratton, of the Advi- \nsory Council, in which he states the Bureau of Standards re- \nports it the best glue ever tested for the Signal Corps. 38. \n\nCol. Deeds\'s connection with the glue matter. 40. \n\nStates what he knows about Mr. Klemin, instructor in the Mas- \nsachusetts Institute of Technology. 41. \n\nMr. Klemin in charge of the tests of the monoplane. 46. \n\nMr. Klemin\'s approval of the plane. 47. \n\nThought Klemin displayed hostility by placing Mulloy as super- \nvisor of the work at the Pigeon factory. 48. \n\nMulloy delayed progress in the construction of the machines. \n49. \n\nOne plane delivered in September, and the other in November to \nLangley Field. 50. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 185 \n\nGeorge Albree \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nPilot states it to be the fastest machine he had ever flown in \n\nhis life, and perfectly safe. 52. \nCol. Clark, in writing, reports that it is unsafe. 52. \nFinally, in February, get the data upon which this report is \n\nbased. 52. \nCol. Clark states they tried to hold up the Government on the \n\nprice of the glue. 53. \nTest of the machine made at McCook field, or rather of the glue \n\nin connection with the machine. 54. \nExplains sand test, and how his two machines were destroyed. \n\n55. \nTest unfair. 59. \nCol. Clark tells him the machines will be accepted, and paid for, \n\nand junked. 56. \nCol. Clark now gives three other reasons for not accepting the \n\nmachine for final flight, none of which are true. 57. \nMr. Klemin in charge of the sand test. 60. \n\nRepeats, for purpose of record, how he happened to come to De- \ntroit. 60. \nKlemin\'s connection with the sand test may be the explanation \n\nof the failure of the machine. 62. \nFrederick R. Robinson, (Detroit, Mich., July 18, 1918; Book 12). \nConnected with the Packard Co. eight years, always in connec- \ntion with accounting. 64. \nGives their system of arriving at the cost of the Liberty motor. \n\n64. \nBogey cost in contract, $6,087. 67. \nActual cost, $3,960.43. 68. \nCost, of course, on 6,000 engines would be reduced more than on \n\n600 engines. 71. \nPercentage of 220 on overhead, covering a number of years back. \n\n74. \nProduces ledger sheet showing estimated depreciation for fiscal \n\nyear ending August 13, 1918. 77. \nGoes through process of arriving at different depreciation values \n\nto be credited to each department. 77-78. \nCorrects himself in stating that he had included a certain amount \n\nfor depreciation in an additional overhead charge of 50.4 per \n\ncent. 80. \nAsked to produce sheet by which he calculated this additional \n\n50.4 per cent overhead charge. 81. \nProduces three sheets to show the calculation of this cost. 82. \nWhat is included in the item of overhead under discussion. 84. \nDepreciation is calculated by divisions. 88. \nExplains this computation by divisions. 89. \nProduces sheet showing figures actually used, what the depre- \nciation was he took for this period of the 600 engines, and how \n\nhe got this percentage. 91. \nAllowed certain amount for depreciation under contract, and \n\nthey again make allowance for depreciation in calculating the \n\ncost. 96. \nClasses of items which come under the head of administration \n\nengineering expenses. 97. \n\n\n\n186 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nFrederick R. Robinson \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nMr. Hughes, by going through the statements of cost and add- \ning up the different items, arrives at the final cost of $3,960.43 \nper engine. 98-103. \nFiguring fixed profit under the contract, this would give them \n$3,750,000 profit on 6,000 engines, and, calculating savings \nunder bogey cost, this adds $1,500,000 in addition. 103. \nWhen they get through they will have included depreciation in \n\naddition to profit. 104. \nProduces vouchers, dated July 2, 1918, showing salaries for De- \ncember, 1917, being correct statement as they then stood, and \npaid by the Government. 106. \nShows final total of $27,694.01 in salaries charged to the Gov- \nernment for the months of August, September. October, No- \nvember, and. December. 109. \nMr. Hughes says he wishes the record to show that in reading* \nthe foregoing figures reference was had to contractor\'s voucher \nNo. 107, supplement No. 23, public voucher, July 2, 1918, \ncontract No. 1646, supporting voucher No. 6. 110. \nVouchers which have been presented to the Government covering- \ntotal overhead charges. 113. (Under contract 1646.) \nThe total for the entire contract, No. 1646, for overhead expenses \n\ndown to May 1, 1918, amounted to $872,946.63. 114. \nCertain proportions of the salaries were charged to the aircraft \n\nexpenses. 116. \nOverhead expenses of $61,791.87, included in the special item of \n$249,159.10, began with the start of the work on the 11 experi- \nmental engines, June, 1917. 118. \nNothing was included in this estimate of cost of 600 engines on \n\naccount of experimentation. 119. \nAmount paid for the 11 engines, $249,159.10. 119. \nGives statement showing how this cost was arrived at. 119. \nThis order was their own order and did not come from the \n\nGovernment. 122. \nTraveling expenses, design section at Bureau of Standards. \n$16,852.93. 122. \nOrmund E. Hunt (Book 12). \n\nThis comprised some 16 detail men, Mr. Vincent, and one other \n\nengineer. 123. \nAsked if Mr. Vincent\'s expenses are covered in this. 123. \nRefers to force of men working in Washington, which includes \nMr. Vincent. 124. \nMr. Robinson (Book 12). \n\nExplains why this is called Packard overhead expense and what \n\nit was on. 124. \nEstimate for engines is made out on date they billed the last \n\ntwo engines, January 14, 1918. 125. \nFirst engine billed at $25,000 on July 3. 126. \nThese 11 engines delivered to various points for use of Govern- \nment as specimen engines, on no order from the Government ; \njust understanding. 126. \nWhen the first engine was billed for $25,000 it was accepted and \npaid for by the Government. 127. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT 01\' AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 187 \n\nMr. RojtfiNSON \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nPaper is produced showing shipments of the 11 engines that \n\nentered into this billing comprising the $249,159.10. 128. \nAlso explains what the $104,500 was presumed to cover. 128, \n\n(See p. 12.) \nAsked why they left out three engines supposed to have been \n\nshipped in September in this estimate of $104,500. 129. \nEequest for payment was evidently not supported by invoice, \n\nand not supported by goods delivered either. 130. \nDoes not think it likely they will have any information which \n\nwill show the make-up of the voucher. 131. \nMr. Hughes reminds him this is a very important matter, getting \n$100,000 when they did not have an order and did not have a \ncontract. 132. \nMr. Hunt sent to obtain further information. 133. \nFrances Lester Jandron (Detroit, Mich., July 18, 1918; Book 12). \nAssistant secretary to the Packard Co. 134. \nAsked if he knows anything about the check for $104,500 from \n\nthe Government, as it bears his name. 134. \nUnderstands the check came through the Council of National \n\nDefense. 135. \nAs the Council of National Defense was hardly a disbursing \nagency, how could they obtain the check through them? 135. \nE. A. Deeds and R. L. Montgomery. 135. \nLieut. Walter D. Williams (Detroit, Mich., July 18, 1918 ; Book 12) . \nPlant accountant, officer in charge of the Packard plant. 137. \nEverything to do with contract 1646, but none of the others. 137. \nNothing to do with vouchers paid by the Government aggregat- \ning $249,000. 138. \nStates no overhead or cost charges including overhead in the \nvouchers submitted called K-9199 of $249,159.10 and the \nvouchers for 1646. 139. \nWere told to leave the matter of the K-9199 account alone. 141. \nSalary distribution begins with August, and the contract was \n\nmade in September; asked to explain. 143. \nAllowances for depreciation have been paid by the Government \n\non an estimated basis. 144. \nThis estimate fixed on the basis of 12 per cent of productive \n\nlabor. 145. \nNot according to basis fixed by Rulings Board. 145. \nTook the matter up with Capt. Brooks\'s department in Wash- \nington, and it was agreed to. 146. \nThe scrap problem. 148. \nEstimate made of the cost of making Liberty motors in March, \n\nbut he was not consulted about it. 149. \nMen sent down by the Government. Used the figures in a secre- \ntive way. Meeting in his office one night at which cost was \narrived at, and said nothing to him about it. 149. \nUnderstood cost was around $3,200 after adding 250 per cent \n\noverhead. 150. \nIn the estimate of cost they have included depreciation, and have \n\nalso increased their original estimate of overhead cost. 151. \nIn matter in the nature of holding up the work reported to Mr. \nBlack, who was in the Dime Savings Bank. 154. \n\n\n\n188 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nJohn Randolph Lee (Ford Motor Co., Detroit, Mich., July 18, 1918; \n\nBook 12). \nAssistant to Mr. Wills in the manufacturing department. 159. \nHas had charge of the work being done for the Government by \n\nthe Ford Motor Co. under Mr. Willis. 159. \nFord Motor Co. has two contracts with the Signal Corps, one for \n\nthe Liberty engine cylinder forgings No. 2899, dated January \n\n30, 1918, and one for 5,000 standardized 12-cylinder engines, \n\nNo. 2129, dated November 21, 1917. 159. \nCommencing about September, 1917, they made some prelimi- \nnary experiments under direction of Col. Deeds. 160. \nStarted actual work in anticipation of receiving a contract in \n\nlatter part of September in making general layout of the \n\nplant for the work. 160. \nAsked why, in view of the above, first deliveries were not made \n\nuntil April. 161. \nHad no knowledge which would have enabled them to state what \n\ntime they could have put any foreign engines into produc- \ntion. 162. \nTheir agreement was to build a motor as per prints and speci- \nfications, presumably did not anticipate changes in design. \n\n163. \nCould not explain why contract was not made until November, \n\nwhen they had all details arranged in September. 163. \nCol. Deeds conducted negotiations on behalf of the Government ; \n\nMr. Wills, Mr. Ford, and Mr. Mayo, on behalf of the com- \npany. 163, 161. \nDelay in execution of contract did not retard production. 164. \nHas to look up in the books the time they began to date their \n\ncosts. 164. \nDelivered first Liberty motor under this contract on the 14th of \n\nJune. 164. \nDelivered up to the present time. 123. 165. \nExpect to have 300 this month prepared for the final test. 165. \nGives rate of production for August, September, October, and \n\nNovember. 166. \nThis shows that under the new contract they will be prepared \n\nto produce at the rate of 1,500 a month. 167. \nStates difficulties which arose in the course of production, which \n\ndelayed things. 168. \nTheir orders entirely for the 12-cylinder engine. 170. \nRefers delay by strengthening of connecting rods to Mr. Wills, \n\n170. \nLubricating system caused a delay of four or five weeks. 170. \nOther changes causing delay. 170. \n\nWill produce memorandum showing the causes of delay. 170. \nAdds that they have made a comparative study of the changes \n\ninvolved, and the changes meted out to them, as compared \n\nwith their regular work. 171. \nThe designing, the tool designing, and drafting room is under \n\ncharge of Mr. Carl Emde. 174. \nHas heard a great deal at different times that was antagonistic \n\nto the patriotic . spirit on the outside, with regard to Mr. \n\nEmde\'s loyalty. 174. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 189 \n\nJohn Randolph Lee \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nTells what has been repeated to him, Mr. Lee. 175. \n\nWas not removed from this position in which he had power to \nslow up or handicap the first stages of the work. 176. \n\nHeld this position for six or seven months. 176. \n\nWere not sure whether he was or was not pro-German, there- \nfore Mr. Lee said he should have been removed right at the \nstart. 178. \n\nOthers in the shop disloyal who were associatd with Mr. Emde. \n178. \n\nMr. Ford\'s pleasure that Mr. Emde should remain. 178. \n\nRead statement made by Mr. Ford. 179. \n\nAt this meeting Mr. Clemett read reports from the various mem- \nbers of the drafting department who felt that the department \nwas practically a pro-German institution. 180. \n\nRelates several instances of things that have come up showing \ndisloyalty somewhere. 181. \n\nThinks the policy of giving a man a fair chance in normal \ntimes not a wise policy in war times. 182. \n\nTaking things more into " their own hands " and not consult- \ning Sir. Ford so freely. 183. \nC. Haeold Wills (July 18, 1918; Book 12). \n\nFactory manager of the Ford Motor Co. 184. \n\nHas had charge of the production of the Liberty motor since the \nbeginning of the work. 184. \n\nWork of preparation begun in September, 1917, but contract \nnot signed until November. 184. \n\nAfter 10 days\' work on 8-cylinder motors, word was received \nthat they were to build 12 -cylinder motors. This took about \n10 weeks to get the data together. 186. \n\nAt the end of seven weeks they were just getting the drawings \ncompleted. 187. \n\nExplains in detail what they did during those seven weeks. 187. \n\nThinks delay in signing the contract was caused by Mr. Lucking \nbringing up some legal details. 188. \n\nThinks Mr. Lucking had information from the Packard Co. \nthat the estimated cost at that time was about $6,000. 189. \n\nIf there had been no changes in the design, they would have \nreached the amount produced in July two months earlier. 191. \n\nStates what in his experience caused delays, to what extent, and \nwhat caused them. 192. \n\nStates that through red tape at Washington two or three weeks \nis always lost in making arrangements to secure priorities \nand get the transportation they needed. 192. \n\nFuel Administrator would not let the people making the crank- \nshafts have coal. 194. \n\nWhen they found they could not get the fuel they decided to \nuse oil, and the railroads would not move the oil. 194. \n\nClosed down for a week or five days on order of the Fuel Ad- \nministrator, and they did not regain their impetus for two \nweeks afterwards. 195. \n\nAsked why they released their men before communicating with \nWashington. 196. \n\nSame let up all along the line through this order. 198. \n\n\n\n190 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\n0. Harold Wills \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nNotwithstanding all these other impediments, they would have \n\nbeen able to have advanced their production a couple of \n\nmonths if there had been no changes. 199. \nDescribes a little more in detail the nature of the changes and \n\nwhat were the most important ones. 199. \nThey made a practice of not starting on the production of what \n\nwas developed, but waited until a perfected plan was de- \nveloped, and thereby saved time. 200. \nAt one time were delayed by what they believed would be a \n\nnecessary change and for which they waited. 200.. \nDid not think they could have hastened production if they had \n\nof had the designing to do themselves. 201. \nPackard Co. went to work four or five months prior to the Ford \n\nMotor Co. 203. \nNo delay because of the lubricating system. 203. \nNo delays because of radiation. 204. \nNo delays due to disloyalty in the plant. 204. \nNo noticeable indications among the workmen of a desire to \n\ndelay production. 204. \nFirst 70 motors cost about $37,000 a piece. 205. \nDoes not know what proportion of their capital is invested. 207. \nAll the work of the Liberty motors kept separate from the regu- \nlar plant. 208. \nThinks accurate statement of their investment in this work could \n\nnot be ready for 120 days. 209. \nGovernment will reimburse them from time to time, but Ford \n\nMotor Co. has up to this time financed all these Government \n\ncontracts itself entirely. 210. \nOne hundred and seventy-eight thousand dollars, first material \n\nand machinery charges, was charged against the Signal Corps \n\nin the month of November. 211. \nSalaries. 212. \n\nPackard Co. stated the bogy cost. 213. \nDid not know the occasion of the reduction of the bogy cost \n\nfrom $6,087 to $5,000. 213. \nHad nothing to do with depreciation in the plant. 213. \nStates what the contract made in January, 1918, No. 2899 was \n\nfor. 214. \nAre now making cylinders for all the Liberty engines excepting \n\nthe Nordyke-Marmon. 216. \nFurnish these forgings on a fixed price of $8.25. 216. \nFirst 50,000 the Government ordered they paid $19 for. 217. \nOnly make profit of 75 cents a cylinder. 217. \nProduces figures showing the total up to the end of August, \n\nSeptember, October, and November. 218. \nUnderstands arrangement has been made for 4,000 more. 219. \nThe price stipulated in this contract are terms the Government \n\nhanded up. Neither sought the work nor stipulated the price. \n\n220. \nTook the work at the price the Signal Corps said they had made \n\nother contracts. 220. \nPrice as reduced from the bogy cost being $5,000. 221. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 191 \n\nC. Harold Wills \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nFixed profit was made in the supplement document at $625. 221. \n\nDate of this supplemental document, May 17, 1918. 221. \n\nAt that time knew more than when they started, but now the} 7 \n\nknow less. 221. \nThe profit on the price which the Government hands them will \n\ngive them profit of $3,125,000 on 5,000 engines. 222. \nFiguring 25 per cent of the saving under the $5,000 cost will \n\nmake the profits upward of $5,000,000. 222. \nTerms with respect to the new order left entirely in the hands \n\nof the Signal. 223. \nDoes know that the company were profited in the first contract \n\nby being guided entirely by what Col. Deeds said as to the \n\ngeneral price arrangements he made with everybody else. 221. \nMaj. Downey and Mr. Fletcher have conducted the negotiations \n\nfor the new contract on the part of the Government. 221. \nMr. Ford always went ahead when he found out what they \n\nwanted and did not wait for the contract office to go through \n\nthe details. 225. \nStates how they took contract for spare parts and would not in- \nsert a bogey price. 22G. \nMr. Emde, in charge of drafting department. 229. \nDrafting department had all the designing of the Liberty motor. \n\n229. \nWas possible for anyone in the drafting department who was \n\nout of sympathy with the work of the Government to delay \n\nthe drafting work. 230. \nGreater proportion of the men in the drafting department of \n\nsimilar pro-German tendencies (50 or 60). 231. \nMr. Ford did not think this department ought to be reorganized \n\nwith different men. 231. \nIn plain English, they had a man who was in sympathy with the \n\nGerman Government in connection with the designing of the \n\nLiberty motor. 233. \nWhile there were hold-ups in the tools and they were late, they \n\nwere never able to lay it to any given reason. 234. \nReads statement Mr. Ford is reported to have made at meeting \n\non November 5, 1917. 236. \nChampion Co. at Flint, Mich., put mica in the vspark plugs to \n\nprevent contact. 237. \nNo steps taken to prosecute them. 238. \n\nMr. Wills states that they tried in other cases to have prosecu- \ntions made, but they have been turned loose. 238. \nUnited States district attorney, Mr. Kinnane, stops everything. \n\n239. \n\' Eeports case of man taken to Federal district attorney with a \n\nlot of photographs and drawings in his possession, and they had \n\nto insult the officer before they could get him to call up the \n\npolice department. 241. \nDistrict attorney refused even to take the matter up. 241. \nIs asked for a full statement of these facts in writing 242. \nThis man a great friend of Emde\'s. 247. \n\n130687\xe2\x80\x9419 13 \n\n\n\n192 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nLouis M. Tereell (Detroit, Mich., July 19, 1918; Book 12). \nAuditor of Ford Motor Co. 248. \nKefers Mr. Hughes to Mr. Leister for figures in the vouchering \n\nunder contract No. 2129 for 5,000 12-cylinder Libert}\' engines \n\nwith the Government. 248. \nHerbert L. Leister (Detroit, Mich., July 19, 1918; Book 12). \nAuditor of Ford Motor Co. 249. \nStates the Government has paid the Ford Motor Co. $1,774,000.33 \n\nup to June 17 on contract No. 2129. 249. \nWill get later statement. 250. \n\nPresents statement of the total amount of their cost to date. 250. \nNo voucher has been submitted for special tools. 252. \nPlant machinery loaned by the company to the aircraft work \n\namounts to approximately $1,000,000. 252. \nCharged depreciation that at rate of 7^ per cent per year. 253. \nThis voucher for overhead charges dated for machines in Janu- \nary. 253. \nGovernment would not allow any portion of salaries to be \n\ncharged direct. 254. \nSalaries of executives go in as items of labor \xe2\x80\x94 based on the \n\nproductive hours. 255. \nCan not keep track of the time expended by executives, so there \n\nis practically no charge. 256. \nVouchers submitted which contained amounts for executive \n\nsalaries and they have been turned down. 256. \nAs a basis of comparison with other plants, he is asked to tell \n\njust when this Avas submitted, who turned theni down, and \n\nwhat was turned down. 256. \nIs not acquainted with what has been done with respect to \n\nsalaries at other plants. 258. \nNo salaries of executives have been submitted to the finance \n\ndivision of the Signal Corps for payment : had been told \n\nthey would not pay on that basis. 258. \nExpect to submit a voucher on basis of pay rolls. 259. \nQuestions in dispute between them and the accounting officers \n\nof the Government. 260. \nGovernment allows either Packard or Lincoln $1,500 for a \n\nmachine containing a fixture on which they failed, and will \n\nonly allow the Ford Motor Co. the same amount after they \n\nhave made it successful for $700 more. 261. \nSignal Corps hands them ruling that they want them to separate \n\nthe overtime allowance, and charge that into overhead. 262. \nGovernment refuses to pay for overhauling the machinery they \n\nput into shape for doing a good job. 263. \nOther questions under dispute. 263-265. \nSignal Corps informed them they would hold up any voucher \n\nthey rendered unless it was on a meter basis. 266. \nHenry Ford (Detroit, Mich., July 19, 1918; Book 12). \n\nMr. Deeds represented the Government in the negotiations for \n\nthe contract for the 5,000 Liberty motors. 269. \nKnew the bogey price of $6,087 an engine was high. 271. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 193 \n\nHenry Ford \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nHad no separate negotiations with respect to his company which \nrelated to that amount. 271. \n\nDid not know what the occasion of the lowering this cost to \n$5,000 was. 271. \n\nNo estimate has been made up to this time by his company of \nthe cost of making the Liberty motors. 272. \n\nUnderstands there is a new contract to follow up the comple- \ntion of old one. 273. \n\nHas not had any negotiation with respect to compensation under \nthis contract. 274. \n\nIf the rate of production were only 1,500 a month it would take \nbut little over two months for the production of the 4,000. \n274. \n\nThinks the Liberty motor is a very fine motor; a very good \nmotor. 275. (Very hard to make.) \n\nNever used the Delco at all in making the Liberty engine. 275. \n\nHe thought the angle was wrong in the first place, and refused \nto make the motor that way. 276. \n\nThis he later corrects. 278. \n\nMr. \'Ford denies that he ever stated that the cylinders were set \nat a certain angle in order that the Delco ignition should be \nused. 279. \n\nNever even had that opinion. 279. \n\nMr. Ford is asked about their expected production, and states \nthere is nothing in that estimated production that furnishes \nan element of uncertainty; that they can count on a produc- \ntion after two or three months of anywhere from 1,500 to \n2,500 motors without anv reasonable expectation of difficulty. \n280. \n\nNo difficulty in getting labor; some little difficulty in getting \nneces^aiy material. 280. \n\nMr. Ford does not think that changes in design have been the \ncause of delay, because the main principle was laid down in \nthe beginning. 281. \n\nThinks there has been as much progress as could be expected. \n281. \n\nHas had no trouble with Signal Corps in obtaining decisions \nwith respect to engineering questions. 282. \n\nThinks they have made just as good time in getting modifica- \ntions on the Liberty motor as if they had put one of the \nforeign engines into production. 283. \n\nMight have saved some experimentation, but would not have had \nanything near the power. 283. \n\nAsked for his opinion from a manufacturing standpoint as to \nother side of problem ; would not have to have much experi- \nmentation, but was there any compensating feature in devel- \noping an American machine, as to saving time. 283. \n\nGives reasons for thinking so. 283. \n\nExplains why he thinks it would of even been a great mistake \nto use a foreign motor temporarily while the Liberty was \nbeing developed. 284. \n\n\n\n194 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nLieut. Chaeles E. Norlin (Ford Motor Co., Detroit, Mich., July \n19, 1918; Book 12). \n\nRank of first lieutenant, Aviation Section, Signal Reserve \nCorps. 290. \n\nCommissioned as first lieutenant on November 8, 1917. 290. \n\nAssigned to Ford Motor Co. on December 3, 1917. 290. \n\nFirst vouchers on behalf of the Ford Motor Co. on February \n22, 1918. 291. \n\nFirst vouchers were for direct labor and material, and began \nfrom the signing* of the contract. 291. \n\nHad no charge against the Government prior to November 17. \n291. \n\nWould not allow the Ford Motor Co. any part of the salaries \nof those engaged on experimental work. 292. \n\nWould not pay any of the salaries, or parts of them, rather, \nunless shown exact proof of the time spent on aircraft work. \n291. \n\nThe whole matter is still under consideration. 296. \n\nUp to and including July 8, $1,576,917.89 has been paid to \nthe Ford Motor Co. 297. \n\nFord Motor Co. has received no advances and have not sought \nany. 297. \n\nFord Motor Co. asked Government to loan $100,000 to the H. J. \nWalker Co., who supplied the Ford Motor Co. with crank \ncases, but the Government refused. Ford Motor Co. had al- \nready loaned them $275,000, themselves. 297. \n\nNothing allowed yet for depreciation. 297. \n\nNo payments included in the vouchers so far, as Ford Motor \nCo. able to support themselves during the course of the con- \ntract. 298. \n\nThe unsettled question in accounting of power. 301. \n\nStates 400 men of German ancestry employed in Ford plant. \n302. \n\nOne man from the plant caught down town saying, " To hell \nwith the President," etc. Took this man to Mr. McClure, as- \nsistant United States district attorney, but could do nothing. \n303. \n\nAll their communications to the Department of Justice in Wash- \nington sent through the military intelligence people. 304. \n\nMr. Lee and Mr. Willis try to help all they can with this ques- \ntion but are afraid of incurring Mr. Ford\'s displeasure. 304. \n\nMr. Emde; any slight variation in his drawings would slow up \nthe work. 305. \n\nThinks this was what was the trouble when for a month or two \nthe work slowed up. 305. \n\nThis happened in March and April. 306. \n\nThere has been something; everybody felt it, but they could not \ndefinitely prove anything, and Mr. Ford they knew wanted \nto keep these men on his staff. 306-307. \n\nInstead of having 20 a day, have only had 20 the last 3 or 4 \ndays; for a while 10 or 12, and then it fell down to nothing. \n307. \n\nInspectors report to Maj. Haeslet. 308. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 195 \n\nLieut. Charles E. Norlin \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nHas 400 affidavits from men in the plant who have heard other \n\nmen make statements and remarks derogatory to the United \n\nStates. 309. \nFiled in the educational department of the Ford plant. 309. \nDean Marquis, in charge of the welfare outfit Ford plant. 310. \nMr. Clemett, assistant to Dr, Marquis. 310. \nMr. A. B. Jewett, head of the photographic department. 310. \nAsk military intelligence to send down men to arrest these men \n\nand they said they would as soon as they got sufficient hold. \n\nJNever showed up. 311. \nHad the Ford Co. arrest a man and took him down to Mr. Mc- \n\nClure and he threw the matter out and said he could do noth- \ning. 312. \nLawyers in general do not seem favorably disposed to Mr. Kin- \n\nnane or Mr. McClure. 312. \nThinks these 400 affidavits would cover at least 260 men who \n\nhave pronounced German feelings. 312. \nNo representative of the intelligence service at the plant. 313. \nMr. Clemett and Mr. Jewett tired of getting men because no- \nbody will arrest them. 313. \nManagement of the plant, with respect to loyalty, excellent, but \n\nMr, Ford objects to eliminating a man unless you can prove \n\nhe has done something wrong. 314. \nEdwin Francis Clemett (Detroit/Mich., July 19, 1918; Book 12). \nDoing special work for Mr. Klingensmith in the factory. 315. \nLeft educational department about three months ago, but still \n\nkeep in touch with it. 316. \nAmerican Productive League has 100 representatives in the Ford \n\nplant, 316. \nStates his experience in submitting reports and affidavits to \n\nMilitary Intelligence Bureau. 317. \nAlways, no action taken. 318. \nHave not received 400 affidavits with respect to disloyalty ; have \n\nreceived 400 reports, but not supported by affidavits. 319. \nSubmitted these reports to the head of the American Protective \n\nLeague, at Detroit. \nHands over portfolio containing about one-third of the reports. \n\n320. \nDr. Marquis submits folder containing reports submitted by \n\nmembers of the American Protective League in the Ford \n\nplant to Mr. Clemett, 320. \nReports on trouble on Liberty motors had been confined practi- \n\n( ally to the drafting department. 322. \nThese half dozen men were recognized as serious cases. Report \n\nmade by Mr. Willis to Mr. Ford, but no change took place \n\nin the make-up of the department. 323. \nAmerican Protective League did nothing. 323. \nGives names of the half dozen men in this department. 324. \nMr. Hughes reads upon the record extracts with regard to Mr. \n\nEmde. Pages 325 to 340. \nMr. E. P. Martin, superintendent of drafting department. 342. \nFurther evidences. 343 to 356. \n\n\n\n196 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nEdwin Francis Clemett \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nTwo hundred men in plant whose disloyalty is open to question. \n\n357. \nDr. Marquis (Detroit, Mich., July 19, 1918; Book 12). \n\nBecame associated with the Ford Motor Co. two years ago last \n\nJanuary. 361. \nIn charge of the educational department, formerly known as the \n\nsocial department of welfare work. 361. \nHis information regarding disloyalty of employees is based upon \n\nwhat has been reported to him by Mr. Clemett and Mr. Rounds. \n\n364. \nRichard H. Collins (Cadillac Motor Car Co., Detroit, Mich., July 19, \n\n1918; Book 12). \nPresident and general manager of the Cadillac Motor Co. 370. \nPrior to 13 months ago was vice president of the General Motors \n\nCo., in Detroit, 370. \nGeneral Motors Co. owns Cadillac Motor Co. 370. \nGeneral Motors Co. has contract with Gov eminent for 2,000 \n\nLiberty engines. 371. \nWork evenly divided between its subsidiary companies. 371. \nAt time of cleliverv Cadillac Co. is expected to deliver 1,000 and \n\nthe Buick Co. 1,000. 372. \nGot contract on December 11, 1917. \nContract called for 25 in May, 125 in June, etc. 372. \nContract changed from 1,000 to 2,000. 373. \nCombined production of the Buick and Cadillac would be 50 a \n\nday on the peak of capacity. 376. \nNo experimental work. 378. \n\nHave received no advances from the Government. 379. \nNo contract with the Government other than the 2,000 and an \n\nadditional 2,000 made in contract a few days ago. 379. \nA large building which had been erected and never used was taken \n\nover for building of Liberty engines, 381. \nThis not charged to Government as temporary building; it is a \n\npart of their property. 381. \nTheir bogey contract $5,000 never was any higher. 382. \nNo reason why they should not have undertaken building Liberty \n\nmotors back in the early part of the year instead of starting in \n\nDecember. 385. \nLateness in getting contract provided them with a great handicap \n\nin getting in their orders fcr special tools, jigs, etc., as so \n\nmany others ahead of them. 387. \nLateness in receiving the contract worked to their advantage in \n\nthat they did not have to change as much as the others did after \n\nthey had tooled up. 389. \nTakes six months as a fair estimate of the time required for a \n\ncompany to get into production on engines like the Liberty \n\nengine. 389. \nThinks any foreign engine of accepted design could have been put \n\ninto production within six months also. 391. \nDisloyalty at plant ; these people removed. 392. \nBiggest jcb they ever had was the Liberty engine connecting rod. \n\n396. \nLabor troubles. 398. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCKAFT INVESTIGATION. 197 \n\nHerman M. Kin nee (Cadillac Motor Co., Detroit, Mich., July 19, \n1918; Book 12). \n\nComptroller of the Cadillac Motor Car Co. 402. \n\nGovernment accountant up to the 13th of July had passed public \nvouchers amounting to $1,611,912. 402. \n\nFirst voucher passed on February 16, 1918. 403. \n\nAll specially designed machinery for the contract charged to the \nGovernment. 403. \n\nNo charges made to the Government for preliminary work, with \nthe exception of work in the engineering department in pre- \nparing designs for tools they had to make to perform the con- \ntract and drawings necessary in the manufacture. 405. \n\nExecutive salaries. 406. \n\nEatio of overhead expenses to the productive labor at 175 per \ncent. 406. \n\nAdministrative salaries. 409. \n\nHas been no presentation to the Government yet of executive \nsalaries, as they have not yet determined on a basis. 411. \n\nDepreciation charges are a part of the overhead estimates. 416. \n\nHave made tentative presentation on account of depreciation, \nbut have made no final presentation of overhead expense. 416. \n\nVouchers for increased facilities. 417. \n\nCadillac Co. has expended up to this time under terms of its \ncontract, $2,521,782.85. 421. \n\nHave presented voucher for the restaurant building and the \nequipment of it, but it has not been approved by Signal \nCorps, $23,000. 422. \n\nExpenditure of $40,000 for heat-treating building, which has \nnot been allowed. 422. \n\nAlso a tear-down building, which cost $71,000, which they think \nwill be allowed by the Government. 423. \nHorace T. Ellis (Lincoln Motor Co., Detroit, Mich., July 20, 1918; \nBook 12). \n\nTool superintendent for Lincoln Motor Co. about one year. 424. \n\nStarted in on the design of the tools for the eight-cylinder motor \nthey were to construct. 424b. \n\nFirst important change noticed was from the 8-cylinder motor \nto the 12-cylinder motor. 427. \n\nSome of the cylinder tools drawn were usuable. Final produc- \ntion delayed to extent of a week and a half of labor thrown \naway. 428. \n\nNext serious change was the change in the propeller hub. Had \n75 per cent of the tools in connection with this delivered. Had \nto begin all over again. 428. \n\nOn October 4, 1917, delay occasioned, about a month. 430b. \n\nThese changes had a very serious effect on production. 430b. \n\nChange in the crank shaft on November 21, 1917. 431. \n\nOn 27th of November another change in the crank-shaft cheek, \nnecessitating complete new forging dies. 431. \n\nOn November 27 the propeller hub was again changed to the \nstandard Army type. New forgings again. 432. \n\nOn 4th of January, 1918, crank shaft again changed. 432. \n\nOther changes. 433. \n\n\n\n198 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nHorace T. Ellis \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nOn 6th of February a change was made in the distributor driv- \ning flange, which was not settled, the final design, until March \n\n10. 433, 434. \nOther serious changes. 435-442, inclusive. \nThinks these changes caused delay anywhere between two to \n\nthree months. 443. \nThinks every change was well taken. 444. \nSabotage. 446. \nProduces list of 89 shops who have been producing the tools \n\nfor them. 450. \nDelay in delivery of the tools explained by inability to get \n\ntrained workmen. 451 to 455. \nSabotage. 455. \n\nTraffic or transportation difficulties. 458. \nDid not lose time on account of stop orders, during February, \n\nof the Fuel Administration. 460. \nDifficulties in getting stock for tools. 460. \nDifficulties in getting the particular tool designers. 462. \nDouble work of designing caused by starting out to build the \n\nmotors in a small plant established to make 14 a day. 463. \nTotal number of special tools built is 91,087; the total number \n\nof orders issued that involved new tools and changes, etc., \n\namounted to 14,948. 464. \nHenry M. Leland (Detroit, Mich., July 29, 1918; Book 12). \nPresident of the Lincoln Motor Co. 466. \nOrganized the Cadillac Co. in 1902. 466. \nGives statement of his reasons for leaving the Cadillac Co. and \n\norganizing the Lincoln Motor Co. 467. \nIn a visit to Germany saw the wonderful preparations that were \n\nbeing made. 468. \nGo to Washington and see Gen. Squier, Col. Montgomery, and \n\nCol. Thompson, and Col. Deeds. 470. \nFirst interviews were in July. 475. \nHad slight acquaintance with Col. Deeds, as they bought their \n\nignition system from the Delco people. 475. \nConsiders Mr. Kettering one of the greatest mechanics in the \n\nworld. 475. \nDid not get contract until latter part of August. 486. \nCol. Deeds had been waiting for approval by the Government of \n\nthe engine and waiting until appropriations were made for \n\nit. 479. \nSo being satisfied himself with the engine, and feeling the ap- \npropriation would come along, he asked Deeds if the engine \n\nwere approved and appropriations were made if they would \n\nget a contract. On this understanding that they would, they \n\nwent ahead of the contract. 479. \nWhen contract was finally made it called for a 12-cylinder 300- \n\nhorsepower. 481. \nProduced list of the number of parts of the Liberty engine, 484. \nHad every expectation of being able to deliver the first 80 in \n\nDecember. 487. \nDelays in getting tools and fixtures ready and lack of skilled \n\nand experienced men. 487 to 491, inclusive. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 199 \n\nHenky M. Delano \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nDifficulties of employing men in uniform. 492. \n\nHispano- Suiza a very difficult motor to make. Wright-Martin \n\npeople have been on job for nearly a year, and they have made \n\nvery few of them. 497. \nConsiders it would have been entirely impracticable to have \n\ntried to introduce another motor while the Liberty was being \n\ndeveloped. 498. \nThinks if he had attempted to use the Rolls-Royce, which he \n\nconsiders best, as a temporary expediency, he would be in \n\nabout the same fix that they are in now. 501. \nFinally considers that they could have gotten into production \n\na little earlier by using an existing motor that would have \n\nbeen serviceable at the front. 503. \nOriginal contract with Government provided bogy cost of \n\n$6,087 per engine. 504. \nConsulted with the Packard people in arriving at the bogy \n\ncost. 505. \nTalked with Mr. Bealle and Mr. MacCauley of the Packard \n\nCo. 506. \nBogy cost reduced to $5,000 some time in December. 507. \nThis reduction in cost proposed by the Signal Corps. 508. \nCapital stock of the Lincoln Motor Co., $1,500,000. 508. \nDayton Metal Products Co. subscribed for $100,000 of stock in \n\nthe Lincoln Motor Co. 509. \nKnows that with Mr. Kettering is associated Mr. Talbott on \n\nthe $100,000 deal. 510. \nW. C. Leland (Resumed) (Detroit, Mich., July 20, 1918; Book 12). \nCol. Montgomery first suggested the reduction in the bogy cost. \n\n512. \nIn view of their pressing the Government for financial assist- \nance the 15 per cent profit was reduced as was also the bogy \n\ncost. 513. \nNo reliable estimate had been made at time of reduction of bogy \n\ncost. 516. \nCol. Montgomery advised them that he thought $6,087 too high \n\nin view of the fact that uncertainties foreseen at the start \n\nwere now clarifying themselves. 517. \n. Explains the arrangement of the other part of the capital stock \n\nother than the $800,000 issued. 517. \nTells of talk with head of leading bank in Detroit. 521. \nProduces stock book and memorandum relating to agreement. \n\n521. \nStates sliding scale suggested, resulting in a price of $7,000, \n\nthis to include a 15 per cent profit, which resulted in $6,087 \n\nas the cost. 532-534. \nBest belief of the cost of the motors is now $3,600. 535. \nProduces program of production. 537. \nPaul W. Abbott (Lincoln Motor Co., Detroit, Mich,, July 20, 1918; \nBook 12). \n\nChief inspector of Lincoln Motor Co., and also representing \n\nthem on the Liberty engine committee. 541. \nNot much trouble in getting decisions from the Production Engi- \nneering Department of the Signal Corps. 541. \n\n\n\n200 ABSTEACT OF AIKCKAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nPaul W. Abbott \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nIs asked about change which occurred on February 6, in the \ndistributer driving flange which was not settled until March \n19,1918. (See pages 433-434). 542. \n\nThis was entirely the fault of the Delco people. 542. \n\nThe change, No. 31 on the connecting rod, was the big change \nthat held them up for about 10 days. 543. \nWilliam T. Nash (Lincoln Motor Co., Detroit, Mich., July 20, 1918; \nBook 12). \n\nResides at Royal Oak, Mich. 546. \n\nHas been secretary-treasurer with Lincoln Motor Co. since \nmiddle of August, 1917. 546. \n\nLincoln Motor Co. has received $5,000,000 from the Government \nup to the present time. 547. \n\nGovernment has advanced $8,800,000, of which $8,200,000 re- \nmains unpaid. 547. \n\nEight hundred and ninety thousand dollars of the total payment \nmade by the Government to date is for special tools. 550. \n\nTake the actual overhead in this case, there being no other work \nin this plant. 551. \n\nThis company, being organized entirely for the purpose of doing \nthis work, charged as part of the cost all the work that had \nbeen done from the organization. 552. \n\nBegan charging executive salaries to the Government about the \nfirst part of September. 554. \n\nVouchers have been accepted in part, 554. \n\nExecutive salaries have not been allowed as charged to Govern- \nment salaries. 555. \n\nHave allowed such proportion of such salaries as could be \ncharged to manufacturing operations. 555. \n\nGives amounts of executive salaries as paid by the Lincoln Motor \nCo. 557. \n\nThe item of executive salaries is still held for decision, also \n$16,000 which was deducted from vouchers for special tools \nstill unsettled. 558. \n\nAll machinery and equipment is subject to the 40 per cent de- \npreciation provision of the modified contract. 559. \n\nThe heat-treating building is to be depreciated according to the \nvalue of the building to the Lincoln Motor Co. in the general \nmotor business at the end of the contract. 560. \n\nOutside of heat-treating building, they are to receive the depreci- \nation as prorated by the Rulings Board on other buildings. \n561. \n\nThe understanding of the Lincoln Motor Co. is that the Govern- \nment, under the contract, will be bound to pay on machinery \nand equipment 40 per cent flat, regardless of the time that has \nelapsed at the time of the completion of the contract. 563. \n\nAnd on the machinery and equipment there will be, in addition, \ndepreciation to be allowed by the Government at the rates of \napproximately 10 per cent per annum on the entire cost of the \nbuilding. 563. \nF. C. Thompson (Lincoln Motor Co., July 20, 1918; Book 12). \n\nAccounting officer for the Government at the Lincoln Motor Co. \nplant since about middle of November, 1917. 568. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 201 \n\nF. C. Thompson \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nOnly a difference of $1,689 between vouchers certified and vouch- \ners submitted which have not yet been certified. 569. \n\nThe matter of $27,000, covering executive salaries for period \nterminating in December, 1917, is still held in suspense. 569. \n\nExecutive salaries in one or two instances went back as far as \nJuly. 570. \n\nLincoln Motor Co. has made no charges for experimental work. \n570. \n\nAgrees with the Lincoln Motor Co.\'s estimate of cost production \nat $3,600. 571. \n\nThinks the Lincoln Motor Co have endeavored to produce as \nquickly as possible. 573. \n\nRegards the record of this plant, from a financial standpoint, \nas a perfectly clean record. 574. \nCharles H. Day (Standard Aero Corporation, Elizabeth, N. J.. \nJuly 25, 1918; Book 13). \n\nAn engineer by occupation. 1. \n\nAt one time with Glen Martin as engineer and adviser. 2. \n\nHas been with Sloane Airplane Co. and companies that have de- \nveloped therefrom since the fall of 1915. 3 \n\nStandard Aero Corporation succeeded the Sloane Co. 3. \n\nStandard Aero Corporation, until very recently, was exclusively \nan experimental plant, and the Standard Aircraft Corporation \nwas a producing companv. 4. \n\nOriginally had an order from Government for four of their \nmodel H3 machines, and an additional order was given for 12 \nmachines. 5. \n\nTheir engineering department, headed by himself, designed what \nis called the Standard J machine. 6. \n\nDesign was perfected in the spring of 1917. 6. \n\nFurnished designs for Standard J plane to Dayton- Wright Air- \nplane Co. 6. \n\nThere were some inaccuracies in drawings furnished. \n\nWould not say that his drafting room had at all times been sat- \nisfactory. 11. \n\nSo far as he has been able to find out. Standard J plane with- \ndrawn principally because the Hall- Scott motor was entirely \nunsatisfactory. 13. \n\nSignal Corps made changes on plane without consulting design- \ners. 14. \n\nMachine was designed to meet Signal Corps specification. 14. \n\nOrder received in December for De Haviland 9s, and a contract \nwas made under date of January 24 or 26, 1918, for 500 De \nHaviland 9s. 16. \n\nWas notified from Washington that De Haviland 9 drawings \nwere ready. 16, \n\nWas notified by the Equipment Division, of Production Engi- \nneering Department, Signal Corps. 17. \n\nIn forepart, of January took a trio to Dayton to investigate sit- \nuation, and found De Haviland 9 was nowhere near a point \nwhere it could be produced. 17. \n\nEither he or Maj. Sheppler suggested that he build 100 De Havi- \nland 4s while awaiting the completion of the De Haviland \n9. 19. \n\n\n\n202 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". \n\nCharles H. Day \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nSignal Corps did not have knowledge of gun mountings, bomb- \ning equipment, wireless installation, camera installation, \npractically none of the military equipment. 20. \n\nAmended contract for 100 De Haviland 4\'s made about Feb- \nruary 1 and substituted contract embracing 500 De Haviland \n4\'s in place of 100 De Haviland 4\'s and 400 De Haviland 9\'s \nappears to have been pursuant to an order of March 28. 1918. \n21. \n\nMade many trips to D avion in attempts to get drawings for \nDe Haviland 4\'s. 21. \n\nOn February 1 told Mr. Coffin and Mr. Potter that he did not \nthink there was a possibility of getting the De Haviland 9\'s \ninto production within six months* time and that De Havi- \nland 4 was nowhere ready to produce. 24. \n\nStated to Mr. Coffin there would be no substantial production \nof De Haviland 4\'s in February and the best that could be \nhoped for was about 25 from Dayton-Wright in March. 25. \n\n, And possibly an equal number from Standard Aircraft Cor- \nporation in April. 26. \n\nQ. " Now, with that anticipation about the 1st of Feb- \nruary, why is it that j^ou have not as yet, being now the \nlatter part of July. 1918, been able to produce a single De \nHaviland 4? " \xe2\x80\x94 A. "Lack of information." \n\nQ. "Of what?" \xe2\x80\x94 A. "Drawings, principally." 26. \n\nAsked Maj. Gray, of Signal Corps, for drawings. 27. \n\nWhen he was unable to get official drawings of the De Haviland \n4 from Maj. Gray, Mr. Mingle took it up with higher au- \nthority in Washington. 29. \n\nInspection Department, Signal Corps, at Elizabeth, would not \nallow them to proceed with drawings furnished bv Davton- \nWright Co. 30, 31. \n\nGot from Dayton-Wright Co. a De Haviland 4 in February. 33. \n\nMade drawings from that machine and built a machine which \nwas flown in March. 33. \n\nMade request of Mr. Kellogg that they be allowed to manufac- \nture in accordance with that machine up to a given date. 34. \n\nA Mr. Ruxtall, representing Col. Hall, came with a number \nof men, and it was discovered that the machine they had was \nnot correct. 35. \n\nWas same machine Dayton- Wright Co. was building and ship- \nping abroad. 35. 36. \n\nTested wheels used on machine and found they were not suffi- \ncient. 39. \n\nHe was not allowed to go on using the Z 2 rims and the Dayton- \nWright Co. was. 39. \n\nHas repeatedly asked for a " go ahead," but it has never come \nthrough. 41. \n\nMaj. Rose is the superior officer with respect to production. 45. \n\nProvided there were no further changes, was ready to go ahead \non production 10 days or a week ago. 46. \n\nProducing six machines for Post Office Department to assist in \nkeeping experimental organization together. 49. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 203 \n\nCharles H. Day \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nEntire engineering on Handley-Page machine in his hands. 52. \n\nIf the De Haviland 4 had come direct to his plant from England \nand they were told to go ahead and make a machine with \nthe Liberty motor installation, sees no reason why they could \nnot have been producing at the very least 10 machines a day \nwithin five months. 54. \n\nHad been orders which had been retracted and it was rather \nquestionable what his plant was going to build, so accepted \norder for seaplanes. 57. \n\nWas also told by Navy officers that he had to take it ; that the \nNavy work was more important than the Army work. 5T. \n\nHas been impossible for them to obtain a large enough order \nto actually know what they were going to do and to prepare \nfor doing it. 62. \n\nNever been given a real experimental job to do at this plant. \n63. \n\nWas told it was not desired that the manufacturers in this coun- \ntry develop any machine whatsoever; that the only machines \nwhich would be produced would be the English and French \nmachines. 65. \n\nIf the situation had been handled in a different manner, does \nnot think there is any reason why we should not have had all \nthe airplanes we desired to produce. 76. \n\n" We, as manufacturers, and I, as an engineer, have never been \ngiven any information from the Government that would be of \nany assistance to us in designing airplanes or in developing \nexisting types of airplanes." 78. \n\nThinks governmental work involves a series of dictatorial super- \nvision. 83. \n\nMade a report on the Bristol fighter at request of Govern- \nment. 85. \n\nCame to conclusion that the machine had no military value \nwhatsoever as it then existed. 87. \n\nIn installing the Liberty motor, with its excess weight, and the \nadded weight incorporated in the machine, and making the \nmachine reasonably safe, practically did away with the ad- \nvantages of superior visibility and superior maneuver ability \nwhich had originally existed. 88. \n\nThinks difficulties which have now resulted in the abandon- \nment of the Bristol fighter should have been foreseen. 94. \n\nHandley-Paige has been subcontracted practically over the East- \nern LTnited States. 102. \n\nThe comparative cost will undoubtedly be excessive by this \nmethod of distribution. 106. \n\nBelieves any of the large airplane manufacturing concerns could \nhave equipped comparatively easy for the production of the \nHandley-Paige complete. 107. \n\nThe difference in weight between the Hispano-Suiza engine \nused on the Bristol in England and the Liberty engine used \non the Bristol in this country is about 300 pounds. 115. \n\n\n\n204 ABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". \n\nHarry Bowers Mingle (Standard Aero Corporation, Elizabeth, \nN. J., July 25, 1918 ; Book 13) . \n\nPresident of the Standard Aircraft Corporation. 117. \n\nA lawyer by profession, of the firm of Mingle & Finklestein. \n117. \n\nBeen president since corporation organized, November 1, 1917. \n117. \n\nCapital of organization is $500,000. 120. \n\nActual owner of preferred stock, which is issued to $150,000, is \nMitzui & Co., a Japanese corporation organized and author- \nized to do business in State of New York. 120. \n\nFifty-one per cent of the common stock is owned by Mitzui \n& Co. 120. \n\nGovernment gave them an order in May, 1916, for three of their \nH3-type machines on condition that they eliminate the Sloane \ninterests entirely from the organization. 121. \n\nStandard Aero Corporation leases from Standard Aircraft Cor- \nporation a portion of the plant at Elizabeth. 123. \n\nOrder for Caproni planes with Standard Aero Corporation \nstands as follows: One delivered on May 1, and an order to \nbuild a second, and the incompleted parts of thei other two \nare to be delivered to the Fisher Body Corporation. 126. \n\nOnly other contract Standard Aero Corporation has with Gov- \nernment is a verbal order issued for 450 advanced training \nmachines, known as their M defense machine. This contract \nwas given them in May of this year by Mr. Fletcher. 127. \n\nAre now in process on that work and expect to make a delivery \nof them in the next few days. 127. \n\nContract was taken on a fixed-price basis, with a bogey price of \n$3,450. 128. \n\nHas a contract with Photographic Division, Signal Corps, for \nsix JR IB machines, given on May 3, 1918. 130. \n\nHave all been delivered at a fixed price of $6,000 cash. 130. \n\nOn June 5, 1916, order was given Standard Aero Corporation \nby Government for three of their H3 planes at a fixed price \nof $9,400. 131. \n\nReceived an order on October 4, 1916, for four machines, with \nHall- Scott motors, at a fixed price of $64,000 for the four \nmachines. 132. \n\nOn October 30 there were 18 machines of the J type at $8,500. \n133. \n\nOn December 16, 1916, had an order with the Army for 32 hy- \ndroplanes at $21,000 apiece, which was afterwards increased \nto $23,100. 133. \n\nOn February 3, 1917, furnished the Government with 16 motors. \n133. \n\nAll these orders down to November, 1917, when the Standard \nAircraft organized, were given to the Standard Aero Corpo- \nration. 134. \n\nOrganized the Standard Aircraft Corporation for the purpose \nof keeping the aircraft production distinct from experimental \nwork on a cost-plus basis. 134. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 205 \n\nHarry Bowers Mingle \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nFollowing are officers of the Standard Aircraft Corporation: \nHarry B. Mingle, president; Mr. Day is vice president and \ngeneral manager, and Mr. Finkelstein is vice president and \ntreasurer. 135. \n\nCapital of Standard Aircraft Corporation was $5,000,000 until \nyesterday, July 24, 1918, when it was increased to $10,000,000. \n135. \n\nTwo million dollars of preferred stock issued and is owned en- \ntirely by Mitzui & Co. ; 23,500 shares of common stock, of which \nMitzui & Co. own 51 per cent. 135. \n\nUntil very recently the Standard Aero and the Standard Air- \ncraft have been absolutely distinct. In last few weeks, since \nthe Aero Corporation received its order for 450 machines. \nStandard Aircraft have been assisting in the financing of \nthat company by loaning them money. 136. \n\nGot an absolute transfer from the Standard Aero Corporation \nof all its interests and drawings and its good will at time \nStandard Aircraft Corporation was organized. 137. \n\nLeases plant at Elizabeth from Stephenson Co. at $25,000 a quar- \nter and subleases to the Standard Aircraft Co. at $36,000 a \nmonth. 139, 140. \n\nStandard Aircraft Co. has following contracts with Govern- \nment : Five hundred De Haviland machines, with spare parts \nfor 500 machines; 150 HS 1L boats for Navy; contract to ware- \nhouse 450 Handley-Paige machines and to assemble parts re- \nceived from the warehouse on 50 additional Handley-Paige \nmachines, making 500 in all. 146. \n\nHave gotten practically $1,700,000 worth of raw materials in \nplant that are not applicable to any contract they have to-day. \n161. \n\nContract for 500 De Haviland 4s under date of March 28, 1918. \n166. This was a substituted contract. \n\nContract for assembly of the Handley-Paige was dated April 1, \n1918. 168. \n\nObjects to the responsibility being taken from an organization \nthat has done what they have done. 174. \n\nIs not a manufacturing man, but has built an organization that \nhas come through on everything they said they would do. \n174. \n\nCorrespondence between company and Signal Corps relative to \ngetting a go-ahead order. 177-225, 228-251. This corre- \nspondence also goes into the changes required on the De Havi- \nland planes. \n\nEdward E. Penniwell (Standard Aero Corporation, Elizabeth, \nN. J., July 25, 1918; Book 13). \n\nkVice president and general manager of Standard Aero Corpo- \nration. 252. \nHas been vice president since November 1, 1917, and general \nmanager since May 1, 1918. 252. \nReason for De Haviland 4s not being produced is due to in- \nformation lacking, necessary information to compile a bill of \nmaterial from which to purchase supplies and materials and \n\n\n\n206 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". \n\nEdward E. Pen ni well \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nto build machines; and lack of an official go-ahead on the \nmanufacture of the first machine; and due to changes which \nMr. Day has spoken of. 252. \n\nNow building machines and parts of machines on drawings that \nhave been approved. 254. \n\nNow have correct drawings for 80 per cent of machines. 254. \n\nWork on De Havilands considerably delayed in cleaning up J \nmachine. 257. \n\nMaking an effort to get out 20 machines in July and 50 in Au- \ngust. 258. \n\nGave order for wood screws to a company in Providence and one \nin Dayton to " keep them SAveet." 262. \n\nContract on Handley-Paige machines provides for a compensa- \ntion of 10 per cent on the cost, which includes the cost of build- \nings and materials supplied by the subcontractors. 264. \n\nContract was drawn by the contract department of the Signal \nCorps, No. 3439, order No. 20906, dated March 29, 1918. 265. \n\nRecapitulation of payments made by War Department on all \ncontracts from commencement down to date to the Standard \nAircraft Co. 278. \n\nStatement shows $4,262,901.71, embracing the entire amount of \nthe estimated cost and the profit on that work has been paid \ncompany on Jl training plane contract. 279. \n\nCompany still has claim pending against Government on Jl \nplanes of from one to three hundred thousand dollars. 280. \n\nReferring to a blue print (Day Exhibit No. 2, July 25, 1918) \nshowing the distribution of the contracts for the making of \nparts of the Handley-Page, Mr. Mingle directed it to be made \nup. 284. \nBlue print compiled on May 15, 1918. 284. \n\nJudge Hughes : " How do you explain a chart made up with such \nglaring errors being presented here as an exhibit with respect \nto this work?" 286. \n\nStandard Aircraft Corporation has only Government work. 292. \n\' Standard Aero Corporation built several machines for the Japa- \nnese Government. 292. \n\nExplains how Mitzuie & Co. became financially interested in the \nbusiness. 292. \n\nCol. Deeds is the only man in Washington with whom he has not \ncome into close contact. 302. \n\nCorrespondence between Standard Aircraft Corporation and \nSignal Corps relative to future work. 306, 316. \n\nWright-Martin Co. in a position to make Hispano-Suiza motors \nall during last summer and fall. 316. \n\nGovernment offered to sell for him material he had on hand. \n324. \n\nLewis & Voight now making an advanced-training type of ma- \nchine with the Hispano-Suiza engine. 326. \n\nIt would be the purpose of the company to put in a claim against \nthe Government for what it does not realize from the sale of \nthe material. 328. \n\n\n\n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 207 \n\nEdward E. Penniwell \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nHas been severely criticised and condemned, having taken the \nmen at Washington at their word, and gone out, as they say \nnow, and bought recklessly, and without any orders or defi- \nnite contracts from the Government, and we have jeopardized \nour credit as the result of that. 334. \n\nWhen the order was given them "for Capronis, which did not \nmaterialize, he was instructed to go upstairs in the Signal \nCorps building and order from the spruce department, spruce \nto take care of the Caproni contract. As a result, he ordered \n500,000 feet of spruce as shipped there per month. 335. \n\nIn April payments were held up and they were told in April or \nMay they were indebted to the Government in some five, or \nsix, or seven hundred thousand dollars for material which had \nbeen shipped there. 336. \n\nHas got the spruce and fir on hand but can not sell it. 337. \n\nGovernment has placed an embargo on it. 338. \n\nPaid $64,000 in royalties to Manufacturers Aircraft Association. \n348. \n\nGen. Pershing has advised that all machines must be flown be- \nfore shipping abroad. 359. \n\nIf he had any machines to-day, could not ship them because he \nhas no place to fly them. 360. \nCharles A. Day (Elizabeth, N. J., July 26, 1918; Book 13.) \n\nContract for assembling 500 Handley-Page machines is on a \ncost-plus basis \xe2\x80\x94 10 per cent. 362. \n\nEstimates a Standard J plane could be built under normal manu- \nfacturing conditions for as low as $3,500. 364. \n\nContract in July, 1917, was for 250 training planes at a fixed \nprice of $6,450. 366, 365. \n\nPrice was reduced as to 100 machines to $5,300 in October. 367. \nJudge Hughes : " How does it happen that there was a con- \ntract for 100 at $5,300, fixed price, when the estimated cost on \nthe cost-plus basis, including the fixed profit, was $4,725 ? " \n367. \n\nKnows of cases where defective material was received at plant \nwhich had passed Government inspection. 369. \nMax J. Finklestein (Standard Aero Corporation, Elizabeth, N. J., \nJuly 26, 1918; Book 13). \n\nVice president of Standard Aircraft Corporation since its in- \nception and treasurer since about June 1. 373. \n\nMr. Daniel L. Meenan, jr., is treasurer of the Standard Aero \nCorporation. 374. \n\n(Produces a " Eecord of cash received from War Department ac- \ncount contract 1839, from November 1, 1917, to July 25, 1918, \nwhich is marked " Finkelstein Exhibit No. 1, July 26, 1918." \n374. \nStatement shows a total for overhead of $957,978.49; total in- \nventory amounts to $894,285.14 ; total of raw materials, $1,212,- \n524.42; total for direct labor, $777,266.39; total profits on J-l \nmachines, $347,257.96 ; total profits on J-l spares, $73,649.37. \n376. \nSecond part of Finkelstein Exhibit 1 relates to moneys received \non account of contract 2692-A \xe2\x80\x94 the De Haviland contract. \n377. \n130(587\xe2\x80\x9419 14 \n\n\n\n208 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". \n\nMax J. Finklestein \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nGovernment has never paid anything on the 9s, and this state- \nment refers only to DH 4s. 377. \n\nTotal for raw material is $571,184.21; total for direct labor, \n$129,806.35; total for overhead, $193,737.44; total for special \ntools, $17,826.43 ; making a grand total of $912,554.43. 378. \n\nNext sheet of Finkelstein Exhibit 1 shows a record of cash re- \nceived on account of contract 3439 down to July 25, 1918; \nHandley-Paige contract. 378. \n\nAnother sheet of this exhibit shows a record of cash received on \naccount of contract 3904, Caproni contract, down to July 25, \n1918. 379. \n\nSalary of president of Standard Aircraft Co. is $63,000; of chief \nengineer and vice president, $25,000; of general manager, \n$10,000 ; of treasurer, $12,000. 380. \n\nGovernment has allowed $15,000 for president, $10,000 for Mr. \nDay, $7,500 for general manager; and $7,500 for treasurer. \nThese salaries are subject to adjustment or confirmation in \nWashington. 381. \n\nGovernment has paid these salaries and is still paying them. \n382. \n\nMr. Mingle\'s salary was raised from $54,000 to $63,000 last \nautumn. 383. \n\nPresident of Standard Aero Corporation, Mr. Mingle, has no \nsalary; vice president, Mr. Juclkins, receives $5,000; general \nmanager receives $100 a week; treasurer gets $10,000 a year. \n384. \n\nStandard Aircraft placed an order with Dayton Metal Products \nCo. for gauge wires without competitive bids. 409. \n\nHave bought material without competitive bids repeatedly. 411. \n\nThe cost-plus contract is now interpreted by some people at this \nplant or at another plant who yesterday was an automobile \nsalesman or a tire man, and suddenlv becomes a judicial offi- \ncer. 414. \n\nThat condition absolutely prohibits healthy manufacture, and \nunhealthy manufacture means there is not the enthusiasm, \nthere is not the desire, and there is not the push and go to get \nfull results. 416. \n\n" I want to say very frankly to you that at times some of \nour people here have thought that the Government representa- \ntives were pro-German, and that they did it purposely to hold \nup production." 417. \n\n" We simply never, never got out cost, and it seems to me \nthat the Government of the United States is able and should \nbe the fairest of vendors, the fairest of contractors, and should \nsee that the contractors gets a human, living profit on his effort \nand on his investments, and we do not get it now." 418. \nDaniel Leo Meenan, Jr. (Elizabeth, N. J., July 26, 1918; Book 13). \n\nHas been associated with aircraft industry for last four years. \n419. \n\nWas with the Sloan Co. ; now treasurer of the Standard Aero \nCorporation. 419. \n\nThe profits on spare for J-l planes was determined at a con- \nference. 420. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 209 \n\nDaniel Leo Meenan, Jr. \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nTotal estimated cost for 100 sets of spares was $74,000. 42 L. \n\nThere was a provision of 25 per cent of saving in case the actual \ncost was under that. 421. \n\nFixed profit on first order for spares was 15 per cent and on later \norder for spare parts was 12^ per cent. 421. \n\nTotal contract for spares for the J-l contract would run up be- \ntween $800,000 or $900,000. 423. \n\nTotal profit on spares figured at $73,649.37. 423. \n\nHas produced 30 or 35 machines at time bogey was arrived at. \n426. \n\nThere was a fixed price of $5,300 for the 100-J plane order given \nto the Standard Aero Corporation. 428. \nLouis H. Sullivan (Elizabeth, N. J., July 26, 1918; Book 13). \n\nWorks manager of Standard Aero Corporation. 430. \n\nHas held this position two months. 430. \n\nPrior to that was assistant to general manager. Previous to \nthat supervisor of employment, and during that time he also \nhad charge of manufacturing. 430. \n\nHas 19 machines on floor at point of completion which are wait- \ning for the installation of the bomb-dropping device, the \nspark-throttle control, the shutter control, and all of them \nhave been undergoing changes for the last three weeks. 432. \n\nHas gotten parts from out West, which were scrapped in many \ninstances. 444. \n\nHave received tie rods with nuts and lock washers on them in a \ncondition that our people, our inspectors, and the Signal \nCorps inspectors ordered the nuts removed, and scrapped or \nsalvaged, and new nuts made and recapped, and Ftill they bore \nSignal Corps inspection at the other plants. 446. \n\nBought some suage wires from the Dayton Metal Products Co., \nwhich had been passed by Government inspectors at that plant \nthat were so crooked that they could not be passed by Gov- \nernment inspectors here. 447. \nWilliam J. Waterhouse (Standard Aero Corporation, Elizabeth, \nN. J.; July 26, 1918; Book 13). \n\nAssistant chief engineer Standard Aero Corporation. 454. \n\nFormerly in the production engineering section of the Signal \nCorps. 454. \n\nRepresented the Government at the Standard Aero plant from \nOctober, 1916. to July, 1917. 457. \n\nCame to the Standard Aero about February 15 or 20. 458. \n\nThe drawings in use at the Standard plant, which were fur- \nnished by the Standard Co. to the Day ton- Wright Co., were \nnot suitable for production at the National Cash Register Co. \n\nkof the parts they were supplying to the Dayton-Wright Air- \nplane Co., and as a consequence the National Cash Register \nCo. made their own drawings, and when those parts were pro- \nduced they would not fit. 461. \nRepresented the Government at the Dayton-Wright plant from \nAugust, 1917, to February, 1918. 469. \n\n\n\n210 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". \n\nWilliam J. Waterhouse \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nDayton- Wright plant was very much delayed in the production \nof De Haviland 4\'s because of lack of information regarding \nvarious parts, in some cases materials, accessories, and draw- \nings; that is, drawings expected from abroad which were \nnever received. 4:71. \n\nGovernment inspectors would not pass anything at the Standard \nplant unless there was an actual drawing with which to com- \npare the parts made. 474. \n\nThirty per cent of delay at Standard plant due to Government \ninspectors refusing to pass anything without a drawing. 476. \nFred E. Dean (Standard Aircraft Corporation, Elizabeth, N". J., \nJuly 26, 1918; Book 13). \n\nPurchasing agent of company since November 1, 1917. 488. \n\nAcquainted with difficulties experienced in connection with the \nsuage wires received from the Dayton Metal Products Co. \n488. \n\nFirst shipment of this wire arrived early part of July. 489. \n\nWrote letter to Dayton Metal Products Companv in respect to \nit. Dean Exhibit No. 1, July 26, 1918. 489. \n\nTurnbuckles purchased from Dayton Metal Products Co. also \ndefective. 491. \nMaj. Charles B. Rose (Standard Aircraft Corporation, Eliza- \nbeth, N. J., Julv 26, 1918; Book 13). \n\nMajor, Signal Corps. Entered Army September 29, 1917. 496. \n\nPrior occupation was vice president of Velie Motors Corpora- \ntion, of Moline, 111. 496. \n\nWith that company for nine years. 496. \n\nUpon entering the Army was assigned to inspection duty, to \nthe inspection section on the aviation program. 497. \n\nCame to Standard plant about May 1. 498. \n\nThought production methods at Curtiss plant very bad. 501. \n\nSome of the trouble was due to a lack of drawings and some of \nthe trouble to lack of proper organization at the Standard \nAircraft plant. 506. \n\nDifficulty with organization of plant is that the heads of the \ncompany are not manufacturers. 507. \n\nNo excuse for lack of inspection of suage wire rods received \nfrom Dayton Metal Products Co. 518. \n\nArrangement of building and distribution of work in Standard \nAircraft plant is very poor. 522. \n\nPlant is in a disorganized condition. 523. \n\nThe organization of the Standard Aircraft plant is such that it \ndoes not justify a higher order for planes. 525. \nLeighton A. Cooksox (Elizabeth, N. J., July 26, 1918; Book 13). \n\nBeen in the employ\' of the Government for nearly a year. ( 526. \n\nPrevious occupation was assistant engineer of Canadian Air- \nplanes (Ltd.), Toronto. 526. \n\nWas asked to come to Washington to work for Government by \nMr. Diffin and Col. Mixter. 526. \n\nWas assigned to the main office of the Inspection Department, \nin charge of planes and engine inspections. 527. \n\nHas been at the Standard plant continually for last six weeks. \n528. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 211 \n\nLeighton A. Cookson \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nWhen changes came through, Standard Co. started immedi- \nately to do the work and did not determine whether or not \nthev had something almost identical with it being made in \nthe plant. 530. \n\nThere were no two files of prints on the machines which were \nalike. 533. \n\nDoes not feel that if he allowed the drawings to come from \nDayton-Wright and go into production at the Standard plant \nthey would be handled properly. 538. \nMaj. C. B. Eose (July 26, 1918 ; Book 13) . \n\nSees no reason why the Standard plant should not have pro- \nduced airplanes within 30 days after the Day ton- Wright Co. \nproduced them, because the Dayton-Wright information was \navailable to the Standard Aircraft Corporation. If it was \nnot available, the Standard Aircraft Corporation should have \ngone after it and gotten it. 540. \n\nA plane called No. 30 of the Dayton-Wright Co. was shipped to \nthe Standard Aircraft Co., and they were to make a " Chinese " \ncopy of that. Went ahead along those lines. 542. \n\nIn a letter dated May 16, 1918, Col. Hall stated: "All planes are \nto be built exactly according to sample ship sent you, and no \ndrawings are to be accepted changing these unless approved \nby the writer." 542. \nLeighton A. Cookson (July 26, 1918; Book 13). \n\nThinks the responsibility for delay in production of planes by \n\nStandard Aircraft Co. was partly with the Government and \npartly with the company. 547. \n\nThinks Government used very bad judgment in placing 500 \nDe Haviland planes in Standard plant, because that is not \nenough to allow any manufacturer to tool up and economically \nbuild 500 planes. 551. \n\nAbout six weeks ago found this company had about $1,000,000 \nin unpaid bills, which were overdue. As a consequence it was \nvery hard for this company (Standard Aircraft Co.) to pur- \nchase material economically and expeditiously. 556. \n\nDoes not think there have been any changes since the model \nship No. 30 was sent on by the Dayton-Wright Co. which have \nseriously interfered with production. 577. \n\nIt would help the Standard people to have an additional order. \n581. \n\nWould not recommend an additional order in plant unless a man \nwas put in there who was thoroughly familiar with manufac- \nture and organization. 582. \nWalter Joseph Conaty (Elizabeth, N. J., July 26, 1918; Book 13). \n\nHas been employed by the Government in this particular branch \nof service since March 11, 1918. 587. \n\nFormerly with the Chesapeake & Ohio lines, leaving them on \nMarch 9. 587. \n\nIn 1914 was an accountant in charge of the division of valuation, \nInterstate Commerce Commission. 588. \n\nGovernment has paid the Standard Aircraft Co. under Jl con- \ntract No. 1839, $4,167,211.09 to date. 588. \n\n\n\n212 ABSTEACT OF AIKCKAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nWalter Joseph Conaty \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nGovernment has paid to Standard Aircraft Co. to date on De \nHaviland contract No. 2698-A, $531,091.38. 589. \n\nGovernment has paid this company to date on Handley-Page \ncontract No. 3139, $89,772.10. 589. \n\nFigures as furnished by company do not agree. 590. \n\nMade a report on the corporate financial relationship of this \ncompany and its predecessor companies. 610. \nGeorge Harrison Houston (Wright-Martin Aircraft Corporation, \nNew Brunswick, N. J., July 27, 1918; Book 11). \n\nConsulting engineer and for past year has been in charge of \nthe operations here at Wright-Martin Co. 1. \n\nPresident and general manager of Wright-Martin Corpora- \ntion. 1. \n\nHas had following experience: Educated in Cincinnati; asso- \nciated with father in Houston, . Standwoocl & Gamble Co., \nmanufacturers of steam engines and boilers, as factory man- \nager ; left them 10 years ago and became associated with Eoot \n& Vandervoort Engineering Co., of Illinois, in various posi- \ntions, ultimately holding position of factory and sales man- \nager. Left them to come East and take up consulting engineer- \ning work, first by himself and then associated with Mr. Charles \nJamieson, constituting the firm of Jamieson & Houston, later \ntaking in Gen. George W. Goethals as a partner. Present time \nthe firm is known as the George W. Goethals Co. 2. \n\nHas been something over two years actively in the production \nof aircraft, having entered the Curtiss Airplane Motor Cor- \nporation in summer of 191 6 as general manager. 2. \n\nEntered the Wright-Martin organization latter part of May, \n\n1917. 3. As vice president and general manager and was to be \nthe managerial head of the company. 3. \n\nCapitalization of company outlined. 4. \n\nWright-Martin Co. has plant at New Brunswick, N. J., which \nis now owned directly by it, having been transferred to it on \nDecember 31, 1917, from the Simplex Co. for the purpose \nof carrying on the manufacture of aeronautical motors for \nthe Government under cost-plus contracts; second, the plant \nof the Glenn L. Martin Co., known as the Wright-Martin Air- \ncraft Corporation, of California, is operating a small factory \nin Newark, N. J., for the manufacture of tools and gauges \nfor New Brunswick, and at present time is organizing and \nequipping a large factory on site of General Vehicle Co., \nLong Island City, to manufacture 300-horsepower aeronautical \nmotors of Hispano-Suiza type for the Government at the Gov- \nernment\'s cost. 4, 5. \n\nExplain contract of November, 1917, for three thousand 300- \nhorsepower Hispano-Suiza motors. 7. \n\nWright-Martin Corporation at New Brunswick has been pro- \nducing what is known in America as type A of the Hispano- \nSuiza motor. Has completed all of its contract for this speci- \nfication and is now starting on the production of type E of \nthe Hispano-Suiza motor. 10. \n\nOn July 31, 1917, received a contract No. 1187 for 500 of type A \nmotors. 10. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 213 \n\nGeorge Harrison Houston \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nIn. September, 1917, received contract for 500 additional type A \nmotors, which was canceled on October 2, 1917. 10. \n\nOn August 28, 1917, received contract No. 1811 for spares for \nthe first 500 of type A motors. 11. \n\nOn October 2, 1917, received contract No. 1867 for 4,000 of type \nF Hispano-Suiza engines, which was canceled on November \n13 and replaced by contract No. 2250 of November 13, 1917, \nfor 1,000 of type A motor with spares. 11. \n\nOn November 20, 1917, contract No. 1867-a for three thousand \n300-horsepower type H Hispano-Suiza engines. 11. \n\nContract No. 2250 has been supplemented by following con- \ntracts: On February 2, 1918, contract No. 2250-1 for 1,000 \ntype A Hispano-Suiza motors and spares; on February 25, \n1918, contract No. 2250-2 for 1,000 of type E or I Hispano- \nSuiza motors with spares. 11. On May 25, 1918, received \ncontract No. 2250-3 for 1,000 type E or I Hispano-Suiza mo- \ntors; on November 20, 1917, received contract 1867-a, which \nwas modified by two contracts dated in 1918, No. 1867-b, set- \nting back deliveries, and further supplemented on May 11, \n1918, by contract No. 1867-c, arranging for the manufacture \nof the type H motors in Long Island City and still further \nsetting back deliceries of type H motors. 12. \n\nContract No. 2250-4, elated May 27, 1918, for the fabrication of \nmotors for instruction purposes at New Brunswick from re- \njected parts under cost-plus contract. 12. \n\nIn September, 1917, took contract No. 1494 for 50 J-l military \ntraining planes, which were manufactured at Los Angeles, \nCalif. 13. \n\nIn spring of 1918 negotiated another contract, No. 3088, for \n200 JN-4 training planes for manufacture at Los Angeles, \nCalif., but after contract had. been negotiated and order issued \nit was canceled by Signal Corps as not being satisfactory to \nthem, and are now liquidating the western company. 13. \n\nFew miscellaneous small contracts for experimental motors, \nspare parts, etc., which have not been included. 15. \n\nSets forth deliveries and compares them with contract schedule. \n15. \n\nIf it had not been for the power difficulties in the winter would \nhave been up to the contract schedule by completion of con- \ntract No. 2250. 21. \n\nContract 2250-1 will be only a few days behind schedule. 22. \n\nWould have been possible to have delivered the 300-horsepower \nmotors at the times called for in contract 1867-a. 33. \n\nGovernment wanted them to continue with the production of \nsmaller motor. 34. \n\nDiscussed the matter personally with Lieut, Emmons and indi- \ncated that they were desirous of going ahead on this contract, \nand that company were thoroughly confident as to the utility \nof motor for military purposes and as to its soundness as a \nmechanical device, but were willing to abide by the depart- \nment\'s decision as to what company should do. 38. \n\n\n\n214. ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nGeokge Harrison Houston \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nProceed slowly, through the minimum of expense, to carry on \nthe production of experimental engines and the preparation \nof all the details of design until the signing of contract 1867-c \non May 11. 42. \n\nContract No. 1487 was for 500 motors at a fixed price of $5,500 \neach. 48. \n\nContract No. 2250, November 13, 1917, for one thousand 150- \nhorsepower Hispano-Suiza motors was on a cost-plus basis, \nfixed on the estimated cost of $3,600 per motor, the profit being \n15 per cent of said $3,600. 48. \n\nIn latter part of March were directed by the Signal Corps to \nacquiesce in an increase in wages of workmen, amounting to \nabout 27 per cent, which would make an increase of about $280 \nper motor. 52. \n\nContract 2250-1 provided an estimated cost covering exactly \nsame items of expenditure of $3,200, instead of $6,600, with a \nfixed profit of 15 per cent of this amount. 53. \n\nContract 2250-2 had an estimated cost, under the same condi- \ntions, of $3,000, plus the amount that the labor had been in- \ncreased by the adjustment mentioned earlier. 54. \n\nContract 1867-a was on a cost plus fixed profit, plus 25 per cent \nsaving basis. The estimated cost was to be determined by \narbitration. The profit was to be 15 per cent on such estimated \ncost. 55. \n\nContract 1867-c set the estimated cost as $5,000 for the first \nthousand, with a profit of 15 per cent on this amount. 55. \n\nIn proposed contract 1867-d the estimated cost is adjusted at \n$4,000 and the penalty, which is provided in all of these con- \ntracts, whereby the contractor agrees to stand half of any cost \nin excess of 33 per cent above the estimated cost, is waived. 56. \n\nCost of production at New Brunswick has, in his opinion, been \nsubstantially higher than it would have been if, at the begin- \nning of their production last summer, they had been given a \ncontract for a sufficient quantity of motors to keep tham going \nfor the period of 12 months. 59. \n\nWere spending thousands of dollars every month for messenger \nservice and expressage for ordinary materials that they should \nhave been able to obtain normally if they had had their re- \nquirements specified far enough ahead of time. 60. \n\nMade continuous representations verbally and otherwise with \nrespect to the advantage that would be had by giving them \nlarger orders, and as a result of a series of conferences in \nJuly, 1917, the following correspondence passed between the \nAircraft Production Board and company. 60. \n\nCorrespondence. 61-72. \n\nThe Wright Co. was organized in 1909 for the purpose of manu- \nfacturing aircraft in this country and desired in 1915 to intro- \nduce into America foreign aeronautical motors. They con- \nsidered the motor situation to be the most difficult of all \nproblems facing aircraft production ; and to this end they sent \nabroad in the fall of 1915 Mr. H. M. Crane, their engineer, and \nMr. Henry Lockhart, jr., who was then president of the com- \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 215 \n\nGeorge Harrison Houston \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\npairy, and who is now associated with the Bureau of Aircraft \nProduction. These gentlemen returned in January of 1916 \nwith American rights for the manufacture of the Hispano \nSuiza motor. 74. \n\nIn order to take this license, the General Aeronautic Co. of \nAmerica was organized as a subsidiary of the Wright Co. and \nthe license was taken in its name. 74. \n\nIn addition to the right to manufacture this motor, these gentle- \nmen brought back a contract for the production of 450 of these \nmotors for the French Government, this order being a portion \nof the first lot of 850 which had ever been made. 75. \n\nThe price of this motor was very low and the order was taken \nin order to obtain American rights, the acceptance of the order \nbeing one of the conditions upon which the French Govern- \nment would permit of the removal from France of the en- \ngineering data necessary to its production. 75. \n\nThe delivery schedule for this French order was to be com- \npleted by the late summer of 1916, but, as a matter of fact, on \nthe 1st of the following May less than 25 had been shipped. \n76. \n\nThinks reason for delay was because an article of the finest \nworkmanship and material and entirely new to American \nshop practice was being undertaken. 76. \n\nIt has been estimated that company lost in the development \nand production of this motor prior to May 31, 1917, $1,269,000 \nand has lost in production of these motors since that date a \nvery large additional sum. 77. \n\nIn October, 1917, were in a position to put this motor into large \nproduction just as rapidly as they could obtain the machinery, \nmake the tools, and secure the material. 81. \n\nIf they had received orders in July, 1917, for 7,000 motors of \nthis type, believes they could have produced them by July, \n1918. 82. \n\nHave not had any advances from the Government or financial \nhelp of any kind up to this time. 82. \n\nUnder these contracts expect to obtain an advance through the \nWar Credits Board, based upon the property of the corpora- \ntion, of $7,500,000 of additional working capital. 82. \n\nHave been able to carry a cash balance of about $1,500,000 dur- \ning the entire past year. 83. \n\nFrom July, 1917, to July, 1918, have actually produced in New \nBrunswick plant approximately 2,500 Hispano-Suiza motors, \nexclusive of the motors for the French Government. 84. \n\nContracts of the 2,250 series have gradually increased the out- \nput required to 20 motors per day. 85. \n\nHave stood ready at all times, under proper conditions, to pro- \nvide such facilities in whatever quantities were necessary to \nmeet the Government\'s demands for these motors. 86. \n\nIt would have been just as simple to have laid out the plant for \n30 motors per da3^ at the beginning and would have saved all \nthe other work. 87. \n\n\n\n216 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nGeorge Harrison Houston \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nLetter from Finance Department, Equipment Division, of Sig- \nnal Corps to Wright-Martin Co., relative to development \ncosts. 90. \n\nExpected to make out of these two contracts about $2,000,000. \nExpected to recoup for their past losses. 93. \n\nQ. That is, the two contracts aggregating 1,000 motors? \xe2\x80\x94 \nA. Yes. But, as a matter of fact, 500 of these motors \xe2\x80\x94 one \ncontract for 500 of them \xe2\x80\x94 was canceled; so that we lost the \nopportunity of recouping on this contract and we had to look \nfor relief to later cost-plus contracts, except for something \nless than a million dollars that we ultimately made as profit \non contract 1187. 93. \n\nUndertook something that had never been undertaken before in \nAmerica, and something which on the Liberty motor develop- \nment was undertaken onlv by the L^nited States Government. \n91. \n\nStrongly recommended that the Aircraft Production Board \navoid giving contracts for the geared motor and go directly to \nthe 300-horsepower direct drive. The board took this matter \nunder advisement, and late in September we were told that \ninstructions from Gen. Pershing made the placing of an order \nfor 1,000 of the geared motors imperative. 101. \n\nThis contract was placed and signed October 2 and canceled on \nNovember 13. Was followed by the contract for the 3,000 \n300-horsepower motors. 101. \n\nGives history of Hispano-Suiza engine, 105. \n\nWhile we were producing these 450, the Hispano Co. of Spain \norganized another French factory near Paris and began the \nactive manufacture of this motor. It quickly became the lead- \ning motor in France, and up to the present time its manufac- \nture has been introduced into 15 different factories in France, \n2 in England, and the parent factory in Spain. 107. \n\nThe Hispano motor of the direct drive, and later of the geared \ndrive, was used in a number of planes of both the pursuit and \nday-bombing types, but its great work has always been in a \npursuit plane, the one application being that of the Spad, de- \nveloped and engineered by a Frenchman named Berchereau. \n109. \n\nWould have produced the 300-horsepower motors for delivery \nearly in the year 1918, and by this time could have been produc- \ning from five to seven hundred per month. 113. \n\nThere are a number of plants in this country that could have \nproduced these motors successfully. 114. \n\nThe Pierce- Arrow Co. has just completed a contract for the pro- \nduction of 5,000 Hispano-Suiza 300-horseopwer motors under \na sublicense from this company. 121. \n\nMade a proposition to the Signal Corps for the production of \n9,450 of these motors, but, as we would not consider taking \nthem on anything but a cost-plus basis, our contract has been \nlimited to 5,000. 123. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 217 \n\nGeorge Harrison Houston \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nHave taken the position that a $10,000,000 corporation could not \nsafely take $120,000,000 worth of work on a fixed-price basis \nin war time with anything like a reasonable percentage of \nprofit and be safe in so doing. 123. \n\nHispano-Suiza patents are not included in the cross-license agree- \nment. 126. \n\nAs soon as we saw we had sufficient business to make it possible \nwe entered into negotiations with the Hispano-Suiza Co., \nupon our own initiative, and by their own sense of fairness we \nwere told to reduce this royalty to 1,200 francs per motor for \na quantity of 4,000 motors. 126. \n\nHispano-Suiza people are willing to accept, under proper condi- \ntions, a contract all of which is in accordance with our present \nconditions and royalties on 150, 180, or 300-horsepower motors, \nfor the United States, not to exceed 600 pesetas for each, a \npeseta being valued at the present time at 27 cents, as com- \npared with a franc, which is valued at approximately 20 cents. \nThat was on the first 4,000 motors, and for the following 4,000 \nmotors 300 pesetas per motor; and for all motors after a \ntotal of 12,000 thus produced 150 pesetas each, thereby re- \nducing the royalty to almost a negligible point. 127. \n\nThe Splitdorf magneto used on Hispano-Suiza motor. 128. \n\nNet work of company at present moment is approximately $10,- \n000,000. It is all invested in the manufacture of Hispano- \nSuiza motors except about $800,000 net book value of its \nWright patents unabsorbed by royalties and about half a mil- \nlion dollars still tied up in automobile inventories. 131. \n\nAnalysis of schedule of public vouchers of company inserted in \nrecord. 132. \n\nStatement of royalties paid Hispano-Suiza Co. 135. \n\nSeventy-five to one hundred thousand dollars allowed and paid \nby the Government for the outlay for materials and machinery \nand labor under contract 1867 for 4,000 geared motors, which \nwas canceled. 136, 137. \n\nCompany has earned about a million and a half dollars under \ncontract 2250, and on earlier contract, 1487, about $800,000. \n141, 142. \n\nFor the period ending March 31, 1918, the compensation paid for \nGoethals & Co.\'s supervision, other than a percentage of the \nprofits, was $50,000 per year. Beginning March 31, 1918, this \npercentage was increased to $150,000 per year, due to the en- \nlargement of the program and responsibilities incurred and to \nthe introduction into the organization of two additional repre- \nsentatives of Goethals & Co. 143. \n\nGives salaries of other executive officers of the corporation. 145. \nGeorge Harrison Houston (New Brunswick, N. J., July 29, 1918; \nBook 14). \n\nCorrespondence between Signal Corps and Wright-Martin Cor- \nporation relative to building planes for the \xe2\x80\xa2 Government. \n160-168. \n\n\n\n218 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nGeorge Hakrison Houston \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nWere particularly interested in the supplying of planes to use \nthe Hispano-Suiza motor, and had in mind the advisability or \npossibility of building pursuit machines similar to those using \nthe Hispano-Suiza motor abroad. 171. \n\nFile of correspondence relative to the Hispano-Suiza engine. \n175-228. \nHenry M. Crane (Wright-Martin Aircraft Corporation, New Bruns- \nwick,^. J., July 29, 1918; Book 14). \n\nChief engineer and vice president of the Wright-Martin Air- \ncraft Corporation. 228. \n\nHas been chief engineer since company was formed under pres- \nent arrangement, and vice president for about three months. \n228. \n\nFirst interested in aeronautical motors in 1910 or 1911. 229. \n\nGives business experience. 229. \n\nWas in Europe w T ith Mr. Lockhard when contract was made for \nHispano-Suiza motor. 230. \n\nExplains why it took so long to complete French contract. 233. \n\nNo plant can reach a production of 40 a day on an order for \n1,000. 238. \n\nNo foundry in this country was then willing, even if capable of \nmaking aluminum castings such as were required to success- \nfully manufacture the motor. 240. \n\nHad solved all the important difficulties, and were actually pro- \nducing motors, but not in large quantities, in June, 1917. 242. \n\nThe Hispano-Suiza engine is adapted primarily to the Spad \nmachine, designed by the French Government, and used in \n1916 in France, when it was first brought out. It was also \nadapted to the SE-5 plane, which was brought out in England \nin actual use last summer. 24. \n\nMr. Houston has been giving 15 hours a day to this company. \n250. \n\nMakes statement regarding motor-design situation. 252. \n\nHave had in the work of developing the Hispano-Suiza motors \nthe advantage of their own plans and their own engineering, \nwithout any direction from the Government. 258. \n\nEegarded it as an advisable project to design and build the \nLiberty motor. 266. \n\nGovernment have under development at the present time a \nBristol fighting machine. It is that general size and type of \nmachine to take either the 300-horsepower Hispano or the \n8-cylincler Liberty. 269. \n\nMakes further statement in regard to Liberty motor. 271. \n\nUnderstands some of the early Liberty motors sent over with the \nold lubricating system proved to be defective. 276. \n\nThe lubricating system, which was found to be defective, was \ninstalled as a result of a great many years of experience of \nMaj. Hall. 278. \n\nThe use of a 21-cylinder Liberty in the English Bristol plane \nwas impossible. 279. \n\nThe Bristol machine was designed to take a motor of about 220- \nhorsepower weighing slightly over 600 oounds, with a corre- \nsponding weight of gasoline, the flying weight being about \n2,750 pounds. 279. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCKAFT INVESTIGATION. 219 \n\nHenry M. Crane \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nThe 300-horsepower Hispano could have been used in\'the single- \nplace fighting machines successfully. I do not think the 12- \ncylinder Liberty can. They can both be used in the two-place \nfighting- machines. 280. \n\n" The Liberty motor to-day, in my opinion, is the best motor of \nits type in the world, all things considered, the reason being \nthat we have a large production, and I do not think we could \nhave gotten a large production on the Rolls-Koyce, the only \nother motor equal to it in quality." 282. \n\nOne hundred and eighty horsepower Hispano-Suiza engine is \nused for fighting in single seaters exclusively. 290. \nJames H. Anderson (Wright-Martin Aircraft Corporation, New \nBrunswick, N. J., July 29, 1918; Book 14). \n\nVice president in charge of finance and accounts of the Wright- \nMartin Aircraft Corporation. 292. \n\nTreasurer of the George W. Goethals Co., and is one of those \nassigned to the management of the Wright-Martin plant. 292. \n\nTook active charge on June 1, 1918. 292. \n\nBeen connected with the plant since September 26 in a systema- \ntizing capacity in the factory. 293. \n\nHas a Mr. Isenberg connected with the plant as assistant factory \nmanager. 295. \nEmmet S. Kyte (Wright-Martin Aircraft Corporation, New Bruns- \nwick, N. J., July 29, 1918; Book 14). \n\nHas been employed at plant since May 16. 297. \n\nFormerly in the United States Treasury Department. 297. \n\nCame there to assume charge of the plant-protection phase of \nthe plant on behalf of the company. 297. \n\nFive alien enemies now employed in plant. 299. \n\nAbout 125 Austrians and Hungarians employed in plant. 302. \n\nDoes not know whether these five Germans have permission to \nremain in plant. 303. \n\nAmerican Protective League not organized in plant to his knowl- \nedge. 305. \nHorace Melville Benstead (New Brunswick, N. J., July 29, 1918; \nBook 14). \n\nCommissioned in the Army on January 11. Was a civilian em- \nployee from November 1, 1917. 320. \n\nPrior to entering the Government service, was auditor and as- \nsistant secretary of the Edison Storage Battery and other \nEdison allied interests of West Orange. 320. . \n\nUpon entering Government employ was assigned to Detroit \nlearning the cost-plus contracts. 320. \n\nWas there one month and then assigned to the Wright-Martin \nAircraft Corporation as accounting officer at New Brunswick, \nand has been there since December 4, 1917. 321. \n\nHas charge of all the reimbursements to the Wright-Martin \nCorporation, to certify to their correctness. 321. \n\nProduces statement showing the total amount paid to this com- \npany by the Government under the various heads under which \nthese payments are divided which was marked Benstead Ex- \nhibit No. 1, July 29, 1918. 322. \n\nWashington office expenses disallowed by Government. 323. \n\n\n\n220 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nHorace Melville Benstead \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nPaid executive salaries tentatively, subject to a ruling of the \nfinance board of the Signal Corps. 324. \n\nList of salaries of Wright-Martin Aircraft Corporation marked \nBenstead Exhibit 2, July 29, 1918. 325. \n\nStatement of payments made under contract 1867 produced by \nwitness and marked " Benstead Exhibit 3, July 29, 1918." 331. \n\nHis contention that the Government owns the investment at \nLong Island City, getting in from the Wright-Martin Co. for \na certain figure. 335. \n\nContractor claims that the labor increase made effective on \nMarch 18 was beyond its control and that it should be paid for \nby the Government and excluded from their cost in the com- \nputation of the bonus for savings effected. 337. \n\nCost of producing the 150-horsepower Hispano-Suiza motor ap- \nproximately $2,900 in January and $2,600 in February. 342. \nWilliam F. McGuire (New Brunswick, N. J., July 29, 1918; \nBook 14). \n\nVice president of Wright-Martin Aircraft Corporation as one \nof the representatives of Goethals & Co. 34. \n\nLooks after the production and arrangement of machinery, \ntools, etc. At present time specially engaged in the work of \nthe Long Island plant. 347. \n\nSupposed to deliver 50 engines of 300 horsepower in Long Island \nplant in September and he thinks they will do it. 349. \nJames L. McCartney (New Brunswick,\' N. J., July 29, 1919; \nBook 14). \n\nHolds position of draft clerk. Has charge of all draft matters \nconnected with the employees of plant, 355. \n\nAbout 800 men in plant have industrial exemptions granted to \nthem. 355. \n\nThese men are motor assemblers and machinists, 358. \nAlbert J. C. De Belleuse (New Brunswick, N. J., July 29, 1918; \nBook 14). \n\nEmployed by Duesenberg Motor Co., Elizabeth, N. J. 359. \n\nPreviously employed in the Long Island plant of the Wright- \nMartin Corporation. 359. \n\nHad charge of the inspection of their tests for the Government. \n359.^ \n\nBorn in France and came to America in 1910. 361. \n\nKnew the man who had charge of the French commission, who \ntold him he would give him a job. Had never had anything \nto do with motors before. 361. \n\nThinks production in Wright-Martin plant was stimulated by \ninvestigation of Mr. Borglum. 366. \n\nCompany ordered overtime when it was unnecessaiy. 367. \n\nWhen they got into the heaviest production the Sunday work \nwas discontinued. 370. \n\nPrince Poniatowski is the representative of the Hispano-Suiza \nCo. 370. \n\nStates there was a wastage of $15,000 a week since January 1 in \nthe foundry department, 375. \n\nWere putting young men in charge of departments after one or \ntwo months\' apprenticeship. 378. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 221 \n\nAlbert J. C. De Belleuse \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nLouis Shuck, foreman in the connecting-rod department, was \nnot a citizen. 387. \nThomas H. Sedley (New Brunswick, N. J., July 29, 1919; Book 14). \nSuperintendent of foundry. 393. \nIn business for 15 years in the aluminum line. 393. \nHas been no more wastage in foundry operations than was abso- \nlutely necessary. 394. \nHans O. C. Isenberg (New Brunswick, N. J., July 29, 1918; Book \n\n14 )- \n\nAssistant factory manager of Wright-Martin Corporation. 395. \n\nHeld that position since June 10. 395. \n\nCame with the Wright-Martin Co. on December 1, 1917. 393. \n\nWas formerly chief engineer and production manager of the \nScripps-Booth Corporation in Detroit. 395. \n\nWent through a postgraduate course in Berlin on gas engines. \n397. \n\nIn 1908 was chief engineer in production in Germany, in auto- \nmobile factories. 398. \n\nLeft Germany in 1911 and went to Wilkes-Barre, Pa., as chief \nengineer of the Matheson Automobile Co. 398. \nOrland J. Ridenour (New Brunswick, N. J., July 29, 1918; Book \n14). \n\nFor three years was general manager of the Star Suspension \nPulley Co. 423. \n\nCame with Wright-Martin Aircraft Co. on March 5, 1918. 423. \n\nReceived instructions from the Chief of the Military Intelli- \ngence Department in Washington that alien enemies were not \nto be employed at plant. 424. \n\nThey are kept on because some of them were employed by this \nplant long before the war and were shop foremen and high- \ngrade mechanics who are difficult to replace. 425. \nCharles R. Sarin (New Brunswick, N. J., July 29, 1918; Book 14). \n\nHas been in the service since February 4, 1918. 444. \n\nPrior to that was an accountant with Montgomery, Ward & Co., \nChicago. 444. \n\nUpon entering the service was sent to the Packard Motor Co., \nDetroit, remaining there six weeks. 445. \n\nCame to New Brunswick on March 22. 445. \n\nHas been in charge of spare sales. 445. \n\nMakes audit of exemptions from draft of employees of Wright- \nMartin Corporation. 445. \nJalma West (Curtiss Airplane & Motor Co., Buffalo, N. Y., July 30, \n1918; Book 15). \n\nAgent in charge of the military intelligence plant production \noffice in Buffalo. 1. \n\nMr. Edmund Leigh, chief of the plant protection of the military \nintelligence. 1. \n\nHis office is Col. Churchill\'s office in Washington, who is Chief \nof Military Intelligence. \n\nWas immigrant inspector for nine years. 3. \n\nWas sworn into the service on the 16th of October, 1917. 4. \n\nInvestigating parties who had been accused of being connected \nwith German propaganda. 5. \n\n\n\n222 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". \n\nJalma West \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nGoes to Buffalo to the Curtiss plant. 6. \n\nFound things in a demoralized state. 6. \n\nOne could enter the Curtiss plant without being properly iden- \ntified. 7. \n\nHundreds of employees that were idle, doing nothing. 7. \n\nLack of system and interest in production. 8. \n\nCurtiss Co. had six plants in Buffalo. 8. \n\nPresents statement giving summary of conditions since he came \nto Buffalo. (" West Exhibit 1, July 30, 1918.") 10. \n\nRecommends better fire and police protection. 11. \n\nHands over report on sabotage, marked "West Exhibit No. 2, \nJuly 30, 1918." 12. \n\nBristol Fighter was found, on February 19, 1918, with radiator \nbracket tampered with; vital part of it bored and filled with \nlead. 12. \n\nHad never been reported to Col. Van Deaman. chief of military \nintelligence. 14. \n\nTakes damaged bracket to Senator Overman. 14. \n\nLeaves memo on his chief\'s desk telling him what he has \ndone. 15. \n\nProduces five letters received through the Washington office \nfrom Senator Overman. 16-29. \n\nVarious questions had been brought up and arguments regarding \nthe poor material put into the Bristol Fighter, carelessness in \nconstruction of the same, which would go to make a faulty \nmachine when it is finished. 32. \n\nPresents report of Mr. Manley Harrison, who did wiring on the \nmachine, marked " West Exhibit 9, July 30, 1918." 32-33. \n\nPresents report by Victor O\'Neill in relation to material, pur- \nchase and rejection of steels and steel tubing for the Bristol \nmachine. 33. \n\nThis report marked " West Exhibit No. 10, July 30, 1918." 33. \n\nMain facts in this report show that the manner of drawing steel \nfrom the steel depot made it possible for the United States \nGovernment to pay for the steel more than once. 34. \n\nMr. O\'Neill erased the former purchaser\'s name from the slip \nand substituted his own. 36. \n\nThings in such a demoralized condition from the standpoint of \nrecords it was impossible to verify anything. 37. \n\nCol. Woods in Buffalo making an investigation of the Curtiss \nplant. 38. \n\nGave him a copy of all the reports he has just submitted. 39. \n\nStates he was told that Lieut. Col. Arthur Woods was making \nthis investigation at the instance of the Signal Corps. 39. \n\nStatement by Alex. H. Beggs, marked "West Exhibit No. 7," \ntells of the lack of effort to speed up production. Men sleep- \ning under their desks in broad daylight. Could have gone to \nsleep on the general foreman\'s desk and no one would have \nsaid anything. 40. \xe2\x80\xa2 \n\nMr. Beggs refers in this statement to a letter to Mr. West in \nwhich he says he has not had three days\' work during the \nthree months he has been out there. 41. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 223 \n\nJalma West \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nStates that on one occasion, accompanied by Mr. Sweeney, chief \nof police, they observed five men pushing one truck ; observed \nthem for half an hour or more going from place to place and \nresting a while and then coming back. Nothing on the \ntruck. 42. \n\nFound 9 or 10 men sitting on barrels in one end of this plant; \nwhen questioned, laugh at you and walk away to another \nspot. 42. \n\nMr. Mueller, the chief engineer, parents German born. 44. \n\nMany reports to show his father strong pro-German. 44. \n\nCharles H. Webber, parents German born. 44. \n\nMr. Hoffman, parents German born. 45. \n\nMr. Schwebel, parents German born; assistant to Mr. Web- \nber. 45. \n\nMr. West is asked about Capt. Oakleaf, which is the equivalent \nof Eichenbaum, who is representing the Government in con- \nnection with wood matters. 47. \n\nLearns from his associates that his parents are German born; \nthat he gloated over the sinking of the Lusitania, etc. 47. \n\nTurns his report in to his chief, Edmund Leigh, and is called \nbefore a board of officers to pass upon Oakleaf\'s application \nfor a commission. 48. \n\nIn spite of this he is commissioned first lieutenant and later a \ncaptain. 48. \n\nThe two officers that interrogated him were in the uniform of \nmajors. 48. \n\nMr. Leigh was present. 49. \nCyril R. Cobttrn (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buf- \nfalo, N. Y., July 30, 1918; Book 15). \n\nResides, Buffalo. \n\nHad charge or performed a part of the inspection of planes \non the various models. 52. \n\nWas in charge of the North Elmwood plant and of the Churchill \nStreet plant on the J. N. models and on the Bristol here. .52. \n\nIs then assigned to the production end. 52. \n\nChange from the Bristol machine on account of so many fall- \ning. 54. \n\nRelates two accidents occasioned by the Bristol macrine. 54. \n\nAfter 120 changes supposed the machine was about where they \nwanted it. 55. \n\nLiberty motor too heavy for the wing area. 56. \n\nShipped 25. 57. \n\nThe 124 changes took place after the first 25 had been shipped. \n58. \n\nCompany get the Bristol model along in August, and 25 planes \nonly are produced in the next 4 months. 59. \n\nDue to " faulty workmanship." 59-61. \n\nA very good percentage of the wood was rejected because it \nwas not well dried in the kilns, 62. \n\nSignal Corps allowed them a plus-and-minus of a thirty-second \nof an inch. 62. \n\nExplains this more fully. 63. \n130687\xe2\x80\x9419 15 \n\n\n\n224 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION\'. \n\nCyril E. Coburx \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nNever seemed to be able to get metal parts made right. 65.. \n\nPoor workmanship on them. 66. \n\nDrill double holes in the wood, splitting the wood. 68. \n\nMan that did this work makes no explanation. 68. \n\nSomething of this sort all the time. 69. \n\nFinds difficulty with the wiring. 70. \n\nDefective installation. TO. \n\nDanger of igniting the fumes of the gasoline. 71. \n\nFirst machine destroyed had two fires on it within an hour of \neach other. 71. \n\nBattery in wrong position ; underneath the gas tank. 73. \n\nMr. Coburn suggested to them to put a leather cover on the; \nbattery in case of a drip of gasoline. 74. \n\nDid not do this, and also run the motor without the manifold on \nit, 74. \n\nThe second fire was due to ignition from the wiring. 75. \n\nThis happened on the 28th of March. 78. \n\nHad been working on the Bristol Fighter ever since he had been \nthere down to this time. 78. \n\nIt seemed to him that there was more idleness than was neces- \nsary. 78. \n\nMade training planes at the Churchill plant. 79. \n\nCharts supplied by Government from June, 1917, to June, 1918, \nshow approximately 2,553 training planes as having been \nshipped by the Curtiss Co. 80. \n\nThese were produced at Churchill Street largely. 80. \n\nThings went better over at the Churchill Street plant. 81. \n\nGo ahead on building plane No. 2. 91. \n\nFirst machine had six or seven flights, otherwise would have \nbeen sent abroad in this condition and the accident would have \nhappened on the front. 92. \n\nGot out second machine in 10 days. 96. \n\nThis machine fell at Dayton. 97. \n\nThe third, up to the sixth, were shipped to Dayton. 97. \n\nThinks remaining 19 were gotten out in 6 to 8 weeks. 98. \n\nHave had six falls at the North Elmwood plant since the 1st of \nJune. (The first one, two men were killed in. This due to \nweakness of the fabric used in the first 25 machines.) 99. \n\nEelates details of the other five falls. 100-103. \n\nOne hundred and twenty-five changes on the second order for \nthese planes and now finally discarded. 104. \n\nContemplate building the S. E. Five machine. 104. \n\nSame organization to build this new plane as with the Bristol \nwith chances of a similar result. 105. \n\nGives as his observation at the Curtiss plant that the Curtiss \npeople have been very prone to put things over and see just \nhow near they could come to getting things right and still get \nthem across, etc. 106. \n\nUsed wood that they knew would produce defective plane, be- \ncause it had passed Army inspection, and that relieved them \nof the responsibility. 108. \n\nThey did not seem to be able to work close to the blue print. 108. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 225 \n\nCyril E. Cobttrn \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nMr. Kepperley and Mr. Guy in charge of this North Elmwood \nplant. 108. \n\nMr. Mueller is chief engineer for the production of the Bristol \nmachine, and is engineer also of the J. N. models. 109. \n\nMr. Heatley Green was district manager for the Government. \n111. \n\nMaj. Moore in charge of production. 113. \n\nMr. Cole is district manager, having general supervision. 113.. \n\nCapt. Eding is manager of production. 114. \n\nCapt. Weller is chief of inspection under the direction of Maj- \nMoore. 114. \n\nShould have been Government control in this plant. 114. \n\nBristol fighter was adapted from the Bristol in England. 116. \n\nIt practically lost its identity in this country. 116. \n\nMr. Mueller was largely responsible for various changes of de- \nsign. 116. \n\nImagines it was done at the request of the Government, as the \nBristol plane could not possibly carry the Liberty motor. 116.. \n\nMr. Butts and Mr. Green were in constant conference with Mi\\ \nMueller when it was under construction. 117. \n\nDefects of Bristol fighter due both to defects in design and \nmanufacture. 117. \n\nWas abandoned on Mr. Landon\'s advice. 118. \n\nThinks before it was abandoned it would have paid to go a little \nfurther into experimental work. 118. \n\nOne hundred were ready for completion when it was abandoned. \n119. \n\nIn the shape they were getting stock in, they would have been \nable to put out 100 of them within the next, say, six weeks. \n122. \n\nHere is where he thought the Government should have stepped \nin and stopped the defective work. 122. \n\nCould have been utilized at least on this side by the men learn- \ning to fly instead of having to wait until they reached the other \nside to learn. 122. \n\nEnough material scrapped of some kinds to build 50 planes, of \nother material, enough has been scrapped to build 500 planes. \n123. \n\nThis material can not be utilized entirely in other planes. 123. \n\nMeans a loss running into millions of dollars. 123-124. \n\nHe personally gave a stop order for certain work still going on \nand two weeks later in going through the metal shop found \nthey were still making them and sending them through vari- \nous operations and working overtime. 124. \n\nOrder had never gone any further than the engineering depart- \nment. 124. \n\nAll the labor and material of these 10 days was lost. 125. \n\nThis change in the bracket that holds the synchronizer, oil pump,, \nand air pump had been communicated to Mesner. 125. \n\nLack of cooperation the plaint among the various departments. \n126. \n\n\n\n226 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nCyril E. Cobttrn \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nThey would get an order for 500 parts and go on making them \nuntil somebody goes through and sees how many they have, \nwhen they would find 5,000 parts. 126. \n\nMr. Brooks designed the Libertv Battler, or at other times called \nthe Curtiss Battler. 130. \n\nSame situation now in connection with the production contem- \nplated here of a fighting plane that was present in connection \nwith the Bristol. 132. \n\nStates fully what was discovered in connection with the unneces- \nsary drilling of holes in the strut. 133. \n\nThis man had built fully 16 fuselages in this way. 136. \nCharles Eohlfs (Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Co.", Buffalo. X. Y., \nJuly 20, 1918; Book 15). \n\nBeen emplo} T ed in connection with the work of the Curtiss plant; \nsince February 5, 1918. \n\nIn the woodworking department ; senior inspector of wood parts. \n141. \n\nOn behalf of the Army. 141. \n\nWhen he came to the Curtiss plant, being used to shops, it looked \nlike things were running wild and loose. Lots of people with \nnothing to do but walk around and look out. 143. \n\nHas been nowhere but right at the North Elmwood plant. 143. \n\nOne man remarked to him, who had formerly worked for him : \n" Mr. Bohlfe, if this thing was run for the Kaiser himself, he \ncould not be running it to better advantage to himself than \nthese people are." 143. \n\nCreeping paralysis over the place, but what the cause of it was \ncould not tell. 144. \n\nObserved these conditions immediately, and same conditions still \nprevail, only they have more to do. 144. \n\nThere was nothing inherent in the difficulty of manufacturing \na new plane that accounted for these conditions, as any me- \nchanic knows all the old methods and processes. 146. \n\nStates that there was a model produced in January of 1918. and \nthat on this model 25 other machines were constructed. 148. \n\nHis son, who came up to fly the machine, was told he need not \nlook the machine over, 20 men had looked it over. 150. \n\nHe found the wings wrong in the first place, the front struts \nwere on behind, the control was wrong, which fact alone would \nhave resulted in his death. 150, 151. \n\nWings were defective in method of applying the canvas. Some- \nthing wrong with the stuff they had put on the ribs that hold \nthese in place, and it soaked through and made it soft, so that \nwhen there was a terrific force by the propeller against these \nwings it loosened the stuff and they were torn off. 154. \n\nHis son, with a fellow named Depew, discovered this. 155. \n\nCopy of the report of serious defects marked "Eohlfs Exhibit \nl/july 30, 1918." 156. \n\nMethod of using the glue all wrong. 163. \n\nTheir ability to make hydroplanes and their inability to make \nBristol fighters was because the former was a tried thing. 167. \n\nAnd further explained that the personnel of the organization \nwas afraid of the cars. 169. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 227 \n\nCharles Rohlfs \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nEven the hydroplanes went slowly enough. What took 2,000 \nhours to do then is now done in TOO. 169. \n\nThe whole thing inexplicable. 170. \n\nAgain asked why a plant that is the oldest in this line of work, \nsuccessfully making planes before this country entered the \nwar, and where you would suppose the best work could be \ndone, has been the most lamentable failure. 171. \n\nWhat they made before was Curtiss output and the Curtiss \noutfit. The results to be seen at Churchill Street plant. 171. \n\nMr. Glen Curtiss, a man named Coleman, an engineer, and Kirk- \nman, an engineer, are at Mineola. 172. \n\nWere not here long enough to get into this at all. 172. \n\nBad results from kiln drying for a long time. 176. \n\nThe kilns under Government control. 176. \n\nDid not cause much delay in production. 177. \n\nWere holding back work by the ignorance of methods of pro- \nduction. 177. \n\nHe secured information from Capt. Eogers, English repre- \nsentative here, that the SE-5 was the very latest of that \ntype of machine and that it had done wonderful service. \n178. \n\nWorking on experimental stuff, and they are going desperately \nslow. 178. \n\nThought the Bristol should have been discarded, as it was \nwrong, especially in connection with the Liberty motor. 179. \n\nOverproduction of parts. 184. \n\nSays the Government is not going to allow for any of the over- \nproduction of parts. 184. \n\nCites an instance of an order being given to supply a shortage \nof 950 of certain things when there are already 600 in the \nstoreroom. 186. \n\nSome of the men who were enthusiastic and interested to do \nsomething overreached, and the thing was delayed and de- \nlayed and not one thing produced. 188. \n\nThey have not seen anything good come out of Washington \nthere. 191. \n\nInefficient, and perhaps their argument would be to anything \xe2\x80\x94 \n" Well, I have not read up on that for several years." 191. \n\nPercentage of spruce lost, manufactured, has run from nothing \nonce in a while to 50 and 60 per cent in manufactured prod- \nucts. 193. \n\nCapt. Rogers, who represents the English Government, told \nhim in February that he had washed his hands of the Bristol \nmachine last November. 197. \n\nNovember, December, January they went on making this ma- \nchine that they should not have made. 197. \n\nThe Signal Corps directed them to keep on with the work. 198. \n\nMaj. Moore was supervising things at the plant at that time \nfor the Signal Corps. 198. \nJohx Hexry Wixterbottom (Curtiss Aeroplane Motor Co., Buffalo, \nN. Y., July 31, 1918; Book 15). \n\nEmploved at the Curtiss plant and working with the Navy on \nthe Naw costs. 200. \n\n\n\n228 ABSTEACT OF AIECEAET INVESTIGATION. \n\nJohn Henky Winterbottom \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nFirst worked at the South Elwood plant in inspection depart- \nment. 200. \n\nCame to the North Elmwood plant when it was first opened up \nfor construction proper. 201. \n\nHad inspection of all metal parts. 201. \n\nOne of the worst things he had to do with was the cases of \nwaste material and the manner in which they did the work. \n202. \n\nSome material had been set at an angle of 45\xc2\xb0, and it should \nhave been only at 30\xc2\xb0. Were going to put this piece of metal \nunder the die to straighten it without treating it, which would \ninjure the metal. These parts used. 202. \n\nStates the effect of using this material. 204-205. \n\nHis desk all cleaned out one night. 206. \n\nHad notes and data on this instance and other occurrences like \nit. 207. \n\nMr. Herman, superintendent of production, takes him over and \nhe has charge of drill-press and milling-machine department. \n209. \n\nIn his department, when they were not busy, they would take \nsheet metal and drill holes in the sheet metal, but down in the \npunch press would work at all kinds of standard parts, and \nthen an order would come for a change, and this would all \nhave to be thrown in salvage. 209. \n\nThis work undertaken without orders from the planning de- \npartment, but through an " S " order. 210. \n\nMr. Rogers gave these " S " orders, because he did not want to \nwait. 211-212. \n\nEvery time there was a change it affected the material some \nway or another. Either had to remachine the material on \nhand or had to scrap the material on hand or else to salvage \nit. 214. \n\nThis steel or excess material would be scattered around on the \nfloors, every once in a while be gathered up and put back in \nthe steel stores, and the Government in this way would pay \nfor it three or four times. 215. \n\nThere was no blank form or slip of any kind to return the \nmaterial on. 217. \n\nMr. Stubbs was in charge of the steel stores. 218. \n\nThis practice has been going on since plant was originated. \n223. \n\nMaterial was returned in this way to the steel stores once a \nmonth. 223. \n\nWhen any of this material was to be used again they would \nmake out a new issue slip for so much of a certain kind of \nmaterial, and the slip would not show it was material that \nhad been returned. 225. \n\nIs asked how it happened that the Government paid twice for \nthis material if the material it had passed was in the bins, \nand was simply returned and issued back under factory \norders. 226. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 229 \n\nJohn Henry Winterbottom \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nThinks that the Government does not pa}- for these materials \n\non the basis of inspection of the materials when it is put in \n\nstores, but on the basis of the issue slips, which are \n\nstamped when that material is issued to the different parts \n\nof the plant for production. 231. \nIf there is a reissue of the same material there is a repayment \n\nby the Government for the same material. 231. \nThe Government cost-notification slip comes through at the \n\nsame time the special issue slip comes through. 232. \nThis is a duplicate of the issue slip, is a notification to the Gov- \nernment office, a carbon copy of the original issue slip. 232. \nDescribes special issue slip. 232. \nTells how double payment by the Government could be avoided. \n\n233. \nThis practice only sto^^ed about two and a half months ago. \n\n233. \nIs asked to explain more fully how this special issue slip would \n\ncorrect this trouble. 235-239. \nIn all the production departments there was excess material \n\nlying around. 246. \n-Although it would be used up it would not be charged to proper \n\norders. Material was used for Army stuff and on Navy orders, \n\nand Curtiss would use it for tools, or to repair stuff for them- \nselves. 246. \nThe Army and Navy are given separate order numbers, and if \n\nyou issue it out on one and credit it to another you can not \n\nkeep the records straight. 247. \nAt one time there were 14 truck loads of excess material on the \n\nfloor Avhich went back to the steel stores without a cent of \n\ncredit, 248. \nThinks this was about five months ago. 248. \nIf this material is used while on the floor there is no record to \n\nshow where it has gone. 249. \nCites instances of material taken out for, say, Army work, and \n\nthen being used for some other work causing great confusion. \n\n249-254. - \nSpoke to Mr. McCaul, his superior, about the papers being rifled \n\nin his desk, but could get no information. 255. \nMr. Talbot t directed his transfer. 255. \nWhen material was bought specially for the Army and Navy \n\nit was entered oil the Army and Navy ledgers. 260. \nWhen material was not bought specially for the Army or Navy \n\nit was entered on the Curtiss ledgers. 260. \nMaterial bought specially for the Army or Navy would be paid \n\nfor outright. 260. \nSo the material that was bought for the Curtiss orders was the \n\nmaterial that was paid for subsequently on requisition slips. \n\n261. \nMr. Crawford was purchasing agent of all raw material. 262. \nMr. Douglas is present purchasing agent, 262. \nStates the raw material record would show what proportion was \n\n\n\nbought on general Curtiss orders. 264. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n230 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nJohn Henry Winterbottom \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nThe metal parts, fabricated parts, that do not come up to speci- \nfications go into the salvage department. 266. \n\nNo system is maintained by which a credit for salvage of dis- \ncarded parts can be had, because they did not have a part \ncost of any particular part. 266. \n\nIs asked to explain how these special issue slips for shortages \ncould be issued by anybody without any reference to the \norders proceeding from the planning department. 274b. \n\nIs transferred because he is holding up production. 278. \n\nRelates instance of a man turning out 1,000 parts after he has \nbeen notified by the foreman that work on this production \nwas to be stopped. 280. \n\nCommon occurrence to hear a man remark " I am acquainted \nwith the fact that this is not the proper way, but it is the \nway of the pro-German system." 287. \n\nExcess material left on the floor would be retained in the depart- \nment for which it was ordered, the tag thrown away, so in \ncase they scrapped some material this could be used to cover \nup their mistakes.. 291. \n\nOne thousand two hundred stop orders in March on the Bristol \nfighter. 309. \n\nThese changes were made about the time they were delivering \nthe 25 finished according to the accepted model. 311. \n\nMade unnecessary changes because a sample part was not made \nto embody all the changes that would be needed in that part \nbefore it went to production. 312. \n\nThis proved a good method of keeping the factorv emploved, \n313. \n\nThe persons in control of the engineering department should \nhave known that this system created work at the expense of \nthe Government. 315. \n\nThe whole matter can be reduced to a certainty by a study of \nthe card index. 315. \n\nMentions Mr. Essinger, who had charge of the control and \npower units of the card index, as a man who would be par- \nticularly informing as a witness. 316. \n\nThis matter was taken up with Mr. Mueller. 316. \n\nEnough parts have been produced and thrown away on account \nof this system to equip 600 planes. 317. \n\nThis can be verified in the card records which were at that time \nin Mr. Golden\'s department. 319. \n\nThe stock ledgers are intended to be a substantial inventory of \nthe parts in stock. They have a credit and a debit. 322. \n\nChanges all suggested at Washington. 327. \n\nAfter interview with Mr. Mueller, improvements were not made \nto avoid the waste that has been described. 336. \n\nInstead, he gets a letter from Mr. McCall that he should not \ntake matters of such importance over his head any more. \n336. \n\nSystem of timekeeping very lax. 340. \nWilliam Ward Moss (Buffalo,\' K Y., July 31, 1918; Book 15). \n\nVice president and comptroller of the Curtiss Aeroplane and \nMotor Corporation. 369. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 231 \n\nWilliam Ward Moss \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nRecommended to the Curtiss Co. for appointment to this office \n\nby the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Nav} 7 . \n\n371. \nWar Credits Board loaned the Curtiss Co. $8,000,000 and the \n\nNavy Department loaned them $3,900,000. 371. \nHad been previous advance of $3,500,000, which was repaid \n\nout of this last loan. 372. \nThis amount is secured by first mortgage on all of the fixed \n\nassets of the company. 375. \nThe only cost plus contracts the Curtiss people have are at the \n\nNorth Elmwood plant, 379. \nJN planes are all at the Churchill Street group. 330. \nFixed price for the JN-4D was $4,750. 382. \nSame price for the JN-4H. 382. \n\nMr. John N. Willys, president of the company. 396. \nJ. E. Kepperly, B. A. Guy, and Mr. Moss are on the finance \n\ncommittee. 397. \nMr. Wilson (C. B.) was in charge of production of all plants. \n\n398. \nUnder his direction Mr. Ericson is in charge of the North Elm- \nwood plant. 399. \nMr. C. M. Keyes, a broker of New York, is vice president of \n\nthe company. 401. \nHas not made an examination to ascertain whether estimate of \n\ncost was properly arrived at, because the accounting system \n\nwas incomplete when he arrived at the plant. 403. \nIn connection with the Bristol Fighter has only the total \n\namount of labor and of material and what that amounts \n\nto and not the actual cost. 405. \nThe Government has paid the Curtiss Co. to date on account of \n\nthe Bristol Fighter, approximately a million dollars. 408. \nThere is also probably a million and a half of unvouchered in- \nvoices that will represent Bristol material. 408. \nAsked to get a record of the amount of estimated cost of work \n\non the Bristol Fighter. 409. \nBristol program unsatisfactory from the start to finish. 410. \nOrder would come to build a certain number of planes which \n\nwould immediately be followed bv orders to discontinue. \n\n410. \nAsked to produce cancellation order. 411. \nOrder came from Mr. Landon. 412. \nHas not been asked yet, but will do so, to make a statement \n\nshowing the amount which will be lost to the company by \n\nreason of this cancellation. 412. \nThe principal loss to the company will be in holding up of pro- \nduction and loss in profit. 413. \nLoss to the company will be nothing in material and labor as \n\nthat is all absorbed by the Government. 413. \nHave new contracts w T ith the Navy Department for $7,000,000. \n\n414. \nAmounts to be paid by the Government under each contract is \n\non amount due for materials purchased and the actual labor. \n\n41(>. (The direct labor that goes into production.) \n\n\n\n232 ABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nWilliam Ward Moss \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nArmy and Navy accountants have agreed on an allowance of \nan arbitrary overhead, subject to adjustment. -116. (A cer- \ntain percentage of direct labor.) \n\nFor January, February, March, and April, 200 per cent. 416. \n\nFor May, 100 per cent 416. \n\nHave two overheads. An overhead that is confined to all the \nplants, and an overhead applying to particular plants. 417. \n\nGives salaries. 418. \n\nIn the agreement there is a provision that after $30,000,000 \nworth of work has been completed at the North Elmwood \nplant an appraisement will be made of the property and the \nGovernment will allow the difference between its value then \nand its cost. 419. \n\nVolume of work at the plant has been about $5,000,000 a month \nrecently. 419. \n\nCurtiss Co. has no experimental contract as distinguished from \nthe contract for planes and engines, excepting the building \nknown as the Liberty battler, which might be regarded as an \nexperimental contract. 419. \n\nWhen the Curtiss Co. buys material that is to be used in any \nof the Government contracts on the cost-plus contract it is \npaid upon the delivery of the material to the plant and the \nchecking up of the receiving slip and invoices. 421. \n\nExplains checking up of the receiving slips and the invoices. 422. \n\nSteel is bought in three different ways. 423. \n\nThe Curtiss Co. in general bought its material and paid for it \nand then used it for the orders to which it was applicable. \n424. \n\nIf the Curtiss Co. makes a general order for steel, they will be \nentitled to payment from the Government for the material \nwhen it is disbursed from the steel depot onto the production \nfloor. 424. \n\nNo billings have been made at the present time against the \nGovernment of any such materials. Now preparing a state- \nment or claim against the Government from the issue slips. 424. \n\nStates that the question of the course that is taken in connec- \ntion with the raw material, say, such as steel, is one of the \nbiggest accounting problems now in the course of being \nsolved. 425. \n\nStates the nature of an agreement between the Army and the \nNavy and the Curtiss Co. which provided for materials that \nwere purchased being kept in consolidated stores. 426. \n\nIn the final accounting the requisition slip will determine what \nhas been used and whatever has not been used of these pur- \nchases and the company will then have to account to the Gov- \nernment for their material, or for whatever difference there \nis. 439. \n\nBut if the whole amount is requisitioned then there is no ac- \ncounting back by the company. 439. \n\nCompany must still further account for it in production. 440. \n\nAccounts for it by issue slips. 440. \n\nHas had some labor thrown out on account of overwork after \nstop-production orders had been issued. 465. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 233 \n\nWilliam Ward Moss \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nProduces paper giving cancellation order for the Bristol ma- \nchine. Marked " Moss Exhibit 3, July 31, 1918." 481. (With \nletters and telegrams following.) \n\nCurtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation and Curtiss Aeroplane \nCo. are two companies of which a consolidation was effected \non January 1, 1918. 491. \n\nThe Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation held the sto^k of \nthe Curtiss Aeroplane Co., and the Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor \nCorporation was the operating company. 492. \n\nThe company set up a total reserve for taxes of $538,646.97. 496. \n\nHaskins & Sells set up $1,700,000, approximately. 496. \n\nHaskins & Sells report under date of March 30, 1918, for the \nvear ending December 31, 1917, was marked " Moss Exhibit \n8, July 31, 1918." 500. \n\nHaskins & Sells report under date of July 18, 1918, for the \nthree months ending March 31, 1918, was marked " Moss Ex- \nhibit 9, July 31, 1918." 501. \n\nCompany\'s own financial statement was marked "Moss Exhibit \n11, July 31, 1918." 501. \n\nCompany\'s last balance sheet produced by Mr. Moss under date \nof June 30, 1918, was marked "Moss Exhibit 12, July 31, \n1918." 501. \n\nBogey cost of Bristol Fighter originally $6,750. Its cost is \n$6,000, and the profit is $750, with a provision as to slight in- \ncrease in profit if they saved on the bogey. 507. \n\nMemorandum of conference held in the office of Maj. Brown, \nsubject to a call by Col. Deeds to consider ways and means of \nconsolidating the handling of raw stores (other than lum- \nber). 507-511. "Moss Exhibit No. 13, July 31, 1918." \n\nAgreement arrived at by the Navy and War Departments at \nBuffalo cancel above agreement. 512-519. " Moss Exhibit \nNo. 14, July 3, 1918." \n\nPaper sent by Mr. Kepperly with respect to the instructions \nsent in the agreement by the Navy and War Departments. \n521. \n\nFurther correspondence relating to these agreements. 524\xe2\x80\x94531. \n\nUnderstood that there were production orders issued, and that \nthe requisitions were based on those production orders. 532. \n\nIt took three ledgers, under the old plan, in order to balance \none account. 535. \n\nNone of the ledgers would balance. 537. \nW. W. Moss (August 1, 1918; Book 15). \n\nProduces contract, No. 2814, under date of January 19. 1918, \nrelating to advances made by the War and Navy Departments \non account of the current contracts. 540-544. Marked " Moss \nExhibit 19, August 1, 1918." \n\nAlso produces statement showing the disposition of Govern- \nment advances, continuing up to April 4, 1918. 544. Marked \n" Moss Exhibit 20, August 1, 1918." \n\nMortgage, securing the advance to the Curtiss Aeroplane & \nMotor Corporation was marked " Exhibit 21. Aug. 1, 1918." \n545. \n\n\n\n234 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nW. W. Moss\xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nReads into record letter addressed to Col. Thompson as president \nof the War Credits Board, under date of March 4, 1918, a \nsimilar letter being sent at the same time to the Secretary of \nWar and the Secretary of the Navy. Marked " Moss Exhibit \n22, 1918." 545-551. \n\nIn this letter of March 4, 1918, it states that " no physical inven- \ntory of stock has been taken since May, 1917." 552. \n\nAs no inventory was taken which would enable Haskins & Sells \nto make out their statement for the year ending December 31, \n\n1917, they made up their statement by the book records. 552! \nOn December 31, 1917, the funded debt of the company was a \n\ntotal of $7,441,000. 552. \n\nInventory of March 31 by Coates & Bertrand, of Chicago, com- \npared favorably with what was shown on the books, being \nwithin a few hundred thousand dollars. 555. \n\nHaskins & Sells\'s statement of March 31, 1918, on their general \nbalance sheet, shows a cost of sales as $10,012,218.96, being the \namount of outlays in January, February, and March. 555. \n\nMr. Moss produces statement entitled " Number of machines \nshipped during the year 1917." "Number of machines shipped \nduring the year 1918 to July 1," and on the second sheet \xe2\x80\x94 \n" Motor production during the year 1917 and motor production \nduring the year 1918 to July 1." These were marked " Moss \nExhibit 23, Aug. 1, 1918." 556. \n\nThe JN-4A was a primary training plane for the Army. 557. \n\nSome of the JN-4 planes were for the British Government. 557. \n\nOut of the total of approximately 4,100 planes that have been \nshipped from January 1, 1917, to July 1, 1918, about 600 were \nfor the Navy. 563. \n\nTwo hundred and forty-eight were on a cost-plus basis. 563. \n\nOut of approximately 484 shipped in the first six months of \n\n1918, that would leave about 240 shipped in 1918 for the Navy \nor for the British Government upon a flat price basis. 563. \n\nSix hundred and forty-three planes were called for by the Navy \n\non a cost-plus basis of the H. S. type. 564. \nDelivered 1 in January, 11 in March, 29 in April, 77 in May r \n\nand 135 in June. Up to July 31 a total of 344 shipped, so the \n\ndifference will be 97. 564. \nThe fact that they are up to Navy requirements in the deliveries \n\nis due to a substantial performance of their contract. 565. \nSo that, so far as the Navy planes are concerned, which have been \n\nmade in the North Eiwood plant on a cost-plus basis, they \n\nhave been substantially up to contract. 565. \nSubmits substance of the H. S. contract 33192 which is marked \n\n" Moss Exhibit 23, August 1, 1918." 565. \nAccording to the contract there is a provision that the Navy \n\nDepartment is to pay the Curtiss Co. a fixed profit of $1,625 \n\nfor each H. S.-l flying boat. 566. \nAnd further, that the estimated cost of the H. S.-l flying boat, \n\nf. o. b. contractor\'s works, crated for overseas shipment, etc., \n\nis $13,000. 566. \nFrom indications it would seem that there will be considerable \n\nsaving under the bogy cost of $13,000. 567. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIKCKAFT INVESTIGATION. 235 \n\nW. W. Moss \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nProbably will exceed $2,000. 568. \n\nNone of these planes have been returned and have not been ad- \nvised that any were defective. 568. \nTwo-thirds of the North Elwood plant was active during the \n\nfirst six months of 1918 in the attempted production of the \n\nBristol Fighter. 571. \nThe failure of the company in performance of its contract has \n\nbeen in connection with the Bristol Fighter. 573. \nHave not got their cost accounting system in relation to the \n\nH. S.-l, the Navy plane, in good shape yet. 574. \nMakes statement as of July 31 of moneys received from the \n\nNavy Department which shows that they are behind in their \n\naccounting and that they have done a great deal better in \n\nproduction than they have in accounting for the product. 575. \nThis is read into the record and marked " Moss Exhibit 25, \n\nAugust 1, 1918." 576. \nExplains method of keeping track of the labor that was done \n\nunder this cost-plus work. 579 to 582-583. \nProduces sheet showing the amount rejected for the Navy from \n\nFebruary 2 down to May 25, and for the Army from March \n\n16 to May 25. 583. \nNavy rejections seem to have been about three times as much \n\nfor the period covered by the Navy report as to the Army \n\nduring the period covered by the Army report. 583. \nThinks the explanation is that there was possible twice or three \n\ntimes as much work done for the Navy than for the Army. \n\n583. \nBoth the Army and the Navy had a complete staff of account- \nants. 584. \nWhen these rejections are reported they check them up and the \n\nNavy accountants on further examination and proof change \n\ntheir rejections. 585. \nClear, detailed statement of what happens in the checking up of \n\ntime and labor. 586-589. \nFactory records contain an account known as No. 98, into \n\nwhich all discrepancies or undetermined labor are entered, \n\npending further check-up. 589. \nPlant G, if the North Elmwood plant. 591. \nProduces some working papers, cumulative as to production, i. e., \n\nspecial orders charged against the Army and Navy, which \n\ncovers from January 5 to June 15. 591. \nThis statement shows the total pay roll for this period to have \n\nbeen $3,775,155.49. 592. \nThis covers the entire labor cost in Plant G, the North Elmwood \n\nplant, for that period, with the exception of the "Treas- \nurers\' roll." 592. \nThis outline of the method of distribution of overhead expense \n\nby the Curtiss Aero & Motor Corporation produced by Mr. \n\nMoss is marked "Moss Exhibit No. 28, August 1, 1918." 595. \nProduces paper which was marked "Moss Exhibit 29, August \n\n1, 1918," being "memorandum in re method of paying for \n\nlumber furnished bv the Government, under date of January \n\n8,1918." 603. \n\n\n\n236 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nW. W. Moss \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nProduces paper of the releases of the Bristol. 604. \n\nThis is read and marked "Moss Exhibit 30, August 1, 1918." \n604. \n\nThe other release produced by Mr. Moss was marked "Moss \nExhibit 31, August 1, 1918." \' 606. \n\nProduces copy of a letter of May 4 to the Navy Department, \nin connection with consolidated stores. This is read and \nmarked " Moss Exhibit 32, August 1, 1918." 607. \n\nProduces statement showing the number of employees. This is \njust the Buffalo plants and does not include the Hammonds- \nport plant. Is read and marked "Moss Exhibit 33, August \n1, 1918." 610. (This is under date of July 31, 1918.) \n\nThis is after a considerable reduction of the force. 610. \n\nProduces paper which shows the amount of purchases for orders \nfor the Bristol, down to July 20, carrying forward everything \nfrom the very beginning, October 31, 1917. 611. \n\nCalls attention to the fact that this is a purchasing-department \nrecord and not an accounting record. 613. \n\nThis record from the purchasing department will be subject \nto inaccuracies which ma} T be ascertained on audit. 614. \n\nThis record is marked " Moss Exhibit 34, August 1, 1918." 614. \n\nAnother exhibit is added showing material transferred to the \nBristol\'s use from the material that had been purchased gen- \nerally by the Curtiss Co. and not speciallv for the Bristol. 614. \n" Moss Exhibit No. 35, August 1, 1918." \n\nThe amount shown in Exhibit 35 should be added to the amount \nin Exhibit 34, which covers the entire material that has gone \ninto the Bristol or has been bought for the Bristol down to \nJuly 20. 616. \n\nAdding a month and a half\'s additional labor and overhead, \nfrom June 15 down to the time of the cancellation of the \norder for the Bristol, would add half a million dollars more. \n619. \n\nIn round figures the entire cost of the Bristol operations from \nJanuary 1, 1918, to the cancellation of the order, would be \napproximately $3,000,000, less what would be salvaged on \ndisposition of material. 620. \n\nProduces contract for Spad machines, marked "Moss Exhibit \n36, August 1, 1918." 621. \n\nProduces Bristol contract which is marked " Moss Exhibit 37, \nAugust 1, 1918." 622. \n\nThe first contract was canceled upon execution of the Bristol \ncontract. 622. \n\nContents of the Bristol contract on page \xe2\x80\x94 . 622. \nA letter showing that the iss^e slips were the basis of credit \nfor material was introduced in evidence and marked "Moss \nExhibit 38, August 1, 1918." 624. \nProduces copy of the contract allowing for special depreciation \nin connection with the North Elmwood plant at the comple- \ntion of the contract. Marked "Moss Exhibit 30, August \n1,1918." 625. \nThe contract \xe2\x80\x94 pages 626 to 631, inclusive. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 237 \n\nW. W. Moss \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nProduces extract from an agreement, dated September 19, rela- \ntive to certain machinery that was purchased by the Govern- \nment and is now owned by the Government and used by the \ncompany. 632. Marked " Moss Exhibit No. 40, August 1> \n1918." \n\nUnder the contract the Government furnished something over \n$1,000,000 worth. _ 635. \n\nTo this already estimated cost of the Bristol fighter from the \nbeginning to the cancellation would have to be added an \nundetermined item for special tools and outlay for machinery > \nand also whatever would be added to it under the head of \ndepreciation in connection with the North Elmwood plant. \n637. \n\nThe outlay of over $1,000,000 for machinery for the Bristol \nwould be largely recouped by the ability to use this machinery \nin connection with other orders. 638. \nRobert Daily (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Co., Buffalo, N. Y.> \nAugust 1, 1918; Book 15). \n\nGeneral factory accountant. 655. \n\nThe factory accountant under him, Frank A. Tooley (mentioned \nby Mr. Hughes on page 649), resigned through dissatisfac- \ntion. 656. \n\nMr. Tooley had the accounting of the plant subdivided into a \ngood many divisions, had a man in charge of those divisions \nwho reported immediately to him, such as the head time- \nkeeper and the storekeeper and bookkeeper and pay-roll de- \npartment, etc. 656-657. \n\nMr. Tooley had charge of all the labor cards and all the workmen \nat this plant. 657. \n\nQuit because he did not feel that the effort "to come across " \nwas worth while. 658. \n\nCurtiss Co. has paid men for six weeks\' work without having \nhad that work distributed to particular orders or contracts. \n659. \n\nIt is not distributed and filed or compiled in such a way that \nthey can invoice the Army or the Navy for the amount for \nwhich they ought to reimburse them. 659. \n\nProduces part of account known as No. 98 showing discrep- \nancies between the labor on the attendance-card basis and the \nlabor on the master-card basis. 660. \n\nProduces part of it as of the period up to Julv 15 showing a \ndebitof $436,022. 660. \n\nAccording to this account, taking the debit items down to May 1 \nto correspond to the different credit items to May 1, it shows \n$48,131 which had been expended by the Curtiss Co. for labor \nin the North Elmwood plant from January 1 to May 1 for \nwhich they had not been able to make a claim against the Gov- \nernment under any contract. 663. \n\nExclusive of the Treasurer\'s pay roll, the amount in total ex- \npended by the Curtiss Co. at the North Elmwood plant for \nlabor from Januarv 1 to May 1, 1918, Avas approximately \n$2,300,000. 665. \n\n\n\n238 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nEobert Daily \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nThis was all charged to Government work with the exception \nof $48,131. 665. \n\nIt might, of course, been charged to the Government on a flat- \nprice contract, but that would only be on the basis of the \nmaster card, showing the work done on the flat-price con- \ntract. 665. \n\nProduces attendance card. 667. \n\nOutlines the meaning of this card. 668. \n\nSo according to this system the}^ charged the total amount for \nwhich the employee was paid against something, unless there \nwas some lapse in their accounting, which would explain this \ndiscrepancy for the four months of $48,000. 669-670. \n\nStates they paid the employees entirely upon the attendance- \ncard basis. 670. \n\nThe way in which they were working during this time and \n\xe2\x80\xa2the way in which the work was distributed was shown on the \nvarious master cards. 670-671. \n\nAsked how he got the average of $25 a Aveek for employees. \n671. \n\nThis would mean that from January 1 to May 1, 1918, the full \ntime of 9 hours a day or 50 hours a week has been charged to \nsome kind of work for all the 5,000 people with the exception \nof the 120. 672. \n\nStates that no man could get out without a special pass. 672. \n\nThere is a fixed pass book, so that if a man is excused prior to \nthe regular quitting time it is supposed to be impossible for \nhim to get by a guard without this pass. 673. \n\nReports of Secret Service agents and by some of the people \ncaused them to be acquainted with the fact that men were \ngoing out without a pass. 674. \n\nDispatcher distributed the work on these master cards. 675. \n\nAround 70, some departments having more than 1. 675. \n\nRelied upon the appearance of the workman for a new job in \ndistributing the hours of labor among different orders. 675. \n\nThe dispatcher had nothing to show in order to establish that \nthe workman had worked all the time that was charged to a \nparticular order upon that card. 676. \n\nReporting for a new job was voluntary on the part of the work- \nman. 676. \n\nHave an idleness account in the overhead account in the factory \nledger. 677. \n\n" Idle time," " idle power," light, waiting for orders, etc. 678. \n\nSix idle accounts down to May 31 aggregate $31,450. 681. \n\nThis is included in the overhead expense. 682. \n\nThe $48,000, however, is entirely apart from this idle time and \nis an amount for which they can not account. 683. \n\nThe attendance card goes to the pay-roll department ; then it is \ntaken to the tabulating-machine department, holes punched \nin the card and compared with pay roll, and if it does not \nagree with the roll they compare each day\'s work. If the \nmaster card does not agree with that, it goes back on the job \nand they have to find out what happened. If they can not \nfind out what happened it goes in " 98 " (which shows the \nbalance of $48,000 down to May 31) . 686. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 239 \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2Stuart L. Mujlholland ( Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Corporation, \nBuffalo, N. Y., Aug. 1, 1918 ; Book 15) . \n\nIn charge of the general factory accounts of the Curtiss Co. \n\nplant at North Elmwood. 689. \nStarted with the company on March 30. 689. \nIn charge of labor and material distribution and expense ac- \ncounts. 689. \nTotal pay roll is distributed by accounts and by departments. \n\n690. > \nWas with Mr. Tooley in the record division before coming into \n\nthe factory accounting department. 690. \nThis division kept a record of all employees and passes issued \n\nand a record of their applications, and all elates pertaining to \n\nthe emploj^ees. 690. \nWas never complete half the time he was over there. 690. \nThere was confusion in any respect you wanted to look at it. 690. \nA lot of the records were lost. Great many instances where it \n\nwas impossible to trace a record of an employee. 692. \nFound that sometimes possibly 200 or 300 men would be without \n\npasses. 692. \nDid not believe that once a man was in he could get out without \n\nbeing observed. 693. \n\'Could not state that the men who were shown to be in attendance \n\nby the attendance card were always in the factory. 693. \nThis would come under the jurisdiction of the pay-roll depart- \nment. 693. \nPound that at the end of March there had been no distribution \n\nof labor among the various contracts with the Government \n\nfrom the 1st of January. 694. \nThat was a part of his duties when he went in there in April to \n\nsee that it was distributed. 694. \nThe machines automatically ascertain the money spent by the \n\nArmy or Navy. 696. \nWhen he took charge the cards showing the distribution had \n\nalready been filled out. 696. \nTells how the Labor Department distributed the time on these \n\ncards. 696. \nThe timekeeper put the information on the card which told \n\nwhether he had worked on that particular order or not. 697. \nThe timekeeper gets his information as to what a man has done \n\nfrom the foreman in the particular department. 698. \nWhen on March 30 he entered this department to place this \n\namount on the books he did not have all the cards from the \n\ndistribution on the sheets. 698. \nFound that possibly 75 per cent of them were wrong. 699. \nTf after comparing the sheet with card it did not balance, an \n\ninstance which he states never occurred, it was thrown into \n\nundistributed labor, or account 98. 701. \nInaccurate workmen in posting the cards to the sheets. 702. \nExplains wherein the system was inadequate. 702. \nTnaccurate work caused material to be charged to the Army \n\nwhen it should have been charged to the Navv, and vice versa. \n\n703. \nThe issue slip is the Government\'s basis of charge. 706. \n130687\xe2\x80\x9419 \xe2\x80\x94 -16 \n\n\n\n240 ABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". \n\nStuart L. Mulholland \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nWith reference to the disappearance of records. 708. \n\nThe ledger lost and found. 708. \n\nCabinet or closet where a lot of issue slips were kept. These dis- \nappeared, and slips later found down in front of the station- \nery stores. Does not know whether they were all there or not. \n708. \n\nBelieved a little friction between the Army and the Curtiss peo- \nple was the reason for Mr. Tooley leaving. 711. \n\nHad not been given enough authority to run his department \nproperly, etc., and new system being put in which would not \nwork reasons why Mr. Tooley left. 711. \n\nThis system put in by Mr. Hilton, assistant to Mr. Moss, and Mr. \nMulholland himself says it is impossible to work. 712. \n\nKnows of an item of $2,600 made up and in the cashier\'s office in \none month, in envelopes for which no men called for. 713. \n\nThis would indicate that the timekeeping was very irregular, be- \ncause the men were not working. 713-714. \n\nIf this could happen, and they had attendance cards, this ap- \nparently was a case where the time was made up. 714. \n\nAnd if this were so, in cases where the men did not go up to \nclaim the money, it might be so in cases where the men did go \nup and get the money. 714. \n\nAcknowledged that this put the whole time system under a very \nserious discredit, 714. \n\nThe cashier went through the journal voucher and took that \namount of money into his funds and had it credited where it \nhad been previously charged. 715. \n\nDid not know whether that month was singular in that respect \nor whether they handled it in some other way in some other \nmonths. 715. \nWilliam F. Darget (Curtiss Airplane & Motor Corporation, Buf- \nfalo, N. Y., August 1, 1918; Book 15). \n\nAssistant general foreman in the sheet-metal department. 717. \n\nHad around 550 to 625 people prior to the stopping of work on \nthe Bristol. 717. \n\nToo many shop changes held up production on the Bristol. 718. \n(Changes in blue prints.) \n\nMistakes in blue prints. 719. \n\nPrior to the 1st of May, when they were not in full production \nthere was a good deal of loafing. 720. \n\nSometimes would have from 5 to 20 men in the department idle \nfor six or seven hours in the day. 720-721. \n\nThen would come another spurt and another stop. 721. \n\nDuring February and March, when there was so much loafing, \nthere were about 350 to 400 men in his division, one-third of \xe2\x80\xa2 \nthem loafing. 723. \n\nAll this time was charged. 724. \n\nHas always been a difference in the timekeeping between the \ntimekeeper and the pay-roll office. 724. \nC. H. Anderson (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buffalo T \nN. Y., August 1, 1918; Book 15). \n\nAssistant timekeeper in direct charge of the time in the sheet- \nmetal division. 726. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 241 \n\nC. H. Anderson \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nExecute the chief timekeeper\'s orders entirely. 726. \n\nExplains how he keeps the time and how he checks it up with \n\nthe men and how he distributes it. 726-728. \nStates that he had many conversations with Mr. Tooley. He is \n\na practical man and wanted to install a practical system, but \n\nthe men above him would not allow it. 730. \nFrank J. Donovan (North Elmwood Plant, Buffalo, N. Y., August \n1, 1918; Book 15). \n\nEmployed in the sheet-metal department. 733. \nAll his work has been on the Bristol Fighter and the H. S. 733. \nWhen he first started to work in the tubes, the plant was un- \ncompleted. But after they got under way stuff was not really \n\ncoming in fast enough to keep them busy. 734. \nBut they were asked to come back and work overtime from time \n\nto time, and then did nothing. 734. \nThis took place in the wintertime. Saw hundreds of girls come \n\nin in the morning, have their time cards O. K\'d and then \n\nturn around and go home. 734. \nSix or eight furnaces burning all day long and nothing in them. \n\n734. \nWould get pay for a full day\'s work on the O. K. of the head of \n\nthe department. 735. \nHad the attendance cards at this time. 735. \nFurnaces in his department burning day after day for six or \n\neight weeks without being used. 737. \nConditions of idleness all the time. 740. \nSeemed like half of the men could have done the work and done \n\nit easily. 740. \nLooked as if the company wanted to spend a lot of money, which \n\non a cost-plus basis would do them a lot of good. 740. \nIf this would not be so under the percentage given the company \n\nfor saving under the bogy cost, there was something wrong \n\notherwise. 741. \nHas stayed all Saturday and worked Saturday afternoons and \n\nit was considered overtime, and they were asked to come on \n\nSunday, and simply sat at the bench and had absolutely noth- \ning to do. 746. \nPaid time and a half for this coming back on Sunday. 746. \nCame back six or seven Sundays this way. 747. \nGives names of other men whose time they can get to show this \n\novertime. 748. \nWhen there is an O. K. on one of these cards it is O. K\'d for \n\nthe full time and no questions asked. 752. \nKnew of instance where one man\'s card was O. K\'d for a week. \n\n752. \nThe foreman evidently had an order from some one higher up \n\nin asking the men to come back to work at night and then \n\nhaving nothing for them to do. 754. \nCan not explain the possible motive for this when the increase \n\nin cost reduced the profit of the contractor. 755. \n\n\n\n242 ABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nFrank J. Donovan \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nLooked to the men like the Government had amassed a lot of \nmoney and wanted to get rid of it, and they were in to get \nsome of it. 756. \nDaniel W. Shull (Buffalo, N. Y., August 1. 1918 ; Book 16) . \n\nEngaged in sheet metal department of Curtiss plant. 1. \n\nHas been there since May 16. 1. \n\nWas in same department at Niagara plant previous to that \ndate. 1. \n\nObserved a great deal of idleness in plant. 2. \n\nWas not the same condition at the Niagara plant. 4. \nEdward Robert Fable (Buffalo, N. Y., August 1, 1918 ; Book 16) . \n\nChief yeoman in the Navy. 6. \n\nWas assigned to plant April 1, 1918, for the purpose of investi- \ngating labor. 6. \n\nWas looking after master cards to see that labor was properly \nentered thereon. 10. \n\nAt the present time the Curtiss inspection is a joke. The men lie \naround, and this can be proven at any time, reading news- \npapers. 11. \n\nHours were from 1 to 7, and he caught men going off at 5.30 and 6 \no\'clock. 12. \n\nHave caught men punching other people\'s cards and their own \ncards. 12. \n\nWent into metal division and found a girl sitting back in the \ncorner with a bcok down in front of her writing love letters. \nThe girls sit back there and do not have enough to do. 14. \n\nHas noticed slack work all through the plant. 16. \n\nThings have improved around the plant wonderfully, but far \nfrom perfect yet. 23. \n\nHas seen many men come back to the plant on Sunday just to be \nable to charge extra time. 25. \n\nIn the propeller division, the glue room, oftentimes that place has \nbeen shut down ; that division, say, two or three hours, or maybe \nfour hours, and then in the evening a rush order comes through \nand they gets 25 or 30 propellers down there, and then they \nstart in to glue those propellers up after quitting time. In \nother words, they work nine hours and then they come on and \nwork until 8 or 9 o\'clock at night and get time and a half for. \n26. \n\nAsked by Judge Hughes for his opinion as to the reason for these \nconditions that have existed, the witness stated, " I think it is a \nbusiness proposition of getting all you can get while the getting \nis good. I believe it is a question of spending $5 to make 50 \ncents for the organization." 30. \nFred L. Dibble (Buffalo, N. Y., August 1, 1918; Book 16). \n\nCame to the Curtiss Co. in November or December. 31. \n\nBeen on duty in the dispatching department, the duty of which is \nto see that work is properly passed along. 31. \n\nWaste of material in metal division due to poor management, in- \ncompetent help, and things of that sort. 32. \n\nWould do a bungling job without waiting for tools. 33. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 24 3 \n\nFred L. Dibble \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nMaterial would have to be scrapped for high-cost production, as \nMr. Hendricks put it. He is superintendent of the metal divi- \nsion. 33. \n\nThought allied inspection department Inspector Christiansen was \npro-German. 35. \n\nChristiansen rejected 800 perfect metal parts out of a total of \n1,000. 36. \n\nKefers to 27 truckloads of metal parts which were scrapped. 37. \n\nLots of men brought back to work on Sundays when they had \nnothing to do. 38. \n\nCould not see any good reason for working on Sundays for what \nthey accomplished. 40. \n\nPaid time and a half for all Sunday work. 41. \n\nThere was plenty of idle time all the time in all the departments. \n41. \nChester A. Harris (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, North \nElmwood Street plant, Buffalo, N. Y., August 2, 1918; Book 16). \n\nHas been employed in the Curtiss plant a year the latter part of \nAugust. 45. \n\nHad been on the regular police force for one month, then was \nmade assistant chief, and then chief of the company\'s police. \n45. \n\nTwo months ago organization was divided into three divisions \nand he was put in charge of the Churchill group. 46. \n\nFor two months has not had any official connection with North \nElmwood plant. 46. \n\nWhen he came out to the North Elmwood plant during the time \nhe had supervision of that plant, he found a desire to put \non a lot of help. Should show from the records that 150 or \n200 and even better were being hired a day. At one time \ncounted 32 men in one group doing nothing at all with their \nforeman entertaining them. 46-47. \n\nDid not know why it was they were not working because he \nbecame accustomed to it \xe2\x80\x94 batches of 10, 15, or 20 all the time. \n48. \n\nCondition had continued since opening of plant. 48. \n\nHad men come before them who were accused of making mis- \ntakes in their work and found that instead of being* carpen- \nters, assemblers, or mechanics, they had been barbers or bar- \ntenders, or something like that. 50. \n\nChurchill Street group seemed to be working pretty well al- \nthough the system was very ragged. 54. \n\nAsked as to what advantage he thought it would be to the com- \npany to employ labor recklessly, witness replied, "Well, I \nhave my own opinion. I do not exactly know how the Gov- \nernment is going on the purchases from the Curtiss Co., but \nI understand it is on a cost-plus basis, and my own honest \nidea, and nobody will ever be able to change it, is that they \nwanted to put on as much as possible, to make it look as ex- \npensive as possible to start with until they got a set figure, \nand then they would possibly start reducing afterwards, when \nthey got a set figure from the Government." 54. \n\nDrew his conclusions from the bonus svstem. 55. \n\n\n\n244 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nChester A. Harris \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nCites Murphy case where a man punched two time cards and \ndrew his pay twice for same period. 57. \n\nTells of cases where time cards were punched for men not on \nduty. 57-60. \n\nThis looseness with respect to the time cards continued until he \nleft. 61. \n\nUnderstands there was a time when timekeepers were beating \nthe bonus system over at the Churchill plant. 62. \n\nLetter from young Polish fellow relative to bad conditions \nexisting at Niagara plant with respect to turning out work. \n64. \n\nSaw plenty of evidence that men were working on other than \nairplane work, work for themselves and others, including the \nforemen. 73. \n\nComplained about them making toy propellers for clocks. 74. \n\nThey made big fancy clock stands, cigar outfits, outagon shape \nCleopatra jewelry boxes, and everything of that kind. Nearly \nlost his job over the clean-up. 74. \n\nFound a man with eight or nine passes on him. He would give \nthem out to anybody for a dollar and they would come in \nand ring in in the morning and go home or go wherever they \npleased. 88. \n\n" They (referring to the girls) would tell me what was going \non. They would say, \' It is a crime the way the Government \nwas having it put over on them.\' She said, c They must be a \nlot of dead ones in Washington, not to see and know what is \ngoing on.\' I would say, \'What is the matter now?\' She \nwould tell me and I would go down and look it over. I found \nthen for myself it was so." 96. \n\nDid not take up with Mr. Rogers and Mr. Hendricks the em- \nployment of the girls to drill holes in scrap because it was \ngenerally understood that was done to keep them busy, so \nthat nobody would see they were idle. 98. \n\nSome of the girls were sent home and were paid while they were \nhome, while other girls were kept at work drilling holes in \nscrap and were paid for that. 98. \n\nMan in charge of allied inspection department was a German \nby name of Keeppen. 100. \n\nAllied inspection department was a joke, as far as he could see. \n101. \n\nOnly a year ago Mr. Guy Talbert, the assistant production man- \nager, was a $30 a week stock chaser. 103. \n\nMade an investigation in regard to the salvage department. Saw \na load of wood going out and asked driver to show his door \npass. It said, " One load of scrap wood, 50 cents." Looked at \nload and found 1,000 feet of 2 by 4, from 8 to 10 feet long, and \nrealized there was something wrong \xe2\x80\x94 looseness somewhere. \n104. \n\nMr. Tanner had laborers go to his house for a day or a day and a \nhalf or two days cutting wood and working around the house, \nand these fellows got their shop time for that. 109. \n\n\n\nABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 245 \n\nChester A. Harris \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nJudge Hughes asked witness if he had ever heard of anyone from \nthe North Elmwood plant by reason of his opportunities as an \nemployee drawing material and using it in any business of his \nown. Witness replied, " Yes ; they have been caught with all \nkinds of supplies, such as electrical supplies, bolts and nuts, \nand practically anything that could be carried out." 110. \n\nFound there was a fellow acting as salesman selling the salvage \nwood at a salary of $25 a week, and the only man he was selling \nthe wood to was himself. 113. \n\nMr. Backhoff and Mr. Guy, of Curtiss Co., run restaurant at \nplant. 115. \n\nThe book of the dispatcher who dispatches the automobile service \nwould show that Curtiss Co. automobiles had been used to the \nextent of over $400 for the personal use of Mr. Guy and Mr. \nBackhoff in their restaurant proposition. 116. \n\nMen working in restaurant carried on pay roll of plant. 117. \n\nThe Erie Service Co., controlled by Mr. Sere Wheeler, who is \nsales manager of the Curtiss Airplane & Motor Corporation, \ndoes the majority of trucking around the plant. 118. \n\nHas been plenty of looseness in the garage. 118. \nFrederick Augustus Brooks (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corpora- \ntion, Buffalo, N. Y., August 2, 1918 ; Book 16) . \n\nHas been connected with the Curtiss Co. since May, 1917. 120. \n\nGraduate of the engineering department of the University of Illi- \nnois and specialized in the aerodynamic courses that were given. \n120. \n\nCame to the plant direct from the university. 121. \n\nWas assigned to the designing department in connection with the \nengineering division. 121. \n\nWas in complete charge of all the technical analysis of the Spads. \n121. \n\nMade a complete analysis of the Bristol, 122. \n\nThen went to work on the Liberty Battler. 122. \n\nLiberty Battler was originally intended to be a redesigned Bris- \ntol. 122. \n\nHad considerable difficulty in various details of the Spad. Was \na bad production proposition, but the tools were practically all \nmade when they were ordered to stop it and the drawings were \npractically finished. 123. \n\nEffect of concellation was to make useless all that work. 123. \n\nSpad was intended to be used with the geared Hispano-Suiza \nmotor. 124. \n\nIt was not necessary that there should be a geared motor. 125. \n\nThinks it would have been advisable to have put Spad into pro- \nduction. 125. \n\nThere were no difficulties created by American methods of manu- \nfacture which would have been obstacles to production of the \nSpad so far as he had observed. 128. \n\nSignal Corps drawings of the Bristol machine were not accurate. \n130. \n\nThinks Bristol plane discarded unnecessarily by the Government. \n136. \n\nMade 2,600 drawings for the Spad in 30 days. 138. \n\n\n\n246 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION.. \n\nFrederick Augustus Brooks \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nHave been on the Bristol drawings for eight months. 138. \nWorked for a couple of months very hard on the Spad and got \n\ncomplete drawings, and they were canceled; worked on the \n\nBristol for several months and made a great many changes and \n\nhad many delays in consequence, and then that was canceled; \n\nhave been working for several weeks on the Liberty Battler,. \n\nand that is now stopped. 142. \nLiberty Battler was so designed that the pilot could not see the \n\nground when he landed, except through mica windows. 143. \n\nWellington E. McGlue (Buffalo, N. Y., August 2, 1918; Book 16). \n\nCeased to be an employee of the Curtiss Co. on July 26, having \n\nenlisted in the Navy. 146. \nHad been employed by the Curtiss Co. since April 18, 1917. 146. \nEmployed in the Austin Street plant. 146. \nHad charge of inspection of panel covering, doping, and painting \n\nfor the Navv entirely. 147. \nVictor Martin O\'Neill (Buffalo, N. Y., August 2, 1918; Book 16). \nWas employed in the Curtiss plant from December 20, 1917, to \n\nJuly 1, 1918. 151. \nResigned to take position with the Wire Wheel Corporation, of \n\nMilwaukee. 151. \nFirst came to work with the Curtiss Co. as stenographer to the \n\nemployment manager. 151. \nEnumerates different positions he had with company, the last \n\nof which was night shipping clerk in the steel depot. 152. \nChanged the specification from 175 to 176, and signed Mr. Men- \n\xc2\xbb no\'s name to it, and got the material out, calling for 2.000 \n\nfeet. 153. \nHad known in his time that these changes had been made, chang- \ning these specifications for all classes of material. 156. \nThere were something like 75 employees and 63 allied inspection \n\ndepartment inspectors in charge of the same department.. \n\nThat is pretty close to one inspector to every employee. 159. \nUsually were allowed to work Saturday night, because they \n\nreceived time and a half for it, but there was hardly 1 Sat- \nurday night out of 10 that they ever had enough work to \n\nkeep them going for the whole 12 hours. 160. \nCould not see any use of being there on Saturday night, because \n\nnobody worked in the shop. 165. \nEnsign Merle C. Reed, United States Naw (Curtiss Aeroplane & \n\nMotor Corporation, Buffalo, N. Y., August 2, 1918; Book 16). \nEnlisted in the Navy as a first-class yeoman on July 12, 1917, \n\nand received a commission as assistant paymaster on February \n\n8, 1918. 182. \nWas in cost-inspection office, in the shipbuilding work, from \n\nJuly 15, 1917, until February 12, 1918. 182. \nWas ordered to Curtiss plant on March 18 and has been at the \n\nNorth Elmwood plant ever since. 182. \nIn charge of labor distribution. 183. \nThis witness testifies to work on Navy orders and method of \n\nchecking labor costs on naval contracts. 183,-278. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 247 \n\nNelson W. Marshall- (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, \nBuffalo, N. Y., August 5, 1918; Book 16). \n\nInspecting machine operations at plant of Curtiss Aeroplane & \nMotor Corporation. 278. \n\nHas been so employed at the North Elmwood plant since May \n30. 279. \n\nPrevious to that was with the Signal Corps for two months, and \nbefore that was salesman for the firm of Pallen & Burns, lum- \nber dealers. 279. \n\nWas employed at the Curtiss plant from November until March \ninspecting wood parts for the company. 280. \n\nCame to the North Elmwood Street plant as inspector for Signal \nCorps. About May 30 there was a change in inspection and \nhe was dismissed. 282. \n\nNotice went out that the Government inspection of wood parts \nin the shop would not be continued any longer, and notice was \ngiven that they would be discharged that day. 286. \n\nMr. Rohlfs is supposed to be a Government inspector, but where \nthe inspection goes on witness does not know. 287. \nPhillip N. Nutt (Buffalo, N. Y., August 5, 1918; Book 16). \n\nHas been employed at North Elmwood plant by the company \nsince February 15 as a write-up clerk, transfer clerk, and a \nrate clerk. 289. \n\nAt present time is interviewing applicants for different positions \nin the factory. 290. \n\nIs in the employment department. 290. \n\nHas employed men when there was no requisition for employ- \nment. 294. \n\nHas employed men when there was no particular place for them, \nbecause some one in the management has requested that they \nbe taken on. 295. \n\nThese are known as special requests. 295. \n\nDid not dare protest. If Mr. Backhoff would sign a request, \nthere was not any protest to it. 297. \n\nHired Mr. Gowey, an electrician, brought to him by a Mr. \nTooley, head of the electrical department. Wrote his rate as \n50 cents, but was sent back to him with his application marked \n. * Special work, $50," and O. K\'d by Mr. Moss. 298. \n\nIt is a fact that incompetent men have been hired at plant. 300. \n\nMr. Fouhy was in charge of employment in February, when the \nfactory was without sufficient work to keep them busy and \nadditional men were hired in large numbers. 304. \n\nHave been requests from politicians in Buffalo to have men \nplaced in the plant. 310. \nEnsign Merle C. Peed (Buffalo, N. Y., August 5, 1918; Book 16). \n\nJudge Hughes asked witness the reason for this company in- \ncreasing the cost of production unnecessarily, in view of the \nfact that they had a percentage of the saving that might be \neffected under the bogy cost, in accordance with the terms of \ntheir contract, and witness stated : " * * * I remember a \nconversation I had with Mr. Todd, who used to have charge of \nthe pay-roll and time-keeping department, who has since left \nthe company, and he told me and Mr. Bruno, who was there, I \nthink, as an efficiency man up until March, who is now at the \n\n\n\n248 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nEnsign Merle C. Reed \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nhead of the Wright-Martin Co., and Mr. Bruno told him that \na certain bunch of men in New York who had capital invested \nin this company here and who were desirous, as far as he knew, \nof increasing the costs under the cost-plus contract with a view \nof the Government withdrawing the cost-plus contract because \nof the high costs, and then they would submit fixed-price con- \ntracts on the basis of cost-plus costs." 316. \n\nWitness then testifies regarding naval contracts. 328-356. \nRudolph Juergesen (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buf- \nfalo, N. Y., Aug. 5, 1918; Book 16). \n\nHas been working for the Curtiss Co. since about September 1 \nor October 1. 356. \n\nWitness is 26 years old; was born Schleswig-Holstein, Ger- \nmany; took out first papers April 4, 1917. 358-359. \n\nIs assistant general foreman of machine shop at North Elmwood \nplant. 358. \n\nParents living in Germany, where he was born. 359. \n\nHas an elderly brother over there, but does not know whether or \nnot he is in German Army. 359. \nMatthew F. O\'Connell (Buffalo, N. Y., Aug. 5, 1918; Book 16). \n\nChief yeoman, United States Naval Reserve. 365. \n\nRepresenting the Navy in the handling of salvaged materials. \n365. \n\nMr. Sessions represents the Army in the handling of salvage. \nGet together and divide it to the best of their knowledge. \n366. \n\nPrivates R. Wood and C. C. Sessions have charge of salvage for \nthe Army. 369. \n\nMr. Woods is being sent down to the Pierce Arrow plant, and \nMr. Sessions has taken back salvage. 369. \n\nEvery morning, at the time the Germans were making their \ngreat drive around April or May, any number of Germans \ncollected out in the plant and discussed it and cheered over \nit. 371. \n\nWitness told Mr. Backoff that by the small expenditure of \n$1,850 they could make a profit on the handling of shavings \nof $13,987~ If they burn them, they will lose $1,800. If they \nsell them, they will make something like $20,000 if they install \na separator costing $1,800. 376. \nErnst Oleman (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buffalo, \nN. Y., Aug. 5, 1918; Book 16). \n\nWent to work in the Curtiss plant in February, 1917, on acety- \nlene welding. Is now foreman of the welding department at \nNorth Elmwood plant. 380. \n\nBorn in Magdeburg, Germany, on October 14, 1888. 380. \n\nCame to this country in July, 1910. 380. \n\nIs not naturalized, but took out first papers on August 4, 1915. \n380, 381. \n\nFather and mother live in Magdeburg, Germany. 381. \n\nHas two brothers, one of whom is in the German Army. 381. \n\nRegistered in the draft and did not claim exemption as an alien, \nbut his superior made him chance it. 382. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 249 \n\nEknst Oleman \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nClaimed exemption on the ground that he was a subject of \nGermany. 383. \nJohn E. Cole (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buffalo, \nN. Y., Aug. 5, 1918; Book 16). \n\nHas been directly connected with the Government since April \n1 ; indirectly since July, when he was representing the firm of \nLybrant, Ross Bros. & Montgomery at the Curtiss plant. 384. \n\nWas sent to Curtiss plant to assist in making an estimate of \ncosts which they had submitted on the JN 4 training plane \nand on the OX 4 engine. 384. \n\nRemained there from latter part of July to September 21 in \nthat capacity. 385. \n\nEstablished an approximate cost of $4,000 on the JN 4 machine. \n385. \n\nMade a verification of the cost which they had submitted in \nJanuary, 1918, which approximated something like $3,300 or \n$3,500. 386. \n\nReturned to Buffalo about the 10th of October as an employee \nof Lybrant, Ross Bros. & Montgomery, to look after the pre- \nliminaries for the start of the Spad contract. 387. \n\nContinued in that relation to the 1st of April, when he was taken \nover by the Government. 387. \n\nGovernment has never paid the company a penny on the Spad \ncontract. 389. \n\nThey have attempted to submit claims, but they have never \nbeen able to get them in satisfactory shape. 389. \n\nAll of the contracts given the company were blanket orders on \nwhich to construct experimental machines to test out draw- \nings, but that was part of the total order. 389. \n\nNever got into production on the Spads ; never made any. 389. \n\nA great deal of time subsequently rejected on Army work and \nGovernment has not paid them for it yet. 397. \n\nHis labor audit department was working under instructions to \nto satisfy themselves, from the master cards, according to \nthe order numbers and part numbers, that the times sub- \nmitted were a reasonable claim for time expended. 399. \n\nCancellation of the Spad contract caused the company a great \ndeal of embarrassment. 401. \n\nThe company was expected to keep a cost record showing the \ncost of production, which they never did. 404. \n\nCompany has from five hundred thousand to a million dollars \nowing to them by reason of their inefficient accounting. 405. \n\nWere up against a proposition that the thing in the mind of \nthe Government right along in connection with airplanes \nhas been production. Their one thought has always been \nproduction, and they were not going to allow anyone to in- \nterfere with that production along the line of account. That \nthought was gotten into the company\'s head, through the \ndifferent officials right down the line, that they wanted to get \nproduction out. Would go in there and tell them : " Here, \nwe have got to have certain records, if you are going to get \npaid." Thev would come along and say we were interfering \nwith them. * 408. \n\n\n\n250 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nJohn E. Cole \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\n" The condition has been known to Washington, not only by my \ngoing down there, but by the representatives coming up here \nand getting out into the plant. 410. \n\n" Col. Montgomery and Col. Deeds was there representing the \nSignal Corps. 410. \n\n" Col. Deeds has a conference with the company later in Janu- \nary, and he said, "We must make a demonstration here; we \nmust get out 25 Bristols in February. You must get them out \nat any cost and regardless of system." 412. \n\n"The company proceeded to do what he asked them to do. \nThey hired a gang of 40 stock chasers, irresponsible indi- \nviduals, and the plan was that they would give them a list \nof the parts they wanted. Those men would go out into a \nmanufacturing establishment, and if they found anything \nwith that kind of a number on it, they would grab it right off. \nThe result was a number of these parts had to be put through \nproduction two or three times, and there was a lot of material \nwhich was brought to the plant through the front door with- \nout any record in the receiving department, and the company \ncould not prove that the material was ever received. * * * " \n413. \n\nJudge Hughes. " I can not understand how the chief engineer \nof the company should be the consulting engineer of the Gov- \nernment." \n\nWitness. "I can not either. Maj. Shepler can answer that \nquestion for you. It struck me as being an anomolous situa- \ntion at the time, but I did not criticize it." 417. \n\nMr. H. C. Thomas is his chief representative in the plant. \n(This refers to the chief representative of the witness). 420. \n\nStarted an audit of the company\'s stock ledgers on the 1st of \nApril and found a very rotten condition, to use the language \nof the day. 425-426. \n\nRelied upon the integrity of the company until it was found \nthey had fallen down. 427. \n\nSales Department, Finance Division, Bureau of Aircraft Pro- \nduction, furnishes supplies to Curtiss Co. on fixed price con- \ntracts. 433. \n\nTotal payments to date approximate a little less than $1,300,000 \non account of the Bristol, which includes about $30,000 worth \nof profit on the 25 Bristols completed. 436. \nGeorge A. Thomas (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buf- \nfalo, N. Y., August 5, 1918; Book 16). \n\nHas been connected with the Government work at the North \nElmwood plant of the Curtiss Co. since about the 10th of De- \ncember under Lybrant, Ross Bros. & Montgomery, and since \nthe 1st of April under the Signal Corps. 437. \n\nSupervises the auditing of vendors\' invoices covering the pur- \nchase of materials by the Curtiss Co. for use on the Bristol \ncontract, also supervises the preparation of public vouchers \nthat are certified to be sent to Washington for reimbursement \nto the Curtiss Co. 437. \n\nStates method of approving vendors\' invoices. 438. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 251 \n\nGeorge A. Thomas \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nThinks 100 per cent of materials purchased directly for Bristol \ncontract were approved by the Government in advance. 446. \n\nCurtiss Co. allowed $95,316.48 by the Government for special \ntools for the Bristol". 456. \n\nTotal paid Curtiss Co. on Bristol contract to date $1,489,520.63. \n457. \n\nBulk of overhead allowed has been estimated. 458. \n\nDifference of close to $600,000 between what has been paid and \n\nwhat they say the total material claimed will be. That is in \n\nprocess of adjustment and he can not say what will be allowed. \n\n463. \n\nDemerle E. Hart (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buffalo, \n\nN. Y., August 5, 1918; Book 16). \n\nHas been employed by the Curtiss Co. for about three years. \n476. \n\nHas charge of the checking of figures on invoices. 476. \n\nQuestioned as to a statement prepared by Mr. Moss, of Curtiss \nCo., but did not know much about it. \nCharles A. Klady (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buf- \nfalo, N. Y., August 5, 1918; Book 16.) \n\nChief of labor auditing division for Government at North Elm- \nwood plant of Curtiss Co. 481. \n\nAudits pay rolls. 481. \n\nHave only had six floor checkers for entire factory. 484. \n\nIn making a floor check they also had to cover the Army as \nwell as the Navy. 485. \n\nConnected with the Government at Curtiss plant since March 6. \n485. \n\nIf the company made any inaccurate representations of work, \nwhen men had not worked, the Government bore the loss. \n495. \n\nHad heard that there was a great deal of idleness in the factory, \nand yet men were receiving on their time cards a full day\'s \npay; they were getting paid for overtime and for Sunday \ntime when they were actually not doing any work or needed \nto do any work. All those payments made by the company dur- \ning that period to men who did not actually work was charged \nby the company on the distribution cards against the Army \nwork or the Bristol work, and were paid for by the Govern- \nment. 495, 496. \n\nNo way now of making an audit to determine how much work \nwas done. 496. \n\nSubstantially, the Government was paying just as though every- \nbody was working on Government orders. 498. \n\nThey would or were paying overtime to a man coming in at 1 \no\'clock, who would work from 1 o\'clock on and put in nine \nhours, getting overtime, getting more than the man putting in \nthe legitimate number of factory hours from 9.30 in the morn- \ning. 500. \n\nThe Government, down to March 16, at least, did not have any \nway of determining whether or not that work was done. 509. \n\nThe actual overhead has not been determined and allocated, but \nit has been allowed simply on an arbitrary percentage of pro- \nductive labor. 513. \n\n\n\n252 ABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nCharles A. Kladf \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nEejected 20 per cent under direct labor for week of May 4. 515. \nStuart L. Mulhollaxd (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, \nBuffalo, N. Y., August 5, 1918; Book 16). \n\nWas recalled and produced a copy of the journal entry showing \nthe amount of $2,692.65, overpayments in pay roll ; that is the \namount not called for by employees and returned. Entry re- \nferred to was marked "Mulholland Exhibit 2. August 5, \n1918." 525. \nPaul Lovas (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buffalo. \nN. Y., August 6, 1918; Book 16). \n\nHas been emploved at the Curtiss plant at North Elmwood \nsince June 18, 1918. 526. \n\nPuts up machinery and building fixtures. Making safety guards \naround machinery. 527. \n\nThinks there are quite a few men employed at plant who are \nnot necessary. 527. \nHenry D. Dargert (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation. Buf- \nfalo, N. Y., August 6. 1918; Book 16). \n\nHas been employed by the Curtiss Co. since a year ago last \nApril, about 16 months. 533. \n\nEnumerates different positions he has held with company. 533. \n\nCame to Xorth Elmwood plant as assistant mechanical super- \nintendent. 534. \n\nThe 1st of December he was changed to assistant general super- \nintendent of the assembly department. 534. \n\nWas there until they tried to build so many boats in one week, \nand they could not do it, and he was discharged, which was on \nFebruary 18. 534. \n\nWas then made general foreman of the salvage department. 535. \n\nThere has been a big force of men out there working since De- \ncember trying to produce Bristol machines. They make parts \nand they are obsoleted before the} T are used; they get them in \nthe salvage division and try to make something good out of \nthem, and if they can not they sell them. 539. \n\nSo far as material that goes to the salvage department is con- \ncerned, if it is not reclaimed, if it is not sold, there is no way \nof finding out how much that material which is finally \nscrapped has cost the Government. 550. \n\nAbout 50 per cent of wood parts and 30 per cent of metal parts \nthat go to the salvage department are finally scrapped. 551. \nJulius Hoffmax (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buffalo, \nN". Y., August 6, 1918; Book 16). \n\nBorn in Germany; been in this country 34 years; naturalized \nthrough his father who ran away from the German Army \nand came to this country about six months before he and his \nmother came over. 559. \n\nLived in Buffalo practically all his life. 559. \n\nBeen employed in the Curtiss plant for four years. 560. \n\nOrganized the engineering department at North Elmwood plant. \n560. \n\nAsked to resign by Mr. Mueller on Saturday. 560. \n\nTold him Government had insisted upon his resignation due to \nhis German name. 562. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 253 \n\nJulius Hoffman \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nHad charge under Mr. Mueller of the work of designing the \nBristol plane. 563. \n\nNo reason given to him why Bristol was discarded. 564. \n\nMakes statement as to the difficulties encountered in producing \nthe Bristol. 565. \n\nIntroduces diary of the different changes and recommendations, \netc., which was marked " Hoffman Exhibit 1, August 6, 1918." \n569. Diary of information received and changes recom- \nmended marked " Hoffman Exhibit 2, August 6, 1918." 570. \n\nA release for production first goes to the record division and \nfrom there to 51 departments. 581. \nMatthew F. O\'Connel (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, \nBuffalo, N. Y., August 6, 1918; Book 16). \n\nProduces certain rejection reports taken for the week of July \n13, 1918. 589. \n\nExplains rejections due to faulty inspection. 590. \n\nWood is not properly kiln dried before sending it to the manu- \nfacturer and when worked it will shrink and be rejected. 593. \n\nDoes not know why Government inspectors have not stopped it. \nIt is up to the production department. 593. \n\nFor week ending July 20 there were 1,962 logs rejected. 595. \n\nSteel stampings sold at $22 a net ton as salvage when it costs 3 \nor 4 cents a pound. 597. \n\nTwenty-eight thousand and ten pounds of steel stampings sold \nin February at $16 a net ton. 599. \n\nReport of scrap disposed of or sold, with proceeds realized, \ncovering period from February 1 to June 30, marked " O\'Con- \nnel Exhibit No. 2." 600. \n\nFolder containing inventory of scrap from March 1 to June 30, \nmarked " O\'Connell Exhibit 3 August 6, 1918." 600. \n\nFound 2,000 parts sent to scrap which were actually all right. \n602. \n\nForty-nine thousand seven hundred part No. 70430 rejected and \nscrapped on July 20; 6,000 repected same date of part No. \n71420; 1,000 rejected same date of part No. 104402, they being \nobsolete. 613. \n\nScrapped means being sold for what you can get for it. 615. \n\nReads other reports of material rejected and scrapped. 615. \nEnsign Mason I. Hawkins (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corpora- \ntion, Buffalo, N. Y., August 6, 1918; Book 16.) \n\nTestifies as to work on Navy contracts. 617-625. \nChaeles A. Klady (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Au- \ngust 6, 1918 ; Book 16. \n\nProduces letter relative to overtime, signed by a Mr. Kepperley, \nwhich is inserted in record. 625. \n\nQuoting from a letter under date of March 14, 1918, addressed by \nLieut. Underwood to Lieut. Berger, relative to overtime, \n" * * * this department alone, through either lack of sys- \ntem, or for some other cause, lost $4,680 in a single week." \n635. \n\nRecapitulation of labor charges to the account of Bristol con- \ntract No. 2463, from January 5 to July 20, marked " Klady \nExhibit 12, August 6, 1918." 664. \n\n\n\n254 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nCharles A. Klady \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nHave received distribution cards reading $90 which should be \nfor 40 cents. Have also received duplicate distribution cards \nfor the same master card. 678. \n\nPaid man according to the master card and charged the Govern- \nment according to the distribution card. 680. \nDale M. Sparks (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buffalo, \nN. Y., August 6, 1918; Book 16). \n\nHas been in the Army four months. 682. \n\nBefore entering the Armv was a public accountant in Boston. \n682. \n\nCame to the North Elmwood plant of the Curtiss Co. on April \n12, 1918, two weeks after he entered the Army. 682. \n\nHas charge of the distribution of overhead. 683. \n\nTotal pay rolls for May of North Elmwood plant were $1,- \n031,000. 685. \n\nThe total productive labor being $50,000, there ought not to be \nas much as $18,000 for overtime on Curtiss work. 690. \nHenky D. Dargert (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buf- \nfalo, N. Y., August 6, 1918; Book 16). \n\n" We have had about eight plant engineers in the past year since \nwe have been on this job." 703. \n\n" The Allied Inspection Department have not had a chance in \nthis plant." 709. \n\nThinks nine-tenths of the wood parts went into the kindling pile. \n714. \n\nThe production superintendent is not an engineer, or even a \nmechanic or shop superintendent. 718. \nJohn E. Cole (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buffalo, \nN. Y., August 6, 1918; Book 16). \n\nExplains svstem of cost accounting established bv the Curtiss \nCo. 720] \n\nMr. C. M. Keys, of New York, had a great deal to do with the \nfinancial history of Curtiss Co. 722. \n\nMr. Keys opened negotiations with Mr. John M. Willys, and \nsold the control of the companv to the Willvs-Overland Co. \n726. \n\nJudge Hlghes. "Was there any inherent reason why, if you \nhad had the cooperation of the Government officials in Wash- \nington, you should not have been able to install a proper cost \nsystem here during those months of February and March, \nwhen there was relatively small production." 735. \n\nMr. Frary was interfering with the carrying out of instructions \nwhich would have given the Government a better cost control. \n741. \n\nAt the present time the Government is only making an inspec- \ntion of not more than 30 per cent of the material that goes into \nproduction. 751. \n\nCurtiss Co. not in a position at present time to make any claim \nin excess of what is actually due them. 753. \n\nCurtiss Co. have got a great deal of money coming to them they \nwill never get, because they can not prove they are entitled \nto it. 755. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 255 \n\nJohn E. Cole (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buffalo, \nN. Y., August 7, 1918; Book 16). \n\nHas a partial record of the audit which has proceeded since \nMay, as to the extent of the overproduction. 762. \nEdward Atterby (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buffalo, \nN. Y., August 7, 1918; Book 16). \n\nBorn in London, England, but is citizen of United States. 763. \n\nBeen employed at North Elmwood plant of Curtiss Co. since \nMarch 4. \n\nIs investigator for Mr. Cawthra, assistant to Mr. Mueller. 764. \n\nHas been investigating the manufacturing end. 764. \n\nDoes not know how it happens the engineering department is \ninvestigating the manufacturing part of the business. 764. \nEdward Atterby (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buffalo, \nN. Y., August 7, 1918; Book 16). \n\nIs a practical metal man. Has had experience in metal business \never since he was 14 years old. 765. \n\nHas made report on conditions in plant. 765. \n\nCalled attention of Mr. Cawthra to the very large quantities of \nperfectly usable new bolts and washers ; millwright stock dis- \nposed of for no logical reason except to get rid of them. 773. \nCharles C. Sessions (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buf- \nfalo, N. Y., August 7, 1918; Book 16). \n\nEntered the Army February 2. 777. \n\nPrior occupation was a mechanical engineer. 777. \n\nCame to North Elmwood plant February 4, 1918. 778. \n\nFirst assigned as assistant property officer, having charge of \nsegregating and listing the Government machinery, the ma- \nchinery that had been paid for by the Government. 779. \n\nWhile he was taking care of this machinery he was given charge \nof salvage. 779. \n\nMaterial goes to scrap that does not go to the salvage room. 782. \n\nSalvage department has no head on the Army side; it is run \nentirely by the Curtiss Co. 784. \n\nEntirely up to the Curtiss Co. to determine what is usable. 786. \n\nSince about six months ago the Government has had no way of \ntelling whether any material in the salvage room was proper \nfor other uses, or, at least, has not attempted to determine \nwhether it is usable. 787. \n\nGovernment has not any check at all on material sent to scrap. \n801. \nErnest H. Cawthra (Buffalo, N. Y., August 7, 1918; Book 17). \n\nBeen in the Curtiss plant since April 15. 1. \n\nCame to the North Elmwood plant last October, when it was in \nthe course of construction. 1. \n\nAssistant to the chief engineer, Mr. Mueller. 1. \n\nKneAv Mr. Mueller since the day they came to the Curtiss Co., \nabout 20 months ago. 2. \n\nHas been Mr. Mueller\'s assistant on the production side. 2. \n\nSays he asked Mr. Atterbury to make investigations, as com- \nplaints had been coming from the factory to his office that the \nengineering department drawings did not accurately show \nthe information, etc. 3. \n130687\xe2\x80\x9419 17 \n\n\n\n256 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nErnest H. Cawthra \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nThis report marked " Cawthra Exhibit No. 1, August 7, 1918." 3. \nOther reports of Mr. Atterburv marked " Cawthra Exhibit No- \n3, August 7, 1918." 6. \n\nOrders for production went out from his department. 8. \n\nMr. Mueller desired to concentrate on the Bristol. 13. \n\nMr. Mueller, as chief, and Mr. Hoffman, as assistant, attended to \nthe engineering work on the Bristol. 14. \n\nParticularly confined himself to production matters. 16. \nEnsign Hawkins (Book 17). \n\nProduces blue prints asked for. 19. \n\nIs shown wood part, No. 64760. and asked how it came to be \nfound at the scrap platform. 19. \n\nThinks these parts came direct from the mill and never went to \nsalvage. 22. \n\nAccounting men on the platform are not expert in airplane parts. \nWould not know whether parts were good or bad. 23. \n\nAll Army work is rejected by Curtiss, although Government has \na man that goes in the salvage every day and makes the final \ndisposition of the woodwork in there. 26. \n\nBy the practice followed in this plant, at any time a careless or \nwrong-meaning foreman or any of his subordinates good ma- \nterial might be picked up and sent direct to the scrap plat- \nform. 26. \n\nExplains the running system. 29. \n\nAgrees as to overproduction. 29. \n\nIf an order for 500 parts resulted in 1,500 instead and an order \n\nfor 1,000 parts resulted in 2,500 parts, there was nothing to \n\nprevent the foreman from sending these extra parts to the \n\nscrap pile and scrap them. 31. \n\nEnsign Merle C. Reed (Buffalo, N. Y., August 7. 1918,; Book 17). \n\nAsked concerning the wood part. No. 64.760. 33. \n\nBears No. 51 as the number of the inspector. 33. \n\nThis inspector or number has been looked and there is no inspec- \ntor No. 51. 33. \n\nThis marked " Hawkins Exhibit No. 1. August 7, 1918." S3. \n\nLater finds the name of the " 51 " man. His number is 59175 \nand his name H. Cittel. Has been discharged. 34. \n\nProduces letter asked for before from Mr. Sanderson to Mr. \nMoss. 36. (Regarding labor). \n\nIf distribution cards are checked with the master cards, would \nstill have no knowledge as to whether the O. K. by the fore- \nman is right or not. 39. \n\nLetter as to treasurer\'s pay roll marked " Reed Exhibit 12. \nAugust 7, 1918." 40 ; \n\nCorrespondence following marked. 40-41. \nEnsign John Sanderson (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Co.. Buffalo. \nN. Y., August 7, 1918; Book 17). \n\nIn charge of accounts for the Navy at Curtiss plant at North \nElmwood, under Paymaster Smith. 42. \n\nPaymaster Smith has jurisdiction of all the cost-plus contract- \nfor the Navy on aircraft work. 42. \n\nUnderstood that the plant was 75 per cent ahead of the schedule \non boats at this time. 43. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 257 \n\nEnsign John Sanderson \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nHas made payments for overhead on an arbitrary basis up to \nApril 27 ; basis of 200 per cent on direct labor. 45. \n\nApril 28 to May 24 on basis of 100 per cent. 45. \n\nTheoretical allowance of material on the basis of the amounts \nsupposed to be required for a part, with a factor of waste. 40. \n\nDown to 1st of July requisitions have not been in such shape \nth*at they could determine the amount of material issued. 47. \n\nMost of the material that goes into the H. S.-l boat is bought on \nrequisitions which are approved within three days from the \ntime they are submitted by the company, which is then re- \nceived at the plant, etc., and the Government pays for it. 50, \n\nOverproduction. 53. \n\nUndoubtedly material could be sent to the scrap pile without \ntheir knowledge that had been overproduced. 56. \n\nIf a fabricated part is rejected the Government gets no credit, \nas contractor is supposed to use reasonable care. 60. \n\nCompany always had an excuse ready, in that there were so \nmany changes and material was rendered obsolete by the \nchanges. 64. \n\nHas never observed any interest on the part of the Curtiss Co. \nin keeping the cost of the boats as low as possible. 68. \n\nHave an indirect check through the records on labor, but have \nnever had a direct check. 72. \n\nInstructions from Washington are contained in a manual known \nas Cost-Pius Regulations \xe2\x80\x94 Manufacturing. 73. \n\nThe Government had to assume that the test reports made were \nsufficient. 76. \n\nProduces statement showing payments made to the Curtiss Co. \non contract 37826 for the H. S.-l. 84. \n\nThinks the estimated cost may be figured at approximately \n$8,000. 86. \n\nThis contract has the usual provision for a 25 per cent saving \nunder the bogy. 86. \n\nProduces statement of the A. I. D. inspectors who turned re- \njections pads over to the Curtiss employees so they could pass \nmaterial without anv inspection at all. Marked " Sanderson \nExhibit 2, August 7,^1918." 87. \n\nProduces memorandum regarding payments for direct labor. \n89. \n\nProduces memorandum regarding rejected parts. 90. \nHarry V. Kexxersox (Buffalo, N. Y., August 7, 1918; Book 17). \n\nCame to work at the Curtiss plant on May 29. \n\nCame immediately to the North Elmwoocl plant. 93. \n\nStates what he has ascertained with respect to the cost-account- \ning methods of the Curtiss Aeroplane Co. 93. \n\nAfter the Government had approved an invoice and checked the \nmaterial as delivered according to invoice it was then paid \nfor. 95. \n\nProduces a ledger called direct material, in which is entered all \nmaterial which the Government purchases and pays for direct \nfrom the vendor or any material which would be invoiced to \nthem by the Curtiss people. 100. \n\n\n\n258 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nHarry V. Kennerson \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nMaterial rejected because of its being made obsolete would show \n\non the ledger as a credit to the Army on the Army salvage \n\naccount. 102. \nIf material is rendered obsolete for any reason or scrapped, then \n\nall the Government gets out of it is*what may be made on its \n\nsale as scrap. 105. \nCapt. Alfred B. Eogers (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, \nBuffalo, N. Y., August 7, 1918; Book 17). \nCaptain in the British Army. 106. \nArrived on second visit on December 21, 1916; inspection \n\nduty on aircraft work. 106. \nRepresents what is called the allied inspection department. 106. \nBeen at the Curtiss plant at North Elmwood ever since it was \n\nbuilt. 106. \nDiscontinued allied inspection department inspection early in \n\nMay. 107. \nBeen looking after British contracts alone. Curtiss Co. was \n\n\n\nmaking the H-16 boats for them. 10 \n\n\n\nc & \n\n\n\nConditions of efficiency, very, very poor. 108. \n\nNo one wanted any information. 108. \n\nTrue of high officers, every one. 108. \n\nRelates instances of this. * 108-109. \n\nThis early in the production of this plant. 109. \n\nNo one had any interest whatever in their work. 110. \n\nThought large quantities of material that was spoiled or ren- \ndered obsolete could have been reclaimed. 110. \n\nMr. Kepperley practically said he did not want any informa- \ntion carried from the plant to the United States Government \nofficers, but to give all the information to his men. 114. \n\nHe predicted the downfall of the Bristol from what he saw. 116. \n\nThere was a difficulty in adapting the motor to the plane, but \nthe attitude adopted toward it was entirely wrong. 118. \n\nShould have made two or three to start with and have these \nthoroughly tested. 118. \n\nFirst machine has never been properly tested to this day. 118. \n\nAtmosphere created the impression that it was not intended that \nthe Bristol should be successful. 119. \n\nThought those who represented more directh T the interests of the \nstockholders of the company were incompetent to form a \njudgment, and those upon whom they relied to run the pro- \nduction were not desirous that it should be a success. \n\nPro-German influences in plant. 120. \n\nCapabilities of the H. S.-l boat very inferior to those of the \nBristol, as the Bristol would be a far more important factor \nas being used by Gen. Pershing on the western front. 123. \n\nThe same engineers in charge of the Bristol are not in charge of \nthe S. E.-5. 125. \n\nAsked as to the changes in the Bristol. 129. \n\nMr. Rogers understood there was no written authority for the \nchanges in the Bristol. 130. \n\nEven if instituted by the Signal Corps, was the point ex- \nplained to these representatives that if they put these on they \nwere doing wrong. 131. \n\n\n\nABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 259 \n\nCapt. Alfred B. Rogers \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nNo one but an expert would know what the effect would be on \nthe machine. 132. \n\nMr. Mueller was heard to express the opinion in Detroit that " I \nam a German to the word \' go.\' " 132. \n\nPro-German statement of Mr. Weber, who was in general charge \nof production. 131. \n\nRelates effects of Mr. Weber\'s method of buying cheap ma- \nterial. 136. \n\nAsked why if the Engineers were charged with the knowledge of \nknowing whether it would fly or not, the Signal Corps were not \ncharged with that knowledge. 110. \n\nThose controlling the situation at that time were ignorant, but \nnot so Mr. Mueller, the chief engineer. 110. \n\nIf he had the disagreeable duty of determining whether he was \nignorant \xe2\x80\x94 Mr. Mueller \xe2\x80\x94 or whether he did what he did will- \nfully, he would say the latter and not hesitate. 111. \n\nMr. Rogers stated that the Curtiss people might say they had \nactually taken the machine and flown it in the air, but he ad- \nvised Mr. Rohlfs, the pilot, to keep out of the machine. 111. \n\nProduces a letter addressed to Mr. Kepperley in which he informs \nMr. Kepperley that work having been done on the Bristol \nwithout notifying the inspection department they Avould not \ntake any further responsibility for the machine. 117. \n\nLouis H. Chuegay (Buffalo, N. Y., August 7, 1918; Book 17). \nBoi\'ii at Budapest, Hungary. 118, \nCame to this country 1890; naturalized. 118. \nCame to work at the Curtiss plant, North Elmwood plant, on \n\n29th day of January, 1918. 118. \nAfter three weeks at the plant was given the salvage division. \n\n150. \nExplains the records kept in this division. 150-151. \nKeeps a stock ledger of every act, and also weekly reports. 152. \nWeekly report would si ow how much had come into the salvage \n\ndepartment and how much had been reclaimed. 152. \nAsked to bring in the stock ledger. 153, \nJoseph F. Weller (Buffalo, N. Y., August 7, 1918; Book 17). \nEntered the Army as a civilian August 20, 1917. 151. \nHas been chief of the inspection for about the last two months. \n\n151. \nSpeaks of the showing of 19,700 obsolete parts, and explains \n\nwhy there are so many of them. 151. \nWith only 2,000 Bristols in contemplation and wdth only 800 \n\nreleased to production how could there be 77,000 of certain \n\nclips made, 12 being needed for a machine ? 156. \nThinks they were swamped with work in that department at \n\nthat time and they overran on them. 156. \nFrequest practice, putting into production a good deal more \n\nthan was ordered. Took four or five days for a notice to get \n\nto the proper people in the factory. 161. \nChester A. Harris (Buffalo, N. Y., August 8, 1918; Book 17). \n\nRelates incident of a visit made on March 15 by representative \n\nof the Military Intelligence Department on a tour of inspection \n\nof the plants. 163. \n\n\n\n260 ABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nChester A. Harris \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nMr. Sweeney asked him to show this man through, but not to \n\nshow him any of the defects, as he was tired of giving them \n\ninformation. 163. \nMr. Sweeney tells him to stay from the Government offices. 165. \nMr. Sweeney will attend to all these cases now himself and take \n\nit up with Mr. Davies before it is turned in to the Government. \n\n165. \nMr. Davies was supposed to be chief special agent for the Curtiss \n\nCo., with offices at Toledo, Ohio. 165. \nMr. Davies tells Mr. Harris that there would be times when he \n\nwould have to do things that did not look right, but that they \n\nwould have to do them just the same. 168. \nProduces letter from Mr. Davies to Mr. Grow, relative to keep- \ning track of Government men. 169. \nCharles J. Simeon (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, \nBuffalo, N. Y., August 8, 1918; Book IT). \n\nHas been with the Curtiss Co. since the 1st of November of last \n\nyear. 179. \nIs asked to state to what extent the entire system of cost account- \ning was defective, what suggestions he made to avoid these \n\ndefects, and why they were not adopted. 181. \nStates further with respect to this plan and to what extent it \n\nfell down. 185. \nWhen Mr. Webber was in charge, shop discipline was poor. 191. \nCould not state why Mr. Kepperly never found out Mr. Webber \n\nwas not maintaining shop discipline. 192. \nMr. Talbert knew nothing of the A B C of modern methods \n\nof production; was incompetent for the job. 195. \nWas put in general control at end of February, then made assit- \n\nant production manager. 196. \nHerr and Swift, two competent men, leave. 196. \nLouis H. Churgay (Buffalo, N. Y., August 8, 1918; Book 17). \n\nProduces weekly reports showing how much had come into the \n\nsalvage department and how much has been reclaimed. 209. \nProceeds to explain this, so that it will be easier to understand \n\nthe procedure. 209. \nIs asked to produce a statement of the salvage sales, scrap sales, \n\netc., of material from the North Elmwood plant. 227. \nThomas Marchall Febery (Buffalo, N. Y.. August 8, 1918; Book \n\nlT )- \n\nWas one of two men selected by the British Government at the \n\nrequest of the United States Government that they should \n\nsend two men across who were experienced on the Bristol \n\nplane \xe2\x80\x94 intelligent men and men who had had experience in \n\nassembling, etc. 229. \nTrouble with the Bristol was that there were too many people \n\ntrying to justify their positions. 230. \nEverybody made alterations \xe2\x80\x94 some by the Signal Corps and \n\nsome by the Curtiss people. Everything changed down to the \n\nsmallest bolt. 230. \nAll these changes not necessitated by the use of the Liberty \n\nmotor at all. 231. \n\n\n\nABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 261 \n\nThomas Marchall Febery \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nSpeaks of the changes made which had nothing to do with the \nuse of the Liberty motor. 233. \n\nFirst machine, the parts came through in such shocking manner \nthe machine would not go together. 238. \n\nShowed both factory deficiency and engineering deficiency. 239. \n\nWas not allowed to pass to the flying field. 240. \n\nStates discussion with Mr. Mueller about the difficulties with \nthe tail parts of the Bristol. 245. \n\nHeard Mueller say, " There are too many Government men \nhanging around this machine altogether. We must get them \ncleared out." 246. \n\nAlso had trouble in getting passes into the factory. 246. \nCharles E. Fotthy (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buf- \nfalo, N. Y., August 8, 1918; Book 17). \n\nBeen employment manager in charge of the plant one year and \nfour months. 247. \n\nBeen at the North Elmwood during the entire existence of the \nplant. 248. \n\nKnows at a given time how many men are employed, how many \nnew employees are being taken on, and how many are being \ndischarged or relieved for other reasons. 248. \n\nAlien enemies employed. 249. \n\nMr. Kepperly made a ruling on May 24 that no German, Hun- \ngarian, or Austrian or the allies of Germany should be em- \nployed. 254. \n\nIn papers which purport to deal with this subject, giving names \nof enemy aliens, the name of a German who has been advanced \nto a position of importance does not appear. 266. \n\nLetter of October 10, 1917, submitting "list of aliens that Mr. \nJohn D. Lynn, United States marshal, Buffalo, has granted \npermission to continue in our employ upon the personal assur- \nance of our factory foreman and superintendent." 273. \n\nSubmits further letters and data concerning enemy aliens. \n276-288. \n\nAsked how it happens that a man who has disclosed that he is a \nGerman and has served in the German Army could come into \na plant of this description. 293. \n\nSaid this man was listed in the marshal\'s office and got permit \nto work in a barred zone. 293. \n\nWas asked if, when a permit was granted by the United States \nmarshal, the employer had not requested it, and some one \nrepresenting the employer vouched for the man. 294. \n\nNo roster of the enemy-alien employees that can be relied on. \n297. \n\nAsked about ruling of the Secretary of War that no enemy alien \nshould be employed in an aircraft plant. 297. \n\nStates did not hire any subject of Germany, although he had a \npermit from the United States marshal after around January. \n302. \n\nCan not answer how they came to employ Henry Victorin, born \nin Germany, on March 18. 303. \n\nHis attention again called to the case of Oleman. 305. \n\n\n\n232 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nCharles E. Fouhy \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nA letter is produced showing that the Curtiss people asked for \n\npermits for foreigners to work for them. 311. \nRobert B. Mason (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buffalo, \nN. Y., August 8, 1918; Book IT). \n\nIn charge of the pay-roll department of this plant. 313. \n\nWas asked with regard to the making up of a list of enemy aliens \n\nemployed at the plant. 313. \nSays he can get a list with Oleman\'s and Jergeson\'s names on \n\nit. 320. \nIs asked then to see if he can produce a list that is reliable. 321. \nW. A. Slaght (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buffalo, \nN. Y., August 8, 1918; Book IT). \n\nConnected with the boat-hull department in last four or five \n\nweeks, and before that in charge of the salvage of the boat \n\nwork. 322. \nWould write up requisition for new material for the stock cases. \n\n322. \nA. I. D. inspectors entered their results upon little pads. 323. \nStates he never had any inspection pads turned over to him by \n\nthe A. I. D. inspectors. 323. \nKept about 20 on his desk and when he got to within about \n\nfive or six of the bottom would call in an inspector and have \n\nthem signed up. 324. \nGreat system to prevent delay. 324. \nWhich amounted to the same thing as if he did the rejecting. \n\n325. \nNot necessary to have the inspector around. 330. \nWilliam Boyle his superior. 335. \nMaj. Edward S. Moore (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, \nBuffalo, N. Y., August 8, 1918; Book IT). \nPermanent home, Chicago, 111. 338. \nEntered Army as civilian on January 25, 1918. 338. \nCame to the North Elmwood plant in April, 1918. 339. \nRepresented the Signal Corps generally in the Buffalo district. \n\n339. \nDistrict manager of production. 340. \nConditions chaotic when he got there. 340. \nAfter the order for the Spads was recalled they gave the Curtiss \n\nCo. the order for the Bristol plane with a Liberty motor on it \n\nin order to help them out. 340. \nSignal Corps and the Curtiss Co. did not get along very well \n\ntogether. 341. \nTrouble about inspection. 341. \nProduction engineering department of the Signal Corps had been \n\ngiven authority over the first 250 ships. 342. \nDid not get a complete inspection of the first 25 planes. 342. \nThe remaining 225 out of the 250 were never flown. 342. \nMr. Kellogg, of Washington, was responsible for releasing the \n\n400 planes, along about April, when the machine was still in the \n\nexperimental stage. 345. \nChanges by the Curtiss Co. were not gone over by the Signal \n\nCorps for some time. 351. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 263 \n\nMaj. Edward S. Moore \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nUntil May the Curtiss people made changes of their own. At a \nmeeting between Mr. Kellogg, Col. Hall, and Mr. Mueller in \nMr. Moore\'s office it was decided that Mr. Mueller should act \nin a way as engineer for the Signal Corps. 352. \n\nMr. Moore was to O. K. changes suggested by Mr. Mueller unless \nhe did riot agree with him. 353. \n\nNever agreed on anything. 354. \n\nCould not understand the reason for making 25, and then before \ncompleting them and seeing whether the machine was satisfac- \ntory putting a total of 400 into actual production. 357. \n\nAccording to overy expert he talked with, the real trouble with \nthe Bristol was trying to put a 450-horsepcwer motor into a \nplane built for a 200 or 225 horsepower motor. 358. \n\nCompares trying to put a Cadillac engine into a Ford and then \nmaking the Ford strong enough to hold the Cadillac engine. \nMakes an unbalanced machine. 358. \n\nOrganization not even 50 per cent perfect. Orders for changes \nwould come through, then an order to cancel it would come \nalong which would not reach some of the departments for three \nor four days afterwards. 359. \n\nMr. Webber responsible for everything more than anvone else. \n360. \n\nOverproduction. 363. \n\nAsked why, when there was the direct fashion of handling it, by \nletting the United States Government take it up with the Cur- \ntiss Co. and stopping these practices, it was not done. 368. \n\nWhen Mr. Wilson was put in authority this was immediately \nstopped. 369. \n\nIdleness of the men at the plant. 370. \nMiss Agxes Kierxan (Buffalo, X. Y., August 8, 1918; Book 17). \n\nEmployed in the record division of the Curtiss Co. since February \n25. 402. \n\nAsked with regard to list of enemv aliens employed in the plant. \n\xe2\x80\xa2402. \nWilliam M. Saveeney (Buffalo, X. Y., August 8. 1918 ; Book 17) . \n\nWill have been with the Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation \ntwo years in November, 1918. 406. \n\nCaptain of fire and police departments at plant " Gr." 407. \n\nUp until two months ago was fire and police commissioner, which \ngave him charge of all the Curtiss plants. 407. \n\nPlace given to Mr. E. S. Davies. 407. \n\nIf enemy alien got through their lines, they endeavored to keep a \nwatch en his activities. 411. \n\nHe had to defer to Mr. Harrington in those matters, as he was Mr. \nSweeney\'s immediate superior. 411. \n\nMade an attempt to get rid of Ernest Oleman. 417. \n\nMr. Ericcson said both Oleman and Jergeson were valuable men. \n418. \n\nAsked to explain how and through what system enemy aliens \nwere employed at the plant contrary to the Secretary of War\'s \nruling to the opposite. 426. \n\nAttention called to the case of Henry Yiktorin. 428. \n\n\n\n264 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nWilliam M. Sweeney\xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nFull report of the Jergenson matter obtained and marked \n" Sweeney Exhibit 3, August 8, 1918." 437. \nCharles Eohlfs (Buffalo, N. Y., August 8, 1918 ; Book 17) . \n\nHis resignation from the North Elmwood plant. 438. \n\nWill bring in copy of letter he wrote to Weller regarding this. \n441. B \n\nCapt. Joseph Weller (Buffalo, X. Y., August 8. 1918; Book 17). \n\nSaid he asked for the resignation of Mr. Charles Eohlfs because \nhe talked too much on the floor. 443. \n\nPrice, of the Curtiss Co., suggested getting rid of him 445. \n\nMr. Eohlfs recognized as an expert in wood; yes. 446. \n\nToo particular about small matters. 447. \n\nTook it up with Maj. Moore, and he approved of this action. \n447. \n\nAs the Curtiss people had been letting out people who did not co- \noperate with the United States Government officers, the3 T , in \nturn, wanted to reciprocate, and would put out Mr. Rohlfs, as \nhe was too arbitrary. 448. \n\nIs reconsidering the matter. 449. \nEdward S Moore (Buffalo, N. Y., August 8, 1918; Book 17). \n\nYes; he instructed Capt. Weller to request Mr. Bohlfs\'s resig- \nnation. 450. \n\nWas very " sassy " to Mr. Wilson. 450. \n\nMr. Price never asked them to get rid of Mr. Eohlfs. but said \nhe was unsatisfactory. 452. \n\nTo have a smooth-running organization it is necessary to get rid \nof one of the few men who has been defending the United \nStates from the start. 454. \n\nHad not heard of an understanding that if they would get rid \nof Eohlfs the company would get rid of Boyle. 455. \nCommander Holdex Chester Eichardson (Buffalo, X. Y., August \n8,1918; Book 17). \n\nEeported for duty at the North Elmwood plant about the 7th of \nMay. 459. \n\nTook him about 10 days to get into run of things, and then he \ndiscovered some trouble which seemed to emanate from a \ntendencv to want to substitute materials for those specified. \n461. \n\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x96\xa0\xe2\x96\xa0 Trouble with the kilns the most serious of anything that hap- \npened while he was there. 461. \n\nMentions Mr. Webber as hunting trouble. 463. \n\nObserved no tendency to inflate costs, but where minor changes \noccur, as a rule their bills come in quite high for changes. 467. \nGeorge Henry Mueller (Curtiss Airplane & Motor Corporation, \nBuffalo, N. Y., August 9, 1918; Book 17). \n\nChief engineer at the Curtiss plants. 470. \n\nParents born in Germany. 471. \n\nIs asked to give the whole history of the Bristol in his own way \nand his relation to it. 474. \n\nProduces report of April 10 as a complete diary, showing the \nchanges which were made. 475. \n\nCould not make any changes on the drawings without the ap- \nproval of some officer of the Signal Corps. 476. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 265 \n\nGeorge Henry Mueller \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nMr, Perrin was the first representative at Buffalo. 476. \n\nAround the 1st of March, Col. Hall came with his staff. 477. \n\nThinks no changes were made by the Curtiss Co. during the \ncourse of production without the approval of the Signal Corps, \n478. \n\nThey attempted to build one machine exactly in accordance with \nthe Signal Corps, drawings, but it was impossible to get the \nmachine together from the parts made from the details of the \nSignal Corps drawings. 480. \n\nHad to make their own assembly drawing, or drawing of a com- \nplete plane, as distinguished from the detailed drawing. 481. \n\nIs asked to produce correspondence in regard to the deficiencies \nof the blue prints and in regard to the assembly drawing. 482. \n\nExplains from his point of view the inaccuracies in the drawings \nand the reasons for them. 485. \n\nEnglish machine furnished by England was not made in accord- \nance with the English drawings. 486. \n\nThe shopmen always get awav from the drawings somewhere. \n\n,. 487. \n\nEvery time he sent instruction to the shop also sent a copy to the \nSignal Corps. 493. \n\nKnew that the Bristol would never be a success flown with tht> \nLiberty motor. 506. \n\nCould not possibly carry so large a weight without structural \nchanges. 506. \n\nNever received any stress analysis from the Signal Corps at all. \n506. \n\nCompany was not in a financial position to dictate to the Signal \nCorps what they should do regarding building or not building \nthe models which they sent them to build. 510. \n\nDiscussed with the Curtiss people, from January to May, his be- \nlief that this job would not be a success. 511. \n\nAsked i\'f effective cooperation did not lie in his bringing this \nto the attention of those who had had but little experience and \nwho were engaged in an endeavor to supply successful planes. \n512. \n\nStates that the authority given him to deal with the engineering \nquestions concerning the Bristol was never confirmed." 531. \n\nMr. Perrin was not in accord with the suggestion of making the \nCurtiss engineer the last word on decisions regarding the Bris- \ntol motor. 532. \n\nAt a conference on January 27 they went through and examined \nthe machine and made a great many changes. 535. \n\nMr. Mueller initiated these changes. 535. \n\nStates he lost authority by not having that authority confirmed. \n538. \n\nAsked if he went on in authority without a confirmation to a \ncertain length of time, what that lack of a confirmation had to \ndo with subsequent events. 542. \n\nStates he had the growing opposition of the Signal Corps, but \nthis did not appear so from the fact that Mr. Green and Mr. \nButts were overruled and he was put in control by Maj. Shep- \nley. 542. \n\n\n\n266 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nGeorge Henry Mueller \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nThe very object of the conference was to decide who should con- \ntrol. 543. \n\nNo one suggested to him that Maj. Shepley did not have the \npower to confer this authority on him. 544. \n\nNo one came to him and told him that this authority had been \nwithdrawn. 544. \n\nAsked why if vested with this authority he did not take it and \nuse it to the utmost limit. 544. \n\nAsked Avhat changes would have made this a satisfactory battle \nplane 548-550. \n\nAsked if after the changes were made on the first 25 machines \nwhich were released the machine was not found to be prac- \ntically in the same condition. 560. \n\nThe machine was practically as it was from a flying standpoint \nright at the start. 563. \n\nHe says at the outset that it is necessary to establish a model \nwhich is satisfactory before starting into production. 577. \n\nThen why did they go into active production on the 400 ma- \nchines ordered when they had a machine in which its flying \ninfirmities were still uncorrected. 578. \n\nIt was satisfactory to the Signal Corps. 578. \n\nMade no complaint to the Signal Corps, did not advise them \nthat the matter should be held up for a while. 578-579. \n\nDid not think they would have paid any attention. 579. \n\nHas tried to stop the production on the SE-5 and substitute the \nSpad, but this was not done. 579. \n\nStill further explains the situation with regard to the withhold- \ning of too much comment by the Curtiss people on the Bristol \nmachine. 581. \n\nStates he could have taken the Bristol and in a month turned \nout a machine that would have carried the Liberty motor if \nthey had given him permission. 585. \n\nSays it was the understanding in writing that the \' Government \nwas designing the Bristol machine. 586. \n\nSays battle-plane program was absolutely in the hands of the \nSignal Corps designers. 586. \n\nWas asked if he had ever heard that the Signal Corps takes a \ndifferent position and says that he was in charge of the de- \nsign of the Bristol. 586. \n\nWas absolutely no reason for ordering 400 additional machines \nwhen it was not a satisfactory flying machine from every \nstandpoint. 588. \n\nTook up the designing of the Liberty battler the latter part of \nMarch. 591. \n\nThis was built with the general idea of having it come right in \nafter the Bristol should that prove a failure. 591. \n\nThe Curtiss people made this suggestion to Col. Hall and they \nwere allowed to go ahead and design and build four machines \nagainst the Liberty contract. 592. \n\nThe one finished fell. 594. \n\nIs asked to produce whatever correspondence he has had with \nofficers of the Signal Corps which will show the plans or \ndrawings that lie had of the Bristol, etc. 607. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 267 \n\nJames Edgar Kepperley (Buffalo, N. Y., August 9, 1918; Book 17). \n\nVice president and general manager of Curtiss Aeroplane and \nMotor Corporation. 608. \n\nBegan practice of law in Indianapolis. 609. \n\nGives his impressions of the plant when he arrived. 610. \n\nThought Mr. Webber was just incompetent. 618. \n\nMr. Mueller was enthusiastic, but was inclined to be of a jealous \ndisposition and had too much engineering and too much de- \nsigning going on. 620. \n\nHad just got started on the first 25 when along came numerous \nattachments to be fitted to the machine, photographic, wire- \nless, heating apparatus, etc. 620. \n\nIt was just one continuous change down to the cancellation, \n620. \n\nAuthority had already been given to Mr. Mueller when he came \nthat his word was to be the final word on any changes. 622. \n\nMr. Kepperley took steps to have this changed, but it took some \ntime. 622. \n\nMaj. Hall is later sent and from that time on either Maj. Hall \nor some of his representatives were on the job all the time. \n623. \n\nCompany pressed for authority to proceed on the machine in \nconsiderable numbers in order to hold the organization to- \ngether. 625. \n\nHad heard Mr. Mueller criticize the machine. 625. \n\nOne of the complaints was that they were trying to make this \nmachine do everything. 626. \n\nThinks the Aircraft Bureau members lost confidence in the \nBristol on account of the serious accidents they had. 627. \n\nWhole organization lost confidence in the Bristol ; the men would \nsay there was no use in going to work, as they were going to \nchange it, as So-and-so said the whole design was rotten. 630. \n\nEnemy aliens. 643-659. \n\nEverything seemed an interminable tangle that could not be \nunraveled. 668. \n\nThey would say they had the record division all fixed ; he would \ncome down the next morning, and the cards would be all mixed \nup. 670. \n\nIs shown the poster which it was stated he refused to have put \non the walls. 672. \n\nStates he only wanted one secret service on the plant. 672. \n\nWas asked if he noticed that his secret-service men that he de- \npended on had not advised him of a great number of things \nabout which he was learning for the first time; production iu \nexcess of orders, and production of orders after the order has \nbeen canceled. 676. \n\nStates he never made a request that the representatives of the \nMilitary Intelligence Service should be taken out of the plant. \n693. \nSeverino Disandro (Buffalo, N. Y., August 9, 1918; Book 17). \n\nCame to the Curtiss plant the 17th of last February. 696. \n\nWas put in the boat hull department, construction of boats. 696. \n\nSaw lots of wrong work done. 697. \n\n\n\n268 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nSeverino Disandro \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nWould put the ribs in, then split the ribs and put glue on and \nsawdust. 698. \n\nWould cut the metal parts, then drill holes in them and fill them \nwith lead. 700. \n\nScrews were put in so loose you could pull them out with your \nhands. Inspector did not see it, because he did not know \nenough. 703. \n\nForeman comes along and takes off the red mark, which shows a \npiece is rejected, and lets it pass. 706. \nStephen T. Lockwood (Buffalo, N. Y., August 9, 1918; Book 17). \n\nUnited States district attorney. 709. \n\nWas asked if after being told by a man named Quinn that Webb \nwas boring holes in parts of airplanes he came to make an in- \nvestigation. 709. \n\nTook the matter up with Mr. Quinn of the Military Intelligence. \n710. \n\nConsidered the holes were bored by accident and lack of skill, \nand did not present the matter to the grand jury. 717. \nJames A. Quinn (Buffalo, N. Y., August 9, 1918; Book 17). \n\nAgent of the Military Police. 718. \n\nDescribes visit of Mr. Lockwood and demonstration following, \nin which it developed the men had to bore two or three times \nin order to hit the hole in the plate underneath the wood. 720. \nCyril R. Cobirn (Buffalo, N. Y.. August 9, 1918; Book 17). \n\nFurther testimony regarding the longeron. 722-729. \nCharles E. Wilson (Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation, Buf- \nfalo, N. Y., August 9, 1918; Book 17). \n\nCame to the plant about middle of April. 730. \n\nAssistant to the general manager, Mr. Kepperley. 730. \n\nHis own statement of condition of affairs as he found them and \nwhat has been done to remedy them. 732. \n\nFifty per cent of Mr. Kepperley \'s time spent in receiving letters \nof complaints and criticisms, being interviewed by Govern- \nment officials, etc. 732. \n\nStates peculiar position he found Mr. Kepperley in. 733. \n\nCalls up Mr. Willys on the telephone and explains conditions, \nstating that he must start to remedy the thing at its source. \n734. \n\nMakes statement of the methods which were from that time car- \nried out to the present. 735-741. \nLouis Mendlesohn (Washington, D. C, August 14, 1918; Book 18). \n\nHas been no change in progress of production, but of shipment. \nSome wires that extend from the Avings down on the fuselage, \nclose to the gasoline tank. They were secured by twisting \nwires together at joint and then covered with solder. How \nit was discovered he does not know, but they discovered that \nin case of a fire in the gasoline tank it would melt the solder \nupon the joint, loosening the wings and lead to a catastrophe. \nThey now insist upon a splice of about 4 or 5 inches and a \nregular cable splice is made. 1. \n\nJudge Hughes requests that company furnish him with a list \nof all enemy aliens employed in plant of Fisher Body Cor- \nporation, showing what positions the}^ hold, etc. 7. \n\n\n\nABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 269 \n\nBudd D. Gray (Washington, D. C, August 14, 1918; Book 18). \n\nWas president of the Hess-Bright Manufacturing Co., of Phil- \nadelphia, until June, when he disposed of holdings in com- \npany and went in the Government service. 8. \n\nAt present time has no occupation. 8. \n\nFirst position with Government was chief of the inspection \nof raw materials, instruments, etc., in the equipment divi- \nsion of the Signal Corps. \n\nIn fall of 1917 the specification section of the equipment divi- \nsion was turned over to him. 11. \n\nLeft Signal Corps because of interference, taking his authority \naway, and disrupting his organization, making it impossible \nfor him to get results. 14. \n\nFunction of production engineering department was to supply \nmanufacturers of planes, engines, and accessories with engi- \nneering information, drawings, specifications, etc., from \nwhich they could produce in quantity what they were to \nmanufacture. Also to specify materials, to decide upon de- \ntails of designs, etc, 14. \n\nMr. Kellogg put Col. Hall in complete charge of work on De \nHaviland 4\'s. 18. \n\nMr. Kellogg took production engineering matters on his own \nshoulders and disposed of them in some instances without \nsaying anything to him about them and in some instances \ndirectly in opposition to an agreement he had with him. 18. \n\nFound in March in some tests conducted in Lake Charles that \nthe radiator which had been designed for the De Haviland 4 \nwas not large enough to cool the engine, and Mr. Kellogg, in \nspite of the developments there, placed an order for some- \nthing like 1,300 with the Livingston Radiator Co. of the \noriginal dimensions. 19. \n\nGot hold of Livingston Radiator Co. and had order changed. \n27. \n\nDid not have very satisfactorv cooperation on the part of the \nDay ton- Wright ^Co. 46. \n\nTheir attitude, presumably occasioned by delay on the part of \nthe various branches of the Government in furnishing them \ninformation, was rather antagonistic. 47. \n\nDid not agree with Mr. Kellogg\'s decision to place the De Havi- \nland 4 work in the Fisher Body plant and in the Standard \nplant, also under Col. Hall. 50. \n\nImpossible to keep in touch with Col. Hall\'s work and check \nhim up. 51. \n\nDid not know Dayton- Wright Co. wanted drawing of gun. 61. \n\nResponsibility lay with the Government inspectors in permit- \nting the delivery of trigger motors which were not satis- \nfactory. 85. \n\nMcCook Field organization, under Col. Vincent, responsible for \nfaulty synchronizing generator. 85. \n\nOne of the representatives of the Trench Warfare Section had \nno difficulty in securing those parts from the New Haven con- \ncern, made to the same drawings, which to his mind is a \nfurther indication of lack of cooperation or inability on the \npart of the Dayton-Wright Co. 88. \n\n\n\n270 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nBudd D. Gray \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nNever knew there was any misunderstanding as to who was to \nfurnish the Holt flare lamps, because it was thoroughly un- \nderstood the Signal Corps was to furnish them. 90. \n\nRadiator is generally considered a part of the plane and the \npropeller a part of the engine. 91. \n\nQuestioned as to his relation to the production of the De Havi- \nlancl 4\'s by the Fisher Body Corporation. 92. \n\nDepartment had to secure drawings for this machine from the \nDayton-Wright Co. 92. \n\nThe Fisher Body Corporation followed the practice of laying \nout every part full sized on alluminum sheets, and they fol- \nlowed that practice in connection with the DH 4, and nat- \nurally it took some time to do that. 94. \n\nIt was felt by those in charge of the equipment division that the \nDayton-Wright Co.. with its facilities, was in a better posi- \ntion to make drawings of the DH 4 than any department \nof the Government. 94. \n\nSignal Corps did not at that time have what he would call an \nefficient engineering organization. 95. \n\nNeither Mr. Kettering nor Mr. Wright, whose names lent luster \nto the Day ton- Wright Co., could be actually depended on in \nthis work of drawings in order to proceed with production. \n97. \n\nCol. Clark handled the engineering work on aeroplanes for Sig- \nnal Corps in schoolboy fashion. 98. \n\nImportant work of getting drawings, in order that work of pro- \nduction might begin, was practically left to Mr. Schoonmaker, \nof the Dayton-Wright Co., and Col. Clark, who were without \ncapacity for the work. 98. \n\nFrom March 1, 1918, only knew in a general way of the changes \nordered in connection with the production of the De Haviland \n4\'s at the Standard Aircraft Co. 109. \n\nGovernment did net have any contract or any obligation what \never imposed upon the Dayton-Wright Co. to furnish draw \nings of the DH 4 to other manufacturers. 111. \n\nSignal Corps officers, who were charged with this particular \nfunction, simply relied on the good nature and friendliness \nof the Dayton-Wright Co. to furnish drawings for the Stand- \nard Co. and the Fisher Body Co. 112. \n\nJudge Hughes : "Manufacturer after manufacturer has charged \nthe Signal Corps with failure to supply it with working draw- \nings, with proper plans, with instructions which could be fol- \nlowed by a manufacturer in building." 118. \n\nDepartment did not succeed in giving the Dayton- Wright Co. \nthe information they required to make the DH 4 a complete \nmachine. 120. \n\nDees not think Col. Clark particularly energetic about going \nafter information. 121. \n\nNever knew that the Government was to supply the drawings. \n143. \n\nRelative to specifications for Liberty motor, talked with Col. \nDeeds about it and asked him how he felt about specifying \nthose accessories. 149. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 271 \n\nBudd D. Gray \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nIt was a little bit delicate for Col. Deeds to specify the Delco \nignition and a little bit delicate for him to specify the Hess- \nBright bearings. 149. \n\nCoL Vincent recommended these particular makes of accessor- \nies. 150. \n\nWitness questioned as to Borglum Exhibits 23-A, 23-B, and \n23-D. 154. 23-C. 159. 23-E. 162. \n\nQuestion relative to the Bristol under contract with the Curtiss \nAeroplane & Motor Corporation. 164. \n\nMr. Kellogg felt Hall had made such a good job of the DH 4 \nthat he would turn the Bristol over to him also, and that was \ndone in the latter part of April. 166. \n\nMr. Mueller, chief engineer of the Curtiss plant, was appointed \nby Maj. Sheppler, on instructions issued by Mr. Potter and \nin consultation with Col. Deeds and Mr. Coffin, to take care \nof the design and engineering work on the Bristol. 167. \n\nMaj. Sheppler told him he appointed Mr. Mueller on his own \nresponsibility. . 170. \n\nAlways a grave doubt in his mind as to the ability of some of \nthe men at the top of the Curtiss organization. 175. \n\nBristol was discarded because it failed to measure up to require- \nments in speed, climbing ability and structurally. 177. \n\nThe arrangement for the responsibility of making these changes \nwas made with the Curtiss Co. when Col. Clark turned the \nBristol (British) over with drawings to that company. 184. \n\nMr. Perrin and Mr. Butts, of his department, approved the \nchang:s made by Mr. Mueller. 187. \n\nIf there was any faulty work in connection with the redesign- \ning then it was the work which was approved bv Mr. Perrin. \n187. \n\nThe lack of balance was an error of judgment on the part of \nMr. Mueller, who inaugurated it and on the part of Mr. Per- \nrin, who thought it was all right. 188. \n\nThe Production Engineering Department specified the materials \nto be used in the various parts of the planes and engines. 189. \n\nWitness gives his reasons as to why airplane program was de- \nlayed. "190. \n\nWhen cablegrams arrived from Gen. Pershing they were dis- \ntributed not with great intelligence, and they frequently \nlanded in the hands of men who were not at all familiar with \nthe subject matter, and apparently remained there, and ridicu- \nlous answers were sent back to the other side. 192. \nLieut. Harold H. Emmons (Washington, D. C, August 14, 1918; \nBook 18). \n\nLieutenant in the Navy, National Naval Volunteers. 193. \n\nPrior to entering the service was a lawyer for a good many \nyears, and a manufacturer for four years. 193. \n\nWas secretary and treasurer of the Regal Automobile Co. 194. \n\nFor two years made ammunition for the Allies. 194. \n\nReported for duty with the Equipment Division, Signal Corps, \non the 15th of August, a year ago. 194. \n130687\xe2\x80\x9419 18 \n\n\n\n272 . ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nLieut. Harold H. Emmons \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nCame to Washington as attorney for H. M. & W. C. Leland, \nwho were going to take a contract to make Liberty engines. \n195. \n\nThinks Col. Waldon was responsible for asking for his detail to \nthe Equipment Division, Signal Corps. 195. \n\nWas with Messrs. Leland when he was so detailed. 195. \n\nDeA r oted his time principally to the Liberty engine. 195. \n\nTerms of contract for Liberty had been established, to a large \nextent, before he entered the service. 196. \n\nStates how the sum of $6,000 was selected as to bogey price for \nthe Liberty motor. 197. \n\nCol. Montgomery was responsible for reducing the bogey price \non the Liberty motor. 202. \n\nThinks advances were made bv the Government to everyone ex- \ncept the Ford Motor Co. 201. \n\nQuestioned as to Bor^him Exhibits 23-A, 23-B, 23-C, 23-D. \n23-E. 207. \n\nHall-Scott engine vibrated so furiously that it disarranged the \nconnections for the gasoline, water, and oil, and made it a \nvery hard and unsatisfactory plane to use in the air (referring \nto standard J.) 213. \n\nHave something like 1,800 Hall -Scott engines in storage and in \nuse. 211. \n\nExplains reasons for delay in the production of Liberty motor. \n215. \n\nFrom the time he came until now there have been 15,780 engines \nmade and delivered. 219. \nLieut. Col. E. Lester Jones (Washington. D. C, August 15, 1918; \nBook 18). \n\nAccounts with respect to Wilbur Wright Field kept in his de- \npartment. 223. \n\nHas reason to believe that Government has paid Dayton Lumber \n& Engineering Co. for labor which was not earned. 227. \n\nMr. J. K. Graniss, now in charge there, caught a padded payrool \ninvolving a large number of thousands of dollars. 228. \n\nHas information that Mr. Talbott is interested in the Day- \nton Lumber & Engineering Co. 229. \n\nFound Mr. Graniss not very well liked,. which was a good rec- \nommendation to him, because he is trying to protect the Gov- \nernment and get at the bottom of things. 231. \n\nChanges were being made on planes at Wilbur Wright Field \nto suit the flyers and recommended through proper channels \nthat the factory follow out their suggestions, and this has \nnot been done. 231. \n\nSpirit that existed around Dayton was anything but productive \nof good results. 240. \n\n" My principal point was, Why should these ships be turned \nout by a manufa turer and be paid for by the Government as \nbeing acceptable and all right, and then be taken to a field, \nplaced in their repair shops, and days spent making repairs \nthat should be made in the factory before they en me out." \n214. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 273 \n\nLieut Ol F T ^steb Tombs \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nPaying double prices for labor, fabric, and dope on Canadian- \nCurtiss machines. 246. \n\nWitness questioned people at Dayton as to why they had aban- \ndoned Wilbur Wright Field as a flying school. It struck him \nas being a very unwise and unbusinesslike proposition. 246. \n\nCondition at acceptance park at Springwells, Detroit, with ref- \nerence to work of Fisher Body people was very bad. 255. \n\nLapere, two-seater, combat plane unanimously commended by \nofficers as one of the best types brought out. 259. \n\nDope used on DH 4 not satisfactory. 265. \n\nFound 50 or 60 cases where one would find a rejected tag right \nunderneath an accepted tag. 267. \nLieut. H. H. Emmons (Washington, D. C Aug. 15, 1918, Book 18). \n\nGives epitome of his business experience. 290. \n\nExplains more fully his connection with the engine-production \ndepartment; also how the bogey cost of Liberty motor was \narrived at. 293. \n\nRelates difficulty in procuring signatures of manufacturers to \ncontract, 298-299. \n\nGives dates on which contracts for Liberty motors were signed \n(manufacture of). 304. \n\nNot a single engine contractor on list wanted to go into busi- \nness of manufacturing Liberty motors. 307. \n\n"A Government production agency could not tell these men \nhow to run their business; thev knew more about it than we \ndid." 312. \n\nMan with rotary engine wins fight every time because the en- \ngine is small and compact, etc. 330. \n\nOn October 12 received cablegram from other side not to build \n5,000 Gnome engines. 334. \n\nMr. Wagner, of General Vehicle Co., felt the Union Switch & \nSignal Co. had not been treated fairly. 335. \n\nUnder coercion the Westinghouse Co. took the job of building \n2,500 LeRhone engines. 343. \n\nNot manufacturing any four-cylinder engines now. 352. \n\nOrders out covering what has already been delivered, 3,500 of \n150-horsepower Hispano-Suiza, 4,000 of the 180 Hispano- \nSuiza, and 10,000 of the 300 Hispano-Suiza; and on the 150- \nhorsepower Hispano-Suiza 2,494 have been delivered. 354. \n\nTook away from Duzenberry Motor Corporation their contract \nfor Liberty 12s and gave them a contract for 2,000 Bugattis\xe2\x80\x94 \n500-horsepower engine, 355. \n\n" France is full of patriots of that type." " When some of the \nexecutives tell you about their negotiations for patent rights \nand for royalties on anything that we wanted from France \nyou will get some idea of what they had to do and what they \nhad to contend with in dealing with that country." 356. \nCan not tell why Hispano-Suiza has come into favor. 357. \nDoes not know why Spacl contract was abandoned last fall and \nthe S. E. 5, a similar type of machine, put into production. \n358. \n\n\n\n274 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nLieut. H. H. Emmons \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nHas no information why. contemporaneously with the develop- \ning of the Liberty motor, production of the Hispano-Suizas \nfor pursuit machines was not encouraged. 358. \n\nContract with Trego Co. for Liberty motors assigned to Ord- \nnance Department; motors to be used in tanks. 358. \n\nTrego Co. could not build an aviation engine that could pass \nmuster. 359. \n\nQuestioned as to why contract was given Trego Co. 360. \n\nContract with Nordyke-Marmon Co. for 3,000 Liberty motors \nwas dated August 15. 1917. Has delivered 24 motors to date. \n363. \n\nTotal program of 50,000 Liberty motors, of which 25.000 have \nbeen contracted for. 363-364. \n\nChart showing aviation engine shipments to and including Au- \ngust 13, 1918, marked " Emmons Exhibit 4." 367. \n\nFour pages of details about experimental engines which have \nbeen made and delivered down to May 31, 1918. marked " Em- \nmons Exhibit 5." 368. \n\nCablegram from Maj. Brett, of the Department of Military \nAeronautics, states there are three quadrons on the front lines \nequipped with the De Haviland 4 planes and Liberty engine. \nConsider them the best equipped squadrons on front. 370. \n\nDoes not know of airy great change they would make if they \nhad to do it over again. 371. \nEdmund Leigh (Washington. D. C. August 15, 1918: Book 18). \n\nIn charge of plant protection section of military intelligence. \n373. \n\nHeld that position about a year. 373. \n\nPrior to that was general superintendent of police of the Balti- \nmore & Ohio Kailroad for five years. Previous to that 19 \nyears in the detective bureau of New York City. 372. \n\nMr. McCarren, his agent at Buffalo, at the Curtiss plant, left \nbecause of a concerted attack and obstruction to all his en- \ndeavors bv the agent in charge in the Department of Justice. \n374. \n\nCol. Van Demon, then in charge of Military Intelligence, di- \nrected him to remove Agent Jalma West from Buffalo, as West \ncould not get along with the Curtiss people, 376. \n\nCol. Horner has requested that this be done. 376. \n\nMr. Kepperly stated he had paid Mr. Sowers, of the Niagara \nDefense League, a good deal of money and he had never \nseen as much as a scrap of paper to show for anything Mr. \nSowers had done for these bills he paid. 380. \n\nReports relative to conditions existing in Buffalo plant were \nforwarded to Mr. Ryan, Aircraft Production Board, and \nprevious to his appointment to Col. Deeds. 383. \n\nTo his knowledge nothing was done on reports submitted rela- \ntive to Curtiss plant, 384. \n\nQuestioned as to various reports received and forwarded in re \nconditions at Curtiss plant. 385-397. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 275 \n\nEdmund Leigh \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nMr. Ford became very much perturbed when Government agents \nwent through his plant of 38,000 employees and found that \n18,000 of them were foreign born and 1,100 of them were Ger- \nman and Austrian enemy aliens. 409. \nLieut. Col. Arthur Woods (Washington, D. C, August 16, 1918; \nBook 18). \n\nFormerly police commissioner of New York City. 412. \n\nEntered Army early in March of 1918. 412. \n\nAssigned to Aviation Section, Signal Corps. For several \nmonths up until about three weeks ago, did most inspection \nwork in the fields and special work as called upon from time \nto time. 412. \n\nSpent about a week at Curtiss plant looking into the matter of \nGerman interference. 414. \n\nConclusion was that every single thing that pointed to sabotage \ncould be explained more easily in some other way than at- \ntributing it to the Germans. 415. \n\nThere was no system of identification of employees; not proper \nprotection against fire; perfectly possible for ill-disposed \npeople to do anything they wanted to do. 416. \n\nThere were several enemy aliens in important positions, and \nthe conduct of these people was about the kind that would \nbe carried out by enemy aliens. 416. \n\nLooked to him as though either a strong and capable manage- \nment should be put in the Curtiss plant or the Government \nshould take the plant over. 422. \n\nJudge Hughes questioned him as to why this information he \ncollected was not placed at his (Mr. Hughes\'s) disposal. 423. \nJohn A. Jordan (Washington, D. C, August 16, 1918; Book 18). \n\nIs a constructing engineer and a stockholder in the Liberty Iron \nWorks. 426. \n\nGeneral manager of Liberty Iron Works for approximately six \nmonths. 426. \n\nHad a contract for 300 JN-4 planes. 427. \n\nTook him three months to get the contract, as Mr. Deeds and \nMr. Waldon opposed very strongly the letting of a contract \nto anybody on the Pacific coast. Had to fight it down through \nSenators and Congressmen. 427. \n\nAircraft Board had already selected all the manufacturers of \nairplanes who would be given contracts, and Mr. Deeds stated \nto him that he did not purpose to enlarge the list. 428. \n\nSenator Phelan was making an appeal for him. 429. \n\nDid not get drawings until long after expiration of contract. \n434. \n\nMr. B. W. Guv, secretary of the Curtiss Co., demanded $75,000 \n\xe2\x96\xa0: for plans of JN-4. 436. \n\nExtract of minutes of Aircraft Board under date of January 31, \n1918 : " * * * three contracts for training planes had been \nplaced on the Pacific coast solely upon the strong recommenda- \ntion of Senator Phelan and Representative Kalm, all three- \nhaving failed in their deliveries^" 438. \n\n\n\n276 ABSTEACT OF AIRCKAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nJohn A. Jordan \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nDeliveries delayed on planes due to disruption of the organiza- \ntion of Liberty Iron Works, and contract cut to 100 planes. \n446. \nMore or less trouble with planes delivered. 446. \nGovernment sent his company a sample machine from which \n\nthey were to check their machine. Sent them a JN 4-A when \n\nthey were manufacturing a JN 4-D. 451. \nCapt. Patterson, the chief inspector, did not know anything in \n\nconnection with an airplane. 453. \nThe organization of the Liberty Iron Works was contingent \n\nupon getting this contract. 457. \nPlanes were not produced because they could not get these small \n\nmetal parts. 463. \nThinks if he had paid the $75,000 everything would have been \n\nsmooth sailing with the Liberty Iron Works. 464. \nFactory had been using parts in planes there that ought not to \n\nhave gone in. 469. \nAll of the planes from the Liberty Iron Works were overhauled \n\nat Mather Field and found defective, after they had passed \n\ninspection. 477. \nUnited States Aircraft Corporation was a joke. 479. \nMr. HoAvell, the original chief inspector out there, was a heavy \n\njtockholder in the Vogelsang concern, which made bolts and \n\nthings of that kind. 481. \nLieut. Col. Virgin ius Evans Clark (Washington, D. C, August 16, \n\n1918; Book 18). \nHas been in the Army since October, 1909. 488. \nA graduate of the Naval Academy. 488. \nWas transferred from the Navy to the Army 1909. 489. \nSix flyers in the LTnited States Army when he entered the Avia- \ntion Corps in 1913. 490. \nLearned to fly at North Island, San Diego, Calif., in 1914-1915. \n\n491. \nTook a course in aeronautical engineering at the Massachusetts \n\nInstitute of Technology in the fall of 1914. 493. \nMet Alexander Klemin very soon after he went to Technology. \n\n493. \nKlemin enlisted as a private in the Army when he ceased to be \n\nan instructor in Boston Technology. 496. \nIs now a lieutenant, and is located at McCook Field, Davton, \n\nOhio. 496. \nArmy did not have any combat planes prior to our entering the \n\nwar in April, 1917. 499. \nArmy had, all told, about 300 planes when we entered the war, \n\nand these were either training or scouting planes. 500. \nUpon our entry into the war he was in charge of design of air- \nplanes. Worked on design for a single-seater for the His- \n\npano-Suiza until June, 1917, when he went to Europe with \n\nMaj. Boiling\'s commission. 500. \nMr. Boiling had been a corporation lawyer, prior to that time, \n\nfor the United States Steel Corporation. 502. \nNavy had not more than 40 planes when we entered the war. \n\n50*2. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 277 \n\nLieut. Col. Vibginitjs Evans Clark \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nArmy had between 75 and 100 flyers and the Navy probably 35 \nor 40 flyers in April, 1917. 503. \n\nThinks they could logically have expected to expand even more \nrapidly than that, even though there had been no war. 504. \n\nGives outline of duties performed by Boiling Commission in \nEurope. 506. \n\nMade recommendations, as a result of experiences abroad, at \nconferences with Col. Deeds, Col. Waldon, Col. Montgomery, \nMaj. Vincent, Maj. Horner, and Capt. Marmon and himself \nin attendance. 510. \n\nThinks report made by Maj. Boiling to Gen. Squier under date \nof August 15, 1917, very accurate. 512. \n\nGives outline of recommendations he made with regard to air- \ncraft program. 513. \n\nDe Haviland 9 was far better suited for bombing than the De \nHaviland 4. 514. \n\nCanceling orders for De Haviland 9 was done against his recom- \nmendation. 515. \n\nDoes not consider that the abandonment of the De Haviland 9 \nfor the De Haviland 4 in any way a dereliction on the part of \nthe authorities. 517. \n\nThinks De Haviland 4 is better adapted to use as a bomber than \na combat plane. 524. \n\nThe Bristol was the machine known as the fighter on the British \nfront. 527. \n\nNot so sure it is a wise policy to order so many machines when \nthe development has not even been started with any particular \nfactory. 529. \n\nNothing about the De Haviland 9 which would make the adapta- \ntion of the Liberty engine more difficult than for the De Havi- \nland 4. 531. \n\nWas at McCook Field in fall of 1917 until January of 1918. \n531. \n\nTried to get sample of De Haviland 9 over to McCook Field to \nwork on it, but Col. Deeds\'s orders were to leave it at Wright \nfactory. 532. \n\nLaid out a machine which was later called the U. 8. D-9. 533. \n\nThought the machine was loaded too heavy per square foot- \n533. \n\nWhile in Italy arranged to have Mr. Caproni send over one of \nhis triplanes, also a biplane, and those two machines arrived \nin September or October and were sent to Langley Field, but \nthere was no attention paid to them. 534. \n\nTriplane was crashed in January of this year. 535. The only \none we had in this country. 535. \n\nThe Caproni biplane is now being put into production, and a tri- \nplane is what was wanted. 535. \n\nThe triplane will carry about 3,500 pounds of bombs, with six \nhours\' fuel, which is six times as much as the biplane will \ncarry with the same fuel. 536. \n\nDoes not consider Caproni biplane satisfactory machine to put \ninto production. 539. \n\n\n\n278 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nLieut. Col. Virgin ius Evans Clark \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nThinks it a fatal error to order two types of machines to accom- \nplish the same function. 540. \n\nSaw cable that arrived yesterday stating that no DH 4s had \nyet arrived at the front. 544. \n\nReason DH 4\'s have not reacheel the front is because they are \nrebuilding* them to some extent on other side. 545. \n\nDid not have enough draftsmen to complete designs of the Bris- \ntol. 560. \n\nThinks you could get away with 2,000 or 2,200 drawings for a \nBristol fighter. 561. \n\nReads extracts from diary of Mr. Perrin relative to work of \nCurtiss Co. on Bristol machine. 565-602. (20 pages in book \nskipped in numbering.) \n\nAgainst his urgent wishes the Bristol was taken out of the ex- \nperimental stage and put into the production stage. 606. \n\nRecommended the Spad for fighting. 611. \n\nCol. Deeds told him that he got a cablegram from Gen. Pershing \nrecommending that no single seaters be built in this country. \n612. \n\nParagraph from cablegram received from Gen. Pershing rela- \ntive to above. 614. \n\nRecommended production of Martinsyde, but British Mission \ndid not favor it. Now planning to build them. 616. \n\nFor the past six or seven months has been commanding officer \nof a concentration camp in Morrison, Va. 625. \n\nThey go into production regardless of the approval or disap- \nproval of the technical section. 634. \n\nAlexander Klemin is as well qualified from a theoretical and \nmathematical standpoint as any man in the country as an \nengineer with aeronautical experience. 638. \n\nCol. Deeds went on his note for $1,000 at a Dayton bank. 641. \nCapt. Elmer J. Clarke (Washington, D. C, August 16, 1918; \nBook 18). \n\nEntered the Government service last September, and was com- \nmissioned in January. 644. \n\nPrior to that was connected with the Portland Motor Car Co. y \nPortland, Oreg. 614. \n\nWas asked to get into the Army by Maj. Tourney. 644. \n\nWas told to get together an organization and office for the in- \nspection of lumber in the Northwest. 615. \n\nRecalled from that duty and assigned to Buffalo, relieving* \nCapt. Ferguson. 647. \n\nNoticed Curtiss Co. was getting the largest quantity of lumber \nof anv company in the East. 648. \n\nNoted that there were men at the Curtiss plant far in excess of \nrequirements. 650. \n\nWas relieved from duty at Buffalo by Maj. Moore. 652. \n\nPut in new department at Washington called Plants and Fac- \ntories, 655. \nEdmlnd Leigh (Washington, D. C., August 19, 1918: Book 18). \n\nProduces letter addressed to him bv Col. Horner under date of \nApril 6, 1918, relating to fire protection, which was marked \n"\' Leigh Exhibit No. 17," August 19, 1918. 659. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIKCEAFT INVESTIGATION. 279 \n\nEdmund Leigh \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nProduces forwarding paper from agent in charge at Buffalo \n\ncarrying with it certain statements of facts of work alleged \n\nto have been done upon a previous recommendation, which \n\nwas marked "Leigh Exhibit No. 18," August 19, 1918. 659. \n\nLieut. Col. Lester Jones (Washington, D. C, August 19, 1918; \n\nBook 18). \n\nTotal paid by Government on account of Wilbur Wright Field \nto August 14 is $3,115,161.94. 663. \n\nStatement of all complete planes DH 4s shipped overseas to \nand including August 7, 1918, marked " Jones Exhibit No. 7," \nAugust 19, 1918. 666. \' \n\nFinancial statement to June 30, 1917, showing the distribution \nof appropriations and an analysis of obligations, marked \n"Jones Exhibits No. 8-A and No. 8-B," August 19, 1918. \n667. \n\nMemorandum of acetate depot contracts for July, 1918. marked \n" Jones Exhibit No. 9," August 19, 1918. 667. _ \n\nProduces various cables with respect to corrections in defects \nof DH 4s on the other side, which were marked " Jones \nExhibit No. 11," August 19, 1918. 669. \nMaj. John Armstrong Drexel (Washington, D. C, August 19, \n1918; Book 18). \n\nEntered the Army in October, 1917. 673. \n\nHas been in active service as a flyer with the French Flying \nCorps. 673. \n\nReturned from France on June 10. 673. \n\nRadiators on DH 4 plane were supposed to be a bad production \njob. 678. \n\nHave changed DH 4s on other side. 679. \n\nConsider Liberty engine very good on other side, except for \ncarbureti on. 680. \n\nThinks DH with Liberty is a wrong conception. It is too high- \npowered for that plane, but thinks they will have the finest \nplane on the front with the DH 9- A wings. 681. \nLieut. Col. Leonard Sherman Horner (Department of Justice, \nWashington, D. C, August 19, 1918; Book 19). \n\nThinks he entered the Armj^ in August, 1917. 1. \n\nWas asked by Col. Deeds to come to Washington. 4. \n\nTook up the work of the ordnance and instrument section in \nJuly, 1917. 5. \n\nWhen Col. Waldron was sent overseas to form an aircraft pro- \nduction over there, he was made executive officer under Col. \nDeeds and afterwards acted in same capacity under Col. Mont- \ngomery. 6. \n\nAsked if he knows anything about orders that were placed in \nFrance for delivery by the French Government of planes for \nour forces. 7. \n\nThese were largely canceled. 8. \n\nIs asked for a statement of the planes and engines actually de- \nlivered to elate by the French Government on contracts placed \nthere by the United States Government. 9. \n\n\n\n280 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nLieut. Col. Leonard Sherman Korxer \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nThinks reason why the French Government did not complete \ncontract in accordan e with anticipations was that the French \nagreed to make certain deliveries to this country of planes, so \nmany per month, provided the United States Government fur- \nnished them certain raw materials at a given time. This time \nhad expired when contract received. 11. \n\nIs asked to furnish these contracts. 11. \n\nThis country also in default in not being able to live up to \npromises made in this connection. 13. \n\nGives statement of the whole matter relating to the various \norders. 14-20. \n\nHe had a distinct understanding, as did others, that when Col. \nBoiling made this contract with the French Government that \nthe French Government actually expected to make these de- \nliveries to the United States Government, and that the ma- \nterial asked for was to fill up their depleted stocks more than \nanything else. 20. \n\nHad a clear idea also that the French Government was short on \nsome materials, so some rush orders were gotten off in remark- \nable time. Is to furnish contracts which will show orders \nplaced on a certain date and the date on which they started \nshipping. 21. \n\nAsked what has become of this stuff, as it did not come back in \nplanes. 22. \n\nHave shipped at least $1,000,000 worth of material and only \nhave 230 or 240 planes. 23. \n\nSubstituted contract was made sometime in May, and states on \naccount of not being able to meet deliveries that the contracts \nare reduced hereby a certain amount, etc. 24. \n\nThree hundred machines from the British. 24. \n\nAsked about the delays on the De Haviland 4s. 26-32. \n\nStates that inability of Dayton-Wright people to get accurate \ninformation w T ith regard to equipment, changes, etc., did pro- \nduce a long and serious dela} T . 33. \n\nPeople on the other side knew what they were putting in a ma- \nchine, but their specifications and drawings could not be put \ntogether. 35. \n\nThe sample planes that were sent over by the commission were \nequipped in most cases, not complete, which explains, he \nstated, why it was so difficult to get definite and accurate in- \nformation from the other side when the subject of the inquiry \nwas something that was in actual use. 36. \n\nDrawings and specifications accompanied these sample planes, \nbut they did not check up with the actual plane. 36. \n\nIn addition to all this, cables and information were continually \ncoming over to the various departments as to certain other \npieces of apparatus to be added, which they in their ignorance \ntook to be facts, and they made the changes accordingly, some- \ntimes coming out right and sometimes wrong. 37. \n\nLack of airplane engineering knowledge was at the root of nil \nthe trouble. 37. \n\nDid not know what a synchronizing dr-vice was in this country \nuntil some engineer came over here and told them. 30. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 281 \n\nLieut. Col. Leonard Sherman Horner \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nStarted to use a synchronizer on the other side latter part of 1915 \nor 1916. 39-42. \n\nAsked why Col. Clark of the engineering department, who had \ndevoted a good deal of attention to airplane matters, was re- \nlieved of that work when the production engineering depart- \nment was organized. 42. \n\nMatter was taken out of the hands of the airplane engineering \ndepartment so as to expedite getting of information to the \nfactories and the changes in the drawings and designs. 43. \n\nIs shown by the statement from the Dayton-Wright Co. which \ncomplained of the lack of these very things. 44. \n\nLack of clearly placed responsibility. 49. \n\nHe understood that in the case of the Bristol the designs origi- \nnally given to the Curtiss Co. did not permit of the pie es \nproperly going together, and that therefore the Curtiss Co. \nwere instructed to make such changes in the drawings as were \nnecessary for a complete plane. 50. \n\nAfter that the matter at the Curtiss plant handled by the Curtiss \nCo. in conjunction with the local representatives of the pro- \nduction engineering department who had had no experience \nwhatever in designing aeroplanes. 50. \n\nAgain explains the displacing of Col. Clark. 54. \n\nSubmits paper entitled "Cause of delav 1 \'; is marked " Hcrner \nExhibit 1." 56. \n\nBristol motor redesigned for use of Liberty engine under direc- \ntion of Col. Clark, which proved to be a failure. 57. \n\nAsked why the Government did not do something to correct the \ncondition of things existing at the Curtiss plant. 63. \n\nStates Mr. Potter, Col. Montgomery, and Col. Deeds were all well \nacquainted with these conditions. 69. \n\nAsked Col. Van Deman to remove Mr. West from the Curtiss \nplant. 72. \n\nAdmitted he was very prolific in obtaining information, but that \nthis was not correct information. 75. \n\nStates he didn\'t mean it was not correct, but that he was not dis- \ncreet in obtaining this information. 76. \n\nDon\'t know who told him so. 76. \n\nAsked if he was more interested in his discretion than the infor- \nmation, than he was in correcting the conditions which the \ninformation disclosed. 76. \n\nCan not answer why they removed a man who was supplying the \nvery information they were supposed to want. 78. \n\nThe reason sifts down to Mr. Kepperly, of the Curtiss plant, who \ndoes not want Mr. West to carry an annual pass, which admits \nhim to all parts of the plant at any and all times. " Wants this \nstopped." 79. \n\nFollows letters and telegrams from the Curtiss people regarding \nthis " nuisance." 79 to 95. \n\nIs asked for all information that exists in letters that passed be- \ntween the department in Washington and Maj. Moore or Mr. \nGreen which would show that these conditions disclosed in the \nreports were taken care of, an effort made to remedy them. 109. \n\nMakes statement on his own account. 110 to 115, inclusive. \n\n\n\n282 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION"; \n\nForrest E. Cardullo (August 19, 1918 ; book 19). \n\nHas been employed at the plant of the Curtiss Airplane & Motor \n\nCorporation since the 1st of December. 1913. 116. \nEngineer of tests. 117. \nKnows nothing about the purchase by the Curtiss Co. of dope \n\nfrom the Celluloid Zapon Co. 119. \nCame to his attention by people from the Celluloid Zapon Co. \n\nappearing one day saying there was a lot of dope they wanted \n\nto correct. 119. \nWhole quantity was returned to Celluloid Zapon Co. to be fixed \n\nright, 121. \nMr. Crossley had condemned a great deal of dope which they \n\nused subsequently with the full consent of the Signal Corps \n\nand the Government people. 122. \nStates that he had never seen the report which showed it cracked \n\nwith two weeks\' exposure. 124. \nAsked how it happened that material condemned by the chief \n\nchemist should be accepted later and passed. 128. \nGives a statement in regard to his individual relation to it. 132 \n\nto 135. \nMr. Guy Leonard (August 19, 1918; book 19). \n\nSupervising the construction of the acetate of lime and acetone \n\nplants and wood chemical plants. 136. \nJust recently built the acetone plant for the Standard Chemical \n\nCo. in Sault Ste. Marie, in Canada, and then came over to the \n\nCurtis Bav Chemical Plant. 137. \nMr. O. W. Ott (August 19, 1918; book 19). \n\nIn the chemical section of the Bureau of Aircraft Production. \n\nhaving charge of disposition of dope. 145. \nAsked to send in whatever their records show in regard to the \n\nCelluloid Zapon Co. 149. \nEdmund Leigh (August 20. 1918; book 19). \n\nAlien enemies. 150. \nCol. Marborough Churchill (August 20, 1918; book 19). \nBeen in the Army since September, 1901. 152. \nGives resume of the duties he has been assigned to since the be- \nginning of the war until June 1. when he arrived in Washing- \nton and was detailed as chief of the militarv intelligence \n\nbranch. 152-155. \nAsked to state what he learned in respect to the delivery of \n\nplanes in France by the French Government under contracts \n\nmade by Col. Boiling. 155. \nWas told that one of the ostensible reasons for the failure of \n\nthe French Government to produce the planes was the failure \n\nof this country to supply raw materials. 158. \nKnows it to be a fact that for a long period there were schools \n\nwith a large number of American flyers who had no machines \n\nin which to be trained and were in virtual idleness. 160. \nSerious situation of affairs that reflected upon the military \n\nadministration of the United States. 161. \nThese conditions existed at Toul and Issouden, the two largest \n\nschools. 161. \nSituation began to be acute in October, and in January it began \n\nto be corrected. 162. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 283 \n\nCol. Marborotjgh Churchill \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nAsked to turn in the reports of the Standard and of the Dayton- \nWright, 166. \n\nArrangements had been made with the British and French to \nreceive a certain number of men for training, which went on \nsatisfactorily, but in addition to that large numbers of Amer- \nican aviation students were sent over who were not to be \ntrained in those camps and for whom no provision had been \nmade by the French or English. 168-170. \n\nGen. Squier had to do with the sending over of men at that \ntime. 171. \nVictor Lougheed (August 20, 1918; Book 19) . \n\nResides in Chicago, 111. 172. \n\nMechanical engineer and technical writer. 172. \n\nBeen actively interested in aeronautics since 1903. 172. \n\nIn connection with other work of this nature published in 1909 \na book entitled Vehicles of the Air, which sold within two \nyears about 30,000 copies in three editions. 173. \n\nIn 1912 wrote Airplane Designing, which, in 1915, half of \nit was published in an Austrian flying magazine. 173. \n\nThis book for amateurs, is now in use in the German and Aus- \ntrian flying corps as a text book. 173. \n\nIs also informed that half of it has been translated and published \nand is on file in the Chicago Library. 174. \n\nAlso does technical writing for Popular Mechanics. 174. \n\nTestifies as to his ability in building airplanes and designing \nof large planes. 175. \n\nDescribes machine built big as Caproni, and flying with two- \nthirds less power. When five hours old flew from Santa \nBarbara to San Diego, 211 miles in 281 minutes, without \nmishap with 1,600 pounds deadweight and enough gasoline \nleft to have flown six times that far. 176. \n\nWas completed within six months\' time of designing. 176. \n\nBuilt in a plant that had less than $5,000 worth of facilities \nin the way of machine tools. 177. \n\nTestifies as to the negotiations he has had with officers of the \nGovernment. 180. \n\nApplication was canceled by the United States Civil Service \nCommission on November 19, 1915, because he was not a \ngraduate in mechanical engineering. 181. \n\nTakes up case with Mr. Siclnev Waldon in Detroit. 181-183. \n\nWrites to Mr. Marmon, and produces the answer he received. \n185. \n\nTry to sell the machine to the Navy, 189. \n\nBrother gets an order for two Curtiss seaplanes to build. 191. \n\nIntroduces this contract into the record. 191-193. \n\nHis point is that the Curtiss Co. could better have built two \nmore machines of that type for the Government than a \nlittle plant. On the other hand two boys with brains on the \nmatter could better have been developing something better \nthan making an arbitrary copy of that machine. 194. \n\nPats a proposition to the Government, in which it would have \ncost the Government nothing, to demonstrate them the im- \n\n\n\n284 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nVictor Lottgheed \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nprovements that can be made in the wings of the machine \nas to get an increased efficiency with a lower-powered engine. \n196-199. \n\nCould not go ahead and build the machine first and then demon- \nstrate to the Government, because you could not get materials \nand labor unless you were doing \'Government work. 199. \nCapt. W. Wickham Hoffman (August 20, 1918; Book 19). \n\nBeen in the Air Service since August 21, 1917. 202. \n\nWas never interested in aviation except as a civilian might be. \n202. \n\nExplains how he entered the Army and the duty to which he was \nassigned. 202-204. \n\nUnderstood that developments later in regard to raw materials \nprevented the French from fulfilling their contract. 205. \n\nThere were no actual training camps absolutely idle because of \nlack of planes. 207. \n\nOne thousand two hundred cadets awaiting training at St. \n\nMaisent at one time, some having waited three months without \nany flying whatever. 208. \nJohn D. Ryan (August 20, 1918; Book 19). \n\nAsked to state conditions as he found them on a recent visit to \nthe Pacific coast. 211-229. \n\nHas found no evidences of any irregularities in the way of \ninfluencing the contracts for consideration, etc. 229. \n\nMakes statement regarding efforts of the Government to correct \nconditions existing at the Curtiss plant. 235. \n\nReports running back to March reveal these conditions. Reports \nto Signal Corps disclose these conditions, and along Avith \nthem they found a disposition to accommodate the Curtiss Co. \nby getting rid of those who disclosed the conditions, and the \ndisposition on the part of the Curtiss Co. to resent activity \nof Government representatives which tended to reveal these \nconditions. 243. \n\nMentions the case of Mr. West, who made reports with detailed \nstatements and was removed. 243. \n\nFound excess production, excess orders, padded pay rolls, idle \ntime, etc. 245. \n\nUnable to understand what it was that give the Curtiss Co. \nauthority apparently superior to the Government. No Gov- \nernment officer with the slightest knowledge of the facts should \nhave permitted it for a fortnight. 245. \nEdward L. Ryerson, Jr. (August 21, 1918; Book 19). \n\nCaptain of the aircraft service production. 253. \n\nSince December 1, 1917, has had charge of the propeller work. \n256. \n\nIn the requirements for propeller production African mahogany \nis put last. 270. \n\nCable from department of aircraft production of Great Britain \nto Gen. Cormack, British War Mission, regarding African \nmahogany. 271. \n\nAnother paper addressed to Chief Signal Office, Washington, \nD. C, giving comparisons of African mahogany with Central \nAmerican species, saying it compared favorably. 274. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 285 \n\nEdwAed L. Ry^bson, Jr. \xe2\x80\x94 Continued, \n\nImagines that this letter was suggested by one from Capt. Oak- \nleaf, but could not say. 276. \n\nLetter from Henry Lockhard, jr., to Office of the Chief Signal \nOfficer, asking whether African mahogany has been approved \nfor use in the manufacture of propellers. 277. \n\nTelegram in reply from production engineering department say- \ning department, not favorably disposed toward African ma- \nhogany. Much poor African mahogany on American market. \n279. \n\nTelegram from production engineering department stating \nAfrican mahogany suitable for use for combat and bombing \nairplane propellers. 281. \n\nWas advised that the English did not use African mahogany \nexcept when it is reinforced with other more strong and re- \nliable wood. 282. \n\nWas aware that there were great quantities of quarter-sawed \nwhite oak in this country and that engineering department \nnow states it is preferred to African mahogany for propellers. \n283. \n\nProduces memorandum referring to African mahogany. 284- \n294. \n\nAfrican mahogany was put ahead of quarter-sawed white oak \nin report of March 16. 295. \n\nIn report of August 7, quarter-sawed white oak was put ahead \nof African mahogany. 295. \n\nAsked why use of it was not discouraged earlier. 295. \n\nIn addition to its inferiority, there were very serious shipping \nproblems in connection with it. 299. \n\nAsked for any information he might have Avith respect to way \nin which it happened that large orders were given for African \nmahogany in view of the above difficulties. 301. \n\nAsked if he observed that the requirements were asserted far \nin excess of the actual requirements. 302. \n\nThe estimates referred to as being excessive were given to him \nfor the purpose of producing propellers and were in turn \ntransmitted by him to the hardwoods section, etc. 310. \n\nProduces copy of report covering all other matters pertaining \nto the original negotiations for mahogany and his connection \nwith it. Marked " Ryerson Exhibit 16." 310. \nHomer Hoyt (August 21, 1918; Book 19). \n\nEconomist for the War Trade Board. 320. \n\nMakes his own statement with regard to investigation of African \nmahogany. 321. \n\nRequirements, after conference, were handed to him in memo- \nrandum from Mr. Williams. (" Hoyt Exhibit l."j 323. . \n\nCould not find out in the conferences what the basis of the re- \nquirements was ; they refused to tell for military reasons. 324. \n\nMr. Tower, of the Shipping Board, thought the requirements \nexcessive since in order to require this large amount of pro- \npeller wood there would be something like 50,000 airplanes \nneeded in the program. 325. \n\nMr. Tower tried to get information on the subject but was \nunable to, so was not able to advise the restriction of this \nAfrican mahogany. 325. \n\n\n\n286 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nHomer Hoyt \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nAbout the latter part of May Mr. Hoyt is taken to Mr. Owen \nThomas, who was at the General Staff. Mr. Owen declared \nthat the airplane requirements as given out by Mr. Williams \nand Mr. Wickliffe were greatly overstated. 325. \n\nMr. Thomas knew the engine production, and said the Shipping \nBoard was right, that the African mahogany was not neces- \nsary, and produced letters from a captain in the British Army \nsaying the African mahogany was an inferior wood. 326. \n\nGives statement concerning concessions or a basis for operations \nin Africa of I. T. Williams & Sons. 332. \n\nMaj. Adriance tells him that the Bureau of Aircraft Produc- \ntion have admitted that quarter-sawed white oak was a satis- \nfactory propeller wood, but that they could not secure suf- \nficient of it to substitute for African mahogany. 335. \n\nMr. Potter makes this statement. 336. \n\nMr. Hoyt immediately has the Forestry Service prepare to make \nan estimate of the available supply of quarter-sawed white oak \navailable for propellers. 337. \n\nMemorandum marked " Moss Exhibit 2, August 2, 1918." 337. \n\nInformation was obtained in an hour\'s notice that 42,000,000 \nfeet of airplane material could be secured within the course \nof a year. 340. \n\nLieut. Col. Botton and Maj. Adriance intimated that the Bureau \nof Aircraft Production had told them that only two or three \nmillion feet of quarter-sawed oak could be obtained, not \nenough to warrant cutting off African mahogany. 340. \n\nGeneral Staff not satisfied until they were shown definite manu- \nfacturers who would supply the wood. 341. \n\nCall up American Propeller Co. bv telephone and they state that \nthey alone can furnish 2,000,000 feet. 341. \n\nGeneral Staff about convinced there is no need to go to Africa \nfor mahogany. 342. \n\nGen. Potter now states in a letter than quarter-sawed white oak \nhad not been tested under combat conditions, and thus they \nwould not feel satisfied to use it. 343. \n\nSet about to find out (Mr. Hoyt) what had been the experience \nwith this wood. 343. \n\nEnsign Monteith, of the Navy, tells them that the Navy has used \noak propellers since 1909 with complete success. Mr. Heath, \nof the American Propeller Co., of Baltimore, stated that they \nhad sold propellers to the Navy and none had ever been re- \nturned or rejected. 343. \n\nNavy would not use African mahogany unless they could not get \nanything else, and then always reenforced by other woods. \n\n. 344. \n\nSaid they considered " Oak to African mahogany about four to \none." 344. \n\nCompany at Dayton makes 750 oak propellers for combat ma- \nchines which prove very satisfactory. 345. \n\nFacts laid before General Staff, but Bureau of Aircraft Pro- \nduction through Mr. Potter would not relinquish their claim \nfor getting African mahogany. They only had about half \nof it through by this time. 346. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 287 \n\nHomer Hoyt \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nMr. Williams stated that the British Government had contracts \nfor 7,000,000 feet of walnut to be satisfied in this country \nwhich greatly reduced the supply in this country. He was \nalways told there was plenty more. 349. \n\nThe British Government, Mr. Williams stated, had practically \nsecured the output of Central American mahogany. 349. \n\nMr. Williams always insisted upon the great necessity of making- \nsure that the airplane program should not fail, so he wanted \nto build up a reserve of 10,000,000 feet, so there would be no \npossibility of this happening, but he always found a way to \nnot buy any domestic woods. 352. \n\nWhen there was no obstacle in their way to buying quarter- \nsawed white oak they did not buy it. 356. \n\nUnderstood from Mr. Weber that there had been an actual ap- \nproval of quarter-sawed oak for propellers in December, 1917. \n357. \nMaj. Gen. William B. Kenly (August 21, 1918; Book 19). \n\nDirector of Military Aeronautics. 385. \n\nSubmits copy of the contracts which were made in France for \nthe supply by the French Government of planes. Marked \n"Kenly Exhibit 1." 386 to 394. \n\nFurnishes list of those actually delivered. " Kenly Exhibit 2." \n394. \n\nCause for the second contract was that the French had a sudden \nand great need for more airplanes and that in view of the fact \nthat the United States Government were not ready to use the \nplanes as per contract, they wished to modify it. 396. \n\nGen. Pershing did not at first approve of this plan, but later \nreturns to it. 397. \n\nWith reference to the cadets from the United States held at \ntraining camps with nothing to learn with, he stated that as \nper schedule of Gen. Pershing the men showed up in France \nbut not the planes. 405. \n\nConsidered the reason for discontinuing thj Standard J was \nthat it was unsafe. 407. \nLieut. Isadore Sack (August 21, 1918; Book 19). \n\nIn the sales department of the finance division in the Bureau \nof Aircraft Production. 422. \n\nProduces statement of orders for African mahogany, marked \n" Sacks Exhibit 1." 423. \n\nEstimated cost of whole is $3,425,625. 424. \nWilliam Hoyt Weber (Washington, D. C, August 21, 1918 ; Book \n19). \n\nForester by occupation. 431. \n\nAsked by Mr. Owen Thomas to get all the information he could \nabout mahogany and particularly to find out the amount of \nboard feet of different kinds of woods that were used in pro- \npellers. 432. \n\nInstead of 175 or 200 feet, which was being used at the esti- \nmate of the number of feet, 150 feet was an approximate basis. \nThis concurred in by various factory managers of the plants \nvisited. 435. \n\nEstimate for quarter oak would be possibly less. 440. \n130687\xe2\x80\x9419 19 \n\n\n\n288 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nWilliam Hoyt Weber \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nThe reason that the Dayton-Wright were going ahead and \n\nmaking their propellers out of oak was because they were one \n\nof the firms not getting their material from the Aircraft \n\nBoard at all. 441. \nAsked for his observation with respect to African mahogany. \n\n447. * J \n\nKnows of no reason for getting African other than a shortage \n\nof wood in this country, which did not exist. 451-452. \nSubmits reports on African mahogany which is marked " Weber \n\nExhibit No. 5, August 22, 1918," then submits or substitutes \n\nanother copy in its place as indicating sources of information \n\non certain points. 454. \nIn one of the paragraphs he inserts statement that C. C. Mengel \n\nand I. T. Williams owned some ships in which they could \n\nbring African mahogany over. 455. \nFound no shortage of mahogany in this country. Opposite \n\nwas true. Out of Government orders, with stocks of mahog- \nany on hand. \nMentions firms who had greater propeller capacity than was \n\nbeing used. 461-462. \nPrice for mahogany fixed at $350 a thousand. Before the war \n\nthe very highest price was around $150. 465. \nHighest Cuban mahogany was only $160. 466. \nCapt. E. L. Kyerson, Jr., (Washington, D. C, August 22, 1918; \nBook 19). \n\nStates that when he places orders for contracts with companies \n\nfor the production of propellers he specifies the kind of wood \n\nout of which the propellers are to be made. 471. \nDoes not know of any cases in which one wood was specified in \n\nthe contract and another wood actually used. 482. \nHis information is that the propellers are built out of the wood \n\nspecified in every case. 486. \nProduces memorandum, " Ryerson Exhibit No. 17, August 22, \n\n1918"; is a memorandum of a meeting for the discussion of \n\nairplane propellers, etc. (This meeting held February 19, \n\n1918.) 492-501. \nThis meeting decided that there was to be no African mahogany. \n\n501. \nCould not say what changed all this, for within three weeks \n\norders for African mahogany were authorized \xe2\x80\x94 about the \n\nmiddle of March. 501. \nKarl K. De Laittre (August 22, 1918; Book 19). \n\nAssistant to the director of planning and suggestions in the \n\nShipping Board. 507. \nTakes up the position of getting definite information as to Army \nrequirements from the Aircraft Production Department. 510. \nSubmits summary of this conversation. " De Laittre Exhibit \n\n1." 510. \nIs later asked by Mr. Wickliffe to add something like one mil- \nlion and a half feet to the requirements. 510. \nGoes back on the seventh day to have some matters cleared up. \n511. \n\n\n\n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 289 \n\nKarl K. De Laittre \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nIs now asked to make some comments on extracts which are read \nto him before proceeding with his other conference. 511-521. \n\nNow proceeds with his report of the meeting on May 7. 525. \n\nThis is marked " De Laittre Exhibit 3." 526. \n\nIs questioned regarding certain extracts in this report. 526 \nto \xe2\x80\x94 . \n\nMengel & Co., of which Mr. Wickliffe was secretary ; I. T. Wil- \nliams & Sons, of which Mr. Williams was formerly a member ; \nand the Astoria Co. were some of the firms who had African \nconcessions or were interested in the African production. 534. \nAdolph Lodewik Deleeuw (Department of Justice, Washington, \nD. C, August 22, 1918; Book i9). \n\nMechanical engineer, Singer Manufacturing Co. 547. \n\nSinger Co. of New York City, South Bend, etc. 547. \n\nFirst appointment with Mr. Deeds and Mr. Waldon was on Au- \ngust 14, 1917. 548. \n\nFirst asked to build 3,000 training planes, then this order \nchanged to a thousand battle planes of the denomination \nDH-4, and then they were informed they would be asked to \nbuild something different from this. 548-549. \n\nThis was the last heard from the Signal Corps. 549. \n\nStates what the capacity of the Singer Manufacturing Co. was, \nits capital, equipment, and ability to construct planes. 549. \n\nHad told Mr. Deeds they would accept any kind of a contract \nthe Government saw fit and were willing to give them. 556. \nBurchell Crocker Ikirk (August 22, 1918; Book 19). \n\nIs now inspector of the Osner Fare Register Co. at Dayton. 579. \n\nWas with the Aircraft Production Board up to August 6, 1918. \n579. \n\nDischarged by Mr. Fitzgerald, assistant district manager. 580. \n\nWrote two letters to Mr. John H. Patterson, of the National \nCash Register Co., relative to the shipment of certain instru- \nments to the Wilbur Wright Field spare house that were \nunder question for being defective without any question. 580. \n\nWas representing the Government in inspecting them. 580. \n\nFive hundred and twenty-five of these instruments. 580. \n\nAt least 75 of these instruments contained springs that were off. \n581. \n\nWere awaiting report from the Bureau of Standards regarding \nthem. 582. \n\nTwenty-five of them went direct to France. 583. \n\nStates the effect of the use of the 75 tachometers that were \nwrong. 585. \nLieut. Col. A. Woods (Washington, D. C, August 22, 1918; Book 20). \n\nProduced memorandum reports of his investigation at the Cur- \ntiss plant. 1. \n\nWoods Exhibit 1. \nAlbert H. Flint (Washington, D. C, August 22, 1918; Book 20). \n\nIs an airplane manufacturer by occupation. 3. \n\nVice president and general manager of the L. W. F. Engineering \nCo., College Point, Long Island. 3. \n\nBuilding all Navy work at the present time. 3. \n\n\n\n290 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nAlbert H. Flint \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nBuilt 150 of their own planes, the L. W. F., for Signal Corps \n\nprevious to contract with Navy. 4. \n\nCompany now known as Laminated Wood Fuselage. 4. \n\nContract in October, 1917, for 18 L. W. F. planes on a fixed-price \nbasis of $12,600 each. 19. \n\nContract in January, 1918, for 36 L. W. F. reconnoissance ma- \nchines at a fixed price of $8,600 each. \n\nWas building planes before we entered the war. 20. \n\nGovernment furnished the engines for the last 36 planes, ac- \ncounting for the difference in price. 21. \n\nRefused to take an order for 500 Bristol fighters in September, \n\n1917, because he did not consider it could be built with the \nLiberty engine. 22. \n\nDoes no tthink DH-4 will make a successful battle plane. 25. \nConstructed a combat plane (L. W. F. model G) which carries a \n\nload of 2,208 pounds at speed of 134 miles an hour. 27. \nHas no contracts with Government for it. 29. \nHave an armor plate on machine of light helmet steel, covering \n\ntwo men and gas tank. 30. \nMachine is 500 pounds heavier with guns and everything than \n\nDH-4, but much faster. 31. \nMaj. Miller Harmon, Jr. (Washington, D. C, August 22, 1918; \nBook 20). \n\nWas in service overseas from March 26, 1917, until May 16, \n\n1918. 37. \n\nWhen he first went over was detailed to take a course of instruc- \ntion in French aviation schools at Pau and Alvord for a \nperiod of two months. 37. \n\nOn completion of that duty was assistant with chief aviation \nofficer, American Expeditionary Forces, stationed in Paris. \n38. \n\nServed as a pilot with a French squadron for about a month \nand a half. 38. \n\nWas then on board to recommend types of airplanes to be pur- \nchased in the United States in 1919, and on completion of that \nduty was ordered back to the United States. 38. \n\nGives in a general way machines recommended. 39. \n\nLieut. Col. T. F. Dodd was president of the board and members \nwere Lieut. Col. Henry Harms, Maj. H. F. Martin, and Maj. \nM. F. Harmon. 40. \n\nReport was completed about 4th of May, 1918. 40. \n\nLieut. Col. Carberry was in charge of training in France during \nall the time he was over there. 43. \n\nReport showing status of the aviation camps abroad, the num- \nber of students there, the number of training planes available, \netc., as of July 17, 1918, marked " Harmon Exhibit 1." 45. \n\nThey have Breguets for bombardment instruction and are using \nNieuports for aerial gunnery instruction. 46. \n\nNumber of aviation students held in depots or aviation camps \nfor two or three months without facilities for training. 48. \n\nCopy of cable dated August 7, 1917, relative to offer of Italy to \ntrain 500 pilots. 49. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 291 \n\nMaj. Miller Harmon, Jr. \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nCable from Gen. Pershing dated July 30 stated that after Sep- \ntember 15 French can not receive American pilots for train- \ning. 50. \n\nCable dated August 7, 1917, from Gen. Pershing stating, with \nreference to pilots, " Send them over and we will take care of \nthem." \n\nAbout 1,000 aviators were at one time held for a period of two \nor three months because they could not get training facili- \nties. 54. \n\nBrighter aviation students in this country, by reason of their ex- \ncellence, were given their choice of continuing their training \nin this country or going to France; supposing that they \nwould have a better opportunity in France they went over \nthere to find that those left behind got their tuition before they \ndid. 56, \n\nAt one time they were considering sending some of those men \nback to the United States for training. 56. \n\nThey had to do guard duty and fatigue duty and things of that \nnature which they did not like and which really they were not \nexpected to do. 57. \nW. W. Moss. (Washington, D. C. ( ? ) , Aug. 23, 1918 ; Book 20.) \n\nQuestioned with regard to the method by which the restaurant \nof the Curtiss plant was established and conducted. 59. \n\nCompany got no compensation whatever from restaurant. 60. \n\nEmployees of Curtiss plant were not supposed to be used by \nrestaurant. 61. \n\nMr. Backoff operated both the North Elmwood and the Church- \nill Street restaurants, but under the new arrangement it will \nbe taken over and operated under the welfare department as \nof September 1. 62. \n\nWill be treated as part of the overhead, if there is any loss. 62. \n\nDepreciation on restaurant will be charged in as overhead ex- \npense in connection with the Government contracts. 63. \nCapt. Edwaed L. Byerson, Jr. (Washington, D. C., August 23, 1918 ; \nBook 20.) \n\nSpecifications describing the kinds of lumber used in propeller \nconstruction marked " Kyerson Exhibit 18." 72. \nAbraham T. Baldwin (Washington, D. C, August 23, 1918; Book \n20). \n\nGeneral manager of the Precision Instrument Co. 79. \n\nHas contract dated December 3, 1917, for 2,500 air speed indi- \ncators, 1,000 at $60 and 1,500 at a price to be agreed upon. 80. \n\nInstead of completing contract in early part of April, did not \nbegin quantity production until July. 81. \n\nForboro Instrument Co. has contract with Government for air \nspeed indicators. 85. \n\nHave been led to believe method of inspection between his com- \npany and other companies are different. 94. \n\nInstrument of Foxboro Instrument Co. had an error of 1 hour \nin first flight of 45 minutes, when it was supposed to be per- \nfect. 95. \n\nHas never heard a commendatory report of the Foxboro indi- \ncator from a flying" field of the United States. 97. \n\n\n\n292 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nAbraham T. Baldwin \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nBristol Co. were granted certain things in April, and his com- \npany were not granted a solitary thing until July, although \nthev asked for the same things. 104. \nMrs. A. T. Baldwin (Washington, D. C, August 23, 1918; Book 20). \n\nIs wife of president of the Precision Instrument Co., vice presi- \ndent of same concern, and in charge of production. 136. \n\nThe testimony of this woman, as well as her husband, is an \neffort to show that favoritism was shown other companies \nmanufacturing air speed indicators, and that delay in produc- \ntion at Precision instrument plant was due to the inspector \nnot allowing certain tolerances allowed other plants. 136- \n165. \nEugene Meyer, Jr. (Washington, D. C August 23, 1918; Book 20). \n\nDirector of the War Finance Corporation of the United States \nGovernment, 166. \n\nEnumerates various positions he has held with Government since \nApril, 1917, when he first became associated with Government. \n166. \n\nIs a banker and broker by occupation. 167. \n\nInterested personally in the Fisher Body Corporation, of Detroit. \n168. \n\nHas an Orlando F. Webber in his employ, whose brother, Charles \nWebber, was interested in the Curtiss plant. 174. \n\nHas discussed conditions in Curtiss plant with Charles Webber. \n174. \n\nHad Mr. Webber make an examination of the Wright-Martin \nCo., and he made a very drastic report as to the management, \nwhich was unfavorable to the management. 177. \n\nCurtiss Co. put all their trouble at the door of incompetent man- \nagement in the aircraft situation. 182. \n\nFeeling was bitter on both sides between the Government de- \npartments and the manufacturing industries. 183. \n\nThinks Signal Corps acted without consideration toward people \nwho had gotten themselves into a very tight situation, largely* \nrelying on the Signal Corps assurances. 185. \n\nThe Secretary of War asked him to investigate and make a \nreport on the aircraft situation. (Then follows a conversation \nwitness had with Secretary of War relative to nature of in- \nvestigation.) 188. \n\nIn letter of the President to the Secretary of War he asked the \nSecretary or suggested that the Secretary give Mr. Borglum\'s \nreport to somebody " to get the impressions on a fresh mind." \n190. \n\nReport of witness to Secretary of War marked " Mever Exhibit \nNo. 1, August 23, 1918." 191. \n\nLater report made under date of February 20, marked " Meyer \nExhibit No. 2, August 23, 1918." 191. \n\nGave his real reports to the Secretary verbally. 193. \n\nRelates what he told the Secretary verbally. 194. \n\nTold Secretary at one time he did not think he had a man in the \nwhole organization (Government organization) who could be \ncalled a man. 195. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 293 \n\nEugene Meyer, Jr. \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nFelt that he sold the Secretary the idea of a production man \nagainst a lot of other men. 197. \n\nDid not seem to have much idea of public policy clown there. \n199. \n\nTold Mr. Stettinius he thought they ought to get rid of Col. \nMontgomery about as fast as it could be done. 200. \n\nHe said, " Mr. Secretary, war and military operations are based \non contact, and in the aircraft program we lack contact." 204. \n\nMaking a product and entirely out of contact with the field of \noperations. 205. \n\nSaw very poor manufacturing at the Dayton- Wright plant. 211. \n\nKnows relationship of Secretary Baker\'s brother in regard to \nthese contracts. 215. \nLewis H. MacLaughlin (Washington, D. C, August 23, 1919; \nBook 20). \n\nAssistant to the vice president of E. F. Houghton Co., dealers \nand manufacturers of oils. 220. \n\nBeen in business about a year and one-half; formerly a news- \npaper man, as associate city editor of the Philadelphia Even- \ning Bulletin and the Evening Telegraph. 220. \n\nFamiliar with operations of Standard Aircraft Co. in a general \nway. 220. \n\nAll requisitions of Standard Aircraft Co. were sent to a jobbing \nconcern. 222. \n\nJudge Hughes. Your inference that there was likely some \ndividing with the jobber\'s profit so that the order went to the \njobber? \n\nWitness. Yes, sir. 226. \nEber W. Finkbiner (Washington, D. C, August 23, 1918; Book 20). \n\nHas been connected with the Houghton Co. for two years and \neight months. 228. \n\nHad dealings with the Standard Aircraft Co. at Elizabeth. 228. \n\nPrior to September or October of 1917 Houghton Co. sold \nStandard Aircraft practically all of the cutting oils. 228. \n\nAbout a month after they moved their plant to Elizabeth they \nceased sending orders. 228. \n\nAll orders for oils, etc., from the Standard plant were sent to \nDingy, a jobber, first. 232. \nLieut. J. Brooks B. Parkek Washington, D. C. August 23, 1918; \nBook 20) . \n\nAssigned to the office of the Chief of Staff, Purchase, Storage \nand Traffic Division, of the program section. 235. \n\nProduces correspondence between Lieut. Col. Colt on and hard- \nwoods section of the Bureau of Aircraft Production and \nothers including two cables from Gen. Pershing) relating to \nthe purchase of woods for propellers. 235. \nAlbert L. Wilcox (Washington, D. C, August 26, 1918; Book 20.) \n\nIn the timber and lumber business since 1894. Deals in foreign \nhardwoods. Business is in Panama. Has been an importer \nof mahogany since 1903. 242. \n\nHis logs all shipped to New York and his brokers, Isaac Branden \n& Bros., 17 Battery Place, New York City, do business \ndirectly with concerns here in the States. 243. \n\n\n\n294 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nAlbert L. Wilcox \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nGood percentage of his logs are straight-grained wood, which \nwould be suitable for airplane stock. 245. \n\nHad about 270,000 feet altogether, 246. \n\nMr. Wickliffe, who passed on mahogany for the Government, \nrequested that he sell his logs to one of the " 11 " who were \ncontractors with the Government. 247. \n\nHad a talk with one of the buyers of C. C. Willey, who was one \nof the Big Eleven, relative to the mahogany market. 250. \n\nTold him it did not look right for the Government to be paying \n$380 a thousand for first and seconds, and $280 for No. 1 com- \nmon. He said, " We have enough mahogany to last us for a \ncouple of years. We covered that pretty well before the war. \nYou can probably sell these logs to some of those boys in New \nYork and probably get a little more, but I doubt if you can get \nover $100 or $120." 251. \n\nHe was told he could not get a chance to sell outside of the Big \nEleven. 252. \n\nBig Eleven seemed to have things pretty well fixed up. 254. \n\nSold logs he had in New York to Willard, Hawes & Co. at $140 \na thousand. 258. \n\nMr. Brown, of C. L. Willeys, of New York, and Mr. Dayton, of \nMontieth Co., told him Government was paying as high as \n$380 for mahogany lumber. 275. \n\nIs in a position to make a contract with the Government for \nPanama mahogany suitable for airplane purposes and is per- \nfectly satisfied to make $5 a thousand to the Government. 290. \nDr. William Frederick Durakt (Washington, D. C, August 26, \n1918; Book 20). N \n\nChairman of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. \n294. \n\nAccording to law, the committee exercises two functions, one of \ngiving advice and one of carrying forward scientific investiga- \ntion and research. 294. \n\nGives brief history of organization, personnel, etc., of com- \nmittee. 294-306. \n\nNational Advisory Committee on Aeronautics had absolutely \nnothing to do with the formulation of the aircraft program. \n306. \n\nCommittee did not have anything to do with the Bristol machine \nand the adaptation of it to the Liberty motor ; with the design of \nthe De Haviland 4; with the design of the Standard J plane, \nor the design of any plane that formed a part of the aircraft \nprogram. 307. \n\nThe Advisory Committee on Aeronautics have had absolutely \nnothing to do with the formulation of a program regarding \nengines or decisions regarding types and forms to be built. \n307. \n\nOpinion of the National Advisory Committee was not requested \nwith reference to the advisability of using any of the foreign \ntypes of engines nor in regard to the Liberty engine. 311. \n\nRelates what he observed in France with respect to engines. 316. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 295 \n\nDr. William Frederick Durant \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nDoes not think 12- cylinder Liberty engine can be fitted into a \nsuccessful type of battle plane, a pursuit or Gombat plane. \nIt is too heavy. 318. \n\nHispano- Suiza engine admirably adapted for pursuit or combat \nplanes, especially the 300 horsepower. 319. \nMelville W. Mix (Washington, D. C, August 26, 1918; Book 20). \n\nPresident of the Dodge Manufacturing Co. 321. \n\nManufactures machinery and wood parts, ply-wood parts for \nairplanes and things of that kind. 321. \n\nHave orders through the Navy direct; others are indirect con- \ntracts such as with the Day ton- Wright Co. 321. \n\nHad a contract for a supply of wing beams. 322. \n\nEnumerates contractors he was supplying. 323. \n\nFurnishes goods in accordance with specifications furnished by \nGovernment. 323. \n\nDelayed through continual changes. 325. \n\nNot anyone at the Dayton-Wright who was an aeroplane en- \ngineer. 326. \n\nIn the early part of the war offered the facilities of plant to the \nUnited States Government for manufacturing purposes. 328. \n\nThe personnel of the ply- wood division of the Aircraft Produc- \ntion Board were not practical men and did not know anything \nabout wood. 348. \n\nIt was dangerous to use a nonwaterproof glue for an airplane. \n352. \n\nOrders were placed for nonwaterproof glue despite his protest. \n353. \nKenyon Mix (Washington, D. C, August 26, 1918; Book 20). \n\nSon of M. M. W. Mix. 354. \n\nCompany developed a knocked-down wing slip at instance of \nGovernment, but never heard anything about it after submit- \nting sample. 355. \n\nSeven or eight months later Government stated they had just \nheard of it, 356. \n\nWhen Signal Corps formed department 80, had to again go \nover the whole information that they had been giving the \ndepartment for the last year, because they had none of it. 359. \n\nDrew up charts for them showing them how the veneer in- \ndustry in this country could be mobilized. 359. \n\nDepartment laughed at them when they first told them there \nwas a waterproof glue in this country. 362. \n\n" In the ordinary De Haviland fuselage, * * * a shot goes \nthrough and collapses one of the braces \xe2\x80\x94 your machine col- \nlapses. You can take a Monocoque fuselage and shoot it full \nof holes, the strength being in the skin." 364. \n\nTold Col. Horner about 60 days ago they were about at the end \nof their subcontracts, and asked if there was anything they \ncould do for them. Col. Horner told them there was nothing \nhe could use their plant for. 366. \n\nIt was through some agreement with the Allies that the pursuit \nmachine was left out of the program of production on this side. \n369. \n\n\n\n296 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nLieut. Col. George W. Mixter (Washington, D. C, August 26, 1918; \nBook 20). \n\nAsked as to his relations to the Curtiss Co. 371. \n\nWhen he first took up this work there were essentially no Gov- \nernment specifications or drawings in existence. 373. \n\nWas head of the inspection department. 373. \n\nDoesn\'t recall whether he is a stockholder in the Curtiss Co. \n374. \n\nBelieves he had 25 shares of preferred stock. 375. \n\nHas not disposed of any of his holdings since he became an \nofficer of the Government. 375. \n\nHas gone up to the Curtiss plant on inspection matters 10 times \nin the last year. 376. \n\nThere were instances where Curtiss inspection had rejected ma- \nterial that was perfectly safe and usable. 378. \n\nHe appoints district managers of production. 379. \n\nFirst broad question referred to and determined by him was the \nmultiplicity of inspection and difficulties relating to the four \ninspection forces at the Curtiss plant. 382. \n\nEliminated the Curtiss, Navy, and British inspection. 383. \n\nUsed Signal Corps inspection entirely at North Elmwood fac- \ntory until about six weeks ago. 384. \n\nJudge Hughes : " But an authority to dispose of the Signal Corps \ninspection and to take the Curtiss inspection in lieu of it would \nbe an authority which a district inspection officer would hardly \nexercise, I should suppose." 385. \n\nThe function of the Government inspection is supervisory, pro- \nviding 100 per cent inspection only for certain parts of the \nfinished assemblies. 387. \nHarley W. Lake (Washington, D. C., August 26, 1918; Book 20). \n\nSecretarv of the Technical Joint Arm} 7 and Navy Aircraft \nBoards 412. \n\nComplete minutes of the board introduced and marked "Lake \nExhibit 1." 412. \nArcher A. Landon (Washington, D. C, August 26, 1918; Book 20). \n\nChief of Production of Aircraft. 413. \n\nHas been in that position since latter part of May or 1st of June. \n413. \n\nWas assistant last fall until October, 1918, to Mr. Coffin. 413. \n\nLetter addressed to Mr. Coffin by the witness in which the lack \nof organization is pointed out and recommendations made. \n415-422. \n\nCurtiss plant was badly organized and a poorly conducted busi- \nness concern. 436. \n\nWas president of the Niagara Frontier Defense League. 439. \nJudge Hughes. We found men not only employed but pro- \nmoted, one or two men that were actually foremen, who were \nalien enemies, reported as such by the Military Intelligence \nBureau, discharged by the management; the Government ap- \nparently paid no attention to the reports of the Military Intel- \nligence and the men were still there. 442. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 297 \n\nArcher A. Landon \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nKnows of one particular case where there was a $20,000 contract \nplaced at 10 per cent, which gave a chance there for $2,000 \nprofit, and the minute that job went in the shop the Govern- \nment ordered up a $10,000 fence that was not needed in their \nregular line, and ordered about $30,000 fire protection on a \ncontract that was going to pay $2,000. 447. \nDr. S. W. Stratton (Washington, D. C, August 26, 1918; Book 20). \n\nDirector of the Bureau of Standards, Department of Commerce. \n451. \n\nLaw establishing the National Advisory Committee on Aeronau- \ntics provides that the Director of the Bureau of Standards \nshall be one of the members of the committee. 451. \n\nAdvisory Committee on Aeronautics did not have anything to \ndo with the types of aeroplanes selected for production in the \naircraft program. 451. \n\nJoined with Dr. Walcott in a letter to the President on the gen- \neral subject of aircraft production the latter part of January; \nletter inserted in record. 453-459. \n\nLetter was sent pursuant to a resolution of the committee, in \nwhich it was stated a confidential memorandum containing \nfigures to be prepared bv Col. Deeds would also be submitted. \n460. \n\nJudge Hughes. You were not purporting to state here of \nyour own knowledge that any such thing as that w T as so ? \nWitness. No, sir. 464. \n\nJudge Hughes. Of course, I most cheerfully acquit you and \nthem of any intention to state absolute falsehoods to the Presi- \ndent of the United States. 464. \n\nCommittee was not asked to pass any judgment at all upon \nwhether the Bristol was a good plane. 477. \n\nJudge Hughes. Did you attach seriousness to this statement \nto the President of the United States; did you intend he \nshould take those statements at their face value, and if so, \nwhat information did you have warranting any such state- \nment as this? (Referring to statement that six plants were \nin production on Liberty motor on January 24, 1918.) 480. \n\nAll statistics used by committee came from either the Aircraft \nProduction Board or the Signal Corps. 482. \n\nJudge Hughes. This letter, signed by the most distinguished \nexperts in the country, was to ease the mind of the President \nin regard to our aircraft program at the very time when he \nshould have been posted in regard to the actual conditions. \n\nWitness. It was intended to at least give some assurance at \nthe time that things were not as black as they were painted. \n483. \n\nDraft of the letter was submitted to the members of the com- \nmittee and discussed, and Gen. Squier was present. 486. \nProf. J. S. MacGregor (Washington, D. C, August 26, 1918; \nBook 20). \n\nA number of conferences held to determine what woods were \nsatisfactory for propellers and the order of preference. 488. \n\n\n\n298 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATIOX. \n\nDr. H. T. Beans (Washington, D. C, August 27, 1918; Book 20). \n\nHas been in the employ of the Government since August 29, 1917. \n490. \n\nWas formerly professor of chemistry, Columbia University. \n490. \n\nCame to Washington to organize the laboratory, the analytical \nand research chemical laboratory, for the Signal Corps. 490. \n\nEither tungsten steel or high chromium steel is used for the \nvalves of Liberty motor. 494. \n\nSteel has not been used in the valves of the engines, as required \nby the specifications. 494. \n\nAnalyzed the valve and found that it contained no tungsten and \nno chromium; that it was soft material, and had evidently \ngiven away badly in the service. The situation seemed ex- \ntremely serious to them. 495. \n\nThese valves were made by the Rich Tool Co. for the Curtiss Co. \nThe valve was constructed in violation of the specifications. \nDoes not know whether it passed Government inspection. 497. \n\nThe inspector for the Government at the plant is supposed to \nascertain whether or not the proper steel has been used in the \nproduction of the particular article. 510. \n\nHis impression that the most crude workman in the plant could \nat once detect the difference in working the material. 514. \n\nCelluloid Zapon Co. is on the approved list. Has heard the state- \nment that a shipment of dope had been received from them \nand been found to be defective. 518. \n\nCurtiss Co. was absolutely incapable of making a correct anal- \nysis. 519. \n\nIn report of December 7, 1917, to Maj. Gray, tabulated the \nerrors in a graphic way that the Curtiss laboratory had made \nfor a period of a month on a few checked samples. 521. \n\nReport referred to marked " Beans\'s Exhibit Xo. 1." 523. \n\nRecommended that chemical results from the Curtiss laboratory \nno longer be used as the basis of judgment of aircraft mate- \nrials for the Signal Corps, but this recommendation was not \nadopted by the Signal Corps. 525. \n\nCurtiss Co. had their own way. 526. \n\nBureau of Aircraft Production absolutely deceiving itself in re- \ngard to inspection at the Curtiss plant because of Mr. Car- \ndello\'s attitude. 527. \n\nWhy Mr. Carclello should be such a powerful factor in the Cur- \ntiss organization is difficult to understand, except just for one \nreason, that he is a man who permits them to get away with \nthe material. 533. \n\nVery little inspection in the dope room at the Curtiss plant. \n535. \n\nHas been compelled to finance the laboratory to the extent of \nover a thousand dollars. 563. \n\nThe cylinders on the Liberty motor are subject to erosion just \nover the intake valve. The aluminum pistons are all being \nburned at just that point. 570. \n\nThe attitude of the Detroit office and of the Aluminum Casting \nCo. is that impurities make no difference. 570. \n\n\n\n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 299 \n\nDr. EL T. Bea^s\xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nGives his opinion of personnel of Army Commodity Commit- \ntees. 571. \nCol. Sidney D. Waldon (Washington, D. C, August 27, 1918; \nBook 20). \n\nOne of the original members of the Aircraft Board. 577. \n\nBoard organized May 17, 1917. 578. \n\nWent to France in October, 1917, and remained there until \nJanuary 23, 1918. \n\nArrangements were made for the purchase of a considerable \nnumber of planes from the French Government pending the \nmanufacture of planes on this side. 578. \n\nMinister Luchere told Col. Boiling that the French Government \nwould be unable to deliver planes in accordance with the agree- \nment made, partly on account of the fact that our material \nhad not arrived in time, but more largely on account of the \nfact that their program was going to be increased and the \nplanes and engines would be needed for their own service. \n579. \n\nContract with J. G. White Co. for the purchase and shipment of \nraw materials had been made before he left for France. 580. \n\nJudge Hughes reads part of contract dated August 30, 1917, \nwith French Government. 582. \n\nMinutes of the Aircraft Production Board of September 7, 1917, \nrelative to material to be supplied French Government, nam- \ning the J. G. White Corporation as the firm to handle the pur- \nchase, etc. 584, 585. \n\nThought agreement, as suggested by Mr. Luchere, to provide us \nwith airplanes, engines, and equipment as fast as our squad- \nrons were ready to go over the front a much fairer one to the \nFrench. 588. - \n\nHis duty in France was in connection with the laying out and \nplanning for salvage and repair of American-made airplanes. \n591. \n\nOffered the resolution at the meeting of May 25 under which \nthe contract for the building of Langley Field was awarded \nto the J. G. White Co. 596. \n\nStill retains his interest in the Packard Co., but has had no deal- \nings with this company on behalf of the Government in any \nway. 600. \n\nNavy would freely discuss and oftentimes criticize recommenda- \ntions made by the Army. 602. \n\nCable signed " Pershing," but unquestionably Col. Boiling\'s ca- \nble, stated they would rather have more of the De Haviland \nand less of the Spad. 607. \n\nCable from Gen. Pershing received about December 14 that the \nsingle seater or Spad should not be put into production in this \ncountrv. 609. Another cable dated October 5 on same matter. \n610. \n\nQuestion of producing the Spad in this country was resumed \nabout the middle of February. 611. \n\nSE-5 and Spad are both single seaters. 613. \n\n\n\n300 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nCol. Sidney D. Waldon \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nContracts for 3,000 Spads to be made by the Curtiss Co. was. \nmade in September; question of advisability of production \nunder that contract was questioned in October ; that in Decem- \nber it was rescinded ; that in February the advisability of hav- \ning Spads was again suggested from the other side ; was ques- \ntioned here; and that later, in May, the single seater known as \nthe SE-5 was ordered to be produced in this country. 613. \nCol. Sidney D. Waldon (Washington, D. C, August 28, 1918; Book \n20). \n\nCables to and from Gen. Pershing and copies of correspondence \nrelative to production of single-seater pkne in this country. \n623-644. \n\nFive hundred and twenty-nine De Havilands and 24 Bristols \ncompleted by July 1, 1918. 648. \n\nEstimated there would be 1,300 De Havilands and 500 Bristols \nby July 1, 1918. 648. \n\nEstimates made by witness naturally relied upon by military \nauthorities on other side. 650. \n\nCables sent every month to Gen. Foulois by Chief Signal Officer \nforecasting deliveries. 650. \n\nJudge Hughes. We have found, both in regard to the com- \nmitments in France, in regard to the contracts made for en- \ngines in France, and the deliveries under those contracts, a \nmost extraordinary lack of information which should have \nbeen immediately at the command of the authorities, and I \nwant to knoAv what system there was for an exchange of infor- \nmation between the authorities on both sides of the water. \n\nWitness. The cable furnished the principal means of com- \nmunication of information. Couriers were used, to some ex- \ntent, The situation in Paris when I arrived was little short of \nchaotic. 655. \n\nCol. Boiling was not an organizer and he has seen better organ- \nizers than Gen. Foulois. 657. \n\nSome contracts were placed under pressure. 659. \n\nQuestioned as to why contracts were granted certain concerns \nand not to concerns like the Singer Sewing Machine Co. and \nthe Pullman Co . who had had a great deal of experience in \nwoodworking. 661-669. \n\nCol. Deeds influenced his judgment in the granting of a con- \ntract to the Day ton- Wright Co. ; that is, the recommendation \nof it as a member of the Aircraft Board. 670. \n\nHas no explanation as to why negotiations were not continued \nand definite proposals made to the Singer Co. for their build- \ning of planes. 672. \n\nWith reference to selecting a site for a flying field : \n\nJudge Hughes. Now, have you stated everything that is in \nyour mind on that subject? Who suggested your going to \nDayton ? \n\nWitness. I do not think Col. Deeds did, if that is in your \nmind. \n\nJudge Hughes. Decidedly in my mind. Is it not in yours? \n675. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 301 \n\nCol. Sidney D. Waldon \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nCol. Deeds brought the site of what is now known as the Wilbur \nWright flying field to his attention. 679. \n\nDoes not know what military requirement there was for the \nacquisiton of over 2,000 acres of the Wilbur Wright field. 683. \n\nHad known Mr. Deeds probably since 1912. 686. \n\nCol. Deeds did not tell him he had already entered into the or- \nganization of the Dayton-Fright Co. when he went to get \nhim to take an interest in aircraft work. 688. \n\nCol. Deeds and he occupied the same office at one time. 690. \n\nJudge Hughes inserts in the record the cable from Gen. Pershing \nto The Adjutant General, of date of June 25, 1918, together \nwith letter of June 28, 1918, of the Acting Secretary of War \nrelating to the same. 692-701. \n\nAlso places upon the record corrections to the testimony of Dr. \nStratton. 701-706. \nThomas A. Hill (Washington, D. C. ; Book 21). \n\nPractices law in New York City at 233 Broadway. 1. \n\nAsked to make a statement regarding the cross-license agree- \nment to the Manufacturers\' Aircraft Association. 1. \n\nThis cross-license agreement contemplated an association of \nmanufacturers who would pool their patent interests and ex- \nchange licenses. 6. \n\nGovernment contracts to pay royalties of $4,000,000 without any \ninvestigation, and then cuts it to $2,000,000 without any reason \nat all. 8. \n\nAlso recently signed a contract on behalf of the Jenin Co. and \nthe Curtiss Co. a contract giving the Curtiss Co. an option to \npurchase this very Jenin patent for $70,000 in cash, etc., and \n$1,000 is paid down on that contract. 8. \n\nThe Government to-day, then, is paying royalties to this asso- \nciation on its cost-plus contracts. 10. \n\nHundreds of inventors felt that the Government was not treat- \ning them right and they were not therefore working for the \ninterests of the war. 12. \n\nA man could not develop his own invention himself comr on \' J *\':"\' \nunless he went to the association and abided by the fining ot \ntheir arbitration committee. 13. \n\nThe difficulty arises from the fact that in the existing state of \nthe art almost any infringement would be in the nature of \nthings an improvement, and in order to be able to use the \nbasic invention he would have to be a member of the associa- \ntion. 15. \n\nAsked if during his study of the agreement anything has ever \nbeen brought to his notice showing that any of the parties to \nthe agreement are required to get these materials from per- \nsons who are favored by the parties to the agreement. 17. \n\nRelates case of Wittemann Bros. 18. \n\nAsked for any information regarding a list, blacklisting, or \nanything done which hampers any party to that cross-license \nagreement in getting his materials where he pleases. 19. \n\n\n\n302 ABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nThomas A. Hill \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nHad a conversation with Mr. Potter, of the Signal Corps, in \nwhich he suggested hearing the inventors first and leaving the \nquestions of damage and injury, etc., until after the war. 21. \n\nThe Government will yet have to account in damages for these \npatents. 24. \n\nGovernment in same position as it would have been if it had \naccepted his suggestion, but in other words it is worse off be- \ncause of the establishment of a standard. 26. \n\nExplains looseness of plan of Federal Trade Commission as \nworking in cooperation with the Patent Office with regard to \npatent applications which are believed to embody subject \nmatter which might be of value to Germany or her allies. \n\nGives illustration in the case of the Tork Creek Shipbuilding \nCo. 27. \n\nThis practice held up work for several days. 30. \nCol. Melville W. Thompson (August 28, 1918; Book 21). \n\nBeen in the Army since August 25, 1914. 32. \n\nHas practiced accountancy as a profession for some 15 years. \n33 \n\nFirm of Thompson & Black. 33. \n\nAt the close of February became president of the War Credits \nBoard, which was formed on or about November 20, 1917. 38. \n\nStates the circumstances under which the General Vehicle Co. \nwas obtained by the Government. 39. \n\nThis contract marked " Thompson\'s Exhibit No. \xe2\x80\x94 ," August \n28, 1918. 41-45. \n\nBeads extracts from minutes of meetings of the Aircraft Board \nof October 19, 1917, stating that the company was willing to \nsell its plant, etc., to the United States for $1,527,568. 45. \n\nCol. Thompson caused the appraisal and examination of the \nbooks to be made. 46. \n\nBeads further extracts from minutes of the meeting of the board \nof November 8, 1917, preceding the adoption of the resolu- \ntion already mentioned. 46-50. \n\nBesult being that the $1,527,000 paid by the Government would \nhave gone to the General Vehicle Co. and that company would \nhave that amount to discharge its notes of $1,405,408.55. 53. \n\nThe company had assets amounting to approximately $461,000. \n54. \n\nGeneral Electric Co. had made some considerable advances to \nthe General Vehicle Co. arising out of losses the latter had \nsustained in business. 55. \n\nGot the idea some way that the General Vehicle Co. was an off- \nshoot of the General Electric Co. 56. \n\nAsked if he had ever heard of any offer of an option upon this \nproperty for any lower sum, or of any offer of the property \nat any lower sum. 59. \n\nGives knowledge of such a fact, and thinks it was considerably \nlower \xe2\x80\x94 several hundred thousand dollars lower. 60. \n\nThinks this other offer might have been made in the spring or \nwinter of 1917. 62. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 303 \n\nCol. Melville W. Thompson \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nA factor that would increase the difference still further is that \nin that other offer machinery was included in the offer which \nhas since been sold. 62. \n\nCol. Thompson is shown what purports to be a statement of the \ncondition of the General Vehicle Co. as of September 30, 1917. \nThere is an item of notes payable P. T. M., $1,530,408. 63. \n\nHe does not know what this has refence to. This paper marked \n" Thompson\'s Exhibit No. 7, August 23, 1918." 63. \n\nAsked if, in connection with his duties in the finance depart- \n\nr ment, he became advised of any irregularities relating to the \noperations of any of the contractors with the Government. \n67. \n\nTook up the question of the agreement between the Government \nand the aircraft manufacturers or the Aircraft Manufac- \nturers\' Association on the subject of royalties. 67. \n\nSatisfied himself that there had been improper influences on \nthe board that arrived at those figures. 68. \n\nWas later satisfied by a member of the Advisory Board on Aero- \nnautics, whose integrity he had absolute faith in, that, though \nthe facts were damaging, they did not have a material effect \nupon the price to be paid. 68. \n\nThe facts were, he stated, that a member of a legal committee \non the advisory committee on recommendations was, in fact, \na representative of the manufacturers \xe2\x80\x94 Mr. W. Benton Crips, \nof New York. 68. \n\nAsked if he knew of anything which would justify criticism in \nconnection with the operations of the Government relating \nto aircraft. 70. \n\nThough he might have had somewhat different views as to the \nmethods in which the business might have been conducted. \n71. \n\nFelt there had been a great deal of lost motion. 73. \n\nStates, for the purposes of the record, the advantages of a cor- \nporation. 73-80. \n\nAsked if the corporation had not really been thought of as a \nmeans of evading the inhibition of the statute. 75. \n\nIn this connection, it was seven months after the country went \nto war before the machinery was provided for advancing \nmoney to manufacturers. 75. \n\nIn the Army a man is either a clerk or an officer. He had the \nmost inordinate amount of trouble in getting a commissioned \npersonnel suitable to handle his finance department. 78. \n\nCould have handled the civilian work without encountering \nmilitary requirements through a corporation. 80. \n\nHe attempted, in recommending men for commission, to classify \nthem as to rank according to the ability of the men. 81. \n\nAsked why it was that the equipment division of the finance de- \npartment was not more successful in establishing in the various \nplants a suitable accounting system under the cost-plus con- \ntract. 81. \n\nAsked what was the trouble in compelling contractors to keep \nthe records and provide a system which would be adequate. 83. \n130687\xe2\x80\x9419 20 \n\n\n\n304 ABSTRACT OF AIECHAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nCol. Melville W. Thompson \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nThinks it was a great mistake that his status was changed in con- \nnection with the finance division. 83. \n\nInstead of being able to report direct to the Chief of the Signal \nCorps he could not make any complaints beyond his superior \nofficer. 84. \n\nCol. Deeds was for a while his superior officer, then Gen. Squier \nand Col. Montgomery, no matter what organization had been \nhad. 84. \n\nAsked as to the confusion which existed at the Curtiss plant, in \nwhich you could not tell what is Curtiss \'s, what is the Army\'s* \nand what is the Navy\'s. 85. \n\nThose who were interested in getting production were not the \nsame outfit that had to do with holding the manufacturers \ndown. His idea as to how many accountants he should have \ni did not agree with the manufacturer\'s idea, and the manufac- \nturer complained to the production people, and the production \npeople looked upon him as a nuisance. 85-86. \n\nHe needed some 600 men for the accounting work, and was given \n135. 86. \n\nHe was embarrassed a great deal by this, but thought he was \nimpeded more by the refusal of the authorities above him to \ngive him the number of commissions that he required. \n\nNo appropriations existed at the time he began to organize by \nwhich he could employ civilian accountants. 87. \n\nTook him several months before he could get the Civil Service \nCommission to give him ratings under which he could employ \nmen for several thousand dollars without examinations, and \nso on. 88. \nCol. M. W. Thompson (resumed) (August 29). \n\nProduces statement or argument with respect to the financial and \neconomic machinery for providing the Army with airplanes \nin August, 1917. 89. \n\nThis paper marked " Thompson Exhibit No. 8, August 29, \n1918." 89. \n\nDoes not think that this statement ever reached Gen. Squier. 90. \n\nThis paper formed the basis of John D. Ryan\'s request to Con- \ngress for the creation of such a corporation as is there recom- \nmended. 91. \n\nTaking the cost-plus contract as it was, there was, of course, an \nextremely difficult auditing system required in the case of \nplants where different types of articles were in the course of \nproduction at the same time. 99. \n\nBut this was self- foreseeable. 99. \n\nProduction department feared the accounts section would tend \nto be too technical in their requirements and might thereby \nscare the manufacturers. 102. \n\nThe whole thing could only have been done by the method of \ngiving him carte blanche to go ahead and do it and get com- \npetent men, regardless of the pay he had to give them and \nregardless of the military rank he had to give them when they \ncame into the office. 104. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 305 \n\nCol. M. W. Thompson \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nHad the restrictions of the military requirements and the restric- \ntions of the civil-service requirements to consider in a degree \nalmost impossible to make clear. 105. \nSays it is not a fact that the more advantageous the contract is \nto the Government the less chance the contractor has to get \nadvances. 114. \nStates the history of the advances given to Siems-Carey, H. S. \nKerbaugh Co., the amount originally suggested, and the \namount by which it was reduced when the contract was ar- \nranged more favorably to the Government. 115 to 131. \nCol. Henry E. Arnold (Washington, D. C, August 29, 1918; Book \n\n21 )\xc2\xab \n\nOn July 1, 1917, was made executive officer of the Air Division. \n\n132. \n\nIn February, 1918, was placed on the control board of the Signal \nCorps. 132. \n\nAir Service reorganized in May, 1918, and he was made assistant \nto the Chief of the Department of Military Aeronautics. 133. \n\nWas also a member of the Joint Technical Board of the Army \nand Navy. 134. \n\nReads on the record certain extracts from the minutes of the \nJoint Army and Navy Board proceedings. 135 to 154, inclu- \nsive. \n\nReads also the report of the Joint Army and Navy Technical \nAircraft Board to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of \nthe Navy, under date of May 23, 1917, which appears to have \nbeen approved by both the Secretary of War and the Secretary \nof the Navy. 155 to 161. \n\nReads a report from the above board to the Secretary of War and \nthe Secretary of the Navy under date of May 25, 1917. 162 to \n164. \n\nReads in evidence a memo from Assistant Naval Constructor \n\nHunsaker to Brig. Gen. Foulois, with inclosures of two page \nproofs of general specifications for airplanes. 164 to 166. \n(Dated Sept. 18, 1917; see p. 167.) \n\nAsked what the Joint Army and Navy Technical Board was \ndoing between the month of May and the month of September. \n169. \n\nThe Joint Army and Navy Technical Board, having made its \nrecommendations in May, was not called upon for further \naction until September. 170. \n\nMr. Hughes places on record the recommendations of the Army \nand Navy technical members of the aeronautical mission sent \nto Europe to the Secretary of War and to the Secretary of the \nNavy dated September 4, 1917. "Arnold Exhibit 9, August 29,, \n1918." 172. \n\nAt same time there was a report of Naval Constructor Wester- \nvelt. United States Navy, and Lieut. Child to the Secretary of \nthe Navy on seaplane types in use in Great Britain, France, and \nItaly, and recommendations bearing on the United States naval \naircraft manufacturing program. "Arnold Exhibit No. 10 ? \nAugust 29, 1918." 173. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n306 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". \n\nCol. Henry E. Arnold \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nIntroduces report from the Joint Army and Navy Technical Air- \ncraft Board to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the \nNavy on the Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation and pro- \nduction of E-6 seaplanes, dated August 30, 1917. "Arnold Ex- \nhibit No. 11, August 29, 1918.\'- 173. \n\nReport from the Joint Army and Navy Technical Aircraft Board \nto the Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of War on the sub- \nject of the Navy air program, dated September 18, 1917. \n"Arnold Exhibit No. 12, August 29, 1918." \n\nMemorandum of September 22, 1917, subject " Naval aircraft re- \nquired to carrv out program alreadv authorized." 173. ("Ar- \nnold Exhibit No. 13, August 29, 1918.") \n\nNovember 1, 1917, memorandum of the naval production program \nfrom Assistant Naval Constructor Hunsaker. "Arnold Ex- \nhibit No. 14, August 29, 1918." 174. \n\nProtested against the purchase of the General Vehicle Co. in \norder to keep alive an organization for the making of rotary \nengines. 179-180. \n\nThought it would have been much better to build fields or in- \ncrease the facilities for ^training men rather than get engines \nthat they could not see any use for. 180. \n\nThe plant never was used for the manufacture of rotary engines, \nonly for a matter of 200, then remained idle and is now manu- \nfacturing the Hispano-Suiza engine, 181. \n\nThe Mono Avroe, a plane which is particularly adapted for train- \ning, in that when a man has been trained on that machine, after \nhe is through he is able to step into anv kind of a seiwice ma- \nchine. 189. \n\nMemorandum from Lieut. Col. Jones, dated December 9, 1917, on \nthe subject of 100 Mono Avros. 190. ("Arnold Exhibit 19, \nAugust 29, 1918.") \n\nTelegram to Gen. Foulois, recommending adopting Avro. 193. \n\nTelegram from Foulois saying Col. Lee, Royal Flying Corps, has \nAvro airplane and all training books with him, etc. 193. \n\nNext minute of January 11, 1918, from Joint Army and Navy \nTechnical Aircraft Board to Secretary of the Navy quoting \ntelegram from Gen. Pershing recommending adoption of Avro \nfor primary training, etc. 195. \n\nIt was resolved at this meeting that one aviation school be \nequipped with this type of airplane exclusively. 195. \n\nNever went into production ; not anv contracts even let for them \nthat he knew of. 195-196. \n\nAsked with reference to the difficulty in getting equipment infor- \nmation regarding the DH4, states that the machine was never \ntested with a military load between the 1st of December and \nthe time it was turned over to the Department of Military \nAeronautics in May, 1918. 209. \n\nWhen telling the Chief Signal Officer that nobody knew how many \nmiles per hour or feet per minute or what its ceiling is he would \nsay, " Well, it will fly, won\'t it? " etc. 210. \n\nSaw the machine in February and it looked like a Christmas tree. \nAnvbody could take an instrument and put it on the machine. \n21L \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCKAFT INVESTIGATION. 307 \n\nCol. Robert L. Montgomery (August 29, 1918 ; Book 21) . \n\nStates the reasons for the acquisition of the plant of the General \nVehicle Co. 258. \n\nDid not consider the phase of making compensation for the use of \nthe plant during the war. 262. \n\nThinks that the Union Switch & Signal Co., who already had a \ncontract for 2,500 rotary engines, were looking to the General \nVehicle Co. for aid in making these engines. 265. \n\nAsks whose initials those are that appear on the item " Notes \npayable, P. T. M., $1,530,408." 266. \n\nKnew nothing in any way which would furnish information \nthat there were any individuals who were concerned in secur- \ning this purchase, to the end that the obligations of the Gen- \neral Vehicle Co. might be paid. 268. \n\nDid not make any examination of the facilities possessed by the \nDayton- Wright Aircraft Co. 276. \n\nTook the word of Mr. Talbott, that he had a certain amount of \nmoney invested in it. 276. \n\nDid not get a balance sheet from the firm. 278. \n\nDid not know whether they had any capital stock paid in at the \ntime this contract was awarded, nor whether they had any \nworking capital or how they got it. 278. \n\nSmall concerns were subjected to a pretty rigid scrutiny because \nthey did not have large and well-known organizations. 279. \n\nIt was his business to know, but did not know whether the con- \ntract in this case was actually made before the company had a \ntitle to a building or had paid up their capital stock, or had \nacquired any resources of a substantial character. 280, 281. \n\nKnew Mr. Talbott two months ; did not know Mr. Kettering at \nall. Relied upon the statements of Col. Deeds, Col. Waldon, \nand Mr. Coffin. 282. \n\nYes; thought the matter of capital and resources was a matter \nof serious importance. 287. \n\nDoes not know why a contract was refused to the Southern Air- \ncraft Corporation, of High Point, N. C. 288. \n\nNor the Singer Co., the selection of plants being left to Col. \nWaldon, Col. Deeds, and Mr. Coffin. 289. \n\nAsked why it would not have been just as easy to have doubled \nthe number of De Havilands, or of any other type of plane it \nwas desired to build, as to get the number of planes that were \nactually built for shipment to the other side if the facilities \nof the Singer Co. had been availed of. 290. \n\nCan not answer this question. 299. \n\nAsked as to negotiations in connection with the forming of a \nGovernment corporation for the purpose of handling various \nmatters that would be connected with the conduct of the cost- \nplus contract. 294. \n\nRemembers that he thought it impractical. 294. \n\nDoes not know whether an effort was made with Congress, but \nstates that he personally, with Col. House and several others, \nurged Mr. Coffin very strongly to do this. 295. \n\nThinks Mr. Coffin simply could not get it through. 295. \n\n\n\n308 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nCol. Robert L. Montgomery \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nRealized the difficulties which would be met in a military organ- \nization with rank determined according to military methods, \netc. 296. \n\nStates that representations from Congress were against this \nmethod. 299. \n\nSays there was a construction by the Secretary of War and \nSecretary of the Navy supplemental to the statute which held \nthe board clown to simply advisory functions. 300. \n\nDoes not think anything was ever clone in the way of a recom- \nmendation to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the \nNavy that the full scope of the statute should be permitted in \noperation. 300. \n\nAsked if it was not a fact that the limitations of which he and \nothers had spoken in respect to the activities of the Aircraft \nBoard were in a large measure due to the definition of the \nauthority of that board as made by the Secretary of War and \nthe Secretary of the Navy and the authority reposed in them \nby the act of Congress. 302. \n\nWhen Col. Deeds was the head of the Equipment Division, \nwhich was down to some time in January, 1918, he was his \naide in connection with financial matters, dealing with con- \ntractors for that side, but not his aide in connection with en- \ngineering and production matters. 311. \n\nIs shown exhibit called " Zacharias Exhibit 1," which shows the \nvariations from day to dav almost of the program for the \nDe Haviland 4s. 322. \n\nAsked who was responsible for getting up any such program as \nthat, he replied he thought it was a guess of Col. Waldon, \nCol. Deeds, and Mr. Coffin. 324. \n\nIs shown Zacharias Exhibit 3 regarding the Handley-Paiges ex- \npected. 324. \n\nStates that it was certainly not intended by whoever did it to \nbe used as a definite program of production. It was their \nguess of what could be done. 325. \n\nStates he has never seen either of these programs. 329. \n\nPlaced the resnonsibilitv in a way on Maj. Sheppler and Maj. \nGray. 334. \n\nYes; did remember a constant complaint from the Dayton \nWright Co. that they did not give them full information to \ngo ahead with production. 334. \n\nThinks the statement is largely correct, but not entirely ; that the \nredesigning of these combat planes had been largely left to \nthe manufacturers themselves. 339. \n\nThe Government had not organized and established an engi- \nneering department which was adequate to the undertaking of \nthe complete design and had to rely upon the engineering de- \npartments of manufacturing concerns which had never be- \ncome familiar enough with the undertaking to achieve prompt \nresults. 339. \n\nAsked if he could tell any reason why the Government did not \nestablish in the very beginning of this a competent engineer- \ning department, and leave to it the rapid designing of the \n\n\n\n\n\n\nABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 309 \n\nCol. Robert L, Montgomery \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nplanes so that the designs complete could be given to the \nmanufacturers and quantity production accelerated. 340. \n\nSays the Government did not have the men, and the manufac- \nturers did not have the men, either. 340. \n\nSays there were very few men who were capable of designing \nan airplane in this country when the war started. 340. \nJ. S. McGregor (August 29, 1918; Book 21). \n\nAsked to recall the statement he signed setting forth the woods \nthat were satisfactory for the making of propellers for com- \nbat planes, and also stating the order of preference. 346. \n\nIn that statement he placed African mahogany last, and put \nahead of African mahogany quarter-sawed white oak. 346. \n\nQuarter sawn oak was first approved at a meeting of the Inter- \nnational Aircraft Standards Board held some time during the \nsummer of 1917. 348. \n\nThe objections to African mahogany is that it varies consider- \nably in quality, some of it being very weak, and inspection \nwould be so far from the source that it would be very difficult \nto be sure vou were getting the species ordered. 349. \nHon. Newton D. Baker (August 30, 1918; Book 21). \n\nGoes into resume of conditions prior to the entry of this country \ninto the war. 351. \n\nThen takes up the question of what provision was made for the \nestablishment of a program of aircraft production. 352. \n\nAfter a few preliminary arrangements did not concern himself \nfurther personallv with the organization of the aircraft activi- \nties. 354. \n\nGen. Squier reported to him through the Chief of Staff. 354. \n\nHad many discussions with Gen. Squier regarding aircraft \nproblems which ultimately turned, imperceptibly, he thought, \ninto Mr. Coffin, who was a member of the advisory committee \nof the Council of National Defense. 354. \n\nMr. Coffin, then Mr. Deeds, and now Col. Deeds, and Col. Mont- \ngomery, then Mr. Montgomery, formed themselves into a \ngroup associated with the Chief Signal Office, Gen. Squier, \nand developed this large so-called $640,000,000 appropriation \nwhich as he recalled it was broached to a group of newspaper \neditors in New York Citv before it was broached to him. \n355. \n\nThis group was approached with his general knowledge as a \nmeans to inspire the Congress in its ideas with regard to air \ncraft, and the address to these men was intended as a pre- \nlude to presenting the matter to Congress. 355. \n\nMr. Coffin had prior to the war made a survey of the industrial \nconcerns of the United States. Had catalogued the manu- \nfacturing facilities of the United States covering some 30,000 \nfactories. 355. \n\nMr. Coffin was a manufacturing man and very expert in indus- \ntrial matters, 356. \n\nDid not know who selected Col. Montgomery, but it was doubt- \nless done in conference with Mr. Coffin and Gen. Squier. 357. \n\nNever knew Mr. Deeds until he saw him in the aircraft work. \n357. \n\n\n\n310 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nHon. Newton D. Baker \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nCouncil of National Defense had no executive function. 357. \n\nWas purely an advisory body. Suggestions regarding every de- \npartment poured in there. 358. \n\nFirst says no, but later, yes, that the Aircraft Production Board \noriginally was a mere committee or auxiliary of the Council \nof National Defense prior to the act of Congress establishing \nthe Aircraft Board. 358. \n\nThe Council of National Defense could constitute such bodies as \nmight aid it in its work. 358. \n\nOne of the bodies which was constituted was this organization \ncalled the Aircraft Production Board. 358-359. \n\nGives his understanding of the function of the Aircraft Board \nestablished by act of Congress. 359. \n\nAircraft Board when the act was passed, about the 1st of Octo- \nber, was approved by him as it was then constituted, with \ndesignations of the Army members; 360. \n\nHad made no special inquiry outside the War Department with \nrespect to qualifications of Mr. Deeds or Mr. Montgomery. \nRelied undoubtedly on Gen. Squier\'s recommendation, and \nMr. Coffin\'s. 360. \n\nSection 4 of the act and section 5 of the act are read to him, and \nhe is asked if the construction of the act and the function of \nthe board under these general provisions and the extent of \nhis own authority in conjunction with the Secretary of the \nNavy to establish the limits of the activities of the board \nhave been brought to his attention. 362. \n\nIs read the opinion of Judge Ansell, etc., under date of February \n14, 1918, which after reviewing the terms of the act just read \n(sections 4 and 5) says: "This office concurs with the counsel \nfor the Aircraft Board in the opinion that only advisory \nfunctions with reference to these matters may be conferred \nupon the Aircraft Board/\' 362. \n\nNo; this was not the opinion Mr. Baker entertained. 363. \n\nHis idea was that subject to the awarding of contracts through \nregular channels they were permitted, with the consent and \napproval of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the \nNavy, actually to supervise and direct, as the act reads, the \nactivities of the board. 363. \n\nJudge Ansell \'s opinion was given out at his request, in that he \ncalled for an interpretation of the act by the Judge Advocate \nGeneral\'s office. 363. \n\nIs read order issued on February 25, 1918, signed by Gen. Squier, \nand approved by him and also by Secretary Daniels, defining \nthe functions of the Aircraft Board. 364^-366. \n\nHis attention is called to the difference between the act of Con- \ngress and the provision of this order. Is asked who proposed \nthe provision of the order referred to. 367. \n\nDid not recall any discussion of the apparent limitation. 368. \n\nIs asked concerning another provision of the order stating that \nall programs shall be made by the board from information \nwhich shall be furnished by the proper Army and Navy mili- \ntary and naval branches on the one hand, etc. Is asked the \norigin of the limitations as to the source of procurement. 368. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 311 \n\nHon. Newton D. Baker \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nCan not answer this. 368. \n\nHis understanding is that this order met with the approval of \nthe Aircraft Board. 369. \n\nDoes not know of any complaint made of the limitation of pow- \ners of the Aircraft Board during the period of the board\'s \nactivities prior to May. 369. \n\nHis attention had never before been called to the provision that \nthe members of the Aircraft Board should have no direct \ncommunication with the manufacturing plants, which, with \nhis authority and that of the Secretary of the Navy, they were \nsupposed to supervise. 370. \n\nThe only explanation he can give is that they did not want to \nconfuse the manufacturers as to who their bosses were. 370. \n\nIs asked with respect to the provisions that were made here for \nthe organization of a competent engineering department to \nact in the matter of the settlement of designs for the planes \nwhich this country was to build. 372. \n\nCan not answer this. 372. \n\nThe Secretary of the Navy writes to him on April 27, 1917, pro- \nposing a joint technical board on aircraft, etc., to standardize \ndesigns and general specifications for aircraft * * * the \nboard to be composed of technical and expert men, * * * \nall of which has Mr. Baker\'s hearty approval. 373. \n\nThe board being composed of technical and expert men, is asked \nif their recommendations were followed. 373. \n\nMr. Baker thinks their recommendations were supplemented by \nrecommendations from abroad. 373, 374. \n\nStates why he thinks the lack of concentration of responsibilit}^ \nand the existence of various bodies with ill-defined functions \nwas inevitable. 376. \n\nIs further reminded of the failure to prepare designs and a \ndivision of responsibility with regard to the preparation and \nsettlement of designs for the manufacturers to follow, and \nasked to keep it apart from voluntary activities. 378, 379. \n\nHad never been brought to his attention when the contracts \nwere let for the De Haviland 4s and for the production of \nthe Bristol and it became apparent that it would be necessary \nto redesign these machines in order that they might be adapted \nto the Liberty motor, that the Government was largely de- \npending upon the manufacturers themselves to aid in the re- \ndesigning, and that the Government had not provided com- \npetent and adequate engineering department to settle upon a \ndesign to be given to the manufacturers to produce. 380. \n\nHe regarded Gen. Squier as the authoritative person to inform \nhim of any difficulties that existed and to see that such or- \nganizations were evolved as would accomplish the purpose. \n381. \n\nStates he did, in the course of the winter, undertake to inquire \nAvhat the needs for delaying production were. 381, 382. \n\nSummarizes the results. 383. \n\nHe asked Mr. Eugene Meyer, for one, to visit the airplane fac- \ntories, * * * consult with the members and find out if he \ncould the difficulties they were having, etc. 382. \n\n\n\n312 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nHon. Newton D. Baker \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nHe can not recall Mr. Meyer having told him that he did not re- \ngard Mr. Deeds or Mr. Montgomery or Gen. Squier as men \nwho were adequate for the performance of the work. 383. \n(Mr. Meyer has testified to this in the course of the inquiry.) \n\nIs read extract from a letter signed by the chairman of the na- \ntional advisory committee on aeronautics and the chairman \nof the executive committee of that committee, addressed to the \nPresident, January 24, 1918, which is a very noteworthy \nstatement. * * * Quantity production has been made in \nseveral large plants to such an extent that quantity produc- \ntion has begun and will be continued with satisfactory results. \n383, 384. \n\nIs also read extract concerning motors. * * * motors are \nnow in production in six of the best equipped plants in the \ncountry. 385. \n\nThis was never brought to his attention. 386. \n\nGen. Squier was a member of the committee, and was present \nat the meeting at which this letter was adopted to be sent to \nthe President. Col. Deeds also appeared before the board \nand gave the committee information on the matter. 386. \n\nConsidering the conditions with respect to the Bristol, thinks \nthis was a serious matter. 388. \n\nFurther about Mr. Meyer\'s testimony. 388-391. \n\nHe never had in mind that he should consider the possibility \nof establishing Mr. Deeds, or Col. Deeds, as an independent \nor superior agent in this enterprise. 391. \n\nDid not know that Col. Deeds, as the head of the equipment \ndivision, down to some time in January. 1918, was the actual \nexecutive in that matter to whom Gen. Squier delegated the \nauthority relating to the production of aircraft. 391. \n\nRelates what information he had of Col. Deeds relative to the \nvery large number of activities that related to aircraft centered \nin Dayton, Ohio. 393-395. \n\nDid not know that Col. Deeds had made transfers of his interests \nto his associates and had taken their personal notes without \nsecurity, which notes remained unpaid. 395. \n\nWill ask Inspector General to get any reports he has affecting \nthis Dayton matter, etc. 399. \n\nWith regard to this general survey made of industrial facilities \nbefore the war, is asked with regard to the offer of the Singer \nfactory with extensive facilities. 400. \n\nDid not undertake to inquire why certain large concerns were \nnot used, or why certain small concerns were used, or why \nthe Day ton- Wright Co. was used ahead of others. 401. \n\nOnly kept in touch with matters relating to production to this \nextent, that a weekly report was made to him of the output \nof every war supply. 402. \n\nWhen it appeared that production was seriously delayed, took \nthe measure spoken of; that is, he consulted Mr. Eugene \nMeyer, a production expert, and asked him to tell him what \nthe trouble was. 402. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 313 \n\nHon. Newton D. Baker \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nThen he went abroad; when he came back Snowden Marshall \nreport had been made in his absence, and the so-called Borg- \nlum report had been completely made and supplemental \npapers to it had been filed with the President. All of the \nthings alleged by Mr. Borglum had been iuquired into by \nMr. Meyer for Mr. Baker. 403. \n\nCame back from Europe at the time President Wilson had de- \ntermined to make a revision of the development of the de- \npartment. 403. \n\nSailed for Europe on 27th day of February; returned between \nthe middle and last of April. 403. \n\nIs asked with regard to the various programs of the produc- \ntion of planes, with statements of the dates on which these \nprograms were formulated, and the dates on which the de- \nliveries on the planes were expected, as received from the \nplanning department of the equipment division. 403. \n\nNever saw them. 404. \n\nIs shown the remarkable sheet on De Haviland 4\'s. 404. \n\nAdmits that the statements are striking, and says it was the \nmost contagious disease that every struck any place. 404. \n\nSays that the men engaged in production took the manufac- \nturers\' view. 405. \n\nWould not say whether this statement just shown to him was \nthe manufacturers\' view or not. 405. \n\nIs questioned about two statements by him, for release in the \npapers Friday, October 4, 1917, and one for release in the \npapers February 21, 1918. 405^07. \n\nObject was to stop loose and misleading statements made from \nmany sources. 406. \n\nSecond statement contained : " The first American-built battle \nplanes are to-day en route to the front in France * * * \nmarks the final overcoming of many difficulties," etc. 407. \n\nAfterwards learned that it was an absolutely misleading state- \nment. 407. \n\nMr. Baker relied entirely upon the facts as stated by Gen. \nSquier and Col. Deeds. 410. \n\nDid not learn of the inaccuracies of this statement until he \nreturned from Europe. 411. \n\nYes ; had been advised that Col. Boiling had placed orders with \nthe French Government for a considerable number of planes \nthat could be used by this country before they could get into \nproduction on this side. 414. \n\nStates he knew that the French Government would be unable \nor were unwilling to fill these orders. 415. \n\nGives his reasons for the inability of the French Government to \nfill these orders as those of one who has been over there and \nknew the actual conditions. 415-418. \n\nAsked for information as to failure to supplv raw materials \nwanted by France. 418-423. \n\nWith reference to the De Haviland 4, representatives from the \nSignal Corps said that they could not get from the other \nside correct information as to what materials were needed for \nequipment or what the equipment was to be. 424. \n\n\n\n314 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nHon. Neavton D. Baker \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nMr. Baker explains the difficulties to be encountered. 426. \n\nMr. Baker is informed that those are not the difficulties pre- \nsented in the report. Could not get definite information from \nthe other side as to just what it was that was desired. 428. \n\nMr. Baker states this has never been called to his attention. \n428. \n\nThinks if it had been brought to his attention he could have \ngotten the kind of information they wanted, but still he \nimagines that they, on the other side, not having seen the \nDe Haviland 4 as it was being built on this side, and wanting \nas many guns on the machine as possible, might well have \nhesitated. 429. \n\nAdmits that if one hesitates as to what one wants one never \nwould get the planes. 429. \n\nIs asked regarding the large number of students sent over to \nFrance, and after they got there there being no facilities for \ntraining. 432-435. \n\nExplains with reference to the cancellation of a contract with \nthe Engle Aircraft Co., of Cleveland, Ohio, with which his \nbrother was associated. 435-439. \nEdward Norton Chilson (Washington, D. C, August 30; Book 21). \n\nManager of purchases for the J. G. White Engineering Cor- \nporation. 441. \n\nHad a small contract with the Signal Corps for supply of \nmaterials in June, 1917. 441. (No. 1381.) \n\nNext contract, No. 1694, covered materials to be sent to France \n442. \n\nProduces other contract that covers materials. 442. \n\nExhibit 4 or the main purchase contract, No. 1694, dated Sep- \ntember 13, 1917, was entered into for the purpose of providing \nraw materials required for the manufacture of planes and \nengines in France under a contract which had been made by \nthe Government there. 445. \n\nExplains specifications for materials under that contract which \nit was impossible to comply with. 445-448. \n\nNot finally met until after the first of the year. 448. \n\nExplains one of the specifications hard to meet encountered bv \nthe Summerill Tool Co. 449. \n\nThe 1 per cent of the materials not yet supplied did not embrace \nanything required for the Hispano-Suizas. 452. \n\nOnly relates to the 1,500 Renault. 453. \n\nThey supplied everything required for the Breguet excepting \nthe wood, and the Signal Corps contracts had to supply that. \n453. \n\nFor the spads they only failed to have the tubing required, but \nthey supplied enough tubing to have made 1,500 spads. 454. \n\nThey were not let have any further information after they \ndelivered the goods to the point of embarkation. 455. \n\nReports show that these materials have been shipped far in \nexcess of the amounts represented by the planes delivered. \n455-456. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OP AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 315 \n\nEdward Nortox Chilsox \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nAfter giving figures relating to the percentages supplied states \nthat there were sufficient raw materials in the 58 per cent \nfurnished to the French manufacturers to have enabled the \nFrench Government to proceed at once had they received it \npromptly. 457. \n\nHe reports that one of the receiving men at the embarkation \npoint of Brunswick, Ga., reported over a million pounds of \nmaterial that had been there over 300 days and still there. \n457. (500 tons.) \n\nSome of the raw materials could have been devoted to other \npurposes, but most of it was material in connection with \nengines and planes. 460. \n\nTheir business upon completion of orders all transacted with \nthe officer at the port of embarkation and had to notify the \nSignal Corps in Washington. 461. \n\nNotified Col. Sidney D. Walclon, and after he went to France \nnotified Maj. Leonard L. Horner. 462. \n\nThe Government has paid, to August 27, $8,938,825.43 for these \nmaterials. 463. \n\nFreight and miscellaneous charges amount to $170,624.52. 463. \n\nDid not put the Government to any added expense by using com- \nmercial bills of lading. 479. \n\nSubmitted a memorandum to the Signal Corps outlining the \nmethods they proposed following in connection with all ship- \nments for which they were responsible. 479. \n\nPages 480 to 507 contain copies of orders, total tonnage shipped, \nkinds of material used, etc. \nEarl Thomas Oakes (Washington, D. C, August 30, 1918; Book 21). \n\nChemist by occupation. 508. \n\nAssistant to Dr. Beans in the general laboratory in the Bureau \nof Aircraft Production. 508. \n\nHeld this position since October 1, 1917. 508. \n\nWas at the Curtiss plant, at Buffalo, from May 5 until Septem- \nber 30, 1917. 510. \n\nAsked to state conditions, as he found them at the Curtiss plant \nduring this stay, as regards tests and laboratory work. 510. \n\nVery little attention was paid to what the Government wanted \nor what they did not want in regard to that work. 510. \n\nCurtiss plant did not maintain a laboratory at all until the Brit- \nish refused to accept any more planes. 511. \n\nPoorly operated and supervised when they did put it in ; results \nof tests often disregarded and the material accepted anyhow. \n511. \n\nSupposed to pass on all raw materials. 512. \n\nPoor chemical laboratory conditions not remedied. 512. \n\nHe was supposed to pass on raw materials on the basis of the \nlaboratory tests, but often laboratory tests were not reliable \nenough to form a basis for passing on materials ; and often, if \nrejected by him and the other Army of inspection, used any- \nway. 514. \n\nEeports this condition June 8 or 10. The report. 515-518. \n\nNothing followed this report. Fixes another report and states \nthat none of these things have been remedied, and senior in- \nspector tells him his report can not go through. 518. \n\n\n\n316 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nEarl Thomas Oakes \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nTests at the Bureau of Standards showed the Curtiss\'s tests to \nbe unreliable. 522. \n\nThis was reported to the Signal Corps. 523. \n\nNothing came from any of it at all. 524. \n\nThese conditions existed at the Churchill Street plant, 527. \n\nImproper way of using the dope. Eecommended by Mr. Muel- \nler in order to keep up production. 544. \n\nProduces report on the whole situation to Mr. Costello. 555-562. \n\nRejected material put in and accepted. 562. \n\nShipped material to Detroit before it had been tested. 562. \n\nOn another occasion they made tie-rods, specified at 105,000 \npounds per square inch of tensile strength, which fell below \n95,000. Found out that instead of making them out of steel \nwhich specified 0.25 and 0.35 per cent of carbon, they were \nmaking them out of steel as low as 0.16 and 0.18 per cent car- \nbon. 563. \n\nUsed silver solder, instead of tin which was just as good, which \ncost the Government $7,000 or $8,000 a year, and the tin \nwould have cost $400. 579. \nCol. H. H. Arnold (Washington, D. C, August 31, 1918; Book 21). \n\nExplains the delay in testing the DeHaviland machine and the \nreason for it. 588. \n\nCol. B. Q. Jones asked permission to fly this first machine, but \nthis was refused, on the ground that it was the only machine \nin existence, and if it got all broken up it would cause serious \ndelay in the production. 589. \n\nNo performance tests were made. 589. \n\nTold by Chief Signal Officer that tests were not necessary, that \nmachine could fly, and that was all that was necessary. 590. \n\nShipped some planes to Gerstner Field, La., for tests. 591. \n\nEacliator problems to be solved by Maj. Gray. 591. \n\nMachine turned over to Air Division for test about April 7 for \nfirst time. 593. \n\nAccording to the charge approximately 70 machines were made \nwithout testing. 598. \n\nThe De Haviland 4 finally tested, at first proved unsatisfactory. \nTwo men killed in this" test. 600. \n\nThe machine overloaded in pounds per square foot. 601. \n\nThe tests continued, and finally machine is passed as an accept- \nable machine for use at the front, not as good as ought to be, \nbut better than nothing. 602. \n\nThis is the condition in which these machines had been shipped \nprior to this time. 602. \n\nModifications suggested by them same as those suggested by \nGen. Pershing in his telegram. 602. \n\nThe Dayton-Wright plant took machines right off the floor and \nboxed them up to ship overseas without flving them at all. \n609. \n\nAfter May they were tested, but not before. They hurried them \noff so that they could say thev had shipped some machines. \n610. \n\nExplains the difference in flying a machine with a military load, \nto meet military requirements, and flying one that did not have \na military load. 613-614, 615, \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 31 T \n\nCapt. E. J. Clark (Washington, D. C., August 31, 1918; Book 21). \nSubmits the correspondence relating to negotiations with the \n\nPatterson Aeroplane Co., of Detroit. 667. \nIs asked concerning letter dated July 27, 1918, addressed to Mr. \n\nFletcher. 667. \n\n(From the Patterson Aeroplane Co., of Detroit.) \nPages 667 to 672 contain the letter. \nProduces report submitted by him on this subject and letter \n\nreceived in reply. 675. \nOther papers, pages 676 to 687. \nCol. R. L. Montgomery (Washington, D. C, September 30, 1918;. \n\nbook 22). \nAdditional statement correcting previous testimony. 1-10. \nLieut. Col. Jesse Gtjrney Vincent (Washington, D. C., September \n\n30, 1918; Book 22). \nWas a mechanical engineer with Packard Motor Car Co., of \n\nDetroit, before entering the Army. 11. \nHeld position of vice president in charge of engineering with \n\nthat company for about two years; prior to that was chief \n\nengineer of the company. 11. \nGives mechanical training. 11. \nFirst came to Washington in connection with the development \n\nof a standardized aircraft engine, since known as the Liberty \n\nmotor, on May 27, 1917. 12. \nReceived a commission in the Army on September 3, 1917. 13. \nWas loaned to the Government by the Packard Motor Car Co. \n\nup until August 15, 1917. 13. \nHas received no compensation from Packard Co. since August \n\n15 with exception of some dividends on some stock which he \n\nowns in company. 13. \nOwns about $60,000 worth of common stock, par value. 11. \nSalary with Packard Co. for year August, 1916, to August, \n\n1917, was $25,000. 19. \nMakes statement of his experience with airplane engines and \n\ntheir development. 24-33. \nReport made by Col. Hall and witness as to the advisability and \n\nwhat should be done to standardize an American airplane en- \ngine was marked " Vincent Exhibit 1, September 30, 1918." \n\nInserted in record. 35-43. \nAfter report was received by Aircraft Board, Col. Hall and \n\nwitness were requested by board to go back to work and sub- \nmit complete drawings of the standardized engine which was \n\nproposed. 43. \nOn June 4 was advised by Mr. Deeds that $250,000 had been set \n\naside and that he was to go back to Detroit and get the work \n\nstarted on sample of 8-cylinder engine. 45. \nWent back to Detroit with an order for five 8-cylinder engines \n\nto be built by the Packard Motor Co. 46. \nFirst engine was built by no less than 12 different concerns. 46. \nFirst engine was completed in 21 days from the time drawings. \n\nwere started. 49. \nReports from abroad in July, 1917, indicated that the 8-cylinder \n\nengine should not be made, but that a 12-cylinder engine was \n\ndesirable. 55. \n\n\n\n318 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nLieut. Col. Jesse Gtjrney Vincent \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nBeport made by Inspector Lynn Reynolds to Government on test \nof 12 -cylinder engines was marked " Vincent Exhibit No. 2, \nSeptember 30, 1918." and is inserted in the record. 61-88. \n\nResults of test were so conclusive that it was immediately de- \ncided to put the engine into production in large quantities. 89. \n\nMr. Oily, of Rolls Royce interests, suggested a change in the oil \npump, to make the motor what is called a dry crank case job. \n103. \n\nMr. Oily also suggested that the propeller hub be made detach- \nable instead of shrunk on. Both of these changes were ap- \nproved. 103. \n\nAn airplane engine developing 400 horsepower on the ground \ndevelops 200 horsepower at 20,000 feet. 105. \n\nCrank shaft was too light to be produced commercially and was \nmade heavier. 107. \n\nIn his opinion, production was not delayed more than two weeks \nby the changes referred to. 109. \n\nKnows of no other changes of an important character that were \nmade in the Liberty motor. 109. \n\nWas not consulted at all about schedules placed in contracts of \ncompanies. 110. \n\nWith reference to speed in production, thinks Ford Co. con- \ntracted to do something that was impossible. 112. \n\nCol. Clark nominally had charge of the Airplane Experimental \nDepartment until he took charge of it about February 6, 1918. \n133. \n\nThis experimental department was to embrace both planes and \nengines. 134. \n\nProtested against the Airplane Experimental Department be- \ncause he did not think it gave them any authority or responsi- \nbility. 135. \n\nArgued for engineering department with the idea that it would \ntake entire charge of engineering and definitely straighten \nout what he thought was an unsettled condition ; one of which \nwas the putting of planes into production in this country with- \nout having complete drawings or a complete understanding as \nto just what equipment such planes were to carry. 136. \n\nFirst established his office in Dayton early in October, 1917. \n138. \n\nUp to February 6 he was known as executive officer of the Air- \nplane Experimental Department. 139. \n\nDid not have anything to do with the designing of planes as dis- \ntinguished from engines. 141. \n\nSupervised the construction of McCook Field. 144. \n\nWas instrumental in selecting the site of McCook Field. 145. \n\nMoraine Field is what is now known as South Field and is a part \nof Col. Deeds\'s old farm. 148. \n\nNorth Field was at the time they went out there a training field \nused by the Dayton- Wright Co. L T nderstood that at least a \npart of that field was owned jointly by Col. Deeds and Mr. \nKettering. \n\nWent to Dayton with the idea of taking what was known as \nMoraine Flying Field. 149. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCKAFT INVESTIGATION". 319 \n\nLieut. Col. Jesse Gurnet Vincent \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nCol. Clark telegraphed from Dayton suggesting North Field. \n153. \n\nMr. Talbott and Mr. Kettering suggested McCook Field. 154. \n\nNo one on the part of the airplane experimental department was \ngiving attention to the settlement of the design of the De \nHaviland 4. 154. \n\nCol. Clark did not agree it was up to us and upon investigation \nfound the Dayton- Wright Co. did not consider we had any- \nthing to do with it. 154. That the airplane experimental de- \npartment had anything to do with the settling of the design \nof the De Haviland 4 plane. 155. \n\nHad many arguments with Col. Clark about the matter. 156. \n\nHis position that the Government ought to determine what was \nto be made and then give it to the manufacturer to make. 156. \n\nTook up matter with Col. Deeds. 156. \n\nCol. Clark had several well qualified theoretical aerodynamic \nengineers with him. 159. \n\nWith the exception of Col. Clark, who did the preliminary work \non the design of the Bristol Fighter to adapt it to the Liberty \n12, none of these men who had had experience were having \nanything to do with settling the De Haviland 4 or the Bristols, \nor any problems related to the actual program. 160. \n\nProduction engineering department did not have anybody that \nhe knew of who had any experience in airplane designing. 161. \n\nAs soon as he was given control of McCook Field he began to \ndirect efforts toward getting some machines ready for produc- \ntion rather than doing purely experimental or research work. \nObtained permission to take the De Haviland 9 away from the \nDayton- Wright Co. at South Field and put it through McCook \nField. 163. \xe2\x96\xa0 \n\nThis particular machine was a sample that had been built by \nDayton-Wright from such meager information as they could \nobtain from abroad. 164. \n\nWas not until the latter part of March or April of this }^ear that \nthey succeeded in obtaining a De Haviland 9 from Europe. \nWitnesses who have testified to the receipt of the De Haviland \n9 in October are mistaken. 164. \n\nThe De Haviland 9 was completed up to the point of equipment \nof bombs before January 1. 168. \n\nThe De Haviland 9 is being put out of production abroad. 171. \n\nDe Haviland 9-A, equipped with Liberty 12, took its place. 171. \n\nOn February 6, when at McCook Field, made efforts to get De \nHaviland 9, Lapere two-seater fighter, VE 7 advanced training \nmachine ready for production, and a little later the U. S. B. 1 \nand U. S. B. 2. 173. \n\nMr. Nash put him in full charge of engineering department on \nJuly 23, 1918. 176. Department was called the Airplane En- \ngineering Division of the Bureau of Aircraft Production. 177. \n\nThe testing and final say on new machines is still with the tech- \nnical section of the Department of Military Aeronautics. 178. \n\nCan not say why De Haviland 4 was permitted to go so far into \nproduction without test. 184. \n\n130687\xe2\x80\x9419 21 \n\n\n\n320 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nLieut. Col. Jesse Gurnet Vincent \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nMr. J. V. Martin is considered a pest, not only by the engineers \nof this country but also those of Europe. 192. \n\nWitness is shown Blakeley Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4 relative to vouchers \n\ncovering payments to the Packard Co. on development work of \n\nLiberty motor and questioned as to the amounts, etc. 193-240. \n\nJames V. Martin (Washington, D. C, September 30, 1918 ; Book 22). \n\nProfession was a master mariner. Now a member of nav al auxil- \niary on leave from overseas Avork to do work for the airplane \nengineering department of the Army and for the Bureau of \nConstruction and Repair of the Navy. 240. \n\nBecame a master mariner in November, 1912. 240. \n\nHas not had any experience in mechanics outside of navigation. \n241. \n\nFirst became interested in aeronautics in 1908 at Harvard Uni- \nversity through Mr. Herring, of the Herring- Curtiss Co. 242. \n\nConstructed the second airplane in the history of the War De- \npartment. 242. \n\nWas in Europe in latter part of summer of 1909 and met the \npioneers in airplane work, such as Bleriot, Grahame- White, \nMr. Handley-Paige, A. V. Eoe, of England, and others. 243. \n\nOrganized the Harvard Aeronautical Society and built and flew \nthe Harvard 1, an airplane for this society at Harvard Uni- \nversity. 243. \n\nIn 1910 held first big international meet in the United States, the \nHarvard-Boston meet, and brought Grahame-White to the \nUnited States, etc. 243. \n\nWent to England and as an employee of Mr. Grahame-White \nbecame chief instructor of the London Aerodrome. 244. \n\nGives list of men prominent in British air ministry whom he \ntrained. 244. \n\nReturned to United States in May, 1911, and originated and \ndemonstrated the type of machine which is used exclusively \nby the United States Army to-day, the tractor biplane. 245. \n\nDe Haviland 4 is based on that macnine. 246. \n\nLeft nothing undone to prepare himself in experience as the \nleading tractor biplane designer of America. 255. \n\nAfter war broke out made trips to Europe to acquaint himself \nwith planes that were used in fighting. 255. \n\nFrom the inception of the European war he had endeavored to \nsecure the attention of the Government aviation authorities to \ncertain airplane efficiency features, etc. 257. \n\nBritish Government sent over with him the A B C motor. 258. \n\nBuilt plane called Kitten 3 in this country, which is the third \nmodification of the British Kittens. 263. \n\nThe ABC motor is used in the B. A. T. and Sop with ma- \nchines. 267. \n\nShowed design of two-place reconnaissance fighter to Col. Clark. \n268. _ \n\nCommittee advised Col. Vincent to let him build two of them. \n269. \n\nModel was built and tested in the Washington Navy Yard wind \ntunnel more than two months ago. 271. \n\nCol. Vincent has been acquainted with result of test. 272. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 321 \n\nJames V. Martin \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nOffered services to Government to have it built, and offer is not \nreceiving a bit of consideration. 273. \n\nOrder for 10 planes was to keep him going while he was doing \nthe bombing work. \n\nAlways held his own services and those of his organization at \nthe service of the Government without profit during the war. \n282. \n\nMotors have been decided on the night bomber which he built \nwhich are not fit to go into the plane. 283. \nBrig. Gen. Charles McKinley Saltzman (Washington, D. C, Oc- \ntober 1, 1918; Book 22). \n\nBrigadier general, Signal Corps. 293. \n\nEntered West Point on June 15, 1892, and became a commis- \nsioned officer on June 15, 1896. 293. \n\nAt time of our entry into war was on duty in the office of the \nChief Signal Officer of the Army. 293. \n\nWhen we entered war, aviation section was a small branch of the \nSignal Corps, consisting of less than 100 officers and probably \nabout 1,000 men. 294. \n\nCol. J. B. Bennett was officer in charge of the air division at \nthat time. 294. \n\nDid not have any combat planes at that time. 294. \n\nHad approximately 100 training planes. 294. \n\nGives history of the development of the aviation section. 295, \n\nHad a number of conferences with Gen. Squier with a view \ntoward having tighter executive control over all the divisions \nof his office. 299. . \n\nThe policy Gen. Squier favored was to place an officer in charge \nof a division of his office, then look to him to go full speed \nahead and accomplish results without coming to him. 299. \n\nCol. Deeds was put in charge of the equipment division and \nvirtually left to carry out his own plans and purposes. 300. \n\nAircraft board was purely advisory. 300. \n\nOther divisions of the office did not get prompt action ; they did \nnot get prompt results from the equipment division. 300-A. \n\nIn November was worried about equipment division and urged \nappointment of a strong executive who would be rather a \ncentral figure down there. Col. Deeds and Col. Montgomery \nappointed Col. Horner to meet this condition. 300-A. \n\nHe strongly urged the appointment of Col. Edgar as executive \nofficer. 302. \n\nGen. Squier was absolutely satisfied with the work of Col. Deeds \nas the head of that division. 302. \n\nKnows of incidents where men who had been in various manu- \nfacturing concerns were permitted to continue their activities \nin transactions of the Government relating to those concerns \nafter thev had been brought into relation with the Signal \nCorps. 305. \n\nEnumerates and explains cases that he knows of. 305-315. \n\nKnows about the acquisition of the General Vehicle Co. 315. \n\nAsked Aircraft Board what object was in taking over plant to \nmake rotary motors when the plan did not call for rotary \n\n\n\n322 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nBrig. Gen. Charles McKinley Saltzman \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nmotors. Was told that this industry must be kept up; that \nit was not known definitely but what we would want rotary \nmotors next year. 316. \nReference to the $250,000 set aside to carry on experimental \nwork on Liberty motor at Packard Co., he is unable to state \nthe occasion for the appointment of a special disbursing \nofficer for that fund. 318. \nSo far as he knows no special disbursing officer was appointed. \nThe entire appropriation was disbursed under four vouchers \xe2\x80\x94 \nBlakely Exhibits Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4. 321. \nAny voucher certified to by Gen. Squire himself or anyone, \ncivilian or officer, to whom he gave that authority to certify \nwas sufficient for any payment within the appropriation. 323. \nLieut. Col. Jesse Gurney Vincent (Washington, D. C, October 1, \n1918; Book 22). \nMakes supplementary statement with regard to vouchers for \npayment to Packard Motor Co. for experimental work on \nLiberty motors. 325. \nTalked with Col. Deeds about it a few minutes last evening. \n\n326. \nStayed with Col. Deeds night before last and last evening at his \n\nresidence. 326. \nCol. Deeds sent Maj. Souther out to see him. Maj. Souther \nmade two trips to the Bureau of Standards and brought with \nhim the second time an officer, a captain, whom he introduced \nto him as one of his assistants who had charge of the placing \nof orders and arranging payments. 325. \nMaj. Souther was one of the men who originally recommended \ngoing ahead with the development of the standardized engine, \nand he followed it very closely up to the time of his death. \n330. \nAsked if the captain to whom he referred was Capt. Elliott, but \n\nis unable to remember the name. 330. \nThis captain was told about the work in connection with the \nvouchers and shown the equipment that had been delivered. \n331. \nWitness was asked " What was the purpose of bringing in a man \nwho was a stranger to the transaction and showing him a lot \nof drawings?" 331. ^ : . \n\nOnly knows what he was told by Maj. Souther as the job was \nput up to him to put the thing through the proper channels. \n332. \nAgain questioned as to method used in arriving at amounts \nshown on vouchers paid Packard Co. in connection with ex- \nperimental work on Liberty motors. 334\xe2\x80\x94353. \nBorglum Exhibit 23- A, a memorandum for Col. Waldon sent \nby Maj. Gray as chief of specification section with respect to \naccessories which should be used on Liberty motor; witness \nhad interview or conversation with Maj. Gray with respect \nto the accessories which were to be used on the first 2.0,000 \nLiberty motors. 353. \nOutlines talks he has had with Col. Deeds about the use of the \nDelco ignition on the Liberty motor. 355. \n\n\n\n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCKAFT INVESTIGATION. 323 \n\nLieut. Col. Jesse Gtjrney Vincent \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nDelco ignition costs approximately $150 a set. 357. \n\nWhen in Washington, Mr. Kettering stayed with him, or stayed \n\nwith Col. Hall and him, who were occupying a suite of rooms \n\nwhich had been reserved by Mr. Deeds at the New Willard \n\nHotel. 358. \n\nCol. Clinton Goodloe Edgar (Washington, D. C, October 1, 1918; \n\nBook 22). \n\nWitness asked to state a little more specifically how Wilbur \nWright Field came to be selected. 359. \n\nGen. Foulois had the sole responsibility of picking out fields. \n362. \n\nCol. Deeds and Mr. Orville Wright took Gen. Foulois and wit- \nness out to this property in an automobile. 365. \n\nCan not state how it happened that 2,500 acres was selected. \n368. \n\nRental was based on acreage. 369. \n\nIn light of his present knowledge thinks 1,300 or 1,400 acres \nwould have been enough. 369. \n\nUnderstood the property was in the ownership of the Miami \nConservency Commission and that arrangement could be \nmade with the Government through one ownership. 370. \n\nMarsh land was transferred back to the State in exchange for \nland at the side. 373. \n\nThinks there is land down there rented by the Government \nthat an airplane could not land on. 378. \n\nHad nothing to do with the selection of McCook Field. 379. \n\nMcCook Field is one of the fields on which no option to pur- \nchase exists. 381. \n\nCol. Deeds told him there would be no option. 381. \n\nAsked as to why he took a lease on a field on which so much \nmoney was to be expended when he did not have an option \nto purchase, witness stated Col. Deeds directed him to do it. \n382. \nHorace B. Wild (Washington, D. C, October 1, 1918; Book 22). \n\nAeronautical engineer. 385. \n\nHas been in that business about 15 years. 385. \n\nHas the third pilot license in the United States, issued by the \nAero Club of America in September, 1910. 386. \n\nMade first flight over Chicago on January 3, 1906. 386. \n\nChief engineer of Illinois Aircraft Corporation. 386. \n\nSpent $25,000 in training organization and building one plane \nfor Government. 388. \n\nCapital stock of company $100,000. 388. \n\nCame to his notice that some of those chaps from Signal Corps \nwere carrying on a system of graft. 390. \n\nMan\'s name was Donohue. He wears captain\'s chevrons now. \n390. \n\nHave made it very unpleasant for him because he tried tc* \nbreak up) work of grafting and padded pay rolls. 393. \n\nIf Mr. Edison S. Williman, 29 South LaSalle Street, Chicago, \nof banking firm of Bowser & Williman, made statement be- \nfore committee, "he would make your hair stand on end." \n394. \n\n\n\n324 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nHorace B. Wild \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\n" They organized the Aircraft Manufacturers\' Association, and \nthe I. W. W., in my estimation, are angels alongside of those \nfellows." 400. \n\nOrville Wright told him a short time ago he had not even been \nconsulted by the Dayton-Wright outfit, 400. \nLester P. Barlow (Washington, D. C, October 1, 1918; Book 22). \n\nWent over to France to conduct tests of the Barlow heavy drop \nbombs in competition with bombs to be furnished by the \nallied government, 418. \n\nDid not see any De Haviland 4\'s over there. Understands \nthere are some over there in storage at Bordeaux. 420. \n\nBombing test was given up as far as dropping any bombs over \nthe German lines was concerned for the simple reason there \nwere no available planes for the work. 424. \n\nThere are about 500,000 shells of the mark 1, 2, and 3 finished \nor being finished in this country, which will not be used, \naccording to latest information from the United States Ord- \nnance Department. 427. \nBrig. Gen. Samuel Tildes Axsell (Washington, D. C. October 2, \n1918; Book 22). \n\nAssigned to duty in office of the Judge Advocate General. 430. \n\nHas no personal recollection of the case of Mr. E. A. Deeds, \nreferred to his office for consideration, although an investi- \ngation might have been made in the office bv an assistant. \n431. \n\nMet Col. Deeds a week ago when he was invited to his home to \nmeet a mutual friend visiting there. 431. \n\nAttention of witness directed to a letter written by Col. Deeds \nto the Aircraft Production Board, dated August 28, 1917, \nstating what he claimed to have been the disposition of certain \ninterests that he had formerly held. 433. \n\nTestimony of Secretary of War before committee was read in \nwhich he stated Col. Deeds, then Mr. Deeds, came to his office \nwith Judge McCann, his legal adviser, relative to straighten- \ning out his business relations before accepting a commission. \nSecretary of War referred them to the Judge Advocate Gen- \neral and stated he had sent word to Judge Ansell. Some days \nlater they (Mr. Deeds and his counsel) came back and said \nthey had fixed up everything to Judge Ansell\'s satisfaction. \n433, 434. \n\nDoes not refresh memory of witness. 434. \n\n"If there was anything written on the subject, and coming that \npointedly to the office \xe2\x80\x94 I should have supposed something \nordinarily would have been written \xe2\x80\x94 it is on the files." 435. \n\nWitness does not recall ever having heard of or having had to \ndeal with any question of stock interest in the United Motors \nCorporation, Dayton Engineering Laboratories Co., Domestic \nBuilding Co., Dayton Metal Product Co., or Dayton- Wright \nAirplane Co. 436. \n\nWitness : " When I got your message this morning, when the \nchief clerk\'s search revealed nothing, I spoke to Gen. Crowder, \nand I found that some time in the spring of this year he had \ntwo officers of the department go over the Inspector General\'s \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 325 \n\nBrig. Gen. Samuel Tilden Ansell \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nreport, and all those officers coupled up that investigation \nwith what palpably this investigating committee wanted to \nknow, and he took charge of that. I was away at that time." \n438. \nCol. Clinton Goodloe Edgar (Washington, D. C, October 2, 1918; \nBook 22). \n\nFound in his files an order of April 28, 1917, ordering him to \nactive duty. Was not in the position of a civilian employee \nbut was a reserve officer on active duty at the time of the trans- \naction of the Wilbur Wright Field. 440. \n\nCopy of report of Maj. Foulois on the inspection of land for \nAviation Service, with recommendations, dated May 11, marked \n" Edgar Exhibit 19, October 2, 1918." 441. \n\nActed with the board but had no official status. 442. \n\nA little disturbed about his memory. 442. \n\nAuthority or request for authority, signed by Gen. Squier, for \nthe renting of site at Dayton \xe2\x80\x94 2,500 acres \xe2\x80\x94 and the authority \nfor building the camp with indorsements through channels \nmarked/\' Edgar Exhibit 20, October 2, 1918." 442. \n\nReceived instructions to acquire the land in question, to take a \nlease for the Government of approximately 2,500 acres, known \nas the Wilbur Wright Field, at a rental of $17,500 per year \nwith the privilege of renewal for three years and the option of \npurchase at $350,000, the cost of crop destruction being \n$75,000. 443. \n\nJudge Hughes: "And the statement in this letter that for the \nconstruction of cantonment buildings, etc., Dayton, Ohio, site \nfor squadron, $1,300,000 ; for roadways, draining and water \nsystem, and the construction of cantonment buildings, was an \nunderestimate ? " 444. \n\nGreat question in mind of witness in regard to those estimates. \nThey proved to be very much underestimated. Does not \ndoubt but what those camps could have been built at the price \nfixed. 444. \n\n505.27 of these acres leased for Wilbur Wright Field later proved \nto be marshy land lying between Erie Railroad and the river. \nThis was withdrawn and an equal value, amounting to 250.47 \nacres, added. Of this amount the commanding officer ap- \nproved 74.94 acres and disapproved 175.53 acres, parts, if not \nall, of which were reported marshy. 447. \n\nThese negotiations were handled by Maj. James S. Holden. \n448. \n\nIn the rush of business turned the real estate matters over to \nMaj. Holden about August, 1917. 452. \n\nJudge Hughes: "And the rental is not $17,500, but $20,000 a \nvear. How do you explain that \xe2\x80\x94 that is, after the first year 1 " \n456. \n\nWitness has no memory on that subject at all. Thinks Maj. \nHolden can clear that up. 456. \n\nHas no further information about Wilbur Wright Field. 456. \n\nLetter from Chief Signal Officer to The Adjutant General rela- \ntive to increase in cost of site for aviation supply depot near \nDayton, Ohio. 460. \n\n\n\n326 ABSTKACT OF AIRCKAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nCol. Clinton Goodloe Edgar \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nJudges Hughes takes up lease of McCook Field made by Dayton \n\nMetal Products Co. to the Government, in which there is no \n\noption to purchase. 464. \nAuthority to lease for rental read into record. 467, 468. \nCol. Deeds had everything to do with the selection of the field, as \n\nfar as he knows. There was no inspection of the field and \n\nno investigation of any sort done by his (witness) section. \n\n469. \nCol. E. A. Deeds (Washington, D. C, October 2, 1918; Book 22). \nBorn on a farm near Granville, Ohio, March 12, 1874. 471. \nFamily name has been Deeds for at least four generations; he \n\nthinks five. 472. \nHas no knowledge of its ever having been Dietz. 472. \nGives briefly his career, including his business relations and ex- \nperience, down to time we entered the war. 472. \nLetter from Secretary of War, dated March 6, asking him to act \n\non Munitions Standard Board, marked " Deeds Exhibit 1, \n\nOctober 2, 1918." 474. \nLetter of acceptance, dated March 10, marked " Deeds Exhibit \n\n2, October 2, 1918." 474. \nTelegram of April 4, sent by Mr. Coffin, asking him to come to \n\nWashington at once, bringing Kettering and Talbott, marked \n\n" Deeds Exhibit 6, October 2, 1918." 475. \nTelegram sent by Mr. Deeds to Mr. Coffin at Darien, Ga., tenta- \ntively declining appointment on an aviation committee, \n\nmarked " Deeds Exhibit 8, October 2, 1918." 480. \nNever knew Mr. Coffin intimately until he came to Washington. \n\nHad had a general acquaintance with him for a number of \n\nyears \xe2\x80\x94 perhaps five. 481. \nWitness was to have been vice president of the Dayton-Wright \n\nAirplane Co. 482. \nMr. Kettering and he owned 120 acres in the field later known \n\nas the McCook Field. 487. \nDayton Metal Products Co. owned remainder of field, approxi- \nmately 80 acres. 487. \nMr. Coffin\'s telegram of May 10, referring to membership on \n\nthe Aircraft Production Board, marked "Deeds Exhibit 9, \n\nOctober 2, 1918." 491. \nMr. Deeds\'s reply, accepting membership and stating he would \n\nbe on hand Tuesday or Wednesday, marked " Deeds Exhibit \n\n10, October 2, 1918:" 492. \nWas formally appointed on the Aircraft Production Board \n\nMay 17. 492. \nCommission in Army was dated August 15. 494. \nOn August 2 was made active chief of the Equipment Division, \n\nAviation Section, Signal Corps. 495.^ \nDid not act in any way in connection with the Signal Corps as \n\na representative of the Chief Signal Officer. 495. \nHas had no authority from Chief Signal Officer to do anything \n\nin connection with the obtaining or the settlement of terms \n\nof contracts. 496. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 327 \n\nCol. E. A. Deeds \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nEquipment Division reorganized on August 29; Finance and \nSupply Division was consolidated with the Equipment Divi- \nsion. Witness continued in charge of division until January \n14. 499. \n\nOn January 14 was assigned to duty in the executive division of \nthe Signal Corps. 500. \n\nRelieved from duty in executive division on May 22. 501. \n\nDoes not know how H. E. Talbott, jr., happened to be on the \nflying fields committee, a subcommittee of the National Ad- \nvisory Committee for Aeronautics. Does not think him quali- \nfied for that. 503. \n\nJudge Hughes : " How was it you came to serve upon a commit- \ntee on fuses when you were contemplating contracts with the \nGovernment through your Dayton Metal Products Co. for the \nmanufacture of fuses ? " \n\nWitness : " We were asked to come here and serve on that \ncommittee, and accepted the service, as a great many other \nmen did." 512. \n\nPages 512-522 are devoted to interrogations and replies relative \nto Col. Deed\'s connection with the Munitions Board and the \nminutes of the Aircraft Production Board under date of May 29, \n1917, in which the board goes on record as favoring a contract- \nwherein a maximum price is established. Witness unable to \noffer a satisfactory explanation of his action in the matter. \n\nMr. Kettering first came to the Cash Register Co. when witness \nwas vice president about 10 years ago. 522. \n\nWitness first, took up with Mr. Kettering a definite venture in \nwhich they were jointly interested in 1909, 1910, or 1911. 523. \n\nWere equal owners of the stock of the Dayton Engineering \nLaboratories Co., known as the Delco Co. 526. " \n\nThere was a time when the control of this organization was sold \nto the United Motors Co. 525. \n\nSale of this stock to the United Motors Co. gave both Mr. Ket- \ntering and witness several million dollars. 530. \n\nHas been associated with Mr. Kettering in various enterprises, \nborrowing money, advancing money, and making investments \non equal shares and is so associated to-day. 530. \n\nBoth have a common agent, Mr. George B. Smith, who signs \nchecks for both. 530. \n\nMr. Smith is a highly confidential and trusted agent for both of \nthem in all their undertakings. 531. \n\nThe Dayton Metal Products Co., Mr. Talbott, and Mr. Ketter- \ning, and Mr. Smith have their offices in a remodeled-private \nhouse on the corner of First and Ludlow, Dayton, Ohio. Also \nMr. Deeds. 531-532. \n\nFirst became associated with Mr. Talbott in a business way at \nthe time of the organization of the Dayton Metal Products \nCo. in the fall of 1915. 532. \n\nCompany was organized to build Russian detonators. 535. \n\nIn latter part of March, 1917, company received contracts from \nUnited States Government for detonators. 536. \n\nCompany accumulated a surplus in excess of $2,000,000. 536. \n\nNames some of the other enterprises in which he was associated \nwith Mr. Kettering. 538. \n\n\n\n328 ABSTKACT OF AIKCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nCol. E. A. Deeds \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nWitness and Mr. Kettering still own equal shares of the Domes- \ntic Building Co. 540. \n\nWitness and Mr. Kettering in the Moraine Development Co. \n541. \n\nOwn practically one-half of the company. 542. \n\nThe Moraine Development owned the land on which the present \nplant of the Dayton-Wright Airplane Co. has been built. 542. \n\nStill holds his interest in the Moraine Development Co. 543. \n\nGave his interest of 17,500 shares of the United Motors Co. to \nMrs. Deeds. 544. \n\nIndorsed the certificates of transfer on October 13, 1917. 545. \n\nAsked Judge McCann to come to Washington to take up his \nlegal status here as a member of the Aircraft Production \nBoard and also of the Army and do whatever was necessary \nin connection therewith to make his status right. 550. \n^ Told Secretary of War he had had a relationship with the Day- \nton-Wright Co., and might be subject to criticism on that \naccount. 552. \n\nHas a hazy recollection that he did see Judge Ansell. 553. \n\nDoes not remember going to Judge Ansell\'s office with Judge \nMcCann. 558. \n\nJudge McCann did not have anything to do with the actual \ntransfer of any of his interests. 560. \n\nJudge McCann drew letter sent to the Aircraft Production \nBoard. 561. \n\nStatement of facts contained in that letter were based on state- \nments made to Judge McCann by witness as he had no per- \nsonal knowledge of the transaction. 562. \n\nTold Judge McCann that Mr. Kettering has taken his interests \nin the Domestic Building Co. when he had not. 563. \n\nJudge Hughes : " The letter that you addressed and signed \nto the Aircraft Production Board said that you had made a \nbona fide transfer of that stock." 566. \n\nPuts responsibility for that statement upon Judge McCann. 566. \n\nHas never parted with stock of Domestic Building Co. 568. \n/ Judge Hughes : " In other words, you were willing to state, \nand did state, that an actual bona fide transfer had been made, \nwhen all that had been done was an arrangement that a trans- \nfer would be made if it was found to be necessary to make it? \nThat is plain English, is it not? " \n\nWitness : " That is exactly what it was." 568. \n\nIt may have been in September or October that it was decided \nthe Dayton- Wright Co. should buy the Domestic Building \nCo.\'s plant, 570. \n\nThe transfer by which the Domestic Building Co. purported to \ntransfer to the Talbotts and Mr. Kettering was closed up and \nnotes given in November, 1917. 570. \n\nSalary of witness in Delco Co. was $60,000 a year. 574. \n\nSalary of witness in Dayton Metal Products Co. was $25,000 a \nyear. 574. \n\nDrew salary from Delco Co. up until some time in August. 575, \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 329 \n\nCol. E. A. Deeds \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nThe actual certificates for the transfer of 38 shares of preferred \nstock in the Delco Co. were transferred to Mr. Kettering on \nOctober 13, 1917. 575. \n\nDayton- Wright Airplane Co. was incorporated in April, 1917, \nand witness was one of the incorporators. 578. \n\nWas not a subscriber for stock. 580. \n\nWas not aware until this last May that the entire capitol stock, \nwith exception of five qualifying shares, of the Dayton- \nWright Co. were subsequently acquired by the Dayton Metal \nProducts Co. 580. \n\nThis transaction took place at the end of November or the be- \nginning of December, 1917. 581. \n\nLearned in the fall of 1917 that the Dayton Metal Products Co. \nhad become the owner of the Dayton-Wright Airplane Co. \n586. \n\nWitness question as to the finances of the Dayton-Wright Co., \ninvolving the Domestic Building Co. and the Moraine Devel- \nopment Co. 590, 605. \n\nThe Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. was a new organization that \nhad no financial backing whatever except that which the Tal- \nbotts and Kettering gave it, either directly or through the \nDayton Metal Products Co. 605. \n\nWitness: "That Munitions Board was the English board \nthat I had in mind at that time." 606. \n\nFirst became interested in the acquisition of the Wilbur Wright \nField by the Government as a flying field about April 24. \n607. \n\nAbout April 24 sent an engineer of the Miami conservancy dis- \ntrict to confer with Mr. Waldon regarding the lands of the \nMiami conservancy district, the Wilbur Wright Field now \noccupying part of those lands. 607. \n\nOn May 7 Maj. Foulois and Capt. Edgar came to Dayton to \nlook over the conservancy lands. 608. \n\nExtract from telegram of Mr. Deeds to Mr. Kuhns, secretary \nof Miami conservancy district: "Subject of our trip yester- \nday moving very rapidly and very satisfactory. There is no \ndoubt in my mind but what we will be successful." 611. \n\nThought there was no doubt but what Government would make \nuse of the fields. 611. \n\nAnother extract from same telegram : " Avoidance of publicity \nvery essential. Inspection will be made end of this week or \nfirst of next. You and Morgan must plan now as though it \nwas decided." 612. \n\nMeant in matter of publicity because " we " had not yet ac- \nquired contracts of purchases and options on all the property. \n612. \n\nJudge Hughes : " You seem to have been quite busy tele- \ngraphing on April 30, 1917, for there is another telegram to \nEzra Kuhns on the same day, in the course of which you sav, \n"Publicity will follow these instructions, and no one outside \nof Signal Corps officers know of our plan for a larger school, \nand so far as everyone is concerned, the Dayton school is \nthe Wright Field Civilian School.\' " 618. \n\n\n\n330 ABSTKACT OF AIKCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nCol. E. A. Deeds \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nJudge Hughes : " On May 11, 1917. That is the same date as \nthe date of Maj. Foulois\'s report. Mr. Talbott telegraphed \nas follows: \'Contracts remaining unsecured to cover 2.500 \nacres will be closed by to-morrow evening. Will start Mon- \nday on immediate possession of land so the fields will be \nready when buildings are finished.\' " 625. \n\nOn May 12, Mr. Deeds telegraphed Mr. Talbott as follows: \n" Suggest Kuhns, Emmett, Grant, and Brown be here Monday \nmorning for conference on conservancy, bringing description \nof entire 2,500. Tax value and tax rate of property under dis- \ncussion will be helpful. Publicity can be delayed at this end \nwithout difficulty. Everything moving nicely." 626. \n\nWitness questioned as to how he knew 2,500 acres had been \nagreed upon. 627-628. \n\nCapt. Edgar asked him who would be a good contractor in Day- \nton, and he recommended the Dayton Lumber & Manufactur- \ning Co. 632. \n\nMr. Talbott had not informed him of the arrangements that had \nbeen made for obtaining the control of the stock of the Day- \nton Lumber & Manufacturing Co. 634. \n\nQuestioned as to his connection in securing contract for Mr. \nKing, president of Davton Lumber & Manufacturing Co. \n636-640. \n\nNever made any inquiry to find out who was the real party in- \nterested in that contract. 648. \n\nKnew Mr. Talbott had given financial assistance to the Dayton \nLumber & Manufacturing Co. to the extent of $400,000. *650. \n\nHad never heard that the Dayton Lumber & Manufacturing Co. T \nthrough Mr. Kind, proved to be an unsatisfactorv contractor. \n669. \n\nCol. Edgar told him it was an unsatisfactory contract. 669. \n\nCol. Vincent and Col. Clark recommended South Field. 670. \n\nPrivilege of purchasing was left out of lease on South Field be- \ncause it was onlv looked upon as a temporary arrangement. \n673. \n\nWitness owns South Field individually. 673. \n\nMr. Talbott and Mr. Kettering had shown what is now McCook \nField to Col. Clark and Maj. Vincent, and they had decided, \neverything considered, that was a much better location. 676. \n\nThe Wright Field, or McCook Field as it is now called, was a \ntract of 210 acres ; 120 belonging to Mr. Kettering and witness, \nthe remaining belonging to the Dayton Metal Products Co. \n676. \n\nLease on that field was recommended by Clark and Vincent. \n678. \n\nDoes not know what part he played in determining the terms of \nthe lease. 681. \n\nHad sold his interest to Mr. Kettering, who later sold it to the \nDayton Metal Products Co. (681). \n\nEemember Col. Edgar saying the Government did not want to \nbuy it. 686. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 331 \n\n\xe2\x82\xacol. E. A. Deeds \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nJudge Hughes : " Our information is just the contrary, that \nit was refused. Do you have a recollection definitely about \nabout that, that you are prepared to testify to ?" 686. \n\nDid not want an option given. 688. \n\nGave Col. Clark a letter to take to Mr. Kettering relative to \nMoraine (South) Field. 692. \n\nMoraine Field was abandoned because of the opposition to the \nDayton Wright Co. 698. \n\nWitness : " It may seem a little strange, but I am not a great \nman on the financial end. I would a great deal rather work \nin the factory on the production engineering, which is my line \nof work, which I enjoy. I have left this other matter to Mr. \nSmith, who has really handled all those things; and I think \nhe keeps them straight, and we abide by his decision." 708. \n\nHas never gone through the account relative to transfer of his \ninterests in McCook Field to Mr. Kettering. 709. \n\nKelied on Mr. Smart and George Smith for the facts. 710. \n\nJudge Hughes: "You have such confidence in them (Tal- \nbotts and Kettering) and in your confidential representative, \nMr. Smith, who also represents Mr. Kettering, that you are \nwilling to have these statements made up and passed by Mr. \nSmith and adopted without a personal knowledge of the ac- \ncuracy ? " \n\nWitness : " Yes, sir ; that is right." 710. \n\nLeased South field to Dayton- Wright Co. at rental of $1 per \nyear. 712. \n\nWent over exhibits with Mr. Smith, which he submitted to com- \nmittee. 719. \n\nNot prepared to testify that he knew when his salary with the \nDayton Metal Products Co. stopped. 724. \n\nAsked if there was any reason he wanted to get out of the Day- \nton Metal Products besides the fact that there might be Gov- \nernment contracts, witness replied, "Yes; there was a real, \nintimate reason, which I do not know as I would care to \nstate on the record, but there was a whole change in our fam- \nily affairs after the death of the younger boy, and I had a real \ndesire to get out of a good many things at that time." 726. \n\nWanted to get out of everything as far as possible, except the \nDomestic Engineering Co. 728. \n\nDoes not think he has ever seen the notes given for his stock in \nthe Dayton Metal Products Co. 731. \n\nNever recognized he had any Government connection of any \nconsequence until he was brought into the aircraft situation. \n736. \n\nWitness would not swear that the minute book of the Dayton \nMetal Products Co. was accurate. 738. \n\nHas not observed the apparent changes and apparent removals \nof portions of minutes and substitutions of others in this book. \n738. \n\nJudge Hughes : " Now, if that is a correct copy of the minutes of \nMay 21, 1917, of the board of directors of the Dayton Metal \nProducts Co., which is now being shown you, will you testify \nwhether you were in Dayton on May 21, 1917, and at such a \nmeeting?" 740. \n\n\n\n332 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nCol. E. A. Deeds \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nWitness : " No ; I will not." 741. \nWitness was in Washington from May 18 to 23. 749. \nCol. E. A. Deeds (Department of Justice, October 3, 1918; Book 23). \nTook steps to locate or procure proper sources of supply; this \n\nbefore he became chief of the Equipment Division. 1. \nGet what information they could get quickly on the existing \n\nplants that had built aircraft. 1. \nContracts placed in a small way at the beginning of the forma- \ntion of the board. 2. \nThe chief contracts for the production of the Curtiss type \nor the JN-4, and the Standard type or the SJ-1 were placed, \nthe Curtiss type with the Curtiss Co. and the Standard type \nwith the Standard Aircraft Corporation, and the Dayton- \nWright Co. at Dayton, and the Fisher Body Corporation in \nDetroit. 2. \nThinks, as a member of the board, he recommended that these \norders for the Standard J be placed as mentioned on page \n3. 4. \nHis attention called to a letter written by him to Mr. Kettering, \nJune 13, 1917, in which he tells him that he will be interested \nin knowing that the Standard training machine is going to be \ncalled the U. S. primary training, and will not be called the \nCurtiss J\'N, etc. 9. \nAsked what was the occasion of that statement to Mr. Ketter- \ning at that time. 9. \nHis attention called to the fact that further extracts from the \nletter would indicate that he was going to tell him what had \nbeen done, rather than to seek advice in an unsettled matter. \nThe Hall- Scott engine had always been used in the \'Standard \nplane, but he is unable to say how many Standard planes had \nbeen built prior to June, 1917. Maybe 12 ; perhaps only 5. 13. \nMr. Kettering advised the continued use of the Hall-Scott en- \ngine with the Standard plane. 14. \nStates that the Wright-Martin Co., on the Pacific coast, had used \n\nthe Hall-Scott engine. 15. \nReminded that the Joint Army and Navy Technical Board gave \ntheir approval reluctantly to the use of the Hall- Scott, and \nthen only for a temporary use. 17. \nHe wanted the Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. to have the con- \ntract, because of the fact that they were a concern who would \ncome through. 18. \nThe first contract, under date of August 1, 1917, with the Day- \nton-Wright Airplane Co., was for 400 Standard Js. 20. \nThis contract merged into another with the Dayton-Wright Air- \nplane Co., under date of September 7, 1917, for 400 Standard \nJs, 1,500 Martynsides, and 2,000 De Haviland 9s. 21. \nOvercome their reluctance to take such a large contract by Sep- \ntember 7. 22. \nThey were so reluctant in the matter that they were going \nahead and working on the first model that arrived in this \ncountry. 22. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIKCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 333 \n\nCol. E. A. Deeds \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nHe was anxious to have the Fisher Body Corporation take a \ncontract because he looked upon them as one of the best pro- \nducing concerns of their kind in existence. 26. \n\nNo, they had never built any airplanes, no airplane engineer on \nthe staff, and had no experience whatever. 26. \n\nHis idea was that if the Dayton-Wright Airplane Co. could \ndo the engineering and turn over a finished product to the \nFisher Body Corporation, and then they could work to- \ngether afterwards. 27. \n\nYes; admits that the Government in their contract specified \nthat the drawings and specifications should be furnished to \nthe Dayton-Wright Airplane Co. by the Government. 28. \n\nMakes the statement that the drawings were produced by the \nGovernment in the experimental department of the Dayton- \nWright Airplane Co. and supplied both to the Day ton- Wright \nAirplane Co., and to the Fisher Body Corporation. 29. \n\nHas to take this statement back. 29 \n\nThe Government did not furnish complete drawings in either \nthe case of the DH 4s or the Standard J planes; it was left \nto the Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. to work out itself. 30. \n\nThe Government, it is supposed, with all its power and re- \nsources was unable to provide facilities which this new Day- \nton-Wright Airplane Co., with no capital stock paid up and no \nmoney except that it could borrow from Mr. Talbott and Mr. \nKettering, was able to provide those facilities. 31. \n\nThe Government had to rely upon this little organization at \nDayton to establish the drawings and designs. 32. \n\nAsked if that was his conception of his duty and power and re- \nsponsibilities as chief of the Equipment Division of the Sig- \nnal Corps. 32. \n\nStates that the Fisher Body Corporation kept men at the ex- \nperimental plant of the Dayton-Wright Airplane Co., and \nthere was constant going back and forth between Dayton and \nDetroit so as to keep in touch. 34. \n\nIs reminded that the officials of the Fisher Body Corporation \nmade the statement that the going to and fro from Dayton \nwas in the vain endeavor to get drawings, without which \nthey could not proceed to produce. 34. \n\nAsked why he didn\'t emplo}^ the resources of the Singer Man- \nufacturing Co. 34. \n\nHe states they, in the first place, did not want an order. 35. \n\nAsked to swear to this ; anyway he had questions in his mind (the \npresident or vice president of the Singer Manufacturing Co.) \nand he did not want to take an order for an airplane unless \nit was absolutely necessary. 35. \n\nAsked if the Singer Manufacturing Co. did not offer in writing \nthe facilities of this company to the Government and to build \nwhatever the Government wanted them to build. 35. \n\nMr. Deeds considered that the Singer Manufacturing Co. was \nan ideal place for a supply of pistols or something of that \nkind, but to get into airplanes they were not fitted for that* \n36. \n\nAsked as to the inconsistencv of his remarks. 36. \n\n\n\n334 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". \n\nCol. E. A. Deeds \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nDid not think they were suited for the work, and yet lie wanted \nthem to take the contract. 37. \n\nIt was among the three or four in the country that were best \nequipped for this work. 38. \n\nThe thought was to ultimately get around to the Singer Sew- \ning Machine Co. and the Pullman Co. 39. \n\nAsked why they did not give a contract to the Pullman Co. 42. \n\nThought they could be added sometime when there had been \nsomething specifically developed. 42. \n\nAsked if it was possible that the Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. \nwas a monopolist of facilities for the production of draw- \nings. 45. \n\nThe Government had an airplane engineering department and \nthe}^ made the drawings for the Bristol, and were not suc- \ncessful, therefore the Government did not have a department \nto do this kind of work. 45-4(1 \n\nConfronted with the statement that he did not establish a de- \npartment that was competent to do it. 46. \n\nYes; the Dayton- Wright Airplane Co.. organized in April, 1917, \nwas left with the work of designing and completing the \nDe Haviland 4. 47. \n\nAnd then the company in its turn charged the Signal Corps \nwith failure to give it the drawings it needed and the informa- \ntion it needed to complete the work, and charged to that \nfailure the delays in production. 47. \n\nAsked if he was aware of that. 47. \n\nAsked if it did not result in this : The Day ton- Wright Airplane \nCo. said to the Signal Corps, " You give us the drawings," \nand the Signal Corps said to the Dayton- Wright Airplane \nCo., " You are to make them,*\' and the Dayton- Wright Air- \nplane Co. said, "We can not," and the Government said, \n" Neither can we," and production was at a standstill. 47-48. \n\nAsked why he drew a contract stipulating that the Government \nwould furnish the drawings, when he knew that the Dayton- \nWright Airplane Co. was going to make them themselves. 48. \n\nLays it onto Col. Montgomery. \n\nOne reason for the preference given to the Dayton-Wright Air- \nplane Co. was that he depended upon Orville Wright and the \nmen who had grown up with him \xe2\x80\x94 Jacobs and other men of \nthat kind. 50. (As adding to the facilities of the plant.) \n\nThought he was competent to design a De Haviland machine, but \nknew he was competent to rearrange the De Haviland machine \nfor receiving the Liberty engine. 51. \n\nAsked why he did not hire him for the Government then. 52. \nIt never occurred to him. \n\nIs told that the engineer of the Dayton- Wright Airplane Co. \ntestified, and this, is abundantly supported by facts, that \nOrville Wright had virtuallv nothing to do with the produc- \ntion of the DH-4. 53. \n\nAsked why he left him with the Dayton-Wright Airplane Co. \nfor the purpose of doing something which that company had \nnot contracted to undertake. 53. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 335 \n\nCol. E. A. Deeds \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nAsked if he knew the salary of Mr. Talbott, sr., to which he \nreplied, " No ; never knew." 78. \n\nPresumed they were charging their salaries to the Government \nexpense as a part of their overhead. 79. \n\nBut never thought of it. 80. \n\nHad no explanation to make of the situation that developed with \nregard to all these high salaries being charged to the Govern- \nment, as he had never heard of their salaries. 83-84. \n\nAsked with regard to the " confidential telegrams." 86. \n\nIs given an illustration of one of these " confidential telegrams " \nwhich amounted to an inside " tip." 88-89. \n\nAsked for a full explanation of his conduct in the matter. 89 \nto 93. \n\nHis attention called to Blakeley Exhibit 1, to the Packard Motor \nCar Co. for $104,500, which appears to have been certified by \nhim. 97. \n\nFinally has a recollection of the matter. 100. \n\nHelped put the voucher through. 100. \n\nAs he understands his position now, does not suppose it was \nwithin his authority to sign vouchers. 101. \n\nDoes not know how many vouchers he ma}^ have signed. 101. \n\nAsked about another voucher, Blakeley Exhibit 3. for $60,000 to \nthe Packard Co. 104. \n\nAs no per or any initials opposite; seems to have been a plain \nsignature in his name. 104. \n\nIs read minutes of Aircraft Production Board of meeting on \nJune 8, 1917, in which it recommended to the Chief Signal \nOfficer of the Signal Corps that the sum of $250,000 be set aside \nto carry on this work, etc. 108. \n\nPlaced this work with the Packard Motor Car Co. after this \nresolution. 108. \n\nIs shown letter attached to voucher, inclosing bills from the \nPackard Co. for the last 8-cylinder engines, etc., with recapitu- \nlation of the material, etc., direct expense and overhead, and \nwith 12^ per cent profit added. 109. \n\nThis amounted to $249,159.10. 110. \n\nHe is the one upon whom they relied to certify that these figures \nwere accurate and he in turn relied upon Maj. Vincent. 110. \n\nDid ,not understand at the time that the Government could only \npay for specific things. 113. \n\nThey did not have the items of the various work and services in- \ncluded in the voucher ; just made a general estimate. 113. \n\nAsked if, as a man of business, he did not know that the Govern- \nment was not paying out money on a cost contract under a \ngeneral estimate. 117. \n\nStates if there had been any irregularity in that respect it would \nhave been caught in the finance division. Asked if he was \nnot the catcher on that nine. 117. \n\nIs confronted with the statement that he knows well enough that \nit never went to the finance division. 117. \n\nHe did not show the voucher to anybody; just signed it and sent \nit to the paymaster and it was paid, he admits. 118. \n\nIs asked regarding the accessories for the Liberty motor. 120. \n130687\xe2\x80\x9419 22 \n\n\n\n336 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nCol. E. A. Deeds \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nWith regard to the various programs gotten up specifying so \nmany machines for this month and so many for the next, says \nthere was a lot of prophecy about the dates, and they may have \nbeen expectations. 130. \n\nHis attention called to McConaughy Exhibit 1 which was laid \nbefore the Secretary of War in the examination he underwent, \nand is told that Mr. Baker said they did not issue this state- \nment until he understood it was verified by Col. Deeds and \nGen. Squier. 135-136. \n\nDid not know that he was verifying this as for the Secretary of \nWar. 137. \n\nKnew, though, that he was a representative of the Committee on \nPublic Information. 137. \n\nAsked why, in testimony before the Senate committee on April \n2, 1918, he replied to Senator Wadsworth that he never saw \nit and did not know of anybody seeing it. 140. \n\nFurther says to Senator Wadsworth that neither he nor any \nother officer of the department consulted with Secretary Baker \nbefore he made this statement. 141-142. \n\nRemembers some indefinite conversation with some one from the \nBureau of Public Information, but he did not say a thing that \nwould justify the statement that they were five months ahead \nof the program. 143. \n\nSaid the first of it he knew was when he saw it in the papers. \n144. \n\nNo effort made that he knew of to find the source of the informa- \ntion which the Secretary of War took as reliable and put his \nsignature to. 144. \n\nDenies the conversation with Mr. Pew, who testified that Col. \nDeeds told him that there had been a shipment abroad, that \nthey were now on the water en route to France. Maybe 10 \xe2\x80\x94 \nperhaps a dozen \xe2\x80\x94 also denies he said the same thing to Mr. \nMcConaughy, who testified that he told him the same things \nas told to Mr. Pew. 147 to 149. \n\nSwears that he did not say that to either one of them. 149. \n\nAt the time this statement was made \xe2\x80\x94 published in the papers \non February 21, 1918 \xe2\x80\x94 he had been advised by Mr. Talbott \nthat the first 100 De Havilands were to remain here, and he \nhad been asked to recall the single one that had been shipped \nfor foreign service. 153. \n\nIs asked to explain this. 153. \n\nIs given summary of the various points of destination for the \nfirst shipments, which shows that on April 3, 1918, was the \ndate of the shipment of one uncompleted plane to France. \n155. \n\nAdmits that on February 21, 1918, there were no planes on the \nwater en route to France. 155. \n\nHe said he did not mention that they were on the water \xe2\x80\x94 just \nthat they were shipped. 156. \n\nAfter dodging the question from all sides, admits that a state- \nment authorized by the Secretary of War is a statement with \nofficial authority, and if he had any place at all as an officer of \nthe Army, and had judgment enough to fill any office in the \nGovernment he should have known it. 161. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 337 \n\nOrville Wright (October 3, 1918; Book 23). \n\nBeen interested in aviation matters since 1896. 175. \n\nStates his experience. 175. \n\nSold his stock in the Wright Co. in 1915 to New York capitalists. \n176. \n\nIn the early part of 1917 Mr. Deeds organized a company with \nMr. Kettering and the Messrs. Talbott to carry out some ex- \nperiments of Mr. Wright\'s, this company at first called the \nDayton Airplane Co. 180. \n\nPut up several buildings on what is known as the South Field? \nwhich was owned by Col. Deeds. 180. \n\nBuilt, he thinks, four hangars and a machine shop. 181. \n\nThe principal work he did on the De Haviland 4s was in pre- \nventing changes being made, following closely as possible the \noriginal machine. 185. \n\nThis all with reference to the model. After the model was com- \npleted he had practically nothing to do with the plant. 185 \n\nStates this model was flown about the end of October, 1917. 186. \n\nSince the model was completed, he has given his time up to* \nthe present to certain experimental engineering being con- \nducted at South Field. 188. \n\nHad nothing to do with the redesigning of the Bristol, or with \nthe Spad. 189. \n\nWas only consulted about the Bristol on propellers. 190. \n\nCol. Hall came to him about this matter. 190. \n\nHad nothing to do with the Standard J planes. 192. \n\nWas not employed by the Government or retained on behalf of \nthe Government. 193. \n\nWas at Dayton all through the fall of 1917. 193. \nDavid Wood Sowers (October 3, 1918; Book 23). \n\nResidence, Buffalo. \n\nPresident, Sowers Manufacturing Co. \n\nMakes statement of his own accord regarding the Niagara \nFrontier Defense League. 195. \n\nTheir organization had nothing to with the cost- accounting \nsystem at the North Elmwood plant. 223. \nJohn Creeps Wickliffe (October 4, 1918; Book 23). \n\nProduction expert, Bureau of Aircraft Production. 341. \n\nBecame associated with the Government February 25, 1918. 341. \n\nPrior to that, secretary of C. C. Mengel & Bros. Co. 341. \n\nMengel & Bros. Co. manufactured mahogany and walnut lum- \nber and veneers. 341. \n\nBeen connected with that company 15 years. 342. \n\nSold out their interests in the Mengel Co. when he came to \nWashington to take a place with the Government. 344. \n\nHis firm dealt both in Central American and African mahog- \nany. 346. \n\nHad contracts with persons in Central America for getting out \nmahogany, and also had rights in Africa, or concessions. 346. \n\nStates the firms who were represented at the meeting to form an \nassociation of mahogany manufacturers and importers. 349. \n\nMinutes from the different meetings gone over. 358 to \xe2\x80\x94 . \n\nOther minutes read. 370-375. \n\n\n\n338 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". \n\nJohn Creeps Wickliffe \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nFurther minutes. 377-381. \n\nThese minutes marked collectively " Wickliffe Exhibit 1, October \n4, 1918." \n\nWas a matter of negotiation with the Government for five or \nsix weeks. 386. \n\nIs shown resolution presented on January 31, 1918, to the war \ncommittee, marked " Wickliffe Exhibit No. 2, October 4, \n1918,;\' 386. \n\nMr. Wickliffe states that in this resolution it will be noticed \nthat they left the fixing of any price to the Government. 387. \n\nUp to this time African mahogany had not been involved in the \nproposition. 387. \n\nMr. Wickliffe prepared a statement of costs at New Orleans, \nNew York, and Louisville, respectively, on behalf of the as- \nsociation for submission to the Government. 388. \n\nThis marked " Exhibit 5, October 4, 1918"." 389. \n\nThis statement prepared early in February. 389. \n\nDown until the latter part of February he was in active associa- \ntion with the committee, the war committee of the mahogany \nassociation, and with the corporation C. C. Mengel Bros. Co., \nof which he was secretary then. 392. \n\nResigned as secretary of the Mengel Co. on February 23. 393. \n\nAsked as to the matter which left the negotiations so long in \nabeyance. 396. \n\nRelates the incidents in connection with the proposition that he \nshould become connected with the Government service in the \nhardwood section. 399-404. \n\nAsked how long the compensation at the rate of $4,000 per \nannum from the Government continued. 404. \n\nLetter is read from Bureau of Aircraft Production, which re- \nquests him to cease accepting a salary from the Mahogany & \nImporters\' Association. 406. \n\nLetter is read in which he does as above requested. 407. \n\nHe received through Mengel Bros. & Co. $500 per month. 409. \n\nPaid by the Mahogany Manufacturers & Importers\' Associa- \ntion the rate of $350 per month from April 1, 1918, down to \nAugust 1. 412. \n\nWas asked if he knew that prior to the date of the letter of \nAugust 20 (p. 407) this subject had been the subject of in- \nquiry by the Federal authorities. 431. \n\nRelates conversation he had with Mr. Mengel regarding the \ncontinuance of his compensation in the company after he went \ninto the service of the Government. 432. \n\nAfter he finds out what the Government is to pay him, he writes \nMr. Mengel to cut down the allowance from $500 to $350, and \nhe would remit the difference. 435. \n\nIs asked to produce copy of the letter to Mr. Mengel and also a \nlittle statement of the receipts of money and the return of the \namounts he referred to. 436. \n\nStates he was not connected with the negotiations of the meet- \nings in any but a subordinate way. 437. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 339 \n\nJohn Creeps Wickliffe \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nS. B. Vrooman, jr., son of S. B. Vrooman, at the head of S. B. \nVrooman Co., one of the members of the association, is chief \ninspector of the wood section of the Bureau of Aircraft Pro- \nduction. 442. \n\nThen, with reference to the meeting of conference of the ma- \nhogany manufacturers, "Williams Exhibit 11" (see p. 438), \nthe only persons representing the Government were Mr. Wil- \nliams, Mr. Vrooman, jr., and Mr. Wickliffe. 443. \n\nMr. Vrooman was called in upon a matter of inspection. 443. \n\nFirst definite statement from the production engineering depart- \nment that authorized quarter-sawed white oak that he ever \nfound was under date of May 23. 470. \n\nMr. Wickliffe produces letter from Mr. Day regarding the use \nof white-oak propellers and finding them unsatisfactory. 474. \n\nProduces letter showing the French were using African ma- \nhogany. 478, \n\nWalter C. Marmon (October 4, 1918; Book 23). \n\nPresident of the Nordyke & Marmon Co. 495. \n\nReceived a contract for the Hall Scott engines, which was signed \nup some time in July. 496. \n\nFixed-price contract at $2,366 an engine. 496. \n\nOriginal contract called for deliveries to be completed on Janu- \nary 15. 497. \n\nShipped the last one on May 3. 497. \n\nGives copy of brief they received for a 90-day extension on ac- \ncount of the reasons they gave for the delay. 497. \n\nThis brief marked " W. C. Marmon Exhibit 1, October 4, 1918.\' r \n498. \n\nThe brief, pages 498 to 527. \n\nNow makes a verbal statement of the reasons for delay in the \ndelivery of the engines. 527-531. \n\nThe next contract is for 3,000 Liberty engines. 531. \n\nThis contract dated September 28, 1917, order No. 10449. 531. \n\nAsked why they took such a contract of such importance to the \ncountry when they did not have the facilities to perform it, \nthe acquiring of which took over a year. 543. \n\nStates they were not seeking the Liberty contract. 544. \n\nThe proposition was put up to them by Col. Waldon, Col. Deeds, \nand Col. Montgomery. 544. \n\nTheir knowledge of how to make gasoline internal-combustion \nengines was considered of greater advantage than facilities. \n545. \n\nFirst advance was a war-credits advance and an agreement to \nbuy certain of the machine-tool equipment. 547. \n\nStates the agreement to install machinery and tools in his plant \non the part of the Government to the extent of a million dol- \nlars is correct. 547. \n\nThe Government up to August 28 had paid $963,323.33 for \ntools and machinery. 548. \n\nPayment of $64,878.71 for testing equipment. 548. \n\nOne-half million was advanced on the Hall Scott, which has \nbeen paid back. 550. \n\n\n\n340 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nWalter C. Marmon \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nAmount authorized for Liberty contract was $2,000,000. the \n\ncontract calling for the fixed profit to be credited against \n\nthat. 550. \nAbout $35,000 or $40,000 had been credited in this way. 551. \nThe fixed-price contract was entered into on the 31st of August, \n\n1918, at $4,000. 552. \nThe contract. Pages 553 to 559. \nAsked Avhy they changed the contract to one for a fixed profit \n\nat $4,000. 587. \nPay the Government 5 per cent on the $2,000,000 advanced. \n\n594. \nOn appraisement they are to get three-fifths of the depreciation \n\non the cost of that part of the investment made for the Hall \n\nScott. 594. \nAsked why real estate was included in the depreciation clause \n\nin paragraph B exclusive of buildings and land. 596. \nDid not know that was in there. 596. \nProduces statement showing payments that have been made to \n\nthe Government. 598. \nThis paper marked " W. C. Marmon Exhibit 3, October 3, \n\n1918." 598. \nIs asked to give a statement as to what he understood he was \n\ndoing when he made the agreement with the Government for \n\ndepreciation in the new contract which provided a fixed price. \n\n601. \nStates their intention in regard to depreciation was to be paid \n\nthe difference between the cost of the investment made in \n\nplant by their company for purposes of producing the Liberty \n\nmotor, plus three-fifths of the cost of the plant erected for \n\nproducing Hall Scott motors, and the fair market value of the \n\nabove-described part of their plant at the end of the con- \ntract. 601. \nSubmits letter to the Attorney General, being a statement of \n\nthe list of the stockholders of their company, under date of \n\nJune 11, 1918. 601-608. \nThis also contains details of payment by the Government on \n\nLiberty motors, and details of payment by the Government \n\non Hall Scott engines shipped. 60*5. \nAlso causes contributing directly and materially to delays in \n\nthe production of Liberty motors. 606. \nAlso factory statement showing the shipment to Hall Scott and \n\ndetailed pavment and amounts of advances also forwarded. \n\n628. \nClarence E. Jeffers (October 4, 1918; Book 23). \n\nChief engineer for the Nordyke & Marmon Co. 631. \n\nBeen with the Marmon & Nordyke Co. since October 24 1912. \n\n631. \nSo far behind in production from changes that none of the \n\nengines got ahead, and the latest changes with all the others \n\nwere incorporated in the first engine. 633. \nChange in the propeller hub did not affect them at all. 634. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 341 \n\nClarence E. Jeefers \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nThought the changes had delayed production from four to six \nmonths. 636. \n\nRelates the delay caused by the piston pin. 636. \n\nGives outline of the connecting-rod change. 638-644. \n\nPratt Whitney & Co., of Hartford, Conn., were behind on their \ndeliveries of surface grinders to them of 60 days. Jig-boring \nmachine was promised on March 15 and not received until \nMay 10. When it was received, they could not use it on ac- \ncount of the poor workmanship. 645. \n\nTheir big trouble in delays has been due to the close limit on the \ndrawings. 645. \n\nOther manufacturers started their production when the Detroit \ninspection office was not organized and were therefore using \nmaterial which the Government inspector at their plant would \nnot let them use. 648. \nFrederick E. Muskovics (October 3, 1918; Book 23). \n\nVice president of the Nordyke & Marmon Co. 650. \n\nKnew of no transactions which Capt. Marmon as a representa- \ntive of the Government has had with the Nordyke & Marmon \nCo. beyond the communications as to blue prints. 650. \n\nNo connection at all. 651. \n\nAt one time he recommended an oil that the Packard Co. had \nturned out, as they were having trouble in cold weather. 651. \nChester P. Siemms (October 4, 1918; Book 23). \n\nPresident and treasurer of the Siemms-Carey-Kerbaugh Cor- \nporation. 652. \n\nHis company had a contract with the Government for getting \nout spruce from the Olympic Peninsula and also for building \na railroad connecting the mill with the C. M. & St. P. Rail- \nroad. 652. \n\nRelates interview with Mr. Hoadlev. 653. \n\nMr. Hoadley appeared drunk. Wanted $500,000. 653. \n\nIf he didn\'t get it Mr. Siemms\'s contract would be canceled. 654. \n\nSaid Senator Chamberlain would cancel the contract. 654. \n\nAt the last, urged him to call up Mr. Pliny Fiske, of New \nYork. 655. \n\nNext morning, through advice from his counsel, calls up Mr. \nJohn D. \xe2\x80\x94 and told him about this. 657. \n\nMr. Charles Brewer, from the Department of Justice, came to \nlook into it. 657. \n\nGives statement of what transpired over the telephone in con- \nversation with Mr. Hoadley. 661-663. \n\nHis organization or combination with Mr. Kerbaugh had noth- \ning to do with the spruce contract. 682. \n\nStates how the spruce contract was brought to his attention. 683. \n\nThe contract as finally worked out was not for delivering logs \nat all, as originally suggested by Mr. Fiske, but was for deliv- \nering flitches, which is a slab of a spruce log. 686. \n\nExplains the basis of the final trade. 689. \n\nFor the railroad contract Mr. Fiske signed a Fidelity bond for an \nadvance of $500,000. For the spruce contract it was necessary \nto provide $6,000,000. 689. \n\n\n\n342 ABSTKACT OF AIKCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nChester P. Siemms \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nEndeavor to satisfy the War Credits Board to get the $6,000,000 \nfor the work. \'689. \n\nMr. Fiske agreed finally that if he could not satisfy the War \nCredits Board in another week, then he could exchange a \nmutual release with them and they could seek financial aid \nelsewhere. 692. \n\nOne contract had no risk in it; the other had. 693. \nMaj. James S. Holden (Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., \nOctober 5, 1918 ; Book 24) . \n\nCommissioned on January 11, 1918. 1. \n\nWorked as a civilian in the Army prior to that time. 1. \n\nWas in charge of real estate matters in the construction division \nof the Signal Corps, under Col. C. G. Edgar, Capt. Edgar at \nthat time. 1. \n\nProduced true copy of the original lease by the Government of \nthe field known as the Wilbur Wright Field, at Davton. 2. \n\nThis lease marked " Holden Exhibit 1, October 5, 1918." \n\nAsked to send in data which will show why the lease was made \nfor 2,075 acres. 3. \n\nOption price was $350,000, or $140 an acre for 2,500 acres. 4. \n\nRental, 5 per cent per annum on the purchase price and $1 per \nacre for the taxes. 5. \n\nStatement in reference to the rental read upon the record. 5-13. \n\nThe titles not searched on the leases for the tracts of land they \nhave had to take for the Government. 21. \n\nIn the hurry they would go ahead and start building thousands \nof dollars\' worth of construction, without any shadow of title, \nlease, or anything else, because it would take six weeks or \ntwo months before you could get any transaction closed by \nthe Government. 22. \n\nCondensed statement of the negotiations in connection with the \nleasing of McCook Field. 23. \n\nCols. Deeds and Edgar did not want to put in an option to pur- \nchase on the McCook Field. 24. \n\nSaid the Government would never want to buy the property any- \nway, as it would never amount to much. 24. \n\nAlong in March, 1918, Col. Deeds and Mr. Craighead approach \nMr. Holden and tell him they will put in an option to purchase, \nat a higher price, $300,000 or $350,000. 25. \nLieut. Samuel Bell Vrooman, Jr. (Department of Justice, Washing- \nton, D. C, October 5, 1918 ; Book 24) . \n\nEntered the Army on July 16, 1918. 31. \n\nBeen in the employ of the Signal Corps since the 1st of Decem- \nber, 1917. 31. \n\nFormerly with S. B, Vrooman Co., of Philadelphia. 32. \n\nWas not an officer of the company. 33. \n\nHis father Avas president. 33. \n\nStockholder to the extent of $10,000, par value, common stock. \n34. \n\nDid not make any disposition of this stock when he entered the \nGovernment. 34. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 343 \n\nLieut. Samuel Bell Yrooman, Jr. \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nHis compensation from the Yrooman Co. prior to the time he \nentered Government service was $100 a week, counting interest \non his stock. 35. \n\nRegular dividend paid of from 15 to 20 per cent on the stock. 35. \n\nHas run practically at 20 per cent all the time, only one year at \n15 per cent. 37. \n\nReceived, therefore, a compensation of about $50 a week before \nhe entered the Government service. 38. \n\nReceived $1,800 compensation a year from the Government \nbefore he was commissioned. 39. \n\nWhen he was commissioned became $1,700, with an allowance \nfor rooms. 40. \n\nBeen receiving the $50 a week compensation from the S. P. \nVrooman Co. ever since he entered the Government. 41. \n\nDuties with the Government consisted of inspecting mahogany \nlumber for propellers. 43. \n\nThe Government was buying mahogany when he first started, \nDecember, 1917. 43. \n\nInspected the mahogany bought from Lewis Thompson & Co. 44. \n\nInspected personally from December 1 until the 10th of Febru- \nary, then was given charge of all propeller lumber, but none of \nthe inspecting himself. 45. \n\nSelected the inspectors and gave them instructions. 45. \n\nOne of his duties to pass upon disputed questions. 46. \n\nVisited the plants of the airplane manufacturers or propeller \nmanufacturers to gain knowledge of the proper kind of lumber \nto go into propellers, 47. \n\nAll plants furnishing mahogany to the Government were under \nhis jurisdiction. 47. \n\nMaintained his force by dividing it up into districts \xe2\x80\x94 New York, \nDayton, and Chicago. The man in charge of each district re- \nsponsible for the personnel of the inspectors, 48. \n\nDayton had charge of all or most of the walnut. No mahogany \nin the Dayton district. 48. \n\nChicago had the Talge Mahogany Co., C. C. Mengel & Bros. Co., \nand C. L. Willey. 48. \n\nNew York had I. T. Williams & Sons, the Astoria Yeneer Mills \n& Dock Co., etc. 48. \n\nIn case of a disagreement regarding the mahogany his was the \nfinal decision. 33. \n\nThe head of each district selected the inspectors, from six up \nat each of the three districts, who were selected from among \nthe plants of the various mahogany manufacturers, 54. \n\nAnd those furnishing mahogany who are members of the Ma- \nhogany Manufacturers\' and Importers\' Association repre- \nsented 75 per cent or more of the entire mahogany trade of \nthe country. 55. \n\nIt was the policy never to have the men inspect mahogany for \nthe firm from which they came. 35. \n\nHis duty at present is just to see whether the mahogany comes \nto the specifications. 64. \n\n\n\n344 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nLieut. Samuel Bell Yrooman, Jr. \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nHis own plant had never furnished any mahogany under air- \ncraft specifications. They had two British contracts taken \nover. 66. \n\nThe American Government commandeered this lumber, and the \nBritish Government was paid 10 per cent of their profit. 67. \n\nMr. McCullough, of the I. T. Williams & Sons, was in charge \nof the New York office. 69. \n\nReceived $2,400 from the Government, and I. T. Williams & Sons \nmade up the difference of $1,600, as he originally received \nfrom I. T. Williams & Sons $4,000. 71. \n\nMr. McCullough had under his supervision the inspection of \ntimber at the Astoria Mills, I. T. Williams & Sons, S. P. Vroo- \nman & Co., etc. 76. \nCol. E. A. Deeds (Book 24). \n\nDesires to make some corrections in his testimony. 90. \n\nChanges the name of the Smith Gas Engine Co. to the Smith \nGas Engineering Co. 90. \n\nMentions page 100 of a report marked " Deeds Exhibit 19, Oc- \ntober 5, 1918," which includes, as one of the subcommittees, \na subcommittee on fuses and detonators, with E. A. Deeds, etc., \nchairman, and H. E. Tablott, Dayton Metal Products Co. 92. \n\nWould not change his testimony in regard to the fact that the \nfuse committee never functioned, and, so far as he knew, never \nhad anything to do after that one meeting was held. 93. \n\nThe only explanation he has of the continuance of the committee \nis the fact that probably a number of the printed lists of com- \nmittees continued long after the committee itself had ceased to \nfunction. 93. \n\nHis appointment on the fuse committee came from Mr. Frank \nScott, chairman of the General Munitions Board. 94. \n\nHe and Mr. Talbott were the sole members of the committee. 94. \n\nStates the munitions standard board did not function. 95. \n\nKnew he had been appointed on the munitions standard board. \n96. \n\nResigned from it some time in June, July, or August, along \nthere, of 1917. 97. \n\nThe report of the function of the munitions standard board for \nthe year June 30, 1917, is read to Mr. Deeds, who says he \ndid not know a thing about what the board was doing. 97-101. \n\nMakes correction on page 66 of this report, or book, regarding \nthe stock of the United Motors Corporation, which does not \nchange it any but makes it a little more intelligible. 102. \n\nRefers to pages 81 to 90, where the questions are asked whether \nor not he had an interview with the Secretary of War and \nanother interview with Gen. Ansell. 103. \n\nWent to see the Secretary of War with Judge McCann. 103. \n\nWent to see the Secretary of War in August, 1917, about the \ntime of the letter of disclosure. 104. \n\nOn page 132, when asked if he and Mr. Kettering received \n$250,000 apiece from the Dayton Metal Products Co., he said, \n" Yes, sir," and he now wants to add " as a loan." 104. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 345 \n\nCol. E. A. Deeds \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nMakes a correction, on page 231, where asked, a You sent that \ntelegram ? " and he said, " Yes, sir," and Mr. Deeds now wishes \nto add " at Mr. Craighead\'s suggestion." 112. \n\nOn page 70 were given the names of engineers \xe2\x80\x94 Mr. Day, Mr. \nLoenning, etc. \xe2\x80\x94 and Mr. Deeds would like to have the records \nshow that each of these men was given something to do, etc. \n116. \n\nHas received no money for any purpose whatever from Mr. Ket- \ntering or H. E. Talbott, or H. E. Talbott, jr., the last year. \n123. \n\nHas no agreement, arrangement, or understanding of any kind \nwhatever with Mr. Kettering for delivery or surrender of his \nnotes. 123. \n\nVarious other questions asked about arrangements or agreements \nwith Mr. Kettering or the Talbotts, to all of which he replies \nhe has none. 123, 124. \n\nSubmits the report of the Senate committee and refers to page \n11, where there is a statement regarding the Miami Field and \nthe Dayton-Kantoul Flying Field. 124, 125. \n\nThen mentioned in the same report a reference regarding the \nacceptance of the field adjoining the plant of the Dayton- \nWright Airplane Co. 126. \n\nSubmits a statement by Mr. W. W. Montgomery, attorney for \nthe Bureau of Aircraft Production, which he says explains \nitself fully. 126. \n\nThis paper marked " Deeds Exhibit 21, October 7, 1918." 128- \n134. \nMaj. Howard Elliott (Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., \nOctober 7, 1918; Book 24). \n\nIn August, 1917, was in the Army, with rank of captain. 158. \n\nWas a disbursing officer in the then Signal Corps, Aviation \nSection. 158. \n\nIs shown a voucher, " Blakeley Exhibit 1," which was paid by \ncheck on August 11, 1917, for the sum of $104,500. 159. \n\nCan not recall anything about this, but it is sufficient evidence \nto a disbursing officer when he sees the signature of the proper \ncompetent officer of the Government certified over his signa- \nture that he had received the material or the services. 160. \n\nHe would see Col Deeds\'s signature there and put his name there, \nas Mr. Deeds, being in charge of the Equipment Division, a \ncommission pending, he would take it that he was the re- \nsponsible party. 167. \n\nHis was known as the Finance and Supply Division. 188. \n\nAsked why a matter of this sort did not take its normal course \nand go through the Finance Division. 169. \n\nCan not recall that the Chief Signal Office issued any orders as \nto who should have authority to pass vouchers for payment \nin the Aviation Section. 170. \n\nNor any orders that he could pay vouchers on Mr. Deeds\'s cer- \ntification before he became a commissioned officer. 172. \n\nArmy regulations require an officer to certify vouchers. 173. \n\nIs shown order 8526 with the initials " G. H. B." at the bottom \nof the order. 174. \n\n\n\n346 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nMaj. Howard Elliott \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nThese are the initials of Capt. Brett, who was in charge of the \nFinance Department. 174. \n\nThis certificate came through the Finance and Supply Division,, \nbut instead of the certificate having been given by Mr. Mont- \ngomery, who was in charge at that time, August 11, 1917, it \nwas certified by Mr. Deeds. 174. \n\nOn the back of the voucher reference is made to the less formal \nagreement, 08256. The order is addressed to the Aircraft \nDivision, which says nothing about the Packard Motor Car \nCo. 175. \n\nAnnexed are a series of blanks, the name of the Packard Motor \nCar Co., and copies of the vouchers. 175. \n\nAsked if that would be regarded as an order to the Packard \nMotor Car Co., or evidence of a contract with the Packard \nMotor Car Co., or what there was to show the terms and con- \nditions on which anything should be paid to the Packard \nMotor Car Co. 176. \n\nMaj. Elliott states there is absolutely nothing. 176. \n\nThis final settlement of $249,159.10 takes the total cost and the \nprofit of 12J per cent. 176. \n\nNothing in all those vouchers or in the order 8526 to show that \nany 12J per cent was ever agreed to be paid to the Packard \nMotor Car Co., nor what was the basis for the allowance of \nthat amount. 176. \n\nIs asked to get all information possible on order 8526. 183. \n\nIs asked to bring in also the regulations which govern disburse- \nments of this character. 184. \nAlfred Bettman (October 7, 1918; Book 24). \n\nEmployed in the Department of Justice. 191. \n\nSpecial assistant to the Attorney General in the division that is \nreferred to as the War Emergency Division. 191. \n\nStates for the record what regulations have been issued or what \ninstructions have been issued upon the subject of enemy aliens. \n191-196. \nCapt. Oscar E. Ewing (October 7, 1918; Book 24). \n\nIn the Contract Section of the Bureau of Aircraft Production \n(of the Signal Corps). 197. \n\nLieut. Col. Downey has been in charge of the Contract Section \nfrom the beginning. 197. \n\nStates he went through all their files and that they have no \nrecord of the contract with the Packard Motor Car Co. for \ncertain work in connection with the development of the Lib- \nerty motor engine. 198. \n\nAnd no record of the contract or order under which approxi- \nmately $250,000 for experimental work or work in the devel- \nopment of the first engines of these types was done. \n\nThe photostat copy of the order which he sent and which was \nmarked " Elliott Exhibit No. 3 " was merely a memorandum to \nthe Air Division and is what is known as an allotment of \nfunds. 198. \n\nTelling them that $250,000 is available for certain purposes, and \nnothing in the memorandum to show that the order was \ngiven to the Packard Motor Car Co. 198-199. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 347 \n\nCapt. Oscar R. Ewing \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nNothing in the files to show anything about this contract. 199. \n\nProduces the only file of correspondence he could find about \nabout this matter. 202. \n\nOne memorandum has a statement of "The increase of $11,- \n464.38 over present allowance on order No. 8526 is author- \nized in order to permit the payment of bills now outstanding." \n204. \n\nMr. Ewing thinks that this meant that the appropriation of \n$250,000 was sufficient to meet outstanding vouchers and that \nthis was a memorandum to increase that allotment, $11,464.38. \n204. \n\nAsked if it did not look more like it was a voucher for $11,464.38 \nand that it was made that amount in order that the total \namount might come within the $250,000 appropriation. 205. \n\nIn fact the two engines are figured at $5,732.19 each to make up \nthat sum of $11,464.38, which is a very low figure as com- \npared with the other engines. 205. \nCol. R. L. Montgomery (October 8, 1918; Book 24). \n\nIs asked to recall the fact that in the early part of 1918 a con- \ntract was concluded with the Curtiss Airplane & Motor \nCorporation for the making of advances by the Government \nto an amount not in excess of $8,000,000 on account of War \nDepartment contracts. 208. \n\nThis contract contains a provision that there shall be retired at \na price not in excess of par and accrued interest all the serial \n6 per cent first-mortgage gold bonds of a total of $1,400,000, \ndated October 1, 1917, etc. 208. \n\nCol. Montgomery is asked for information with respect to these \ngold notes of the Curtiss Co. that were outstanding. 209. \n\nHas no information at all with respect to the owners of those \nnotes. 201. \n\nAsked why there should have been any provision made for the \nretiring of those gold notes. 210. \n\nThe effect of the transaction was that a premium was paid at \nthe expense of the Curtiss Co. upon those notes. 211. \n\nAnd that at a time when the Curtiss Co., instead of paying a \npremium, was seriously in need of money to carry on Govern- \nment work. 212. \n\nApparently the only purpose was to pay the notes to some peo- \nple who held them, and Mr. Hughes told him he wanted to \nknow who those people were. 213. \n\nStates the National City Co. did not hold any of those notes. \n213. \n\nThinks the idea originated in the minds of the Navy Depart- \nment. 214. \n\nHis firm had nothing to do with the bringing out of the Miami \nconservancy district, 5 per cent bonds, an issue of $10,000,000, \ndated December 1, 1917. 215. \n\nRelates conversation with Col. Deeds wherein Col. Montgomery \nis asked who he thought would take the bond issue of the \nMiami conservancy district. 215. \n\nHas no knowledge of the disposition of the funds. 217. \n\n\n\n348 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nCol. R. L. Montgomery \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nHis attention called to the General Vehicle Co. and the fact \nthat at the time of the acquisition of its plant by the Govern- \nment it had outstanding certain notes amounting to $1,530,- \n408, not far from the amount the Government paid for the \nplant. 217. \n\nAsked what the initials " P. T. & M. ? \' opposite this item stand \nfor. 217. \n\nTakes it that those represent the Peerless Co. or a subsidiary of \nthe Peerless Co. 217. \n\nPoor\'s Manual of Industrials for 1917 under the title of " Peer- \nless Truck & Motor Corporation " states that the Peerless \nTruck & Motor Corporation \xe2\x96\xa0owned or had acquired the own- \nership of the Peerless Motor Co. and the General Vehicle Co. \n218. \n\nDid not undestand at the time the proposition was made to buy \nthe plant that the General Vehicle Co. stock was owned by \nthe Peerless Truck & Motor Corporation or by any organi- \nzation of the Peerless. 220. \n\nIf the National City Co. owned the Peerless, he did not know \nit. 221. \n\nMr. Montgomery strongly advised the Aircraft Board to make \nthe purchase. 225. \n\nThe negotiations were carried on by Mr. W. W. Montgomery, jr. \n225. \n\nThe General Motors Co. needed the General Vehicle Co. for its \nknowledge of rotary-engine building. 225. \n\nThese engines to be built to fill an order or request from Gen. \nPershing. They would have gone into the Nieuport plane- \n226. \n\nStates that it is not exactly true that the reason the General \nVehicle Co.\'s plant was purchased was so that there would be \na continuous manufacture of rotary engines in the country. \n226. \n\nThe Union Switch & Signal Co. was starting to do that, 226. \n\nAt any rate the price arrived at as the purchase price is substan- \ntially the same as the amount of the notes which the General \nVehicle Co. had outstanding. 228. \nMaj. Gen. George Owen Sqtjier. (October 9, 1918; Book 24.) \n\nChief Signal Officer of the Army. 234. \n\nIn charge of the aviation section of the Signal Corps. 238. \n(Prior to his appointment as Chief Signal Officer.) \n\nIs asked how many airplanes were owned by the Government \nwhen he became Chief Signal Officer in February, 1917. 238. \n\nApproximately 150 training planes, no service planes, and no \nbombing or pursuit planes. 239. \n\nProceeded from the day war was declared to outline an esti- \nmated program as a basis to proceed to Congress with for \nhearings, etc, 241. \n\nOnly had a program in a vague way which stated the types of \nplanes it was proposed to build. 242. \n\nWhen he returned to this country fully posted on the progress of \naviation activities abroad and the types of planes in use, \nneeded, etc. 243. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OE AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 349 \n\nMaj. Gen. George Owen Squier \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nWith this information in his possession he is asked why he was \nnot in a position to order at once planes and engines that would \nbe needed. 245. \n\nPerhaps $20,000,000 was available at the time this country en- \ntered war for making airplanes and engines. 247. \n\nDid start ordering training planes immediately for the work \nthe country was entering in. 247. \n\nDid not order combat or bombing planes or pursuit planes be- \ncause they did not have the money and because there was not \na settled judgment as to which types were the best. 248. \n\nAs soon as the war broke out requested France and England to \nsend the best experts they could spare. 249. \n\nQuite a few here bv the last of May from England, France, and \nItaly. 250. \n\nCaproni people were the first men sent from abroad to under- \ntake the designing of planes for the American Government. \n253. \n\nThe idea was to adapt the Caproni plane to the Liberty engine. \n254. \n\nWith an expectation of 9,000 arranged for in August, by Feb- \nruary it was reduced to a total of 50. 257. \n\nContinuously before the board, but also continuously postponed, \nhe admits. 258. \n\nIs shown program of the Handley-Page, which program started \nin September, 1917, with an expectation that 1,500 Handley- \nPage\'s would be made, and again on February 19 it was re- \nduced to a program of a total of 50. 261. \n\nThis program also postponed and suspended. 262. \n\nThe information which he had received abroad and the informa- \ntion he received during the following year before this country \nentered the war was not adequate to enable him to formulate a \nplane program. 265. \n\nSent a commission over in May to find out the whole situation \nand to bring back what to do. 266. \n\nHad no notion that the country was going into an air program \nof the size that later developed, but he had notions large \nenough to ask for an appropriation of $640,000,000 bv Con- \ngress. 266-267. \n\nAsked why the commission could not have been sent two months \nearlier. 269. \n\nAppropriation bill passed on July 24, 1917. 270. \n\nEstablished the Equipment Division of the Signal Corps in \nAugust or September. 271. \n\nFunctions of this division to procure the material of the Signal \nCorps in contradistinction to personnel. 271. \n\nAppointed Mr. Deeds to be in charge of that division. 271. \n\nPrior to that time Mr. Deeds had been a member of the first \nAircraft Board, appointed by the Council of National De- \nfense. 272. \n\nHad no duties with the Signal Corps of an executive character. \n272. \n\n\n\n350 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nMaj. Gen. George Owen Squier \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nWas then not in the service of the United States, as a repre- \nsentative of the United States, prior to the time he was made \nChief of the Equipment Division, outside of his duties as a \nmember of the Aircraft Production Board. 272. \n\nIs reminded that the Aircraft Production Board had no execu- \ntive authority, could not place any contracts, which he ad- \nmits. 273. \n\nBoard authorized by law October 1, 1917. 273. \n\nHis attention again directed to August, 1917, when the Equip- \nment Division was established, and to the fact that Mr. Deeds \nas a member of the Aircraft Production Board had no execu- \ntive or administrative authority. 274. \n\nDoes not recall any order from him that would clothe him with \nthis authority. 274. \n\nThe Engineering and Supply Division, before the Equipment \nDivision was established, corresponded to it in function. 275. \n\nHad a separate section called the Finance and Supply Depart- \nment, with Col. Montgomery at the head. 276. \n\nThen about August 29 these two divisions were reorganized and \namalgamated, the Equipment Division and the Finance and \nSupply Division. 276. \n\nMade one Equipment Division, of which the Finance Section \nwould be a part, with Col. Montgomery under Col. Deeds. \n277. \n\nAdmits that, as Chief Signal Officer dealing with the military \nprogram, before a board which was limited by the authority \nof the Secretary of War to obtaining of its information as to \nprogram from the Army and the Navv, he held an influential \nposition. 283-284. \n\nThis board was a regular clearing house for information, he \nstates. 285. \n\nGoes over the first part of the contract situation. 286. \n\nAsked what information he got as to the resources of the Dayton- \nWright Co. 289. \n\nStates he knew Mr. Orville Wright, in reply. 290. \n\nDid not know whether he owned stock or was just employed \nby the company. 290. \n\nDid not know what the capital stock of the Dayton- Wright \nAirplane Co. was. 291. \n\nDid not know when the capital stock of the company was paid \nin. 291. \n\nAgain states how much reliance he placed in the fact that Orville \nWright was about in this plant. 292, 293. \n\nAsked if he understood that the contract with the Dayton- \nWright Airplane Co. made it the duty of the Government \nto furnish it with drawings, etc. 294. \n\nAnd that so far as the manufacturing end of it was concerned \nand the making of the planes, he understood that Mr. Orville \nWright was not to have anything to do with that, to which \nhe answers, yes. 295. \n\nAsked if he knew he was placing this contract with the Dayton- \nWright Airplane Co. at a time when it had no financial re- \nsources to carry it out with. 296. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 351 \n\nMaj. Gen. George Owen Squier \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nHe knew it could get all the money it wanted. 297. \n\nDid not know how much the Day ton- Wright Airplane Co. \nwould be able to make out of this contract in one year. 300. \n\nResume given him of the order for the 4,000 De Havilands, \nprofits, bogy price, etc., etc., salaries of the Talbotts, and of \nMr. Kettering, etc., and he is asked the theory on which this \ncontract was made. 305. \n\nSays it would seem exorbitant, if true. 306. \n\nSays he did not know these conditions, he had too much to cope \nwith, had to rely and trust the people who were doing the \nnegotiating; in other words, the chief of the financial depart- \nment and the Chief of the Equipment Division. 307. _ \n\nStates on page 306 that these contracts were the subject of \nweeks, even months, of careful negotiations and consideration. \n306. \n\nAdmits on page 308 that the contracts were let to the Dayton- \nWright Airplane Co. very promptly. 308. \n\nAsked why they did not make a contract with the Singer Co. \n309. \n\nAsked about the Fisher Body Corporation. 312. \n\nAsked if he knew that Mitsui & Co. owned the Standard. 316. \n\nHere he is asked a leading question; i. e., had he noticed that the \nStandard Co. in some way got hold of a contract for nearly \nevery type of plane that was being put into service by the \nAmerican Government and that the representatives of this \nJapanese house are familiar with every detail, etc., etc. 316, \n317. \n\nHad heard that this firm was financed by Japanese funds. 317. \n\nHe is asked how, as a " military " man, they got this series of \nlittle contracts covering the entire aviation field with the \nexception of the Bristol. 318. \n\nThinks it may have been a mistake. 318. \n\nThinks possibly that something was done here that should not \nITave been done. 318. \n\nAsked with regard to Mr. Vincent who had been chief engineer \nof the Packard Co. 324. \n\nWhen the $250,000 was appropriated they started to design, to \nconstruct, the Liberty engine. 326. \n\nDoes not know whether positively that a contract was ever \ngiven to the Packard Co. 327. \n\nRules of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer are that verbal \ncontracts are not to be made unless they are absolutely neces- \nsary \xe2\x80\x94 emergencies. 327. \n\nHis attention called to the provision, chapter 418 of the act \nof Congress of August 29, 1916, providing * * * whenever \ncontracts which are not to be performed within 60 days on be- \nhalf of the Government by the Chief Signal Officer * * * \nshall be reduced in writing * * *. In other cases contracts \nshall be entered into under certain regulations, as may be pre- \nscribed by the Chief Signal Officer. 328. \n\nSays he will send in a copy of any regulations he may have \nprescribed under that provision. 328. \n130687\xe2\x80\x9419 23 \n\n\n\n352 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\n) \n\nMaj. Gen. George Owen Sqtjier \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nSays he never gave any authority to any officer of the Equipment \nDivision or the Finance Division or otherwise in the Signal \nCorps to disburse the $250,000 without any written contract \nor written order. 330. \n\nSuch a disbursement was not according to the rules and regula- \ntions of the department. 330. \n\nIs read Mr. Macauley \'s statement, president of the Packard Co., \nin which he says they went ahead on verbal orders. 330. \n\nGot the verbal orders from Lieut. Col. J. G. Vincent. 331. \n\nNever gave anyone authority to violate any of the regulations. \n333. \n\nAsked to explain the fact that Lieut. Col. Vincent himself have \nthese orders, a salaried officer of the Packard Co., and that \nwhen the vouchers were put in they were paid upon his cer- \ntificate. 325. \n\nHis attention called to the voucher for $104,500, with Col. Deeds \nsignature to it. 327. \n\nStates Col. Deeds had no authority from him, and there was \nnobody else to give him that authority. 328. \n\nStates the same about the voucher for $60,000, certified to by \nCol. Deeds. 328. \n\nAlso makes the same negative statement with regard to the \nvoucher for $73,194, which has a letter from Col. Deeds \nattached. 330. \n\nGave no authority to anyone in the Signal Corps to certify for \npayment, or to make payments, under these conditions. 332. \n\nDid not know that Lieut. Col. Vincent was a stockholder in the \nPackard Motor Car Co. 333. \n\nStates that none of these vouchers were brought to him for his \nconsideration before they were paid. 333. \n\nNone of these amounts were brought to his attention for ap- \nproval before they were paid. 334. \n\nWas not aware that Mr. Deeds, before he received a commission, \nor Col. Deeds thereafter, undertook to certify vouchers for \npayment. 335. \n\nStates the first De Haviland 4 was received in this country in \nAugust, 1917. 338. \n\nCol. Vincent\'s testimony said that Col. Clark, during the period \nfrom October 1, 1917, to February 6, 1918, was devoting most \nof his time to the design of an airplane known as the TJ. S. A. \nC-l, and that no one on the part of the airplane experimental \ndepartment was giving attention to the settlement of the de- \nsign of Che DH-4. 341. \n\nRelied upon Col. Deeds to see that the DH-4 was designed. 342. \n\nThe matter of Orville Wright being brought up again, he finally \nstates that Orville Wright was working on secret matter for \nthe Government. 349. \n\nAsked why, if the delay was caused because they could not get \ninformation as to what equipment was desired, he did not \nadvise the President or the Secretary of War that the air \nprogram was being held up month after month. 362. \n\nStates he was a member of the National Advisory Committee \nfor Aeronautics. 364. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 3\xc2\xa33 \n\nMaj. Gen. George Owen Squier \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nAsked regarding the misleading statement or letter which was \naddressed to the President of the United States by the secre- \ntary of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics \nunder date of January 24, 1918.\' 364. \n\nUnderstood that some sort of a report was being sent to reassure \nthe President. 367. \n\nStates they did not get the information from him, but admits \nhe never took pains to tell them the exact position they were \nin. 369. ! \n\nUnder the terms of the contract with the French Government, \nregarding the supplying of raw materials, it was contemplated \nthat there would be 100 per cent of the deliveries by the middle \nof April. 374. \n\nDown to February 1, 1918, 58 per cent of the materials had been \nshipped. 374. \n\nHis attention called to another inaccuracy in the letter under \ndate of January 24 to the President by the National Advisory \nCommittee for Aeronautics. 380. \n\nWherein it states that "The same types of machines are being \nput in quantity production in foreign countries under con- \ntracts with the United States." 381. \n\nDid nothing when he read the statement in the paper by the Sec- \nretary of War which stated " The first American-built battle \nplanes are to-day en route to the front in France," etc. 383. \n\nIs told of Mr. Pew\'s testimony in which he stated that Maj. Gen. \nSquier called the Senate speeches, criticizing the inaccurate \nstatements emanating from his department, " German propa- \nganda." 390. \n\nRemembers nothing of this at all. 392. \nMaj. Howard Elliott (October 9, 1918; Book 24). \n\nProduces what correspondence he was able to find in the files \nrelative to transactions with the Packard Motor Car Co. 422. \n\nIs satisfied that there was never a written contract. There is \nabsolutely no evidence of a contract. 429. \n\nReads from Army Regulations, page 138, portion of paragraph \n653, that " Every order issued by any military authority which \nmay cause an expenditure of money in a staff department will \nbe given in writing." 435. \n\nVerbal order is permissible in an emergency. 435. \n\nA matter that was in progress from the 1st of June until Novem- \nber would seem to have been susceptible of a written state- \nment. 436. \nLieut. Col. M. W. Thompson (Washington, D. C, October 10, 1918; \nBook 24). \n\nWar Credits Board made an advance in the nature of a loan to \nthe Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corporation. 442. \n\nThe Curtiss Co. was advanced substantially $12,000,000, of which \ntwo-thirds came from the Army through the War Credits \nBoard and the remaining third from the Navy. 443. \n\nCan not state from memory how much of this loan was devoted \nto the retirement of outstanding obligations of the Curtiss \nCo. 445. \n\n\n\n354 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nLieut. Col. M. W. Thompson \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nOut of total advance of $12,000,000, nearly $7,500,000 was de- \nvoted to the retirement of first lien bonds on the North Elm- \nwood plant and debenture notes. 447. \n\n" One day in comes a telegram saying that the New York Central \nagent of the Director General of Railroads had asked for \nauthority to put an embargo on cars to the Curtiss plant, the \nreason being that they had a great number of cars that had \nbeen shipped in there against draft with bill of lading at- \ntached, and not getting their money they could not take up the \ndraft, and the railroad yards were clogged up. If that em- \nbargo had been put on, it would have busted the Curtiss Co. \nand they would have been in the hands of receivers." 452. \n\nCopy of memorandum from War Credits Board to Acting Secre- \ntary of War relative to advances to Curtiss Co. 455. \n\nLetter from Navy Department to War Credits Board on same \nmatter. 466. \n\nThe moneys advanced by the Army were deposited in the Bank- \ners\' Trust Co. in New York, at the request of the Curtiss Co., \nand that part of those moneys required to pay off the deben- \ntures was transferred by the Bankers\' Trust Co. to the Central \nTrust Co., at whose offices the debentures were payable. 473. \n\nIt has been a part of policy of Government to endeavor to cause \nthe Curtiss Co.\'s general commercial credit to be built up so \nfar as possible, in order that they might transfer the load of \ncredit off the Government. 475. \n\nGenerally understood the control of stock of the Peerless Truck \n\n& Motor Co. is in the General Electric Co. It appears the \n\nPeerless Truck & Motor Co. held the notes of approximated \n\n$1,500,000 of the General Vehicle Co. 476. \n\nRoderick S. Huddleston (Washington, D. C, October 10, 1918; \n\nBook 24). \n\nPresident of the Huddleston-Marsh Mahogany Co. since Janu- \nary 1, 1909. 479. \n\nHad contracts with Government for mahogany lumber. 480. ^ \n\nTwo contracts called for about 3,195,000 feet of Central Ameri- \ncan and Mexican mahogany. 480. \n\nFirm is a member of the Mahogany Manufacturers\' & Im- \nporters\' Association. 480. \n\nFirst meeting of association was held January 21, 1918. In \nWashington. 481. \n\nWar committee of association was formed with Mr. A. S. Wil- \nliams as chairman and Mr. Charles H. Thompson as secretary. \n483. \n\nList of firms desirous of becoming members of the association. \n485. \n\nProposition submitted by committee to the Government. 487- \n500. \n\nProposition was rejected by Lieut. Ryerson and members of as- \nsociation were told to submit a price on lumber only. 502. \n\nThinks it was between $350 and $400 per thousand. 502. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 355 \n\nRoderick S. Huddleston \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nMr. John C. Wickliffe, representing C. R. Mengel Bro. & Co., \nwas in Washington when these negotiations held. 504. \n\nThe association made certain payments to Mr. Wickliffe. 505. \n\nList showing contributions made by each member of the associa- \ntion. 508. \n\nDid not like to feel that one mahogany manufacturer was paying \nall the expenses of an employee of the Government. 510. \n\nWould not pay Mr. Wickliffe until it was approved by the Sig- \nnal Corps. 514. \n\nLetter from office of Chief Signal Officer to C. C. Mengel & Bro. \nCo., approving their request to be allowed to pay Mr. J. C. \nWickliffe a salary while he was in the employ of the Signal \nCorps. 518. \n\nPayment was discontinued at end of July at request of Mr. \nWickliffe. 521. \n\nJudge Hughes: " \xe2\x80\x94 but there was not the slightest doubt \nbut what Mr. Wickliffe went into that department and then \ndealt with those very manufacturers who constituted that as- \nsociation which was paying him this money." 523. \n\nMade payments to Mr. McCullough, an employee of the George \nD. Emery Co., who was identified with the Signal Corps. \n528. \n\nMr. McCullough was an inspector under Mr. Yrooman. 529. \n\nMr. McCullough was in charge of inspection in Philadelphia and \nNew York. 539. \nJohn Edward McCullough (Washington, D. C, October 10, 1918; \nBook 24). \n\nAt present time is superintendent at mill for the George D. \nEmery Co., manufacturing mahogany and Spanish cedar cigar \nboxes. 544. \n\nBecame identified with the Signal Corps on March 4, 1918. 545. \n\nResigned on August 3, 1918. 545. \n\nDuring that time he was district inspector in charge of New \nYork district, which took a strip along the coast from Maine \nto Texas. 545. \n\nMr. S. B. Yrooman, jr., chief inspector of lumber for the Signal \nCorps, asked him to take that work in charge. 546. _ \n\nInspected plant of S. B. Yrooman & Co. in Philadelphia. 548. \n\nReceived compensation at rate of $2,400 a year from Government. \n549. \n\nReceived from George D. Emery Co. the difference between that \nand $3,500, which was his regular income. 550. \n\nThat account was turned over to a committee and he got check \nmonthly from that committee through the treasurer, Mr. Hud- \ndleston. 550. \n\nLieut. Yrooman, as his superior officer, occasionally visited same \nplants that he did. 551. \n\nWent around with him to make rulings as to what should be ac- \ncepted and not accepted. 551. \n\n\n\n356 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nWilliam Woodrow Montgomery, Jr. (Washington, D. C, October 10, \n1918; Book 24). \n\nConnected with the Bureau of Aircraft Production as chief of \nwhat is known as the advisory and consulting department, \nwhose duty it is to look after miscellaneous matters which in- \nvolve legal questions. 554. \n\nIs a brother of Col. Montgomery. 556. \n\nConducted negotiations relating to the acquisition of the plant \nof the General Vehicle Co. 559. \n\nGives history of negotiations. 560. \n\nHad been telling Genera] Vehicle Co. not to get tied up with other \ncontracts; that they (Government) would need their facilities. \n566. \n\nWhen plan by which their (General Vehicle Co.) plane would \nbe taken over by the General Motors people was dropped it left \nthem in a very awkward situation. 566. \n\nProposition was made by Mr. Wagoner that Government take \nover plant on the same terms as General Motors had contem- \nplated paying for it. 567. \n\nArrangement was made that, subject to the approval of the Air- \ncraft Board, we would purchase the plant of the General \nVehicle Co. at its actual asset value, deducting, however, the \nappraised value or perhaps the inventory value of their elec- \ntric-truck business. 567. \n\nUnderstood Peerless Motor Co. had an interest in the General \nVehicle Co. 569. \n\nHas no idea who the real persons were behind the Peerless Co. \n570. \n\nDoes not know whether the National Citv Co. had any relation to \nit. 570. \n\nContract was placed with Union Switch & Signal Co. on Decem- \nber 6, 1917, for 2,500 La Rhone engines, but negotiations started \nconsiderably \n\nCablegram signed Pershing, dated October 5, 1917, No. 204, para- \ngraph 2, contains sentence reading, "Advise you build no rotary \nengines ; single-seater pursuit airplanes be sent to Europe ; ex- \nisting machines this type will be outclassed by date yours ar- \nrive. Build only what you need for use in United States train- \ning purposes." 565, 574. \n\nDid not know whether the Union Switch & Signal Co. would \nmake good on their contract, although for some reason he does \nnot know why Government wanted both types of engines \xe2\x80\x94 the \nGnome and the La Rhone. 576. \n\nQuestion arose as to what to do with the General Vehicle Co.\'s \nplant, which Government had bought. 576. \n\nGeneral Vehicle Co. plant was turned over to the Wright-Martin \nCo. for the manufacture of Hispano-Suiza engines. 577. \n\nWitness asked why it was deemed necessary or advisable to buy \nthe plant of the General Vehicle Co. 578. \n\nJudge Hughes : " Have you ever looked up the question as to \nthe inherent power of the Government to institute condemnation \nproceedings for lands that are needed for governmental use ? " \n580. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 357 \n\nWilliam Woodrow Montgomery, Jr. \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nThinks this general rule would have resulted in a lawsuit in this \ncase. 580. \n\nGovernment took plant of the General Vehicle Co. at a time when \nit did not contemplate business which would be adequate to \nutilize the plant. 581. \n\nCol. Thompson employed the firm of Black & Veitch, who* made \nan appraisal of the property, which seemed to justify the price \nGovernment was paying. 582. \n\nMemorandum of the Joint Army and Navy Technical Aircraft \nBoard relative to the rotary engine. 584. \n\nSupposes matters of purchasing plant around either with Col. \nDeeds or Col. Montgomery. 588. \n\nThinks either Mr. Vanderlip or Mr. Rich, of National City \nBank, were in some way connected with it. 590. \n\nVoucher for the payment of real estate \xe2\x80\x94 has in mind figure of \n$861,000 \xe2\x80\x94 was approved by Mr. Baker personally. 592. \n\nPractice required that the Secretary of War shall personally \napprove the voucher before any payment for real estate is \nmade, and there is no such requirement in regard to person- \nality or other things. 593. \nEdward Putnam Currier (Washington, D. C, October 10, 1918; \nBook 24). \n\nWas commissioned a major in the Signal Corps last October. \n597. \n\nWas sort of utility man. Was there for about two weeks and \nthen detailed to the Treasury Department for a little over six \nweeks. 597. \n\nCame to Washington in April, 1917, and was sort of secretary or \nassistant to Mr. Coffin for a while. 598. \n\nWas there about three or four months and then went down to \nCol. Montgomery\'s office and helped there. 599. \n\nBefore coming to Washington was member of firm of Mont- \ngomery, Clothier & Tyler, which later changed to Mont- \ngomery &, Co. 599. \n\nEntered the firm April 2, 1917. 600. \n\nPrevious to that was with the National City Bank. 600. \n\nDoes not recall the notation of securities of the Curtiss Aero* \nplane and Motor Corporation. 600. \nAlbert Lariviere (Washington, D. C, October 10, 1918; Book 24). \n\nIs principal clerk of appropriations department in War Depart- \nment. 605. \n\nDealing with appropriations of Bureau of Aircraft Production, \nFinance Division. 605. \n\nPrior to organization of bureau was with the Signal Corps. \n606. \n\nWas relieved of Capt. Elliott\'s accounts and Maj. Gutensogn\'s \naccounts, his predecessor, about the 1st of August, 1917. \n607. \n\nMr. Mehrlick checked Capt. Elliott\'s accounts. 607. \n\nGives information as to how a voucher is checked. 608. \n\nIt is up to disbursing officer to satisfy himself that party had \na rignt to sign voucher. 610. \n\n\n\n358 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nAlbert Lariviere \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nDoes not recall ever O. King voucher No. 7228 for $60,000, \npayable to Packard Motor Car Co., upon which his initials \nappear. 612. \n\nDoes not remember ever signing a voucher in that way. 628. \nMaj. Earnest A. Coleman (Washington, D. C, October 10, 1918; \nBook 24). \n\nCommissioned a major August 3, 1918. 630. \n\nCommissioned a first lieutenant on August 18, 1917. 630. \n\nEmployed in office of Auditor for the War Department before \nentering the Army. 630. \n\nHas seen original of voucher No. 458, paid August 11, 1917, for \n$104,500, to the Packard Motor Car Co., before. 631. \n\nChief Signal Officer asked for these vouchers last winter or last \nfall. 634. \n\nThe Aircraft Board, the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, and \nthe Department of Justice were inquiring about matter. 635. \n\nFurnished photostated copies of vouchers to Department of Jus- \ntice for the purpose of determining as to whether this investi- \ngation now being conducted was necessary. 636. \n\nThere should be a written order covering voucher. 644. \n\nHas never met Maj. Vincent. 661. \nLieut. Col. A. C. Downey (Washington, D. C, October 10, 1918; \nBook 24) . \n\nJudge Hughes. " Capt. Elliott is responsible for your coming \nhere to-day, because he told us that you had some informa- \ntion with regard to these vouchers under which $249,159.10 \nwas paid to the Pack Co. for experimental work in develop- \ning the Liberty motor." 663. \n\nHad no personal relation to it whatever. 664. \nDouglas Campbell (Washington, D. C, October 14, 1918; Book 24). \n\nIs a lawyer. His firm, Campbell, Harding & Pratt, represent \nthe J. G. White Corporation. 672. \n\nRecently made a trip to France on behalf of the Bureau of Air- \ncraft Production at the request of the J. G. White Corpora- \ntion. 672. \n\nCopy of his report on the subject of air motor and materials \nshipped to France under United States Government contract, \nNo. 1694, with the J. G. White Corporation. 673-676. _ \n\nImmediate object of inquiry was to ascertain the disposition of \nmaterials which had been shipped and general condition in \nwhich the materials arrived in France, 676. \n\nMr. Chilton\'s statement as to material shipped to France under \nthis contract. 678. \n\nLieut. Hiltz and Capt. Satterfield, of the American Air Serv- \nice, and Maj. Guinard, of the French service, advised him \nwith respect to the satisfaction as the quality of the materials \ndelivered. 681. \n\n\n\nDIGEST OF HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF \nTHE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS. SENATE. \n\n\n\nCol. C. G. Edgar (Washington, D. C, May 29, 1918; Volume I). \n\nA colonel, Signal Corps, United States Army, commissioned a \nreserve captain in Quartermaster Corps, December, 1916. Put \nin charge of construction division, Signal Corps, April, 1917. \n\nOrganized construction division and began project to build \naviation training plants, 54 buildings. Only three existing \nwhen he began this work. Sites selected by board of offi- \ncers. 5. \n\nWork required an architect to get out plans for buildings. \n\nArchitect chosen, Mr. Kahn, Detroit. Completed 10 days. \n\nTraining before Army service shows no airplane-construction \nknowledge. 6. \n\nAutomobile connections. 7. \n\nLocating flying fields, repair depots. 9-11. \n\nEeport of progress on all fields, May 27, 1918. 12. \n\nNo connection with ground flying schools. Formation of same. \n14. \n\nFormation of the construction division, employees, some in uni- \nform, others not. The discipline prevailing. 16-17. \n\nGen. Squier responsible for all moneys and things done in \nSignal Corps. \n\nStatement showing estimated cost of all projects constructed or \nunder construction in the United States up to March 25, 1918, \nand actual cash disbursements. 19. \n\nStatement showing rentals of land to June 30, 1918. 21. \n\nPurchase of land. 22. \n\nList of construction work, showing estimated and actual cost of \neach project as of May 24, 1918. 22-23. \n\nConstruction abroad. 23. \n\nCommitment for construction work, Langley Field, Hampton, \nVa. \n\nAllotments available for purchase of land and construction of \nbuildings in the United States and abroad. 24. \n\nCost of Belleville, 111., field. 27. \n\nBuilding of fields. \n\nSenator Reed, "Do you think there was any waste down there \n(referring to Fort Worth, Tex.), avoidable waste? " \n\nCol. Edgar, " Yes, sir ; I do. I think there has been avoidable \nwaste on every one of these jobs." 28. \n\nSanitary conditions at the fields. 29. \n\nMade first protest to these conditions in January; no action at \nthat time. Protests made to Gen. Squier and Gen. Kinley. \n30-31. J \n\n359 \n\n\n\n360 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nCol. C. G. Edgar \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nThe names of contractors who built the various fields and \n\nwhether their work proved satisfactory. 31-35. \nLangley Field project gave much trouble. Senator Reed, " Did \n\nthe Government lose any money, particularly on that ? " Col. \n\nEdgar, " I think more money was spent down there than was \n\nnecessary; yes." \nJ. G. White, New York, contractor. Also contracted for other \n\njobs. Selected by Aircraft Production Board. 36. \nTestimony showing Col. Deed\'s connection with Mr. Talbott, of \n\nthe Dayton Lumber Co. 37. \nNight flying route, Dayton to Rantoul, 111. 38. \nYery expensive project. One or two flights made each night. \n\nLack of cooperation and system in Signal Corps. 39. \nList of airplane manufacturers. 40. \nName of Construction Division changed to Supply Division. \n\nExperienced trouble with Equipment Division to secure parts \n\nfor damaged planes. Col Deeds head of Equipment Division. \n\n42-46. \nImprovement in Equipment Division when Col. Deeds replaced \n\nby Mr. Potter. Now materials being received. Thinks delays \n\ndue to interior friction in Equipment Division. 49. \nLack of fighting planes now. One hundred and thirteen fighting \n\nplanes, De Haviland, shipped overseas. \nMiami Field built without his authority. Approximately $40,000 \n\nspent. Col. Deeds assumes responsibility for its construction. \n\n" I never knew anything about it until I heard from Carl \n\nFisher that additional work ought to be done. I wired him. \n\nHe said, \' I am building you a field.\' " 50. \nEquipment Division built acetone plants. Million-dollar job. \n\nCould have been done by Supply Division for $60,000. 51. \nUnauthorized construction assumed by commanding officers of \n\nfields without advice from his office. Paid for out of post \n\nfunds, designed for other purposes. 52. \nMemo showing present housing capacity and quarters for en- \nlisted men and officers at all fields. 56. \nTables showing housing capacity Signal Corps camps, fields, \n\ndepots, etc. 54-55. \nRepresentatives of Supply Division sent to fields. Ignored by \n\ncommanding officers there. 56-57. \nLieut. Col. E. Lester Jones (May 29, 1918; Volume I). \n\nA lieutenant colonel, Supply Section, Division of Military Aero- \nnautics, chief assistant to Col. Edgar. \nConstruction of the unauthorized Miami Field and night-flying \n\nfield, Dayton to Eantoul, 111. 58\xc2\xa359. \nCol. Deeds : " I am to blame for this situation, and I am the \n\ncause of the trouble." Miami Field now used successfully as \n\nexperimental station. \nJ. G. White & Co. bought materials and paid freight charges for \n\nGovernment. Used commercial bills of lading in lieu of Gov- \nernment bills of lading. 60-61. \n\n\n\nABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 361 \n\nMr. B. A. Guy (Buffalo, N. Y., June 3, 1918; Volume I). \n\nSecretary and. general manager Curtiss Aeroplane Corporation. \nSix plants. North Elmwood plant built for Government. \nSize of plant. Started August 1, 1917. Operating within 30 \ndays and manufacturing by following October. \n\nEngaged in making planes before United States entered war. \nFive of six plants built after war in Europe began. \n\nFirst Government order was for 600 JN-4B machines, June 27, \n1917. Price $8,000. 65-66. All delivered by November 21. \nThis type used by England. Delivery not hampered by \nGovernment in any way. 67. Prepared to fill this con- \ntract even before Government placed order. 68. \n\nSecond order September 19, 1917, before other completed. 69. \nIncluded 3,000 Spad machines. Had no plans for building \nthis type, but on October 20, 1917, ready to build them; but \norder canceled on October 20 by Government. 71. Failed to \nbuild 500 Caproni\'s; also in second order, due to failure of \nGovernment to furnish blue prints and specifications. 72. \n\nIf Government had placed orders promptly, it would have \nstimulated production in Curtiss plant. Much loss of time \npflu^pcl thpT^pb^ 74- \n\nThird order for 1,400 JN-4D, September 19, 1917. Produced \nby May, 1918. Delays caused by Government due to its \nrequest to build machines so they could be stored ; also manu- \nfacture of certain spare parts given to other concerns and \nwhen order given for certain type of machine Government \ndesired various changes from time to time. 76-81. \n\nCancellation of contract for spare parts. 82-83. \n\nEffort of Government to have Liberty engine installed in Spad \nmachines. 85. \nWilliam A. Morgan (production manager, June 3, 1918; Volume I). \n\nCurtiss Corporation brought in at this point to show cancella- \ntion of Spad contract. 86-91. \n\nCol. Deeds claimed Spad obsolete, but returning officer from \nEurope said, " Well, the Spad machine is not obsolete, because \nit is one of the best types -we have over there to-day." 91. \n\nReasons for selling stock and leaving Curtiss Corporation: In- \nsinuations made he was profiteering, so sold his stock at a \nsacrifice. 93\xe2\x80\x9496 \nMr. B. A. Guy (Buffalo, N. Y., June 3, 1918; Volume I). \n\nDifficulties experienced in manufacturing Bristol Fighter planes \nfor Government. 98. \n\nFailed to receive proper specifications from Engineer Corps of \nGovernment. Much loss of time in production caused. 98-99. \n\nTo stimulate production in plant large orders should have been \nplaced from time to time. 101-102. \n\nNavy contracts for planes. 103. \n\nSenator Reed sums up, " You mean when they gave you the \nblue prints for this machine, and there are necessarily parts \nof a machine that have to be fitted to each other, that in some \ninstance the parts would not fit if made according to the \nplans and you could not assemble the machines." Mr. Guy, \n" That is true." 105. \n\n\n\n362 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nMr. B. A. Gut \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nCurtiss Co. developed high-horsepower machine. Not offered \nto Government for fear of competing with Liberty motor. \n106. \n\nLoss of eight months\' production due to Government\'s insistence \nfor certain motor in one type of plane. 107. \n\nCancellation of contract for Caproni\'s machines. 107-108. \n\nMr. Morgan\'s statement as to finances of Curtiss plant and his \nactivities to secure Government orders. 110. \n\nAssurances made by Secretary of War that Government would \nfinance extension of Curtiss plant. All arrangements made, \nbut officials refused to sign contract. 112-116. \n\nCorrespondence between Curtiss and Government officials. \nGeorge H. Mueller (June 4, 1918; Volume I). \n\nChief engineer Curtiss Corporation. Of German parentage. \nPrevious training before entering employ of Curtiss Co. \n\nTestimony showing reverses made by the Government in decid- \ning what motor and what guns should be used with the manu- \nfacture of Spad plane. Much time lost. 124^128. \n\nAll of his testimony related to the technical construction of \nmotors and types of airplanes. 128-146. \nMr. C. Weber (Buffalo, N. Y., June 4, 1918; Volume I). \n\nProduction manager, Curtiss Corporation. \n\nKeduction in production due to failure of Signal Corps to fur- \nnish spare parts which were manufactured elsewhere and \nshipped to Curtiss Co. to put on machines. 147. \n\nLoss of production due to Government caused employees to be \nidle, but received wages. Probably paid by Government. 149. \nMr. Charles M. Manly (Buffalo, N. Y., June 4, 1918; Volume I). \n\nConsulting engineer and chief inspection engineer, Curtiss Aero- \nplane & Motor Corporation ; 20 years\' experience with airplane \ndevelopment. \n\nMade trip to England and France to cooperate for airplane pro- \nduction. 150. \n\nA plane should be designed to suit the motor. Liberty engine. \n152-153. \n\nTechnical discussion of engines follows. \nMr. James E. Kepperly (Buffalo, N. Y., June 4, 1918; Volume I). \n\nVice president, general manager, director, and member of voting \ntrust. \n\nNot a stockholder. Connected formerly with Willys- Overland. \n\nAnnoyance by Secret Service in Buffalo. Military Intelligence. \n158. \nFrancis Lyster Jandron (Detroit, Mich., June 5, 1918; Volume I). \n\nAssistant secretary Packard Motor Co. \n\nWar work of this company. J. G. Vincent, later colonel of Sig- \nnal Corps, had charge of development of Liberty motor. \n\nStatement of O. E. Hunt, chief engineer of Packard Co., giving \ntechnical discussion of various motors and company\'s activity \nin airplane development. \n\nCorrespondence of president Packard Co. and Col. Deeds show- \ning development of Liberty motor. 169-170. \n\nDifference between Packard and Liberty motors. 173. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 363 \n\nFrancis Lyster Jandron \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nCriticism of Liberty motor. Senator Frelinghuysen\'s statement. \n178-179. Technical criticism follows. \n\nProblem of radiation in Liberty motor. Packard Co. had noth- \ning to do with it and was never asked. \n\nSenator Frelinghttysen. Who is to blame for that? 186. \n\nLack of coordination. 186-187. \n\nMr. Hunt. Contracts were let when there has been no tests \nof the engine in combination with the radiators in the planes. \n187. \n\nChange in system of oiling. 189. \n\nContracts for production given before experiments completed. \n196. \n\nLack of tool makers. Enlisted in Army. " We have 50 men de- \ntailed to us from Camp Custer, and they are drawing the pay \nof soldiers and working alongside of our men who are draw- \ning twice as much." 203. \n\nChanges for the betterment of airplane production. 203. \n\nChanges in Liberty motor directed by the Government. 205. \n\nQuestion of patent rights and royalties turned over to the Gov- \nernment. 205. \n\nCol. Waldron\'s connections with Packard Co. Correspondence \nshowing relationship. \n\nGeneral description of Packard plant. 209. \nMr. Henry Ford (Detroit, Mich., June 6, 1918; Volume I). \n\nGovernment work by his company. \n\nInstallation of special machinery caused delays. \nMr. Ford. And too many experts. 213. \n\nSuggestions to expedite production. 214r-2l7. \n\nBuilding of ships. 220-221. \nMr. R, H. Collins (Detroit, Mich., June 6, 1918; Volume I). \n\nPresident and general manager Cadillac Motor Car Co. \n\nEngaged in making Liberty motors. Thinks Government at- \ntracted expert toolmakers to leave factories. Many officers en- \ntered factories and induced men by promises to enlist. 224. \n\nSuggestions for betterment of the production. 226. \n\nLabor conditions in Detroit. 226. \n\nVarious faults in Liberty motor. \n\nHandling of I. W. W. activity in his plant. 229. \nMr. W. C. Leland (Detroit Mich., June 6, 1918; Volume I). \n\nLincoln Co. formed to take up Government work. Building Lib- \nerty motors. \n\nStatement of why his plant unable to keep up with schedule in \nproduction. 231-235. \n\nOpinion of Liberty motor. 236. \n\nSabotage activity in his plant. 238. \n\nTechnical discussion of motors. \nMr. Charles Fisher (Detroit, Mich., June 6, 1918; Volume I). \n\nOf the Fisher Body Corporation, Detroit. \n\nContracted to build De Haviland airplane. Drawings submitted \nin driblets and held up production. Promised specifications \nand drawings within two weeks. 244. \n\nCols. Montgomery, Deeds, and Waldon made promises. 246. \n\n\n\n364 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nMr. C. F. Kettering (Dayton, Ohio, June 7, 1918; Volume I). \n\nDayton- Wright Airplane Corporation. Succeeded the Domestic \nBuilding Co., of which he was vice president and Col. Deeds, \nwith 40 per cent holdings, was president. \n\nBusiness of the Domestic Building Co. 260. \n\nHis various business connection with Col. Deeds. 261-265. \n\nIncidents leading up to the formation of the Dayton- Wright Cor- \nporation by Deeds, Wright, Talbott, and Kettering. 270-271. \n\nCorporation formed to take up promised Government contracts. \n272. \n\nGovernment sent accountants to check up values in taking over \ncorporation. Method of arriving at realty values. 274. \n\nContract with the Miami Conservancy District for land to build \nthe Wilbur Wright Flying Field. 278-279. \n\nSabotage activity. 280. \n\nContracts to build planes. 282-283. \n\nCause of delays. 283-290. \n\nCompelled to sign the cross-licensing agreement, and the royalty \nwhich was paid included in cost of production. 291. \n\nHis opinion of the Liberty motor. \n\nTwenty-six million dollars of contracts done by this company. \n295. \nMr. John Grier Hibben (Princeton, N. J., June 18, 1918 ; Volume I) . \n\nPresident of Princeton University. \n\nUnited States School of Military Aeronautics. Five such \nschools. Seven hundred students taking seven courses offered. \nUniversity gives instructions to men sent by Government, who \nhas charge of the military instructions. Graduates sent to \nflying schools in United States. Expenses of school, $136,248. \nMr. J. H. Anderson (New Brunswick, N. J., June 18, 1918; Vol- \nume I) . \n\nOf the Wright-Martin Aircraft Corporation. Manufacturing \nHispano-Suiza motors. Operates also a Government-owned \nplant at Long Island. Its financial organization. This com- \npany a beneficiary of the cross-license agreement. 302. List \nof the company\'s officers. \nMr. William Hand (New Brunswick, N. J., June 18, 1918; Vol- \nume I). \n\nAssistant to the sales manager, Wright-Martin Corporation. \nCame to company immediately after letting of first contract. \nList of contracts taken from the Government. 305, 306. \n\nAll contracts let on cost plus basis. Contract states construction \nmust commence 90 days after all details completed. Govern- \nment failed to send all details. Does not know how much time \nwas lost thereby. 307. \n\nConnections of Mr. Houston, formerly of the Curtiss plant. \n\nEmployed only male help. No labor difficulties. \n\nOperated a plant protection department to guard against sabo- \ntage. 310. \nMr. George H. Houston (Somerville, N. J., June 19, 1918; Vol- \nume I). \n\nOf the Wright-Martin Aircraft Corporation. \n\nDetailed account of the contracts let by the Government. 314, \n315. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 365 \n\nMr. George H. Houston \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nDelivering 500 motors each month. Part of plant forced to close \ndown because of receiving no more orders. Contracts nego- \ntiated by a Mr. Fletcher, Bureau of Aircraft Production. Let \non the cost plus and bogy price basis. 316. \n\nSecured right to manufacture this Hispano- Suiza motor from \nFrance and Spain. \n\nHis letter of July 25, 1917, to S. D. Waldon, Aircraft Produc- \ntion Board offering a year\'s output covering contract already \nto supply French with planes and what could be done for \nUnited States Government. 317. Letter in reply. 318. No \ncontract let until October. \n\nFrench representatives of company advises change from geared \nmotors to direct drive. This told to United States officials, but \norder given for geared motors. Months later order changed \nto direct drive. Much time lost thereby. 318, 319. \n\nTheir Los Angeles factory made 50 planes for Government, but \nit proved a bad undertaking due to miserable drawings and \nspecifications submitted by Government. 320. \n\nOffer to form organization to build planes but nothing done. \n320. \n\nFormation of secret service to combat sabotage. 322. \n\nGen. George W. Goethals president of this company before enter- \ning Army. 323. \nMr. L. G. Randall (Plainfield, K J., June 19, 1918; Volume I). \n\nOf the Standard Aircraft Corporation. Built machines and \nspare parts for Government. Only doing Government work. \n\nMany employees discharged because of not receiving more con- \ntracts. \n\nFactory not suitable to build fighting planes. Used most for as- \nsembling. Plant at Elizabeth and at Plainfield both could be \nused in emergency. \n\nStatement of Mr. Thomas Henri Huff giving a discussion of a \nmachine he designed for company with Gnome and Le Rhone \nmotors. 332-337. \nMr. Harry B. Mingle (Elizabeth, N. J., June 19, 1918; Volume I). \n\nPresident, Standard Aircraft Corporation. Capitalization and \nformation of the company. \n\nPlant enlarged for the United States Signal Corps. \n\nFinanced by Japanese concern, Mitsui & Co. Stock owned by \nMingle, given as collateral in favor of Mitsui & Co. 340-347. \n\nPlant making planes for Japanese Government. 347. \n\nList of contracts. 347, 348. \n\nContract for assembling Handley-Page plane. 349. \n\nSignal Corps sent drawings and parts and desire his corpora- \ntion to build plane suitable for Liberty motor and ship same \nto fields and overseas without testing. 351. \n"We canned the idea," Dealings with Mr. Kellogg, Signal \n\nCorps. \n\nSenator Reed. Did you have any previous experience that \nled you to believe that the drawings and blue prints sent by \nthe Government were inaccurate? \n\nMr. Mingle. Oh, yes, sir. It was continual. \n\n\n\n366 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". \n\nMr. Harry B. Mingle \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nSenator Reed. I want to know if the United States officers \nproposed to have you make a machine from parts that had \nbeen assembled from drawings which were sent to you, the \nmachine when completed to be equipped with a Liberty motor, \nand yet that kind of machine had never been tested with a \nLiberty motor in it. \nMr. Mingle. Yes. \n\nAfter this thing was done I made a trip through the Handley- \nPaige plants to which these parts had been assigned, and the \ncondition which I found in those plants was the greatest in- \ndictment against the Signal Corps that I ever saw in my life. \nThere was not anyone who had the least conception, so far as \nI could find out, of what the entire program was. 355. \nWould have saved five or six months if drawings had been \ncompleted. \n\nDe Haviland contract uncomplete. Only one produced. " When \ndo you expect quantity production." "There is not a man \nthat can tell until somebody puts his foot down and says \n\' produce it as it stands to-day and get it out.\' " 357. \n\nRed tape in getting drawings and plans for De Haviland \nchanges. 357. Production entirely prevented. 358. \n\nApplied for sanction to go ahead. No reply. 359. \n\nMore or less freedom in producing Handley-Paige. 362. \n\nNecessary for plant to close down unless more contracts are let \nto them. 362. Orders received; later rescinded. 363. \n\nCompany developed a sample plane under supervision of Italian \nrepresentative of Caproni machine and plans were taken to \nbegin to build them. Given out to another company. 364^-365. \n\nOfficials of company sent to Dayton, found prints for parts of \nDe Haviland 9\'s not ready for production. This told to \nofficials in Washington. Chairman, " Did they seem to be sur- \nprised at your story." " I think they were shocked." 365. \n\nMuch material bought, but contract canceled. Authorized to \nsell material and make claim for difference bewteen cost price \nand price obtained. 367. Authorization given by finance \nsection, who were told that this material could be used by \nother manufacturers in building other types of planes. 367- \n\n368. "That to me is absolutely outrageous." Senator Reed, \n"Have you had other trouble with sabotage besides that." \n[Laughter.] His intention to finally dispose of the material. \n\n369. ; \n\nFeels his company discriminated against. 370. Mr. Ryan visit- \ned other plants but not this one. Col. Deeds only came re- \ncently. Built and tested a " J " machine, but received contract \nfor only 100, while contract for a 1,000 of his company\'s own \ninventive machine given to Fisher Body Co., and 1,000 to \nthe Dayton-Wright Co. 372-376. " Did they, however, state \na reason for not giving these particular contracts that there \nwas any objection on account of the way you were financed." \n\nProgress his company made with Standard " J " plane with \nHispano-Suiza motors. 379-380. \n\nExperience with the Navy has been satisfactory. 381. \n\nNo trouble from sabotage. 381. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 367 \n\nMr. Harry B. Mingle \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n, Liberty motor as good as any. 382. \n\nSuggestion as to placing of responsibility somewhere. 383. \n\nCorrespondence showing condition of airplane production. 384- \n389. \nMaj. Boy S. Brown (Mineola, Long Island, June 20, 1918; Vol- \nume I). \n\nOf Regular Army, Aviation Section. Much experience in fly- \ning with Liberty motor. Engaged in teaching. \n\nTestimony mostly technical, giving- his experience with various \nplanes and motors. Thinks Mercedes (German), Rolls-Royce \n(English), and Liberty (American) best of the motors. His- \npano-Suiza an excellent motor. Spad and German Albatross \nbest planes. \nCapt. Ugo D\'Annunzio (Mineola, Long Island, June 20, 1918; \nVolume I). \n\nCaptain of Italian Army, charge of technical direction of avi- \nation. Chief engineer of the Caproni plant, Milan, Italy. \nConnected with Italian Army since 1910. \n\nHis story of how Caproni became connected with United States \nin building Caproni machines. 406. Came to America con- \nference with Mr. Coffin and Col. Deeds. Sent to Standard \nAircraft Corporation. Plant not adequate to build Caproni. \nAssurances by Mr. Mingle his plant could be enlarged. Gov- \nernment not certain in program to build this machine. Many \nconferences with Col. Deeds, but no decisions. 408. \n\nNecessary to build motor to go with Caproni which used a \nFiat. Impossible to build fast enough in Italy and ship to \nAmerica. 409. \n\nTechnical discussion of Liberty motor. A good one. \n\nCurtiss plant a wonderful one but badly organized. Fisher \nBody plant efficiency superior, but equipment not so large as \nCurtiss. Standard Aircraft Corporation an excellent one but \nsmall. 413-415. \nMr. W. F. Bennett (Long Island City, June 21, 1918; Volume I). \n\nTreasurer Lewis Vought Corporation, Long Island City. His \nplant expects to enlarge and receive some Government con- \ntracts. 419-422. \nMr. George A. Morrison (Farmingdale, Long Island, June 21, 1918; \nVolume I). \n\nProduction manager of Breese Aircraft Co. \n\nGovernment contract for 300 Penquin planes. Production \ntrouble with Lawrence Motor furnished them by the Govern- \nment. 425. \n\nMotor made by the Excelsior Co., of Chicago. \n\nCorrespondence of the company to show defective workmanship \nof Lawrence motor. 426-436. \n\n" We received them from the Excelsior Motor Co., with the \nstamp of approval of the United States Signal Corps on them. \nWe are not supposed to do anything with the motors. 437. \n\nOne-third of the deliveries defective; could be seen with naked \neye, yet they bore Government stamp of approval on them. 438. \n130687\xe2\x80\x9419 24 \n\n\n\n368 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nMr. George A. Morrison \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nBogey price basis. \nMr. Carl Hendrickson (Farmingdale, Long Island, June 21, 1918; \nVolume I). \n\nOf the Excelsior Co. ? Chicago. Sent to Breese plant to look \nafter defects in engines which his company sent to Breese Co. \nTestifies trouble with engines due to bad workmanship. \nShould never have passed Government inspector. 441. \nSecond Lieut. Felice Testoni (Mineola, Long Island, June 21, 1918; \nvolume 1). \n\nOf Italian Army. Special duty to test Liberty engines. Bound \nby agreement not to discuss Liberty motor. 443. \n\nTechnical discussion of motors and planes. 444. \nMr. W. H. Workman (Washington, D. C, June 25, 1918; Volume I). \n\nStatement of airplane production in England and France. 452. \n\nReturned to this country feeling that something was really \nbeing done. " I regret to say that I can not feel we are any \nbetter off than we were six months ago." 452. \n\nProduction of Handley-Page plane and motor. 453. \n\nProposal to Bureau of Aircraft Production on behalf of Mr. \nHandley Page, of England. His interest with Mr. Page. \n454-468. \nMaj. A. C. Downey (Washington, D. C., June 26, 1918; Volume I). \n\nBureau of Aircraft Production. His duties. 469. \n\nConnection with conference on legislation relative to the Air- \ncraft Board. Board desired authority without responsibility. \nDesired Signal Corps to execute contracts and the board to \nhave simply advisory capacity. \n\nHis information regarding letting of contracts. Senator New, \n" Did you agree with all matters relating to the letting of those \ncontracts, either for the planes or the motors? " Incident \nshowing his disapproval. \n\nContract drawn up with Willys-Overland Co. whereby com- \npany was to receive $2,100 per motor if delivered by certain \ntime. If not delivered then, company was to receive $1,950. \nCompany did not make deliveries on time, but Aircraft Board \npassed resolutions to pay them $2,100 because some machinery \ncosting about $25,000 had been installed by them. " The \nGovernment has not any right, and there is not any considera- \ntion for amending a contract where we are to receive $25,000 \nworth of machinery and stand to pay out three-quarters of a \nmillion dollars." 471. \n\nExplanation of basis of letting contracts. Cost plus, etc. \n472-473. \n\nThe contractor receives a fixed profit equal to either 12J per \ncent or 15 per cent of an estimated cost. If manufactured for \nless than estimated cost contractor receives 25 per cent of \nsavings, Government 75 per cent. Dayton- Wright Co. re- \nceived 12J per cent, Fisher Body Co., 15 per cent. 473. \n\nHe approved of supplemental contracts. \n\nGovernment had to amortize North Elmwood plant of Curtiss \npeople. 474. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 369 \n\nMaj. A. C. Downey \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nThe original cross license agreement costing the Government \n$4,500,000. 475. Supplemental agreement cut this amount to \n$2,300,000. 476. Wright-Martin Co. and Curtiss Co. bene- \nficiaries under this agreement. \n\nAircraft Board did not attempt to force corporations to join the \nManufacturers\' Aircraft Association. 477. \n\nFisher Body Co. and Standard people stated they signed cross \nlicense agreement almost under duress. " I did not want to see \nthem join the Manufacturers\' Aircraft Association." "I did \nnot think it was an arrangement which was fair to the Gov- \nernment." 477. \n\nSo far as everything has been brought to his attention, he ap- \nproves of everything in connection with the McCook Field \nproposition. 479. \n\nHow contractors coming to Washington to secure contracts to \nmanufacture airplanes for the Government were dealt with. \n482. \n\nContract with Engle Aircraft Co. for spare parts on the Curtiss \n\ntraining plane. Secretary of War Baker\'s brother connected \n\nwith Engle Co. He resigned because of criticism. Contract \n\ncanceled but renewed upon his resignation. \n\nMr. Frank H. Adams (Washington, D. C, June 26, 1918; Volume I). \n\nOf the New York Times relative to production of Liberty motors \nin the Trego Iron Works. He visited plant because his brother \nwas connected with this company. Production impossible \nthere because of so many changes, 5 to 30 per day, coming in. \n485-487. \n\nCorrespondence showing cancellation and reinstatement. 488. \nMaj. H. S. Beown (Washington, D. C, June 26, 1918; Volume I). \n\nChief of Finance Division, Bureau of Aircraft Production. \n\nHis business activities in civil life, Wall Street. \n\nStory of the organization of the Finance Division. 493. General \nmemorandum No. 30 gives general function of his section. \nNumber of personnel employed. 495. \n\nComplaints of Standard Aircraft Corporation gone into. Sum- \nmarizes Standard Corporation\'s condition (a) as being result \nof lack of management, (b) lack of accounting system, (c) \nlack of money. 496-498. \n\nDealings of Finance Section with Curtiss people. Lack of ac- \ncounting in this company. 499. \n\nDealings with the Day ton- Wright Corporation. 500. \n\nAdvanced $11,900,000 to the Curtiss people to relieve their finan- \ncial difficulties. 501. \n\nGovernment took a mortgage secured by notes, also furnished \n$2,000,000 worth of materials to them. 502 ; \n\nGovernment placed a controller in the Curtiss office. Found a \nmisstatement as to liabilities. 502. \n\nDailv statement, Curtiss Airplane & Motor Co., of June 19, \n1918. 503. \n\nKelation between Finance Division and the Spruce Production \nDivision. 504. \n\n\n\n370 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nMaj. H. S. Brown \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nCorrespondence relative to the litigation between Wright Co. \nagainst the Curtiss Airplane Co. with reference to cross \nlicense agreement. 505-506. \nMaj. Frank E. Smith (June 26, 1918; Volume I). \n\nCharge of approvals and appraisals section, also chief executive \nofficer in charge of field forces of the Finance Division. His \nbusiness activities before entering Army. Connected with \nautomobile industry. 507. \n\nHis duties with the approvals and appraisals sections. 508-509. \n\nTrouble in securing sufficient personnel to do the work at hand. \nCommissions held up from two to five months. 510. \n\nDivisions of the approvals department and functions of each. \n511. \n\nThe procedure adopted of letting contracts, thinks Government \ninterests are fully protected. \n\nFinance section pays salaries to civilians, quartermaster pays \nofficers. Salaries of some contractors too high and only part \nof salary is being paid until a proper salary return can be \ndetermined. Examples, Mr. Mingle, $62,000; Mr. Talbott, sr., \nand Mr. Kettering, $35,000 each; Mr. Talbott, jr., $30,000. \nMany of these men do not give full time to government work. \n514-516. \n\nContractors have failed to give full details of cost of spare \nparts because it would enable the Government to fix future \ncontracts. 516. \n\nLetter prepared for Department of Justice showing a record of \ncosts and changes in the Liberty motor. 517-518. \n\nMethod of arriving at cost of producing De Haviland. 519. \nAgreed upon $3,525.21, but contract contained original \nbogey price of $7,000. \n\nCost of Le Ehone motor. Found estimated cost to Government, \n$3,375.81. Bogey price placed at $5,500. 520. \n\nStatement showing savings effected by Finance Division in their \ncontracts. 523. \n\nFriction between Finance Division and contractors, confined \nmostly to manufacturers of planes, not motors. Concerted \naction of plane manufacturers through agency of Manufac- \nturers Aircraft Association caused friction. 524. \n\nThinks because of labor difficulties and because none of the prod- \nucts are standardized that cost-plus contract is best form to \nadopt in lieu of fixed price which the manufacturers desire. \n525. \n\nHow enlisted men detailed as toolmakers in Detroit were paid \nextra. 526. \n\nAdvances by the War Credits Board to the Lincoln Motor \nCo., amounting to $6,500,000. \nMaj. Charles B. Rose (June 26, 1918; Volume I). \n\nReserve Corps officer detailed to aid and help in production \nat the Standard Aircraft Corporation at Elizabeth, K J. \n\nHis judgment as to chief cause of the failure of production. \nStandard plant has six different types of planes varying widely \nin design. Causes inefficiency in plant, Another cause is failure \nof smaller company to develop an organization to carry on \nquantity production. 529-530. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION". 371 \n\nMaj, Charles B. Rose \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nThinks personnel of Signal Corps not efficient to handle work. \nVascillation og Government engineers in making changes \nmakes organization in plants difficult. 530. \n\nFour agencies in Washington in control of production causing \nduplication of work. 531. \n\nEnglish or Italian methods of producing could not be used \nin American plants. \nRichard Henry Depew, Jr. (Washington, D. C, June 29, 1918; \nVolume I). \n\nAn aviator received license certificate to fly from a French \nschool, 1911. Devoted much time to studying airplanes and \nflying. Connected with Curtiss people at Buffalo plant. \n\nTechnical discussion of Bristol planes. Thinks Liberty \nmotor too heavy to be installed in this plane. \n\nWeaknesses found in Bristol. 538. \n\nSuggestions for improvement of this plane, but "tendency was \nto take suggestions only from Dayton and to give very little \nconsideration to the suggestions from the Curtiss test pilots." \nThis was the main reason that I resigned from the company. \n544. \n\nDoes not like the Bristol machine. 545. \n\nA plane should be designed for the motor. 547. \n\nLiberty motor can not be used except in two-seater machine. \nJohn H. Davis (Washington, D. C, June 29, 1918; Volume I). \n\nAn aviator holds license, but had no instructions. Took it up for \nfun of it. 548. \n\nEmployed by Government as civilian instructor. \n\nConditions prevailing at Kelly Field, San Antonio. No tools \nwith which to work. Men discouraged. " The few tools that \nwere in the hangars appeared to be of no better quality than \nthose purchased at a 10-cent store." 549. \n\nHis handling of the men. 548. \n\nIncompetency of officers: Speaking of Maj. Ferron, Col. Chitty, \ncommanding officer at the field, said, " he would not have the \nmajor in his office at $10 per week." Engineer officer also in- \ncompetent. \n\nPhoned to Washington to Gen. Saltzman of conditions there. \nHe was surprised. Later Col. Chitty relieved. 550. \n\nRecommendations. 551-555. \n\nFailure to receive spare parts. 557. \n\nAccidents at Kelly Field. \n\nLater transferred to Gerstner Field. Found conditions there \nworse than at Kelly. Made suggestions about things which \nwere inexcusable. Officer in charge of field, Kirby, said : " Do \nyou think vou can come over here now and run this field ? " \n560. \n\nIncidents leading up to his discharge. 560-562. \n\nSenator Thomas : " Mr. Davis, you have given us some very \nvaluable information, and we are very much obliged to you \nfor it." \n\n\n\n372 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nMr. William F. Parish (Washington, D. C, July 5, 1918; \nVolume I). \n\nChief of the oil lubrication branch, supply section, Bureau of \nMilitary Aeronautics. Mechanical engineer specializing in \nlubrication for 23 years. His connections in civil life. 563. \n\nWork for Government to conduct tests and write specifications \nof the oil to be used on the aeronautics engines of the Signal \nCorps. 564. \n\nUse of castor oil as lubricant for airplane engines. 564. \n\nPicking of expert men at various fields to look after lubricant \nwork on the planes. Satisfactory reports received from these \nmen as to progress of the work. 566. \n\nThe fields lack good mechanical engineers. " There does not seem \nto be a single practical experienced engineer in a position of \nauthority among the officers operating these flying fields." \n567. " Due to fundamental weakness in the organization of \nthe War Department." \n\nMany of our flyers not mechanically inclined, yet can operate \nmachines. \n\nMany fields so disorganized that the work of maintenance and \ncare of machinery could not be systematized. Matter of lubri- \ncation has been systematized now in all but seven fields. 569. \n"At Kelly Field, San Antonio, there were a number of new \nplanes of a value of nearly a half million of dollars ruined \nin a very short space of time due to a lack of care." 569. " I \nhave records covering a lack of maintenance of equipment \nfrom a great majority of the fields." 570. \n\nWhy mineral oil was used in place of castor oil. 570, 571. \n\nLetters showing ability of Mr. Parish. 573. \n\nCorrespondence to Senator Thomas showing misunderstanding \nbetween Mr. Parish and Mr. Acheson as to lubrication of air- \nplane engines. 574, 579. \n\nLetter from Engineer officer, Aviation School, Fairfield, Ohio, \nindorsed by C. O. and then sent to Chief Signal Officer at \nWashington, complaining of troubles at the fields. Followed \nup by telegrams. 580, 582. \n\nDifficulties experienced at Wilbur Wright Field, Dayton. 583, \n589. \n\nOfficial test of De Haviland. 592, 595. Most technical. \n\nTestimony of Lieut Tabuteau, inserted here for the record. \nTaken at Fairfield, Ohio. A technical discussion of planes \nand motors. 596, 598. \nCorrespondence about purchasing auxiliary flying field at Fair- \nfield, Ohio. 598,601. \n\nLetters to the Fisher Body Corporation from Government offi- \ncials asking them to sign the supplementary cross-license \nagreement. Inserted here for the record. 604, 608. \nJames S. Douglas (Washington, D. C, July 8, 1918 ; Volume I) . \nConnected with Red Cross work in France. Returned to United \nStates June 11, 1918, and at that time only the Liberty motors \nwere beginning to arrive in France without American planes. \nOnly the motors. 609, 611. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 373 \n\nMaj. Cushman A. Rice (Washington, D. C, July 9, 1918 ; Volume I). \n\nEnlisted in Aviation Corps. Later commissioned after taking \ncourse in flying. Took and commanded four American squad- \nrons to England and then to France. \n\nSquadrons attached to British flying squadrons on the front. \n\nUsed entirely British equipment. 616, 617. " The Americans \nthat were operating in my sector were all equipped with Brit- \nish machines. Of course, as I say, that was under a contract \nwith the Royal Air Force." 617. Our men had been trained \nwith British equipment. \n\nHis story of incidents of the war. 618, 619. \n\nDiscussion of various types of British airplanes and how they \nare used on the front, 619, 623. " English very cautious in \nmanufacture. They take their war pilots over and do all \ntheir experimenting under war conditions, as far as possible, \nand they do it very thoroughly. They send one set of pilots \nafter another over. Usually when the British service passes \na machine, it is a pretty serviceable machine when it comes \nout to the front," very few changes necessary. \n\nHis opinion of Bristol and Spad: a I do not think the building \nof the actual frame for carrying an engine is any wonderful \nengineering feat." 626. \nMr. Leo J. Perrette (Washington, D. C, July 9, 1918; Volume I). \n\nEmployed as Army inspector at the Willys-Morrow Co., Elmira, \nN. Y., which were making spare parts for the Government. \n\nNoticed practices which were detrimental to the interest of the \nGovernment. Incident given where inspectors of the company \nwere not permitted to report defects to the inspectors repre- \nsenting the United States Government, 630. Other incidents \nof bad practices. 631. When he went to this company for \nemployment before entering Government service, the company \nwere about to remove the man who had the job, I found out \nlater that the company held he was holding up production. I \ninquired into it and found out that in one certain \xe2\x96\xa0 instance, \neven after the Army inspector on duty had passed a case, this \nfellow at one time had gone around and even after the Army \ninspector and held that case. 632. \n\nSenator New. Do you think that there is at the Willys motor \nplant something of a systematic effort to get those defective \npieces passed by the inspectors ? Let me cite you this : K-211 \nmagneto brake stud, 3,000 were rejected for the first two or \nthree threads being stripped. The same pair was returned \nto the Army inspection room three times on three separate \ndays. 634. \nMaj. Cushman A. Rice (Washington, D. C, June 9, 1918; Volume I). \n\nTechnical discussion of the testing of motors for certain planes. \n637-641. \n\nStory of how machines on the front now operating in the matter \nof bombing. 641-645. \n\nSuggestions as to improving aviation service on the front. 646. \nHas never flown in any American combat planes and never \nsaw any on the front. Not likely to have seen any in his sec- \ntor on the front. 647. Never saw Liberty motor operated. \n\n\n\n374 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nMaj. Cushman A. Rice \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nRather have opinion of flyer who has fought on the front than \none from a technical engineer. 648. \n\nHis story of accidents at fields. 648-649. \nMr. Henry Woodhouse (Washington, D. C, July 11, 1918; Vol- \nume I). \n\nMember of board of governors, Aero Club of America. Activity \nof the club to promote aviation before the war. The club\'s de- \nsire to secure speed in airplanes was criticized by many Army \nofficers. 652-653. \n\nFirst suggestion is to have 40 per cent replacements per month \nto the aviators on the front. Army has not kept up this pro- \ngram. 653-655. \n\nNext, proportion of destruction per month is 100 per cent. 656. \n\nEditor of two magazines. 657. Photographs bought from the \nCommittee on Public Information attempting to show Amer- \nican planes on the front revealed they were not American \nplanes, but French. 658. \n\nCablegram to the Aero Club of America from American training \nfields in France complaining of idleness among American avi- \nators due to lack of machines and equipment. 660. \n\nStatement prepared by Mr. Woodhouse for the Senate committee \nto show his connections with the aeronautic movement and his \nopinions and conclusions regarding the future. 661-663. \n\nAt the suggestion of Mr. Eugene Meyer, jr., War Industries \nBoard, wrote an article giving the most important aspects of \nthe present Allied aeronautic situation. 664^693). \n\n(a) What the Allies expect to get from United States in air- \n\ncraft. \n\n(b) What United States promises to do aeronautically. \n\n(c) Sending of untrained aviators to France caused criti- \n\ncism that United States taxing Allied manufacturing \nfacilities. \n\n(d) What United States must send to Allies to prevent criti- \n\ncism in case of Allied reverses. \n\n(e) Our present aeronautic plans. \n\n(/) What Germany is planning to do to meet our program. \n(g) Mr. Coffin\'s report regarding status of aircraft build- \ning program. 661\xe2\x80\x94668, these seven items. \n\nNumber of aircraft and motors to train 10,000 aviators needed \nfor one year\'s fighting. 671-674. \n\nPartial list of airplane and parts manufacturers. 674. \n\nMotors being manufactured in United States. 675. \n\nSuggests best results obtained by giving orders for completed \nairplanes and motors to firms already engaged in manufac- \nturing them and let them contract for parts. 677. \n\nLarge amount of machinery now idle could be used. 677-678. \n\nSufficient material in United States to complete program in 12 \nmonths. 678-680. \n\nSuggestions of solving problems that may arise to retard carry- \ning out of program. 684-691. \n\nShipping facilities to ship planes. 694-695. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 375 \n\nHenry Woodhottse \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nCare of the aviators. 698-699. Many aviators equipped from \nprivate funds. So many of them could not supply all. Com- \nplaint made to Washington, letters from Gen. Squiers\'s office \nsaying they would receive equipment on other side, but letters \nfrom officers on other side shows they were not getting them \nover there. 701-708. \nMaj. Rice (Washington, D. C, July 12, 1918; Volume II). \n\nTable showing more or less number of planes that have been \noperated and used successfully by the British during four \nyears of war, in order to give committee an idea as to what \nmachines have given the best results. 709-710. \nThomas A. Hill (July 12, 1918; Volume II). \n\nA patent attorney. Testimony shows how Government may be- \ncome involved by cross-license agreement. 710-715. \nMr. John A. Jordan (Washington, D. C, July 15, 1918; Volume II). \n\nEngaged in constructing airplanes for Government. Engaged \nin this work before entrance of United States in war. \n\nConnected with Andermat Aeroplane Co., of California. He \nand president of this company came to Washington to solicit \ncontracts with Government. Cols. Deeds and Waldron told \nus flatly we could not get a contract. All companies had been \nchosen. 718. \n\nHis reasons why Government should place contracts with Pacific \ncoast concerns. Finally secured contract. Wright-Martin \nCo. were being paid $1,000 additional for building planes in \ntheir Los Angeles plant. Should not have been done. 718- \n719. \n\nNecessary for his company to secure certain supplies from the \nEast. Waldron and Deeds said " You can not depend upon \nus; we have all we can do ourselves." \n\nLieut. Farwell, Deeds\'s confidential man, " You will have to join \nthe association, the Aircraft Association." Reference to the \ncross-license agreement. 720. \n\nSent to Buffalo to secure plans and specifications from Curtiss \npeople. Were told you have to pay $240 and also 1 per cent \nadditionl to Curtiss people for use of plans and specifications. \n720. \n\n" Waldron gave Curtiss Co. all the information as to price, etc., \nof my contract, which was supposed to be confidential." 721. \n\nReceiving of bad prints and drawings from the Curtiss Co. \n722-723. \n\nConference with Col. Montgomery about cross-license agree- \nment. Refused to pay Curtiss $75,000 royalties. 723. \n\nRefused to sign cross-license agreement and were unable to se- \ncure small parts from Curtiss people while other manufac- \nturers were getting them. Appealed to Washington, as shown \nin correspondence. 729. \n\nLater I resigned from company because of lack of internal har- \nmony. Superintendent of our factory, who took my place, \nimmediately " swayed the Government inspector boys so that \nthey passed everything and went out to the scrap pile and \nbrought in everything." Reported this to Washington. 730. \n\n\n\n376 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nEdouard de Billy, acting French high commissioner, and Col. \nTulasne and Lieut. Henri Marqttisan, of the French high com- \nmission (July 15, 1918; Volume II). \n\nTheir commission cooperating with United States to relieve air- \nplane construction in France by stimulating production in \nthe United States. Technical discussion of planes and mo- \ntors. Thinks very highly of Liberty motor. Regarded so by \nthe French. 730-739. \nCol. H. H. Arnold (Washington, D. C., July 16, 1918; Volume II). \n\nAssistant Director Bureau of Military Aeronautics. \n\nOnly acted as " step-in " at the conference. Hearsay. Experi- \nmenting and testing was transferred from Langley Field to \nMcCook Field, Ohio, because of lack of transportation of \nmachines, etc., " Personally, I think that could be done down \nthere (reference to Langley Field, Va.). 743. \n\nEailroad runs into Langley Field, and possible to fly from \nthere to Washington and not from Washington to McCook \nField. 744. \n\nMcCook Field too small for safe testing, not an ideal place \nfor flying. "I do not see why they selected such a small \nfield." 745. \n\nHas seen water over the McCook Field. 746. \n\nCost of Wilbur Wright Field, $2,804,632. Cost $700,000 for \ngrading. Table showing cost of fields and buildings, etc., on \ndifferent flying fields. 748. \n\nShipment of 425 airplanes up to July 12. 750. Up to June 1 \nno American planes used on the front. Up to July 1 200 \nhad been sent to front, but practically no use made of them. \n752. \n\nThinks De Haviland and Bristol machines as made in this coun- \ntry not satisfactory to fly in. 753. Compass used is worth- \nless. " Our production people improved on it to such au \nextent that they made it worthless." 753. \n\nDelay in receiving reports of testing machines. Asked pro- \nduction department for them in December, 1917, but first \ntest in April, 1918, yet production of De Haviland went on. \n755-756. Gen. Pershing\'s report by cable as to efficiency of \nDe Haviland 4. Motion passed by Senate Committee asking \nWar Department for copy of this report. 757. \n\nMachines more carefully tested before shipped overseas after \nthis cable. Gen. Kenly\'s orders. 758. \n\nDefects of design in putting cloth. Col. Semple\'s recommenda- \ntions. Not carried out. 759. \n\nAsked production board for tests on Bristol. Never completed. \nCloth failed and machine demolished. Mueller\'s report of \ntest for Curtiss plant different to Government\'s test. 761. \nMueller\'s only estimated tests. Submitted to Government \nand asked for their opinion. No reply. 761. \n\nTest of Hispano-Suize. 761-762. Varied in their tests. We \nreported not satisfactory for use at front. 762. " Well, we \nare not getting anywhere." \n\n" An automobile engineer can not design aeroplanes." Col. Vin- \ncent charge of all production. An engine builder and he \npasses on both planes and engines. 763. Production can not \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 377 \n\nCol. H. H. Arnold \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nstart until tests approved by Gen. Kenly of Bureau of Aero- \nnautics. Thinks this system detrimental to aviation program. \nThis program started by Deeds and Montgomery. 763. \n\nRequest of Bureau of Aeronautics for braces on De Haviland. \nNever put on any machine by production people. 764. His \nsuggestion for remedy is to put one man at head of all avia- \ntion, both military and production side. 764. There is a \nlack of authority. " There is no authority." \n\nReason for discarding Hall-Scott engine: In hot weather ma- \nchine burns before plane can reach ground. 766-767. \n\nInvestigation of causes of accidents. Studied from many \nangles. Average one fatality for every 2,900 hours flying. \n768. French and British averages show higher rate. \n\nCollisions in the air. Precautions taken at Park Field, Mem- \nphis, Tenn., yet collisions occurred. 769-770. Due to eager- \nness of new students to look around in the air without look- \ning where they are going. Very few accidents due to de- \nfects in machines. 770. \n\nStatement regarding inspections at the fields. Facilities for \nrepair work and quality of workmen at the fields. 771. \n\nTelegrams showing cancellation of Spad contract with the Cur- \ntis plant. 772. \nLieut. Col. V. E. Clark (Washington, D. C, July 16, 1918 ; Vol. II.). \n\nWith the technical section in the office of the Director of Mil- \nitary Aeronautics, Gen. Kenly. 773. \n\nWent to Europe on a commission to negotiate with foreign \nGovernments as to production of airplanes in United States. \nAlso to secure available data concerning development of air- \nplane designs in England, France, and Italy. Made report \nto Gen. Squier\'s office. Recommended three types of British \nplanes, two of French, and one of Italy. \n\nTypes of machines recommended. Technical discussion of \nmotors follows. 775. \n\nDesigned a Bristol of the English models and his design turned \nover to Curtiss people. 779. \n\nFailure to produce due to lack of coordination between heads \nof various departments. Necessitated changes in drawings, \netc. 780. \n\nHis recommendations not carried out. After year, War De- \npartment thinking of making a type of machine, Martinsyde, \nwhich he recommended. "Lack of confidence in me." 780. \n\nWe have no two-seater fighter in production now. I recom- \nmended Caproni triplane for night bombing work. A year \nhas passed and nothing done. 781. Either Handley-Page or \nCaproni could be used. Latter better, but not enough to \nwarrant any delay in production. Both should not be made \nbecause of spare part difficulties. 781. \n\nAttempted to do development work while in command at \nMcCook Field. 782. Ordered away. Heard indirectly his \nwork there unsatisfactory. Col. Deeds appointed him and \nalso removed him. 784. Had come to Washington and sit \nathis right hand to advise him on basic policies. " I have \ndone no useful work since January." 784. \n\n\n\n378 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nLieut. Col. V. E. Clark \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nOur failure to produce more successful service machines. "I \nthink it was a matter of vacillation on the part of those in \nauthority about what to build." " They seem to have confi- \ndence in no one present, or they did not appoint a board whose \ndecisions they were willing to abide by * * *." Secured \nservices of many successful business men and when they came \n"no one man knew what his job was and no one could find \nout what his job was." 785. \n\nCancellation of Spad contract. 787. \n\nSuggestions for the bettering airplane production system. 788, \n789. Creation of a board constituting permanent president \nand secretary and three actual flyers every four months who \nhave seen service at the front. \n\nRemoval from command at McCook Field came one month after \nsome criticism he made on the De Haviland 4, built by Day- \nton-Wright Co. 790. \n\nNotes from Mr. J. D. Perrhrs diary concerning contraction of \nBristol Fighter redesigned by him for the Liberty motor. \n791-795. \n\nFeatures of delays in Curtiss Co. in not getting results out of \nM. Ellwood factory. 795. \n\nMcCook and Langley Fields controversy. 795. \n\nCopy of Col. Clark\'s memorandum to chief signal officer about \nhis recommendations from Europe relative to airplane pro- \nduction. 799-808. \nMr. Glenn M. Tait (Washington, D. C, July 16, 1918; Volume II). \n\nInspector for the Government at Thomas Morse Aircraft Cor- \nporation, Ithaca, N. Y. \n\nMany parts passed that he had rejected. Made complaint to \nchief inspector. Inspection sacrificed for production. 810. \nMr. Hamm stated " that he could not hold them too close or \nhe would not have production." 811. \n\nHe was asked to resign, which he did. Incidents to show his \nrequest for transfer and which resulted in his resignation. \n812-814. \nMr. John A. Jordan (Washington, D. C, July 17,1918; Volume II). \n\nStatement reaffirms his testimony taken previously about the \ntrouble he experienced in securing blue prints and small parts \nfrom the Curtiss people, dealing with Mr. Morgan, particu- \nlarly Mr. Guy, because he would not sign the Cross license \nagreement to pay Curtiss people $75,000 royalties on his con- \ntract with the Government. \n\nBefore he refused to sign agreement everything was lovely. \nMr. Curtiss himself told him he could have anything. Later \nMr. Curtiss was not in authority and Mr. Guy refused to give \nhim anything. Came to Washington and complained. Mr. \nCoffin said, " That is too bad. I do not see any necessity for \npaying those fellows anything. I will see that you get the \nblue prints." 818. \n\nReturned to Curtiss plant at Buffalo with Mr. Montgomery, \nattorney for the board, but did not secure original prints, \nwhich were given him before he told them he would not sign \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 379 \n\nJohn A. Jordan \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nagreement, but was given old prints, which he could not pro- \nduce with. 819. \n\nMaj. Emmons, commander at Mather Field, complained of re- \nceiving machines with bad defects. 822, 823. \nMr. A. A. D. Lano, of Great Britain (Washington, D. C, July 17, \n1918; Volume II). \n\nCame to United States. A manufacture of propellers for air- \nplanes. \n\nHad letter of introduction and offered services to United States \nGovernment in May. Not accepted, so went to Canada, \nwhere he received a contract. His plant to make propellers \nat Long Island, N. Y. \n\nIn August sent for by Maj. Charles E. Sligh, charge of pro- \npeller purchasing and production. Asked if he could pro- \nduce propellers and inquired how he was financed. Told to \ngo to Grand Rapids, Mich., to meet some bankers. These \nbankers turned out later to be the Sligh Furniture Co. \nRefused to go as he had made arrangements with New York \nconnections about finance. Nothing then heard from Maj. \nSligh. 829. \n\nContract with Navy to make propellers and was experiencing \ntrouble in having carload of lumber come through from the \nWest; appealed to Maj. Sligh; received no assistance; corre- \nspondence. 830-834. \n\nOnly one complaint about character of the work for the Navy, \nwhich was an experimental propeller and did not amount to \nmuch. 835, 836. \n\nDiscussion of kinds of wood to be used in propeller. " The in- \nspection in this country at the moment is extremely lax * * \xe2\x96\xa0 ** \nAll sorts of people are making propellers, and are making \nthem cheaply, and they would not stand inspection." Signal \nCorps would say, " Yes ; but the Lang Co.\'s prices are too \nhigh." Propeller must stand enormous strain and can not be \nmade too cheaply. Thomas Morse Co. buy their propellers \nfrom his company. \n\nHistory of the wood used in making propellers. Black Ameri- \ncan walnut used, but as supply became short used Honduras \nmahogany, but drain on this became enormous; necessary to \nlook for another type of wood. Only recently the tanguile \nmahogany from the Philippines was tested and found O. K. \n837. \n\nMr. Williams, representing Army as lumber expert, refused to \nlisten to him in recommending this type, but Navy said, " We \nare delighted to hear of it." Williams connected with a firm \nbefore entering Army which controlled mahogany, Honduras. \n839, 840. \nLieut Col. T. H. Bane (Washington, D. C, July 17, 1918; Vol- \nume II). \n\nSignal Corps. His reasons for present situation in aircraft pro- \nduction. Lack of organization and lack of proper aeronauti- \ncal engineering ability. 842. \n\n\n\n380 ABSTEACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nLieut. Col. T. H. Bane \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nMen who fly should be the designers ; now being done by the Bu- \nreau of Production, which has done nothing but copy de- \nsigns. Has allowed latitude in making changes. Incidents \nof overloading which caused many fatalities. 843, 844. \n\nInvestigation into Bristol Fighter. Many accidents. Kecom- \nmended as a member of board to stop production on this ma- \nchine. 845. \n\nWeights of engines given and possibilities of carrying the mili- \ntary load. 846-848. \n\nDe Haviland 4 not entirely satisfactory as the British De Havi- \nland 4, because of different motor used. 850. \n\nNo prospects for improvement in aircraft production. 853. \n\n" A great deal of time is being devoted to testing freak models \nof airplanes and producing such machines without consulting \npeople who could almost at a glance state that such a machine \nhas no part in the military program." \n\n" You can eliminate two- thirds of them on paper by standards \nthat everyone knows about except the Production Division." \n853. \n\nSuggestions for improvement of the situation. One head of the \nAir Service. \n\nFollow the British system of making changes. Wrote a memo- \nrandum to the Production Division telling them of the British \nsystem. The reply was it was interesting. 854. \n\nIncidents to show how United States system works. 855. \n\n" I think we are worse off than we were six months ago;" refer- \nence to the production situation. 855, 856. \nMaj. B. Q. Jones (Washington, D. C, July 17, 1918; Volume II). \n\nA practical flyer, connected with the Department of Military \nAeronautics. Loaned to Production Division; as he was do- \ning nothing asked Gen. Kenly to transfer him back. Types \nof training machines ordered against wishes of flyers. 857. \n\nIn the arrangement between production department and Bureau \nof Military Aeronautics no one to decide on technical engi- \nneering matters. 859. \n\nTrouble in production ; no responsibility given or allowed young \nflyers, only because they are too young. No competent men \nin charge of production. 859. \n\nLeave questions to men who have been in the air, and not those \nwho know nothing about it except as they have picked up \nfrom books and from a study on the ground. 859, 860. \n\nShould follow the British system, which leaves entire engineer- \ning under the control of the actual flyers, and production \npeople build what they are told. 860. \n\nAccident to Bristol Fighter on last Monday due to overloading. \n860, 861. \n\nSent to France and found Americans using antiquated machines \npurchased from the French, that were discarded by them a \nyear and a half ago. 862. \n\nTechnical discussion of planes and motors for various uses. His \nopinion as to what machines should be used. 862-865. \n\n\n\nABSTBACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 381 \n\nMaj. Harold S. Martin (Washington, D. C, July 18, 1918; Vol- \nume II). \n\nDepartment of Military Aeronautics. Sent to France to look \ninto designing of aeroplanes upon request of chief of Air \nService, American Expeditionary Forces. 867. \n\nWent with a board and made recommendations which were ap- \nproved in principle by cable from Gen. Pershing. 868. \n\nRecommended nine types of machines for production in 1919. \nOnly steps to carry out his recommendations sent a commission \nabroad to get the drawings and sample of these machines. 868. \n\nTypes of planes being built in this country. 869. \n\nAs member of board recommended production of Bristol fighter \nto be stopped. \n\nDe Haviland built in this country not equal to British De Havi- \nland. \n\nRegards reports made on testing of machines with suspicion. \nFinds variance in the testing from Col. Vincent\'s report. \nTheir tests not as good as the colonel\'s. 870-871. \n\nOne thousand two hundred Standard J-I machines cost $6,500 \nfor plane and $2,500 for engine being stored away and further \ntraining in them abandoned. 871. Trouble with the engine \ncause for abandonment. Hall-Scott motor used. \n\nFunctions of Department of Military Aeronautics. 872. \n\nAdvises the Bureau of Production what is desired for different \ntypes of machines. Production Department builds samples of \nmachines and submits them to Department of Aeronautics, \nwhich then determines whether they are satisfactory. Thinks \nProduction Department should have men who can definitely \ndecide whether or not a machine should be made. At present \ncan not do this. There should be one head of the Air Service. \n873. \n\nLittle organization in Production Department. No mistake \nmade if we follow the British system. \nMaj. Frank E. Smith (Washington, D. C, July 18, 1918; Volume \n\nRecalled to give information about Government\'s plan to pur- \nchase fields for testing. \n\nDay ton- Wright Field used by Day ton- Wright Co., but Govern- \nment pays expenses by way of rental for that field. \n\nLease executed whereby Dayton-Wright Co. secured property \nbelonging to Morain Developing Co., of which Col. Deeds is \n25 per cent stockholder. 875. \n\nLease made in name of Dayton- Wright Co. so it could be entered- \ninto the cost in the cost-plus contract with the Government. \nReceived 15 per cent on the cost. \n\nPrepared memo to Mr. Potter protesting against this policy and \nurged that all such contracts for leasing property should be \nmade in the name of the Government. 876-877. \n\nThis memo prepared because Mr. Talbott wrote in to go ahead \nwith the field. Matter now under consideration by the Gen- \neral Staff. 879. \n\nAmount of money spent on various fields. 880. \n\n\n\n382 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nSergt. Alexander Klemin (Washington, D. C, July 18, 1918 ; Vol- \nume II). \n\nM. S. E., 807 Aero Squadron, McCook Field, Dayton, Ohio. Is \nin charge of aeronautical research department." Previous ex- \nperience. 881. \n\nEelation of airplane engineering to production. Main work at \nthe fields is getting the English design and turning it into an \nAmerican proposition; we get English drawings and adapt \nthem to Liberty 12. 881. \n\nThinks technical engineers who understand stress on the machines \nand balance of parts ought to be given a very large part in the \nproduction. 884. \n\nTestimony as to his birth, etc. \n\nInsertions made here for the completion of the record. Testi- \nmony of Mr. Mois H. Avram in behalf of the Wittemann-Lewis \nAircraft Corporation, of Newark, N. J. Letter to Senator \nThomas inclosing letter from the secretary of this corporation \nto Mr. Evan, chairman Aircraft Production Board. 887-895. \n\nCopy of Mr. Avranrs letter to the New York Times, May 2, 1918. \n895-898. \nMr. Mois H. Avram (Washington. D. C, July 18, 1918; Volume II). \n\nConnected with the Slocum, Avram & Slocum Industrial Engi- \nneers, of New York. Their business being to investigate and \nreport to financial men on production and otherwise. \n\nInvestigated the Wittemann-Lewis Corporation and found them \nto have engaged in aircraft business for 12 years. Made elabo- \nrate report for the Production Board about this corporation. \n\nWittemann-Lewis people could not deliver this report to the Gov- \nernment. Officials, so asked Mr. Avram. \n\nCame to Washington and secretary insisted that Col. Deeds in \nconference and could not see him. I waited in the hall for \nthree days until I recognized Col. Deeds, and this was the only \nway I delivered this report. Said he would look into it and \ndeliver it to Mr. Shepler. 900-901. \n\nBut nothing came of it, no work being given to this corporation. \nLater saw Lieut. Farwell, Shepler\'s assistant. " The minute \nI mentioned the name of Wittemann, Farwell said, \xe2\x96\xa0 That is a \nlemon.\' " 901. \n\nFinally agreed to send an inspector to this plant. He came and \nmade a report and still nothing came of it. \n\nFinancing of Wittemann-Lewis Corporation. Mr. Avram did \nnot feel at liberty to divulge how corporation was financed. \n902, 903. \n\nInsertion for the record. Mr. Wittemann\'s testimony. 903-906. \nMr. Paul W. Wittemann (Washington, D. C, July 18, 1918; Vol- \nume II). \n\nTreasurer of Witteman & Lewis Aircraft Corporation, Newark, \nN. J. Corporation engaged in making aircraft since 1906. \nIts activities. * \n\nJust after war was declared, this company completed a training \nmachine as a result of a request made by the Signal Corps \nOctober 16, 1916. " They requested us to develop a machine \nafter which they promised to give us business." 907. \n\nWould order 20 if we would build a machine which would fly \nsuccessfully from our factory to Mineola. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 38& \n\nMr. Paul W. Wittemann \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nThis was built and Government notified that the machine was \nbeing flown by Mr. Alan Adams. The flight was O. K. and \nour plane remained at Mineola subjected to bad weather with- \nout shelter for 30 days. Government refused to give them a \ntest. 908. \n\nMr. Scott of our company went to Washington to try to secure a \ntest of the machine. Promise given that orders would be \nissued to the commanding officer at Mineola to make test, but \nnothing ever done. Curtiss people and experts came there \nand made photographs and inspected it. 909. \n\nOur machine transferred to camp, now known as Camp Mills, \nwhere it received a severe and thorough test. \n\nMr. Scott spent all summer in Washington trying to secure Gov- \nernment contract. 910. Since this machine had made 300 \nflights we asked if it would be better to wait and test one of the \nnew machines which were then being built. Government re- \nplied it would. Then they notified us that no new types would\' \nbe considered; that they had decided on the Curtiss and: \nStandard. \n\nLater they said they would not consider any plant unless it\' \ncould produce 500 to 1,000 planes per year. We made progress \nto take over Stevenson plant on strength of this statement, and \nnothing came of it, so we asked assistance of Senator Freling- \nhuysen. Copy of letter to Senator Frelinghuysen. 912-914.. \n\nContract for 300 spare parts given us. 9,14. Letter to Senator \nFrelinghuysen. Were to receive blue prints for spare parts \nfrom Curtiss people. Same trouble of the cross license agree- \nment arose that other corporations had had. Correspondence \ninserted into record showing this. 915-919. \n\nPromised they would be given work when further appropria- \ntions made. Never received any. \n\nWe inquired if Government was allowing or letting contracts \nconcerns other than those who were not producing the program \n500 planes per year. " They answered that they did not wish \nto discuss these things with us." 920. \n\nLetters to Senator Thomas showing dealings with Mr. Potter. \n921. \n\nThere was a feeling that we had a prejudice against the Air- \ncraft Board. Matter thrashed out ; Capt. White said it was a \nmisunderstanding on the part of the Aircraft Board and that \nthere was absolutely no reason or plausible excuse why we \nshould not get contracts. 923. Copy of Mr. Avram\'s letter to \nMr. Coffin. 924, 925. \n\nHis company on the list to become a member of the Aircraft \n\nManufacturing Association relative to cross license agreement, \n\nbut since our last year\'s business or present contracts did not \n\namount to $100,000, we were excluded. 925. \n\nMaj. Gen. William L. Kenley (Washington, D. C, July 20, 1918; \n\nVolume II). \n\nChief of Military Aeronautic Department. Keasons for being \ncalled as a witness. 927. \n\n130687\xe2\x80\x9419 25 \n\n\n\n384 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nMaj. Gen. William L. Kenley \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\n" Found organization when turned over to me rather messed up." \nMade changes in the heads of departments. Took a trip \naround the preliminary schools to get idea of how things were \ngoing on. Impressed with both training and advanced schools, \nyet there was a lack of coordination, one school accentuating \non one thing, another another thing. Attempted to stand- \nardize. 928. \n\nReasons for stopping training with Hall- Scott motor. Loss \nabout $6,000,000 to Government and knew there would be \ncriticism, yet many accidents and deaths were due to the im- \nperfection of this motor. It was unreliable. \n\nThere was also a slowing down of production and thus justified \nin stopping this training. Cause of accidents due to careless- \nness among the flyers. \n\nSlowing down of production due to cancellation of French con- \ntracts due to our failure to ship raw materials to France and \nour lack of advanced trained pilots. 931. \n\nAmerican method of inspection at fields before planes are \nflown. 932. \n\nHis statement of Gen. Pershing\'s cable report to not ship any \nmore De Havilands overseas until they had been inspected in \nthis country. 933. \n\nAbandonment of the program to build Bristol Fighters. Will \nsecure data regarding the cost of this program and what \nGovernment lost -by its abandonment. 934-935. \n\nSpad a very good machine. Ordered to be built, but canceled \nbecause Gen. Pershing cabled that this program be cut out. \nHis reasons why this program was abandoned. 936. \n\nRelative to American machines on the front, " We have not any \nadvice that they are flying any." 937. Have not produced \na single two-seater fighter that is upon the battle front at \nthis time. 938. \n\nOne billion dollars expended or obligated, and only small num- \nber of machines sent over. 939. \n\nBelieves at the outset we should have adopted one or two of \nthe more advanced planes of Italy, France, and England, and \ngone ahead and produced them with so much experimenting \nwith new motors, etc. 939. This was done by Italy. \n\nCause of delays was that Gen. Pershing\'s cable reports would \nbe referred to production departments before Gen. Kenly \nwould see them, causing much confusion. 941. \n\nHow the work is carried on between Mr. Ryan\'s department \nand his department. 942-943. Thinks there should be estab- \nlished a separate department of aeronautics. 943. \n\nFriction between the Navy and War Departments. 494. \n\nProgram now is to approve anything requested by Gen. Per- \nshing. Cables in my office show that one day one thing is \nasked for, next day cable comes in canceling that, and a \nweek later another cable comes in asking for the thing re- \nquested in first cable. Entirely a jumbled affair. 945. \n\nHas nothing to do with the inspections at the plants, but Mr. \nRyan has assured me that every inspector will be an expert. \n947. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 385 \n\nMaj. Gen. William L. Kenley \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nMethod of producing and testing the Liberty motor. 947. \n\nChoice of Fields. Why Wilbur Wright Field was chosen and \nMcCook Field given to production testing. If selection had \nbeen left to me I would not have chosen Wilbur Wright Field. \nPlan to do in case of a flood. 949. \n\nLetter to Senator Thomas from Department of Military Aero- \nnautics showing equipment of American air squadrons at the \nfront. 950. \n\nInsertions for the completion of the record. \n\nReport of Senator Frelinghuysen on the Aero-Marine Plane \n& Motor Co., Keyport, N. J. 951. \n\nMemo prepared by Bureau of Aircraft Production containing \ninformation as to the general causes of delay and the specific \ncauses of delay. 951-956. \n\nOpen letter of Mr. W. H. Fauber, Brooklyn, N. Y., to Mr. John \nD. Ryan, Chief Aeroplane Production. 95-966. \nMr. John A. Jordan (Washington, D. C, July 23, 1918; Volume II). \n\nRecalled. His former statement was that there was much cor- \nrespondence between Liberty Iron Works, of Sacramento, \nCalif., and Aircraft Production Board. Shown telegram \nfrom Mr. Henderson, of this company, saying there were no \nletters or correspondence concerning the contract for 300 \naeroplanes awarded them. " There is voluminous correspon- \ndence." Does not know why Henderson sent such a tele- \ngram. 967. \n\nPresentation of written statement prepared giving fuller in- \nformation relating to this contract. 968-974. \n\nHow he came to Washington, finally secured a contract with \nthe Government for his company, the Liberty Iron Works, \nhis difficulty with the Curtiss people in securing blue prints \nand small parts because of the Cross license agreement; how \nhe was given bad prints, etc. ; trouble experienced in getting \nsmall parts, and when they did arrive he was compelled to send \nthem back, etc. ; how friction arose in his own company which \nresulted in his resignation ; how the new manager carried on the \ncontract, using parts that had been rejected on inspection; \ncontract finally canceled. \nMr. Walter D. Sayle (Washington, D. C, July 23, 1918; Vol- \nume II). \n\nPresident and general manager Engle Aircraft Co., Mies, Ohio, \nwhich company was organized from the partnership of En- \ngel, Patterson & Baker, the Baker being a brother to Secre- \ntary of War Baker, about January, 1917, and was incorporated \nin August, 1917. 974. \n\nCapitalization of the company. 975. \n\nCompany was given contracts for spare parts, but public criti- \ncism both in Washington and throughout the country in the \npress caused Mr. Baker to resign as president of the corpora- \ntion. 976. Sold completely out for $15,000, part being for \ncash put into company and for services. \n\n\n\n386 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nMr. Walter D. Sayle \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nHow corporation bought out Engel who was making a flying \nboat. Baker and Patterson furnished money, Engel furnish \nthe technical brains, his machinery, and flying boat. 977. \n\nAfter resigning, Mr. Baker\'s only interest in the company was \nto come to Washington with Mr. Sayle to advise Mr. Sayle \nin matters with the Government. \n\nHis company never signed cross-license agreement, but placed \n$2,500 with Curtiss people to secure blue prints, etc., of which \n$2,000 was refunded. 983. \nCapt. Riley Scott (Washington, D. C, July 26, 1918; Volume II). \n\nOriginally in the Regular Army, a graduate of West Point, \nand through friendship of Lieut. Selfridge and the Wright \nbrothers became interested in airplanes and resigned from \nArmy and specialized on the airplane, particularly the role \nas a bombing plane. \n\nWent to Europe in 1911 and 1912 to compete for Michelo prize. \n986. \n\nOffered services to France and England when war declared. \nEntered United States Army, and as such was employed \nas an aeronautical mechanical engineer with especial concern \nwith bombing. 986. \n\nTechnical reasons why he made report on De Haviland that it \nwas unsuited for bombing and combat fighting. 987. \n\nTechnical discussion of the American De Haviland in comparison \nwith English De Haviland follows. 987-996. \nNaval Constructor J. C. Hunsaker (Washington, D. C, July 27, \n1918; Volume II). \n\nRegular Navy Service. American-made aircraft delivered to \nthe Navy so far has been satisfactorily operated on our coasts, \nbut has not been in operation long enough in France and \nEngland to know what changes should be made. 997. \n\nBecause of request from the Marine Corps for ground flying \nmachines, we secured from Signal Corps of the Army part of \ntheir first delivery of De Havilands. All but four shipped to \nFrance, the four being sent to Miami, Fla., training school \nfor testing. Testing there showed defects in workmanship, \nminor defects which developed while flying them. Can be \ncorrected, not fundamental defects. 998. \n\nNature of the defects. 999. \n\nUncertain what to do with the 100 crated machines for France. \n1000. \n\nShown a photograph and technical discussion follows of various \nparts of airplanes. 1001, 1002. \nMaj. H. C. K. Muhlenberg (Washington, D. C, July 30, 1918; \nVolume II). \n\nCommanding officer testing department, Wilbur Wright Field. \n\nDiscussion of the De Haviland 4. Giving changes made in the \nBritish De Haviland, producing photographs, etc., carrying \nweights, etc. 1006-1014. \n\nThe American-built Bristol machine. Approves of its rejection \nand does not think it is a fit machine as made in this country. \nAssembling shows grossest kind of carelessness. Defects cov- \nered up. Built by the Curtiss plant. 1015. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 387 \n\nMaj. H. C. K. Muhlenberg \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nInspection at Dayton-Wright plant. Their inspectors and Gov- \nment inspectors have opportunity to see each step that is \ntaken in the machine from the time it is laid out until it is \ncompleted. Failure to see these defects indicates grossest \nkind of carelessness or conspiracy. 1017. \n\nRecords showing criticism of the De Haviland 4. 1022-1026. \n(a) Criticisms of his office. 1022. \n\n(h) Letter from testing department, Wilbur Wright Field. \n(c) Gen. Pershing\'s cable report. 1024-1026. \n\nEven other changes than those suggested by Pershing must be \nmade before the plane is satisfactory. 1027. \n\nThinks there should be created a division of aeronautics. 1028- \n1029. \nCapt. R. W. Schroeder (Washington, D. C, July 30, 1918; Vol-, \nume II). \n\nEntered Army because of previous experience in aviation. Em- \nployed as aeroplane mechanic in Franco-American Aviation \nCo., Chicago, 111. 1030-1031. \n\nWas present during testimony of Maj. Muhlenberg and agrees \nwith everything said by him. 1031. \n\nShows from photograph an incident to substantiate Gen. Persh- \ning\'s report of a defect. 1031. \n\nDoes not think De Haviland machine fit to send to the boys at \nthe front. 1033. \n\nNotices poor workmanship in work turned out by Dayton- \nWright factory and the woodwork turned out by Curtiss plant \nunsatisfactory. 1033. Lieut. Foote says, "I think I would \nbe very safe in saying that every pilot at our field, without \nexception, is very leery of these machines." \nLieut. John M. Foote (Washington, D. C, July 30, 1918; Vol- \nume II). \n\nFormerly an automobile mechanic ; entered Army ; and graduate \nflyer of the school at Memphis. \n\nList of machines he has flown. 1035. \n\nEntertains the same distrust as expressed by flyers at Dayton- \nWright Field about the De Haviland 4. Heard testimony of \nMaj. Muhlenberg and Capt. Schroeder, and agrees with them. \n1035. Thinks the machine is wrong in design as well as pro- \nduction. \n\nCriticism of the plane for bombing purposes. Not suitable also \nas a fighting machine. Mounting of guns on the De Haviland \n4 would make absolutely useless. Thinks machine should be \nrelegated for all purposes that he knows of. Can not say \nabout reconnoissance purposes. 1037, 1038. \nMaj. C. K. Reinhart (Washington, D. C, August 1, 1918; Vol- \nume II). \n\nCommanding officer, First Provisional Squadron, Hazelhurst \nField, Long Island, N. Y. A practical flyer. List of machines \nthat he has flown. 1039. \n\nReceived eight De Haviland 4\'s at his field for defense of city \nof New York. Before testing they were mounted with guns \nand bombing devices. Tested it for speed and climbing, and \nfound structural defects. 1040. \n\n\n\n388 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT IISITESTIGATION. \n\nMaj. C. K. Reinhart \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nEnumeration of defects which developed in the testing. 1040- \n1042. Another shipment of De Havilands came to his field \nand many defects developed after two or three hours of flying. \n1042, 1043. \n\nDoes not think, as an expert flyer, that this machine will stand \nthe severe service tests. Made reports to Washington; does \nnot know what happened to his reports. Only 8 of 20 of his \nofficers will take a chance to fly. 1044^1045. \n\nThinks one who goes up in De Haviland and had to do battle \nwith a German machine would be at a disadvantage. 1045. \nCapt. J. H. Kelley (Washington, D. C, August 1, 1918; Volume II). \n\nCharge of the fighter flight, including the De Haviland, at \nWilbur Wright Field, Fairfield, Ohio. Saw service at the \nfront. List of machines he has had experience with. 1046. \n\nEnters into discussion of the technical side of machines, particu- \nlarly the American and English De Havilands. \n\nLeft France June 27, 1918, and to his knowledge knew of no \nAmerican planes in France. 1052. \nCapt. Charles C. Johnson (Washington, D. C, August 1, 1918; \nVolume II). \n\nCharge of scout flight at testing department, Wilbur Wright \nField, Ohio. \n\nTransferred from the French Army to the United States Army \nin France. Entered French Army in 1915. 1053. His service \nat the front, 1054. \n\nNever flown the De Haviland, but from a little inspection of it \non the ground thinks it has weak points. Confirms defects \nthat others have testified to. Outline of the defect. 1054r- \n1057. Thinks defects can be remedied, but the machine never \ncan be made a combat machine. 1057. \n\nThinks it can be used for reconnoissance and photo work. \n\nPrevious to leaving France saw no American combat planes in \nuse at the front. 1058. \nLieut. Frank W. Wells (Washington, D. C, August 1, 1918; Vol- \nume II). \n\nA pilot in scout flight at Wilbur Wright Field. Was with the \nFrench Army at the front and was transferred to American \nArnry January, 1918. Came to the United States July 1, 1918. \n1059-1060. \n\nNever flown at the field. " There have not been any machines to \nfly in the scout flight, with the exception of one, and I did not \nthink that was fit to fly, so I did not fly that one." 1060. \n\nEeference made to Standard M Defense. Defects. \n\nNo experience with the De Haviland except to observe it. Saw \none American De Haviland in France. At first flyers liked it, \nbut now they will not do any stunts with it. 1061-1062. Does \nnot think De Haviland can ever be made a combat plane. \nMay be used for photo work and possibly directing artillery \nfire. 1064. \n\nHas never seen an American-built plane used on the front. 1064. \n\n\n\nABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 389 \n\nNaval Constructor J. C. Hunsaker (Washington, D. C, August 2 r \n1918; Volume II). \n\nRecalled to testify about 100 De Havilands which the Navy had \ncrated for shipment to France and were being held up because \nof the defective workmanship on four of the same lot which \nwere tested at Miami, Fla. Decided to refuse to accept them \nand returned them to the Aircraft Production Board of the \nArmy, who agreed to give them other later models, which they \nwould guarantee. 1067-1068. Fifty of them did go to France. \n\nDiscussion of the defects. 1068-1070. \n\nSteps taken to patch up the 50 sent to France. Men sent to \nFrance for this purpose. 1071-1072. \n\nMarines in France need airplanes. Does not know how steps \nwill be taken to prevent the use of these 50 machines, but \nthinks full information as to the defects will be sent. 1072. \n\nNo trouble -with other contracts with the Army for other types \n\nof planes. Most of their airplane work done separately from \n\nthe Army either by contract with other concerns or in the \n\nnaval shops themselves. 1073. \n\nCapt. N. E. Irwin, United States Navy (Washington, D. C, August \n\n2,1918; Volume II). \n\nDirector of Naval Aviation. Program of the United States \nNavy in building aircraft, etc. All satisfactory except the \nHall- Scott motor, which they stopped using. 1076. Ones \nalready secured patched up, but abandoned all production of \nfurther Hall-Scott motors. 1076-1077. \n\nTestimony about the De Haviland which the Navy received from \nthe Army confirms Naval Constructor Hunsaker\'s testimony \nconcerning the defects in the 4 tested at Miami, the 50 sent to \nFrance, and the taking back by the Army of the 100. 1078- \n1079. Letter to Senator Thomas from Secretary Daniels in- \nclosing report of the defects discovered in testing the 4 De \nHavilands at Miami, Fla. 1079-1080. \n\nInsertions for the record: Letter to Senator Thomas from Maj. \nH. S. Brown, Chief of Finance Division, showing the loss in \nthe cancellation of Bristol contracts. Loss, $6,482,000, with \ndeduction for salvage. 1081-1082. \nMr. Wm. C. Potter, Assistant Director, Bureau of Aircraft Produc- \ntion (Washington, D. C, August 6, 1918 ; Volume II) . \n\nStatement of Gen. Pershing\'s request for 25,000 planes, with \naccessories, spare parts, guns, etc, by July 1, 1919. \n\nHis request included planes for various purposes. He did not \nrecommend a particular type of plane for its particular pur- \npose, but he desired us to develop the planes intended for a \ncertain purpose. 1083-1085. \n\nWith exception of two foreigners who have come to America, " I \npersonally do not know of an airplane designer in this country \nthat I think has had the experience close to the front and in \ncontact with the military necessities who is capable of design- \ning by himself a successful battle plane." 1085. \n\nHow Mr. Pomelio, of Italy, one of the above exceptions, came \nto this country. 1085-1086. \n\nHis statement as to the responsibility for the failure of the \nBristol Fighter machine. 1087. \n\nTechnical discussion of engines for this machine. \n\n\n\n390 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nMr. Wm. C. Potter \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nEffort to induce Aircraft Board to adopt the " Sunbeam," was \nbefore his connection, but he investigated a little of it. His \nstatement regarding it. Found it not powerful enough to put \ninto the Bristol plane, 1088-1089. \n\nSums up to say, " the faulty design and construction of the \nBristol Fighter was due entirely to a lack of detailed knowledge \nof aeronautical design on the part of the men who had the \nmatter in hand." 1090. \n\nMany changes made in the original design, but thinks failure \nwould have been greater if original design had been used. \nAlso bad workmanship. 1090. \n\nProgram now for observation planes. The planes being used. \n1091-1093. \n\nProgram for day bomber. 1093. \n\nProgram for night bomber. 1093-1091. \n\nTaking up discussion of the De Haviland 4. Program for 1,000. \nAbout tOO on the way to France. Cable a week ago says that \nnone had reached the front, no reason being given. 1095. \n\nPrevious report of defects in the De Havilands shipped over, but \nthese latter planes sent over with the same defects. 1096. \n\nHis testimony confirms other testimony about the tests of the 4 \nDe Havilands which the navy officials made at Miami, Fla. \n1097. \n\nNo favorable report ever made on the testing of the De Havi- \nland. 1097. \n\nNo more De Havilands similar to those turned over to the Navy \nor those already shipped abroad will be turned out until all \nthe defects reported have been made. 1098. \n\nSending of Col. Hall over on July 16 to look after the defective \nDe Havilands which had already been sent over. His state- \nment concerning Mr. Hall. \n\nCan not answer when we are able to put an acceptable machine \nof American manufacture in actual combat on the front. 1099. \n\n" The machine that is to be satisfactory to the Department of \nMilitary Aeronautics has yet to be built." 1100. \n\nStatement of obligations and net expenditures of aircraft pro- \nduction and Signal Corps appropriations as of May 31, 1918, \nand July 31, 1918. 1101. \n\nIncident of Capt. de Annunzio coming to America. " Mr. de \nAnnunzio has not been marooned anywhere." " I take excep- \ntion to it. He has been given every facility that the United \nStates Government offers to develop his machines." 1102. \n\nImpossible to get the services of the right kind of aeronautical \nengineers to come, because of salaries. 1103. \n\nCongress has not denied to grant a single power but one relating \nto the press, and why not get these men? 1103. \n\nMen coming from France and Italy now upon invitation. \n\nCriticism of the work made by Senator Reed in his questions \nput to Mr. Potter. " These gentlemen who have been pro- \nducing this work will fare just as well in dollars and cents as \nif they had produced first-class work." Mr. Potter, "They \nwill." 1106. \n\nNot satisfied with the inspections. Men not competent. 1106. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 391 \n\nC. W. Nash (Washington, D. C, August 8, 1918; Volume II). \n\nAssistant to the director in charge of engineering and produc- \ntion Aircraft Production Board. President Nash Motors Co., \nand entered into present service at request of Mr. Ryan. \n\nStatement of the efforts which were made to have him come. \nUpon invitation, made investigation, and found that the sit- \nuation was so badly handled that I declined conference with \nCol. Mixter in Chicago and meeting Mr. Ryan in Detroit. \nFinally, put up to me that I could not retain my self-respect \nwithout doing something. 1108. \n\nAfter receiving assurance from Mr. Ryan that I could set or- \nganization up as I saw fit, I accepted the proposition. \n1108-1109. \n\nFound that the organization was in an impossible shape. His \nproposition to have technical section, engineering section, and \nproduction department under one head. 1109. \n\nNew engineering department to be formed. Does not know if \nthe men responsible for past blunders will be discharged. \nCol. Vincent will be retained under his direction. 1110. \n\nDe Haviland 4 only machine to be on front in short time. De- \nliveries on them suspended, however, for 10 days. \n\nConfirms statement about deliveries to France and to the Navy \nof the defective De Havilands even after receipt of Gen. Persh- \ning\'s cable report of defects. 1111. \n\nCorrections of these defects now being considered. 1113. \n\nNo production of a 300 horsepower or thereabouts going on \nnow. Not until January 1. 1113-1114. \n\nThinks De Haviland an average machine for bombing, but not \na fighter machine. 1114. \n\nThinks that all talks to newspapers about the Liberty motor be- \ning a cure-all for everything should be stopped. Liberty mo- \ntor has not been tested and no plane should be pronounced a \nsuccess until it has been tried in every conceivable situation. \n1115. \n\nMr. Ryan\'s speech, " Fifty thousand motors have been ordered \nfor them (meaning the boys on the front) and that the new \nmotor (referring to the Liberty motor) was worthy of the \nhighest praise." This impossible. 1116. \n\nThinks if 10,000 planes sent over by July 1, 1919, it will be a \nmiracle. Only De Havilands sent over until January 1, 1919. \n\nMr. Ryan, Mr. Landon, nor Mr. Nash had previous experience \nin airplanes. A new profession in this country. HIT. \n\nHe must have authority. Expert men coming from Europe to \nadvise. 1118. \n\nStatement concerning the Caproni incident the coming over \nof De Annunzio to assist in production of Caproni. 1120- \n1121. \n\n" The policy is going to be to no longer try to plug round holes \nwith square plugs, but to put round plugs into round holes." \n1122. \n\n\n\n392 ABSTKACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nC. W. Nash \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nIncidents brought out in testimony about the Witteman-Lewis \nCo., and Mr. Lang, who offered to make propellers, etc., \ndirected to Mr. Nash. 1123-1124. \n\nNot throughly acquainted with Cross License Agreement, but \nsays, "We are at war, and I think aircraft licensing or any- \nthing else that you may call it should be waived, and we should \ngo out and build the best planes at the best places, and get \nthem to France at the quickest possible moment." 1125. \n\nThinks it would be suicidal for Government to take over plants \nand operate them. 1125. \n\nDiscussion as to contracts and what should be done about the \nStandard plant with its Japanese financial backing. 1126. \n\nQuestion of installing fire protection in the plants. 1127. \nNewton D. Baker, Secretary of War (Washington, D. C, August 9, \n1918; Volume II). \n\nDoes not know if there is any combat planes on the front at this \ntime. 1129. \n\nDoes not know that airplanes with defects were sent across after \nreceiving Gen. Pershing\'s cable reporting defects. 1130. \n\nDoes not agree with others that it will be January 1, 1919, before \nwe have a combat plane on the front. 1130. \n\nGen. Pershing\'s cable says : " Planes sent here must be inspected \nand thoroughly tested before being shipped." Does not think \nit a grave error not to comply with this request. 1131. \nHis statement regarding this follows. \n\nDiscussion of the War Department\'s declination to give the \ncommittee the reports from Gen. Pershing. These highly con- \nfidential, says Baker. 1134. \n\nReading of Official Bulletin conveying wrong information as to \nprogress being made in aircraft production. Is it not time to \nhave Mr. Creel stop this? 1137-1140. \nJohn D. Ryax, Director of the Bureau of Aircraft Production \n(Washington, D. C, August 13, 1918; Volume II). \n\nPrevious business activity. Nothing to do with aircraft. \n\nIs in dual capacity. Chairman of Aircraft Board and director \nof the bureau. 1143. \n\nMembers of the Aircraft Board. Col. Deeds and Col. Montgom- \nery have been detached and are not now serving on the board. \n1144. \n\nTakes up the personnel of Bureau of Aircraft Production and \ntheir previous training, the work of this bureau, etc. 1145- \n1149. \n\nRelation of the Equipment Division of the Signal Corps. 1149, \n1150. \n\nExpenses. $350,000,000 already expended. Commitments outly- \ning will absorb rest of $640,000,000 appropriation. Now ask \nCongress for additional $1,032,000,000 to carry them until \nJune 30. 1152-1155. \n\nWhen he took charge, thinks advancement on elementary-train- \ning planes were entirely satisfactory. Backward, however, on \nadvanced-training planes. 1155. \n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. 393 \n\nJohn D. Ryan \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nHis statement about the progress on the production of the Bris- \ntol Fighter. 1156-1159. \n\nTechnical discussion of motors and planes follows. 1160, 1161. \n\nSenator Reed : "As a matter of fact, we have not a single Ameri- \ncan-made fighting machine anywhere, have we ? " "I think \nthat is true," replied Mr. Ryan. 1162. \n\nCancellation of the Spad contract. Can not criticize, since he \ncame in months afterwards. 1162, 1163. \n\nStatement concerning the De Haviland 4 contract. 1165, 1169. \n\nLieut. Farwell sent to France, and he made tests of the De Havi- \nlands, and it was his findings that Gen. Pershing\'s cabled re- \nport was based. 1166. \n\nProduction not canceled, but orders given that changes must \nbe incorporated before any more sent out from factory. \n\nIntends to continue producing De Haviland 4 until the De \nHaviland 9 can be produced. Does not consider the weight of \nopinion is that this is a dangerous machine. 1170. \n\nDeeds, Montgomery, and Waldon have nothing to do with Air- \ncraft Production Board. Col. Vincent has nothing to do with \nmoney expenditures or making of contracts, but is retained for \nhis technical advice. 1171, 1172. \n\nMen connected with factories having contracts with Govern- \nment may be called in for advice, but they have no connection \nwith the board. 1173. \n\nHis statement relative to the conditions he found in the West \nrelative to spruce situation. 1174. \n\nPrevention of fire at factories. 1175. \n\nReceived information last three days that De Havilands were \nflying satisfactorily ; that three squadrons had gone up to the \nfront. This information brought back by Maj. Brett. He \nreturned from production department overseas to secure parts \nand accessories. 1177, 1178. \n\nProduction after 1st day of September, 30 machines a day; \nafter October 1, 50 machines each day. Production of other \nplanes. \n\nCapabilities for climbing, etc., given by Mr. Ryan, relative to \nthe De Haviland. Senator Reed. " I can not understand those \nfigures in connection with the ones that we have been given. \nThey are utterly irreconcilable." 1179. \n\nInformal discussion of secret documents. " I can not put those \nin the record." \n\nDifference between a combat and fighter plane brought out. \n1180. \n\nHandley-Page plane. Inference from a request by the British \nfor us to send them Liberty motors is that we could not build \na plane around the Liberty motor. 1182. \n\nProduction on this plane. 1182-1183. \n\nCaproni has not been tested sufficiently to go into production. \n1184-1185. \n\n\n\n394 ABSTRACT OF AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION. \n\nMr. Ryan \xe2\x80\x94 Continued. \n\nSenator New takes up the record of the testimony of Capt. Kelly \nconcerning the De Haviland 4 with Mr. Ryan. Takes up the \nstatements also of Maj. Muhlenberg. Mr. Ryan\'s comments. \n1186-1188. \n\nRecord of expenses. Expenditures amount to $334,236,363.50. \nCommitments amount to $764,115,582.09. \nMaj. G. H. Brett (Washington, D. C., August 16, 1918; Volume II). \n\nCame into Army through Philippine Scouts. In cavalry branch \nplaced in aviation temporarily from October, 1915. Sailed \nfor France October 29, 1917, after taking course in flying. \nContinuous overseas\' service until last Sunday. \n\nDuties over there, chief of the materiel division of the supply \nsection of the American Expeditionary Forces. \n\nHis flying of machines, the types, etc. 1192-1193. \n\nUnderstood before leaving three squadrons fully equipped ready \nto go to the front. 1193. \n\nChanges that were made in these planes. 1194. \n\nHow the Liberty motor was received in France. Officer who \nhad tested English airplanes said, " It was the sweetest and \nmost responsive motor we have for training and it was one of \nthe easiest handled machines that he had ever driven." Criti- \ncized by the French. 1191^-1195. \n\nMany knockers on the other side. Accidents in this plane. Not \nas numerous in proportion to the other planes. 1196. \n\nWhat he has picked up from hearsay and observation of the \nDe Haviland. Taking up the testimony and record. Per- \nshing\'s cablegram, etc., with Maj. Brett. His comments. \nMostly technical discussion of the defects. 1198-1208. \n\nIn reply to Senator Reed\'s question that we were using the De \nHaviland 4 for want of a better machine, he answered in the \naffirmative. 1209. \n\nTaking up with Maj. Brett the record of the testimony of Maj. \nMuhlenberg and Capt. Kelly. Maj. Brett\'s comments. 1210- \n1216. \n\nMemorandum showing the approximate number of airplanes \nreceived from European sources to July 31, 1918, by the Air \nService, Supply Division, American Expeditionary Forces. \n1218-1219. \n\nMemorandum showing the number of squadrons in operation \non the front. 1220-1221. \n\nSays the French have not lived up to their part of the contract \nwhen asked about Gen. Kenly\'s testimony that production had \nslowed down with our contracts with the French because of \nour inability to send them raw materials. 1221-1222. \n\nSenator Frelinghuysen presented statement showing the status \nof program contracts. 1224\xe2\x80\x941226. \n\n\n\no \n\n\n\n; \n\n\n\n'